• Pour les archives :

    The National 2009 / Déclarations de l’émir du Qatar sur un gazoduc Qatar-Turquie via l’Irak et la Syrie
    http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/qatar-seeks-gas-pipeline-to-turkey#full

    The Guardian / Nafeez Ahmed 2013
    Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concern
    http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines

    RAND Corporation 2008
    http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf

    Divide and Rule focuses on exploiting fault lines between the various Salafi-jihadist groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts. This strategy relies heavily on covert action, information operations (IO), unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces... the United States and its local allies could use the nationalist jihadists to launch proxy IO campaigns to discredit the transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace... US leaders could also choose to capitalize on the ’Sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict’ trajectory by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes against Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world.... possibly supporting authoritative Sunni governments against a continuingly hostile Iran.

    #pipelineistan #Syrie

  • The Pentagon plan to ‘divide and rule’ the Muslim world
    http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/pentagon-plan-divide-and-rule-muslim-world-1690265165

    Davidson points out that there is precedent for this: “There have been repeated references in the Reagan era to the usefulness of sectarian conflict in the region to US interests.”

    One post-Reagan reiteration of this vision was published by the Jerusalem-based Institute for Strategic and Political Advanced Studies for Benjamin Netanyahu. The 1996 paper, A Clean Break, by Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Richard Perle – all of whom went on to join the Bush administration – advocated regime-change in Iraq as a precursor to forging an Israel-Jordan-Turkey axis that would “roll back” Syria, Lebanon and Iran. The scenario is surprisingly similar to US policy today under Obama.

    Twelve years later, the US Army commissioned a further RAND report suggesting that the US “could choose to capitalise on the Shia-Sunni conflict by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes in a decisive fashion and working with them against all Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world… to split the jihadist movement between Shiites and Sunnis.” The US would need to contain “Iranian power and influence” in the Gulf by “shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan”. Simultaneously, the US must maintain “a strong strategic relationship with the Iraqi Shiite government” despite its Iran alliance.

    Around the same time as this RAND report was released, the US was covertly coordinating Saudi-led Gulf state financing to Sunni jihadist groups, many affiliated to al-Qaeda, from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon. That secret strategy accelerated under Obama in the context of the anti-Assad drive.

    The widening Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict would “reduce the al-Qaeda threat to US interests in the short term,” the report concluded, by diverting Salafi-jihadist resources toward “targeting Iranian interests throughout the Middle East,” especially in Iraq and Lebanon, hence “cutting back… anti-Western operations”.

    By backing the Iraqi Shiite regime and seeking an accommodation with Iran, while propping up al-Qaeda sponsoring Gulf states and empowering local anti-Shia Islamists across the region, this covert US strategy would calibrate levels of violence to debilitate both sides, and sustain “Western dominance”.

    Le rapport de la Rand : Unfolding the Future of the Long War, 2008 :
    http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf

    Nafeez Ahmed avait déjà cité longuement ce document en août 2013 dans le Guardian (repris à l’époque sur Seenthis par Kassem) :
    http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines

    (via Angry Arab)

    • Ca, que les Etats-Unis aient aidé l’Arabie et les autres émirats à financer des groupes djihadistes, y a-t-il de véritables preuves ?

      “Around the same time as this RAND report was released, the US was covertly coordinating Saudi-led Gulf state financing to Sunni jihadist groups, many affiliated to al-Qaeda, from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon. That secret strategy accelerated under Obama in the context of the anti-Assad drive.”

    • #Israël – Palestine – Liban : Le chemin le plus long vers la paix-
      Auteur(s) :
      Pailhe Caroline
      08 Août 2006
      http://www.grip.org/fr/node/296

      Cette nouvelle guerre contre le Liban [2006] correspond en effet à la deuxième phase d’ un plan stratégique rédigé en 1996 au sein de l’ Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies de Jérusalem, par un groupe d’ experts sous la direction de #Richard_Perle, qui deviendra conseiller du Pentagone dans la présente Administration et jouera un rôle majeur dans la conception de la guerre en Irak.

      Soumis à l’ époque au Premier ministre israélien Benjamin #Netanyahu, le document, intitulé « A Clean Break : A New Strategy for Securing the Realm » (Un changement radical : Une nouvelle stratégie pour sécuriser le territoire), préconise un revirement de la stratégie israélienne[28].

      Au niveau des concepts, le plan prône l’ abandon de la stratégie « terre contre paix » poursuivie jusqu’ alors et plaide pour « #la_paix_par_la_force », une politique fondée sur le rapport de force (balance of power). Il recommande également l’ instauration du principe de #préemption, à côté de celui de #punition, dans la doctrine stratégique israélienne.

      Plus concrètement, le changement de stratégie visait à rompre avec le processus de paix d’ Oslo et fournir à Israël la possibilité d’ étendre une fois pour toutes son empire au-delà des frontières actuelles. Certaines des recommandations sont déjà des faits acquis : changement de régime en Irak, durcissement vis-à-vis des Palestiniens et affaiblissement d’ Arafat. Pour assurer la sécurité d’ Israël à sa frontière nord, le rapport recommande de « prendre l’ initiative stratégique » afin de combattre le Hezbollah, la Syrie et l’ Iran. C’ est ce qui se joue actuellement.

      A la base de ce document, le groupe d’ experts chargé d’ étudier la « Nouvelle stratégie israélienne pour 2000 » n’ était pratiquement constitué que d’ Américains qui, depuis, ont occupé des positions clés dans l’ Administration Bush et singulièrement dans la définition de sa politique étrangère au Moyen-Orient.

      Plus récemment, #Robert_Satloff, directeur d’ un autre think tank néoconservateur influent sur la politique moyen-orientale de Washington, louait la stratégie américaine d’ « #instabilité_constructive » au Liban et en Syrie[29].

      Il constate que, si la recherche de la #stabilité a été un trait caractéristique de la politique des #Etats-Unis dans la région, « George W. Bush a été le premier président à considérer que la stabilité en tant que telle était un obstacle à l’ avancement des intérêts américains au Moyen-Orient. (...) A cet effet, les Etats-Unis ont employé un éventail de mesures coercitives ou non coercitives, allant de l’ usage de la force militaire pour changer les régimes en Afghanistan et en Irak, en passant par une politique de la carotte et du bâton (...) pour isoler Yasser Arafat et encourager une nouvelle et pacifique direction palestinienne, jusqu’ aux encouragements courtois à l’ Egypte et à l’ Arabie saoudite pour les engager sur la voie des réformes. » Sur cet échiquier, le Liban et la Syrie seraient, pour M. Satloff, « un premier test » de cette politique d’ ’ instabilité constructive car « Israël et l’ Iran, l’ Europe et les Etats-Unis, la Syrie et les Palestiniens, tous ces chemins convergent à Beyrouth ». Il reconnaît que les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés locaux devront certes subir « quelques défaites tactiques » mais « avec de la persévérance, des changements positifs continus ne manqueront pas de se produire ».

    • The Redirection - Seymour Hersh, 2007
      http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirection

      In the past few months, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, the Bush Administration, in both its public diplomacy and its covert operations, has significantly shifted its Middle East strategy. The “redirection,” as some inside the White House have called the new strategy, has brought the United States closer to an open confrontation with Iran and, in parts of the region, propelled it into a widening sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

      To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has cooperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda

  • D’après la « RAND » (et blague à part) le régime étasunien est confronté à un gros casse-tête dans sa nouvelle stratégie #MENA : si l’avènement des soulèvements #arabes lui a fait prendre conscience que trop de « #stabilité » (comprendre : aider les #tyrans arabes à brimer leurs #populations) est in fine source d’#instabilité, l’instabilité qui a résulté de la « stabilité » l’amène à soutenir les tyrans dans leur effort à ramener la « stabilité »...
    http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR605/RAND_RR605.pdf#page22

    Prioritizing Stability over Democracy in MENA

    The Arab uprisings that began in 2010 have thrown into stark relief a longstanding dictum governing U.S. conduct in the Arab world— namely, the idea that there is both an inherent tension and a zero- sum relationship between U.S. strategic interests and U.S. support for reform in the region. Moreover, the general assumption has been that the former always takes precedence over the latter.

    (...)

    In the aftermath of the popular revolutions that toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—not to mention a leadership change in Yemen, some measure of constitutional reform in Morocco, and violent protests in Bahrain and Syria—the United States has sought to emphasize the need to find a “new way of doing business” in the Middle East. Successive policy statements and speeches by U.S. government principals since 2011 have emphasized renewed U.S. support for democracy in the region.

    (...)

    The idea here is that the Arab uprisings have demonstrated that authoritarian regimes are ultimately unstable because they refuse to be responsive and accountable to populations increasingly unwilling to remain silent. By not initiating processes of political reform now, regional governments increase the likelihood that they will face internal opposition—potentially violent in nature—in the future. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage these countries down the path of democracy before they become increasingly unstable.

    The U.S. administration, however, has faced considerable challenges in operationalizing this new approach. Ongoing instability and violence in the region, continued skepticism about U.S. support for democracy and civil society, and a generalized sense that American influence in the Middle East is waning have dampened U.S. government efforts to significantly alter the strategic orientation in the Arab world. But there are also drag effects generated by very real U.S. con- cerns, such as Gulf security imperatives (Iran) and political violence in Sinai and parts of North Africa.

    To date, much of the debate about how the United States can influence outcomes in the region has centered on foreign assistance—particularly the sizable amounts of military aid that go to countries such as Egypt and Israel (more than $1 billion per year) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq and Jordan.

    While the U.S. Congress has sought to enforce some measure of democratic conditionality over these funds, ongoing regional uncertainties as well as concerns about the structure of U.S. defense contracts with Egypt have twice led the U.S. administration to exercise national security waivers and allow military aid to Egypt to continue flowing despite clear authoritarian actions on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.5 In July 2013, the same government was overthrown in what was widely perceived as a military coup.

    The subsequent violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood at the hands of Egypt’s security forces led the United States to first cancel the Bright Star joint military exercises and eventually to suspend several components of U.S. military aid. The controversy and debate surrounding these decisions illustrate the challenges that Washington faces today in calibrating its MENA security cooperation policies. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2013, President Obama seemed to summarize the dilemma faced by the United States when he said that the “United States will at times work with governments that do not meet . . . the highest international expectations, but who work with us on our core interests.”

    #Etats-Unis #démocratie

  • Predictive Policing
    The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations | Rapport 2013 de la RAND Corporation, by Walter L. Perry, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan Smith, John S. Hollywood
    http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR233.html

    Predictive policing is the use of analytical techniques to identify promising targets for police intervention with the goal of preventing crime, solving past crimes, and identifying potential offenders and victims. These techniques can help departments address crime problems more effectively and efficiently. They are being used by law enforcement agencies across the United States and elsewhere, and these experiences offer valuable lessons for other police departments as they consider the available tools to collect data, develop crime-related forecasts, and take action in their communities. This guide is one in a series of resources sponsored by the National Institute of Justice to help police departments develop strategies to more effectively prevent crime or conduct investigations. It provides assessments of some of the most promising technical tools for making predictions and tactical approaches for acting on them, drawing on prior research, information from vendors and developers, case studies of predictive policing in practice, and lessons from the use of similar techniques in military operations. It also dispels some myths about predictive methods and explores some pitfalls to avoid in using these tools. Predictive policing is a topic of much enthusiasm and much concern, particularly with regard to civil liberties and privacy rights. As this guide shows, these tools are not a substitute for integrated approaches to policing, nor are they a crystal ball; the most effective predictive policing approaches are elements of larger proactive strategies that build strong relationships between police departments and their communities to solve crime problems.

    #prédiction #police #surveillance via @evgenymorozov cc @pr

    En lien : http://seenthis.net/messages/181015
    http://seenthis.net/messages/174268
    http://seenthis.net/messages/174278