/05

Depuis quelques mois, les Etats unis entendent relancer le processus de paix. D’une conférence organisée à Tel Aviv le 27 mai sur l’Initiative de Paix arabe, Shlomi Eldar (Al-Monitor) a tiré les conclusions suivantes :
– La plus grande victoire de la droite israélienne n’est pas la colonisation mais le fait qu’elle a réussi à rendre les Israéliens apathiques et léthargiques et qu’elle a toujours repoussé les efforts internationaux de paix. Elle a délégitimé tout effort de paix.
– Si l’une des raisons est que la guerre en Syrie et le nucléaire iranien ont fait passer au second plan la question de Palestine, la véritable explication est qu’aucune force politique israélienne n’avait, et n’a toujours pas, réagi à l’offre de paix arabe qui date de 2002 et qui est régulièrement renouvelée par la Ligue arabe depuis cette époque. Cette offre n’est pourtant pas éternelle.
– Israël est incapable de concevoir une initiative arabe.
– Les Israéliens ne se rendent pas compte qu’il est dans leur intérêt d’accepter l’Initiative de paix arabe. Ils ne peuvent compter sur leur classe politique pour changer d’avis.
– En fait, les dirigeants israéliens repousseront toute initiative de paix pour faire admettre que le statut quo est préférable à un plan de paix.

By: Shlomi Eldar for Al-Monitor Israel Pulse Posted on May 31
Shlomi Eldar is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Israel Pulse. For the past two decades, he has covered the Palestinian Authority and especially the Gaza Strip for Israel’s Channels 1 and 10 and has reported on the emergence of Hamas. In 2007, he was awarded the Sokolov Prize, Israel’s most important media award, for this work

▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/arab-peace-initiative-apathy.html

The greatest achievement of the Israeli right is not the settlement enterprise. The greatest achievement of the Israeli right is its success in making most of the Israeli public lethargic and apathetic.
Earlier this week (May 27), there was a conference in Tel Aviv dedicated exclusively to the Arab Peace Initiative. The conference was organized by the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue of the Netanya Academic College, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Yisrael Yozemet (Israeli Peace Initiative), which is a group founded to promote the Arab Peace Initiative. The conference had a large turnout that included academics, economists and people who were once senior figures in the Israeli political system.
The only Knesset members who attended were Erel Margalit and Meirav Michaeli, both from the Labor Party. The organizers invited Knesset members from the right as well, but the invitations were turned down. These days, the Israeli political system looks dimly at the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular. There is almost no one who wants to begin any sort of dialogue whatsoever or to make any effort to resolve the conflict (…)

#Arab_peace_initiative, #settlement, #peace, #lethargy, #apathy, #peace_proposal, #Arab_league, #Syria, #Iran

Islamization of Istanbul Continues

Pinar Tremblay for Al-Monitor Posted on May 30.
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/islamization-istanbul-turkey.html#ixzz2VESdmFXj

“May 29, 2013, was the 560th anniversary of Istanbul’s conquest. One of Al-Monitor’s contributors, Kadri Gursel, tweeted, “If you were a real Istanbulian, you would not be celebrating the city’s conquest.” While his tweet generated polarized reactions from all political fronts, another diplomatic pundit told Al-Monitor, “The Islamization of Istanbul is not yet complete, a la neo-Ottoman style.”

On Conquest Day, there were two other battles in this ever-growing city. The first was the beginning of the construction of the third bridge over the Bosporus. Second, a small recreational area, Gezi Park in Taksim district, was scheduled to be demolished to build a shopping strip. Both of these events may seem rather normal and not political to the unsuspecting eye, but not in Istanbul. Both of these “modernization” projects of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have several religious and political battles embedded in them.

The third bridge has long been a contentious issue. Although everyone agrees Istanbul needs a better transportation system, there are multiple concerns about the cost-benefit analysis of how this third bridge was designed. The focus of this piece, however, is not about city planning details.”

How We Lost The Syrian Revolution - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
►http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/syria-revolution-aleppo-assad.html

Le témoignage (qui ne risque pas d’être disséminé) d’un habitant anti-Assad d’Alep sur la brutalité de certains « révolutionnaires » , témoignage très manichéen cependant par son opposition gentils-citadins-éduqués-cultivés versus ruraux-revanchards haineux-frustes, et qui ne peut de ce fait que passer complètement sous silence le rôle du parrainage étranger de certains desdits citadins qui alimente la brutalité.

So what went wrong? Or to be more accurate, where did we go wrong? How did a once inspirational and noble popular uprising calling for freedom and basic human rights degenerate into an orgy of bloodthirsty sectarian violence, with depravity unfit for even animals? Was it inevitable and wholly unavoidable, or did it not have to be this way?

...

To us, a rebel fighting against tyranny doesn’t commit the same sort of crimes as the regime he’s supposed to be fighting against. He doesn’t loot the homes, businesses and communities of the people he’s supposed to be fighting for. Yet, as the weeks went by in Aleppo, it became increasingly clear that this was exactly what was happening.

Rebels would systematically loot the neighborhoods they entered. They had very little regard for the lives and property of the people, and would even kidnap for ransom and execute anyone they pleased with little recourse to any form of judicial process. They would deliberately vandalize and destroy ancient and historical landmarks and icons of the city. They would strip factories and industrial zones bare, even down to the electrical wiring, hauling their loot of expensive industrial machinery and infrastructure off across the border to Turkey to be sold at a fraction of its price. Shopping malls were emptied, warehouses, too. They stole the grain in storage silos, creating a crisis and a sharp rise in staple food costs. They would incessantly shell residential civilian neighborhoods under regime control with mortars, rocket fire and car bombs, causing death and injury to countless innocent people, their snipers routinely killing in cold blood unsuspecting passersby. As a consequence, tens of thousands became destitute and homeless in this once bustling, thriving and rich commercial metropolis.

But why was this so? Why were they doing it? It became apparent soon enough, that it was simply a case of us versus them. They were the underprivileged rural class who took up arms and stormed the city, and they were out for revenge against the perceived injustices of years past. Their motivation wasn’t like ours, it was not to seek freedom, democracy or justice for the entire nation, it was simply unbridled hatred and vengeance for themselves.
Extremist and sectarian in nature, they made no secret that they thought us city folk in Aleppo, all of us, regime stooges and sympathizers, and that our lives and property were forfeit as far as they were concerned.

Rebel profiteer warlords soon became household names, their penchant for looting and spreading terror among the populace inducing far more bitterness and bile than what was felt against the regime and its forces. Add to that terrible fray, the extremist Islamists and their open association with Al-Qaeda and their horrific plans for the future of our nation, and you can guess what the atmosphere over here felt like: a stifling primordial fear, a mixture of terror and despair.

So who was “us,” and why did we feel that we were any different or better? Well, by “us” I mean, and at the risk of sounding rather elitist, the civil grassroots opposition movement in Aleppo, who for months were organizing peaceful protests and handing out aid at considerable danger and risk to our own lives. “We” truly believed in the higher ideals of social and political change, and tried to emulate them. We tried to model ourselves on the civil rights movement of the US in the 1960s, Mandela’s struggle against apartheid, and the teachings of Gandhi: precisely what similar civil movements in other Arab Spring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt had done before. 

...

Street Clashes Rock Istanbul, Turkish Government - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/istanbul-protests-turkey-police-demands.html

One aspect of the social unrest and political uncertainty has to do with questions emerging over the AKP’s identity. The party is a powerful “social coalition” with a profile that goes beyond any Islamist identity, and has described itself as “Muslim Democrat” over the past five years. But during that same period, doubts have arisen over its “democrat” nature amid a slowdown in reforms, uncertainties in the Kurdish peace process and discriminatory rhetoric. And now the authoritarian and neo-liberal attitude displayed in major projects concerning Istanbul’s fabric, lifestyle and environment has given food for thought also to those who really know what “conservative” means.

Emirati Sent to Jail Over ’False Tweets’ - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/uae-false-news-twitter-jail-sentence.html

The conviction of Al Haddidi and the arrest of Al Shehhi sends a message to everyone in the United Arab Emirates: “Criticize the government at your own peril.”
The verdict of the sedition trial — which some observers say stems from critical comments on social media — may send a much larger message. That decision is expected on July 2.

Dans cet article, l’auteur dissèque un par un les tweets concernant le procès en ’tentative de coup d’état’- pour lesquels al Haddidi a été condamné à 10 mois de prison ferme (et perdu son appel le 22 mai). Pour lui, l’auteur ne faisait que remédier au manque absolu d’information venant contre-dire la seule version officielle sur ce procès tenu très secret.

Extraordinaire, et c’est signé. ▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/hezbollah-war-syria-jabhat-nusra-lebanon.html

The rockets were fired only hours after Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced in a speech the party’s decision to fight in Syria alongside the Syrian regime. This means that military cells that support the Syrian regime are present in Lebanon and can carry out attacks at any time they are ordered.

How We Lost The Syrian Revolution - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
►http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/syria-revolution-aleppo-assad.html

How We Lost
The Syrian Revolution

Bilan autocritique attribué à un militant alépin.

Les articles à base de « sources proches du Hezbollah » citées par les agences occidentales ne sont jamais convaincantes, mais ici il s’agit de Jean Aziz, quelqu’un de tout à fait sérieux. Il publie un long témoignage sur les opérations sur Hezbollah à Qusayr : Hezbollah Opens Up About Syria, Qusair
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/hezbollah-involvement-qusair-battle-syria.html

The sources explained that Hezbollah never, for one instant, worried about Syrian insurgents or Lebanese pro-Syrian opposition militants. Its main attention throughout the battle was aimed at those that it characterized as takfiri militants. Hezbollah had received information from Lebanese authorities that a few hundred of those takfiris had in fact previously managed to reach Palestinian refugee camps inside Lebanon, and had, for the most part, taken up positions in the Ein el-Hilweh camp located on the eastern outskirts of South Lebanon’s capital, Sidon. A smaller number of them had reached the Sabra and Shatila camps, adjacent to Beirut.

Social Divisions Hinder Saudi Rights Movement
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/saudi-arabia-human-rights.html

Les divisions sociales nuisent aux mouvements des droits saoudiens

...

Il n’a pas fallu longtemps pour qu’il devienne clair, cependant, que ce n’était pas seulement les chiites qui réclamaient davantage de droits. Des habitants de la province Qassim - une zone traditionnellement connue pour adhérer à une interprétation sunnite stricte - sont également descendus dans les rues pour manifester, ce qui discrédite le discours du gouvernement saoudien que les protestations étaient simplement un problème "chiite" isolé.

Malgré les demandes de droits parmi plusieurs groupes d’origines différentes, ce qui est devenu très apparent est que les divisions sociales au sein de la société saoudienne ont considérablement entravé le mouvement des droits humains. La propagande du gouvernement a rapidement tenté de discréditer tous les groupes qui faisaient pression pour des droits humains : les manifestants à Qatif sont devenus des hérétiques au service d’une « nation étrangère » (sous-entendu l’Iran), les manifestants à Qassim ont été étiquetés comme des terroristes qui étaient une menace pour la sécurité de la nation et les activistes libéraux avaient subi « un lavage de cerveau par des infidèles » et tentaient d’ « occidentaliser » le pays.

Un certain nombre de Saoudiens croient qu’il s’agit de propagande gouvernementale. Beaucoup d’autres défendent la quête de droits de l’un des groupes, tout en condamnant les demandes similaires provenant d’autres individus, en raison de préjugés sectaires ou idéologiques.

En ce qui concerne les divisions au sein de la société saoudienne, un militant de Riyad a déclaré à Al-Monitor : "Ce n’est pas la faute des gens, c’est le système. Dès le plus jeune âge on nous apprend que notre identité devrait être deux choses : un saoudien ’pur’ et un musulmans ’réel’. Ce pays est cependant extrêmement diversifié en arrière-plan ; plutôt que de célébrer notre diversité, on nous apprend à cacher les différences et à s’intégrer dans le statu quo...

...

Misreading ’Syria Transition Act’ In Turkey
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-syria-transition-act.html

A US Department of Defense official familiar with Syria told Al-Monitor that “I cannot imagine that Congress is going to push Obama into a Syria policy that he does not agree with. Nor do I think that this act will ever pass through Congress”. The probability of a congressional backing is very low since the US public opinion polls demonstrate a consistent unwillingness for a military intervention in Syria. 

Tony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., said, “Debating non-binding Congressional legislative gestures is a dubious proposition since they are little more than an exercise in political symbolism. The act clearly states that it does not authorize the use of military force, and only involves $250 million for Syrian transition expenses which would come from authorized funds when and if a transition expense occurred that the US actually wanted to support and that it could not cover with existing aid funds.” Overall, the act is a gesture and nothing more at this point.

Australian Visit Highlights Syrian Refugee Problem in Lebanon - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/australia-foreign-minister-syria-bob-carr.html

More than 1 million Syrians now reside in Lebanon, making up 20% of the total population, Luciano Calestini, a UNICEF official accompanying Carr on the visit, said citing Lebanese government estimates. Close to 500,000 of them are registered with the UNHCR.

Islamist Threat Constrains Jordan’s Syria Policy - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East

▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/jordan-islamists-syria-civil-war.html

King Abdullah II is no longer hiding his worries about the fate of post-Assad Syria and the danger of it falling into the hands of Islamists, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, the king’s discomfort toward whom is locally and regionally well known. American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg wrote in The Atlantic, quoting the Jordanian monarch’s criticism of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who are brought together by a background of political Islam. Despite the king’s position stemming from foreign concerns, it also figures into the domestic equation.

Syrie. Le point sur la bataille de Qoussaïr (21 mai 2013)

Où est Qoussaïr ? Ville située près de Homs, à quelques kilomètres de la frontière avec le Liban. Elle occupe une position stratégique. Elle permet aisément de rentrer et sortir du Liban.

Début des combats ? L’assaut de l’armée syrienne contre la rébellion installée à Qoussaïr a débuté le dimanche 19 mai. Il n’est pas terminé (1). L’armée régulière avait pris position dans les alentours depuis plusieurs semaines. Elle contrôlait depuis une dizaine de jours la zone d’al-Tal, qui domine Qoussaïr.

Qui combat ? D’un côté, des groupes de la rébellion qui contrôlaient la ville depuis une année (notamment la Brigade Farouk relevant de l’Armée Libre Syrienne) ; En face, l’armée syrienne assistée de combattants se revendiquant du Hezbollah et les Forces de la Défense Nationale (milice paramilitaire créée par le régime). L’aviation est intervenue. Il y aurait une centaine de morts des deux côtés.

Issue ? Tout le monde s’accorde à dire que le régime va reprendre le contrôle de la ville dans les heures ou jours à venir.

Réactions arabes ? La Ligue arabe a convoqué une réunion pour jeudi 23 mai pour évoquer la conférence internationale dans le contexte de la situation sur le terrain, notamment à Qoussaïr.

Contexte politique et diplomatique ? L’assaut de Qoussaïr est intervenu au lendemain du jour où Assad a déclaré qu’il ne quitterait pas le pouvoir (2). Personne ne croit que la conférence internationale, destinée à mettre fin au conflit par un accord entre le régime et la rébellion, puisse réellement se tenir début juin. Le fossé se creuse entre chiites et alaouites, combattant pour le régime, et sunnites qui forment le gros de la rébellion. Le Président Assad a récemment fait valoir que son gouvernement n’utilisait les services « d’aucun combattant extérieur à la Syrie, ni d’autres nationalités, et n’avait besoin d’aucun autre Etat arabe ou étranger » (2) (3) La participation du Hezbollah aux combats rend caduc la politique de non-intervention du Liban. Pire, le Front al-Nousra avait menacé, il y a plusieurs semaines, de prendre Beyrouth pour cible si le Hezbollah ne cessait pas ses opérations en Syrie.

Conséquences ? La chute de Qoussaïr permettra à Damas de reprendre le contrôle de la zone frontalière du Liban. Elle affaiblira la rébellion à Homs et ailleurs en Syrie. Elle offrira au régime la possibilité de choisir ses prochaines cibles. Elle modifiera la lecture des événements en replaçant les loyalistes au centre du jeu. Elle est susceptible de provoquer en Syrie des représailles à l’encontre des alaouites et des chiites (4) et de réalimenter les troubles à Tripoli entre alaouites et sunnites
1. ▻http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/05/2013519124646578835.html
2. ▻http://www.clarin.com/zona/Renunciar-pueblo-decide-quedo-EEUU_0_922107887.html
3. ▻http://www.syriaonline.sy/?f=Details&catid=12&pageid=5835
4. ▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/syria-conflict-lebanese-border-qusayr.html

The Extent and Limits Of Qatar-Hamas Ties - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/qatari-hamas-alliance-meaning.html

Hamas and Doha may have a dispute at some point, but there are a lot of maneuvering margins and points that may delay or prevent the moment of separation, and allow the tactics of strategic alliance between the two parties to continue. Qatar needs the relationship with Hamas in order to strengthen its regional role, and Hamas needs Qatar’s support at the financial, political and media levels.

Si l’on en croit cet article d’Al Monitor, en Turquie, il y a deux camps : Erdogan d’un côté, et des malades mentaux antisémites de l’autre. Erdogan Confronts the Near Insanity Of His Opposition. Ambiance.
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/reyhanli-bombing-watershed-moment-for-turkey.html

However, Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has had a different take on Reyhanli since the beginning. Spokesmen for the party, whose sympathies for the Assad regime — for ideological and sectarian reasons — have only been thinly veiled, rather implied that the Syrian opposition must be behind the bombings. One CHP speaker, Nihat Matkap, even offered a bizarre conspiracy theory by claiming that “there were strangely no Syrians on the streets right before the bombing.” In other words, he implied that Syrian refugees in Reyhanli were somehow informed about the bombing, and thus were collaborators of the crime. (To me, he sounded like a lunatic, similar to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists who keep claiming that Jews did not go to work in New York’s World Trade Center on 9/11.)
Soon, CHP’s leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu made another accusation, this time to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “The murderer of [the people of] Reyhanli,” he bluntly said, “is none other than Erdogan.” (A few days later, Erdogan sued Kilicdaroglu for these words, claiming that this is a personal insult.)

A more dramatic Kilicdaroglu statement came out in Europe and caused a political scandal. Speaking at a press conference during a visit to Brussels on May 15, Kilicdaroglu claimed that both Assad and Erdogan are “dictators,” and the difference between them is “only a nuance.” In the face of this claim — whose pro-Assadism was probably more intolerable than its anti-Erdoganism — Hannes Swoboda, president of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, who was supposed to meet Kilicdaroglu, canceled the meeting.

Pour Jeremy Salt, une seule option en Syrie : la victoire de l’armée et du gouvernement syriens | Mounadil al Djazaïri
▻http://mounadil.wordpress.com/2013/05/19/pour-jeremy-salt-une-seule-option-en-syrie-la-victoire-de-larmee

Alors que toutes les options sont censées être toujours sur la table, Barack Obama s’éloigne clairement de l’éventualité d’une implication plus profonde en Syrie maintenant qu’il est évident que rien, à part une intervention militaire directe, ne fera tomber le régime de Damas. Au cours des derniers mois seulement, les groupes armés ont perdu des milliers d’hommes. Même si le conflit va perdurer un certain temps encore, l’armée syrienne est en train de réduire progressivement l’insurrection.

Israël/ Syrie/ Russie.

Article apocalyptique de Ben Caspit (Al-Monitor) pour conjurer la guerre au Proche Orient.

Résumé : Poutine a mis en garde Netanyahou contre toute nouvelle attaque en Syrie. Au lendemain de la visite à Moscou du premier ministre israélien, la Russie a annoncé que des missiles S-300 seraient livrés à Assad [missiles anti-aériens commandés depuis deux années].

Israël examine les options à sa disposition dans l’hypothèse où la livraison se ferait. Détruire les missiles pendant leur acheminement ou à leur arrivée en territoire syrien ? Ce serait jouer avec le risque de provoquer la réaction de Damas, du Hezbollah et/ou de l’Iran ? Quelle serait l’attitude de la Russie ? Accepter la présence de ces missiles ferait peser une menace inacceptable sur l’aviation israélienne. Israël est dans un cercle vicieux. Tout le monde fait pression sur tout le monde. Une explosion régionale n’est pas à exclure. « Telle est l’image du Moyen Orient à la mi 2013. Israël se trouve au beau milieu d’un conflit régional, national, religieux, ethnique et tribal impliquant tout le monde, et ne sait même pas rendu compte de ce qui arrivait ». Sans compter les incertitudes sur l’après-Assad, à supposer qu’il quitte le pouvoir.

Au fond, l’imbroglio actuel en Syrie, où régime et oppositions s’épuisent dans un conflit sanglant, est la moins mauvaise des solutions pour Israël.

Will Israel Take OutThe Russian Missiles in Syria ?

By : Ben Caspit for Al-Monitor Israel Pulse Posted on May 17 (2013)

▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/israel-versus-the-russian-syrian-alliance.html#ixzz2TcLq9c9A

Saudi-Qatar Honeymoon In Lebanon is Over
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/qatar-saudi-arabia-stuggle-influence-middle-east.html

In its internal discussions, Hezbollah affirms that Qatari funding stands behind the rise of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who came to prominence in the last two years by challenging and criticizing Hezbollah from his Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Sidon. Hezbollah’s information also indicates that Saudi Arabia is funding Salafist factions in Lebanon that profess animosity towards the party.

(En dehors de ce paragraphe, c’est le genre d’article que je trouve totalement spéculatif.)

Tehran Battles Drugs, Addiction And Crime - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/iran-drugs-heroin-crime-tehran.html

Tehran Battles Drugs, Addiction
And Crime

 : l’extension du domaine de la drogue à Téhéran (comme dans de très nombreuses métropoles d’Orient).

Iraq’s Political Crisis Spreads To Sports Stadiums - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/political-crisis-affects-sports-iraq.html

Iraq’s Political Crisis Spreads
To Sports Stadiums

Toujours les stades et la politique au Moyen-Orient. Cette fois-ci, il s’agit des Kurdes. En gros, ils veulent bien être autonomes, mais pas lâcher le droit à participer au championnat irakien ;-)