• Hawking Something
    The Syria interventionists want us to go to war. They’re wrong.
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/30/hawking_something_syria_intervention?page=full

    The difficulty with preventing the use of chemical weapons, or securing and consolidating the several dozen sites where they are held, is that it is a resource-intensive military mission, requiring up to 75,000 troops. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned in January: “The act of preventing the use of chemical weapons would be almost unachievable. You would have to have such clarity of intelligence, persistent surveillance — you’d have to actually see it before it happened. And that’s unlikely.” Dempsey recently declared that the Pentagon had completed the planning to secure Syria’s chemical weapons caches, but that he was not confident of success “because [Syrian security forces have] been moving it and the number of sites is quite numerous.”

  • Why the Sheikhs Will Fall - By Christopher M. Davidson
    | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/26/why_the_sheikhs_will_fall

    On April 22, a Kuwaiti judge announced that opposition figure Musallam al-Barrak would be released on bail, prompting cheers from his supporters packing the court. Barrak’s refusal to hand himself over to the authorities last week to serve a five-year sentence for criticizing the emir symbolized the intensifying resistance to autocracy in the oil-rich state.

    In the wake of Barrak’s sentencing, thousands of Kuwaitis took to the streets in solidarity, sporadic clashes broke out with security forces, and dozens of key activists recited his controversial speech. The stage now seems set for a long summer of confrontations between large sections of Kuwait’s emboldened citizenry and an entrenched, traditional monarchy that has abandoned its democratic pretensions and is pressing ahead with police state strategies.

    The contrast between now and summer 2012, when the British edition of my book After the Sheikhs went to press, could not be starker. Back then, there was little, if any, mainstream discussion outside the Middle East itself of the prospect of serious political unrest in the Gulf monarchies. Academics and policy wonks, at least in the monarchies’ Western allies, had for the most part set these states apart as somehow exceptional and aloof from the Arab Spring movements sweeping the region.

  • The Big One ? - By Laurie Garrett | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/23/the_big_one?page=full

    Laurie Garrett sur #H7N9 ; tldr

    We are at a mysterious fork in the road. One path leads to years, perhaps decades, of spread of a new type of influenza, occasionally making people sick and killing about 18 percent of them. It’s not a pleasant route, strewn as it is with uncertainties, but no terror seems to lurk on its horizon. The other path, however, wrenches the gut with fear, as it brings worldwide transmission of a dangerous new form of flu that could spread unchecked throughout humanity, testing global solidarity, vaccine production, hospital systems and humanity’s most basic family and community instincts

    #santé #chine

    • Le problème avec la grippe, c’est qu’il existe un « lobby de la grippe » qui est très influent dans la sphère politique, et qui s’appuie sur la stratégie de la peur (cf la répétition sur l’exemple de la « grippe espagnole » en 1918).
      On sait qu’un jour ou l’autre, un virus aviaire mutera de façon à devenir transmissible et percuter l’humanité jusqu’à ce qu’elle trouve en elle-même une parade (cf. la grande peste). Le problème est qu’en criant au loup à chaque nouvelle mutation annuelle, on finit par exaspérer les populations, qui seront désarmées le jour où la mutation épidémique arrivera.
      J’ai beaucoup suivi la question au moment du H5N1 (6 ans déjà !) et depuis, on voit systématiquement les mêmes refrains, les mêmes arguments, la même façon de distiller la peur pour garantir le flux de subvention vers les laboratoire du lobby de la grippe. Le précédent épisode concernait l’étude (pleine de trous) du laboratoire hollandais sur les mutations provoquées autour du virus H5N1. Fabriquer des virus dangereux au prétexte de mieux connaître les mutations mortelles... quand la souche même qui pourrait muter change tout le temps (maintenant, c’est le H7N9).

  • Boston’s Jihadist Past - By J.M. Berger | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/22/bostons_jihadist_past?print=yes

    L’"élite" apprenti-sorcier.

    During the 1980s and into the 1990s, Islamist foreign fighters operated robust recruiting and financing networks that supported Chechen jihadists from the United States, and Boston was home to one of the most significant centers: a branch of the Al Kifah Center based in Brooklyn, which would later be rechristened CARE International.

    Al Kifah sprang from the military jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Through the end of the occupation, a network of centers in the United States helped support the efforts of Afghan and Arab mujahedeen, soliciting donations and recruiting fighters, including at least four from Boston who died in action (one of them a former Dunkin Donuts employee). When the war ended, those networks did not disappear; they refocused on other activities.

    In Brooklyn, that network turned against the United States. The center’s leaders and many of its members helped facilitate the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and they actively planned and attempted to execute a subsequent plot that summer to blow up the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels in New York, which would have killed thousands.

    When the FBI thwarted the tunnels plot, the Brooklyn Al Kifah office and most of the other satellite locations were shuttered. But in Boston, the work continued under a new name and with a new focus: supporting foreign-fighter efforts in Bosnia and Chechnya.

    The following narrative is derived from interviews and thousands of pages of court exhibits, including correspondence, Al Kifah and CARE International publications, and telephone intercepts developed over a years-long series of FBI investigations into the charity that were made public as part of multiple terrorism-related prosecutions.

    Established in the early 1990s, the Boston branch had emerged from the World Trade Center investigation relatively unscathed. Little more than two weeks after the bombing, the head of the Boston office, Emad Muntasser, changed his operation’s name from Al Kifah to CARE International (not to be confused with the legitimate charity of the same name).

    Telling the IRS it was a non-political charity, CARE applied for and received a tax exemption, but its operations continued as before — supporting jihad overseas with money and men. Although it was heavily focused on the ongoing conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya, its interests reached around the globe to anywhere mujahideen were fighting. As one associate of the group put it in a phone call recorded by the FBI, “As long as there is slaughtering, we’re with them. If there’s no slaughtering, there’s none, that’s it. Buzz off.”

    The name change deflected public scrutiny, and while law enforcement monitored the Boston operation for many years, the Justice Department made no attempt to prosecute the organization’s principal leaders until after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

    Jihadist propaganda and recruiting didn’t begin with the Internet, as it sometimes seems today. CARE’s tactics included dinner speeches and events at local mosques and universities, among them MIT, Boston College, and Boston University, usually slipping them in under the auspices of the local Muslim Students Association, sometimes as part of Friday services. They ran “phonathons” to contact potential donors at home with urgent appeals for generosity.

    The charity also arranged public screenings of jihadist videos, long before the advent of YouTube. One letter to CARE supporters promised to “bring to your [mosque] the latest video tape from CHECHNYA showing how Grouznyy [sic] was recaptured by Muslims and how the CHECHENS are struggling to implement the Islamic rule in their land by help of Allah (S.W.T). It will be a fund raising event. For the Donations we have our direct contact to CHECHNYA.”

    When the Internet did come along, CARE was an early adopter, using email blasts and websites to further spread its message.

    Although CARE was based in Boston, the radical fundamentalists who ran the charity (a mix of American citizens and immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa) were often disappointed with local Muslims, who were not particularly interested in their cause.

    “I hate Boston,” said Mohammed Chehade, a director of the Global Relief Foundation, one of the charities through which CARE laundered its money, in a phone conversation with CARE’s directors that was recorded by the FBI in 2000. “Do you know why I hate it? The men are far from each other, far away, it is a trip between one and another. They are busy. I mean, Boston... if someone wants to stay in America temporarily, it is not a place to be.”

    In other conversations, CARE’s leaders bemoaned the fact that area Muslims refused to cough up money for the network’s radical speakers, suggesting that they avoid bringing prominent speakers to the city, or at least characterize the trips as something other than fundraising, for fear of an embarrassingly low result.

    ...

  • The Middle East Kings of Cowardice by Marc Lynch

    Lynch revient sur la multiplication, dans les monarchies du Golfe, des condamnations pour ’insultes à l’émir’/ roi/ sultan. Il y voit le signe que le mythe de la spécificité monarchique, basé sur l’idée que les souverains jouissent d’un certain attachement populaire, ne tient pas. Il y voit aussi le signe de l’érosion de leur légitimité, après que le printemps arabe ait fait tomber ’la culture de la conformité publique’

    In other words, the crackdown across the Gulf suggests that its regimes are probably not nearly as stable as they’d like everyone to believe. If the monarchs of the region were truly stable and legitimate, they would brush aside these insults. Nothing telegraphs weakness and insecurity quite like lawsuits and arrests over perceived disrespect.

    Egypt gets all the headlines — and of course Bassem Youssef should win the right to make fun of Morsy’s hat. But Egypt’s drama shouldn’t distract attention from the significance of the mounting battle in the Gulf over the right to directly criticize one’s leaders — humorously or not. Rulers who imprison poets or bloggers over “insults” should always be mocked both at home and in the international realm. If they want to be respected, they should earn it through democratic inclusion, open engagement, transparency, and accountability.

    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/18/middle_east_kings_of_cowardice

  • Ici on t’apprend à faire la différence entre vrai Printemps arabe et faux Printemps arabe : Our Friends in Manama - By Ronald E. Neumann
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/19/united_states_interests_reform_bahrain

    But the calls for reform that began in 2011 have a long history in Bahrain, and almost everything else over the past couple of years is as disputed as it is complicated. There are disputes over whether the government was sincere in offering negotiations led by Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. Did the opposition miss its best opportunity by rejecting talks and demanding that the government make extensive advance concessions? Or were the negotiations a government ploy to justify forceful suppression? The government’s narrative notes that it released prisoners, allowed exiles to return, and withdrew its forces from the streets until the demonstrators tried to close down central areas of the capital, Manama. The opposition notes deaths of protesters, claims it wants only democratic reform, and says that human rights violations continue in nightly raids on Shiite villages. But one thing is for sure: Bahrain differs markedly from other “Arab Spring” countries with which it is frequently lumped.

  • Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong ?

    Nope. But it’s time to revise our assessments.

    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/did_we_get_the_muslim_brotherhood_wrong

    The deterioration of Egyptian politics has spurred an intense, often vitriolic polarization between Islamists and their rivals that has increasingly spilled over into analytical disputes. Some principled liberals who once supported the Muslim Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime’s repression have recanted. Longtime critics of the Islamists view themselves as vindicated and demand that Americans, including me, apologize for getting the Brotherhood wrong. As one prominent Egyptian blogger recently put it, “are you ready to apologize for at least 5 years of promoting the MB as fluffy Democrats to everyone? ARE YOU?”

    So, should we apologize? Did we get the Brotherhood wrong? Not really.

  • Bahrain’s Continuing War on Doctors - By Rula al-Saffar | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/bahrains_continuing_war_on_doctors?page=full

    Au Bahreïn, le respect du serment d’Hippocrate est criminalisé (et pire encore.)

    When it began, I knew that it was my duty as a nurse to help. So I made my way to Salmaniya Medical Complex, Bahrain’s only public hospital, to do what I could to aid the overwhelmed staff, even though I did not work there myself. What I witnessed was horrifying: Evidence of the use of live ammunition, bodies battered by tear gas canisters fired at close range, and protesters blinded by the use of bird shot. In the months that closely followed, nearly 50 people were killed as a direct result of the violence against protesters, a number which has risen to over 100 since 2011.

    As a healthcare professional, it was my duty to aid the injured. But as a witness to the Bahraini security forces’ violent response to the peaceful protests, I also felt a duty to speak out against the abuses. Many of my colleagues who felt the same way spoke on the record with the media to describe the types of injuries they had seen, shedding light on the nature of the government’s brutality. After authorities barred ambulances from bringing injured protesters to Salmaniya Medical Complex, we joined in protests to demand that the wounded have access to the hospital and care.

    As health care professionals, we felt a need to speak out against violations of medical neutrality. The government felt a need to silence us. And so in response to exercising our right to free speech, security forces attacked medics and brought Salmaniya hospital under military occupation. To justify their actions, the Ministry of Interior and state-controlled media falsely reported that healthcare workers were refusing to treat injured security forces. The truth is much more appalling: Security forces occupying Salmaniya hospital used their proximity to medical workers and patients to gather information about protesters. The sixth floor of the facility was used to interrogate patients, many of whom were suffering from severe injuries. As a result, patients with sometimes life-threatening injuries were afraid to seek treatment out of fear of being interrogated, or worse, by government security forces. It was these sorts of egregious actions by the government that my colleagues and I sought to expose. In turn, we soon became the targets of government brutality ourselves.

    In March 2011, the Bahrain government began detaining and interrogating healthcare workers. On April 4, in response to a summons, I presented myself to the Bahrain Central Investigation Department for questioning on my role in the uprising. While in detention, I was given electric shocks to my head and face, and threatened with rape . What happened to me also happened to dozens of other medics. Since the uprising, 82 medical professionals have been arrested on a variety of politically-motivated charges meant to intimidate citizens from speaking out against the government’s abuses. Their stories of receiving physical and emotional abuse were documented in a report released in May 2012 by Physicians for Human Rights.

    ....

  • Secret US documents show Brennan’s ‘no civilian drone deaths’ claim was false: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
    http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/04/11/secret-us-documents-show-brennans-no-civilian-drone-deaths-cl

    US intelligence officials were aware that at least one civilian had died in drone strikes in Pakistan during 2011, despite claims to the contrary made by the man now running the Central Intelligence Agency.

    In June 2011, John Brennan, at the time President Obama’s chief counter terrorism adviser, stated publicly that for ‘almost a year’ no civilian had died in US drone strikes in Pakistan.

    But leaked US intelligence documents obtained by news agency McClatchy show this was not true.

    • An Inconvenient Truth
      Finally, proof that the United States has lied in the drone wars. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/an_inconvenient_truth_drones

      Jonathan Landay, national security reporter at McClatchy Newspapers, has provided the first analysis of drone-strike victims that is based upon internal, top-secret U.S intelligence reports http://seenthis.net/messages/129176.

      It is the most important reporting on U.S. drone strikes to date because Landay, using U.S. government assessments, plainly demonstrates that the claim repeatedly made by President Obama and his senior aides — that targeted killings are limited only to officials, members, and affiliates of al Qaeda who pose an imminent threat of attack on the U.S. homeland — is false.

      ...

      It is important to note that the claim of a single civilian casualty is based on the CIA’s interpretation that any military-age males who are behaving suspiciously can be lawfully targeted . No U.S. government official has ever openly acknowledged the practice of such “signature strikes” because it is so clearly at odds with the bedrock principle of distinction required for using force within the laws of armed conflict. According to the documents reviewed by Landay, even the U.S. intelligence community does not necessarily know who it has killed; it is forced to use fuzzy categories like “other militants” and “foreign fighters.”

      Some of the drone strikes that Landay describes, such as a May 22, 2007 attack requested by Pakistan’s intelligence service to support Pakistani troops in combat, do not appear in the databases maintained by the New America Foundation, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, or Long Wars Journal . This should strengthen the concerns of many analysts about the accuracy of reporting from Pakistan’s tribal areas. It also suggests that there may be a few additional targeted killing efforts of which we know nothing.

      ...

      ...based on the Obama administration’s patterns of behavior, the Department of Justice will assuredly target Landay and his sources for leaking classified information. While the DOJ has refrained from plugging the many selective leaks by anonymous administration officials that praise the precision and efficacy of drone strikes, it has sought more criminal prosecutions of leaks in Obama’s first term than during all previous presidential administrations combined. (...) Absolutely nothing in Landay’s reporting reveals the CIA’s sources and methods for determining who had been killed.

      Three key lessons from the Obama administration’s drone lies - http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/11/three-lessons-obama-drone-lies

      (1) The Obama administration often has no idea who they are killing.

      ....

      (2) Whisteblowers are vital for transparency and accountability, which is precisely why the Obama administration is waging a war on them.

      ...

      (3) Secrecy ensures both government lies and abuses of power.

      ...

    • Sequestering the War on Terror : The New Yorker
      http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/04/sequestering-the-war-on-terror.html

      Questions capitales:

      The logic is deeply troubling. Are drone strikes a diplomatic chit? Do we call someone dangerous because he gets in the way of what we’ve persuaded ourselves we need to do somewhere? If it was necessary to get a foreign leader to help us with a war, could we, by the same reasoning, kill someone who was merely a political threat—or a political figure who, say, by rallying domestic opposition to drone strikes in a foreign country, we’d decided was helping Al Qaeda?

    • Rights Groups Question Legality of Targeted Killing - NYTimes.com
      http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/us/politics/rights-groups-question-legality-of-targeted-killing.html

      .... efforts on Thursday by Representative Jan Schakowsky, Democrat of Illinois, to get John O. Brennan, formerly the president’s counterterrorism adviser and now the C.I.A. director, to discuss strike policies during a hearing of the House Intelligence Committee went nowhere.

      (...)

      Ms. Schakowsky was prompted to question Mr. Brennan in part by an article this week by McClatchy News Service reporting that it had obtained classified government documents showing that the drone strikes had killed hundreds of low-level suspected militants whose identities were not known. The article suggested that the documents undercut assertions by Mr. Obama and his aides.

      “There are a lot of things that are printed in the press that are inaccurate, in my mind, and misrepresent the facts,” Mr. Brennan said. When Ms. Schakowsky pressed the point, he said, “I’m not going to engage in any type of discussion on that here today, congresswoman.”

  • Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong? - Marc Lynch | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/did_we_get_the_muslim_brotherhood_wrong?print=yes

    It has become clear that the Brotherhood was more profoundly shaped by its inability to actually win power than has generally been recognized. Almost every aspect of its organization, ideology, and strategy was shaped by the limits Mubarak placed upon it. The revolution removed those boundaries — and the Brotherhood has struggled badly to adapt. Its erratic, incompetent, and often incomprensibly alienating behavior since the revolution comes in part from having utterly lost its bearings in a new institutional environment. The chance to rule forced it to confront a whole range of contradictions that Mubarak’s domination had allowed the group to finesse.

    ...

    ... I recall sitting in Deputy Supreme Guide Khairet al-Shater’s office in late 2011 being shown what appeared to be comprehensive, detailed plans for economic development and institutional reform. It seemed plausible at that point that a Brotherhood government would quickly get things moving again and establish itself as a centrist Islamist majority party, like Turkey’s ruling AK Party. Yet it has utterly failed to do so. What went wrong?

    One part of the answer lies in something else the academics got right: factional politics inside the Brotherhood. Put simply, the years immediately preceding the Egyptian revolution had produced a Brotherhood leadership and organization almost uniquely poorly adapted to the challenges of a democratic transition. The regime cracked down hard on the Brotherhood following its electoral success in 2005, arresting a wide range of its leaders (including currently prominent personalities such as Morsy and Shater), confiscating its financial assets, and launching intense media propaganda campaigns.

    This took a toll on the internal balance of power inside the Brotherhood as advocates of political participation found themselves on the defensive against the more conservative faction, which preferred to focus on social outreach and religious affairs. In 2008, conservatives were declared the winners in all five seats being contested in by-elections to replace empty seats on the Brotherhood’s highest official body, the Guidance Council; reformists cried foul. The next year, in new elections to the council again marred by serious procedural violations, the most prominent reformist member, Abdel Monem Abou el-Fotouh, and a key intermediary between the factions, Mohammed Habib, lost their long-held seats. Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef, an old-guard conservative who had nonetheless maintained a careful balance between the factions, later stepped down and was replaced by little-known conservative Mohammed Badie. Over the next few years, a number of leading members of the reformist faction left the Brotherhood or were excluded from positions of influence.

    When the revolution broke out, then, the Brotherhood had already driven away many of its most politically savvy and ideologically moderate leaders. Its leadership had become dominated by cautious, paranoid, and ideologically rigid conservatives who had little experience at building cross-ideological partnerships or making democratic compromises. One-time reformists such as Essam el-Erian and Mohammed el-Beltagy had made their peace with conservative domination and commanded little influence on the movement’s strategy. It is fascinating to imagine how the Brotherhood might have handled the revolution and its aftermath if the dominant personalities on the Guidance Bureau had been Abou el-Fotouh and Habib rather than Shater and Badie — but we’ll never know.

  • The North Korea Deal That Wasn’t - By Joel Wit | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/02/the_north_korea_deal_that_wasnt_yongbyon?page=full

    ... during a Track II meeting in Pyongyang in November 2010, senior North Korean Foreign Ministry officials made it very clear that they were willing to relinquish thousands of fuel rods in their possession that could have been used by the reactor, rods that could help produce as many as eight nuclear bombs. That would have been a first step toward permanently disabling the facility, making sure the reactor would never again be a threat. Of course, the North Koreans wanted compensation — standard practice in the international nuclear fuel industry — and they wanted more than the rods were worth. But that was clearly their opening position. The offer was repeated during meetings in March 2011 in Berlin and once again in Pyongyang at the end of that year.

    Each time, the North Korean proposal was dutifully reported to the Obama administration in briefings for the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. The Lee Myung-bak administration was familiar with the offer, as they would have been intimately involved in any effort to shut Yongbyon down because Lee’s predecessor had been willing to pay for the rods to take them off North Korea’s hands.

    The North Korean initiative was duly noted, but the United States and South Korea failed to take advantage of the opportunity to ensure that North Korea wasn’t able to restart the reactor and turn the rods into new nuclear bombs. Some U.S. officials felt it wasn’t worth the effort since the reactor was old and probably useless. Others believed that Washington should focus entirely on stopping Pyongyang’s much more threatening program to enrich uranium, unveiled in late 2010, rather than putting the final nail in the coffin of the plutonium production program. Still others, infected by the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience,” did not want to do much of anything before the North demonstrated its willingness to reform and end its bad behavior. By August 2012, when another unofficial meeting was held in Singapore, the North Koreans’ position had shifted. It was clear that Washington and Seoul were going to be in for tough times after their respective presidential elections at the end of the year.

    According to an estimate by Siegfried Hecker, the former head of the Los Alamos Weapons lab now at Stanford University, the North Koreans may need as little as six months to restart the reactor. Unless they are willing to operate at very low power levels, reducing the output of plutonium, they will need to rebuild the cooling tower or put in place some sort of alternative cooling system. That might take six months. Another important job will be to modify some of the thousands of fuel rods either meant for another reactor or complete unfinished rods so that they can be used by the 5 MWe system. That task also may take six months from start to finish. Both of these tasks can be done concurrently.

    The missed opportunity to stop the restart of the 5 MWe reactor and make sure Pyongyang has eight fewer nuclear weapons is now water under the bridge. More importantly, if the North Koreans make good on their threat, it’s one more sign, if we need it, that Pyongyang is moving full-steam ahead with becoming a small nuclear power. How many nuclear weapons they will eventually produce is anyone’s guess. But one thing should be clear by now: The Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea has failed.