Il est de bon ton de tout mettre sur le dos de Nouri al-Maliki et des irakiens eux-mêmes, aussi je suggère de relire cet article daté du 13 mai 2005. À l’époque, le premier ministre installé par les Américains est Ibrahim al-Jaafari.
In Iraq’s insurgency, no rules, just death, Ehsan Ahrari.
▻http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GE13Ak01.html
The insurgents in Iraq comprise a variety of groups. First and foremost are the Ba’athists and pan-Arabists, including persons of civilian bureaucracy and armed forces under Saddam Hussein. They had careers and retirement plans. They had guaranteed sources of income to support their families. Even in the uncertain political environment of Iraq under a dictator, they did not harbor grave doubts about having a secure means of earning a living, as long as they did not antagonize the wicked regime. Today, almost 90% of them have no job, no income and no future. Thus, they form a majority of the Iraqi insurgency. A large number of army personnel are reportedly well trained in urban warfare. They are eager to destroy the current evolving system, which, from their point of view, is highly illegitimate because it is created by the United States.
Then there are the Sunni Islamists who wish to see their country ruled under the banner of Sunni Islam. There is also the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, whose goals of having an Islamist Iraq may not be too much different than that of the Sunni Islamists, like Ansar al-Islam, and its offshoot, Ansar al-Sunnah. They are driven by the jihadi frame of mind. The “super-Infidel” is occupying the land of Islam, according to this perspective, and should be driven out, no matter the cost. In this frame of reference, there is no compromise, just death, either for them, or for their enemy, or for both. Consequently, Iraq has gone beyond a point where it could be described as “hell”.
[…]
A news dispatch published in the Washington Post on May 8, is a case in point of how destabilizing some of the tactics used by the US and the Iraqi government are. The government side is currently using Shi’ite Iraqi forces for security purposes in the Sunni city of Ramadi, which has remained one of the hotbeds of the Sunni insurgency. From the perspective of forces of stability, since there is no Sunni government in Ramadi, they are forced to use the Shi’ite forces, “including ad hoc militia groups such as the Defenders of Baghdad - as are flowing into Ramadi as part of the latest strategy by Iraq’s central government and the US military to stem insurgent violence here”.
The above dispatch makes some very important pro and con points. It states, “As a short-term counterinsurgency strategy, such forces have several advantages. First, they and their families are less subject to intimidation than when the forces are in their own area. Also, as Iraqis, they are far more familiar with the territory and less likely to be viewed as occupiers than are US troops.” However, it goes on to note “... by pitting Iraqis from different religious sects, ethnic groups and tribes against each other”, this tactic “also aggravates the underlying fault lines of Iraqi society, heightening the prospect of civil strife ...”
As sectarian strife between the Shi’ites and Sunnis is increasing, one wonders who in his right mind would devise such a dangerous tactic only to attain short-term security?