Why Is Bahrain Outsourcing Extremism ?
▻http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/29/why_is_bahrain_outsourcing_extremism_isis_democracy
The video is graphic evidence that Bahrain has a burgeoning problem with Salafi radicalization.
Support for extremist groups has flourished even as the state has been cracking down on the non-violent, pro-democracy opposition.
Support for extremist groups has flourished even as the state has been cracking down on the non-violent, pro-democracy opposition. The regime’s response to the film, which has been viewed around 100,000 times seems it was uploaded in September, has been muted, though officials admit that at least 100 Bahrainis have joined IS and several have been killed. That number is small but significant. Not only is there a direct link between IS and Bahrain’s security services (as the video suggests), but the Bahraini cohort in the Islamic State includes Turki al-Binali, one of the movement’s most influential radical preachers.
Bahrain’s public stance on the war against IS contrasts sharply with its lack of action at home. The kingdom has attempted to present itself as the leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) anti-IS efforts. At the start of the air campaign launched against IS by the United States and a select group of allies in September, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, made prominent appearances in the Western media, including the BBC and CNN, to announce Bahrain’s membership in the U.S. military coalition. Khalifa even spoke of the need to rid the region of the “deviated cult.”
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So far there doesn’t appear to have been any documented trial of any person on charges of IS-related terrorist activity despite government vows to pursue and monitor their activities. The government offered a two-week amnesty for former jihadists in March of this year. (A Bahraini IS fighter responded by ripping up his Bahraini passport on YouTube.) Commenters on Bahraini websites supporting IS brag about the freedom they enjoy in the kingdom, compared with other Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates.
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Bahrain’s rulers may regard the country’s role in the coalition as necessary for their own self-preservation. If they lose their Western allies, and if their already small base of Sunni loyalists defects to the extremists, the already bare threads of sovereign legitimacy may not be strong enough to keep the dynasty in power. The regime hopes is that it can reduce the external pressure for democratic change by strengthening its alliance with the West. But its allies, above all the United States and the United Kingdom, must not let the regime’s participation in the military offensive serve as a quid pro quo for avoiding genuine democratization.