Syria Comment

http://www.joshualandis.com

  • Syria Comment » Archives » US Policy Toward the Levant, Kurds and Turkey – By Joshua Landis
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/us-policy-toward-the-levant-kurds-and-turkey-by-joshua-landis

    By keeping Damascus weak and divided, the US hopes to deny Iran and Russia the fruits of their victory. Washington believes this pro-Kurdish policy will increase US leverage in the region and help roll back Iran. The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, David Satterfield, explained to the Senate on January 11, 2018 that US policy is designed to convince the Russians to see that a new constitution for Syria is written and that fair elections, overseen by the UN, are carried out that Assad will lose. By denying the Damascus access to North Syria, the US says it is convinced it will achieve these stated ends. I am unaware of any analysts who believe this. It is completely unrealistic. Russia, even if it wished to, cannot force Assad to make such concessions. Most analysts brush off such State Department formulations as talking points designed to obscure more cynical objectives.

    #Syrie #Etats-Unis #Iran #Russie

  • U.S.-led coalition helps to build new Syrian force, angering Turkey
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sdf/u-s-led-coalition-helps-build-new-syrian-force-angering-turkey-idUSKBN1F30O

    The force will deploy along the border with Turkey to the north, the Iraqi border to the southeast and along the Euphrates River Valley, which broadly acts as the dividing line separating the U.S.-backed SDF and Syrian government forces backed by Iran and Russia.

    Syrie : les Kurdes vont constituer une force frontalière avec la coalition internationale - France 24
    http://www.france24.com/fr/20180114-syrie-etats-unis-turquie-kurdes-frontieres-coalition-fds-ypg

  • Syria Comment » Archives Reconciliations: The Case of al-Sanamayn in North Deraa - Syria Comment
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/reconciliations-case-al-sanamayn-north-deraa

    However, it would not be feasible for the regime to depopulate every restive area. It is in this context that the mechanism of ‘reconciliation’ (musalaha) exists, whereby an agreement is struck in order to bring an area officially back under regime authority. The exact terms of the reconciliation agreements have varied from place to place, perhaps reflecting some experimentation.

  • Un long et très intéressant article sur le blog de Joshua Landis pour démonter la thèse «Assad a fabriqué ISIS»: Is Assad the Author of ISIS? Did Iran Blow Up Assef Shawkat? And Other Tall Tales
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/assad-author-isis-iran-blow-assef-sawkat-tall-tales-ehsani2

    As the events in Daraa unfolded, the President invited key figures from the town to see what can be done to calm the demonstrations. One such figure was cleric Sayasneh. One of the consistent demands of such meetings was the release of prisoners. It was no different when Douma joined the uprising. Foreign Embassies were also pushing the Syrian State to release what it called political prisoners. People like Zahran Alloush were sentenced to seven years in prison when he was arrested with a group of 40 people on the charge of promoting Wahhabi ideology and gun possession. They had not killed anyone or even fired a shot. Yet, they were sent to prisons like Sednaya and kept there beyond the end of their sentence on the whim of one of the security agencies. It was in this context when the residents of Douma demanded the release of prisoners from their districts. The Syrian leadership was under intense pressure to calm the crisis. The people of Douma promised to do their job at calming their own streets if some of those prisoners were released. Zahran and many others like him were released under this rationale. This is not too dissimilar to the way the American prisons in Iraq worked. Zarqawi, Baghdadi and Golani were all released from those prisons either when their terms ended or when the local populations demanded their release. Just like in Syrian prisons, the prisoners in American jails were also indoctrinated with jihadist ideology. Syria erred by releasing Alloush and Abboud who would go on to form Jeish al Islam and Ahrar just like the U.S. erred when it released Baghdadi who would go on to form ISIS.

    • Angry Arab revient lui aussi sur cette théorie, mais en réponse à un billet de Qifa Nabki : Elias Muhanna ("Qifanabki") on ISIS and the Syrian regime
      http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2016/12/elias-muhanna-qifanabki-on-isis-and.html

      So Elias commented on the lousy (really trashy, journalistically speaking) series about ISIS and the Syrian regime in Daily Beast.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis
      This is not about politics but about methodology, journalistic standards and about the dominant political paradigm about Syria and beyond. Basically, in this piece, Eias reveals himself as fully March 14, while he used to be more careful in his analysis before. This piece reads like the talking points of March 14 really. But away from generalizations let us talk specifics (my responses to his words are in red):

      1) His opening sentence set the stage: "Gutman’s articles have been championed by opposition supporters and critiqued by regime loyalists." So here he tells readers that anyone who is critical of the piece is a regime supporters. Look at this demagogic method. So end of story. Let us go home. If you dare disagree with the non-expert Gutman (who research basically constituted spending long hours in cafes in Istanbul). There is really no need to continue when he says that, but I will continue.

      2) He then informs the readers this: "The most astute observers of the conflict have long recognized the alignment of certain interests between the regime and the most radical elements in the Islamist opposition." Here, you are to believe that if you are astute you have to agree with the premise of Gutman and Western media and government, otherwise you are not astute. No evidence is necessary.

      3) Look at this line (and notice that Elias, like all other cheerleaders of the armed Jihadi groups in Syria) still insist that there was this really secular/feminist/democratic spectrum of secular armed groups, and then the regime came and produced those Islamists and then, voila, the secular armed groups suddenly disappeared in order for Bashshar to claim that his enemies are not the real Voltaire Battalions but the various Islamist Jihadi battalions: "The rise of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra has been disastrous for the secular political opposition".

      4) Elias then proceeds to yet again complains that the fact that Gutman piece is short on data and research (unless sitting in cafes in Istanbul counts as solid research) is bad not from a journalistic standpoint but because it helps the opponents of his beloved Syrian rebels (former Voltaire battalions who were transformed by trickery by the regime to Jihadi battalions): "That’s unfortunate, because they have given regime apologists more ammunition for the claim that the Syrian uprising is nothing but a foreign conspiracy fueled by fake news and Gulf-funded think tanks." But I am not sure what he means by the side reference to Gulf-funded think tanks? Does he mean that those are valuable academic assets who should not be criticized or does he mean that their punditry should be respected and not maligned and ridiculed. Not sure here but he seems defensive about them.

      5) Here he produces his theory (same as Gutman theory and same as the various theories about the Jihadi rebels from DAY ONE): "When the Assad regime released many of its Islamist prisoners from Sednaya Prison in 2011 — including individuals like Zahran Alloush, Yahia al-Hamawi, Hassan Abboud, and others who would go on to positions of leadership in Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and ISIS — it did so in full knowledge that the Islamists spelled trouble for the nascent uprising." So the evidence marshaled by Elias is that since the regime released them from jail, it means it controls them and even controls them when they bomb the regime sites and when they kill regime supporters, etc. But here is what curious: if this is the evidence in itself, how come Elias never wrote that US is responsible for the Jihadi in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as the US release scores of Jihadi fighters INCLUDING BAGHDADI HIMSELF? And does this argument not apply to Jordan, Saudi, Pakistani, Afghani, and Moroccan regime? The Jordanian regime is most culpable among them all as it started to manipulate Jihadis long before any of those regimes. So if the evidence is the release from jail, then it can’t be true in the case of Syrian regime and not true in the case of all those other regimes including the US government and its occupation authorities in the region.

      6) Then Elias produces another conspiracy theory more fascinating than the first one: "The intelligence services guessed correctly that the peaceful secular demonstrations would be overrun by violent former inmates". Here, what does overrun mean? I mean, if the rebels were mostly secular, why would the release of Jihadi “overrun” them? What would that happen if the majority are active in the Voltaire Battalions? Why did not the more popular (according to Elias and all other mainstream journalists) secular forces overrun the others?

      7) Then Elias proceeds to make a Lebanon analogy: "That group was widely seen as a tool of Syrian intelligence". Widely seen? It was only “widely seen” by the Hariri family and the rest of the Saudi-run March 14 Movement. There was never any evidence presented about that. The only evidence is that its leader once spent time in Syrian regime jail, just as Baghdadi once spent time in US military jails in Iraq. And many of those Jihadi groups are openly and blatantly opposed to the Syrian regime on sectarian grounds and in fact the regime fought against them in Lebanon during the Syrian political domination of Lebanon. But it gets worse:

      8) Elias then says: "Longtime Syria-watchers will recall that Hizbullah was adamantly opposed to the Lebanese Army’s assault on the camp". I consider myself “a long time Syria-watcher” — and an occasional bird-watcher — and I dont recall that. This is absolutely and totally untrue, and even Elias friends in March 14 would not mischaracterize the stance of Hizbullah as such. Hizbullah was NOT opposed to the assault on the camp: Nasrallah specifically said that entry into the camp “is the red line”. He meant that the civilian population of the camp should be spared and that the assault on Fath Al-Islam should have sparred the lives of civilians But unfortunatley, once the Lebanese Amy began the assault on the camp, Hizbullah never complained AS IT SHOULD HAVE. More than 45 Palestinian civilians were massacred by the Lebanese Army assault. I was and still am of the position that the Lebanese Army should not have assaulted the camp (I call on Elias to visit what is left of the camp to see for himself) in order to get rid of a small armed gang, especially that negotiations were going on. In fact, the lousy Syrian regime Army supported and helped and the lousy Lebanese regime Army in the assault of the camp. And unfortunately Hizbullhah provided intelligence and military support for the Army during the assault. So if my position against Army assault make me an accomplice with Fath Al-Islam, be my guest. But it was really incredible how Elias—desperate to find evidence of any kind—decided to distort the position of Hizbullah.

      9) Finally, Elias concludes with his last evidence, that the Syrian regime had “infiltrated” those groups: "given the regime’s successful infiltration of these groups". Wait. Infiltration of groups means control and creation of those groups? Do you remember after Sep. 11 when George Tenet testified before US Congress that CIA had infiltrated Al-Qa`idah? Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, and other Arab and Western and Israeli intelligence services had all infiltrated those groups, but why do you go from here to decide that only the Syrian regime is guilty of infiltration? Are you that desperate to validate a lousy piece of journalism by Roy Gutman? Finally, here is what I find interesting: Gutman built up his case on coffee shop chatter by Syrians in Istanbul, but usually Westerners mock unsubstanitated conspiracy theories by Middle Easterners. Yet, only in the case of Syria are those conspiracy theories believed and peddled and only because they serve the propaganda interests of of Western governments.

      PS Do you notice that when people cite the lousy piece by Roy Gutman they always say: the award-winning Roy Gutman. I remember when people cited Judith Miller about WMDs of Iraq before 2003, they also always said: award-winning journalist, Judith Miller.

      PPS Elias Responds here.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis/comment-page-1/#comment-127286

    • Sinon, c’est la même #théorie_du_complot, explicitée cette fois par Michel Touma de l’Orient-Le Jour, reprise de manière extrêmement fainéante par Courrier international :
      http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/lettre-ouverte-du-liban-pourquoi-francois-fillon-tout-faux-su

      (alors qu’il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur le fait de baser une politique étrangère française sur la prétendue et forcément catastrophique « protection des Chrétiens d’Orient »)

  • In the Line of Fire - the War Against the UN in Syria
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/line-fire-war-un-syria

    Since the war in Syria began, aid delivery has been politicized. The anti-regime camp rejected the very notion of delivering aid through government held areas. Western countries who backed the insurgency and supported regime change pushed for most aid to be delivered “cross border,” from Turkey or Jordan. Diplomats and aid workers based in Turkey or Jordan often went native and viewed aid agencies based in Damascus as the enemy. Even the UN faced divisions and rivalries. At the center of this was Yacoub El Hillo, the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Syria since August 2013. El Hillo’s very existence was an affront to those who prioritized regime change above all else and because he was based in Damascus and accredited by the Syrian government he was required to acknowledge the Syrian government as it continued to represent the sovereignty of Syria at the United Nations. This cooperation with Syrian state institutions was anathema to those who hoped El Hillo could be some kind of humanitarian dictator, operating as if there was no Syrian state. But since most Syrians still live in government held parts of Syria and there is still a government with institutions and security forces, the UN must work especially with institutions that provide services to people such as health, education, water, electricity and vaccination.

    […]

    In mid June an advocacy group called The Syria Campaign accused the UN of collaborating with and supporting the government’s policies.

    • Tué par Liwaa Chouhada al-Yarmouk - comme l’indique l’article, soit la branche de Da’ich aux confins du Golan sous occupation israélienne et de la Jordanie.
      Du coup, après cette percée en territoire rebello-al-Qaïdesque au sud (prise de Tasil et Adwan), Da’ich s’approche de la ville de Sheikh Maskin, sous contrôle du régime et menace le nord de Deraa :


      et

    • La chose « amusante » est que ce groupe, désormais filiale de Da’ich, a fait autrefois partie de la coalition du « Front du Sud » et a donc reçu directement l’aide des Occidentaux et des pétromonarchies via la Jordanie.
      Il avait aussi très probablement obtenu l’aide des Israéliens à travers la ligne du Golan - sachant par ailleurs que c’est ce même groupe qui avait procédé au kidnapping de casques bleus philippins en 2013 sur le Golan... :
      http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/liwa-shuhada-al-yarmouk-history-and-analysis

      At the time, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk seemed keen to assure outsiders of its supposedly good intentions, even telling the Times of Israel that the group’s quarrel was only with Assad regime and praising Israeli medical treatment for refugees. [...]
      In July, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk announced participation in the “Umm al-Ma’arak” (“Mother of Battles”) to capture Nawa from regime forces, though that operation was ultimately unsuccessful. At this point, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk’s nationalist rebel affiliations were still apparent, and in October the group joined a coalition of 50 southern formations embodied in the “Revolution Leadership Council- Southern Region. ” In a show of military strength, a video emerged in November 2013 of a large military parade held by Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk. At the time, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk’s leader Ali al-Baridi (nickname: al-Khal) claimed that the group’s control of territory extended from the area of Tel Shehab (near the border with Jordan) to the occupied Golan.
      Moving into 2014, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk continued to participate in rebel operations, being one of the declared participants alongside Jabhat al-Nusra and other brigades in the “Hold fast to God’s rope entirely and don’t separate” battle announced in late February to capture strategic positions between Deraa and Quneitra. In that same month, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk was also one of the declared components of the ‘Southern Front’ initiative backed by the West and Gulf states. At the end of April, the brigade along with some other groups announced a new offensive to take Tel al-Jumu’ and other areas to the south of Nawa, though that came to nothing as an identical initiative with more participants including Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk was announced in June.

      Even at this point, Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk’s public affiliations were ostensibly clear in its appearance as a signatory to a statement signed by 54 southern groups affirming respect for human rights and democracy: as per the third clause, “We fight so that Syrian men and women may choose a free and democratic system that establishes a prosperous state respecting the aspirations of Syrians in the freedom and dignity for which they have fought.”

  • Syria Comment » Archives Harakat al-Hawiya al-Arabiya al-Druziya: Defending Druze Identity in Suwayda’ - Syria Comment
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/harakat-al-hawiya-al-arabiya-al-druziya-defending-druze-identity-in-su

    By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

    Although the Druze originate from a sect within Shi’i Islam, the religious movement evolved over time such that the Druze identity is deemed separate from that of the Shi’a. The same has been true of the Alawites, though as is well known, a number of efforts have been made in the recent past to bring the Alawites into the fold of mainstream Shi’i Islam, such as Musa Sadr’s fatwa in 1974 that recognized the Alawites as Shi’a- a trend of identification strengthened by the post-1979 alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad dynasty. More recently, extensive Iranian and pro-Iranian Shi’a militia involvement on the ground in the Syrian civil war has given rise to claims of further Shi’ification trends targeting the Alawite community in particular, such as the opening of husseiniyas (Shi’i centres) in the Damascus and Latakia areas.

    Less well known is that allegations of Shi’ification efforts also exist with respect to the Druze community in Syria. It seems that primarily in response to these developments has come the emergence of the Harakat al-Hawiya al-Arabiya al-Druziya (“The Arab Druze Identity Movement”), also known as the Harakat al-Difa’ ‘an al-Hawiya al-Druziya (“The Movement to Defend Druze Identity”), which first appears to have come on the scene in late 2015 (c. October 2015). Ethnically speaking, the ‘Arab’ aspect has long been a strong component of Druze identity.

    Unsurprisingly, given the context in which this movement has emerged, it is highly critical of the regime and those associated with it. However, it is also consistent in its opposition to attempts to alter Druze identity (real and perceived), and so has also drawn attention (approvingly quoting independent Druze opposition activist-in-exile Maher Sharf al-Din) to the treatment of the Druze in Jabal al-Summaq in Idlib at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra, which has not only implemented forced conversions to Sunni Islam but has also confiscated property of those from the area who fled to/live in regime-held areas and are thought to work with the regime, while altering the demographics with an influx of Turkmen people. This contrasts with the reluctance of anti-regime Druze in Lebanon associated with Walid Jumblatt to admit these realities, playing up instead the false idea that some kind of agreement to protect the Druze was reached with Jabhat al-Nusra (a falsehood recently repeated by Fabrice Balanche).

    Syria Comment
    AUTHOR

    Joshua Landis
    Director: Center
    for Middle East Studies
    and Associate Professor,
    University of Oklahoma
    405-819-7955
    Email: Landis@ou.edu Follow @joshua_landis

    Co-Editor: Matthew Barber - University of Chicago
    Email: SCmoderation@mail.com
    Follow @Matthew__Barber

    • En fait, comme à chaque fois, je me demande s’il l’a dit avant. En cherchant « magnet » (qui est le terme consacré) sur son blog Syria Comment, la seule occurence pertinente que j’ai trouvée, c’est l’interview de novembre 2015 :
      http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/regime-change-without-state-collapse-is-impossible-in-syria-landis-int

      JL: This is true, but many top US generals, like the Syrian opposition, continue to insist that Assad is the magnet drawing ISIS into Syria and thus must be destroyed first. This argument makes little sense. After all, when did Al-Qaeda pour into Iraq? Only after Saddam was deposed and the Americans ruled the country. I don’t think any of the US generals who now claim that Assad must be destroyed in order to defeat ISIS would also argue that America had to be destroyed in Iraq in order to rid it of al-Qaida.

      À moins qu’il ait dénoncé cette théorie en d’autres termes ailleurs (je n’en ai pas souvenir), je ne comprends pas pourquoi il a fallu attendre fin 2015 pour énoncer que la « théorie de l’aimant » est « idiote », alors que c’est l’un des axes principaux de la narrative occidentale.

  • Syria Comment - Syrian politics, history, and religion
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog

    C’est juste le résumé de ses 10 points, très bien développés. En plus, Joshua Landis devait être en forme, il y a un certain nombre de formules assez drôles, sur un sujet uqi ne l’est pas vraiment, on est d’accord...

    10. The Death of Zahran Alloush.
    9. The Failure of the Southern Storm Offensive.
    8. Operation Decisive Quagmire.
    7. Europe’s Syria Fatigue vs. Assad’s Viability
    6. The Vienna Meeting, the ISSG, and Geneva III.
    5. The Donald.
    4. The Iran Deal.
    3. The Continuing Structural Decay of the Syrian Government. 

    2. The American-Kurdish Alliance.
    1. The Russian Intervention.❞

    #syrie

  • Ken Roth dans ses œuvres… Après avoir expliqué qu’Assad avait tué Zahran Alloush dans le but de réduire l’opposition à lui-même ou ISIS :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/443513#message443575

    Killing Zahran Alloush is part of Assad strategy of trying to reduce choice to him or ISIS.

    voilà qu’il répète la théorie selon laquelle Assad avait fait libérer Alloush pour « tenter de nuire à l’image de la révolution » :
    https://twitter.com/KenRoth/status/682115210845487104

    Assad released jihadist Zahran Alloush from jail June 2011—part of effort to taint uprising http://bit.ly/1mh542I

    Vraiment, ces gens n’essaient même plus d’être cohérents.

    Un autre aspect du message de Roth, c’est qu’il fait reposer sa théorie –
    « part of effort to taint uprising » – sur un lien vers un article d’Aron Lund publié chez Joshua Landis :
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/death-of-zahran-alloush-by-aron-lund

    Or l’article de Lund n’énonce pas cette théorie, mais un paragraphe qui ne se risque pas du tout à un tel jugement de valeur :

    Alloush was arrested several times before the uprising for his religious and political activism and sent to the ”Islamist wing” of the Seidnaia prison north of Damascus. There, he formed close connections to many other Syrian Islamists, including people who now run large rebel factions like Ahrar al-Sham. He was released from jail in June 2011 and quickly joined the armed uprising, eventually emerging as the strongman of his home region in the Eastern Ghouta and one of the most powerful rebel leaders in all of Syria.

    La manipulation de Roth est d’autant plus remarquable que, par ailleurs, Aron Lund et Joshua Landis ne sont pas adeptes de cette #théorie_du_complot, et qu’ils l’ont déjà expliqué en août 2014 (contredisant les affirmations péremptoires du fan boy de la rébellitude Thomas Pierret) :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/283373

    Aron Lund : On ne devrait probablement pas présumer de trop de plannification stratégique ni de contrôle, cependant. Certains islamistes ont peut-être été libérés dans le cadre d’une mesure d’administie plus large, d’autres spécifiquement pour semer la merde et radicaliser les rebelles, et il y a certainement aussi des éléments infiltrés. Mais il ne m’apparaît pas évident qu’il s’agit de quelque chose de plus planifié que cela.

    […]

    Joshua Landis. Prévisible, mais tous étaient des prisonniers politiques. Les militants des droits de l’Homme demandaient leur libération. Même moi j’étais en faveur de cette libération.

  • Le chef des rebelles syriens Zahran Aloush aurait été tué dans des frappes aériennes en Syrie —
    25 déc. 2015
    https://francais.rt.com/international/12725-chef-rebelles-syriens-zahran-aloush-tue

    Zahran Alloush, chef du groupe djihadiste Jaish al-Islam, opérant dans la banlieue de Damas, aurait été tué dans un raid aérien, selon des sources locales a déclaré à Reuters vendredi.

    Le raid aérien a visé le siège de Jaish al-Islam (’Brigade de l’islam’), une coalition formée de différents groupes extrémistes de lutte contre les forces du gouvernement syrien .

    Deux sources rebelles ont confirmé à Reuters que le raid aérien avait tué Alloush. Bien que selon leurs allégations, l’attaque aurait été menée par « des avions russes », l’information n’a pas été confirmée.

    Jaish al-Islam est une coalition d’unités islamistes et salafistes dont le siège principalement se situe dans les quartiers de Damas de Ghouta.

    Bien qu’il ne fasse pas partie de l’Armée syrienne libre, un grand groupe de coordination d’unités de lutte contre les forces fidèles au président Bachar el-Assad, la coalition a pris part à la conférence organisée par l’Arabie saoudite au début du mois de décembre pour essayer de convenir d’une position commune pour négocier avec le gouvernement syrien actuel.

    Certains critiques ont accusé Jaish al-Islam d’utiliser les mêmes méthodes que les combattants de l’Etat islamique, y compris des exécutions publiques de prisonniers.

    Zahran Alloush avait quant à lui appelé sur Youtube à l’extermination des chiites et des alaouites, le groupe religieux dont fait partie le président Assad.

    ““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
    Zahran Alloush : His Ideology and Beliefs
    Posted by Joshua on Sunday, December 15th, 2013
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/zahran-alloush

    #Zahran_Alloush #Syrie

    • Syrie : le régime élimine Zahrane Allouche, chef islamiste rebelle
      Par RFI Publié le 26-12-2015 | Paul Khalifeh
      http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20151226-syrie-armee-regime-elimine-allouche-chef-islamiste-rebelle

      En plus de Zahrane Allouche, âgé de 44 ans, Abdel Nasser Chmeir, un capitaine dissident de l’armée, chef de Faylaq al-Rahman, et une quinzaine d’autres commandants ont trouvé la mort.

      L’Armée de l’islam a annoncé, vendredi soir, la nomination d’Abou Hammam Bouyadani pour succéder à son fondateur. Mais les analystes prévoient l’éclatement de ce groupe composé à l’origine d’une soixantaine de brigades islamistes, et dont la cohésion tenait beaucoup à la personnalité fédératrice de Zahrane Allouche.

  • Josh Landis should be credited for putting his... -
    by Reinoud Leenders
    https://www.facebook.com/reinoud.leenders/posts/924899757598688
    en réponse à http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/regime-change-without-state-collapse-is-impossible-in-syria-landis-int (voir http://seenthis.net/messages/426341#message427231)

    Josh Landis should be credited for putting his finger on a host of important issues and dilemmas. But he’s wrong on several counts:

    “The West falsely believes that it can separate the regime from the state. It argues that it can pursue regime-change while simultaneously preserving the state and its institutions. Washington believes it can avoid the chaos it sewed in Iraq. I don’t believe it can.”

    But surely equating the Syrian state to a narrow and ruthless regime hasn’t generated ’statehood’ either by even a minimalistic definition of that term: It has failed to enforce a monopoly on violence (and that’s putting it politely), it outsourced violence to an array of shady and unaccountable militias and foreign mercenaries, it doesn’t control (any of?) its borders, its fails to provide security to even its staunchest supporters, and it helped to chase out one-fifth of the country’s 2011 population (and still counting). And that’s leaving aside the responsibilities that supposedly come with state sovereignty; none of which are upheld by this regime ostensibly embracing the Syrian state.

    “Westerners believe that because their own state institutions are run by professional civil servants, Middle Eastern states are too. But they aren’t. Political appointees make up the entire edifice.”

    That’s an incredibly dangerous (Chalabi-ist?) thing to say as it could be read as giving a green light for anyone opposing the Syrian regime to eradicate any single public servant along the “entire edifice” when given the chance. But more importantly, it is inaccurate as many rebel forces and opposition activists who worked with dedicated public servants to get garbage collected, to operate bakeries and facilitate food distribution in opposition-controlled areas will be able to confirm. Also, if all civil servants are supposedly part and parcel of the regime, why then did the regime itself try so hard to marginalise them, selling out state assets to well-placed crony businessmen, and starve them from resources to effectuate their perceived significance to the regime? Most state employees are there for their salary only; they don’t inherently owe allegiance to the regime but for the fact that the latter keeps paying their wages.

    “... many top US generals, like the Syrian opposition, continue to insist that Assad is the magnet drawing ISIS into Syria and thus must be destroyed first. This argument makes little sense. After all, when did Al-Qaeda pour into Iraq? Only after Saddam was deposed and the Americans ruled the country.”

    The analogy doesn’t fly. Al-Qaeda in Iraq fought US forces; ISIS hardly fights Syrian regime forces. The Syrian regime (and now with the Russians) make an effort to keep ISIS in place while fighting all the other insurgents. Furthermore, the Syrian regime from the start of the uprising has been begging the opposition to turn to ’takfiri’ extremism for it to remain the only game in town; whatever one may think of the Americans in Iraq but at least they weren’t hoping for a fully armed ’takfiri’ adversary. When a regime needs ISIS to retain a modicum of acceptability or to present itself as a less disastrous alternative, it follows that it sustains ISIS and it shows how far it has itself moved up to the wrong end of that scale of disastrousness.

    “Those that argue that the US squandered its opportunity to train, arm and finance moderates to destroy both Assad and Jihadist militias delude themselves.”

    Up to the Summer of 2012 there was a window of opportunity for arming and supporting ’moderates’ and, arguably, after having squandered that opportunity the Jihadist militias had free reign.

    “The price of regime-change is chaos.”

    That’s a prediction; fair enough. But we know for a fact today that the price of regime maintenance is ... chaos. Arguably, without it the regime wouldn’t have survived up to this day.

    • Joshua Landis aux USA, Fabrice Blanche en France, et bien d’autres beaucoup moins pertinents à mes yeux... Une constante : le conflit syrien a définitivement enterré le mythe du « social scientist » remplacé par une sorte d’expert, conseiller, où le militant, quelle que soit la cause, remplace l’homme de science. Dans le contexte très particulier des études sur le monde arabe, c’est un étonnant retour de la figure de l’orientaliste, au sens donné par Edward Saïd à ce terme. Mais personne ne souhaite trop s’étendre sur cet aspect de la question.

    • Le transcript de l’interview sur le site de Landis :
      http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/regime-change-without-state-collapse-is-impossible-in-syria-landis-int
      Extraits :

      SS: Assad has agreed to take part in early elections – can Syria in its current state hold the vote? Can there be a vote before Islamic State is beaten?

      JL: First, Syria is in such terrible physical state and so many people have been forced from their homes or left the country that it would be almost impossible to have fair elections. Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, it is hard for anyone to believe that the outcome would be different from the elections held in the past 45 years? All ended up with a 99% vote for the President. There’s such distrust between all sides. Nobody puts much faith in the idea of elections. Most people understand that lurking beneath the question of elections is another question: “Can the Assad regime stay or not?” Now that Russia has intervened on the side of Assad, it’s quite clear the Assad regime is staying and will stay. How the West is going to accommodate itself to this fact is not yet clear.

      SS: The Western-backed FSA commander Ahmad Sa’oud told AP: “What we care about is Assad leaving, not turning this from a war against the regime to a war against terrorism”. So, they don’t really care about the fight against Islamic State as well…

      JL: You’re right. Most actors in Syria have other priorities besides destroying the Islamic State. Almost all rebel groups insist on destroying Assad before the Islamic State. They refuse to be drawn into what they call a “sahwa.” They do not want to become “agents of America” and so forth. The vast majority want nothing to do with the fight against ISIS before they have defeated Assad. Many members of the Coalition that are fighting ISIS also have other priorities. That is a big problem for both for the Russians and for the U.S. Indeed, the US has other priorities as well. We saw in Palmyra, Deir ez-Zor and elsewhere, the US would not attack ISIS if it believed Assad and his military would benefit. It preferred to have ISIS take Palmyra than to be seen to be helping Assad.

      [...]

      SS: Does the U.S. have enough influence over the opposition they’re backing to make them agree to a political process in Syria?

      JL: No. That’s the short answer.

      SS: So people who represent the opposition in peace talks, are they controlling forces on the ground?

      JL: No, they’re not. The strongest militias in Syria are the more extreme and more Salafist militias. The Islamists have a real ideology to sell; they are the militias who have national reach and representation in all provinces of Syria. The US backs the weakest militias in Syria. They are the non-ideological militias and are extremely local. For the most part, they are composed of clan and tribal leaders. They may hold sway over a village or two; they may command a thousand men, perhaps two thousand, but not more than that. The Islamic militants, such as Al-Qaeda, Ahrar ash-Sham, ISIS and the Islamic Army, have purchase over a broad segment of Syrian society that stretches from north to south. The US refuses to deal with Islamist militias. It insists on dealing only with the weaker ones, which operate with some independence, but in many cases have to defer to the tougher and stronger Islamist militias that hold sway in most parts of Syria.

  • Viols en temps de guerre, le silence et l’impunité - par Agnès Stienne
    http://visionscarto.net/viols-en-temps-de-guerre

    Fin juillet 2015, Zainab Bangura, représentante spéciale des Nations unies dans la lutte contre la #violence_sexuelle en période de conflit s’indignait, lors d’une rencontre internationale à Québec, de la persécution systématique des femmes par le groupe armé État islamique (EI) sur tous les territoires que celui-ci assiège. Les conflits ont pour causes les ressources naturelles, le pouvoir, politique ou religieux, mais c’est sur les femmes et les filles, utilisées comme armes de guerre, que les combats se déchaînent. Cette synthèse historique et géographique dresse un état des lieux des #crimes_de_guerre contre les #femmes et l’efficacité des instruments juridiques censés les protéger.
    par @odilon

    #cartographie #viols #culture_du_viol #droit_des_femmes #guerre #conventions_internationales #conflits_armés

  • OK : Landis a fait du sarcasme hier, mais le message initial m’a tellement choqué que je ne m’en suis pas rendu compte et je l’ai pris au premier degré. J’ai donc viré mon message (merci @fil).

  • Syria Comment » Archives "The inside Story of the British Suicide Bomber of Ramadi," By Tam Hussein - Syria Comment
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-inside-story-of-the-british-suicide-bomber-of-ramadi-by-tam-hussei

    http://i0.wp.com/www.joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/Screen-Shot-2015-07-21-at-9.21.43-AM.png?resize=450%2C192

    #EI #mercenariat #syrie

    Ce que la recherche française (à ma connaissance) n’a pas fait (officiellement) en France : itinéraire détaillé d’un desesperado jihadiste.

  • Syria Comment - Syrian politics, history, and religion
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog

    It should be noted in particular that the potential salary on offer here amounts to more than $200 a month, which is not only much higher than the salaries of regular army conscripts but also of many rebel fighters. For comparison, it is some 2-3 times higher than the salary of an average Northern Storm fighter from the Azaz area. Wishing to extend its recruitment further, the Coastal Shield Brigade put up another notice in June, pushing forward the cut-off date for draft-dodgers to widen the recruitment pool and emphasizing local service

    La fourchette des prix se resserre pour les mercenaires syriens entre l’offre officielle du régime et celle des « rebelles ». Une des conséquences aussi du deal irano-étasunien, avec plus de liquidités pour la Syrie ?

    #EI #mercenariat #syrie

    • C’est aussi le moment choisit par l’impayable Marwan Hamadé pour appeler les druzes syriens à « rejeter la pensée minoritaire » (ohhh) :
      http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/929164/lappel-de-hamade-aux-druzes-de-syrie-il-est-temps-de-marcher-sur-dama

      Le député Marwan Hamadé a emboîté le pas hier au chef du Parti socialiste progressiste (PSP), Walid Joumblatt, appelant les druzes de Syrie à « en finir définitivement avec la duperie, la tentation, l’oppression et la criminalité assadistes, et à prendre seulement le parti des traditions qui ont fait d’eux, tout au long de l’histoire, les épées des Arabes et de l’islam, (...) et les héros de la grande révolution arabe ».

      […]

      Le député du Rassemblement démocratique a appelé ses coreligionnaires à « réagir immédiatement » aux appels lancés par le leader Walid Joumblatt, c’est-à-dire « à se réconcilier avec leur environnement naturel et historique fraternel, à rejeter la pensée minoritaire et à rester attachés à une arabité hostile aux projets de partition et de morcellement, tout comme leurs ancêtres, ces héros de l’unité de la Syrie, ce cœur vibrant de l’arabité, avaient dit non au mandat français ».

      Est-ce que quelqu’un sait (je veux dire : un peu sérieusement) si Marwan Hamadé a réellement la moindre influence sur les druzes de Syrie. Il me semblait que Walid Joumblatt, déjà pas tellement, alors Marwan…

    • La version du Akhbar est sensiblement différente de celle de l’OSDH : ils annoncent une quarantaine de tués, et la raison serait que les villageois se seraient opposés à la « conscription » forcée des enfants par Nousra :
      http://al-akhbar.com/node/235313

      لم تنفع تطمينات النائب وليد جنبلاط وزيارات مبعوثيه إلى الأردن وتركيا في حماية دروز جبل السّماق في إدلب (شمال سوريا) من الذبح والقتل. يوم أمس، حصل ما كان بالحسبان: ذبح إرهابيو «تنظيم القاعدة في بلاد الشام ـــ جبهة النصرة» عدداً كبيراً من رجال بلدة قلب لوزة في جبل السّماق أمام بيوتهم وفي شوارع البلدة. وفيما تتضارب الأرقام حول أعداد شهداء المجزرة وأسباب الذبح بسبب الحصار الذي يفرضه الإرهابيون على البلدة، أكّدت مصادر في جبل السمّاق لـ«الأخبار» أنّ «العدد التقريبي يتجاوز 40 رجلاً، بينهم مشايخ وشبّان صغار».

      وقالت المصادر إنّ أحد أسباب المجزرة هو رفض رجال البلدة تسليم أولادهم الذين تراوح أعمارهم بين 10 و14 عاماً لإرهابيي «النصرة»، بعد أن أصدر «أمير» التنظيم الإرهابي في جبل السّماق المدعو «أبو عبد الرحمن التونسي» قراراً قبل نحو أسبوع بسحب الأولاد إلى معسكرات تدريب مغلقة لمدّة شهرين، وأُبلغ القرار للأهالي بالتزامن مع حملة مصادرة الأسلحة الفردية من القرى. وقالت المصادر إن إرهابيي «النصرة» من «المهاجرين» (الأجانب والعرب) «باتوا يطلبون الزواج بفتيات القرى، حتى نثبت لهم اعتناقنا إسلامهم، وهذا ما نرفضه». وقالت مصادر أخرى إن السبب المباشر هو «صدور قرار من التونسي بمصادرة منازل أهالي شهداء الجيش السوري ورمي عائلاتهم خارجاً، ما دفع الأهالي إلى التمرّد».

    • Même Geagea est au courant :
      http://nna-leb.gov.lb/fr/show-news/45402

      Le chef du Parti des Forces libanaises, Samir Geagea a condamné, ce jeudi lors d’une conférence de presse, « la tuerie de Qalb Lozé, dans la province d’Idleb, commise contre les Druzes ».

      Avec une tournure ultra-alambiquée pour quand même dire du mal de Bachar :

      « Nous sommes contre le régime de Bachar Assad parce qu’il commet de tels actes et contre également tous ceux qui se comportent de la sorte », a-t-il affirmé.

    • Et ici le Premier ministre libanais:
      http://nna-leb.gov.lb/fr/show-news/45401

      Le Premier ministre, Tammam Salam, a dénoncé jeudi le massacre commis contre les druzes syriens à Qalb Loze, à Idleb.

      Dans un communiqué, le chef du gouvernement a dénoncé un « crime barbare qui a coûté la vie à une dizaine de druzes à Qalb Loze, dans le rif d’Idleb ».

      Il l’a qualifié d’"agression flagrante contre une composante principales du peuple syrien frère" orchestrée par « les forces de l’obscurité qui violent toutes les valeurs ».

    • À la une,

      Al-Nosra veut sanctionner les coupables de l’assassinat de druzes à Idlib
      http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/929572/al-nosra-veut-sanctionner-les-coupables-de-lassassinat-de-druzes-a-id

      « M. Joumblatt a surpassé l’épreuve douloureuse de la tuerie de Qalb Lozé », a déclaré M. #Siniora à l’issue de l’entretien. Par ailleurs, il a appelé à « éviter la discorde et s’abstenir d’exacerber les tensions ».

    • Syria Comment » Archives The Massacre of Druze Villagers in Qalb Lawza, Idlib Province - Syria Comment
      http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-massacre-of-druze-villagers-in-qalb-lawza-idlib-province

      Before giving the more immediate context of these killings, it should be noted that Qalb Lawza is one of the Druze villages in Idlib whose inhabitants were compelled at the beginning of this year to renounce the Druze faith and accept Sunni Islam at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra, including destruction of Druze shrines and other Jabhat al-Nusra regulations such as gender segregation. These impositions have not been cancelled and remain in force to this day , which became clear not only in an interview carried out by Syria Direct in March 2015, but also most recently from the testimony of a resident of another of the villages- Kaftin- who agreed to speak to this author in the aftermath of the massacre on condition of anonymity. This is so despite supposed mediation efforts by Lebanese Druze leader Walid #Jumblatt, who has tried to convince the Syrian Druze that their best interests will be guaranteed by throwing their weight behind the rebellion, even as Jabhat al-Nusra is heavily intertwined with that rebellion .

  • Important : “Is #Zahran_Alloush in Amman ?” by Aron Lund

    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/is-zahran-alloush-in-amman-by-aron-lund

    MUJTAHIDD’S TWEETS ON ZAHRAN ALLOUSH’S VISIT TO AMMAN, JUNE 6:

    Zahran Alloush spent last week meeting with Saudi, American, and Jordanian intelligence in Amman hotels, in order to coordinate the situation against the Islamic State and the Nusra Front, and for other tasks.

    The meeting with the Americans took place a week ago. He met with the Saudis two times: last Friday between 14.30 until 16.00 and on Sunday at 20.00 in the Hayat hotel in Amman.

    [...]

    The goal was to coordinate the war against the Islamic State and the Nusra Front. Alloush said that the war against the Nusra Front will be more difficult to justify than the war on the Islamic State, and that they will have to help him with that.

    Alloush was asked to coordinate with the Southern Front, which consists of the remains of what’s left of #Jamal_Maarouf ’s troops and the rest of the mercenaries. A meeting was set up between Alloush and Abu Osama al-Golani, who is one of the leaders of this front.

    Alloush started coordinating with the Southern Front to fight the Islamic State and the Nusra Front in Deraa and Quneitra. With the Saudis, he discussed replacing the Islam Army flag by the revolutionary flag.

    The meetings were arranged by members of the Jordanian intelligence services. No fewer than ten were seen there and several of them attended the meetings.

    Despite insisting on the destruction of the the Islamic State and the Nusra Front in all of Syria, the main focus was on keeping the Damascus front in his hands so that he will be able to reap the fruits even if the regime is toppled by someone else.

    An interesting point is that the person known as Abu Badr asked in detail about the Muslim Brotherhood’s strength on the various fronts. It was not clear if the question was in order to push them out or to make use of them.

    An observation: the meetings took place in the Hayat hotel, but Alloush is living at the Crowne Plaza. Of course, they’re all in Amman. We ask God to expose all the hypocrites.