• Oltre le sigle, la detenzione amministrativa si diffonde nelle procedure in frontiera e cancella il diritto di asilo ed i diritti di difesa

    1.Malgrado le pause indotte dal maltempo, continuano, e continueranno, gli arrivi dalla Tunisia e dalla Libia, e si avvicina il collasso del sistema di accoglienza già minato dai decreti sicurezza di Salvini e dal Decreto “Cutro” (legge n.50/2023). Il governo Meloni con un ennesimo decreto sicurezza, ma se ne attende un’altro per colpire i minori stranieri non accompagnati,” al fine di rendere più veloci i rimpatri”, cerca di raddoppiare i CPR e di creare di nuovi centri di detenzione amministrativa vicino ai luoghi di frontiera, meglio in località isolate, per le procedure accelerate destinate ai richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri”. La legge 50 del 2023 (già definita impropriamente “Decreto Cutro”) prevede che il richiedente asilo, qualora sia proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro, e sia entrato irregolarmente, possa essere trattenuto per 30 giorni, durante la procedura accelerata di esame della domanda di asilo presentata alla frontiera, al solo scopo di accertare il diritto ad entrare nel territorio dello Stato.

    Sul concetto di paese terzo “sicuro” non c’è ancora un accordo a livello europeo. Le conclusioni del Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea riuniti a Lussembugo lo scorso 8 giugno sono state propagandate come una vittoria della linea tenuta dal governo Meloni proprio su questo punto, ma le previsioni della legge 50/2023, in materia di trattenimento ed espulsioni, non hanno ottenuto quella “copertura europea” che il governo italiano sperava. Per questo motivo sulle “scelte detentive” più recenti del governo Meloni con riferimento ai richiedenti asilo potrebbe intervenire prima la Commissione europea e poi la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. Come sta già avvenendo per la previsione “manifesto”, di dubbia applicabilità, della garanzia finanziaria introdotta dalla legge 50 del 2023 e specificata dal Decreto legge 19 settembre 2023, n. 124, contenente Disposizioni urgenti in materia di politiche di coesione, per il rilancio dell’economia nelle aree del Mezzogiorno del Paese, nonche’ in materia di immigrazione. Una garanzia finanziaria che assieme ad altri requisiti, come la disponibilità di alloggio e documenti validi, potrebbe evitare il trattenimento amministrativo dei richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine sicuri. Secondo Amnesty International,“Si tratta di un provvedimento illegale. Non è pensabile che persone in fuga dal proprio paese possano disporre in Italia di un alloggio o di un conto in banca e quindi attivare una polizza fideiussoria. Subordinare la libertà delle persone richiedenti asilo a condizioni di fatto impraticabili configura una misura per porre coloro che arrivano in Italia automaticamente in detenzione. La detenzione automatica è arbitraria e vietata dal diritto internazionale”.

    Dunque, ciascun caso dovrà essere esaminato singolarmente, come adesso precisa la Commissione europea sull’ultimo “escamotage propagandistico” inventato dal Governo Meloni, la garanzia finanziaria che dovrebbero prestare (attraverso fideiussione) i richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine sicuri., Come se riuscissero ad avere immediatamente, subito dopo lo sbarco, la disponibilità finanziaria e i documenti di identità necessari per stipulare il contratto di fideiussione, Una norma manifesto, odiosa ma inapplicabile, dietro la quale si nascondono procedure accelerate che abbattono il diritto di asilo e rendono solo cartacee le garanzie di difesa, anche per il ricorso generalizzato alle videoconferenze, e per le difficoltà per i difensori, che vogliano davvero assolvere al loro ruolo, di ottenere tempestivamente la documentazione relativa al richiedente asilo che devono assistere in sede di convalida o per un ricorso contro la decisione di rigetto della domanda.

    2. Di fronte al fallimento delle politiche migratorie del governo Meloni, dopo l’annuncio, da parte dell’ennesimo Commissario all’emergenza, di un piano nazionale per la detenzione amministrativa, al fine di applicare “procedure accelerate in frontiera” in centri chiusi, dei richiedenti asilo, se provengono da paesi di origine definiti “sicuri”. si richiamano una serie di decreti ministeriali che hanno formato una apposita lista che non tiene conto della situazione attuale in gran parte dell’Africa, soprattutto nella fascia subsahariana, dopo lo scoppio della guerra civile in Sudan e il rovesciamento in Niger del governo sostenuto dai paesi occidentali. Non si hanno ancora notizie certe, invece, dei nuovi centri per i rimpatri (CPR) che si era annunciato sarebbero stati attivati in ogni regione italiana. Le resistenze delle amministrazioni locali, anche di destra, hanno evidentemente rallentato questo progetto dai costi enormi, per l’impianto e la gestione.

    I rimpatri con accompagnamento forzato nei primi sette mesi dell’anno sono stati soltanto 2.561 (+28,05%) rispetto ai 2.000 dello scorso anno. Nulla rispetto ad oltre 100.000 arrivi ed a oltre 70.000 richieste di asilo, conteggiati proprio il 15 agosto, quando il Viminale dà i suoi numeri, esibendo quando conviene le percentuali e lasciando nell’ombra i dati assoluti. Ed oggi i numeri sono ancora più elevati, si tratta non solo di numeri ma di persone, uomini, donne e bambini lasciati allo sbando dopo lo sbarco, che cercano soltanto di lasciare il nostro paese prima possibile. Per questo il primo CPR targato Piantedosi che si aprirà a breve potrebbe essere ubicato a Ventimiglia, vicino al confine tra Italia e Francia, mentre Svizzera ed Austria hanno già annunciato un inasprimento dei controlli di frontiera.

    La prima struttura detentiva entrata in attività lo scorso primo settembre, per dare applicazione, ancora chiamata “sperimentazione”, alle procedure accelerate in frontiera previste dal Decreto “Cutro”, è ubicata nell’area industriale tra i comuni confinanti di Pozzallo e Modica. dove da anni esiste un centro Hotspot, nella zona portuale, che opera spesso in modalità di “centro chiuso”, nel quale già da tempo è stata periodicamente limitata la libertà personale degli “ospiti”. Si tratta di una nuova struttura da 84 posti nella quale vengono rinchiusi per un mese coloro che provengono da paesi di origine definiti “sicuri”, prima del diniego sulla richiesta di protezione che si dà come scontato e del successivo tentativo di rimpatrio con accompagnamento forzato, sempre che i paesi di origine accettino la riammissione dei loro cittadini giunti irregolarmente in Italia. Le informazioni provenienti da fonti ufficiali non dicono molto, ma la natura detentiva della struttura e i suoi costi sono facilmente reperibili on line.

    In Sicilia si prevede anche l’apertura di “strutture di transito”, già appaltate, come quella che dovrebbe sorgere a Porto Empedocle, dove l’area di transito, che verrà ulteriormente potenziata, resta provvisoria, fino a quando non verrà realizzato l’hotspot a valle di contrada Caos a Porto Empedocle che sarà, come quello di Lampedusa, gestito dalla Croce Rossa. Altre “sezioni chiuse” per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi ritenuti “sicuri”, per cui si prevede un rimpatrio “veloce” potrebbero essere attivate nei centri Hotspot di Pozzallo e Lampedusa. Mentre i richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri,” in caso di arrivi massicci e di indisponibilità di posti negli Hotspot, potrebbero finire anche nei centri di permanenza per i rimpatri, come i famigerati lager di Pian del Lago (Caltanissetta) e di Trapani (MIlo), da anni spazi di trattamenti disumani, di tentativi di fuga e di abusi sulle persone trattenute. Se non si tratta di annientamento fisico (Vernichtung), ma ci sono stati anche i morti, si può documentare in molti casi l’annientamento psichico degli “ospiti”, che dopo il diniego, in caso di mancato rimpatrio, potrebbero passare mesi su mesi rinchiusi in queste strutture, magari sotto psicofarmaci, come coloro che sono sottoposti al rimpatrio con accompagnamento forzato, tra i richiedenti asilo denegati che non abbiano fatto ricorso con effetto sospensivo o lo abbiano visto respingere.

    La normativa europea impone invece il rilascio delle persone trattenute nei centri di detenzione quando è evidente che non ci sono più prospettive di rimpatrio forzato nel paese di origine (Direttiva rimpatri 2008/115/CE, art.15.4), per la mancata collaborazione degli Stati di origine che non effettuano i riconoscimenti e non forniscono i documenti di viaggio.

    Altri “centri chiusi” potrebbero essere attivati a Messina (probabilmente nei locali del Centro di accoglienza ubicato all’interno della vecchia e fatiscente Caserma Gasparro) fantasiosamente denominato “CIPSI”, Centro di primo soccorso ed identificazione, ed a Catania, dove si sono recentemente sperimentate diverse strutture provvisorie, “tensostrutture”, nelle quali i potenziali richiedenti asilo, che diventano tali con la semplice manifestazione di volontà, anche prima della formalizzazione della domanda da parte delle autorità di polizia, sono stati trattenuti per giorni in condizioni di totale privazione della libertà personale, in assenza di convalida giurisdizionale.

    3. Il fallimento del sistema italiano dei centri di detenzione amministrativa è ormai documentato da anni, e sarà ancora più evidente con l’aumento dei termini di trattenimento fino a 18 mesi (12 per i richiedenti asilo).

    Con riguardo ai nuovi centri di detenzione per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri” non sembra eludibile una rigorosa verifica della legittimità del trattenimento in sede di convalida del giudice ordinario, e non del giudice di pace, come invece sembrerebbe prevedere la legge 50/2023 (ingiustamente definita ancora oggi “Decreto Cutro), trattandosi di richiedenti asilo che chiedono di fare valere un loro diritto fondamentale, e deve essere prevista una completa base legale con la indicazione precisa delle modalità di trattenimento -che ancora manca- conformi alla normativa europea (Direttiva procedure 2013/32/UE e Direttiva Accoglienza 2013/33/UE). Rimane a tale riguardo una grave violazione del principio di legalità in materia di misure detentive, che la Corte Costituzionale non ha ancora rilevato.

    In ogni caso il trattenimento amministrativo non può essere finalizzato esclusivamente al’esame della domanda di protezione, o per accertare il diritto all’ingresso nel territorio, come sembrerebbe affermare la legge 50/2023, perchè proprio nelle circostanze di limitazione della libertà personale che si riscontrano nei centri “chiusi” risulta più difficile avere contatti con organizzazioni che difendono i diritti umani e raccogliere prove per dimostrare la fondatezza della propria richiesta. Dal tenore della legge sembrerebbe che le strutture detentive riservate ai richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine ritenuti “sicuri” siano strutture extra-territoriali, come se le persone trattenute non avessero ancora fatto ingresso nel territorio nazionale, circostanza che legittimerebbe l’aggiramento dei principi costituzionali e delle Convenzioni internazionali. Si tratta invece di luoghi che non possono sottrarsi alla giurisdizione italiana, unionale e internazionale dove i diritti e le garanzie non possono essere riconosciuti solo sul piano formale per venire poi negati nelle prassi applicate dalle autorità di polizia. Dunque è il tempo delle denunce e dei ricorsi, mentre l’opinione pubblica sembra ancora rimanere ostaggio delle politiche della paura e dell’odio. Fondamentale l’accesso civico agli atti e la possibilità di ingresso di giornalisti ed operatori umanitari indipendenti, se occorre con gruppi di parlamentari, in tutti i centri in cui si pratica la detenzione amministrativa.

    4. Vanno comunque garantiti diritti di informazione ed accesso alle procedure ordinarie, e quindi nel sistema di centri aperti di accoglienza (CAS, SAI, CPSA) per tutti i richiedenti asilo che adducano a supporto della domanda gravi motivi di carattere personale, pure se provengono da paesi terzi ritenuti sicuri.

    L’ACNUR dopo una generale considerazione positiva delle procedure accelerate in frontiera, soprattuto nei casi in cui appare maggiormente probabile l’esito positivo della domanda di protezione, “Raccomanda, tuttavia, di incanalare in procedura di frontiera (con trattenimento) solo le domande di protezione internazionale che, in una fase iniziale di raccolta delle informazioni e registrazione, appaiano manifestamente infondate.
    In particolare, la domanda proposta dal richiedente proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro non deve essere incanalata in tale iter quando lo stesso abbia invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che, nelle sue specifiche circostanze, il Paese non sia sicuro. Si sottolinea, a tal fine, la centralità di una fase iniziale di screening, volta a far emergere elementi utili alla categorizzazione delle domande (triaging) e alla conseguente individuazione della procedura più appropriata per ciascun caso”.

    I piani sui rimpatri “veloci” del governo Meloni non sono dunque applicabili su vasta scala, presentano caratteri fortemente discriminatori, ed avranno costi umani ed economici insostenibili. Se si spera negli accordi bilaterali e nel sostegno di Frontex, si dovrà comunque fare i conti con i ricorsi ai Tribunali in Italia ed in Europa, e con un ulteriore aggravamento delle crisi di legittimazione dei governi africani che accettano lo scambio della propria gente con una manciata di denaro.

    Una particolare attenzione dovrà rivolgersi alle persone vulnerabili per età, salute, genere e orientamento sessuale, ma anche per le ferite o per le torture subite durante il transito in Libia o in Tunisia. Una serie di condizioni che potrebbero di per sè legittimare il riconoscimento di uno status di protezione, a prescindere del paese di origine dal quale si è partiti.

    In ogni caso, dopo le decisioni di diniego da parte delle Commissioni territoriali, che potrebbero essere orientate da indirizzi politici, dovranno garantirsi tempi di esecuzione delle misure di allontanamento forzato che non cancellino la portata sostanziale del diritto al ricorso.

    Gli accordi bilaterali, come quelli con l’Egitto e la Tunisia, che prevedono procedure “semplificate”di rimpatrio, magari in aeroporto, senza la compiuta identificazione individuale,e senza un diritto effettivo di ricorso, vanno sospesi.

    Il provvedimento giudiziale che convalida la proroga del trattenimento deve contenere l’accertamento della sussistenza delle ragioni addotte a sostegno della richiesta (Cass. n. 5200/2023). Non si può continuare oltre con le decisioni di rigetto”fotocopia” o con le espulsioni ed i respingimenti con accompagnamento forzato adottati prima della convalida giurisdizionale. I termini di trattenimento amministrativo in assenza di una convalida giurisdizionale sono inderogabili. Come si rilevava al tempo dei centri di prima accoglienza e soccorso (CPSA) e dei Centri Hotspot, lo stesso vale oggi per i “centri di transito” e per i centri per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine ritenuti “sicuri”, nelle more delle procedure accelerate in frontiera.

    Occorre ricordare che la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo, proprio con riferimento a cittadini tunisini, nel dicembre 2016, nel caso Khlaifia e altri c. Italia, e poi ancora quest’anno, nel caso J.A. c.Italia, ha condannato il nostro Paese per violazione, tra gli altri motivi, dell’articolo 5 della Convenzione per aver trattenuto per un periodo prolungato persone appena arrivate in Italia, senza una base legale e senza la possibilità di ricorso. Con riferimento alle nuove strutture detentive che il governo Meloni si accinge ad aprire, resta da verificare il rispetto dei principi affermati dalla Corte di Strasburgo e dei diritti fondamentali, a partire dal diritto di asilo costituzionale, sanciti dalla Costituzione italiana. Sarà anche l’occasione per verificare la legittimità costituzionale di molte disposizioni del decreto “Cutro” che, fin dalla entrata in vigore del provvedimento, hanno evidenziato sotto questo profilo gravi criticità, prima ancora che riuscissero ad avere concreta applicazione.

    https://www.a-dif.org/2023/09/26/oltre-le-sigle-la-detenzione-amministrativa-si-diffonde-nelle-procedure-in-fr

    #rétention #détention_administrative #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #CPR #Italie #procédures_accélérées #pays_sûrs #pays_d'origine_sûrs #decret_Cutro #decreto_Cutro #garantie_financière #5000_EUR #5000_euros #decreto_Sud #Modica #Sicile #Porto_Empedocle #Messina #centres_fermés

    • Turning the Exception into the Rule

      Assessing Italy’s New Border Procedure

      Having promised its electorate a strong stance towards immigration, in January 2023 Italy’s new government adopted a reform that heavily curtailed immigrant rights to speed up return procedures. However, between September and October, several judgments issued by the Catania Tribunal declared it in violation of EU law (https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf). In particular, when requested to review the detention of asylum applicants, the judges found the new Italian asylum border procedure contrary to the Procedures Directive 2013/32 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032) and the Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033).

      The judgments led to a backlash, with PM Meloni and other members of the government accusing them of being politically motivated. One minister even published a video on social media showing a judge of the Catania Tribunal taking part in a pro-migrant rights demonstration in 2018, thus accusing her of partiality.

      Such political attacks (https://www.associazionemagistrati.it/doc/4037/lanm-sul-caso-catania.htm) must always be condemned, for they pose a significant threat to judicial independence and thus Italian democracy. Yet, they are particularly unwarranted given that the Catania Tribunal’s judges were correct in finding the new Italian border procedures incompatible with EU law.

      Detention as the Rule for Asylum Seekers

      The 2023 reform (https://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2023-03-10&atto.codice) of Italy’s asylum system included the introduction of an accelerated border procedure which allows for the detention (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/articolo/la-bestia-tentacolare) of asylum seekers „exclusively to determine the applicant’s right to enter the territory“ (Art. 6 bis, Law Decree 142/2015).

      This new procedure is applied when an asylum application is made „at the border or in a transit zone“ by a person who either a) evaded or attempted to evade border controls, or b) hails from a safe country of origin, which were determined by a Ministerial Decree in 2019 (https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2019/10/decreto_paesi_sicuri.pdf), later updated in 2023 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/03/25/23A01952/sg).

      Another Ministerial Decree (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) identified the „border and transit zones“ where the border procedure can be used, without providing a clear definition of these concepts nor explaining the distinction between them. Instead, it lists 16 provinces where the procedure applies (Trieste, Gorizia, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi, Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Syracuse, Catania, Messina, Trapani, Agrigento, Cagliari, and South Sardinia).

      Finally, the law specifies that asylum seekers are to be detained unless they submit a passport (or equivalent document) or provide a financial guarantee of € 4,938.00 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/09/21/23A05308/sg). This amount was allegedly calculated with reference to the cost of suitable accommodation, repatriation, and minimum means of subsistence. The sum can be provided through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, but solely by the asylum seekers themselves, not by third parties.

      [voir aussi: https://seenthis.net/messages/1018093]

      Following a recent increase in migrant flows from Tunisia, the Italian authorities extensively relied on the new border procedure to detain several Tunisian citizens on the ground that they come from a “safe country of origin” (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/rivista/articolo/la-protezione-dei-cittadini-stranieri-provenienti-da-cd-paesi-sic). However, on September 29 (https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf) and October 8 (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/data/doc/3650/2023-tribunale-catania-8-10-2023-non-convalida-oscurato.pdf), the Catania Tribunal issued a series of similar rulings in which it annulled the detention orders because they were in conflict with EU law. In the following sections, we analyze and expand the three main arguments advanced by the Tribunal, showing that they were largely correct in their findings that the new Italian border procedure exceeds what is permissible under EU law.

      The ‘Border’ under EU Law

      The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

      In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

      Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

      By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

      The Regulation of Detention under EU Law

      The second argument of the Catania Tribunal turned on the lack of motivation for the detention orders. The applicants were detained solely because they were from Tunisia, did not submit a valid passport nor pay the bail. As such, the orders lacked any case-by-case assessment of the applicant’s individual circumstances, and they did not apply the proportionality and necessity principles, as prescribed by EU law under art. 8(2) Directive 2013/33 and art. 52 and 6 of the Charter.

      Indeed, even if a border procedure is correctly initiated, Italy’s new provisions on the detention of asylum seekers do not meet the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Reception Directive. According to the CJEU, this authorizes asylum seekers‘ detention “only where, following an assessment carried out on a case-by-case basis, that is necessary” and where other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively. (ex multis, FMS, par. 258; VL, par. 102; M.A., par. 82).

      Italy’s norms contain no reference to the principles of necessity and proportionality nor to the need for a case-by-case assessment (Art. 6 bis D. Lgs. 142/2015). In so far as the Italian provisions allow for an automatic application of detention whenever the border procedure is activated, they are incompatible with Art. 8(2) of the Reception Directive. In light of the primacy and direct effect of EU law, Italian public authorities are required to give direct application to the principles of proportionality and necessity and to carry out an individual assessment, even if not directly foreseen by Italian law.
      The Possibility of Bail

      Finally, the Catania Tribunal argued that the financial guarantee to avoid detention is contrary to EU law. The Tribunal observed that the guarantee is not used as an alternative measure to detention, but rather as an ‚administrative requirement‘ that, if not complied with, leads to detention. According to the judge, this renders it incompatible with Articles 8 and 9 of the Reception Directive 2013/33 which “preclude[s] an applicant for international protection being placed in detention on the sole ground that he or she is unable to provide for his or her needs.”(at 256).

      As rightly noted by Savino, EU law does not prohibit the use of financial guarantees; to the contrary, Article 8(4) mentions it as a legitimate alternative to detention. However, both scholars and the European Asylum Agency maintain that the guarantee shall be proportionate to the means of the applicant in order to avoid discriminatory effects. The EUAA Guidelines on asylum seeker detention further specify that:

      “the amount should be tailored to individual circumstances, and therefore be reasonable given the particular situation of asylum seekers, and not so high as to lead to discrimination against persons with limited funds. Any failure to be able to do so resulting in detention (or its continuation), would suggest that the system is arbitrary.”

      It is doubtful whether the financial guarantee in its current legal design can be considered an “effective” alternative to detention (Art.8(4)). Its high amount (€4,938.00) and procedural requirements make it practically impossible for asylum applicants to rely upon it. In particular, they are required to deposit the sum upon arrival, through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, which are concretely impossible for them to obtain. Moreover, the financial guarantee is the only alternative to detention provided by the new Italian law, while migrants detained under other circumstances can rely upon more alternative measures.

      Taken together, it means that the measure is designed in a discriminatory way and is neither effective nor proportionate.

      Concluding Thoughts

      Several aspects of the new law foresee a system in which the border procedure is systematically applied, rendering detention the rule, instead of the exception. This follows from the geographic expansion of the “borders areas and transit zones”, the automatic (indiscriminate) application of the safe country of origin concept, the lack of a proportionality assessment, and the practical impossibility of applying the only alternative measure foreseen.

      More and more Italian courts are annulling detention orders, on the grounds that the Italian border procedure is in conflict with EU law. While the Italian government considers this an unacceptable form of judicial activism, this blog has shown that the judges’ concerns are well-founded.

      Member States’ courts are “EU law judges”, they must give precedence to EU law and general principles and set aside any incompatible national law. The recent personal attacks against some of the judges show that the government struggles to come to terms with this thick form of judicial review which takes seriously European and human rights standards.

      https://verfassungsblog.de/turning-the-exception-into-the-rule
      #exception #justice #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #décret #procédure_accélérée #garantie_financière #5000_EUR #chantage #caution #decreto_Cutro #décret_Cutro #5000_euros #tribunal_de_Catane #procédure_frontière #directive_procédures #zone_de_transit #proximité #distance #zone_frontalière #directive_retour #frontière_extérieure #fiction_de_non-entrée

      –-

      La partie sur les frontières ajouté à cette métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/795053

  • #métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements

    Je viens de lire dans un compte-rendu de réunion qui a eu lieu à Milan en juin 2019, ce commentaire, sur la situation à la #frontière italo-slovène :

    Gianfranco Schiavone :

    «Quello che sicuramente dovrebbe diventare una questione delicata é l’annunciato avvio delle pattuglie italo slovene in frontiera con l’obiettivo dichiarato alla stampa di bloccare gli arrivi. Con riammissione senza formalita’ delle persone irregolari intercettate nella fascia dei 5 km dalla frontiera . Queste sono le dichiarazioni pubbliche di questi giorni»

    Une #zone_frontalière de #5_km dans laquelle ont lieu des #refoulements directs.

    #Italie #Slovénie #frontière_sud-alpine #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontière_mobile #bande_frontalière #frontières_mobiles #zone_frontalière #zones_frontalières #zone-frontière

    Ceci me rappelle d’autres cas, en Europe et ailleurs, dans lesquels des procédures semblables (la frontière n’est plus une #ligne, mais une #zone) ont été mises en place, j’essaie de les mettre sur ce fil de discussion.
    Si quelqu’un a d’autres cas à signaler, les contributions sont bienvenues...

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4 @isskein

    • A la frontière entre franco-italienne :

      Dans un amendement, l’élu a proposé « une zone limitée aux communes limitrophes ou une bande de 10 kms par rapport à la frontière. » Le gouvernement en a accepté le principe, mais « le délimitera de manière précise par décret pour coller à la réalité du terrain. »

      http://alpesdusud.alpes1.com/news/locales/67705/alpes-du-sud-refus-d-entree-pour-les-migrants-vers-une-evolution-
      #France #Italie #frontière_sud-alpine

    • L’article 10 de la loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme modifie l’article 78-2 du Code de procédure pénale relatif aux contrôles d’identités. Il permet ainsi des contrôles aux frontières pour une durée de douze heures consécutives (contre six auparavant). Il les élargit « aux abords » de 373 gares et dans un rayon de dix kilomètres des ports et aéroports au nombre des points de passage frontaliers. Bien au-delà des simples frontières de l’Hexagone, c’est une partie importante du territoire français qui est ainsi couvert, dont des villes entières comme Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, etc.

      source, p.25 : https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf
      #France

    • Frontière entre #Italie et #Slovénie :

      This month saw the introduction of joint Slovenian and Italian police patrols on their mutual border, raising concerns about the retrenchment of national boundaries contra the Schengen Agreement. The collaboration between authorities, due to be implemented until the end of September, mobilises four joint operations per week, with respective police forces able to enter 10km into the territory of their neighboring state in order to apprehend migrants. Mixed operations by member states signifies a growing trend towards the securitization of the EU’s internal borders, and in this case a tightening of controls on the departure point from the West Balkan route.

      The patrols aim at stemming the transit of migrants from the western Slovenian regions of #Goriška and #Obalno-kraška, into the eastern region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy. Given the extensive pushback apparatus being employed by Slovenian and Croatian officials, arrival in Italy has often been the first place where persons-in-transit can apply for international protection without the threat of summary removal. However, these developments in cross border patrols highlight a growing effort on the part of the Italian government to prevent people seeking sanctuary on its territory.

      (p.15-16)

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/July-2019-Final-Report.pdf

      –—

      While the exact number of persons arriving via the Slovenian-Italian border is unknown, there has been a sharp rise since April (http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2020/11/09/friuli-venezia-giulia-immigrazione-fedriga-ripensare-politiche-di-controllo-) of people entering Italy from the Balkan route. Not only in Trieste, but also around the province of #Udine, arrivals have increased compared to last year. In Udine, around 100 people (https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/11/30/migranti-oltre-cento-persone-rintracciate-nelludinese_9fdae48d-8174-4ea1-b221-8) were identified in one day. This has been met with a huge rise in chain pushbacks, initiated by Italian authorities via readmissions to Slovenia. From January to October 2020, 1321 people (https://www.rainews.it/tgr/fvg/articoli/2020/11/fvg-massimiliano-fedriga-migranti-arrivi-emergenza-98da1880-455e-4c59-9dc9-6) have been returned via the informal readmissions agreement , representing a fivefold increase when compared with the statistics from 2019.

      But instead of dealing with this deficit in adherence to international asylum law, in recent months Italian authorities have only sought to adapt border controls to apprehend more people. Border checks are now focusing on trucks, cars and smaller border crossings (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu4es3xXVc8&feature=youtu.be

      ), rather than focusing solely on the military patrols of the forested area. This fits into a strategy of heightened control, pioneered by the Governor of the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region Massimiliano Fedriga who hopes to deploy more detection equipment at the border. The aim is to choke off any onward transit beyond the first 10km of Italian territory, and therefore apply the fast tracked process of readmission to the maximum number of new arrivals.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/892914

      #10_km

    • Kuster Backs Bill To Reduce 100-Mile Zone for Border Patrol Checkpoints

      Congresswoman Ann McLane Kuster is cosponsoring legislation to reduce border zones from 100 to 25 miles from the border (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3852?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22border+zone%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1), within which U.S. Customs and Border Patrol can set up immigration checkpoints.

      Congressman Peter Welch of Vermont is the prime sponsor of the legislation.

      Kuster was stopped at one such immigration checkpoint in June of this year. The checkpoint, on I-93 in Woodstock, around 90 miles from the border, resulted in 29 tickets for alleged immigration violations.

      The violations were for legal visitors who did not have appropriate paperwork on them, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

      According to a map from CityLabs, the entire state of New Hampshire falls within a border zone (which includes coastal borders).

      “I think it has a chilling effect,” says Kuster. “It’s not the free and open America that we know.”

      Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a similar bill to the Senate.

      https://www.nhpr.org/post/kuster-backs-bill-reduce-100-mile-zone-border-patrol-checkpoints#stream/0
      #USA #Etats-Unis

    • Inside the Massive U.S. ’Border Zone’

      All of Michigan, D.C., and a large chunk of Pennsylvania are part of the area where Border Patrol has expanded search and seizure rights. Here’s what it means to live or travel there.

      https://cdn.citylab.com/media/img/citylab/2018/05/03_Esri_Map/940.png?mod=1548686763

      https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/who-lives-in-border-patrols-100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275
      #cartographie #visualisation
      #100-Mile_Zone

      déjà signalé sur seenthis par @reka en 2018 :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/727225

    • En #Hongrie, les pushbacks, largement pratiqués depuis des années, ont été légalisés en mars 2017 par de nouvelles dispositions permettant aux forces de l’ordre de refouler automatiquement toute personne interpellée sur le territoire hongrois et considérée en situation irrégulière. Ces personnes sont ramenées jusqu’à la clôture et renvoyées de l’autre côté. Si elles manifestent leur volonté de demander l’asile, on leur signifie qu’elles doivent repartir en Serbie et passer par les zones de transit. Pourtant, se trouvant géographiquement et juridiquement en Hongrie (le mur étant situé à 1,5 mètre à l’intérieur du tracé officiel de la frontière), les autorités ont l’obligation de prendre en compte ces demandes d’asile en vertu des conventions européennes et des textes internationaux dont la Hongrie est signataire.

      Tiré du rapport de La Cimade (2018), pp.37-38 :
      https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf

    • Le zone di transito e di frontiera – commento dell’ASGI al decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019

      Il 7 settembre 2009 sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 210 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) è stato pubblicato il decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019 che individua le zone di transito e di frontiera dove potrà trovare applicazione la procedura accelerata per l’esame nel merito delle domande di protezione internazionale e istituisce due nuove sezioni delle Commissioni territoriali , come previsto dall’art. 28 bis co. 1 quater del D.lgs. n. 25/2008, introdotto dal d.l. n. 113/2018.

      Le zone di frontiera o di transito sono individuate in quelle esistenti nelle seguenti province:

      –Trieste e Gorizia;

      –Crotone, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce e Brindisi;

      –Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Siracusa, Catania, Messina;

      –Trapani, Agrigento;

      –Città metropolitana di Cagliari e Sud Sardegna.

      Il decreto ministeriale istituisce altresì due nuove sezioni , Matera e Ragusa, le quali operano rispettivamente nella commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato di Bari, per la zona di frontiera di Matera, e nella commissione territoriale di Siracusa, per la zona di frontiera di Ragusa.

      Nel commento qui pubblicato ASGI sottolinea come le nuove disposizioni paiono contrastare con le norme dell’Unione Europea perché si riferiscono in modo assolutamente generico alle “zone di transito o di frontiera individuate in quelle esistenti nelle province” e non ad aree delimitate, quali ad esempio i porti o le aree aeroportuali o altri luoghi coincidenti con frontiere fisiche con Paesi terzi non appartenenti all’Unione europea.

      ASGI evidenzia come “l’applicazione delle procedure accelerate alle domande presentate nelle zone individuate nel decreto ministeriale comporta una restrizione dell’effettivo esercizio dei diritti di cui ogni straniero è titolare allorché manifesta la volontà di presentare la domanda di asilo e una conseguente contrazione del diritto di difesa, in ragione del dimezzamento dei termini di impugnazione e dell’assenza di un effetto sospensivo automatico derivante dalla proposizione del ricorso previsti, in modo differente per le varie ipotesi specifiche, dall’art. 35 bis D. Lgs. 25/08”.

      A tal fine ASGI ricorda che:

      – ai cittadini di Paesi terzi o apolidi tenuti in centri di trattenimento o presenti ai valichi di frontiera, comprese le zone di transito alla frontiere esterne, che desiderino presentare una domanda di protezione internazionale, gli Stati membri devono garantire l’informazione, anche sull’accesso procedura per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, adeguati servizi di interpretariato,
      nonché l’effettivo accesso a tali aree alle organizzazioni e alle persone che prestano consulenza e assistenza ai richiedenti asilo (art. 8 Direttiva 2013/32/UE);

      – gli Stati membri devono provvedere affinché l’avvocato o altro consulente legale che assiste o rappresenta un richiedente possa accedere alle aree chiuse, quali i centri di trattenimento e le zone di transito (art. 23 par. 2) e analoga possibilità deve essere garantita all’UNHCR (art. 29, par. 1);

      – ai sensi dell’art. 46 par. 1 il richiedente ha diritto a un ricorso effettivo dinanzi a un giudice anche nel caso in cui la decisione sulla domanda di protezione internazionale venga presa in frontiera o nelle zone di transito.

      E’ evidente, conclude ASGI nel commento al Decreto, che vi sia il rischio che lo straniero espulso o respinto e che abbia presentato domanda di protezione internazionale dopo l’espulsione o il respingimento in una zona di frontiera tra quelle indicate nel nuovo decreto ministeriale si veda esaminata la sua domanda in modo sommario mentre è trattenuto in condizioni e luoghi imprecisati e inaccessibili di fatto a difensori e organizzazioni di tutela dei diritti.

      Occorre invece ribadire che la presentazione della domanda di protezione internazionale in frontiera riguarderà spesso persone rese ulteriormente vulnerabili dalle condizioni traumatiche del viaggio ed alle quali andrà perciò in ogni caso garantito un esame adeguato della domanda di protezione internazionale e l’applicazione delle garanzie e dei diritti previsti a tutela dei richiedenti protezione internazionale dalle disposizioni nazionali e dell’Unione Europea.

      https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/asilo-zone-transito-frontiera

    • La loi renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme étend à nouveau les contrôles d’identités frontaliers

      Avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi du 30 octobre 2017, les #contrôles_frontaliers étaient autorisés dans les espaces publics des #gares, #ports et #aéroports ouverts au trafic international (désignés par un arrêté ministériel) et dans une zone située entre la frontière terrestre et une ligne tracée de 20 kilomètres en deçà. Le législateur avait étendu les zones frontalières, notamment dans les territoires ultra-marins (où la convention de Schengen n’est pourtant pas applicable).

      https://www.editions-legislatives.fr/actualite/la-loi-renforcant-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-etend-a-nouvea
      #France #20_km #20_kilomètres #espace_public #gares_internationales

    • The Grand Chamber Judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary: Immigration Detention and how the Ground beneath our Feet Continues to Erode

      The ECtHR has been for a long time criticized for its approach to immigration detention that diverts from the generally applicable principles to deprivation of liberty in other contexts. As Cathryn Costello has observed in her article Immigration Detention: The Ground beneath our Feet, a major weakness in the Court’s approach has been the failure to scrutinize the necessity of immigration detention under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary delivered on 21 November 2019 has further eroded the protection extended to asylum-seekers under the Convention to the point that restrictions imposed upon asylum-seekers might not even be qualified as deprivation of liberty worthy of the protection of Article 5. The Grand Chamber overruled on this point the unanimously adopted Chamber judgment that found that the holding of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ between Hungary and Serbia actually amounts to deprivation of liberty.

      In this blog, I will briefly describe the facts of the case, the findings of the Grand Chamber under Article 3 ECHR that was also invoked by the applicants and then I will focus on the reasoning as to the applicability of Article 5.

      The case concerned two Bangladeshi nationals who transited through Greece, the Republic of Northern Macedonia (as it is now known) and Serbia before reaching Hungary, where they immediately applied for asylum. They found themselves in the transit zone on the land border between Hungary and Serbia, where they were held for 23 days pending the examination of their asylum applications. The applications were rejected on the same day on the ground that the applicants had transited through Serbia that, according to Hungary, was a safe third country. The rejections were confirmed on appeal, an order for their expulsion was issued, the applicants were escorted out of the transit zone and they crossed back into Serbia.

      Procedural Breach of Article 3 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber established that Hungary ‘failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision before removing the applicants from Hungary’ to Serbia (para 163). No finding was made on the issue as to whether Hungary was substantively in breach of the right not to be subjected to refoulement given the conditions in Serbia and the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedures that might lead to chain refoulement. This omission follows a trend in the Court’s reasoning that can be described as a procedural turn: focus on the quality of the national decision making processes rather than on the substantive accuracy of the decisions taken at national level.[1] This omission, however, had important consequences for the application of Article 5 to the applicants’ case, the most controversial aspect in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning.

      The Chamber’s reasoning under Article 5 ECHR

      On this aspect, the Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber’s conclusion that the applicants were deprived of their liberty. The fundamental question here is whether ‘the stay’ (Hungary used the term ‘accommodation’) of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ with an exit door open to Serbia, but closed to Hungary, amounts to deprivation of liberty (i.e. detention) in the sense of Article 5 ECHR. Asylum seekers in the transit zone were denied access to the Hungarian territory,[2] but they could leave to Serbia. This creates a complex intertwinement between deprivation of liberty (Article 5(1)(f)) normally understood as not allowing somebody to leave a place, on the one hand, and not allowing somebody to enter a place. Entering a State can be very relevant from the perspective of the obligation upon this State not to refoule, which necessitates a procedure for determining whether there is a risk of refoulement.

      In its judgment from 14 March 2017 the Chamber unanimously answered in positive: by holding them in the transit zone, Hungary deprived the applicants from their liberty, which was in violation of Article 5(1)(f) since this measures had no legal basis in the national law. The Chamber clarified that‘[t]he mere fact that it was possible for them to leave voluntarily returning to Serbia which never consented to their readmission cannot rule out an infringement of the right to liberty.’ (para 55). In this way the Chamber reaffirmed the reasoning in Amuur v France where the Court observed ‘[…] this possibility [to leave voluntary the country] becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.’ (para 48) It follows that although the transit zone at the French airport was, as France argued, “open to the outside”, the applicants were still considered as having been detained since this ‘outside’ did not offer a level of protection comparable to the one in France.

      The Chamber followed this reasoning from Amuur v France in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, which led to the recognition that ‘[…] the applicants could not have left the transit zone in the direction of Serbia without unwanted and grave consequences, that is, without forfeiting their asylum claims and running the risk of refoulement’ (para 55). The Chamber also added that ‘To hold otherwise would void the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention by compelling the applicants to choose between liberty and the pursuit of a procedure ultimately aimed to shelter them from the risk of exposure to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.’ (para 56)

      The ‘practical and realistic’ approach of the Grand Chamber under Article 5 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber in its reasoning broke precisely this linkage between the applicability of Article 5 (the qualification of a treatment as deprivation of liberty) and Article 3 (protection from refoulement). The Grand Chamber performed the following important moves to achieve this. First, it stated that ‘its approach should be practical and realistic, having regard to the present-day conditions and challenges’, which implied that States were not only entitled to control their borders, but also ‘to take measures against foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration.’ (para 213). With Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Court has thus added another nuance to its well-established point of departure in cases dealing with migrants. This point of departure has been that States are entitled, subject to their treaty obligations, to control their borders. The new addition introduced with Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary and also repeated in Z.A. and Others v Russia, a Grand Chamber judgment issued on the same day, concerns States’ right to prevent ‘foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration’. This addition, however, does not seem appropriate given that the applicants themselves in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary never circumvented any immigration control restrictions. They applied immediately for asylum.

      This ‘practical and realistic approach’ also implied an endorsement of the representation of the situation as one of ‘crisis’:[3] ‘the Court observes that the Hungarian authorities were in conditions of a mass influx of asylum-seekers and migrants at the border, which necessitated rapidly putting in place measures to deal with what was clearly a crisis situation.’ (para 228) In the same paragraph, the Grand Chamber went on to almost praise Hungary for having processed the applicants’ claims so fast event though it was ‘a crisis’: ‘Despite the ensuring very significant difficulties, the applicants’ asylum claims and their judicial appeals were examined within three weeks and two days.’ It appears as if the Grand Chamber at this stage had already forgotten its findings made earlier in the judgment under Article 3 that the national procedure for examining the applicants’ claims was deficient. This ultimately gave the basis for the Grand Chamber to find a violation of Article 3.

      The distinction based on how asylum-seekers arrive and the type of border they find themselves at

      The second move performed by the Grand Chamber implied the introduction of a distinction between ‘staying at airport transit zones’ (para 214) and at reception centers located on islands (para 216), on the one hand, and a transit zone located on the land border between two Council of Europe Member States (para 219). This meant, as the Court reasoned, that the applicants did not have to take a plane to leave the zone, they could simply walk out of the zone. In other words, it was practically possible for them to do it on their own and they did not need anybody’s help. As the Court continued to reason in para 236, ‘Indeed, unlike the case of Amuur, where the French courts described the applicants’ confinement as an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty”, in the present case the Hungarian authorities were apparently convinced that the applicants could realistically leave in the direction of Serbia [emphasis added].’ This quotation also begs the comment as to why what the national authorities were or were not convinced about actually mattered. In addition, the reference in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary as to how the national authorities had qualified the situation is also bizarre given that ‘deprivation of liberty’ is an autonomous concept under the Convention. On this point, the two dissenting judges, Judge Bianku and Judge Vućinić criticized the majority by highlighting that ‘the Court has reiterated on many occasions that it does not consider itself bound by the domestic courts’ legal conclusions as to the existence of a deprivation of liberty.’

      Narrowing down the importance of Amuur v France

      The third move performed by the Court is playing down the importance of and narrowing the relevance of Amuur v France. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Grand Chamber reiterated (para 239) the most significant pronouncement from Amuur: the possibility to leave the zone ‘becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is included to take them in.’ It then noted that this reasoning ‘must be read in close relation to the factual and legal context in that case.’ This meant that in contrast to the situation in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, in Amuur the applicants could not leave ‘without authorization to board an airplane and without diplomatic assurance concerning their only possible destination, Syria, a country “not bound by the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ (para 240) On this point Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary can be also distinguished from Z.A. and Others v Russia, where the Grand Chamber observed that ‘[…] unlike in land border transit zones, in this particular case leaving the Sheremetyevo airport transit zone would have required planning, contacting aviation companies, purchasing tickets and possibly applying for a visa depending on the destination.’ (para 154) For the applicants in Ilias and Ahmed ‘it was practically possible […] to walk to the border and cross into Serbia, a country bound by the Geneva Convention.’ (para 241). The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the applicants feared of the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedure and the related risk of removal to the Republic of North Macedonia or Greece. (para 242) However, what seems to be crucial is that their fears were not related to ‘direct threat to their life or health’ (para 242). It follows that the possibility to leave for a place will not preclude the qualification of the situation as one of detention, only if this place poses a direct threat to life or health.

      As noted by the two dissenting judges, it did not seem to matter for the majority that the applicants could not enter Serbia lawfully. In this way, the majority’s reasoning under Article 5 appears to endorse a situation where people are just pushed out of the border without some formal procedures with elementary guarantees.

      Read as a whole the Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary is inconsistent: it contains two findings that are difficult to square together. The Court concluded that since the applicants would not be exposed to a direct risk in Serbia, they were not detained in Hungary. At the same time, Hungary violated Article 3 of the Convention since it did not conduct a proper assessment of the risks that the applicants could face if they were to return to Serbia.

      Overall weakening of the protection of Article 5 ECHR

      One final comment is due. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, the Grand Chamber summarized the following factors for determining whether ‘confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones and reception centers’ can be defined as deprivation of liberty: ‘i) the applicants’ individual situation and their choices, ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose, iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events, and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants.’ (para 217) (see also Z.A. and Others v Russia, para 145) Among these criteria particular attention needs to be directed to the applicable legal regime and the availability of procedural protection. In principle, Article 5, if found applicable, offers certain guarantees (e.g. statutory basis for the deprivation of liberty, access to proceedings for challenging the lawfulness of the detention). The Court seems to have inserted such considerations at the definitional stage of its analysis. For example, in Z.A. and Others v Russia, the Grand Chamber when it examined whether the confinement of the applicants in the airport transit zone amounted to deprivation of liberty, noted that they were left ‘in a legal limbo without any possibility of challenging the measure restricting their liberty’ (para 146). This played a role for the Grand Chamber to conclude that the applicants in Z.A. and Others v Russia were indeed deprived of liberty and Article 5 was thus found applicable. In contrast, the Grand Chamber in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary observed that certain procedural guarantees applied to the applicants’ case (para 226), which also played a role for the final conclusion that Article 5 was not applicable. In sum, instead of scrutinizing the national legal regime and the access to procedural guarantees as part of the substantive analysis under Article 5, where a single deficiency leads to a finding of a violation (i.e. it is sufficient to find a violation of Article 5 if there is no strictly defined statutory basis for the applicants’ detention), the Court has muddled these criteria together with other factors and made them pertinent for the definitional analysis. This ultimately weakens the roles of these criteria and creates uncertainty.

      [1] See V Stoyanova, ‘How Exception must “Very Exceptional” Be? Non-refoulement, Socio-Economic Deprivation and Paposhvili v Belgium’ (2017) International Journal of Refugee Law 29(4) 580.

      [2] See B Nagy, ‘From Reluctance to Total Denial: Asylum Policy in Hungary 2015-2018’ in V Stoyanova and E Karageorgiou (eds) The New Asylum and Transit Countries in Europe during and in the Aftermath of the 2015/2016 Crisis (Brill 2019) 17.

      [3] Boldizsar Nagy has argued that this representation made by the Hungarian government is a lie. See B Nagy, Restricting access to asylum and contempt of courts: illiberals at work in Hungary, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/restricting-access-to-asylum-and-contempt-of-courts-illiberals-at

      https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/12/23/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-ilias-and-ahmed-v-hungary-immigra
      #justice #CEDH #Hongrie #CourEDH

    • Entre la #Pologne et la #Biélorussie :

      Si cette famille a pu être aidée, c’est aussi parce qu’elle a réussi à dépasser la zone de l’état d’urgence : une bande de 3 km tracée par la Pologne tout du long de sa frontière avec la Biélorussie, formellement interdite d’accès aux organisations comme aux journalistes.
      Le long de la frontière, les migrants se retrouvent donc seuls entre les gardes-frontières polonais et biélorusses. Côté polonais, ils sont ramenés manu militari en Biélorussie… En Biélorussie, ils sont également refoulés : depuis octobre, le pays refuse de laisser entrer les migrants déjà passés côté européen. « La seule chance de sortir de la Pologne, c’est d’entrer en Biélorussie. La seule chance de sortir de la Biélorussie, c’est d’entrer en Pologne. C’est comme un ping-pong », confie Nelson (pseudonyme), un migrant originaire de la République démocratique du Congo qui a contacté notre rédaction.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199
      et plus précisément ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948201

      –-

      Et l’article de Médiapart :
      Entre la Pologne et le Belarus, les migrants abandonnés dans une #zone_de_non-droit
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948202

    • « À titre de mesures compensatoires à l’entrée en vigueur de la convention de Schengen – qui, du reste, n’était pas encore applicable –, la loi du 10 août 1993 instaure les contrôles dits frontaliers : la police, la gendarmerie et la douane peuvent vérifier l’identité de toute personne, pour s’assurer qu’elle respecte les obligations liées à la détention d’un titre de circulation ou de séjour, dans la zone frontalière et dans les zones publiques des ports, aéroports et gares ouvertes au trafic international. La zone frontalière est une bande de terre, large de 20 km, longeant la frontière terrestre ; les ports, gares ou autres aérogares visés figurent sur une longue liste fixée par un arrêté ministériel. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 16)

      –-

      « Il suffit de passer quelques heures à la gare de Menton pour le constater. Pour les personnes présumées étrangères, la liberté d’aller et de venir dans les espaces placés sous surveillance est restreinte. Elle a encore été réduite avec la loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme qui modifie, une fois de plus, le texte de loi sur les contrôles d’identité en étendant les zones frontalières autour de certains ports et aéroports qui constituent des points de passage frontaliers au sens du code frontières Schengen, soit « tout point de passage autorisé par les autorités compétentes pour le franchissement des frontières extérieures ». Dans ces nouvelles zones, la police pourra procéder à des opérations de contrôle sans avoir besoin de motiver son intervention. La loi de 2017 a également prévu que les contrôles frontaliers puissent s’effectuer « aux abords des gares » et non plus seulement dans les zones publiques de ces lieux. La formulation souffre, c’est peu de le dire, d’un manque de précision qui donne plus de latitude encore aux forces de l’ordre. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 19)

      source : Nathalie Ferré, « La France s’enferme à double tour », Plein Droit, 2018, n°116.

      #20_km #20_kilomètres

    • #Pyrénées, frontière #Espagne-#France, témoignage d’une personne ayant acheté un terrain en zone frontalière :

      « En ce moment, on croise plein de voitures de forces de l’ordre, ce qui est étonnant en plein hiver car il n’y a personne. Il y a aussi des barrages de police réguliers car ils savent que des gens se font prendre sur la route », raconte Camille Rosa, cofondatrice d’une cantine solidaire à Perpignan. « On a acheté avec des copains un petit terrain vers Cerbère. Un jour, des gendarmes sont venus fouiller notre camion alors que mes enfants faisaient la sieste à l’intérieur. J’ai tenté de m’interposer, mais ils m’ont dit que sur la #zone_frontalière, ils avaient une #commission_rogatoire_permanente », poursuit-elle.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/950934

    • #France :

      Le contrôle d’identité « Schengen » permet de vérifier le respect des obligations liées aux titres et documents d’identité et de voyage. Il peut avoir lieu dans une zone située à moins de #20_kilomètres de la frontière terrestre séparant la France d’un pays limitrophe (Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, Luxembourg et Suisse). Si le contrôle a lieu sur l’autoroute ou dans un train, la zone s’étend jusqu’au 1er péage ou l’arrêt après les 20 kilomètres. Le contrôle peut être effectué dans un port, un aéroport ou une gare et ses abords accessible au public et ouverte au trafic international. Le contrôle ne peut pas être pratiqué plus de 12 heures consécutives dans un même lieu et ne peut pas être systématique.

      Depuis la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure, des contrôles d’identité peuvent également être effectués dans un rayon de #10_kilomètres autour de certains #ports et #aéroports sur le territoire.

      C’est ce dernier contrôle qui concerne majoritairement les personnes se présentant à la frontière francoitalienne, mais certaines situations suivies par les militants locaux laissent penser que d’autres types de contrôles ont pu servir pour justifier les arrestations de personnes au-delà de la bande des 20 kilomètres ou des zones transfrontalières.

      Rapport de l’Anafé, Persona non grata, 2019 : http://www.anafe.org/spip.php?article520

      –—

      Rapport CNCDH 2018, p.7 :

      « la préfète des Hautes-Alpes a expliqué que la zone permettant de procéder à des refus d’entrée avait été définie par son prédécesseur mais qu’elle ne correspondait pas nécessairement à la bande des 20 kms14. Selon la PAF, les refus d’entrée peuvent être prononcés dès lors que l’étranger est contrôlé sur le territoire des communes de Montgenèvre et Nevache, et donc jusqu’à l’entrée de Briançon. »
      Il convient de rappeler que des contrôles aléatoires, hors du cadre dérogatoire prévu en cas de rétablissement des frontières, peuvent être opérés, conformément à l’article 78-2 du code de procédure pénale, dans une zone comprise entre la frontière terrestre de la France avec les Etats de l’espace et une ligne tracée à 20 kilomètres en deçà, ainsi que dans les zones accessibles au public des ports, aéroports et gares ferroviaires ou routières ouverts au trafic international et désignés par arrêté et aux abords de ces gares. Ces contrôles sont toutefois strictement encadrés, notamment par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Les personnes interpellées sur ce fondement peuvent faire l’objet d’une procédure de réadmission. En revanche, lorsque les contrôles aux frontières intérieures sont rétablis, les autorités françaises peuvent refuser l’entrée aux étrangers ne remplissant pas les conditions d’entrée sur le territoire aux frontières terrestres et leur notifier une décision de non-admission. Ces étrangers sont considérés comme n’étant pas entrés sur le territoire

      https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-situation-des-migrants-la-frontiere-franco-italienne

      #10_km #20_km

    • Sur le #Bibby_Stockholm barge at #Portland Port :

      “Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission”

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1000870#message1011761

      voir aussi :

      “The circumstances at Portland Port are very different because where the barge is to be positioned is below the mean low water mark. This means that the barge is outside of our planning control and there is no requirement for planning permission from the council.”

      https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/2023/07/18/leaders-comments-on-the-home-office-barge

      #UK #Angleterre

    • The ‘Border’ under EU Law

      The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

      In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

      Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

      By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1018938#message1023987
      #fiction_de_non-entrée

      –—

      Ce terme est empruntée d’une vieille loi des Etats-Unis, The Immigration Act 1891 :

      “The Immigration Act 1891 was the first to expressly mention detention, as it made provision for officers to ’inspect all such aliens’ or ’to orcier a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a de ignated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is made’. The Act alsa created the very important provision that came to be known as the ’entry fiction’. According to this, a removal to shore for examination ’shall not be considered a landing during the pendency of such examination’. This was a criticallegal (and constitutional) innovation because it meant that th ose incarcerated must be treated as if they were not there. This was both an attempt to treat the place of detention as if it were sim ply an extension ofbeing held on board ship, but also something more serious. The concept of being physically detained within the territorial land-mass of the United States but not being considered legally present was radical. It suggested a kind of limbo - with the detention centre constituting perhaps an extra-legal space- putting immigrants beyond the reach of constitutional norms, pending a final executive decision to land or deport them.”

      source : Daniel Wilsher, Immigration detention : law, history, politics, 2012, p. 13