Elijah J. Magnier 🇪🇺 sur X : Will Israel open fire on Lebanon as it did on Gaza? ▻https://twitter.com/ejmalrai/status/1733183225646727519
Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Galant has warned that he may resort to military intervention to force Hezbollah to withdraw 40 kilometres from the Lebanese border. The question is whether Israel will follow through on this threat, potentially opening a new front during or after the ongoing conflict in Gaza.
Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa flooding battle, Hezbollah has been actively involved in supporting the Palestinian cause. This support has been demonstrated through direct action, such as attacks on Israeli positions in the seven Lebanese-occupied villages and the Lebanese-Israeli borders-disputed territories.
Hezbollah’s strategy seems to focus on maintaining a specific operational boundary. When Israeli forces bombed beyond 2 to 5 kilometres into Lebanese territory in retaliation for attacks, Hezbollah responded by targeting Israeli positions at the same depth. This tactic sends a clear message to Israel.
It underlines Hezbollah’s commitment to enforcing the battle lines it has drawn and imposing its rule of engagement over Israel. Hezbollah has made it clear that any violation of these lines, particularly attacks on civilians or the press, will be met with an immediate and equal response, which has happened on more than one occasion.
This stance reflects Hezbollah’s determination to mirror Israel’s actions and ensure that any escalation or breach of the established boundaries will not go unchallenged. This approach highlights the tension and complexity of the conflict, where each party’s actions directly influence the other’s response, maintaining a delicate balance of power and confrontation but walking on the edge of the abyss.
Israel has used the advanced Merkava 4 tank equipped with the TROPHY laser missile interceptor system since 2011. This development followed the 2006 war with Israel and the encounter in Wadi al-Hujair, southern Lebanon, where Lebanese resistance forces targeted numerous tanks in a historic event known as the Israeli “tank massacre”. Despite its advanced technology, the TROPHY system was deemed ineffective during the Gaza war. Israel had to revert to the older Merkava 3 tanks after the Merkava 4 tanks were hit and destroyed by resistance forces at close range, despite their protection systems. Israel considered the Merkava 4 to be unsuitable for the battle of Gaza and deployed it on the Lebanese borders. The Israeli Merkava tank, equipped with an Israeli-made 120 mm MG 253 smoothbore gun, has a maximum range of 4,000 metres.
On the other hand, Hezbollah has used in the latest conflict a variety of weapons, including kamikaze drones and “Burkan” rockets with explosive payloads ranging from 500 kilograms to 2 tonnes, to name but a few. In addition, Hezbollah has fired several types of laser-guided missiles, notably the KORNET 9M133-1TB and other models capable of firing two laser-guided missiles simultaneously and hitting targets over 8,000 metres away. Since the beginning of the conflict, Hezbollah has been targeting dozens of Merkava tanks stationed along the Lebanon-Israel border with considerable success and without noticing any interception from the Trophy.
This consistent and focused effort by Hezbollah has reportedly prompted a strategic response from Israel, hiding or repositioning its tanks away from border areas. This move can be seen as an acknowledgement of the threat that Hezbollah’s capabilities pose to Israeli armoured units in these regions.
Keeping the tanks away from the border is a tactical decision aimed at reducing vulnerability and destruction and minimising the risk of further Israeli casualties. This development underlines the dynamic and evolving nature of the military strategies of both sides in this conflict, as each adapts to the capabilities and actions of the other. It reflects Israel’s cautious approach to a formidable adversary and a border confrontation’s challenging terrain and circumstances.
Given these capabilities, Hezbollah can effectively target and destroy tanks at considerable distances, engaging them several kilometres before the tanks can use their guns within their effective range. This tactical advantage becomes particularly relevant in the context of Israel’s intention to partially invade Lebanon to push Hezbollah 40 kilometres from the border. Should Israel attempt a ground incursion to achieve this objective, Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities pose a significant threat to Israeli tanks, potentially affecting the dynamics and outcome of such a military operation. Israel would, therefore, consider carpet bombing, which has never succeeded in dislodging Hezbollah or degrading its capabilities.
Hezbollah has reportedly carried out frequent attacks on Israeli tanks, barracks, radar and communications systems, with an estimated frequency of 7 to 13 attacks per day. This sustained rate of attack is said to have caused significant casualties on the Israeli side.
Israel is concealing the extent of its human losses out of concern for the possible reactions of the Israeli public, who might react with alarm or unrest if they were fully aware of the scale of the losses.
This situation underlines the intense and ongoing nature of the conflict, with both sides engaged in a constant exchange of hostilities. Israel’s secrecy about its casualties is indicative of the sensitivity of public opinion in times of conflict and the impact it can have on national morale and political stability. It also reflects the strategic considerations governments and militaries must weigh when managing information in conflict, balancing transparency against the potential impact on public opinion and national security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already struggling to hold his government together and remain in office amid widespread Israeli dissatisfaction with his performance before the war and on 7 October.
The significant escalation of the undeclared conflict has had a major impact on the civilian population. On Lebanese territory, the exchange of bombardments has destroyed more than 1,000 Lebanese civilian homes along the borders and displaced several thousand. In addition, the intensity and impact of the hostilities have forced tens of thousands of Israeli settlers to flee from areas near the Lebanese border to the Eilat region on the Red Sea. The erecting of tents for these displaced persons indicates a large-scale and rapid response to accommodate them. These settlers, who met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Gallant, have reportedly expressed a firm stance: they refuse to return to their homes as long as Hezbollah’s “Al-Radwan” special forces remain positioned along the border. This sentiment is driven by fears stemming from threats by Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to cross the borders to “conquer the Galilee”, a reference to an action carried out years later by Hamas in the 7 October attack on settlements around Gaza.
The prospect of a ground invasion of Lebanon, therefore, looks increasingly unlikely, especially given the formidable presence and capabilities of Hezbollah forces along the border and inside southern Lebanon, equipped with advanced weapons and ample ammunition. Netanyahu’s statement that south Lebanon and the Beirut suburbs could be turned into a devastated region similar to Gaza and Khan Yunis suggests a strategy that relies more on air and artillery bombardment, identical to the tactics used in Gaza.
The influx of munitions into Israel from American and European sources since the beginning of the Gaza conflict has been a notable factor in supporting the bombardment of Gaza. These supplies have enabled Israel to carry out extensive bombing campaigns, resulting in significant destruction of homes, infrastructure, electricity and water supplies, schools and civilian casualties. The world’s reaction to Israel’s violation of international law and crimes against humanity reduces the West’s appetite for supplying Israel with ammunition and weapons for another war against Lebanon.
The role of international support, and in particular, the reluctance of the United States to see another war turn into a regional conflict, is a crucial factor in this equation. However, the intense and devastating Israeli bombardment has not led to any form of surrender by the Palestinian resistance fighters, nor has it resulted in a decisive military victory. For example, the situation in the Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, which the Israeli forces occupied weeks ago but faced fierce resistance, resulted in 50 resistance attacks in one day on Thursday. Despite the occupation of the area, the ongoing urban fighting is a testament to the complex and protracted nature of this conflict. It highlights the challenges that conventional military forces often face in urban and guerrilla warfare scenarios, where the occupation of territory does not necessarily translate into control of the situation.
The effect of Hamas’s rocket attacks in driving half a million Israeli settlers from their illegal homes underscores the physical and psychological impact of such military action despite the inaccuracy and limited destructive power of these rockets. Hezbollah’s unique strategic position and capabilities are significant compared to other regional groups. They can cause the displacement of over a million Israelis and invite them to return to their countries of origin.
As a vital part of the Axis of Resistance and closely aligned with Iran’s national security interests, Hezbollah has significant military capabilities, particularly in missile technology. These include supersonic surface-to-surface missiles, rockets with payloads of up to 2 tonnes, and precision-guided missiles carrying over 450 kg of explosives that could target critical infrastructure and strategic sites in Israel and the Mediterranean (oil platforms).
Hezbollah’s ability to target critical Israeli assets such as airports, ports, oil and gas facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, military barracks and command centres underlines the serious threat they pose. The proximity of these strategic Israeli sites to the Lebanese border (Haifa and Tel Aviv are within 20 to 60 km) makes them viable targets for Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
The potential consequences of an Israeli scorched-earth policy in Lebanon underline the escalatory potential of this conflict. In such a scenario, Hezbollah could retaliate with significant force, potentially causing considerable damage to Israel’s infrastructure and economic stability. Such an escalation could be catastrophic, potentially sending Israel’s development and stability back to the Stone Age.
Israel is using its Western connection to try to achieve some calm for the settlers through the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. This resolution, which was supposed to resolve the conflict and keep Hezbollah at a distance of 40 km from the Lebanese borders, has, in fact, not affected Hezbollah’s strategic positioning or decisions. Israel’s efforts to involve France and the US as mediators in talks with the Lebanese government illustrate the diplomatic complexity of the situation.
Israel’s proposal that Hezbollah vacates the borders in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory represents a significant diplomatic overture. However, Hezbollah’s response to such an offer may require more work. The non-state actor may welcome indirect dialogue between the Lebanese and Israelis and a complete Israeli withdrawal. Still, he may not necessarily see this as a reason to withdraw from the borders or to offer Israel undeserved gifts.
Hezbollah’s deployment in southern Lebanon, backed by an agreement with the Lebanese government endorsing a tripartite strategy in which the “army, the people and the resistance” work together to protect Lebanon, underpins its position. This agreement provides Hezbollah with a rationale for maintaining its border presence and frames it as an essential aspect of Lebanon’s defence strategy. In this context, Hezbollah’s reluctance to make concessions to Israel, especially in exchange for territory that arguably justifies its border deployment, is guaranteed.
The conflict is far from resolved, and the parties are still considering all options. The possibility of Hezbollah taking the initiative and possibly launching attacks on Israel to reduce Tel Aviv and Haifa, as well as Gaza and Khan Younis, with significant religious justification, indicates a shift in the rules of engagement and is still on the table. This suggests that the battle is still in its early stages, with future developments unpredictable and dependent on many military and diplomatic factors.
Hamas is telling the members of the Axis of Resistance that it is still at the beginning and that it has all its military capabilities.
Therefore, Hezbollah still has time to decide on its next move. Israel is still in the middle of its battle, which is far from over.
