• Terrorism in Africa increased 100,000% during ’war on terror’ | Responsible Statecraft
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/africa-terrorism

    Deaths from terrorism in Africa have skyrocketed more than 100,000 percent during the U.S. war on terror according to a new study by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. These findings contradict claims by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) that it is thwarting terrorist threats on the continent and promoting security and stability.

    #états-unis

  • Why America fell out of love with its Army
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-army-recruitment
    Elle était si belle, the Army, toutes nos mères tombaient amoureuses des jeunes et beaux GIs stationnés dans ma ville natale pour la défendre contre les méchants russes et leur armée rouge fémicidaire. Aujourd’hui méme les américains ne veulent plus der leur « Army of Excellence ». C’est triste le déclin de l’empire.

    Jan 04, 2024 by Justin Overbaugh - A lack of truth and accountability tends to have a bad effect on trust, and as it turns out, recruitment, too

    For the past several years now, a phalanx of defense officials and retired senior officers have been lamenting the dearth of people willing to serve in the U.S. military.

    The problem is particularly acute for the Army, the largest of the U.S. forces, which fell short of its target by 25,000 recruits over the past two years. The situation is so grave that experts claim it imperils the all-volunteer force, an institution that has provided manpower for the American military for half a century.

    Why does the Army, an organization that prides itself on achievement, fail at this fundamental task? Excuses tend to focus on market dynamics such as shrinking recruiting pools, lack of knowledge among American youth about service opportunities, and impacts from COVID 19. These factors are undoubtedly relevant, but are they the actual cause of the Army’s failure?

    Current officials seem to think so. After failing in 2022, the Army increased its efforts to convince young people to serve. This, combined with a campaign to overcome “misperceptions” about life in the military, was a primary focus of the branch’s $104 million advertising budget in 2023.

    Additionally, the Army estimated it invested over $119 million in the future soldier preparatory course. This new program enabled young Americans, initially disqualified because of low aptitude scores or high body-fat results, the opportunity to improve their marks. The Army claimed over 8,800 recruits completed the course and moved on to basic combat training. In the end, however, none of these initiatives enabled the force to achieve its quotas.

    If market dynamics are not the underlying cause of the crisis, what is? I believe that the Army fails to meet its recruiting goals not because of a challenging market environment, but rather because a sizable portion of the American public has lost trust in it and no longer sees it as an institution worthy of personal investment.

    Professor of sociology Piotr Sztompka defines trust as “a bet about the future contingent actions of others.” He presents the concept of trust in two components: beliefs and commitment. Essentially, a person trusts when they believe something about the future and they act in accordance with this belief. This is directly relevant to recruiting: in a high trust environment, people are more likely to enlist because they have a reasonable expectation of future benefit.

    Unfortunately, anyone considering service today can look to myriad examples of the Army failing to meet their end of the bargain. Whether it is a lack of adequate and safe housing for soldiers and their families, the persistence of sexual assault, an inability to address suicide rates or to accurately account for property and funds — or even to develop a comprehensive physical fitness test — the Army, and the Department of Defense more broadly, consistently fail to achieve results.

    But these shortcomings, while disastrous, pale in comparison to the Army’s ultimate failure: the failure to win wars.

    In his book, “Why America Loses Wars,” Donald Stoker reminds us that winning in war means, “the achievement of the political purpose for which the war is being fought.” Judging by this standard, the Army has clearly failed at its raison d’être, to fight and win the nation’s wars, over the past two decades. This failure has come at catastrophic cost: the loss of over 900,000 lives, the death of over 7000 U.S. service members, and the depletion of eight trillion dollars. Additionally, on the international scene, the U.S. has bled influence, and levels of violence are on the rise.

    Considering the wreckage listed above, it is little wonder that the American people have markedly lost confidence in the institution and its leaders in recent years and could explain the unwillingness to volunteer for service. Essentially, signing up for the military is starting to look like a really bad bet.

    Adding insult to injury, a recent survey of military members indicates their enthusiasm to recommend military service has also declined significantly. While quality of life issues are highlighted as a concern, one cannot ignore the impact of failed wars on this trend. The 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, leaving the Taliban in control of the country after 20 years, has left veterans feeling betrayed and humiliated, and naturally, unlikely to encourage others to follow their path in life.

    Instead of flailing about trying to overcome challenging market dynamics, therefore, the Army should immediately commit to fixing itself. It can start by admitting its significant failures and its baffling inability to be honest with the American public about them. There are plenty of retired officers who have had public epiphanies about these systematic failures, but this kind of candor and responsibility needs to propagate among currently serving senior officials across the defense enterprise and the political establishment.

    Once honesty is re-established as a core value, and the Army has come to grips with the fact that it failed, it can then begin to explore the reason why.

    Simply put, the Army fails because it is set up to fail. It was asked to accomplish objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq that it could not possibly hope to achieve. Professors Leo Blanken and Jason Lapore point out what every senior defense official should clearly understand by now: that despite its impressive capabilities, the U.S. military is of limited utility in the type of non-existential conflicts we have fought in the past two decades. This is because the U.S. military is built for and excels at “battlefield dominance,” yet it was saddled with conducting counterinsurgency, reconstruction and building democratic institutions, tasks it was not trained for or prepared to accomplish.

    These revelations are not new, senior defense officials should have understood these dynamics all along, and speaking frankly, they did. From General Shinseki’s ignored warnings about the number of troops at the beginning of the Iraq invasion, to ongoing assessments throughout both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, it seems that it was clear throughout the defense establishment (at least behind closed doors) that the U.S. military could not and would not achieve the nation’s political objectives.

    Yet despite this, top defense officials assured the American public that the U.S. military was “making progress” towards its goals, right up to the point that it was manifestly evident that they were not. And yet, at precisely the moment the American public is looking for accountability, many of the same senior officials who failed to achieve results for the nation, are instead rewarded with lucrative positions in the defense industry and with foreign countries.

    Seeing that the military refuses to hold itself accountable, it is unsurprising that by withholding their most precious resources, their sons and daughters, the American public is.

    The service’s leadership handbook states that “trust is the foundation of the Army’s relationship with the American people, who rely on the Army to ethically, effectively and efficiently serve the Nation.”

    To earn back the trust of the American people and solve the recruiting crisis, the Army is going to have to do what everyone else has to do when relationships are broken: accept responsibility and begin to show, by deeds not words, a commitment to change.

    Senior Army officials could immediately improve by critically examining the “unquestioned assumptions that form the basis of…American grand strategy,” reevaluating military officer professional development models, and understanding how misaligned military incentive structures work against achieving policy goals. Regardless of the approach, it should be laser-focused on delivering the ethical, effective and efficient service to the nation mentioned above.

    If the Army lets this opportunity pass them by, however, claims that the military and the broader defense establishment are in a position to decisively win the nation’s wars lack credibility, as the American public will understandably remain uneasy about making a personal investment in the Army.

    Justin Overbaugh is a Colonel in the U.S. Army with experience in Combat Arms, Special Operations, Intelligence, and Talent Acquisition. In his 25-year career, he led operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and across Europe and he commanded the Tampa Recruiting Battalion from 2017-2019. This article reflects his own personal views which are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Army or the Department of Defense.
    The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

    #USA #armée #soldats #crise

  • Biden says Ukraine has already won. He’s right. - The inklings of a new narrative ?
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/zelensky-biden-washington

    Une comparaison historique de la guerre en Ukraine avec la guerre d’hiver entre le 30 novembre 1939 et le 13 mars 1940 ouvre de nouvelles perspectives de paix.

    L’analogie historique va plus loin que son esquisse dans l’article : La Finlande anticommuniste fut la création des militaires allemands les plus réactionnaires comme l’Ukraine militariste est l’oeuvre des faucons antirusses de Washington.

    13.12.2023 by Anatol Lieven - In his press conference with President Zelensky on Tuesday evening, President Biden made one statement that was both entirely true, and is the potential basis for a new U.S. approach to the conflict in Ukraine. He said that Ukraine has already won a great victory in the war — by defeating the initial Russian plan to subjugate the whole of Ukraine.

    If the Biden administration and Washington establishment could recognize the implications of this, they could craft a new narrative that would allow them, and the Ukrainian government, to present a compromise peace as a Ukrainian victory (albeit a qualified one) and a Russian defeat — though not a complete one.

    In fact, the Ukrainian victory in 2022 was even greater than that. As things stand today, by preserving the independence and Western orientation of 80 percent of former Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainian forces, with Western help, have reversed more than 300 years of history during which, in one way or another, Ukraine has been ruled from Russia.

    As the distinguished Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy told the Quincy Institute on Tuesday, this achievement echoes that of the Finns during the Second World War, when their heroic resistance convinced Stalin that conquering the whole of Finland and turning it into a Communist state would be more trouble than it was worth. Finland was therefore the only part of the former Russian empire that was not incorporated into the Soviet Union or turned into a Communist client state.

    Given the strength and unity of Ukrainian nationalism that this war has demonstrated, it is impossible to imagine that the whole of Ukraine could ever again be ruled for long by Moscow. However, Finnish survival as a democratic state did come at a price. Finland had to surrender a portion of its territory (including the historic city of Vyborg) and sign a treaty of neutrality. It should be obvious though that this was a vastly preferable alternative to sharing the fate of Poland, let alone the Baltic States.

    In his own remarks to the press conference, President Zelensky categorically ruled out any cession of territory to Russia. Indeed it is very hard to imagine any Ukrainian government formally and legally agreeing to Russian annexation. On the other hand, bowing to military reality and the advice of his military commanders, President Zelensky has now ordered the Ukrainian army to go on the defensive and fortify its existing positions.

    If this remains Ukrainian strategy, then by default the territory now held by Russia will remain under de facto Russian control; and given the disproportion of forces and resources between Ukraine and Russia, it is very difficult to see how a future Ukrainian offensive would succeed any more than this year’s has done.

    Even if the Biden administration does persuade the Republicans in Congress to agree to another massive aid package for Ukraine, can anyone seriously think that future administrations will be able to procure such US aid next year, and the year after that, indefinitely? Yet that is what will be required if Ukraine is to sustain its fight. And when the aid stops, Ukraine will be defeated.

    The Biden administration and its NATO allies have declared that their goal in the war is to help Ukraine achieve a better position at the negotiating table. But the truth is that Ukraine is unlikely ever to be in a better position than it is today. It could be much worse.

    Finally, Biden said something that was probably just evasive phrasing, but could be spun into a new diplomatic approach. Asked about NATO membership for Ukraine, he said that “NATO will be part of Ukraine’s future.” NATO, for better or worse, will be part of all our futures. That does not mean that we will all become members of NATO.

    #histoire #guerre #Ukraine #Finlande #Russie #URSS

  • How Western tanks could change Ukraine’s war effort
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/01/05/how-western-tanks-could-change-ukraines-war-effort

    The new weapons could make a significant difference in the conflict, which has fallen into a grinding stalemate as Russia and Ukraine continue to dig into their positions along the frontlines. Kyiv has already seen some success in using armor to retake territory from Moscow, and American Bradley Fighting Vehicles could help bring those efforts to the next level, according to Lyle Goldstein of Defense Priorities.

    “To the credit of the Ukrainian commanders, they have managed to create some interesting tactics here,” Goldstein said, noting that Kyiv has used simpler armored vehicles like MRAPs in a sort of “Blitzkrieg-light” whereby its soldiers penetrate well beyond the front lines and “create chaos in the rear of the Russian forces.” New tanks and combat vehicles could make this tactic more effective, potentially helping to break the stalemate in the east.

    There are, of course, a couple of limits to this approach. First, as Goldstein notes, “traditional military theory would hold that this is really impossible without air cover,” and Ukrainian air power “remains extremely limited.” In other words, it’s unclear whether Kyiv has all the necessary tools to take full advantage of its new armor.

    The second drawback is somewhat more dramatic. If these vehicles help Ukraine take back more Russian-held territory, much of which Moscow now considers to be part of Russia, then the Kremlin may resort to the use of so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons — nukes that are smaller than strategic warheads but still at least as big as the bombs the United States dropped on Japan in World War II.

    Russian analysts have largely stopped discussing tactical nukes since a flurry of chatter last fall. But Goldstein worries that a successful offensive could make Russian President Vladimir Putin reach for his trump card, and tanks would likely be an “appetizing target” for such a move.

    The main obstacle standing between Putin and the nuclear button is the “nuclear taboo,” which posits that rational leaders are too wary of their international reputation to use the ultimate weapon.

    “But we’re in the realm of desperate actions,” Goldstein argued. “I don’t think Russia is worrying too much about their reputation.”

  • When courting quasi-allies like Ukraine becomes a moral hazard
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/28/when-courting-quasi-allies-like-ukraine-becomes-a-moral-hazar

    At a recent virtual summit, #NATO leaders reaffirmed their intent to admit #Ukraine to the alliance.

    In doing so, they indicated an odd preference to directly defend Ukraine at some point, just not now while it’s under attack. As the dominant power in the NATO alliance, this puts the United States in the familiar, but dangerous, position of vaguely and half-heartedly offering to defend a non-ally.

    These states, which we call “#quasi-allies,” in our recent report, are not true allies, in that the United States has no treaty commitment to defend them. But they hover in a kind of geopolitical purgatory, encouraged by Washington to believe that they might be under the U.S. defensive penumbra. Quasi-ally status creates danger, not only for the United States, but also for those states it feints at protecting. Washington should stop creating quasi-allies, with word and deed, and either commit to defending states or, as should be the case most of the time, be clear that we won’t.

  • Behind every scene in Top Gun, War Inc. steps up to take its bows
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/06/02/behind-every-scene-in-top-gun-war-inc-steps-up-to-take-its-bo

    Top Gun: Maverick is, at its core, an unapologetically pro-military industrial complex film. The Washington Post reported that the film received support from the Pentagon itself “in the form of equipment — including jets and aircraft carriers — personnel and technical expertise.” In exchange for its help, the Navy even retained the power to veto things it didn’t like in the script.

    [...] The original #Top_Gun helped America get over its Vietnam complex, rehabilitating the military in the public square. As American audiences crammed in to see Maverick’s flying antics 36 years ago, naval aviator applications reportedly increased by 500 percent. The sequel aims to recreate that, brushing aside the failures in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya in the interim years to serve unabashedly as an infomercial for a romanticized version of the military, its contractors, and their mission.

  • Blinken signals zero change from failed Trump #Venezuela policy
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/05/06/blinken-signals-zero-change-from-failed-trump-venezuela-polic

    While Washington has pursued its unrealistic goal of regime change, U.S. #sanctions have exacerbated the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere and inflicted senseless collective punishment on the people of Venezuela. There are no serious signs so far that the administration intends to ease these sanctions in the slightest. Incredibly, the official line from the administration is that U.S. sanctions have nothing to do with the suffering of ordinary Venezuelans.

    There was a glimmer of hope earlier this year that the U.S. and Venezuela might find a compromise on oil sanctions, and a U.S. delegation even traveled to Caracas for preliminary talks. But the Biden administration backed off from the idea as soon as it faced political opposition from hawks at home. The false start in the spring showed how easily the administration can be spooked by hawkish criticism and how it would rather stick with a failed status quo than take a modicum of political risk.

  • How the ’self licking ice cream cone,’ prolonged the 20-year war – Responsible Statecraft
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/04/how-the-self-licking-ice-cream-cone-prolonged-the-20-year-war

    This is the first time political candidates have suggested that the interests of senior military officials played a key part in prolonging the war in Afghanistan. The idea that national security institutions and their leaders pursue such parochial interests has been almost entirely ignored in past discussions, because mainstream foreign policy specialists have disapproved of it.

    #états-unis #l’important #MSM

  • Former envoy: Al-Qaida linked leader an ’asset’ to US Syria strategy – Responsible Statecraft
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/04/03/former-envoy-al-qaida-linked-leader-an-asset-to-us-syria-stra

    The former U.S. special envoy to Syria said in an interview excerpt published Friday that Al Qaida’s Syrian offshoot is an “asset” to U.S. strategy in Syria.

    Ambassador James Jeffrey had told PBS News in March 2021 that the Islamist rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was “least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East.”

    Jeffrey oversaw the Trump administration’s Syria policy until November 2020, when he left the State Department in the wake of the election of President Joe Biden.”

    The interview excerpt was taken from an upcoming PBS documentary about Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, a former senior official in Al Qaida who now leads HTS.

    #syrie #Daech #terrorisme (d’Etat)

  • Responsible Statecraft
    https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/03/17/will-the-trump-administration-block-irans-request-for-an-emer

    For the first time in 60 years, Iran has requested a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), seeking emergency financing to support its efforts to combat COVID-19. On March 4, the IMF announced that it would make available up to $50 billion in financial assistance through its Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), a facility targeting “low-income and emerging markets.”

    Iran’s request for financial assistance reflects the acute challenges the country faces in its efforts to control the country’s COVID-19 outbreak — over 14,000 Iranians have been infected according to official statistics. The government has mobilized extensive resources to try to respond to the public health crisis, but the Iranian economy is being pushed to a breaking point. Iran is seeking $5 billion in emergency assistance from the IMF, funding that could dramatically improve the prognosis not only for the Iranian economy, but also the health and wellbeing of the Iranian public.

    (...)

    In this way, by calling upon the IMF to provide it access to a facility that the fund has offered to all similar countries confronting COVID-19, Iran is effectively asking the fund’s leadership to seek such an approval from the Trump administration in order to open the kind of financial channel that Iran’s central bank has found increasingly difficult to maintain. In the two years since the Trump administration launch its “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, Iran has struggled to freely access the ample foreign currency reserves — valued at around $70 billion — that it maintains in accounts around the world. This is in large part due to the hesitance of central banks, including European central banks, the Bank of Japan, and the Reserve Bank of India, to invite scrutiny from U.S. sanctions enforcement authorities and possibly compromise their ties with the U.S. financial system. If, because of these longstanding impediments, the IMF fails to provide Iran financial assistance that it makes available to countries in similar situations, the fund’s reputation will take a hit, as the fact of effective American control over its operations is laid bare.

    It is unlikely that Iran will receive an IMF loan, but interestingly the official request comes just days after the Treasury Department clarified authorizations that permit financial dealings with the Central Bank of Iran in order to facilitate humanitarian trade — further evidence that administration officials do not see systemic issues related to terrorist financing or money laundering stemming from Iran’s humanitarian trade. The latest clarifications became necessary after an unprecedented move to sanction Iran’s central bank under new authorities in September had been widely perceived to eliminate the longstanding humanitarian exemption.

    #iran #usa #covid-19