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Ukraine’s Increasing Polarization and the Western Challenge | Stratfor
▻http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraines-increasing-polarization-and-western-challenge
▻http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/640_scale_width/public/main/images/geopolitical-weekly.png?itok=e3Jio6iv

Just days before the Ukrainian crisis broke out, I took an overnight train to Kiev from Sevastopol in Crimea. Three mechanics in their 30s on their way to jobs in Estonia shared my compartment. All ethnic Russians born and raised in Sevastopol, they have made the trip to the Baltic states for the past eight years for seasonal work at Baltic Sea shipyards. Our ride together, accompanied by obligatory rounds of vodka, presented the opportunity for an in-depth discussion of Ukraine’s political crisis. The ensuing conversation was perhaps more enlightening than talks of similar length with Ukrainian political, economic or security officials.

My fellow passengers viewed the events at Independence Square in an overwhelmingly negative light. They considered the protesters camped out in Kiev’s central square terrorists, completely organized and financed by the United States and the European Union. They did not see the protesters as their fellow countrymen, and they supported then-President Viktor Yanukovich’s use of the Berkut security forces to crack down on them. In fact, they were shocked by the Berkut’s restraint, saying if it had been up to them, the protests would have been “cleaned up” from the outset. They added that while they usually looked forward to stopping over in Kiev during the long journey to the Baltics, this time they were ashamed of what was happening there and didn’t even want to set foot in the city. They also predicted that the situation in Ukraine would worsen before it improved.

A few days later, the protests in Independence Square in fact reached a crescendo of violence. The Berkut closed in on the demonstrators, and subsequent clashes between protesters and security forces throughout the week left dozens dead and hundreds injured. This spawned a sequence of events that led to the overthrow of Yanukovich, the formation of a new Ukrainian government not recognized by Moscow and the subsequent Russian military intervention in Crimea. While the speed of these events astonished many foreign (especially Western) observers, to the men I met on the train, it was all but expected.

After all, the crisis didn’t emerge from a vacuum. Ukraine was a polarized country well before the EuroMaidan movement took shape. I have always been struck by how traveling to different parts of Ukraine feels like visiting different countries. Every country has its regional differences, to be sure. But Ukraine stands apart in this regard.
Ukraine’s East-West Divide

Traveling in Lviv in the west, for example, is a starkly different experience than traveling in Donetsk in the east. The language spoken is different, with Ukrainian used in Lviv and Russian in Donetsk. The architecture is different, too, with classical European architecture lining narrow cobblestoned streets in Lviv and Soviet apartment blocs alongside sprawling boulevards predominating in Donetsk. Each region has different heroes: A large bust of Lenin surveys the main square in Donetsk, while Stepan Bandera, a World War II-era Ukrainian nationalist revolutionary, is honored in Lviv. Citizens of Lviv commonly view people from Donetsk as pro-Russian rubes while people in Donetsk constantly speak of nationalists/fascists in Lviv.......

#Ukraine
#Russie
#UE
#États-Unis

#Sochi 2014: A Security Challenge

The Russian city of Sochi will host the 2014 Winter Olympics from Feb. 7 to Feb. 23 and the Paralympics from March 7 to March 16. Russia is no stranger to hosting high-profile global events; it hosted the 1980 Summer Olympics and is preparing for the 2018 World Cup final.

▻http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/sochi-2014-security-challenge

@fil: l’article parle aussi de #drones

Un billet de l’agence Stratfor au sujet de la mort de Majed al-Majed :
▻http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/lebanon-saudi-militant-leader-dies-under-suspicious-circumstances

Traduction par Mediarama :
▻http://mediaramalb.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/mediarama-496.pdf

L’affaire al-Majed a rapidement tourné en un bras de fer entre l’Iran et l’Arabie saoudite, avec un Liban impuissant juste au milieu. L’Arabie saoudite a réclamé son extradition, vu qu’il est un ressortissant saoudien recherché par les autorités de son pays. Mais l’Iran, après avoir été la cible de son groupe quelques semaines plus tôt, a assuré qu’il avait le droit de l’interroger en premier. Riyad a refusé la demande de l’Iran, mais Téhéran a quand même envoyé une délégation au Liban pour l’interroger. Les responsables libanais ont essayé d’éviter de prendre parti pour l’un des deux pays, affirmant que Majed était trop malade pour être entendu. Le 4 janvier, sa mort a été annoncée à l’hôpital de Beyrouth, où il était traité.

Al- Majed était malade, mais les circonstances de sa mort sont très suspectes. L’Iran a déjà exprimé ses soupçons que l’Arabie saoudite a joué un rôle dans sa mort. Stratfor a également reçu des indications avant son décès selon lesquelles les autorités libanaises étaient sous pression pour lui refuser un traitement médical afin que le problème soit, pour ainsi dire, réglé de lui-même. La question qui s’impose est celle de savoir pourquoi al-Majed était-il tellement dangereux pour rester en vie. L’Arabie saoudite parraine un réseau élaboré de militants sunnites qui sont particulièrement actifs en ce moment au Levant, en particulier en Syrie et au Liban, où l’Iran et l’Arabie sont engagés dans une intense bataille par procuration. Le soutien des Saoudiens aux factions militantes peut varier d’une aide financière directe, aux armes et aux combattants, ou en fermant simplement les yeux sur des activités qui servent des intérêts sectaires plus larges. On ne sait pas quel est le niveau du soutien que le groupe d’al-Majed pourrait avoir reçu de Riyad, mais il est clair que les Saoudiens souhaitaient le faire taire.

Le problème historique avec la stratégie de l’Arabie saoudite est que la plupart des factions jihadistes qui gagnent du terrain dans la région sont tout aussi capables de se retourner contre la Maison des Saoud, une fois que le champ de bataille actuel perd de son attrait. La politique saoudienne dans la région est donc pleine de contradictions.

(C’est moi qui souligne la partie sur les « indications » signalées à Stratfor.)

Central Asia: The Complexities of the Fergana Valley | Stratfor

▻http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/central-asia-complexities-fergana-valley

Signalé par Olivier Pironet

A recent border dispute in the Fergana Valley, the core of Central Asia, highlights the growing tensions in the strategic and contested region. Kyrgyz and Uzbek border patrol units were removed from the Ungar-Too area in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalal-Abad region Oct. 2, after a two-week standoff over an alleged Uzbek border incursion into the area. Such incursions, coupled with ethnic tensions and sporadic violence, have become increasingly common in the Fergana Valley region, which is split between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/main/images/Fergana-pop-dense_0.jpg

#asie_centrale #fergana

Syria and the Limits of Comparison |
Robert D. Kaplan

Stratfor
▻http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/syria-and-limits-comparison

Because so many war plans simply do not survive the reality of war itself, each war is a unique universe unto its own and thus comparisons with previous wars, while useful, may also prove illusory. One of the many wrong assumptions about the Second Gulf War before it started was that it would somehow be like the First Gulf War, in which the pessimists had been humiliated by the ease of the victory. Indeed, the Second Gulf War unfolded in vastly different ways, this time proving the pessimists right. That is why the recent media refrain comparing a military operation in Syria with the one in Kosovo in 1999 worries me.

There are profound differences.

Syria has a population ten times the size of Kosovo’s in 1999. Because everything in Syria is on a much vaster scale, deciding the outcome by military means could be that much harder.

Kosovo sustained violence and harsh repression at the hands of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, which was met with a low-intensity separatist campaign by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Violence was widespread but not nearly on the scale of Syria’s. Syria is in the midst of a full-fledged civil war. The toppling of Milosevic, moreover, carried much less risk of ever-expanding anarchy than does the toppling of Syrian ruler Bashar al Assad.

The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy Strategy | Stratfor

▻http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/past-present-and-future-russian-energy-strategy

Comme @nidal, je précise ici que je ne suis pas nécessairement daccod avec les thèses développées ici, mais je référence pour avoir une archives et m’y référer pour le prochain papier (ou la prochaine carte). STratfor n’est pas une institution très fréquentable, mais bon.

The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy Strategy

February 12, 2013
By Lauren Goodrich and Marc Lanthemann

The future of Russia’s ability to remain a global energy supplier and the strength the Russian energy sector gives the Kremlin are increasingly in question. After a decade of robust energy exports and revenues, Russia is cutting natural gas prices to Europe while revenue projections for its energy behemoth, Gazprom, are declining starting this year.

#russie #énergie #gaz #gazprom

Important : pour Stratfor, la présence des jihadistes en Syrie n’est pas une conséquence imprévue et incontrôlée des événements, mais la façon délibérée des Séoudiens de mener la guerre. Le billet donne plusieurs éléments pour objectiver l’utilisation de ces jihadistes par l’Arabie séoudite :
►http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/consequences-intervening-syria

Despite the jihadist blowback the Saudis experienced after the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan — and the current object lesson of the jihadists Syria sent to fight U.S. forces in Iraq now leading groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra — the Saudi government has apparently calculated that its use of jihadist proxies in Syria is worth the inherent risk.

Assez visible effort de communication des Américains en ce moment pour faire croire que les États-Unis ne sont pas « directement impliqués » en Syrie, et surtout pas dans la fourniture d’armes. Même pour Statfor, cependant, ça saute aux yeux…
►http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/consequences-intervening-syria

For more than a year now, countries such as the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and European states have been providing aid to the Syrian rebels. Much of this aid has been in the form of humanitarian assistance, providing things such as shelter, food and medical care for refugees. Other aid has helped provide the rebels with non-lethal military supplies such as radios and ballistic vests. But a review of the weapons spotted on the battlefield reveals that the rebels are also receiving an increasing number of lethal supplies.

For example, there have been numerous videos released showing Syrian rebels using weapons such as the M79 Osa rocket launcher, the RPG-22, the M-60 recoilless rifle and the RBG-6 multiple grenade launcher. The Syrian government has also released videos of these weapons after seizing them in arms caches. What is so interesting about these weapons is that they were not in the Syrian military’s inventory prior to the crisis, and they all likely were purchased from Croatia. We have also seen many reports and photos of Syrian rebels carrying Austrian Steyr Aug rifles, and the Swiss government has complained that Swiss-made hand grenades sold to the United Arab Emirates are making their way to the Syrian rebels.

With the Syrian rebel groups using predominantly second-hand weapons from the region, weapons captured from the regime, or an assortment of odd ordnance they have manufactured themselves, the appearance and spread of these exogenous weapons in rebel arsenals over the past several months is at first glance evidence of external arms supply. The appearance of a single Steyr Aug or RBG-6 on the battlefield could be an interesting anomaly, but the variety and concentration of these weapons seen in Syria are well beyond the point where they could be considered coincidental.

This means that the current level of external intervention in Syria is similar to the level exercised against the Soviet Union and its communist proxies following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The external supporters are providing not only training, intelligence and assistance, but also weapons — exogenous weapons that make the external provision of weapons obvious to the world. It is also interesting that in Syria, like Afghanistan, two of the major external supporters are Washington and Riyadh — though in Syria they are joined by regional powers such as Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, rather than Pakistan.

The Geopolitics of Shale | Stratfor

►http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitics-shale
December 19, 2012
By Robert D. Kaplan
Chief Geopolitical Analyst

According to the elite newspapers and journals of opinion, the future of foreign affairs mainly rests on ideas: the moral impetus for humanitarian intervention, the various theories governing exchange rates and debt rebalancing necessary to fix Europe, the rise of cosmopolitanism alongside the stubborn vibrancy of nationalism in East Asia and so on. In other words, the world of the future can be engineered and defined based on doctoral theses. And to a certain extent this may be true. As the 20th century showed us, ideologies — whether communism, fascism or humanism — matter and matter greatly.

Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever ? | Stratfor

►http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/boko-haram-more-dangerous-ever
December 13, 2012

On Nov. 25, Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group from northern Nigeria, attacked a church in Jaji, Kaduna state, using two suicide bombers during the church’s weekly religious service. The first bomb detonated in a vehicle driven into the church, and the second detonated approximately 10 minutes later, when a crowd of first responders gathered at the scene. About 30 people were killed in the attacks; the second blast caused the majority of the deaths. The incident was particularly symbolic because Jaji is the home of Nigeria’s Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and many of the churchgoers were senior military officers.

#nigeria