• Oltre le sigle, la detenzione amministrativa si diffonde nelle procedure in frontiera e cancella il diritto di asilo ed i diritti di difesa

    1.Malgrado le pause indotte dal maltempo, continuano, e continueranno, gli arrivi dalla Tunisia e dalla Libia, e si avvicina il collasso del sistema di accoglienza già minato dai decreti sicurezza di Salvini e dal Decreto “Cutro” (legge n.50/2023). Il governo Meloni con un ennesimo decreto sicurezza, ma se ne attende un’altro per colpire i minori stranieri non accompagnati,” al fine di rendere più veloci i rimpatri”, cerca di raddoppiare i CPR e di creare di nuovi centri di detenzione amministrativa vicino ai luoghi di frontiera, meglio in località isolate, per le procedure accelerate destinate ai richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri”. La legge 50 del 2023 (già definita impropriamente “Decreto Cutro”) prevede che il richiedente asilo, qualora sia proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro, e sia entrato irregolarmente, possa essere trattenuto per 30 giorni, durante la procedura accelerata di esame della domanda di asilo presentata alla frontiera, al solo scopo di accertare il diritto ad entrare nel territorio dello Stato.

    Sul concetto di paese terzo “sicuro” non c’è ancora un accordo a livello europeo. Le conclusioni del Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea riuniti a Lussembugo lo scorso 8 giugno sono state propagandate come una vittoria della linea tenuta dal governo Meloni proprio su questo punto, ma le previsioni della legge 50/2023, in materia di trattenimento ed espulsioni, non hanno ottenuto quella “copertura europea” che il governo italiano sperava. Per questo motivo sulle “scelte detentive” più recenti del governo Meloni con riferimento ai richiedenti asilo potrebbe intervenire prima la Commissione europea e poi la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. Come sta già avvenendo per la previsione “manifesto”, di dubbia applicabilità, della garanzia finanziaria introdotta dalla legge 50 del 2023 e specificata dal Decreto legge 19 settembre 2023, n. 124, contenente Disposizioni urgenti in materia di politiche di coesione, per il rilancio dell’economia nelle aree del Mezzogiorno del Paese, nonche’ in materia di immigrazione. Una garanzia finanziaria che assieme ad altri requisiti, come la disponibilità di alloggio e documenti validi, potrebbe evitare il trattenimento amministrativo dei richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine sicuri. Secondo Amnesty International,“Si tratta di un provvedimento illegale. Non è pensabile che persone in fuga dal proprio paese possano disporre in Italia di un alloggio o di un conto in banca e quindi attivare una polizza fideiussoria. Subordinare la libertà delle persone richiedenti asilo a condizioni di fatto impraticabili configura una misura per porre coloro che arrivano in Italia automaticamente in detenzione. La detenzione automatica è arbitraria e vietata dal diritto internazionale”.

    Dunque, ciascun caso dovrà essere esaminato singolarmente, come adesso precisa la Commissione europea sull’ultimo “escamotage propagandistico” inventato dal Governo Meloni, la garanzia finanziaria che dovrebbero prestare (attraverso fideiussione) i richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine sicuri., Come se riuscissero ad avere immediatamente, subito dopo lo sbarco, la disponibilità finanziaria e i documenti di identità necessari per stipulare il contratto di fideiussione, Una norma manifesto, odiosa ma inapplicabile, dietro la quale si nascondono procedure accelerate che abbattono il diritto di asilo e rendono solo cartacee le garanzie di difesa, anche per il ricorso generalizzato alle videoconferenze, e per le difficoltà per i difensori, che vogliano davvero assolvere al loro ruolo, di ottenere tempestivamente la documentazione relativa al richiedente asilo che devono assistere in sede di convalida o per un ricorso contro la decisione di rigetto della domanda.

    2. Di fronte al fallimento delle politiche migratorie del governo Meloni, dopo l’annuncio, da parte dell’ennesimo Commissario all’emergenza, di un piano nazionale per la detenzione amministrativa, al fine di applicare “procedure accelerate in frontiera” in centri chiusi, dei richiedenti asilo, se provengono da paesi di origine definiti “sicuri”. si richiamano una serie di decreti ministeriali che hanno formato una apposita lista che non tiene conto della situazione attuale in gran parte dell’Africa, soprattutto nella fascia subsahariana, dopo lo scoppio della guerra civile in Sudan e il rovesciamento in Niger del governo sostenuto dai paesi occidentali. Non si hanno ancora notizie certe, invece, dei nuovi centri per i rimpatri (CPR) che si era annunciato sarebbero stati attivati in ogni regione italiana. Le resistenze delle amministrazioni locali, anche di destra, hanno evidentemente rallentato questo progetto dai costi enormi, per l’impianto e la gestione.

    I rimpatri con accompagnamento forzato nei primi sette mesi dell’anno sono stati soltanto 2.561 (+28,05%) rispetto ai 2.000 dello scorso anno. Nulla rispetto ad oltre 100.000 arrivi ed a oltre 70.000 richieste di asilo, conteggiati proprio il 15 agosto, quando il Viminale dà i suoi numeri, esibendo quando conviene le percentuali e lasciando nell’ombra i dati assoluti. Ed oggi i numeri sono ancora più elevati, si tratta non solo di numeri ma di persone, uomini, donne e bambini lasciati allo sbando dopo lo sbarco, che cercano soltanto di lasciare il nostro paese prima possibile. Per questo il primo CPR targato Piantedosi che si aprirà a breve potrebbe essere ubicato a Ventimiglia, vicino al confine tra Italia e Francia, mentre Svizzera ed Austria hanno già annunciato un inasprimento dei controlli di frontiera.

    La prima struttura detentiva entrata in attività lo scorso primo settembre, per dare applicazione, ancora chiamata “sperimentazione”, alle procedure accelerate in frontiera previste dal Decreto “Cutro”, è ubicata nell’area industriale tra i comuni confinanti di Pozzallo e Modica. dove da anni esiste un centro Hotspot, nella zona portuale, che opera spesso in modalità di “centro chiuso”, nel quale già da tempo è stata periodicamente limitata la libertà personale degli “ospiti”. Si tratta di una nuova struttura da 84 posti nella quale vengono rinchiusi per un mese coloro che provengono da paesi di origine definiti “sicuri”, prima del diniego sulla richiesta di protezione che si dà come scontato e del successivo tentativo di rimpatrio con accompagnamento forzato, sempre che i paesi di origine accettino la riammissione dei loro cittadini giunti irregolarmente in Italia. Le informazioni provenienti da fonti ufficiali non dicono molto, ma la natura detentiva della struttura e i suoi costi sono facilmente reperibili on line.

    In Sicilia si prevede anche l’apertura di “strutture di transito”, già appaltate, come quella che dovrebbe sorgere a Porto Empedocle, dove l’area di transito, che verrà ulteriormente potenziata, resta provvisoria, fino a quando non verrà realizzato l’hotspot a valle di contrada Caos a Porto Empedocle che sarà, come quello di Lampedusa, gestito dalla Croce Rossa. Altre “sezioni chiuse” per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi ritenuti “sicuri”, per cui si prevede un rimpatrio “veloce” potrebbero essere attivate nei centri Hotspot di Pozzallo e Lampedusa. Mentre i richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri,” in caso di arrivi massicci e di indisponibilità di posti negli Hotspot, potrebbero finire anche nei centri di permanenza per i rimpatri, come i famigerati lager di Pian del Lago (Caltanissetta) e di Trapani (MIlo), da anni spazi di trattamenti disumani, di tentativi di fuga e di abusi sulle persone trattenute. Se non si tratta di annientamento fisico (Vernichtung), ma ci sono stati anche i morti, si può documentare in molti casi l’annientamento psichico degli “ospiti”, che dopo il diniego, in caso di mancato rimpatrio, potrebbero passare mesi su mesi rinchiusi in queste strutture, magari sotto psicofarmaci, come coloro che sono sottoposti al rimpatrio con accompagnamento forzato, tra i richiedenti asilo denegati che non abbiano fatto ricorso con effetto sospensivo o lo abbiano visto respingere.

    La normativa europea impone invece il rilascio delle persone trattenute nei centri di detenzione quando è evidente che non ci sono più prospettive di rimpatrio forzato nel paese di origine (Direttiva rimpatri 2008/115/CE, art.15.4), per la mancata collaborazione degli Stati di origine che non effettuano i riconoscimenti e non forniscono i documenti di viaggio.

    Altri “centri chiusi” potrebbero essere attivati a Messina (probabilmente nei locali del Centro di accoglienza ubicato all’interno della vecchia e fatiscente Caserma Gasparro) fantasiosamente denominato “CIPSI”, Centro di primo soccorso ed identificazione, ed a Catania, dove si sono recentemente sperimentate diverse strutture provvisorie, “tensostrutture”, nelle quali i potenziali richiedenti asilo, che diventano tali con la semplice manifestazione di volontà, anche prima della formalizzazione della domanda da parte delle autorità di polizia, sono stati trattenuti per giorni in condizioni di totale privazione della libertà personale, in assenza di convalida giurisdizionale.

    3. Il fallimento del sistema italiano dei centri di detenzione amministrativa è ormai documentato da anni, e sarà ancora più evidente con l’aumento dei termini di trattenimento fino a 18 mesi (12 per i richiedenti asilo).

    Con riguardo ai nuovi centri di detenzione per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine “sicuri” non sembra eludibile una rigorosa verifica della legittimità del trattenimento in sede di convalida del giudice ordinario, e non del giudice di pace, come invece sembrerebbe prevedere la legge 50/2023 (ingiustamente definita ancora oggi “Decreto Cutro), trattandosi di richiedenti asilo che chiedono di fare valere un loro diritto fondamentale, e deve essere prevista una completa base legale con la indicazione precisa delle modalità di trattenimento -che ancora manca- conformi alla normativa europea (Direttiva procedure 2013/32/UE e Direttiva Accoglienza 2013/33/UE). Rimane a tale riguardo una grave violazione del principio di legalità in materia di misure detentive, che la Corte Costituzionale non ha ancora rilevato.

    In ogni caso il trattenimento amministrativo non può essere finalizzato esclusivamente al’esame della domanda di protezione, o per accertare il diritto all’ingresso nel territorio, come sembrerebbe affermare la legge 50/2023, perchè proprio nelle circostanze di limitazione della libertà personale che si riscontrano nei centri “chiusi” risulta più difficile avere contatti con organizzazioni che difendono i diritti umani e raccogliere prove per dimostrare la fondatezza della propria richiesta. Dal tenore della legge sembrerebbe che le strutture detentive riservate ai richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine ritenuti “sicuri” siano strutture extra-territoriali, come se le persone trattenute non avessero ancora fatto ingresso nel territorio nazionale, circostanza che legittimerebbe l’aggiramento dei principi costituzionali e delle Convenzioni internazionali. Si tratta invece di luoghi che non possono sottrarsi alla giurisdizione italiana, unionale e internazionale dove i diritti e le garanzie non possono essere riconosciuti solo sul piano formale per venire poi negati nelle prassi applicate dalle autorità di polizia. Dunque è il tempo delle denunce e dei ricorsi, mentre l’opinione pubblica sembra ancora rimanere ostaggio delle politiche della paura e dell’odio. Fondamentale l’accesso civico agli atti e la possibilità di ingresso di giornalisti ed operatori umanitari indipendenti, se occorre con gruppi di parlamentari, in tutti i centri in cui si pratica la detenzione amministrativa.

    4. Vanno comunque garantiti diritti di informazione ed accesso alle procedure ordinarie, e quindi nel sistema di centri aperti di accoglienza (CAS, SAI, CPSA) per tutti i richiedenti asilo che adducano a supporto della domanda gravi motivi di carattere personale, pure se provengono da paesi terzi ritenuti sicuri.

    L’ACNUR dopo una generale considerazione positiva delle procedure accelerate in frontiera, soprattuto nei casi in cui appare maggiormente probabile l’esito positivo della domanda di protezione, “Raccomanda, tuttavia, di incanalare in procedura di frontiera (con trattenimento) solo le domande di protezione internazionale che, in una fase iniziale di raccolta delle informazioni e registrazione, appaiano manifestamente infondate.
    In particolare, la domanda proposta dal richiedente proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro non deve essere incanalata in tale iter quando lo stesso abbia invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che, nelle sue specifiche circostanze, il Paese non sia sicuro. Si sottolinea, a tal fine, la centralità di una fase iniziale di screening, volta a far emergere elementi utili alla categorizzazione delle domande (triaging) e alla conseguente individuazione della procedura più appropriata per ciascun caso”.

    I piani sui rimpatri “veloci” del governo Meloni non sono dunque applicabili su vasta scala, presentano caratteri fortemente discriminatori, ed avranno costi umani ed economici insostenibili. Se si spera negli accordi bilaterali e nel sostegno di Frontex, si dovrà comunque fare i conti con i ricorsi ai Tribunali in Italia ed in Europa, e con un ulteriore aggravamento delle crisi di legittimazione dei governi africani che accettano lo scambio della propria gente con una manciata di denaro.

    Una particolare attenzione dovrà rivolgersi alle persone vulnerabili per età, salute, genere e orientamento sessuale, ma anche per le ferite o per le torture subite durante il transito in Libia o in Tunisia. Una serie di condizioni che potrebbero di per sè legittimare il riconoscimento di uno status di protezione, a prescindere del paese di origine dal quale si è partiti.

    In ogni caso, dopo le decisioni di diniego da parte delle Commissioni territoriali, che potrebbero essere orientate da indirizzi politici, dovranno garantirsi tempi di esecuzione delle misure di allontanamento forzato che non cancellino la portata sostanziale del diritto al ricorso.

    Gli accordi bilaterali, come quelli con l’Egitto e la Tunisia, che prevedono procedure “semplificate”di rimpatrio, magari in aeroporto, senza la compiuta identificazione individuale,e senza un diritto effettivo di ricorso, vanno sospesi.

    Il provvedimento giudiziale che convalida la proroga del trattenimento deve contenere l’accertamento della sussistenza delle ragioni addotte a sostegno della richiesta (Cass. n. 5200/2023). Non si può continuare oltre con le decisioni di rigetto”fotocopia” o con le espulsioni ed i respingimenti con accompagnamento forzato adottati prima della convalida giurisdizionale. I termini di trattenimento amministrativo in assenza di una convalida giurisdizionale sono inderogabili. Come si rilevava al tempo dei centri di prima accoglienza e soccorso (CPSA) e dei Centri Hotspot, lo stesso vale oggi per i “centri di transito” e per i centri per richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi di origine ritenuti “sicuri”, nelle more delle procedure accelerate in frontiera.

    Occorre ricordare che la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo, proprio con riferimento a cittadini tunisini, nel dicembre 2016, nel caso Khlaifia e altri c. Italia, e poi ancora quest’anno, nel caso J.A. c.Italia, ha condannato il nostro Paese per violazione, tra gli altri motivi, dell’articolo 5 della Convenzione per aver trattenuto per un periodo prolungato persone appena arrivate in Italia, senza una base legale e senza la possibilità di ricorso. Con riferimento alle nuove strutture detentive che il governo Meloni si accinge ad aprire, resta da verificare il rispetto dei principi affermati dalla Corte di Strasburgo e dei diritti fondamentali, a partire dal diritto di asilo costituzionale, sanciti dalla Costituzione italiana. Sarà anche l’occasione per verificare la legittimità costituzionale di molte disposizioni del decreto “Cutro” che, fin dalla entrata in vigore del provvedimento, hanno evidenziato sotto questo profilo gravi criticità, prima ancora che riuscissero ad avere concreta applicazione.

    https://www.a-dif.org/2023/09/26/oltre-le-sigle-la-detenzione-amministrativa-si-diffonde-nelle-procedure-in-fr

    #rétention #détention_administrative #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #CPR #Italie #procédures_accélérées #pays_sûrs #pays_d'origine_sûrs #decret_Cutro #decreto_Cutro #garantie_financière #5000_EUR #5000_euros #decreto_Sud #Modica #Sicile #Porto_Empedocle #Messina #centres_fermés

    • Turning the Exception into the Rule

      Assessing Italy’s New Border Procedure

      Having promised its electorate a strong stance towards immigration, in January 2023 Italy’s new government adopted a reform that heavily curtailed immigrant rights to speed up return procedures. However, between September and October, several judgments issued by the Catania Tribunal declared it in violation of EU law (https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf). In particular, when requested to review the detention of asylum applicants, the judges found the new Italian asylum border procedure contrary to the Procedures Directive 2013/32 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032) and the Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033).

      The judgments led to a backlash, with PM Meloni and other members of the government accusing them of being politically motivated. One minister even published a video on social media showing a judge of the Catania Tribunal taking part in a pro-migrant rights demonstration in 2018, thus accusing her of partiality.

      Such political attacks (https://www.associazionemagistrati.it/doc/4037/lanm-sul-caso-catania.htm) must always be condemned, for they pose a significant threat to judicial independence and thus Italian democracy. Yet, they are particularly unwarranted given that the Catania Tribunal’s judges were correct in finding the new Italian border procedures incompatible with EU law.

      Detention as the Rule for Asylum Seekers

      The 2023 reform (https://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2023-03-10&atto.codice) of Italy’s asylum system included the introduction of an accelerated border procedure which allows for the detention (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/articolo/la-bestia-tentacolare) of asylum seekers „exclusively to determine the applicant’s right to enter the territory“ (Art. 6 bis, Law Decree 142/2015).

      This new procedure is applied when an asylum application is made „at the border or in a transit zone“ by a person who either a) evaded or attempted to evade border controls, or b) hails from a safe country of origin, which were determined by a Ministerial Decree in 2019 (https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2019/10/decreto_paesi_sicuri.pdf), later updated in 2023 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/03/25/23A01952/sg).

      Another Ministerial Decree (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) identified the „border and transit zones“ where the border procedure can be used, without providing a clear definition of these concepts nor explaining the distinction between them. Instead, it lists 16 provinces where the procedure applies (Trieste, Gorizia, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi, Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Syracuse, Catania, Messina, Trapani, Agrigento, Cagliari, and South Sardinia).

      Finally, the law specifies that asylum seekers are to be detained unless they submit a passport (or equivalent document) or provide a financial guarantee of € 4,938.00 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/09/21/23A05308/sg). This amount was allegedly calculated with reference to the cost of suitable accommodation, repatriation, and minimum means of subsistence. The sum can be provided through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, but solely by the asylum seekers themselves, not by third parties.

      [voir aussi: https://seenthis.net/messages/1018093]

      Following a recent increase in migrant flows from Tunisia, the Italian authorities extensively relied on the new border procedure to detain several Tunisian citizens on the ground that they come from a “safe country of origin” (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/rivista/articolo/la-protezione-dei-cittadini-stranieri-provenienti-da-cd-paesi-sic). However, on September 29 (https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf) and October 8 (https://www.questionegiustizia.it/data/doc/3650/2023-tribunale-catania-8-10-2023-non-convalida-oscurato.pdf), the Catania Tribunal issued a series of similar rulings in which it annulled the detention orders because they were in conflict with EU law. In the following sections, we analyze and expand the three main arguments advanced by the Tribunal, showing that they were largely correct in their findings that the new Italian border procedure exceeds what is permissible under EU law.

      The ‘Border’ under EU Law

      The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

      In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

      Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

      By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

      The Regulation of Detention under EU Law

      The second argument of the Catania Tribunal turned on the lack of motivation for the detention orders. The applicants were detained solely because they were from Tunisia, did not submit a valid passport nor pay the bail. As such, the orders lacked any case-by-case assessment of the applicant’s individual circumstances, and they did not apply the proportionality and necessity principles, as prescribed by EU law under art. 8(2) Directive 2013/33 and art. 52 and 6 of the Charter.

      Indeed, even if a border procedure is correctly initiated, Italy’s new provisions on the detention of asylum seekers do not meet the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Reception Directive. According to the CJEU, this authorizes asylum seekers‘ detention “only where, following an assessment carried out on a case-by-case basis, that is necessary” and where other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively. (ex multis, FMS, par. 258; VL, par. 102; M.A., par. 82).

      Italy’s norms contain no reference to the principles of necessity and proportionality nor to the need for a case-by-case assessment (Art. 6 bis D. Lgs. 142/2015). In so far as the Italian provisions allow for an automatic application of detention whenever the border procedure is activated, they are incompatible with Art. 8(2) of the Reception Directive. In light of the primacy and direct effect of EU law, Italian public authorities are required to give direct application to the principles of proportionality and necessity and to carry out an individual assessment, even if not directly foreseen by Italian law.
      The Possibility of Bail

      Finally, the Catania Tribunal argued that the financial guarantee to avoid detention is contrary to EU law. The Tribunal observed that the guarantee is not used as an alternative measure to detention, but rather as an ‚administrative requirement‘ that, if not complied with, leads to detention. According to the judge, this renders it incompatible with Articles 8 and 9 of the Reception Directive 2013/33 which “preclude[s] an applicant for international protection being placed in detention on the sole ground that he or she is unable to provide for his or her needs.”(at 256).

      As rightly noted by Savino, EU law does not prohibit the use of financial guarantees; to the contrary, Article 8(4) mentions it as a legitimate alternative to detention. However, both scholars and the European Asylum Agency maintain that the guarantee shall be proportionate to the means of the applicant in order to avoid discriminatory effects. The EUAA Guidelines on asylum seeker detention further specify that:

      “the amount should be tailored to individual circumstances, and therefore be reasonable given the particular situation of asylum seekers, and not so high as to lead to discrimination against persons with limited funds. Any failure to be able to do so resulting in detention (or its continuation), would suggest that the system is arbitrary.”

      It is doubtful whether the financial guarantee in its current legal design can be considered an “effective” alternative to detention (Art.8(4)). Its high amount (€4,938.00) and procedural requirements make it practically impossible for asylum applicants to rely upon it. In particular, they are required to deposit the sum upon arrival, through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, which are concretely impossible for them to obtain. Moreover, the financial guarantee is the only alternative to detention provided by the new Italian law, while migrants detained under other circumstances can rely upon more alternative measures.

      Taken together, it means that the measure is designed in a discriminatory way and is neither effective nor proportionate.

      Concluding Thoughts

      Several aspects of the new law foresee a system in which the border procedure is systematically applied, rendering detention the rule, instead of the exception. This follows from the geographic expansion of the “borders areas and transit zones”, the automatic (indiscriminate) application of the safe country of origin concept, the lack of a proportionality assessment, and the practical impossibility of applying the only alternative measure foreseen.

      More and more Italian courts are annulling detention orders, on the grounds that the Italian border procedure is in conflict with EU law. While the Italian government considers this an unacceptable form of judicial activism, this blog has shown that the judges’ concerns are well-founded.

      Member States’ courts are “EU law judges”, they must give precedence to EU law and general principles and set aside any incompatible national law. The recent personal attacks against some of the judges show that the government struggles to come to terms with this thick form of judicial review which takes seriously European and human rights standards.

      https://verfassungsblog.de/turning-the-exception-into-the-rule
      #exception #justice #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #décret #procédure_accélérée #garantie_financière #5000_EUR #chantage #caution #decreto_Cutro #décret_Cutro #5000_euros #tribunal_de_Catane #procédure_frontière #directive_procédures #zone_de_transit #proximité #distance #zone_frontalière #directive_retour #frontière_extérieure #fiction_de_non-entrée

      –-

      La partie sur les frontières ajouté à cette métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/795053

  • El Supremo reconoce el derecho a pedir asilo en las embajadas en contra del criterio del Gobierno

    Esta posibilidad aparece recogida en la Ley de Asilo, pero ningún gobierno ha aprobado su desarrollo reglamentario por lo que España, salvo escasas excepciones, impide de forma sistemática acceder al procedimiento de asilo a través de esta vía

    El Tribunal Supremo ha reconocido el derecho de potenciales solicitantes de asilo a pedir en embajadas españolas su traslado legal a España para formalizar una petición de protección internacional. Aunque esta posibilidad aparece recogida en la Ley de Asilo de 2009, ningún gobierno ha aprobado su desarrollo reglamentario por lo que, salvo escasas excepciones, habitualmente se impide de forma sistemática acceder al procedimiento de asilo a través de esta vía. Los magistrados también han confirmado la obligación de los embajadores a contestar a dichas peticiones.

    En la sentencia, el Alto Tribunal echa por tierra los argumentos en los que se han apoyado gobiernos de distintos colores para negarse a aplicar el artículo 38 de la normativa de asilo, que permite a los embajadores del país «promover el traslado» de los solicitantes de asilo a España para que estos puedan formalizar su solicitud en territorio español. Para la Sala de lo contencioso administrativo número 5, el enunciado de la legislación española contiene «elementos suficientes» para realizar traslados de solicitantes de asilo por esta vía cuando el demandante «corra peligro» en su país de origen, sin que su aplicación quede supeditada al desarrollo reglamentario al que se aferra el gobierno.

    El fallo sostiene que la normativa «se limita a regular la atención de aquellas solicitudes que se presentan fuera del territorio nacional y en un tercer país», por la que el embajador tiene competencia de valorar «el peligro para la integridad física del solicitante que motive su derivación a España». Para ello, apunta la Sala, debe aplicar «las mismas exigencias» que determinan el reconocimiento de la protección internacional en España.

    Es decir, el Supremo concluye que la normativa ya desarrolla el mecanismo por el que un demandante puede registrar en las embajadas españolas una suerte de petición de asilo, sobre la que los representantes españoles deben valorar si su integridad corre peligro y, en ese caso, promover su traslado a España para tramitar la demanda de manera oficial.

    La sentencia se refiere al caso de una familia kurdo-iraquí que llegó a Grecia en 2016 huyendo del conflicto bélico en Irak, donde solicitó asilo sin respuesta, según Stop Mare Mortum, organización que ha apoyado jurídicamente a los demandantes. Un año después, pidieron ser trasladados a España en el marco del programa europeo de reubicación, pero solo fue aceptada la solicitud de la madre y las hijas. El padre, quien tuvo que permanecer en Grecia, solicitó protección posteriormente junto al resto de su familia en la Embajada española en el país europeo, pero no recibieron respuesta.

    Ante el silencio de la embajada española, explican desde la organización, la familia presentó una demanda ante la Audiencia Nacional que le dio la razón en marzo del 2019. No obstante, la abogacía del Estado interpuso un recurso de casación en el Tribunal Supremo para evitar el traslado del padre de familia en España, alegando la imposibilidad de aplicación del artículo 34 de la Ley de Asilo, debido a su falta de desarrollo reglamentario, entre otras razones expuestas.
    La falta de reglamento no impide su aplicación

    Para el Supremo, la falta de desarrollo reglamentario no impide la aplicación del contenido de la normativa «a las solicitudes de protección internacional formuladas a su amparo». Además, el Tribunal aclara que la valoración del peligro para la integridad física del solicitante se debe realizar en base a la situación que le empuja a salir del país de origen.

    Según Stop Mare Nostrum, es «habitual» la falta de respuesta de las embajadas españolas cuando un potencial solicitante de asilo intenta acceder al procedimiento de protección internacional a través de esta vía. De las 38 peticiones de traslado registradas por la ONG en los consulados de Atenas y Tánger, los representantes españoles «no han respondido a ninguna». En este sentido, la Abogacía del Estado justificó en su recurso que la Ley de Asilo no «les impone la obligación de resolver estas peticiones». Este extremo también ha sido rechazado por el Alto Tribunal, que sí ve en la ausencia de contestación una actuación «susceptible de impugnación».

    Según detalla la sentencia, a la que ha accedido elDiario.es, el abogado del Estado defendía que, ante la falta de desarrollo reglamentario, «no existe como tal un procedimiento administrativo para poder aplicar ese artículo» lo que, consideraba «imprescindible para determinar los órganos competentes y las condiciones en las que un embajador puede promover el traslado a España a los efectos de solicitar asilo así como para determinar las consecuencias prácticas de tal medida».
    Diferente argumento para defender ante Estrasburgo las devoluciones en caliente

    Los argumentos de la Abogacía del Estado evidencian la falta de aplicación por parte del Gobierno de la posibilidad de solicitar el traslado a España desde las embajadas españolas, lo que se contradice con los razonamientos que España presentó ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos para defender la legalidad de las devoluciones en caliente en las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla.

    Según sostenían entonces desde la Abogacía del Estado, España contaba con vías legales de entrada al territorio, entre las que nombraba el artículo 38 de la Ley de Asilo. El mismo que no se podría aplicar debido a la falta de desarrollo reglamentario, según dice el abogado del Estado en el recurso que pretendía evitar el traslado del hombre iraquí para encontrarse con su familia.

    «La sentencia demuestra la incoherencia de los argumentos de la Abogacía del Estado, que los utiliza según su conveniencia en una materia tan sensible como los derechos humanos», dice Stop Mare Mortum. «El pasado mes de febrero, ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, defendía la existencia de este mecanismo para pedir asilo en las embajadas y así demostrar que las personas que saltaron la valla, podían haber solicitado asilo en España vía artículo 38», recuerda la organización. «En los procedimientos judiciales que han terminado en la actual Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo la argumentación de la abogacía del estado era la contraria: que las solicitudes a Embajada no se podían tramitar por falta de reglamento de desarrollo de la ley de asilo».

    El razonamiento desarrollado por la Abogacía del Estado para justificar las devoluciones en caliente de migrantes en Ceuta y Melilla fue clave en la consiguiente sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que avaló las expulsiones inmediatas de quienes sortean de forma irregular las alambradas de las ciudades autónomas porque, según el concluyó, «se pusieron ellos mismos en una situación de ilegalidad al intentar entrar deliberadamente en España por la valla de Melilla».

    Según el Defensor del Pueblo, la Ley de Asilo de 2009, a diferencia de la normativa anterior, no permite la presentación oficial de solicitudes de asilo en las representaciones diplomáticas, por lo que deja en manos del embajador la posibilidad de promover el traslado a España del solicitante si considera que corre peligro físico. Un informe de la institución de 2016 señaló que «la alta conflictividad existente en la actualidad en muchos países, junto a la limitación de no permitir la presentación de la demanda en las representaciones de España en el exterior, contribuyen a dificultar el acceso al procedimiento». Estos obstáculos, advertía, «pueden menoscabar los compromisos internacionales asumidos por España y la finalidad de dicho instrumento».

    https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/supremo-reconoce-derecho-solicitantes-asilo-pedir-asilo-embajadas-espanolas
    #asile #réfugiés #ambassade #ambassades #Espagne #justice #voies_légales

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Blockchain and GDPR
    Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law?

    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634445/EPRS_STU(2019)634445_EN.pdf

    120-page document, by the EPRS - European Parliamentary Research Service, July 2019

    In recent times, there has been much discussion in policy circles, academia and the private sector regarding the tension between blockchain and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Indeed, many of the points of tension between blockchain and the GDPR are due to two overarching factors.

    First, the GDPR is based on an underlying assumption that in relation to each personal data point there is at least one natural or legal person – the data controller – whom data subjects can address to enforce their rights under EU data protection law. These data controllers must comply with the GDPR’s obligations. Blockchains, however, are distributed databases that often seek to achieve decentralisation by replacing a unitary actor with many different players. The lack of consensus as to how (joint-) controllership ought to be defined hampers the allocation of responsibility and accountability.

    Second, the GDPR is based on the assumption that data can be modified or erased where necessary to comply with legal requirements, such as Articles 16 and 17 GDPR. Blockchains, however, render the unilateral modification of data purposefully onerous in order to ensure data integrity and to increase trust in the network. Furthermore, blockchains underline the challenges of adhering to the requirements of data minimisation and purpose limitation in the current form of the data economy.

    This study examines the European data protection framework and applies it to blockchain technologies so as to document these tensions. It also highlights the fact that blockchain may help further some of the GDPR’s objectives. Concrete policy options are developed on the basis of this analysis.

    #GDPR #RGPD
    #blockchain

  • Trapped in Dublin

    ECRE’s study (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/842813/EPRS_STU(2020)842813_EN.pdf) on the implementation of the Dublin Regulation III, has just been published by the Europpean Parliament Research Service which commissioned it.

    Drawing largely on statistics from the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) database, managed by ECRE and fed by national experts from across Europe, and on ongoing Dublin-related litigation, the study uses the European Commission’s own Better Regulation toolbox. The Better Regulation framework is designed to evaluate any piece of Regulation against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value.

    There are no surprises:

    Assessing the data shows that Dublin III is not effective legislation as it does not meet its own objectives of allowing rapid access to the procedure and ending multiple applications. The hierarchy of criteria it lays down is not fully respected. It appears inefficient – financial costs are significant and probably disproportionate. Notable are the large investments in transfers that do not happen and the inefficient sending of different people in different directions. The human costs of the system are considerable – people left in limbo, people forcibly transferred, the use of detention. The relevance and EU added value of the Regulation in its current form should be questioned. The coherence of the Dublin Regulation is weak in three ways: internal coherence is lacking due to the differing interpretations of key articles across the Member States+; coherence with the rest of the asylum acquis is not perfect; and coherence with fundamental rights is weak due to flaws in drafting and implementation.

    So far, so already well known.

    None of this is news: everybody knows that Dublin is flawed. Indeed, in this week’s hearing at the European Parliament, speaker after speaker stood up to condemn Dublin, including all the Member States present. Even the Member States that drove the Dublin system and whose interests it is supposed to serve (loosely known as the northern Member States), now condemn it openly: it is important to hear Germany argue in a public event that the responsibility sharing rules are unfair and that both trust among states and compliance across the Common European Asylum System is not possible without a fundamental reform of Dublin.

    More disturbing is the view from the persons subject to Dublin, with Shaza Alrihawi from the Global Refugee-led Network describing the depression and despair resulting from being left in limbo while EU countries use Dublin to divest themselves of responsibility. One of the main objectives of Dublin is to give rapid access to an asylum procedure but here was yet another case of someone ready to contribute and to move on with their life who was delayed by Dublin. It is no surprise that “to Dublin” has become a verb in many European languages – “dubliner” or “dublinare”, and a noun: “I Dublinati” – in all cases with a strong negative connotation, reflecting the fear that people understandably have of being “dublinated”.

    With this picture indicating an unsatisfactory situation, what happens now?

    Probably not much. While there is agreement that Dublin III is flawed there is profound disagreement on what should replace it. But the perpetual debate on alternatives to Dublin needs to continue. Dysfunctional legislation which fails the Commission’s own Better Regulation assessment on every score cannot be allowed to sit and fester.

    All jurisdictions have redundant and dysfunctional legislation on their statute books; within the EU legal order, Dublin III is not the only example. Nonetheless, the damage it does is profound so it requires attention. ECRE’s study concludes that the problems exist at the levels of design and implementation. As well as the unfair underlying principles, the design leaves too much room for policy choices on implementation – precisely the problem that regulations as legal instruments are supposed to avoid. Member States’ policy choices on implementation are currently (and perhaps forever) shaped by efforts to minimise responsibility. This means that a focus on implementation alone is not the answer; changes should cover design and implementation.

    The starting point for reform has to be a fundamental overhaul, tackling the responsibility allocation principles. While the original Dublin IV proposal did not do this, there are multiple alternatives, including the European Parliament’s response to Dublin IV and the Commission’s own alternatives developed but not launched in 2016 and before.

    Of course, Dublin IV also had the other flaws, including introducing inadmissibility procedures pre-Dublin and reduction of standards in other ways. Moving forward now means it is necessary to de-link procedural changes and the responsibility-sharing piece.

    Unfortunately, the negotiations, especially between the Member States, are currently stuck in a cul-de-sac that focuses on exactly this kind of unwelcome deal. The discussion can be over-simplified as follows: “WE will offer you some ‘solidarity’ – possibly even a reform of Dublin – but only if, in exchange, YOU agree to manage mandatory or expanded border procedures of some description”. These might be expanded use of current optional asylum procedures at the border; it might be other types of rapid procedures or processes to make decisions about people arriving at or transferred to borders. In any case, the effect on the access to asylum and people’s rights will be highly detrimental, as ECRE has described at length. But they also won’t be acceptable to the “you” in this scenario, the Member States at the external borders.

    There is no logical or legal reason to link the procedural piece and responsibility allocation so closely. And why link responsibility allocation and procedures and not responsibility allocation and reception, for instance? Or responsibility allocation and national/EU resources? This derives from the intrusion of a different agenda: the disproportionate focus on onward movement, also known as (the) “secondary” movement (obsession).

    If responsibility allocation is unfair, then it should be reformed in and of itself, not in exchange for something. The cry will then go out that it is not fair because the MS perceived to “benefit” from the reform will get something for nothing. Well no: any reform could – and should – be accompanied with strict insistence on compliance with the rest of the asylum acquis. The well-documented implementation gaps at the levels of reception, registration, decision-making and procedural guarantees should be priority.

    Recent remarks by Commissioner Schinas (https://euobserver.com/migration/147511) present nothing new and among many uncertainties concerning the fate of the 2016 reforms is whether or not a “package approach” will be maintained by either or both the co-legislators – and whether indeed that is desirable. One bad scenario is that everything is reformed except Dublin. There are provisional inter-institutional agreements on five files, with the Commission suggesting that they move forward. ECRE’s view is that the changes contained in the agreements on these files would reduce protection standards and not add value; other assessments are that protection standards have been improved. Either way, there are strong voices in both the EP and among the MS who don’t want to go ahead without an agreement on Dublin. Which is not wrong – allocation of responsibility is essential in a partially harmonised system: with common legal provisions but without centralised decision-making, responsibility allocation is the gateway to access rights and obligations flowing from the other pieces of legislation. Thus, to pass other reforms without tackling Dublin seems rather pointless.

    While certainly not the best option, the best bet (if one had to place money on something) would be that nothing changes for the core legislation of the CEAS. For that reason, ECRE’s study also lists extensive recommendations for rights-based compliance with Dublin III.

    For example, effectiveness would be improved through better respect for the hierarchy of responsibility criteria, the letter of the law: prioritise family unity through policy choices, better practice on evidential standards, and greater use of Articles 16 and 17. Minimise the focus on transfers based on take-back requests, especially when they are doomed to fail. To know from the start that a transfer is doomed to fail yet to persist with it is an example of a particularly inhumane political dysfunction. Effectiveness also requires better reporting to deal with the multiple information gaps identified, and clarity on key provisions, including through guidance from the Commission.

    Solidarity among Member States could be fostered through use of Article 33 in challenging situations, which allows for preventive actions by the Commission and by Member States, and along with the Temporary Protection Directive, provides better options than some of the new contingency plans under discussion. The use of Article 17, 1 and 2, provides a legal basis for the temporary responsibility-sharing mechanisms which are needed in the absence of deeper reform.

    In perhaps the most crucial area, fundamental rights compliance could be significantly improved: avoid coercive transfers; implement CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence on reasons for suspension of transfers – there is no need to show systemic deficiencies (CK, Jawo); make a policy decision to suspend transfers to the EU countries where conditions are not adequate and human rights violations are commonplace, rather than waiting for the courts to block the transfer. Resources and political attention could focus on the rights currently neglected: the right to family life, the best interests of the child, right to information, alternatives to detention. Evaluating implementation should be done against the Charter of Fundamental Rights and should always include the people directly affected.

    Even with flawed legislation, there are decisions on policy and resource allocation to be made that could make for better compliance and, in this case, compliance in a way that generates less suffering.

    https://www.ecre.org/weekly-editorial-trapped-in-dublin

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #Dublin_III #Better_Regulation #efficacité #demandes_multiples (le fameux #shopping_de_l'asile) #accélération_des_procédures #coût #transferts_Dublin #renvois_Dublin #coûts_humains #rétention #limbe #détention_administrative #renvois_forcés #cohérence #droits_humains #dépression #désespoir #santé_mentale #responsabilité #Dublin_IV #procédure_d'asile #frontières #frontière #mouvements_secondaires #unité_familiale #inhumanité #solidarité #Temporary_Protection_Directive #protection_temporaire #droits #intérêt_supérieur_de_l'enfant

    –—

    Commentaire de Aldo Brina à qui je fais aveuglement confiance :

    Les éditos de #Catherine_Woollard, secrétaire générale de l’#ECRE, sont souvent bons… mais celui-ci, qui porte sur Dublin, gagne à être lu et largement diffusé

    ping @karine4 @isskein

    • #Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 décembre 2020 sur la mise en œuvre du règlement #Dublin_III (2019/2206(INI))

      Extrait :

      Les procédures de transfert ont fortement augmenté en 2016-2017 et génèrent des coûts humains, matériels et financiers considérables ; déplore toutefois que les transferts n’aient été effectués que dans 11 % des cas, ce qui aggrave encore la surcharge souvent importante des régimes d’asile et confirme le manque d’efficacité du règlement ; juge essentiels les efforts visant à garantir l’accès à l’information et des procédures rapides pour le regroupement familial et les transferts de demandeurs d’asile

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0361_FR.html

      #statistiques #chiffres

  • Question concernant les #statistiques reçue via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 29.11.2019 et que je mets ici pour archivage, car la question des #chiffres autour des #migrations, de l’#asile, des #réfugiés et des #frontières revient souvent...

    La question concerne le pourcentage d’#entrées_irrégulières des personnes ayant obtenu une protection en Europe .

    Je n’arrive pas à trouver d’infos fiables sur le sujet.
    Ici en France nos politiques rivalisent de chiffres hasardeux...
    Il y a quelques mois une étude visant à promouvoir la mise en place de visas humanitaires avancait le chiffre de 90% de réfugiés étant entrés irrégulièrement en Europe.
    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621823/EPRS_STU(2018)621823_EN.pdf
    "Currently, up to 90% of the total population of subsequently recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection reach the territory of Member States irregularly."

    Comme source de cette info, ils indiquent ce document :
    https://www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/asylrecht/rechtsgrundlagen/exploring-avenues-for-protected-entry-in-europe.pdf
    ...qui date de 2012, et c’est une « estimation », sans citer de sources.
    "According to estimates, approximately 90% of all asylum seekers enter Europe in an irregular manner, since legal entry has become more and more difficult and in most cases impossible. »

    Est-ce quelqu’un saurait ou il est possible de trouver cette info, c’est à dire le pourcentage d’entrée irrégulière ou via un visa, parmi les demandeurs d’asile d’une part, et ceux qui obtiennent un statut de réfugié, en Europe ?

    ping @simplicissimus @reka

    • Je n’ai pas su répondre à cette question, mais il y a un commentaire à faire par rapport à ce que les deux citations mettent en avant (pas la même chose, à mon avis, même si les deux donnent le même chiffre... ce qui montre qu’il y a un problème). Et des information à donner en complément, d’autres statistiques (et leur #manipulation) dans d’autres contextes, mais toujours sur la question du passage irrégulier des frontières...

      Voici ma réponse :

      J’envoie à toi et aux autres abonné·es de la liste le graphique ci-dessous :


      tiré du livre « Méditerranée : des frontières à la dérive »

      https://lepassagerclandestin.fr/catalogue/bibliotheque-des-frontieres/mediterranee-des-frontieres-a-la-derive.html

      On y voit que les « interception des migrants à la frontière » (donc sans visa, qui entre « irrégulièrement ») représentent 1 à 3% des entrées sur le territoire européen...

      ça ne répond pas à ta question, mais c’est intéressant de l’avoir en tête... pour montrer que la très très très grande majorité des personnes non-européennes entrent de manière régulière sur le territoire, avec des visas.

      Mais là, il ne s’agit pas de ce que tu cherches.

      Ce qui est sûr c’est que tes deux citations se contredisent :
      1. « Currently, up to 90% of the total population of subsequently recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection reach the territory of Member States irregularly. »
      –-> % des personnes entrées irrégulièrement sur les personnes reconnues réfugiées ou qui ont obtenu une protection subsidiaire, après être entrées sur le territoire européen.

      Ce qui n’est pas la même chose de dire que

      2. « According to estimates, approximately 90% of all asylum seekers enter Europe in an irregular manner »
      –-> car là la base de calcul sont les demandeurs d’asile, ce qui comportent d’y intégrer aussi des personnes qui seront après examen de la demande déboutées de l’asile.

      Une des deux affirmations est donc fausse, car étant la base différente, on ne peut pas avoir le même pourcentage...

      –------------

      Je pense que je n’ai jamais vu passer les chiffres des entrées irrégulières sur la base de ceux qui après sont reconnus réfugiés... Mais je suis preneuse si jamais des personnes de la liste ont cette info, en effet.

      Je vous rappelle par contre ci-dessous d’autres contextes dans lesquels on a pu démontré que les entrées (irrégulières) ont été gonflées :
      ... les chiffres publiés par Frontex des entrées irrégulières dans les Balkans : https://theconversation.com/seeing-double-how-the-eu-miscounts-migrants-arriving-at-its-borders
      ... et la Suisse gonflait ceux des passages à la frontière depuis l’Italie : https://asile.ch/2016/08/12/parlant-de-personnes-lieu-de-cas-medias-surestiment-nombre-de-passages-a-front
      ... et puis ceux des passages entre la Grèce et l’Albanie : https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/2675

      Tout cela, avec plus de documents, vous le trouvez dans ce fil de discussion sur seenthis.net :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/705957

      Je n’ai pas vraiment répondu à ta question, mais cette réponse peut peut-être être utile à des personnes sur la liste qui se posent des questions sur les statistiques des entrées sur le territoire européen...

    • A priori, seul l’OFPRA, et lui seul, serait en mesure de fournir ce chiffre et il ne le fait pas.
      https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/l-ofpra/nos-publications/rapports-d-activite

      Par ailleurs, il me semble que le chiffre de 90% d’illégaux parmi les bénéficiaires de protection signifierait qu’une (très ?) forte proportion des immigrants irréguliers demanderaient la protection. Mais je n’y connais pas grand chose.

      Je trouve quelques éléments autour de l’estimation, par construction problématique, des entrées irrégulières dans les échanges rapportés par le rapport sénatorial de 2006 (oui, ça fait loin…)
      https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-300-1/r05-300-111.html

    • @simplicissimus :

      Par ailleurs, il me semble que le chiffre de 90% d’illégaux parmi les bénéficiaires de protection signifierait qu’une (très ?) forte proportion des immigrants irréguliers demanderaient la protection. Mais je n’y connais pas grand chose.

      –-> ça absolument, oui, car malheureusement les #voies_légales sont bouchées (politique de #visas très restrictive pour des questions liées à l’asile mais aussi pour le travail, les études, etc.), du coup, les personnes prennent la route quand même et la seule manière pour laquelle on peut traverser la frontière SANS les « bons » documents. Les frontières fermées, d’une certaine manière, pousse les personnes à passer les frontières irrégulièrement et la seule manière de ne pas être refoulé c’est en demandant l’asile (en théorie, car en pratique les Etats bafouent souvent ce droit et refoulent quand même).
      J’espère avoir été claire...

      #merci en tout cas pour le lien du Sénat...

    • Le document signalé par @simplicissimus, in extenso (pour archivage, ça date de 2006 :

      Immigration clandestine : une réalité inacceptable, une réponse ferme, juste et humaine (rapport)

      B. DES CHIFFRES SUJETS À CAUTION

      Rares sont les personnes entendues par la commission d’enquête qui se sont aventurées à fournir une évaluation chiffrée de l’immigration irrégulière. Les chiffres communiqués semblent vraisemblables mais restent sujets à caution compte tenu des lacunes du dispositif d’évaluation statistique.
      1. Les chiffres nationaux

      En juin 1998, dans son rapport au nom de la commission d’enquête du Sénat sur les régularisations d’étrangers en situation irrégulière présidée par notre ancien collègue M. Paul Masson, notre collègue M. José Balarello écrivait qu’« une estimation du nombre des clandestins entre 350.000 et 400.000 ne paraît pas éloignée de la réalité20(). »

      Selon M. Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre d’Etat, ministre de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire, entre 200.000 et 400.000 étrangers en situation irrégulière seraient aujourd’hui présents sur le territoire national et entre 80.000 et 100.000 migrants illégaux supplémentaires y entreraient chaque année.

      La direction des affaires juridiques et des libertés publiques du ministère explique que cette estimation des « flux » « résulte notamment du nombre de demandeurs d’asile, diminué du nombre de personnes ayant obtenu le statut de réfugié, du nombre de personnes ayant été régularisées et du nombre d’arrêtés de reconduite à la frontière pris et exécutés à l’encontre des demandeurs d’asile déboutés. » Quant à celle du « stock », « elle prend pour base minimale le nombre (150.000) d’étrangers en situation irrégulière qui bénéficient de l’aide médicale d’Etat. Sur cette base, et en y ajustant un pourcentage du flux annuel (pour tenir compte, d’une part, des régularisations « au fil de l’eau » et, d’autre part, des départs volontaires), on peut raisonnablement estimer ce stock à environ 400.000 personnes. »

      La controverse, par auditions devant la commission d’enquête interposées, entre le ministre d’Etat et M. François Héran, directeur de l’Institut national des études démographiques, montre combien la question est sensible et complexe.

      Le premier a reproché à l’INED d’avoir, en janvier 2004, sous-évalué le flux annuel d’immigration illégale, en l’estimant à 13.000 par an sur la base d’une analyse de la régularisation pratiquée en 1997-1998.

      Le second a observé que ces déclarations reposaient sur plusieurs méprises : d’abord, la migration illégale nette évoquée valait pour la décennie 1989-1998 ; ensuite l’INED a proposé une évaluation des flux nets ou encore du solde migratoire, c’est-à-dire du nombre d’immigrants irréguliers qui demeurent sur notre sol une fois défalquées les sorties, alors que M. Nicolas Sarkozy a évoqué les seuls flux bruts d’entrées irrégulières.

      Il a en outre jugé incompatibles les chiffres avancés par le ministre d’Etat : dans la mesure où les régularisations menées en France et en Europe montrent que la durée de séjour des immigrants illégaux s’étale sur au moins une dizaine d’années, l’arrivée de 90.000 immigrants irréguliers supplémentaires en moyenne par an devrait porter le « stock » d’immigrants illégaux présents sur notre territoire à environ 800.000 personnes ; si l’on considère en revanche que 300.000 immigrants irréguliers séjournent sur notre territoire, alors le flux annuel d’entrées se situe entre 30.000 et 40.000 personnes, évaluation tout à fait compatible avec celle de l’INED.

      La divergence porte donc davantage sur l’évaluation des flux que sur celle du stock qui, si elle reste sujette à caution, semble vraisemblable.

      Par ailleurs -et c’est l’un des rares chiffres qu’elle a accepté de communiquer à la commission d’enquête- Mme Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, membre du Haut conseil à l’intégration et directrice de l’Observatoire statistique de l’immigration et de l’intégration, a fait état d’estimations selon lesquelles le nombre d’enfants scolarisés dont les parents sont en situation irrégulière serait compris entre 15.000 et 20.000. Mme Armelle Gardien, représentante du Réseau éducation sans frontières, a pour sa part estimé à plus de 10.000 le nombre des jeunes étrangers sans papiers scolarisés, tout en soulignant la difficulté de disposer d’évaluations fiables.

      Enfin, environ 3.000 mineurs étrangers isolés sont pris en charge par les services de l’Etat (protection judiciaire de la jeunesse) ou des départements (aide sociale à l’enfance).

      Dans un rapport21() paru au moins de janvier 2005, l’inspection générale des affaires sociales note, sur la base d’une enquête auprès des départements à laquelle 64 conseils généraux ont répondu qu’« environ 3.100 mineurs auraient été admis à l’aide sociale à l’enfance en 2003 ; 2.300 sur les neuf premiers mois de 2004. Près de 2.500 mineurs étaient présents au 30 septembre 2004 dans les mêmes départements. (...). Des origines et des trajectoires de migration diverses sont perceptibles, qui laissent néanmoins apparaître des dominantes. 5 nationalités dominent les flux depuis plusieurs années : Roumanie, Chine, Maroc, Albanie, Congo, avec une apparition plus récente de l’Angola. L’enquête commanditée par la direction des populations et des migrations en 2001 distinguait cinq grands types qui demeurent pertinents : les exilés (souvent africains) ; les mandatés (chinois, indiens...) ; les exploités -catégorie qui peut recouper les précédentes- (Europe de l’Est et Balkans) ; les fugueurs (Afrique du Nord) ; les errants. »

      Le rapport relève également que « la réalité de l’isolement n’est pas toujours aisée à établir, dans la mesure où ces jeunes sont parfois venus rejoindre un parent plus ou moins éloigné » mais que « le caractère relatif de cet isolement ne minimise pas le danger auquel ces jeunes sont exposés car les adultes auxquels ils ont été confiés sont inégalement désireux de les accueillir et les conditions d’accueil se dégradent parfois rapidement sans compter les situations extrêmes d’exploitation (esclavage domestique ou prostitution par exemple). »

      20 Rapport n° 470 (Sénat, 1997-1998), page 22.

      21 Mission d’analyse et de proposition sur les conditions d’accueil des mineurs étrangers isolés en France - Rapport n° 2005 010, présenté par Jean Blocquaux, Anne Burstin et Dominique Giorgi, membres de l’inspection générale des affaires sociales - janvier 2005.

      https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-300-1/r05-300-111.html

      Source : Rapport de commission d’enquête n° 300 (2005-2006) de MM. #Georges_OTHILY et #François-Noël_BUFFET, fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, déposé le 6 avril 2006

    • Intéressant de voir le vocabulaire, qui n’a guère changé depuis, autour de #fermeté et #humanité
      voir notamment cet article de Véronique Albanel :
      Humanité et fermeté

      https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2018-4-page-4.htm

      En #France, mais aussi en #Belgique...
      #Asile et #immigration en #Belgique (I) : la Méthode #De_Block, ou la #fermeté_déshumanisante

      Au plus haut dans les sondages et cajolée par les médias, la Secrétaire d’Etat à l’Asile et à l’Immigration #Maggie_De_Block voit sa gestion restrictive des flux migratoires couronnée de succès politique. Son secret ? Une #communication habile sur un dosage présenté comme équilibré entre #fermeté et #humanité. Une formule dont les deux éléments présentent tous les traits d’un #oxymore aux conséquences humaines désastreuses.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/213382

      #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots

    • C’est vrai qu’il s’agit de celles et ceux qui se sont fait intercepter et qu’ils n’ont plus guère d’options…

      Reste, comme toujours, à estimer celles et ceux qui sont passés à travers les mailles des filets…

      a parte, je vais pouvoir tester ces jours-ci la gare de Champel flambant neuve, inaugurée ce week-end…

    • Vous le savez, on est plusieurs à se poser pas mal de questions sur les statistiques françaises sur l’asile.
      Les chiffres officiels de la DGEF sont souvent très différents des statisques officielles européenne d’#Eurostat.
      C’est assez « pratique » pour le gouvernement, qui justifie sa politique migratoire selon les chiffres qui l’arrange…

      Gérard Sadik, de la Cimade, l’a évoqué il y a déjà plusieurs mois : la France ne comptabilisait pas les #dublinés.
      Afin de vérifier, j’avais contacté les journalistes du service « CheckNews » du journal Libération, fin novembre.
      Ils ont enquêté, et diffusé leurs résultats aujourd’hui :
      https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2020/01/20/demandes-d-asile-eurostat-epingle-la-france-pour-avoir-tronque-des-statis

      L’article est réservé aux abonnés, je copie/colle en fin de message l’article complet, mais à ne pas rediffuser publiquement par respect pour leur travail.

      En résumé ils confirment que la France ne respecte pas les consignes statistiques européennes... en ne prenant pas en compte les demandeurs d’asile dublinés, notre pays fausse les comparaisons.
      Bilan : il est très difficile d’avoir une vision précise des statistiques sur l’asile, à cause de l’incompétence française.
      Ce qui n’empêche pas le gouvernement français de s’appuyer sur ces chiffres tronqués pour justifier le durcissement de sa politique…

      Le Ministère de l’intérieur doit justement diffuser demain les premiers chiffres de 2019… qui ne seront donc vraisemblablement pas conformes !

      Message de David Torondel reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 20.01.2020.

    • Selon nos informations, Eurostat a récemment pris contact avec les autorités françaises, en raison de statistiques tronquées fournies par Paris quant au nombre de demandeurs d’asile. L’office statistique européen s’est en effet rendu compte que la France, depuis plusieurs années, ne comptabilisait pas dans ses chiffres les demandeurs sous procédure de Dublin (personnes demandant l’asile mais qui doivent en théorie être prises en charge par le pays dans lequel elles sont entrées dans l’UE). Ce qui a pour effet de minorer chaque mois de plusieurs milliers de demandeurs, et de biaiser toute comparaison. Ce qui est pourtant l’objet d’Eurostat.

      #paywall

  • #métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements

    Je viens de lire dans un compte-rendu de réunion qui a eu lieu à Milan en juin 2019, ce commentaire, sur la situation à la #frontière italo-slovène :

    Gianfranco Schiavone :

    «Quello che sicuramente dovrebbe diventare una questione delicata é l’annunciato avvio delle pattuglie italo slovene in frontiera con l’obiettivo dichiarato alla stampa di bloccare gli arrivi. Con riammissione senza formalita’ delle persone irregolari intercettate nella fascia dei 5 km dalla frontiera . Queste sono le dichiarazioni pubbliche di questi giorni»

    Une #zone_frontalière de #5_km dans laquelle ont lieu des #refoulements directs.

    #Italie #Slovénie #frontière_sud-alpine #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontière_mobile #bande_frontalière #frontières_mobiles #zone_frontalière #zones_frontalières #zone-frontière

    Ceci me rappelle d’autres cas, en Europe et ailleurs, dans lesquels des procédures semblables (la frontière n’est plus une #ligne, mais une #zone) ont été mises en place, j’essaie de les mettre sur ce fil de discussion.
    Si quelqu’un a d’autres cas à signaler, les contributions sont bienvenues...

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4 @isskein

    • A la frontière entre franco-italienne :

      Dans un amendement, l’élu a proposé « une zone limitée aux communes limitrophes ou une bande de 10 kms par rapport à la frontière. » Le gouvernement en a accepté le principe, mais « le délimitera de manière précise par décret pour coller à la réalité du terrain. »

      http://alpesdusud.alpes1.com/news/locales/67705/alpes-du-sud-refus-d-entree-pour-les-migrants-vers-une-evolution-
      #France #Italie #frontière_sud-alpine

    • L’article 10 de la loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme modifie l’article 78-2 du Code de procédure pénale relatif aux contrôles d’identités. Il permet ainsi des contrôles aux frontières pour une durée de douze heures consécutives (contre six auparavant). Il les élargit « aux abords » de 373 gares et dans un rayon de dix kilomètres des ports et aéroports au nombre des points de passage frontaliers. Bien au-delà des simples frontières de l’Hexagone, c’est une partie importante du territoire français qui est ainsi couvert, dont des villes entières comme Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, etc.

      source, p.25 : https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf
      #France

    • Frontière entre #Italie et #Slovénie :

      This month saw the introduction of joint Slovenian and Italian police patrols on their mutual border, raising concerns about the retrenchment of national boundaries contra the Schengen Agreement. The collaboration between authorities, due to be implemented until the end of September, mobilises four joint operations per week, with respective police forces able to enter 10km into the territory of their neighboring state in order to apprehend migrants. Mixed operations by member states signifies a growing trend towards the securitization of the EU’s internal borders, and in this case a tightening of controls on the departure point from the West Balkan route.

      The patrols aim at stemming the transit of migrants from the western Slovenian regions of #Goriška and #Obalno-kraška, into the eastern region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy. Given the extensive pushback apparatus being employed by Slovenian and Croatian officials, arrival in Italy has often been the first place where persons-in-transit can apply for international protection without the threat of summary removal. However, these developments in cross border patrols highlight a growing effort on the part of the Italian government to prevent people seeking sanctuary on its territory.

      (p.15-16)

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/July-2019-Final-Report.pdf

      –—

      While the exact number of persons arriving via the Slovenian-Italian border is unknown, there has been a sharp rise since April (http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2020/11/09/friuli-venezia-giulia-immigrazione-fedriga-ripensare-politiche-di-controllo-) of people entering Italy from the Balkan route. Not only in Trieste, but also around the province of #Udine, arrivals have increased compared to last year. In Udine, around 100 people (https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/11/30/migranti-oltre-cento-persone-rintracciate-nelludinese_9fdae48d-8174-4ea1-b221-8) were identified in one day. This has been met with a huge rise in chain pushbacks, initiated by Italian authorities via readmissions to Slovenia. From January to October 2020, 1321 people (https://www.rainews.it/tgr/fvg/articoli/2020/11/fvg-massimiliano-fedriga-migranti-arrivi-emergenza-98da1880-455e-4c59-9dc9-6) have been returned via the informal readmissions agreement , representing a fivefold increase when compared with the statistics from 2019.

      But instead of dealing with this deficit in adherence to international asylum law, in recent months Italian authorities have only sought to adapt border controls to apprehend more people. Border checks are now focusing on trucks, cars and smaller border crossings (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu4es3xXVc8&feature=youtu.be

      ), rather than focusing solely on the military patrols of the forested area. This fits into a strategy of heightened control, pioneered by the Governor of the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region Massimiliano Fedriga who hopes to deploy more detection equipment at the border. The aim is to choke off any onward transit beyond the first 10km of Italian territory, and therefore apply the fast tracked process of readmission to the maximum number of new arrivals.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/892914

      #10_km

    • Kuster Backs Bill To Reduce 100-Mile Zone for Border Patrol Checkpoints

      Congresswoman Ann McLane Kuster is cosponsoring legislation to reduce border zones from 100 to 25 miles from the border (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3852?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22border+zone%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1), within which U.S. Customs and Border Patrol can set up immigration checkpoints.

      Congressman Peter Welch of Vermont is the prime sponsor of the legislation.

      Kuster was stopped at one such immigration checkpoint in June of this year. The checkpoint, on I-93 in Woodstock, around 90 miles from the border, resulted in 29 tickets for alleged immigration violations.

      The violations were for legal visitors who did not have appropriate paperwork on them, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

      According to a map from CityLabs, the entire state of New Hampshire falls within a border zone (which includes coastal borders).

      “I think it has a chilling effect,” says Kuster. “It’s not the free and open America that we know.”

      Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a similar bill to the Senate.

      https://www.nhpr.org/post/kuster-backs-bill-reduce-100-mile-zone-border-patrol-checkpoints#stream/0
      #USA #Etats-Unis

    • Inside the Massive U.S. ’Border Zone’

      All of Michigan, D.C., and a large chunk of Pennsylvania are part of the area where Border Patrol has expanded search and seizure rights. Here’s what it means to live or travel there.

      https://cdn.citylab.com/media/img/citylab/2018/05/03_Esri_Map/940.png?mod=1548686763

      https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/who-lives-in-border-patrols-100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275
      #cartographie #visualisation
      #100-Mile_Zone

      déjà signalé sur seenthis par @reka en 2018 :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/727225

    • En #Hongrie, les pushbacks, largement pratiqués depuis des années, ont été légalisés en mars 2017 par de nouvelles dispositions permettant aux forces de l’ordre de refouler automatiquement toute personne interpellée sur le territoire hongrois et considérée en situation irrégulière. Ces personnes sont ramenées jusqu’à la clôture et renvoyées de l’autre côté. Si elles manifestent leur volonté de demander l’asile, on leur signifie qu’elles doivent repartir en Serbie et passer par les zones de transit. Pourtant, se trouvant géographiquement et juridiquement en Hongrie (le mur étant situé à 1,5 mètre à l’intérieur du tracé officiel de la frontière), les autorités ont l’obligation de prendre en compte ces demandes d’asile en vertu des conventions européennes et des textes internationaux dont la Hongrie est signataire.

      Tiré du rapport de La Cimade (2018), pp.37-38 :
      https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf

    • Le zone di transito e di frontiera – commento dell’ASGI al decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019

      Il 7 settembre 2009 sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 210 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) è stato pubblicato il decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019 che individua le zone di transito e di frontiera dove potrà trovare applicazione la procedura accelerata per l’esame nel merito delle domande di protezione internazionale e istituisce due nuove sezioni delle Commissioni territoriali , come previsto dall’art. 28 bis co. 1 quater del D.lgs. n. 25/2008, introdotto dal d.l. n. 113/2018.

      Le zone di frontiera o di transito sono individuate in quelle esistenti nelle seguenti province:

      –Trieste e Gorizia;

      –Crotone, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce e Brindisi;

      –Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Siracusa, Catania, Messina;

      –Trapani, Agrigento;

      –Città metropolitana di Cagliari e Sud Sardegna.

      Il decreto ministeriale istituisce altresì due nuove sezioni , Matera e Ragusa, le quali operano rispettivamente nella commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato di Bari, per la zona di frontiera di Matera, e nella commissione territoriale di Siracusa, per la zona di frontiera di Ragusa.

      Nel commento qui pubblicato ASGI sottolinea come le nuove disposizioni paiono contrastare con le norme dell’Unione Europea perché si riferiscono in modo assolutamente generico alle “zone di transito o di frontiera individuate in quelle esistenti nelle province” e non ad aree delimitate, quali ad esempio i porti o le aree aeroportuali o altri luoghi coincidenti con frontiere fisiche con Paesi terzi non appartenenti all’Unione europea.

      ASGI evidenzia come “l’applicazione delle procedure accelerate alle domande presentate nelle zone individuate nel decreto ministeriale comporta una restrizione dell’effettivo esercizio dei diritti di cui ogni straniero è titolare allorché manifesta la volontà di presentare la domanda di asilo e una conseguente contrazione del diritto di difesa, in ragione del dimezzamento dei termini di impugnazione e dell’assenza di un effetto sospensivo automatico derivante dalla proposizione del ricorso previsti, in modo differente per le varie ipotesi specifiche, dall’art. 35 bis D. Lgs. 25/08”.

      A tal fine ASGI ricorda che:

      – ai cittadini di Paesi terzi o apolidi tenuti in centri di trattenimento o presenti ai valichi di frontiera, comprese le zone di transito alla frontiere esterne, che desiderino presentare una domanda di protezione internazionale, gli Stati membri devono garantire l’informazione, anche sull’accesso procedura per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, adeguati servizi di interpretariato,
      nonché l’effettivo accesso a tali aree alle organizzazioni e alle persone che prestano consulenza e assistenza ai richiedenti asilo (art. 8 Direttiva 2013/32/UE);

      – gli Stati membri devono provvedere affinché l’avvocato o altro consulente legale che assiste o rappresenta un richiedente possa accedere alle aree chiuse, quali i centri di trattenimento e le zone di transito (art. 23 par. 2) e analoga possibilità deve essere garantita all’UNHCR (art. 29, par. 1);

      – ai sensi dell’art. 46 par. 1 il richiedente ha diritto a un ricorso effettivo dinanzi a un giudice anche nel caso in cui la decisione sulla domanda di protezione internazionale venga presa in frontiera o nelle zone di transito.

      E’ evidente, conclude ASGI nel commento al Decreto, che vi sia il rischio che lo straniero espulso o respinto e che abbia presentato domanda di protezione internazionale dopo l’espulsione o il respingimento in una zona di frontiera tra quelle indicate nel nuovo decreto ministeriale si veda esaminata la sua domanda in modo sommario mentre è trattenuto in condizioni e luoghi imprecisati e inaccessibili di fatto a difensori e organizzazioni di tutela dei diritti.

      Occorre invece ribadire che la presentazione della domanda di protezione internazionale in frontiera riguarderà spesso persone rese ulteriormente vulnerabili dalle condizioni traumatiche del viaggio ed alle quali andrà perciò in ogni caso garantito un esame adeguato della domanda di protezione internazionale e l’applicazione delle garanzie e dei diritti previsti a tutela dei richiedenti protezione internazionale dalle disposizioni nazionali e dell’Unione Europea.

      https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/asilo-zone-transito-frontiera

    • La loi renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme étend à nouveau les contrôles d’identités frontaliers

      Avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi du 30 octobre 2017, les #contrôles_frontaliers étaient autorisés dans les espaces publics des #gares, #ports et #aéroports ouverts au trafic international (désignés par un arrêté ministériel) et dans une zone située entre la frontière terrestre et une ligne tracée de 20 kilomètres en deçà. Le législateur avait étendu les zones frontalières, notamment dans les territoires ultra-marins (où la convention de Schengen n’est pourtant pas applicable).

      https://www.editions-legislatives.fr/actualite/la-loi-renforcant-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-etend-a-nouvea
      #France #20_km #20_kilomètres #espace_public #gares_internationales

    • The Grand Chamber Judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary: Immigration Detention and how the Ground beneath our Feet Continues to Erode

      The ECtHR has been for a long time criticized for its approach to immigration detention that diverts from the generally applicable principles to deprivation of liberty in other contexts. As Cathryn Costello has observed in her article Immigration Detention: The Ground beneath our Feet, a major weakness in the Court’s approach has been the failure to scrutinize the necessity of immigration detention under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary delivered on 21 November 2019 has further eroded the protection extended to asylum-seekers under the Convention to the point that restrictions imposed upon asylum-seekers might not even be qualified as deprivation of liberty worthy of the protection of Article 5. The Grand Chamber overruled on this point the unanimously adopted Chamber judgment that found that the holding of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ between Hungary and Serbia actually amounts to deprivation of liberty.

      In this blog, I will briefly describe the facts of the case, the findings of the Grand Chamber under Article 3 ECHR that was also invoked by the applicants and then I will focus on the reasoning as to the applicability of Article 5.

      The case concerned two Bangladeshi nationals who transited through Greece, the Republic of Northern Macedonia (as it is now known) and Serbia before reaching Hungary, where they immediately applied for asylum. They found themselves in the transit zone on the land border between Hungary and Serbia, where they were held for 23 days pending the examination of their asylum applications. The applications were rejected on the same day on the ground that the applicants had transited through Serbia that, according to Hungary, was a safe third country. The rejections were confirmed on appeal, an order for their expulsion was issued, the applicants were escorted out of the transit zone and they crossed back into Serbia.

      Procedural Breach of Article 3 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber established that Hungary ‘failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision before removing the applicants from Hungary’ to Serbia (para 163). No finding was made on the issue as to whether Hungary was substantively in breach of the right not to be subjected to refoulement given the conditions in Serbia and the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedures that might lead to chain refoulement. This omission follows a trend in the Court’s reasoning that can be described as a procedural turn: focus on the quality of the national decision making processes rather than on the substantive accuracy of the decisions taken at national level.[1] This omission, however, had important consequences for the application of Article 5 to the applicants’ case, the most controversial aspect in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning.

      The Chamber’s reasoning under Article 5 ECHR

      On this aspect, the Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber’s conclusion that the applicants were deprived of their liberty. The fundamental question here is whether ‘the stay’ (Hungary used the term ‘accommodation’) of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ with an exit door open to Serbia, but closed to Hungary, amounts to deprivation of liberty (i.e. detention) in the sense of Article 5 ECHR. Asylum seekers in the transit zone were denied access to the Hungarian territory,[2] but they could leave to Serbia. This creates a complex intertwinement between deprivation of liberty (Article 5(1)(f)) normally understood as not allowing somebody to leave a place, on the one hand, and not allowing somebody to enter a place. Entering a State can be very relevant from the perspective of the obligation upon this State not to refoule, which necessitates a procedure for determining whether there is a risk of refoulement.

      In its judgment from 14 March 2017 the Chamber unanimously answered in positive: by holding them in the transit zone, Hungary deprived the applicants from their liberty, which was in violation of Article 5(1)(f) since this measures had no legal basis in the national law. The Chamber clarified that‘[t]he mere fact that it was possible for them to leave voluntarily returning to Serbia which never consented to their readmission cannot rule out an infringement of the right to liberty.’ (para 55). In this way the Chamber reaffirmed the reasoning in Amuur v France where the Court observed ‘[…] this possibility [to leave voluntary the country] becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.’ (para 48) It follows that although the transit zone at the French airport was, as France argued, “open to the outside”, the applicants were still considered as having been detained since this ‘outside’ did not offer a level of protection comparable to the one in France.

      The Chamber followed this reasoning from Amuur v France in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, which led to the recognition that ‘[…] the applicants could not have left the transit zone in the direction of Serbia without unwanted and grave consequences, that is, without forfeiting their asylum claims and running the risk of refoulement’ (para 55). The Chamber also added that ‘To hold otherwise would void the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention by compelling the applicants to choose between liberty and the pursuit of a procedure ultimately aimed to shelter them from the risk of exposure to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.’ (para 56)

      The ‘practical and realistic’ approach of the Grand Chamber under Article 5 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber in its reasoning broke precisely this linkage between the applicability of Article 5 (the qualification of a treatment as deprivation of liberty) and Article 3 (protection from refoulement). The Grand Chamber performed the following important moves to achieve this. First, it stated that ‘its approach should be practical and realistic, having regard to the present-day conditions and challenges’, which implied that States were not only entitled to control their borders, but also ‘to take measures against foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration.’ (para 213). With Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Court has thus added another nuance to its well-established point of departure in cases dealing with migrants. This point of departure has been that States are entitled, subject to their treaty obligations, to control their borders. The new addition introduced with Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary and also repeated in Z.A. and Others v Russia, a Grand Chamber judgment issued on the same day, concerns States’ right to prevent ‘foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration’. This addition, however, does not seem appropriate given that the applicants themselves in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary never circumvented any immigration control restrictions. They applied immediately for asylum.

      This ‘practical and realistic approach’ also implied an endorsement of the representation of the situation as one of ‘crisis’:[3] ‘the Court observes that the Hungarian authorities were in conditions of a mass influx of asylum-seekers and migrants at the border, which necessitated rapidly putting in place measures to deal with what was clearly a crisis situation.’ (para 228) In the same paragraph, the Grand Chamber went on to almost praise Hungary for having processed the applicants’ claims so fast event though it was ‘a crisis’: ‘Despite the ensuring very significant difficulties, the applicants’ asylum claims and their judicial appeals were examined within three weeks and two days.’ It appears as if the Grand Chamber at this stage had already forgotten its findings made earlier in the judgment under Article 3 that the national procedure for examining the applicants’ claims was deficient. This ultimately gave the basis for the Grand Chamber to find a violation of Article 3.

      The distinction based on how asylum-seekers arrive and the type of border they find themselves at

      The second move performed by the Grand Chamber implied the introduction of a distinction between ‘staying at airport transit zones’ (para 214) and at reception centers located on islands (para 216), on the one hand, and a transit zone located on the land border between two Council of Europe Member States (para 219). This meant, as the Court reasoned, that the applicants did not have to take a plane to leave the zone, they could simply walk out of the zone. In other words, it was practically possible for them to do it on their own and they did not need anybody’s help. As the Court continued to reason in para 236, ‘Indeed, unlike the case of Amuur, where the French courts described the applicants’ confinement as an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty”, in the present case the Hungarian authorities were apparently convinced that the applicants could realistically leave in the direction of Serbia [emphasis added].’ This quotation also begs the comment as to why what the national authorities were or were not convinced about actually mattered. In addition, the reference in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary as to how the national authorities had qualified the situation is also bizarre given that ‘deprivation of liberty’ is an autonomous concept under the Convention. On this point, the two dissenting judges, Judge Bianku and Judge Vućinić criticized the majority by highlighting that ‘the Court has reiterated on many occasions that it does not consider itself bound by the domestic courts’ legal conclusions as to the existence of a deprivation of liberty.’

      Narrowing down the importance of Amuur v France

      The third move performed by the Court is playing down the importance of and narrowing the relevance of Amuur v France. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Grand Chamber reiterated (para 239) the most significant pronouncement from Amuur: the possibility to leave the zone ‘becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is included to take them in.’ It then noted that this reasoning ‘must be read in close relation to the factual and legal context in that case.’ This meant that in contrast to the situation in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, in Amuur the applicants could not leave ‘without authorization to board an airplane and without diplomatic assurance concerning their only possible destination, Syria, a country “not bound by the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ (para 240) On this point Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary can be also distinguished from Z.A. and Others v Russia, where the Grand Chamber observed that ‘[…] unlike in land border transit zones, in this particular case leaving the Sheremetyevo airport transit zone would have required planning, contacting aviation companies, purchasing tickets and possibly applying for a visa depending on the destination.’ (para 154) For the applicants in Ilias and Ahmed ‘it was practically possible […] to walk to the border and cross into Serbia, a country bound by the Geneva Convention.’ (para 241). The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the applicants feared of the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedure and the related risk of removal to the Republic of North Macedonia or Greece. (para 242) However, what seems to be crucial is that their fears were not related to ‘direct threat to their life or health’ (para 242). It follows that the possibility to leave for a place will not preclude the qualification of the situation as one of detention, only if this place poses a direct threat to life or health.

      As noted by the two dissenting judges, it did not seem to matter for the majority that the applicants could not enter Serbia lawfully. In this way, the majority’s reasoning under Article 5 appears to endorse a situation where people are just pushed out of the border without some formal procedures with elementary guarantees.

      Read as a whole the Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary is inconsistent: it contains two findings that are difficult to square together. The Court concluded that since the applicants would not be exposed to a direct risk in Serbia, they were not detained in Hungary. At the same time, Hungary violated Article 3 of the Convention since it did not conduct a proper assessment of the risks that the applicants could face if they were to return to Serbia.

      Overall weakening of the protection of Article 5 ECHR

      One final comment is due. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, the Grand Chamber summarized the following factors for determining whether ‘confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones and reception centers’ can be defined as deprivation of liberty: ‘i) the applicants’ individual situation and their choices, ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose, iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events, and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants.’ (para 217) (see also Z.A. and Others v Russia, para 145) Among these criteria particular attention needs to be directed to the applicable legal regime and the availability of procedural protection. In principle, Article 5, if found applicable, offers certain guarantees (e.g. statutory basis for the deprivation of liberty, access to proceedings for challenging the lawfulness of the detention). The Court seems to have inserted such considerations at the definitional stage of its analysis. For example, in Z.A. and Others v Russia, the Grand Chamber when it examined whether the confinement of the applicants in the airport transit zone amounted to deprivation of liberty, noted that they were left ‘in a legal limbo without any possibility of challenging the measure restricting their liberty’ (para 146). This played a role for the Grand Chamber to conclude that the applicants in Z.A. and Others v Russia were indeed deprived of liberty and Article 5 was thus found applicable. In contrast, the Grand Chamber in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary observed that certain procedural guarantees applied to the applicants’ case (para 226), which also played a role for the final conclusion that Article 5 was not applicable. In sum, instead of scrutinizing the national legal regime and the access to procedural guarantees as part of the substantive analysis under Article 5, where a single deficiency leads to a finding of a violation (i.e. it is sufficient to find a violation of Article 5 if there is no strictly defined statutory basis for the applicants’ detention), the Court has muddled these criteria together with other factors and made them pertinent for the definitional analysis. This ultimately weakens the roles of these criteria and creates uncertainty.

      [1] See V Stoyanova, ‘How Exception must “Very Exceptional” Be? Non-refoulement, Socio-Economic Deprivation and Paposhvili v Belgium’ (2017) International Journal of Refugee Law 29(4) 580.

      [2] See B Nagy, ‘From Reluctance to Total Denial: Asylum Policy in Hungary 2015-2018’ in V Stoyanova and E Karageorgiou (eds) The New Asylum and Transit Countries in Europe during and in the Aftermath of the 2015/2016 Crisis (Brill 2019) 17.

      [3] Boldizsar Nagy has argued that this representation made by the Hungarian government is a lie. See B Nagy, Restricting access to asylum and contempt of courts: illiberals at work in Hungary, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/restricting-access-to-asylum-and-contempt-of-courts-illiberals-at

      https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/12/23/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-ilias-and-ahmed-v-hungary-immigra
      #justice #CEDH #Hongrie #CourEDH

    • Entre la #Pologne et la #Biélorussie :

      Si cette famille a pu être aidée, c’est aussi parce qu’elle a réussi à dépasser la zone de l’état d’urgence : une bande de 3 km tracée par la Pologne tout du long de sa frontière avec la Biélorussie, formellement interdite d’accès aux organisations comme aux journalistes.
      Le long de la frontière, les migrants se retrouvent donc seuls entre les gardes-frontières polonais et biélorusses. Côté polonais, ils sont ramenés manu militari en Biélorussie… En Biélorussie, ils sont également refoulés : depuis octobre, le pays refuse de laisser entrer les migrants déjà passés côté européen. « La seule chance de sortir de la Pologne, c’est d’entrer en Biélorussie. La seule chance de sortir de la Biélorussie, c’est d’entrer en Pologne. C’est comme un ping-pong », confie Nelson (pseudonyme), un migrant originaire de la République démocratique du Congo qui a contacté notre rédaction.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199
      et plus précisément ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948201

      –-

      Et l’article de Médiapart :
      Entre la Pologne et le Belarus, les migrants abandonnés dans une #zone_de_non-droit
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948202

    • « À titre de mesures compensatoires à l’entrée en vigueur de la convention de Schengen – qui, du reste, n’était pas encore applicable –, la loi du 10 août 1993 instaure les contrôles dits frontaliers : la police, la gendarmerie et la douane peuvent vérifier l’identité de toute personne, pour s’assurer qu’elle respecte les obligations liées à la détention d’un titre de circulation ou de séjour, dans la zone frontalière et dans les zones publiques des ports, aéroports et gares ouvertes au trafic international. La zone frontalière est une bande de terre, large de 20 km, longeant la frontière terrestre ; les ports, gares ou autres aérogares visés figurent sur une longue liste fixée par un arrêté ministériel. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 16)

      –-

      « Il suffit de passer quelques heures à la gare de Menton pour le constater. Pour les personnes présumées étrangères, la liberté d’aller et de venir dans les espaces placés sous surveillance est restreinte. Elle a encore été réduite avec la loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme qui modifie, une fois de plus, le texte de loi sur les contrôles d’identité en étendant les zones frontalières autour de certains ports et aéroports qui constituent des points de passage frontaliers au sens du code frontières Schengen, soit « tout point de passage autorisé par les autorités compétentes pour le franchissement des frontières extérieures ». Dans ces nouvelles zones, la police pourra procéder à des opérations de contrôle sans avoir besoin de motiver son intervention. La loi de 2017 a également prévu que les contrôles frontaliers puissent s’effectuer « aux abords des gares » et non plus seulement dans les zones publiques de ces lieux. La formulation souffre, c’est peu de le dire, d’un manque de précision qui donne plus de latitude encore aux forces de l’ordre. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 19)

      source : Nathalie Ferré, « La France s’enferme à double tour », Plein Droit, 2018, n°116.

      #20_km #20_kilomètres

    • #Pyrénées, frontière #Espagne-#France, témoignage d’une personne ayant acheté un terrain en zone frontalière :

      « En ce moment, on croise plein de voitures de forces de l’ordre, ce qui est étonnant en plein hiver car il n’y a personne. Il y a aussi des barrages de police réguliers car ils savent que des gens se font prendre sur la route », raconte Camille Rosa, cofondatrice d’une cantine solidaire à Perpignan. « On a acheté avec des copains un petit terrain vers Cerbère. Un jour, des gendarmes sont venus fouiller notre camion alors que mes enfants faisaient la sieste à l’intérieur. J’ai tenté de m’interposer, mais ils m’ont dit que sur la #zone_frontalière, ils avaient une #commission_rogatoire_permanente », poursuit-elle.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/950934

    • #France :

      Le contrôle d’identité « Schengen » permet de vérifier le respect des obligations liées aux titres et documents d’identité et de voyage. Il peut avoir lieu dans une zone située à moins de #20_kilomètres de la frontière terrestre séparant la France d’un pays limitrophe (Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, Luxembourg et Suisse). Si le contrôle a lieu sur l’autoroute ou dans un train, la zone s’étend jusqu’au 1er péage ou l’arrêt après les 20 kilomètres. Le contrôle peut être effectué dans un port, un aéroport ou une gare et ses abords accessible au public et ouverte au trafic international. Le contrôle ne peut pas être pratiqué plus de 12 heures consécutives dans un même lieu et ne peut pas être systématique.

      Depuis la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure, des contrôles d’identité peuvent également être effectués dans un rayon de #10_kilomètres autour de certains #ports et #aéroports sur le territoire.

      C’est ce dernier contrôle qui concerne majoritairement les personnes se présentant à la frontière francoitalienne, mais certaines situations suivies par les militants locaux laissent penser que d’autres types de contrôles ont pu servir pour justifier les arrestations de personnes au-delà de la bande des 20 kilomètres ou des zones transfrontalières.

      Rapport de l’Anafé, Persona non grata, 2019 : http://www.anafe.org/spip.php?article520

      –—

      Rapport CNCDH 2018, p.7 :

      « la préfète des Hautes-Alpes a expliqué que la zone permettant de procéder à des refus d’entrée avait été définie par son prédécesseur mais qu’elle ne correspondait pas nécessairement à la bande des 20 kms14. Selon la PAF, les refus d’entrée peuvent être prononcés dès lors que l’étranger est contrôlé sur le territoire des communes de Montgenèvre et Nevache, et donc jusqu’à l’entrée de Briançon. »
      Il convient de rappeler que des contrôles aléatoires, hors du cadre dérogatoire prévu en cas de rétablissement des frontières, peuvent être opérés, conformément à l’article 78-2 du code de procédure pénale, dans une zone comprise entre la frontière terrestre de la France avec les Etats de l’espace et une ligne tracée à 20 kilomètres en deçà, ainsi que dans les zones accessibles au public des ports, aéroports et gares ferroviaires ou routières ouverts au trafic international et désignés par arrêté et aux abords de ces gares. Ces contrôles sont toutefois strictement encadrés, notamment par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Les personnes interpellées sur ce fondement peuvent faire l’objet d’une procédure de réadmission. En revanche, lorsque les contrôles aux frontières intérieures sont rétablis, les autorités françaises peuvent refuser l’entrée aux étrangers ne remplissant pas les conditions d’entrée sur le territoire aux frontières terrestres et leur notifier une décision de non-admission. Ces étrangers sont considérés comme n’étant pas entrés sur le territoire

      https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-situation-des-migrants-la-frontiere-franco-italienne

      #10_km #20_km

    • Sur le #Bibby_Stockholm barge at #Portland Port :

      “Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission”

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1000870#message1011761

      voir aussi :

      “The circumstances at Portland Port are very different because where the barge is to be positioned is below the mean low water mark. This means that the barge is outside of our planning control and there is no requirement for planning permission from the council.”

      https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/2023/07/18/leaders-comments-on-the-home-office-barge

      #UK #Angleterre

    • The ‘Border’ under EU Law

      The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

      In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

      Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

      By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1018938#message1023987
      #fiction_de_non-entrée

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      Ce terme est empruntée d’une vieille loi des Etats-Unis, The Immigration Act 1891 :

      “The Immigration Act 1891 was the first to expressly mention detention, as it made provision for officers to ’inspect all such aliens’ or ’to orcier a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a de ignated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is made’. The Act alsa created the very important provision that came to be known as the ’entry fiction’. According to this, a removal to shore for examination ’shall not be considered a landing during the pendency of such examination’. This was a criticallegal (and constitutional) innovation because it meant that th ose incarcerated must be treated as if they were not there. This was both an attempt to treat the place of detention as if it were sim ply an extension ofbeing held on board ship, but also something more serious. The concept of being physically detained within the territorial land-mass of the United States but not being considered legally present was radical. It suggested a kind of limbo - with the detention centre constituting perhaps an extra-legal space- putting immigrants beyond the reach of constitutional norms, pending a final executive decision to land or deport them.”

      source : Daniel Wilsher, Immigration detention : law, history, politics, 2012, p. 13