• A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood- http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=3&_r=3&

    Bon voilà : La CIA adorerait les assassinats par drones parce qu’ils lui évitent d’avoir recours à la torture, cette dernière étant passible de poursuites judiciaires.

    A New Direction

    As the negotiations were taking place, the C.I.A.’s inspector general, John L. Helgerson, had just finished a searing report about the abuse of detainees in the C.I.A.’s secret prisons. The report kicked out the foundation upon which the C.I.A. detention and interrogation program had rested. It was perhaps the single most important reason for the C.I.A.’s shift from capturing to killing terrorism suspects.

    Mr. Helgerson raised questions about whether C.I.A. officers might face criminal prosecution for the interrogations carried out in the secret prisons, and he suggested that interrogation methods like waterboarding, sleep deprivation and the exploiting of the phobias of prisoners — like confining them in a small box with live bugs — violated the United Nations Convention Against Torture.

    “The agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC detention and interrogation program,” the report concluded, given the brutality of the interrogation techniques and the “inability of the U.S. government to decide what it will ultimately do with the terrorists detained by the agency.”

    The report was the beginning of the end for the program. The prisons would stay open for several more years, and new detainees were occasionally picked up and taken to secret sites, but at Langley, senior C.I.A. officers began looking for an endgame to the prison program. One C.I.A. operative told Mr. Helgerson’s team that officers from the agency might one day wind up on a “wanted list” and be tried for war crimes in an international court.

    The ground had shifted, and counterterrorism officials began to rethink the strategy for the secret war. Armed drones, and targeted killings in general, offered a new direction. Killing by remote control was the antithesis of the dirty, intimate work of interrogation. Targeted killings were cheered by Republicans and Democrats alike, and using drones flown by pilots who were stationed thousands of miles away made the whole strategy seem risk-free.

    • Paul Rogers: Suicide-bombs without the suicides: why drones are so cool- http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/suicide-bombs-without-suicides-why-drones-are-so-cool

      (...)

      The similarity [of suicide-bombing] with armed-drones is striking. (...)

      (...)

      Then comes the blowback.

      As paramilitary movements learn to respond, their range of options starts with the utilisation of many readily available technologies. They may be aided by support from a sympathetic regime - witness the unarmed TV-guided drones from Hizbollah, deploying Iranian technology, that have caused the Israelis such concern (see “Hizbollah’s warning flight”, 5 May 2005). Even short of that, the fusion of so many available dual-use technologies and the abilities of skilled engineers and technicians working within radical movements means that armed-drones from non-state actors will be a feature of asymmetrical, transnational war very soon (see An asymmetrical drone war", 19 August 2010).

      In addition, and even without using drones, paramilitary movements should be expected to target the drone-war centres such as the Creech and Waddington bases - if not the bases themselves, then soft targets in their vicinity.

      What military planners and policy-formers in the west realise least of all is that while the results of drone-warfare rarely make the western media in any depth, they are extensively reported on regional and satellite TV stations across the middle east and into Asia. Even more pertinent is the pervasive coverage of drone-attacks on the worldwide jihadist social media. Moreover, the graphic images of death and suffering on both these kinds of outlets are far grimmer than anything seen in the west (see “Every casualty: the human face of war”, 15 September 2011).

      For now, the drones hold sway - but it is no more than a temporary phenomenon, a transient phase. Within a very few years, and maybe even only months, the next phase will commence as paramilitary groups respond. As with other elements of the “war on terror”, the seduction of short-term advantage disguises damaging longer-term consequences.