/doceo

[...]

... findet sich dort kein einziges Wort. Diese Resolution liest sich als Aufruf zum totalen Krieg. Die EU verfolgt eine irrationale Politik und hat sich seiner Meinung nach längst von einem Friedens- in ein Kriegsprojekt verwandelt.

Der genaue Text dieses Beschlusses, der mit 595 Pro- bei 137 Gegenstimmen und 47 Enthaltungen, angenommen worden ist, befindet sich in der Beilage dieses Newsletters. Übrigens, von den österreichischen Fraktionen haben ÖVP und Neos dafür, FPÖ dagegen gestimmt, SPÖ und Grüne haben sich der Stimme enthalten.

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-10-2024-0028_DE.html

Ich möchte bei dieser Gelegenheit auf einen hoch interessanten Kommentar des deutschen Historikers und Friedensforschers Leo Ensel verweisen, welcher bereits vor der Beschlussfassung des EP bei der Schweizer Plattform globalbridge publiziert worden ist. Auch dieser artikuliert das völlige Unverständnis über die beim politischen und auch medialen Mainstream in #Europa vorherrschende kriegsunterstützende Haltung. Die Aufforderung nach konkreten Initiativen für einen baldigen Waffenstillstand und Friedensverhandlungen wird bereits vielfach als “Putinversteherei” diffamiert, obwohl sich ganz offensichtlich immer mehr EU-Bürger*innen dafür aussprechen.

▻https://globalbridge.ch/apathie-und-schockstarre-warum-bleiben-die-aengste-vor-einer-ausweitung

*Crise migratoire : le bilan mitigé des accords passés par l’Union européenne pour limiter les entrées sur son sol*

Réunis en conseil jeudi et vendredi, les Vingt-Sept devaient faire le point sur la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE. Mardi, la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, a proposé de conclure de nouveaux partenariats « sur mesure » avec le #Sénégal, la #Mauritanie et l’Egypte.

Malgré la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, qui s’est imposée à leur ordre du jour, le sujet de la migration demeure au menu des Vingt-Sept, qui se réunissent en Conseil européen jeudi 26 et vendredi 27 octobre à Bruxelles. Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement doivent faire un point sur la dimension externe de cette migration et la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne (UE). Depuis janvier, le nombre d’arrivées irrégulières, selon l’agence Frontex, a atteint 270 000, en progression de 17 % par rapport à 2022. Sur certaines routes, la croissance est bien plus importante, notamment entre la Tunisie et l’Italie, avec une augmentation de 83 % des arrivées sur les neuf premiers mois de 2023.

Si le #pacte_asile_et_migration, un ensemble de réglementations censé améliorer la gestion intra européenne de la migration, est en passe d’être adopté, le contrôle des frontières externes de l’Europe est au cœur des discussions politiques. A moins de huit mois des élections européennes, « les questions de migration seront décisives », prévient Manfred Weber, le patron du groupe conservateur PPE au Parlement européen.

Nouveaux « #partenariats sur mesure »

Mardi, dans une lettre aux dirigeants européens, Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, a rappelé sa volonté de « combattre la migration irrégulière à la racine et travailler mieux avec des #pays_partenaires », c’est-à-dire ceux où les migrants s’embarquent ou prennent la route pour l’UE, en établissant avec ces pays des « #partenariats_stratégiques_mutuellement_bénéficiaires ». Elle propose de conclure avec le Sénégal, la Mauritanie et l’Egypte de nouveaux « #partenariats_sur_mesure » sur le modèle de celui qui a été passé avec la Tunisie. Sans oublier la Jordanie et le Liban, fortement déstabilisés par le conflit en cours entre Israël et Gaza.

L’UE souhaite que ces pays bloquent l’arrivée de migrants vers ses côtes et réadmettent leurs citoyens en situation irrégulière sur le Vieux Continent contre des investissements pour renforcer leurs infrastructures et développer leur économie. « L’idée n’est pas nécessairement mauvaise, glisse un diplomate européen, mais il faut voir comment c’est mené et négocié. Le partenariat avec la Tunisie a été bâclé et cela a été fiasco. »

Depuis vingt ans, l’Europe n’a eu de cesse d’intégrer cette dimension migratoire dans ses accords avec les pays tiers et cette préoccupation s’est accentuée en 2015 avec l’arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens. Les moyens consacrés à cet aspect migratoire ont augmenté de façon exponentielle. Au moins 8 milliards d’euros sont programmés pour la période 2021-2027, soit environ 10 % des fonds de la coopération, pour des politiques de sécurisation et d’équipements des gardes-côtes. Ces moyens manquent au développement des pays aidés, critique l’ONG Oxfam. Et la Commission a demandé une rallonge de 15 milliards d’euros aux Vingt-Sept.

Mettre l’accent sur les retours

Tant de moyens, pour quels résultats ? Il est impossible de chiffrer le nombre d’entrées évitées par les accords passés, exception faite de l’arrangement avec la Turquie. Après la signature le 18 mars 2016, par les Vingt-Sept et la Commission, de la déclaration UE-Turquie, les arrivées de Syriens ont chuté de 98 % dès 2017, mais cela n’a pas fonctionné pour les retours, la Turquie ayant refusé de réadmettre la majorité des Syriens refoulés d’Europe. Cet engagement a coûté 6 milliards d’euros, financés à la fois par les Etats et l’UE.

« Pour les autres accords, le bilan est modeste, indique Florian Trauner, spécialiste des migrations à la Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgique). Nous avons étudié l’ensemble des accords passés par l’UE avec les pays tiers sur la période 2008-2018 pour mesurer leurs effets sur les retours et réadmissions. Si les pays des Balkans, plus proches de l’Europe, ont joué le jeu, avec les pays africains, cela ne fonctionne pas. »

Depuis le début de l’année, la Commission assure malgré tout mettre l’accent sur les retours. Selon Ylva Johansson, la commissaire chargée de la politique migratoire, sur près de 300 000 obligations de quitter le territoire européen, environ 65 000 ont été exécutées, en progression de 22 % en 2023. Ces chiffres modestes « sont liés à des questions de procédures internes en Europe, mais également à nos relations avec les Etats tiers. Nous avons fait beaucoup de pédagogie avec ces Etats en mettant en balance l’accès aux visas européens et cela commence à porter ses fruits. »

« Généralement, explique Florian Trauner, les Etats tiers acceptent les premiers temps les retours, puis la pression de l’opinion publique locale se retourne contre eux et les taux de réadmissions baissent. Les accords qui conditionnent l’aide au développement à des réadmissions créent davantage de problèmes qu’ils n’en résolvent. La diplomatie des petits pas, plus discrète, est bien plus efficace. »

L’alternative, juge le chercheur, serait une meilleure gestion par les Européens des migrations, en ménageant des voies légales identifiées pour le travail, par exemple. Dans ce cas, affirme-t-il, les pays concernés accepteraient de reprendre plus simplement leurs citoyens. « Mais en Europe, on ne veut pas entendre cela », observe M. Trauner.
Statut juridique obscur

Le développement de ces accords donnant-donnant pose un autre problème à l’UE : leur statut juridique. « Quel que soit leur nom – partenariat, déclaration…–, ce ne sont pas des accords internationaux en bonne et due forme, négociés de manière transparente avec consultation de la société civile, sous le contrôle du Parlement européen puis des tribunaux, rappelle Eleonora Frasca, juriste à l’Université catholique de Louvain (Belgique). Ce sont des objets juridiques plus obscurs. »

En outre, les arrangements avec la Turquie ou la Libye ont conduit des migrants à des situations dramatiques. Qu’il s’agisse des camps aux conditions déplorables des îles grecques où étaient parqués des milliers de Syriens refoulés d’Europe mais non repris en Turquie, ou des refoulements en mer, souvent avec des moyens européens, au large de la Grèce et de la Libye, ou enfin du sort des migrants renvoyés en Libye où de multiples abus et de crimes ont été documentés.

Concernant la Tunisie, « l’Union européenne a signé l’accord sans inclure de clause de respect de l’Etat de droit ou des droits de l’homme au moment même où cette dernière chassait des migrants subsahariens vers les frontières libyenne et algérienne, relève Sara Prestianni, de l’ONG EuroMed Droit. Du coup, aucune condamnation n’a été formulée par l’UE contre ces abus. » L’Europe a été réduite au silence.

Sous la pression d’Ursula von der Leyen, de Giorgia Melloni, la présidente du conseil italien, et de Mark Rutte, le premier ministre néerlandais, ce partenariat global doté d’un milliard d’euros « a été négocié au forceps et sans consultation », juge une source européenne. La conséquence a été une condamnation en Europe et une incompréhension de la part des Tunisiens, qui ont décidé de renvoyer 60 millions d’euros versés en septembre, estimant que c’était loin du milliard annoncé. « Aujourd’hui, le dialogue avec la Tunisie est exécrable, déplore un diplomate. La méthode n’a pas été la bonne », déplore la même source.
Exposition à un chantage aux migrants

« L’Union européenne a déjà été confrontée à ce risque réputationnel et semble disposée à l’accepter dans une certaine mesure, nuance Helena Hahn, de l’European Policy Center. Il est important qu’elle s’engage avec les pays tiers sur cette question des migrations. Toutefois, elle doit veiller à ce que ses objectifs ne l’emportent pas sur ses intérêts dans d’autres domaines, tels que la politique commerciale ou le développement. »

Dernier risque pour l’UE : en multipliant ces accords avec des régimes autoritaires, elle s’expose à un chantage aux migrants. Depuis 2020, elle en a déjà été l’objet de la part de la Turquie et du Maroc, de loin le premier bénéficiaire d’aides financières au titre du contrôle des migrations. « Ce n’est pas juste le beau temps qui a exposé Lampedusa à l’arrivée de 12 000 migrants en quelques jours en juin, juge Mme Prestianni. Les autorités tunisiennes étaient derrière. La solution est de rester fermes sur nos valeurs. Et dans notre négociation avec la Tunisie, nous ne l’avons pas été. »

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/10/26/crise-migratoire-le-bilan-mitige-des-accords-passes-par-l-union-europeenne-p

EU planning new anti-migration deals with Egypt and Tunisia, unrepentant in support for Libya

The European Commission wants to agree “new anti-smuggling operational partnerships” with Tunisia and Egypt before the end of the year, despite longstanding reports of abuse against migrants and refugees in Egypt and recent racist violence endorsed by the Tunisian state. Material and financial support is already being stepped up to the two North African countries, along with support for Libya.

The plan for new “partnerships” is referred to in a newly-revealed annex (pdf) of a letter from European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, that was sent to the European Council prior to its meeting in October and published by Statewatch.

In April, the Commission announced “willingness” from the EU and Tunisia “to establish a stronger operational partnership on anti-smuggling,” which would cover stronger border controls, more police and judicial cooperation, increased cooperation with EU agencies, and anti-migration advertising campaigns.

The annex includes little further detail on the issue, but says that the agreements with Tunisia and Egypt should build on the anti-smuggling partnerships “in place with Morocco, Niger and the Western Balkans, with the support of Europol and Eurojust,” and that they should include “joint operational teams with prosecutors and law enforcement authorities of Member States and partners.”

Abuse and impunity

Last year, Human Rights Watch investigations found that “Egyptian authorities have failed to protect vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers from pervasive sexual violence, including by failing to investigate rape and sexual assault,” and that the police had subjected Sudanese refugee activists to “forced physical labor [sic] and beatings.” Eritrean asylum-seekers have also been detained and deported by the Egyptian authorities.

The EU’s own report on human rights in Egypt in 2022 (pdf) says the authorities continue to impose “constraints” on “freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and media freedom,” while “concerns remained about broad application of the Terrorism Law against peaceful critics and individuals, and extensive and indiscriminate use of pre-trial detention.”

Amr Magdi, Human Rights Watch’s Senior Researcher on the Middle East and North Africa, has said more bluntly that “there can be no light at the end of the tunnel without addressing rampant security force abuses and lawlessness.” The Cairo Institute for Human Rights said in August that the country’s “security apparatus continues to surveil and repress Egyptians with impunity. There is little to no access to participatory democracy.”

The situation in Tunisia for migrants and refugees has worsened substantially since the beginning of the year, when president Kais Said declared a crackdown against sub-Saharan Africans in speeches that appeared to draw heavily from the far-right great replacement theory.

It is unclear whether the EU will attempt to address this violence, abuse and discrimination as it seeks to strengthen the powers of the countries’ security authorities. The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that cooperation with Tunisia is already underway, even if an anti-smuggling deal has not been finalised:

“Three mentorship pairs on migrant smuggling TU [Tunisia] with Member States (AT, ES, IT [Austria, Spain and Italy]) to start cooperation in the framework of Euromed Police, in the last quarter of 2023 (implemented by CEPOL [the European Police College] with Europol)”

Anti-smuggling conference

The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, “confirmed interest in a comprehensive partnership on migration, including anti-smuggling and promoting legal pathways,” at a meeting with European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, at the UN General Assembly.

This month the fourth EU-Egypt High Level Dialogue on Migration and the second Senior Officials Meeting on Security and Law Enforcement would be used to discuss the partnership, the annex notes – “including on the involvement of CEPOL, Europol and Frontex” – but it is unclear when exactly the Commission plans to sign the new agreements. An “International Conference on strengthening international cooperation on countering migrant smuggling” that will take place in Brussels on 28 November would provide an opportune moment to do so.

The conference will be used to announce a proposal “to reinforce the EU legal framework on migrant smuggling, including elements related to: sanctions, governance, information flows and the role of JHA agencies,” said a Council document published by Statewatch in October.

Other sources indicate that the proposal will include amendments to the EU’s Facilitation Directive and the Europol Regulation, with measures to boost the role of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre hosted at Europol; step up the exchange of information between member states, EU agencies and third countries; and step up Europol’s support to operations.

Additional support

The proposed “partnerships” with Egypt and Tunisia come on top of ongoing support provided by the EU to control migration.

In July the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia covering “macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy, people-to-people contacts and migration and mobility.”

Despite the Tunisian government returning €67 million provided by the EU, the number of refugee boat departures from Tunisia has decreased significantly, following an increase in patrols at sea and the increased destruction of intercepted vessels.

Violent coercion is also playing a role, as noted by Matthias Monroy:

“State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.”

The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes that the EU has provided “fuel to support anti-smuggling operations,” and that Tunisian officials were shown around Frontex’s headquarters in mid-September for a “familiarisation visit”.

Egypt, meanwhile, is expected to receive the first of three new patrol boats from the EU in December, €87 million as part of the second phase of a border management project will be disbursed “in the coming months,” and Frontex will pursue a working arrangement with the Egyptian authorities, who visited the agency’s HQ in Warsaw in October.

Ongoing support to Libya

Meanwhile, the EU’s support for migration control by actors in Libya continues, despite a UN investigation earlier this year accusing that support of contributing to crimes against humanity in the country.

The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes with approval that five search and rescue vessels have been provided to the Libyan Coast Guard this year, and that by 21 September, “more than 10,900 individuals reported as rescued or intercepted by the Libyan authorities in more than 100 operations… Of those disembarked, the largest groups were from Bangladesh, Egypt and Syria”.

The letter does not clarify what distinguishes “rescue” and “interception” in this context. The organisation Forensic Oceanography has previously described them as “conflicting imperatives” in an analysis of a disaster at sea in which some survivors were taken to Libya, and some to EU territory.

In a letter (pdf) sent last week to the chairs of three European Parliament committees, three Commissioners – Margaritas Schinas, Ylva Johansson and Oliver Várhelyi – said the Commission remained “convinced that halting EU assistance in the country or disengagement would not improve the situation of those most in need.”

While evidence that EU support provided to Libya has facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity is not enough to put that policy to a halt, it remains to be seen whether the Egyptian authorities’ violent repression, or state racism in Tunisia, will be deemed worthy of mention in public by Commission officials.

The annex to von der Leyen’s letter also details EU action in a host of other areas, including the “pilot projects” launched in Bulgaria and Romania to step up border surveillance and speed up asylum proceedings and returns, support for the Moroccan authorities, and cooperation with Western Balkans states, amongst other things.

►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

en italien:
Statewatch. Mentre continua il sostegno alla Libia, l’UE sta pianificando nuovi accordi anti-migrazione con Egitto e Tunisia
▻https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/11/statewatch-mentre-continua-il-sostegno-alla-libia-lue-sta-pianificando-n

REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation concerning negotiations on a status agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2023-0358_EN.html

Accord migratoire avec l’Égypte. Des #navires français en eaux troubles

Les entreprises françaises #Civipol, #Défense_Conseil_International et #Couach vont fournir à la marine du Caire trois navires de recherche et sauvetage dont elles formeront également les équipages, révèle Orient XXI dans une enquête exclusive. Cette livraison, dans le cadre d’un accord migratoire avec l’Égypte, risque de rendre l’Union européenne complice d’exactions perpétrées par les gardes-côtes égyptiens et libyens.

La France est chaque année un peu plus en première ligne de l’externalisation des frontières de l’Europe. Selon nos informations, Civipol, l’opérateur de coopération internationale du ministère de l’intérieur, ainsi que son sous-traitant Défense Conseil International (DCI), prestataire attitré du ministère des armées pour la formation des militaires étrangers, ont sélectionné le chantier naval girondin Couach pour fournir trois navires de recherche et sauvetage (SAR) aux gardes-côtes égyptiens, dont la formation sera assurée par DCI sur des financements européens de 23 millions d’euros comprenant des outils civils de surveillance des frontières.

Toujours selon nos sources, d’autres appels d’offres de Civipol et DCI destinés à la surveillance migratoire en Égypte devraient suivre, notamment pour la fourniture de caméras thermiques et de systèmes de positionnement satellite.

Ces contrats sont directement liés à l’accord migratoire passé en octobre 2022 entre l’Union européenne (UE) et l’Égypte : en échange d’une assistance matérielle de 110 millions d’euros au total, Le Caire est chargé de bloquer, sur son territoire ainsi que dans ses eaux territoriales, le passage des migrants et réfugiés en partance pour l’Europe. Ce projet a pour architecte le commissaire européen à l’élargissement et à la politique de voisinage, Olivér Várhelyi. Diplomate affilié au parti Fidesz de l’illibéral premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orbán, il s’est récemment fait remarquer en annonçant unilatéralement la suspension de l’aide européenne à la Palestine au lendemain du 7 octobre — avant d’être recadré.

La mise en œuvre de ce pacte a été conjointement confiée à Civipol et à l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) de l’ONU, comme déjà indiqué par le média Africa Intelligence. Depuis, la présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen a déjà plaidé pour un nouvel accord migratoire avec le régime du maréchal Sissi. Selon l’UE, il s’agirait d’aider les gardes-côtes égyptiens à venir en aide aux migrants naufragés, via une approche « basée sur les droits, orientée vers la protection et sensible au genre ».
Circulez, il n’y a rien à voir

Des éléments de langage qui ne convainquent guère l’ONG Refugees Platform in Egypt (REP), qui a alerté sur cet accord il y a un an. « Depuis 2016, le gouvernement égyptien a durci la répression des migrants et des personnes qui leur viennent en aide, dénonce-t-elle auprès d’Orient XXI. De plus en plus d’Égyptiens émigrent en Europe parce que la jeunesse n’a aucun avenir ici. Ce phénomène va justement être accentué par le soutien de l’UE au gouvernement égyptien. L’immigration est instrumentalisée par les dictatures de la région comme un levier pour obtenir un appui politique et financier de l’Europe. »

En Égypte, des migrants sont arrêtés et brutalisés après avoir manifesté. Des femmes réfugiées sont agressées sexuellement dans l’impunité. Des demandeurs d’asile sont expulsés vers des pays dangereux comme l’Érythrée ou empêchés d’entrer sur le territoire égyptien. Par ailleurs, les gardes-côtes égyptiens collaborent avec leurs homologues libyens qui, également soutenus par l’UE, rejettent des migrants en mer ou les arrêtent pour les placer en détention dans des conditions inhumaines, et entretiennent des liens avec des milices qui jouent aussi le rôle de passeurs.

Autant d’informations peu compatibles avec la promesse européenne d’un contrôle des frontières « basé sur les droits, orienté vers la protection et sensible au genre ». Sachant que l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes Frontex s’est elle-même rendue coupable de refoulements illégaux de migrants (pushbacks) et a été accusée de tolérer de mauvais traitements sur ces derniers.

Contactés à ce sujet, les ministères français de l’intérieur, des affaires étrangères et des armées, l’OIM, Civipol, DCI et Couach n’ont pas répondu à nos questions. Dans le cadre de cette enquête, Orient XXI a aussi effectué le 1er juin une demande de droit à l’information auprès de la Direction générale du voisinage et des négociations d’élargissement (DG NEAR) de la Commission européenne, afin d’accéder aux différents documents liés à l’accord migratoire passé entre l’UE et l’Égypte. Celle-ci a identifié douze documents susceptibles de nous intéresser, mais a décidé de nous refuser l’accès à onze d’entre eux, le douzième ne comprenant aucune information intéressante. La DG NEAR a invoqué une série de motifs allant du cohérent (caractère confidentiel des informations touchant à la politique de sécurité et la politique étrangère de l’UE) au plus surprenant (protection des données personnelles — alors qu’il aurait suffi de masquer lesdites données —, et même secret des affaires). Un premier recours interne a été déposé le 18 juillet, mais en l’absence de réponse de la DG NEAR dans les délais impartis, Orient XXI a saisi fin septembre la Médiatrice européenne, qui a demandé à la Commission de nous répondre avant le 13 octobre. Sans succès.

Dans un courrier parvenu le 15 novembre, un porte-parole de la DG NEAR indique :

"L’Égypte reste un partenaire fiable et prévisible pour l’Europe, et la migration constitue un domaine clé de coopération. Le projet ne cible pas seulement le matériel, mais également la formation pour améliorer les connaissances et les compétences [des gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières égyptiens] en matière de gestion humanitaire des frontières (…) Le plein respect des droits de l’homme sera un élément essentiel et intégré de cette action [grâce] à un contrôle rigoureux et régulier de l’utilisation des équipements."

Paris-Le Caire, une relation particulière

Cette livraison de navires s’inscrit dans une longue histoire de coopération sécuritaire entre la France et la dictature militaire égyptienne, arrivée au pouvoir après le coup d’État du 3 juillet 2013 et au lendemain du massacre de centaines de partisans du président renversé Mohamed Morsi. Paris a depuis multiplié les ventes d’armes et de logiciels d’espionnage à destination du régime du maréchal Sissi, caractérisé par la mainmise des militaires sur la vie politique et économique du pays et d’effroyables atteintes aux droits humains.

La mise sous surveillance, la perquisition par la Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI) et le placement en garde à vue de la journaliste indépendante Ariane Lavrilleux fin septembre étaient notamment liés à ses révélations dans le média Disclose sur Sirli, une opération secrète associant les renseignements militaires français et égyptien, dont la finalité antiterroriste a été détournée par Le Caire vers la répression intérieure. Une enquête pour « compromission du secret de la défense nationale » avait ensuite été ouverte en raison de la publication de documents (faiblement) classifiés par Disclose.

La mise en œuvre de l’accord migratoire UE-Égypte a donc été indirectement confiée à la France via Civipol. Société dirigée par le préfet Yann Jounot, codétenue par l’État français et des acteurs privés de la sécurité — l’électronicien de défense Thales, le spécialiste de l’identité numérique Idemia, Airbus Defence & Space —, Civipol met en œuvre des projets de coopération internationale visant à renforcer les capacités d’États étrangers en matière de sécurité, notamment en Afrique. Ceux-ci peuvent être portés par la France, notamment via la Direction de la coopération internationale de sécurité (DCIS) du ministère de l’intérieur. Mais l’entreprise travaille aussi pour l’UE.

Civipol a appelé en renfort DCI, société pilotée par un ancien chef adjoint de cabinet de Nicolas Sarkozy passé dans le privé, le gendarme Samuel Fringant. DCI était jusqu’à récemment contrôlée par l’État, aux côtés de l’ancien office d’armement Eurotradia soupçonné de corruption et du vendeur de matériel militaire français reconditionné Sofema. Mais l’entreprise devrait prochainement passer aux mains du groupe français d’intelligence économique ADIT de Philippe Caduc, dont l’actionnaire principal est le fonds Sagard de la famille canadienne Desmarais, au capital duquel figure désormais le fonds souverain émirati.

DCI assure principalement la formation des armées étrangères à l’utilisation des équipements militaires vendus par la France, surtout au Proche-Orient et notamment en Égypte. Mais à l’image de Civipol, l’entreprise collabore de plus en plus avec l’UE, notamment via la mal nommée « Facilité européenne pour la paix » (FEP).
Pacte (migratoire) avec le diable

Plus largement, ce partenariat avec l’Égypte s’inscrit dans une tendance généralisée d’externalisation du contrôle des frontières de l’Europe, qui voit l’UE passer des accords avec les pays situés le long des routes migratoires afin que ceux-ci bloquent les départs de migrants et réfugiés, et que ces derniers déposent leurs demandes d’asile depuis l’Afrique, avant d’arriver sur le territoire européen. Après la Libye, pionnière en la matière, l’UE a notamment signé des partenariats avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie — dont le président Kaïs Saïed a récemment encouragé des émeutes racistes —, le Maroc, et en tout 26 pays africains, selon une enquête du journaliste Andrei Popoviciu pour le magazine américain In These Times.

Via ces accords, l’UE n’hésite pas à apporter une assistance financière, humaine et matérielle à des acteurs peu soucieux du respect des droits fondamentaux, de la bonne gestion financière et parfois eux-mêmes impliqués dans le trafic d’êtres humains. L’UE peine par ailleurs à tracer l’utilisation de ces centaines de millions d’euros et à évaluer l’efficacité de ces politiques, qui se sont déjà retournées contre elles sous la forme de chantage migratoire, par exemple en Turquie.

D’autres approches existent pourtant. Mais face à des opinions publiques de plus en plus hostiles à l’immigration, sur fond de banalisation des idées d’extrême droite en politique et dans les médias, les 27 pays membres et les institutions européennes apparaissent enfermés dans une spirale répressive.

▻https://orientxxi.info/magazine/accord-migratoire-avec-l-egypte-des-navires-francais-en-eaux-troubles,68

RAPPORT sur la mise en œuvre de l’#article_43 de la directive 2013/32/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale

Le présent rapport porte sur l’application des procédures à la frontière par les États membres. L’article 43 de la directive 2013/32/UE relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale (directive sur les procédures d’asile) établit les procédures à la frontière comme une possibilité à laquelle les États membres peuvent avoir recours dans le cadre du fonctionnement du régime d’asile européen commun. Lorsqu’une demande d’asile est présentée à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit, les États membres peuvent, sous certaines conditions, examiner la demande dans ces lieux.

Objet du rapport

L’objectif principal du rapport est de permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur le pacte sur la migration et l’asile, dans le cadre duquel les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle crucial. Les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle essentiel dans la proposition relative au pacte. Or, la Commission n’a jamais fait l’effort d’évaluer leur mise en œuvre, de déterminer si leurs objectifs sont atteints et d’établir les conclusions à tirer pour une nouvelle législation.

Les rapports de mise en œuvre constituent un élément essentiel du programme de la Commission pour une meilleure réglementation, qui vise à concevoir et à évaluer les politiques de l’Union de manière à ce qu’elles atteignent leurs objectifs de la façon la plus efficace et efficiente possible. Toutefois, la Commission n’a pas publié à ce jour de rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, manquant ainsi aux obligations d’information qui lui incombent en vertu de l’article 50 de ladite directive. De plus, en 2016, aucune analyse d’impact n’a été réalisée lorsque la Commission a proposé une réforme de cette directive pour la transformer en règlement. Il en va de même pour la proposition de modification récemment publiée (COM(2020) 611 final).

Le présent rapport ne vise ni à remplacer le rapport complet sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile que la Commission aurait dû réaliser, ni à évaluer les incidences des nouvelles propositions de cette dernière. Elle vise plutôt à apporter un éclairage sur la mise en œuvre par les États membres des procédures à la frontière au titre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile ainsi que sur les problèmes et les lacunes existants. Cet état des lieux devrait permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur la proposition de modification de la directive.

Le rapport repose sur l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre publiée par l’EPRS en novembre 2020, qui donne une analyse comparative de l’application de l’article 43 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, ainsi qu’une appréciation juridique de la transposition et de l’application de cet article par les États membres. Le projet de rapport initial s’appuie sur les conclusions préliminaires de cette évaluation. Il se peut que le rapporteur dépose des amendements au projet de rapport afin d’adapter le rapport à l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre finale.

Les procédures à la frontière sont mal définies

Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que le concept des procédures à la frontière est mal défini dans la législation de l’Union en matière d’asile. Cela soulève de vives inquiétudes quant à leur application, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits fondamentaux et les garanties procédurales.

Les procédures à la frontière constituent une exception à la règle juridiquement définie par la directive sur les procédures d’asile selon laquelle les demandeurs d’asile ont le droit de rester sur le territoire d’un État membre, y compris à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit. La directive sur les procédures d’asile limite donc strictement les procédures à la frontière à un nombre exhaustif de cas. Le législateur de l’Union a en outre souhaité une interprétation étroite puisqu’il souligne que, pour autant qu’un demandeur ait exposé des raisons reconnues valables, l’absence de documents à l’entrée ou l’utilisation de documents falsifiés ne devrait pas entraîner en soi un recours automatique à la procédure à la frontière ou à la procédure accélérée (considérant 21 de la directive). Néanmoins, dans la pratique, la directive donne une trop grande marge de manœuvre aux États membres pour un recours « à la carte » aux procédures à la frontière, souvent bien au-delà des limites fixées par la directive.

Certains États membres examinent la recevabilité des demandes d’asile dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres en examinent également le fond. Certains États membres examinent les cas relevant du règlement de Dublin dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres ne le font pas. Certains États membres accordent une protection internationale dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière, tandis que d’autres autorisent l’entrée des demandeurs lorsqu’ils constatent qu’un demandeur d’asile est susceptible de remplir les conditions requises pour bénéficier d’une protection internationale. En outre, plusieurs États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière d’une manière beaucoup plus large que ne le prescrit la directive sur les procédures d’asile ; certains dirigent même toutes les demandes d’asile introduites à la frontière vers les procédures à la frontière. De plus, certains États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière sans les qualifier en tant que telles dans le droit national.

La rétention comme règle dans les procédures à la frontière

Les procédures à la frontière reposent souvent sur la fiction juridique de l’absence d’entrée, partant ainsi du principe que la procédure a lieu avant une décision sur le droit d’un demandeur d’entrer sur le territoire d’un État membre ou dans le cadre d’une telle décision. Cela a de graves conséquences pour les demandeurs d’asile. Dans tous les cas analysés par l’EPRS dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, les demandeurs d’asile soumis à des procédures à la frontière ont de facto été placés en rétention.

La rétention et la privation de liberté ont de graves répercussions sur les droits fondamentaux d’une personne. C’est pourquoi le droit de l’Union et le droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme établissent des conditions strictes pour la rétention des demandeurs d’asile. L’article 26 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile interdit le placement en rétention de demandeurs au seul motif qu’ils sont des demandeurs. Une liste exhaustive des motifs de placement en rétention et des garanties pour les personnes placées en rétention figurent dans la directive 2013/33/UE (directive relative aux conditions d’accueil).

Or, ces conditions et garanties ne sont généralement pas prises en compte dans les procédures à la frontière. En règle générale, les États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, souvent sans examiner le critère de nécessité ou sans fournir d’autres solutions que la rétention. Dans de nombreux cas, les demandeurs d’asile n’ont pas accès aux garanties applicables aux demandeurs d’asile qui sont placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. Plusieurs États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, sur la base de la fiction de l’absence d’entrée, sans reconnaître qu’il s’agit là d’une privation de liberté. En conséquence, les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre d’une telle procédure à la frontière n’ont même pas accès aux garanties procédurales de base telles qu’un contrôle juridictionnel de leur rétention. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que les conditions de rétention aux frontières sont souvent inadaptées. En cas d’afflux massif, comme sur les îles grecques, les procédures à la frontière vouent les demandeurs à des conditions inhumaines.

Si les demandeurs d’asile sont de facto placés en rétention aux frontières, la rétention devrait toujours être prescrite par la loi, et les mêmes garanties procédurales devraient être appliquées que pour les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. En tout état de cause, les demandeurs d’asile ne devraient pas être placés en rétention par défaut.

Refus d’entrée

Il y a lieu de donner aux intéressés la possibilité d’introduire une demande d’asile à la frontière. S’il existe des éléments donnant à penser qu’une personne aux frontières extérieures peut souhaiter présenter une demande de protection internationale, les États membres doivent l’informer de la possibilité de le faire et prendre des dispositions en matière d’interprétation afin de faciliter l’accès à la procédure d’asile.

Toutefois, de nombreuses informations font état d’un refus d’entrée ou d’un renvoi forcé dans le cadre de procédures à la frontière, sans que les besoins de protection des intéressés ne soient évalués et sans que leurs demandes d’asile ne soient enregistrées. Cela constitue une violation grave du droit de l’Union et du droit international.

Pour prévenir de telles pratiques illégales et veiller à ce que les États membres respectent le droit de l’Union et le droit international aux frontières extérieures, il convient de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle indépendants. Conformément aux orientations de l’Agence des droits fondamentaux (FRA) sur les contrôles aux frontières, les États membres devraient être tenus d’accorder aux organes de contrôle l’accès aux installations frontalières en vue de garantir la protection effective des droits fondamentaux et la notification systématique des violations. Les États membres devraient également faire en sorte que toutes les allégations donnent lieu à des enquêtes et des sanctions.

Évaluation de la vulnérabilité

Il est inquiétant que les États membres ne disposent pas de mécanismes adéquats permettant d’identifier les personnes ayant des besoins particuliers afin de les exempter de la procédure à la frontière. Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que des mécanismes appropriés et efficaces d’identification des vulnérabilités font défaut dans tous les pays examinés et que plusieurs États membres ne disposent d’aucun mécanisme de ce type. Les personnes présentant des vulnérabilités invisibles, telles que les victimes de torture ou d’abus sexuels, ne sont pratiquement jamais identifiées lors d’une procédure à la frontière. Les garanties procédurales spéciales et le soutien adéquat sont souvent vains dans la pratique en l’absence de mécanismes d’identification appropriés. Cette situation est particulièrement préoccupante pour les enfants et soulève des questions quant au respect de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant consacré à l’article 24, paragraphe 2, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. C’est pourquoi les enfants et leurs familles devraient généralement être exemptés des procédures à la frontière.

Garanties procédurales et équité des procédures à la frontière

Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS fait état de problèmes importants liés aux garanties procédurales dans tous les États membres examinés. Les demandeurs doivent être informés de leurs droits et de la procédure d’asile et ils doivent avoir un accès effectif aux organisations et personnes qui fournissent des conseils. Or, dans la pratique, cela n’est souvent pas le cas. De nombreux États membres prévoient dans leur législation le droit à une assistance juridique gratuite en première instance des procédures à la frontière, alors qu’ils ne sont pas tenus de le faire. Cependant, la brièveté des délais et la rétention (de facto) empêchent souvent l’accès effectif à l’assistance juridique. Les demandeurs d’asile ne sont pas en mesure de contacter un avocat en raison d’un manque d’outils de communication, les avocats manquent de temps pour préparer le recours ou une audition avec leur client ou les avocats qualifiés font complètement défaut. Les ONG ne peuvent souvent pas combler les lacunes en raison de leur accès limité ou total aux infrastructures aux frontières. L’interprétation est souvent indisponible, de mauvaise qualité ou difficile lorsqu’elle est effectuée par téléphone. De plus, les demandeurs ne sont souvent pas informés systématiquement de la procédure d’asile et de leurs droits.

En raison de la nature même des procédures à la frontière, il est difficile de fournir des garanties procédurales complètes dans la pratique. Leur efficacité est compromise par la combinaison d’une rétention (de facto) et de délais plus courts appliqués dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière. Les États membres fixent généralement des délais très courts de quelques jours seulement pour la procédure de recours, ce qui porte atteinte au droit à un recours effectif, compte tenu de l’accès limité à l’assistance et au monde extérieur. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que la directive sur les procédures d’asile ne garantit pas que la procédure de recours aura un effet suspensif.

En ce qui concerne la procédure rapide à la frontière sur les îles grecques, la FRA, le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies pour les réfugiés et le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies sur les droits de l’homme des migrants ont tous fait part de graves préoccupations concernant les garanties procédurales et les problèmes relatifs aux droits fondamentaux qui semblent presque insurmontables.

Les procédures à la frontière se caractérisent par le dilemme inévitable de la nécessité de garantir une procédure équitable, pour laquelle le temps manque, et de celle de réduire autant que possible la durée de la rétention des demandeurs, le cas échéant. Elles ne contribuent donc pas aux objectifs de la directive sur les procédures d’asile. Par conséquent, les États membres devraient généralement s’abstenir d’appliquer des procédures à la frontière et ne devraient en aucun cas être tenus de les appliquer. Les États membres qui recourent à de telles procédures soit ne peuvent pas garantir une procédure équitable soit enfreignent les droits fondamentaux des demandeurs en les plaçant en rétention pendant de longues périodes.

Si elles sont néanmoins appliquées, ces procédures devraient être strictement limitées aux cas moins complexes, par exemple ceux où le demandeur a obtenu une protection internationale dans un autre État (membre) ou ne soulève que des questions non pertinentes pour l’examen d’une procédure d’asile.

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0005_FR.html

Le #Parlement_européen vote pour conditionner son aide au développement au contrôle des migrations

Le Parlement européen a adopté hier un rapport sur “l’#amélioration de l’#efficacité et de l’#efficience de l’aide au développement”, qui soutient la conditionnalité de l’aide au développement au contrôle des migrations.

Cette position était soutenue par le gouvernement français dans une note adressée aux eurodéputés français.

Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, directrice France de ONE, réagit : « Le Parlement européen a décidé de modifier soudainement son approche et de se mettre de surcroit en porte-à-faux du #traité_européen qui définit l’objectif et les valeurs de l’aide au développement européenne. Cela pourrait encore retarder les négociations autour de ce budget, et donc repousser sa mise en œuvre, en pleine urgence sanitaire et économique. »

« Les études montrent justement que lier l’aide au développement aux #retours et #réadmissions des ressortissants étrangers dans leurs pays d’origine ne fonctionne pas, et peut même avoir des effets contre-productifs. L’UE doit tirer les leçons de ses erreurs passées en alignant sa politique migratoire sur les besoins de ses partenaires, pas sur des priorités politiques à court terme. »

« On prévoit que 100 millions de personnes supplémentaires tomberont dans l’extrême pauvreté à cause de la pandémie, et que fait le Parlement européen ? Il tourne le dos aux populations les plus fragiles, qui souffriraient directement de cette décision. L’aide au développement doit, sans concessions, se concentrer sur des solutions pour lutter contre l’extrême #pauvreté, renforcer les systèmes de santé et créer des emplois décents. »

▻https://www.one.org/fr/press/alerte-le-parlement-europeen-vote-pour-conditionner-son-aide-au-developpement-a

Petit rappel, en #Suisse on a voté, en 2013, contre la suppression des #visas_humanitaires demandés dans les ambassades...

... et qu’en 2018 .... « Le Parlement européen demandait que les visas humanitaires pour l’UE soient délivrés dans les #consulats » :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/743919

L’EPRS avait fait une étude sur ce sujet :
►https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621823/EPRS_STU(2018)621823_EN.pdf

Il y a le rapport de la commission LIBE aussi, qui s’appuie dessus :
▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0423_FR.html

Note politique sur les #visas_humanitaires (suite au « #visagate » survenu en 2019 en #Belgique). Elle rassemble les recommandations de la plus part des associations belges sur ce thème :

▻https://www.cncd.be/IMG/pdf/www_notepolitique_25.pdf

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
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Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

Grèce : recours en justice contre la suspension de la procédure d’octroi d’asile

Le conseil grec des réfugiés (GCR), ONG grecque de défense du droit d’asile, a annoncé mardi avoir formulé un recours devant le Conseil d’Etat contre une ordonnance de l’exécutif qui en suspend temporairement la procédure.

Le conseil grec des réfugiés (GCR), ONG grecque de défense du droit d’asile, a annoncé mardi avoir formulé un recours devant le Conseil d’Etat contre une ordonnance de l’exécutif qui en suspend temporairement la procédure.

Adoptée le 1er mars, à effet immédiat et valable un mois, cette ordnnance, qui permet aussi le refoulement des demandeurs d’asile, a été la réponse d’Athènes à la décision d’Ankara d’ouvrir fin février les frontières aux migrants qui souhaitaient passer en Europe.

De violents incidents avaient alors eu lieu à Kastanies, l’un des deux postes frontaliers grecs avec la Turquie, où des milliers de demandeurs d’asile avaient alors afflué à destination de l’Europe.

Le recours du GCR a été déposé lundi pour le compte de demandeurs d’asile que cette ONG assiste dans leurs démarches.

« Trois femmes qui accompagnent leurs enfants sont menacées d’expulsion immédiate vers Afghanistan ou la Turquie alors que leur vie, leur santé et leurs droits fondamentaux sont en danger », prévient dans u communiqué l’ONG, qui souligne que la suspension de l’octroi du droit d’asile « a été fortement critiquée par des organisations nationales et internationales, y compris la Commission nationale des droits de l’homme et l’Agence onusienne du Haut commissariat des réfugiés ».

L’ONG rappelle que ce droit est prévu par « le droit international » et qu’« on ne peut pas le suspendre ».

Elle exhorte la présidente de la République hellénique, Katerina Sakellaropoulou, à « annuler cet acte législatif illégal et le Parlement grec à ne pas le ratifier pour que la Grèce ne soit pas le premier pays après la Seconde guerre mondiale à violer le principe international du non refoulement ».

De nombreux demandeurs d’asile entrés en Grèce après le 1er mars ont été arrêtés et transférés dans des camps fermés avant leur expulsion prévue en vertu de cette ordonnance malgré les critiques des ONG de défense des droits de l’homme, comme Amnesty International.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/240320/grece-recours-en-justice-contre-la-suspension-de-la-procedure-d-octroi-d-a

Procédures pour le droit d’asile gelées

« De quel crime se sont rendus coupables, ces gens pour être confinés dans cette situation inhumaine ? », s’est ému cette semaine le quotidien Efimerida Ton Syntakton (« Le journal des rédacteurs »), l’un des rares médias grecs à avoir dénoncé cet #enfermement qui ne respecte ni la convention de Genève, ni la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Qui s’en soucie ? Bruxelles se tait. Et le gouvernement grec du Premier ministre, Kyriákos Mitsotákis, a de toute façon gelé toutes les procédures de droit d’asile depuis le 1er mars, réagissant alors à la décision du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, d’ouvrir les frontières aux réfugiés et migrants qui se trouvaient en Turquie. La menace d’un afflux massif depuis la Turquie a permis à la Grèce de faire jouer une clause d’urgence, bloquant provisoirement le droit d’asile, tout en négligeant de consulter ses partenaires européens, comme le veut pourtant la règle.

Et dans l’immédiat, la mise entre parenthèses du droit d’asile permet désormais de considérer de facto comme des migrants illégaux promis à la déportation, tous ceux qui ont accosté depuis mars sur les îles grecques. Avant même de quitter Lesbos, les 189 réfugiés transportés à Klidi avaient d’ailleurs été sommés de signer un document en grec. Sans savoir qu’ils acceptaient ainsi leur future déportation. Le coronavirus (et les mauvaises relations actuelles entre la Grèce et la Turquie) retarde dans l’immédiat ces rapatriements forcés. Mais le confinement dans un camp quasi militaire au nord de la Grèce risque de générer de nouvelles souffrances pour ces réfugiés jugés indésirables.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/825871#message834430

Europe must act to stop coronavirus outbreak in Lesbos, say MEPs

NGOs have raised concerns over asylum procedures being frozen. According to the Commissioner for Home Affairs, processing applications must not be stopped.

“People arriving at the borders still have the right to apply for asylum and cannot be sent away without their claim being assessed,” explains Professor Philippe De Bruycker, Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles. “This does not mean that nothing can be done regarding the protection of health: People requiring asylum maybe tested to see if they are sick or not, and if they are it can be applied measures such as quarantine, or even detention or restrictions of movement within the territory of the states.”

Restrictions on travel and social distancing measures means delays in the asylum process are inevitable.

“A lot of member states are making the decision that the interviews with asylum seekers should not take place right now because they would like to limit the social interaction,” says Commissioner Johansson. “So there will be delays in the processes of asylum, but I think that member states are taking measures to deal with the risk of the virus being spread.”

MEPs have called for an “immediate European response” to avoid a humanitarian crisis spiralling into a public health crisis. NGOs warn there is little chance of not getting infected living in such conditions.

►https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/24/europe-must-act-to-stop-coronavirus-outbreak-in-lesbos-say-meps

Grèce : un nouveau projet de loi encore plus restrictif pour l’asile en cours d’élaboration

Le quotidien grec Efimerida tôn syntaktôn (Journal des Rédacteurs) (►https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/237741_etoimazoyn-nomoshedio-eytelismoy-tis-diadikasias-asyloy) révèle le nouveau projet du ministère de l’Immigration pour la procédure d’asile

Un nouveau projet de loi est en cours d’élaboration avec des dispositions problématiques en termes de finalité, d’efficacité et de légalité.

Ce projet de loi vient à peine cinq mois après la loi sur la protection internationale, dont les dispositions restrictives ont été dénoncées par plusieurs organisations.

Le nouveau projet en élaboration comprend les dispositions suivantes, très problématiques du point de vue de leur opportunité, de leur applicabilité, mais surtout de leur conformité au droit européen, international et national :

• la possibilité d’omettre l’entretien personnel, pierre angulaire de la procédure d’asile, s’il s’avère impossible de trouver un interprète dans la langue choisie par l’interviewé, dans le cas où celle-ci est différente de la langue officielle de son pays d’origine

• L’aide juridique, lors de l’examen en deuxième instance de la demande d’asile sera fournie uniquement à la demande de l’intéressé dans les deux jours qui suivent la notification de la décision de première instance. La demande d’aide juridique ne sera pas satisfaite automatiquement, mais sera examinée par le président de la commission de recours et ne sera accordée que si celui-ci juge probable une issue favorable à l’intéressé de l’appel. L’absence d’assistance judiciaire ne constituera pas une raison valable pour un report du réexamen de la demande d’asile, à moins que la Commission de recours ne considère que cette absence puisse provoquer un préjudice irréparable au demandeur d’asile, et que l’appel ait de fortes chances d’aboutir à l’annulation de la décision en première instance.

• si le demandeur d’asile a déjà séjourné dans un autre pays pendant plus que de deux mois, sans être menacé de poursuite individuelle pour des raisons de race, de religion, de nationalité, d’appartenance à un groupe social particulier ou de convictions politiques, alors ce pays est considéré comme offrant une protection adéquate et sa demande d’asile en Grèce est irrecevable

• en cas de rejet en deuxième instance de la demande d’asile, le demandeur sera maintenu en centre de détention jusqu’à son expulsion ou jusqu’à ce que la procédure arrive à son terme, sans qu’il puisse être libéré, s’il dépose une demande d’annulation du rejet ou une demande de suspension de son expulsion.

Ce nouveau projet réduit à moins que rien, voire annule des garanties de la procédure d’asile ; il est introduit quelques jours après l’expiration de la loi sans précédent qui suspendait le dépôt de nouvelles demandes d’asile pendant un mois et prévoyait l’expulsion immédiate vers les pays d’origine des nouveaux arrivants. Il s’agissait d’une suspension de la Convention de Genève, qui n’est pas prévue par celle-ci même en temps de guerre. Il faudrait ajouter que la fin de la période de suspension ne se traduit pas par une réouverture de la procédure car le service d’asile reste fermé jusqu’au 10 avril à cause de mesures de protection sanitaire. Et tout laisse croire que la fermeture du service, sera prolongée pour au moins un mois.

Enfin, le projet de loi réduit de plus que de moitié le temps prévu pour l’examen et l’adoption d’une décision en appel, en introduisant de nouveaux délais impossible à tenir : un mois pour la décision en appel contre trois actuellement, vingt jours pour la procédure accélérée appliquée aux frontières contre 40 jours en vigueur aujourd’hui, dix jours pour l’audition de l’appel si l’intéressé est en détention.

L’expulsion en application du décret de suspension de la procédure d’asile de deux femmes vulnérables d’origine afghane, a été stoppée par le Conseil d’État, qui a ordonné leur maintien dans le territoire. Le sort d’une troisième femme afghane sera décidée en séance plénière du Conseil d’Etat en septembre.

Source (en grec)

►https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/237741_etoimazoyn-nomoshedio-eytelismoy-tis-diadikasias-asyloy

▻https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiosyni/237450_stamatiste-tis-ameses-apelaseis

–-> reçu de Vicky Skoumbi, via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 04.04.2020

GCR’s comments on the draft law amending asylum legislation

Athens, 27 April 2020—The Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) expresses its deep concern over the new draft law that inter alia amends asylum legislation[1], which was submitted for public consultation amidst a public health crisis, at a time when the main concern is the protection of asylum seekers and the entire population from the risks and effects of the pandemic, and while concerns for asylum seekers who remain in overcrowded sites and/or in administrative detention in the midst of the pandemic are increasing.

The Ministry’s of Migration and Asylum new draft law comes within less than 4 months since the entry into force (January 1, 2020) of L. 4636/2019 "On International Protection”, i.e. the law that entailed extensive changes of the Greek asylum law, which in itself is not an example of good law-making, and which in practice invalidates the invoked purpose of systematizing and codifying the relevant legislation (see explanatory memorandum law 4636/2019).

In addition, despite the fact that L. 4636/2019 has been consistently and substantively criticized by all national and international bodies and civil society organisations, due its numerous problematic regulations having led to deregulating the Greek asylum system, weakening the safeguards of refugee protection in Greece and “placing people in need of international protection in danger”,[2] the proposed amendments do not, in any part, restore the extremely problematic provisions of L. 4636/2019.

On the contrary, the introduced amendments are once more and in many respects contrary to the EU acquis in the field of asylum, and in this sense constitute a direct violation of EU law and of the Asylum and Return Directives, weakening basic guarantees for persons in need of protection, introducing additional procedural obstacles and reflecting, at the legislative level, the repeatedly stated intention to generalize detention and to increase returns, by preventing actual access to international protection. Accordingly, the draft law’s title “Improving Legislation on Migration, etc.” can only be considered as a euphemism.

Amongst a set of extremely problematic provisions, the following are indicatively highlighted:

The possibility for a non-competent Service (Regional Reception and Identification Services), which unlike the Asylum Service does not have the status of an independent Agency, to register requests for international protection, without even ensuring that this procedure can be completed by properly trained staff or compliance with the necessary guarantees for properly completing the procedure (Article 5 of the draft law)

The deviation from the obligation to provide interpretation in a language that the applicant understands and the limitation of the obligation to conduct a personal interview with the applicant prior to a decision on a request for international protection (articles 7 & 11 of the draft law), in direct violation of the Procedures’ Directive (Directive 2013/32/ EU).

The proposed amendments derogate from the minimum guarantees provided by the Procedures’ Directive, allowing for a personal interview to be conducted in the official language of the applicant’s country of origin “if it proves impossible to provide interpretation in the language of his/her choice" and for a decision to be issued without having previously conducted a personal interview, “if the applicant does not wish to conduct the interview in the official language of his/her country of origin", irrespective of whether the applicant is in fact able to understand this language. It is recalled that the competent Commissioner of the European Commission recently reiterated that “as far as interpretation is concerned, the Asylum Procedure Directive provides that communication takes place in the language preferred by the applicant, unless there is another language which the applicant understands and in which he/she can communicate in a clear and concise manner”,[3] while the Directive does not, under any circumstances, infer that the language understood by the applicant is the official language of their country of origin. Syrian Kurds, who constitute the largest minority in Syria and who largely do not speak/understand the official language of their state (Arabic), but only the Kurdish dialect kurmanji, are a typical such case. It is further noted that the cases under which a first instance asylum decision can be issued without conducting a personal interview are restrictively regulated under Article 14 of Directive 2013/32/EU. The proposed omission of the personal interview, under Article 11 of the draft law, does not constitute one of the cases provided in the Directive, nor is it left at the Member States’ discretion to foresee additional exceptions to the obligation to conduct a personal interview. In any case, the possibility of issuing a decision without conducting a personal interview with the applicant places asylum seekers at increased risk of return, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

The obstruction of the right to legal aid and the right to effective remedies (article 9 of the draft law). As has been repeatedly documented, to date, the Greek authorities have yet to ensure real access to free legal aid at second instance, as is enshrined in EU law. On the contrary, in 2019 only 33% of asylum seekers who appealed a negative decision were able to benefit from free legal aid at second instance, and only 21% in 2018. [4] A fact that demonstrates “an administrative practice that is incompatible with EU law, and which to an extent is of a permanent and genera nature”. [5]

However and instead of taking all necessary measures to ensure the right to free legal aid, the proposed amendment introduces an additional restriction on this right, requiring for applicants to submit, within a very short and exclusive period of two days, after the notification of their negative decision, an application for legal aid, which is granted by the President of the Appeals Committee “only if it is considered probable for the appeal to succeed.” In this case, and in order to provide legal assistance to the applicant, the appointed lawyer has the opportunity to submit a memorandum, which can exclusively include “belated (οψιφανείς and και οψιγενείς)” claims.

Specifically, it is noted that a) The amendment reverses the rule and standard of proof set out in Article 20 (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, which states that “Member States may provide that free legal assistance and representation not be granted where the applicant’s appeal is considered by a court or tribunal or other competent authority to have no tangible prospect of success", instead providing that legal assistance is restricted not in case where the appeal “has no tangible prospects of success”, but in case it is merely “presumed that the appeal has no prospects of success”.

b) The amendment of article 9 of the draft law introduces an additional procedural obstacle to accessing legal aid and the right to an effective remedy, in what concerns the applicants, as well as added workload in what concerns the Appeals Committees. Applicants are required to submit a request in Greek (and for that matter, within a deadline of only two days from the moment the decision has been notified), following which the existence of the substantial preconditions for the provision of free legal aid shall be examined. Without the assistance of a lawyer, without specialized legal knowledge and without knowledge of the language, it is obvious that this request, in the oumost favorable event, will necessarily be limited to a standardised form, essentially depriving the applicant of the opportunity to develop the reasons his/her meeting, in the specific case, the substantial reasons for being granted legal aid.

(c) In the proposed amendment it is stated that the request for legal aid is “examined by the President of the Committee, before which the appeal is pending” and “is granted only if the appeal is presumed likely to be successful”, whereas if the request is granted, the lawyer that represents the applicant, in the context of legal aid, can only "submit a memorandum on the appeal, with which they can make “belated and posterior (οψιφανείς and και οψιγενείς) claims”. Based on this, it appears as if the provision indicates that the request for legal aid is submitted after the appeal has already been lodged (as, otherwise, neither a determination of the appeal can take place, nor can the probability of success of an appeal that has yet to be lodged be examined). However, it is recalled that in accordance with Article 93 (c) L. 4636/2019, the appeal must inter alia cite the “specific reasons on which the appeal is based”, which in itself requires the drafting of a legal document in Greek, [6] unless the appeal is to be rejected as inadmissible; i.e. rejected without previously having examined the substance of the appeal. Consequently, even in the event that the request for free legal aid is ultimately granted, the content of the legal aid ends up being devoid of meaning, in violation of Article 20 (1) of Directive 2013/32/ EU, which provides that free legal assistance “shall include, at least, the preparation of the required procedural documents […]“. By contrast, in accordance with the introduced amendment, the lack of “specific reasons” in the initial appeal cannot be remedied by the appointed lawyer, nor is a possibility to develop any potential claims in the memorandum even provided, as currently provided by article 99 L. 4636/2019; instead, the lawyer can only make “belated (οψιφανείς και οψιγενείς) claims” that is new or subsequent arguments, under an obvious and actual fear that, even after granting free legal aid, the appeal can be rejected as inadmissible; i.e. without examining the merits of the applicant’s claims at second instance, practically depriving the applicant of actual access to an effective remedy, in violation of Directive 2013/33/EU and article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The retroactive abolition of the possibility for the applicant to be referred for the issuance of a residence permit on humanitarian grounds, in case their application for international protection is rejected (Article 33). The possibility of referral for the issuance of a residence permit on humanitarian grounds is to this day an important safeguard and complements the Greek state’s obligations in view of its international commitments to protect individuals who, although not recognized as beneficiaries of international protection, fall under the non-refoulement principle (eg. unaccompanied minors, persons with special connection with the country - right to private or family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, serious health reasons) that prevent their removal. The abolition of the relevant provision contributes to creating a significant group of persons who cannot be removed from the country, yet whom being deprived fundamental rights, remain in a prolonged state of insecurity and peril.

The generalization of the possibility to impose detention measures and the reduction of basic guarantees when imposing such a measure (articles 2, 21 and 52 of the draft law). The proposed amendments attempt a further strictening of legislation with respect to the imposition of detention measures, in violation of fundamental guarantees enshrined in EU law and international human rights law. Indicatively, article 2 proposes the abolition of the obligation to provide “full and thorough reasoning” when ordering the detention of asylum seekers. The provision of article 52 attempts to reverse the rule that administrative detention in view of return is applied, exclusively, as an exceptional measure, and only if the possibility of implementing alternatives to detention has been exhausted, while at the same time attempts to limit the control of legality. In view of CJEU case law, based on which the Return Directive foresees “a gradation of the measures to be taken in order to enforce the return decision, a gradation which goes from the measure which allows the person concerned the most liberty, namely granting a period for his voluntary departure, to measures which restrict that liberty the most, namely detention in a specialised facility",[7] the proposed provision is in check for compliance with the minimum standards of protection guaranteed by the EU.

[1] “Improvements on the Legislation on Migration, amendments of provisions of laws 4636/2019 (A ’169), 4375/2016 (A’ 51), 4251/2014 (A ’80) and other provisions”.

[2] See UNHCR, UNHCR urges Greece to strengthen safeguards in draft asylum law, 24 October 2019, available at: ▻https://www.unhcr.org/gr/en/13170-unhcr-urges-greece-to-strengthen-safeguards-in-draft-asylum-law.html; GNCHR Observations [in Greek] on the Draft Law of the Ministry of Citizen Protection: “On International Protection: provisions on the recognition and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, on a single status for refugees or for persons entitled to subsidiary protection and on the content of the protection provided, unification of provisions on the reception of applicants for international protection, the procedure for granting and revoking the status of international protection, restructuring of judicial protection for asylum seekers and other provisions”, 24 October 2019, available at: ▻http://www.nchr.gr/images/pdf/apofaseis/prosfuges_metanastes/Paratiriseis%20EEDA%20sto%20nomosxedio%20gia%20Asylo%2024.10.2019.pdf; GCR, GCR’s comments on the draft bill “On International Protection, 22 October 2019, available at: ▻https://www.gcr.gr/media/k2/attachments/GCR_on_bill_about_International_Protection_en.pdf.

[3] P-004017/2019, Commissioner Johansson’s reply on behalf of the European Commission, 5 February 2020, available at: ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2019-004017-ASW_EL.pdf

[4] AIDA Report on Greece, Update 2019, forthcoming and AIDA Report on Greece, Update 2018, March 2019, available at: ►https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece.

[5] See case C‑525/14, Commission v Czech Republic, EU C 2016 714, recital 14.

[6] Indicatively, see GCR, GCR’s comments on the draft bill “On International Protection”, op. cit.

[7] CJEU, El Dridi, C-61/11, recital 41.

▻https://www.gcr.gr/en/news/press-releases-announcements/item/1434-gcr-s-comments-on-the-draft-law-amending-asylum-legislation

Asylum-seekers in Evros center protest asylum procedures delays

Young asylum-seekers rioted on Tuesday morning in the Reception and Identification Center of #Fylakio in northern Evros. They set mattresses in the ward for unaccompanied minors on fire and it needed the intervention of the fire service extinguish the blaze.

The riots started short before 10 o’ clock. Police forces rushed to the center to restore the order..

Nobody was injured, yet significant material damage was reportedly caused.

According to state broadcaster ERT TV, the protest was staged against the delays in asylum procedures and the extension of the lockdown in refugees centers until May 21.

Local media report adds also the living conditions as one of the reasons for the protest.

https://i0.wp.com/www.keeptalkinggreece.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/evroskyt.jpg?w=560&ssl=1#.jpg

Grèce : prison ferme pour deux demandeurs d’asile accusés de violences dans un camp

Deux demandeurs d’asile afghans ont été condamnés jeudi 14 mai par la justice grecque à six ans et huit mois de prison ferme pour des violences commises lors d’une manifestation dans le camp de Fylakio, au nord du pays.

Ils réclamaient l’accélération du traitement de leur demande d’asile, ils ont obtenu de la prison ferme.

Deux demandeurs d’asile originaires d’Afghanistan, âgés de 22 et 23 ans, ont écopé jeudi en Grèce de peines de six ans et huit mois de prison pour violences, trouble à l’ordre public, possession et utilisation illégale d’armes.

Mardi 12 mai, des migrants avaient exprimé leur mécontentement en mettant le feu à des matelas et en agressant des policiers présents dans le camp de Fylakio (▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/24711/grece-des-demandeurs-d-asile-manifestent-contre-la-lenteur-du-traiteme), à la frontière gréco-turque. Selon les forces de l’ordre appelées à la barre lors de l’audience de jeudi, plusieurs personnes les ont attaquées avec des tournevis, des lames métalliques et des haches.

Vingt-six autres demandeurs d’asile, qui avaient également été interpellés par la police grecque lors de cette manifestation, seront jugés ultérieurement.

La centaine de migrants, dont des mineurs isolés, hébergés dans le centre de Fylakio y sont détenus le temps du traitement de leur dossier d’asile. Certains attendent depuis plus de six mois l’examen de leur demande.

La pandémie de coronavirus a aggravé les retards déjà existants dans le traitement des dossiers, les services d’asile fonctionnant au ralenti ces dernières semaines.

Athènes a été critiqué à plusieurs reprises par des ONG de défense des droits de migrants et réfugiés pour les défaillances chroniques de son système d’octroi d’asile et les conditions de vie épouvantables dans les camps de réfugiés surpeuplés.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/24782/grece-prison-ferme-pour-deux-demandeurs-d-asile-accuses-de-violences-d

#Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 décembre 2020 sur la mise en œuvre du règlement #Dublin_III (2019/2206(INI))

Extrait :

Les procédures de transfert ont fortement augmenté en 2016-2017 et génèrent des coûts humains, matériels et financiers considérables ; déplore toutefois que les transferts n’aient été effectués que dans 11 % des cas, ce qui aggrave encore la surcharge souvent importante des régimes d’asile et confirme le manque d’efficacité du règlement ; juge essentiels les efforts visant à garantir l’accès à l’information et des procédures rapides pour le regroupement familial et les transferts de demandeurs d’asile

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0361_FR.html

#statistiques #chiffres