• Do realists and leftists want the same thing?
    https://inkstickmedia.com/do-realists-and-leftists-want-the-same-thing

    It’s not the first time the left and realists have agreed on something. Both vehemently reject neoconservatism and military interventionism. Both vocally protested the US invasion of Iraq. Both see the US’ alliance with Israel as a militaristic distortion of the its role in the Middle East. And both opposed the successive rounds of NATO enlargement after the Cold War.

    [...] Yet, the ideological tensions run deeper still. Realists believe security is divisible — that my security might need to come at the expense of yours and that’s just fine with me because, shrug emoji, that’s how the world works. Most leftists view security as something that’s either indivisible or that needs to sort classes in a manner that pits workers against the wealthy. Anti-war leftists, for example, have rejected balance-of-power politics since World War I — the conceptual stock-and-trade of realist politics —and many still reject it today. The left is also divided on the merits of engaging in sphere-of-influence diplomacy; a practice that realists find natural.

    Realists center the state — not its classes or its people — in their analysis, and I’ve never heard a realist embrace the slogan, “No war but class war.” Similarly, what leftist would, in formulating their policy positions, systematically forsake the well-being of workers in other countries in favor of winning security in a violent, highly abstracted “great game” where progress rarely means more than improving one’s relative power position?

    #Van_Jackson

  • Budgeting Justice. Cities must empower historically marginalized communities to shape how public funds are spent

    During the summer of 2020, protestors demanded that George Floyd’s, Breonna Taylor’s, and too many others’ murderers be charged and convicted. They also demanded that cities nationwide defund the police. The Black Lives Matter uprisings provoked intense conversations regarding systemic racism in U.S. policing and foregrounded the need for institutional reforms.

    In the year since, responses have been woefully inadequate. Though Derek Chauvin was found guilty of killing Floyd, the prosecution’s case hardly mentioned race. Beyond his conviction, cities around the country issued apology statements for institutionalized racism—acknowledging the role of urban planners in redlining and the disinvestment of Black communities—and formed commissions for racial justice. But the results have been disappointing. The Philadelphia commission on Pathways to Reform, Transformation, and Reconciliation, for instance, only launched economic programs aimed at Black small business owners, not wage workers, freelancers, and the unemployed.

    These top-down moves give companies and governments a semblance of righteous action, even as they leave intact the histories and structures that enable police violence. They fail to redistribute funds away from police departments and toward new visions of community safety, freedom, and spaces where all individuals can thrive.

    To address police brutality, cities need budget justice: public budgets that give historically marginalized communities resources to address their needs. Budget justice requires a new sort of democracy that emphasizes three points of practice: first, budgets are moral documents that make explicit what communities choose to divest from and invest in; two, direct democracy must engage everyday constituents, rather than elected representatives, in a range of decision-making conversations and actions about collective needs; three, micropolitics must reshape the rules and expectations regarding whose knowledge, expertise, and lived experience shapes state policy and collective action.

    Policymakers usually make budget decisions behind closed doors. When elected officials do make public budgets transparent, they often present them as neutral documents and claim that “numbers don’t lie.” Budget numbers do, however, often obfuscate our everyday circumstances and needs. For example, without a sense of historical data or where exactly money is going, it would be difficult to discern whether additional funds for a particular school benefit all of the students, barely make up for the prior year’s budget cuts, or add amenities for a small selection of honors students. While public budgets are often portrayed as technical and impersonal, they are moral documents that reflect specific public values and theories of government.

    Taking cues from the platform articulated by the Movement 4 Black Lives, focusing on the budget part of budget justice prompts communities to articulate divest-invest strategies that redirect money away from expenditures the community doesn’t value and toward those it does. For instance, in the summer of 2020, protestors camped out in front of City Hall for more than a month, asking the New York Mayor and the City Council to cut the police budget by $1 billion and instead invest in community care: healthcare and social services, child and elderly care, and well-maintained streets, gardens, parks, and public spaces. Although the police eventually cleared the encampment, the monthlong Occupy City Hall protests significantly shaped the 2021 fiscal year budget, with more than $865 million in cuts to the police department’s operating expenses compared to the 2020 budget. (DeBlasio explicitly acknowledged the protests’ impact by including lower fringe benefits in his calculations, so that he could claim $1 billion in cuts.) The defund the police aspect of budget justice has received attention and deservingly so, but we also need new tools to meaningfully redistribute and invest money. In my work with activists, I have heard laments on how communities must articulate a vision of the different worlds we should work toward. Demands would then concern not just community safety and violence prevention, but all policy domains shaped by racial and class inequalities.

    We cannot expect such ideas to come from policymakers and those in power. Those most impacted by over-policing, carceral capitalism, unaffordable housing, and underfunded schools must make budget decisions. Likewise, many of the participants in the current uprisings against police brutality argue that voting is not enough; they claim that demographic or descriptive representation and placing “Black faces in high places,” as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor writes, have not addressed racial inequalities nor stopped the killing of Black Americans. Empowerment entails more than fighting voter suppression and fixing the electoral college. The road to budget justice emphasizes new modes of democracy—such as citizens’ assemblies and mini publics—that give participants opportunities for deliberation, not just picking from ready-made menus of policies or ballots.

    Our greatest challenge is breaking out of the confines of our popular imagination in radical ways and creating new social, economic, and political relations. As public policy is currently governed by racial hierarchies and neoliberal logics of competition, deservingness, respectability politics, and individual responsibility, struggling communities are too busy competing against one another to build a better world. Logics of competition undergird means-tested services for unhoused people, for instance, and expanding opportunities for bootstrapped hard work (through “uplift” and entrepreneurial mindsets, education, cultural competence, or plain hustle and “grit”). These are all formulated inside the box of austerity and mainstream liberal inclusion.

    We need new models altogether for grants and urban planning. We must demand substantively different models for affordable housing, schools, and public space. This asks cities to not just improve the numbers (of Black enterprises) in the current system, but to change the relationships between real estate developers, residents, and urban planners. In other words, this requires each of us to engage our communities’ experiences with racial capitalism and then change the criteria that determines the beneficiaries of current public policies and budgets.

    Changing these relationships begins with micropolitics, or what others have called prefigurative politics, which occurs outside official voting and formal advocacy. It involves mutual aid collectives, neighbors helping neighbors without asking for their résumés or histories of suffering, and constituents allocating funds to policies and projects that address community needs. It involves paying attention to community members’ local knowledges and lived experiences. The work of micropolitics reshapes participants’ class and racial subjectivities—the stories we tell ourselves about the positions we hold in social hierarchies and the roles we play vis-à-vis the government and one another. Realizing budget justice requires that community members themselves articulate the criteria we wish to live by, forwarding new logics of collective care and community control.

    The contemporary goal of budget justice attempts to pay tribute to the idea of abolition democracy W. E. B. Du Bois examined in Black Reconstruction in America (1935) almost ninety years ago. In recent decades, Black feminist, intersectional, queer, indigenous, critical race, and anticolonial scholarship have pinpointed just how systemic hierarchies persist in the afterlives of slavery and empire. As Harsha Walia writes, abolition democracy also demands the “imagining and generating of alternative institutions . . . prefiguring societies based on equity, mutual aid, and self-determination.” This project of world-building must be rooted in on-the-ground community organizing and participatory democratic experiments.

    Attempts to realize budget justice already exist. A number of cities, such as Los Angeles, Nashville, and Seattle, have articulated new funding priorities in lieu of policing. This has occurred against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, as the U.S. government has failed to coordinate adequate testing, protective equipment, and epidemiologically sound guidance, as well as offer support during remote schooling, job loss, and massive loss of life.

    Integral to such efforts is participatory budgeting (PB), a process by which residents, rather than elected officials, allocate public funds. Since it first began in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, PB has spread to over 3,000 cities worldwide. In past cases of PB, diversity in participation by gender, income, and racial background contributed to the legitimacy, continuity, and redistributive potential of the processes. In the United States, PB has spread from a single local process in 2010 to over 500 currently active district, city, or institutional processes. PB attempts to give stakeholders an opportunity to draw upon their knowledge of local needs, articulate proposals, interact with neighbors, deliberate over priorities, and select—not just consult on—which proposals receive funding. In so doing, it lays out budget questions in tractable ways and helps individuals understand how city bureaucracies work. But some researchers have argued that PB has morphed from an empowering and democratizing process into a politically malleable, innocuous set of procedures that reflect subtle domination by elites or legitimize pro forma decisions by policymakers. Indeed, PB can be misused to reinforce existing racial hierarchies.

    New York City has the country’s largest PB process by far; since 2012, New Yorkers have decided how to spend more than $250 million on almost 1,000 projects through PBNYC. I draw on a decade of fieldwork on PBNYC to ground my ideals of budget justice, the limits and uses of the groundwork laid thus far, and how communities might build upon PB processes for budget justice.

    I conducted fieldwork in East Harlem, where residents gathered at PB assemblies and met in school cafeterias and auditoriums to discuss what they wanted to spend public funds on. A middle-aged white man from the Upper West Side had walked across town to come to a neighborhood assembly and pitch new amenities for his daughter’s school. As he listened to mostly Asian American, Latinx, and Black neighbors, especially elderly ones, talk about the need for laundry in their buildings and the neighborhood’s largest concentration of public housing in the country, he changed his mind. He decided to withdraw his proposal for his daughter’s school and instead help his neighbors advance their proposals.

    Through exchanges such as these, communities around New York have used PB to articulate and reprioritize funding allocations. An analysis by Carolin Hagelskamp, Rebecca Silliman, Erin Godfrey, and David Schleifer shows that from 2009 to 2018, capital spending in districts with PB were markedly different from those without. Schools and public housing, for instance, received more funding, while parks and housing preservation received less.

    Whereas electoral politics typically engage the “usual suspects”—higher-income, older constituents—PB engages traditionally marginalized constituents, including youth, formerly incarcerated constituents, and undocumented immigrants. The first citywide rulebook dictated that anyone over sixteen who lives, works, attends school, or is the parent of a student in a district could participate in neighborhood assemblies and project-vetting, and residents over eighteen, including undocumented immigrants, could vote on the allocations. Enthusiastic and strikingly fruitful youth participation in neighborhood assemblies then convinced adults to lower the PB voting age to sixteen and the participation age to fourteen in 2012. The voting age has been lowered almost every subsequent year, now standing at age eleven.

    Research coordinated by the Community Development Project shows that nearly one-quarter of people who voted in NYC’s PB process were not eligible to do so in typical elections. Carolina Johnson, H. Jacob Carlson, and Sonya Reynolds found that PB participants were 8.4 percent more likely to vote than those who had not participated in the process; the effects are even greater for those who have lower probabilities of voting, such as low-income and Black voters.

    Indeed, participants repeatedly stated that the PB process allowed them to engage in discussions with neighbors they otherwise wouldn’t have met, the proverbial “other” in deliberations. They emphasized PB’s deliberative nature, its encouragement to exchange ideas and compromise. This differs from electoral politics, even for those already politically active. For one participant, the combination of working with others unlike herself and working toward binding budgetary decisions gave the PB process a sense of impact lacking in her usual civic engagement.

    My interviews with PB participants revealed the potential for alliances between groups of residents and organizations who might usually lobby for funds independently. They spoke to how the PB deliberations allowed them to emphasize more than one aspect of their lives and identities—for example, as African Americans, Harlemites, parents, public housing residents, or sports fans—and emphasize issues of intersectionality, rather than a single identity of race, gender, or other social axes. More than one interviewee stated that, like the Upper West Side resident, they ended up backing projects they would not have otherwise thought of or supported.

    PB thus serves as a necessary, though incomplete, node in a larger ecosystem of participation and mobilization for budget justice. I highlight three takeaways:

    First, PB must be expanded and deepened beyond its current design. The East Harlem exchange previously described could not have transpired even two years later, after City Council lines were redrawn in New York (East Harlem was zoned to be in the same district as lower-income South Bronx neighborhoods, rather than higher-income Upper West Side ones). That district’s PB process thus lost much of its redistributive potential. Unless the funds and scopes of projects are substantially expanded, PB remains the exception to how municipal budgeting usually works: a way for constituents to voice concerns, let off steam, and see some of their ideas come to fruition while most of the budget remains opaque and predetermined. (In the 2019-2020 cycle, New York City Councilmembers devoted over $35 million to the PB process. That year, the city’s budget totaled $96 billion dollars.)

    Second, by focusing exclusively on the invest side of the equation, PB will remain incomplete. It thus risks propagating the myth that the problem is a scarcity of funds, rather than austerity as a policy. PB in the United States is not consistently tied to explicit questions of funds’ origins; eligible funds are often those deemed easy, limited, regressive, or discretionary. In Vallejo, California, the citywide PB process allocates proceeds from a sales tax. Other PB funds have come from Community Development Block Grants. In other places, community groups have campaigned for PB processes to allocate the proceeds of court cases where firms had to pay hefty damages. In New York current PB funds come from City Councilmembers’ discretionary budgets; when the pandemic hit, all but a few paused their PB processes. In 2018 a referendum to change the City Charter and establish a mayor coordinated PB process was approved by a landslide, but Mayor de Blasio failed to adequately fund it. PB must be tied to larger policy campaigns, individual projects (as with Seattle’s Solidarity Budget), progressive tax policies, and divestments and investments.

    Third, PB deliberations were profoundly shaped by micropolitics, namely how participants related to each other and to civil servants and city bureaucrats, as well as whose arguments and proposals were deemed credible. PB deliberations could perpetuate existing inequalities without attention to epistemic justice—actively questioning what bodies of knowledge are counted as rational, true, and valuable and who is seen as an expert. In PB this concerns how city bureaucrats sideline local knowledge in favor of technical knowledge. In issues related to budget justice, someone with lived experience should be considered an expert on their own environments as much as someone who has crunched quantitative policy analyses or studied the law. Without attention to epistemic justice, technical experts can reject project ideas with significant community support.

    These are not simply quibbles about institutional design, but about power. On whose terms and to what ends is PB carried out? These are questions of quality as well as size and scope.

    Even if the entire New York City budget were subject to a participatory process, to what extent does the process enable constituents to forward project proposals that combat dominant discourses on what New York needs? To be sure, the city government’s budgeting becoming more transparent does not render it liberatory. In particular, the prevalence of surveillance cameras among New York City PB projects, especially in public housing, highlights PB’s limited power in contesting racist logics of austerity. Thus far, these surveillance camera projects have won funding every year.

    These PB projects prompted debates in neighborhoods with changing demographics, deep inequalities, and new real estate developments—in other words, vulnerability to hyper-gentrification and displacement. Long-term residents felt that the surveillance cameras were yet another sign that they were being pushed out and local budgets were being used to make newer, wealthier residents feel safe and welcome. Many residents believe that new residents—less likely to be Black or Brown—voted for these surveillance cameras operated by the New York Police Department.

    But participants of color also advocated for surveillance cameras. These proponents reported that they did so because their visions of community safety included greater police accountability and economic support as well as surveillance. In their proposals, it was crucial to include both bottom-up accountability and access to the video footage captured by cameras. PB should allow constituents to shape both what programs are administered and how. Interviews suggested that the more robust, nuanced proposals had been dismissed, whittled down, abandoned, or improperly implemented during the PB process.

    By contrast, when implemented well, PB can help communities articulate proposals that tend to everyone’s safety. In one Brooklyn district, local participants reached out to members of historically sidelined communities and translated proposals into formal, technical language deemed “proper” by city bureaucrats. They also convinced their local Councilmember to make more creative proposals—with no current precedent in the existing city budgets—eligible to receive PB funds. When hate crimes rose after the 2016 election, innovative projects funded through PB in this district included bystander/ “upstander” training for residents to safely intervene when they witness harassment or violence. Residents also voted to fund self-defense workshops by and for Bangladeshi and Muslim women.

    This stands in contrast to the national and ostensibly progressive responses to anti-Asian violence. The March 2021 shootings in Atlanta spas prompted Congress to pass the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act with rare, bipartisan support. However, the Act solely serves to allot more grant money to law enforcement agencies nationwide. In May President Biden signed it into law and deemed it a triumph against hate. This differs greatly from how members of affected communities would go about implementing change.

    PB entails tough conversations on the intersection between policing and gentrification, the availability of health and employment services, and how community safety policies should be executed and implemented. In this case of rising anti-Asian violence, it also entails conversations on whether additional policing would actually prevent individual acts of hate or address the white supremacy and austerity that sow systemic violence. The sorts of conversations that yielded the Muslim women’s self-defense workshops in Brooklyn, for example, also touched on histories of anti-Black urban policies, the War on Terror and anti-Asian xenophobia, and contradictions in popular discourse about Asian Americans as both model minorities and “foreigners.” Face-to-face dialogue and brainstorming help neighbors assist one another in concrete ways and articulate new roles based on solidarity, without fomenting racial resentments or hierarchies of oppression.

    The questions raised in PB deliberations prompt fraught conversations on race and class. Native-born, white residents report higher incomes than other residents. Moreover, higher-income, higher-educated residents may have the social networks and legal skills to navigate bureaucratic regulations more easily in municipal budgeting. Race continues to serve, as Stuart Hall put it, as a fundamental “modality in which class is lived. It is also the medium in which class relations are experienced.”

    Despite significant limitations, we know that PB is doing something in New York—if only because some city officials work so hard to contain it. Indeed, the most impressive and important impacts of New York’s PB process have not been the winning projects themselves. Rather, they lie in PB’s spillover effects and the changes prompted by the process itself.

    For example, from 2011 to 2013, parents and students were upset about putting PB discretionary funds toward school bathroom stalls, which felt like a basic need. The PB process mobilized them around this issue; in 2014, the Department of Education doubled its allocation for school bathrooms explicitly because of PB. By 2018 PBNYC had also sparked over $180 million in additional spending on specific, community-articulated priorities, such as air conditioning and bathroom repairs in schools. In another example, a former parent-teaching association (PTA) president angered by her wealthy school’s aggressive campaign in the local PB process led her to create a new organization explicitly aimed at helping PTAs at lower-income schools access funding.

    PB helps set new precedents for both spending priorities and how city agencies operate, and it helps to change residents’ expectations for city policymaking. For example, in addition to spending its budget differently, the Parks Department’s experiences with PB led it to design new websites to make it easier for residents to track its expenditures, including not-yet-implemented ones.

    When—as in the school bathrooms and PTA cases above—PB’s limits leave participants frustrated, indignant, and angry, the process has also trained constituents to want, demand, and fight for more. PB can hence serve as site for politicization. One participant, for instance, had never worked on a community issue before; she built upon her PB experiences to become a member of her public housing tenants’ union and then a tenant organizer, winning significant concessions for her housing project.

    PB can thus contribute to budget justice when it is tied to mobilization and ecologies of care. Indeed, many of the New Yorkers now active in mutual aid efforts during the pandemic became adept at non-hierarchical organizing and decision-making through PB, and several of the more recent PB projects funded during the pandemic, such as diaper distribution centers throughout Brooklyn, build upon mutual aid networks. Communities can only achieve budget justice if we combine seemingly disparate forms of resistance and care in strategic ways with a clear eye to the future. In so doing, we conceptualize democracy not as a set of institutions, but a set of practices and situated solidarities.

    https://bostonreview.net/articles/budgeting-justice/#

    #villes #budget #justice #budget_participatif #démocratie #TRUST #Master_TRUST #budget_public #aménagement_urbain #urbanisme #justice_budgétaire

  • How Law Made Neoliberalism | Boston Review
    http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/jedediah-britton-purdy-amy-kapczynski-david-singh-grewal-how-law-made-

    Many people recognize that the law has changed in anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic ways in recent decades—for example, that Citizens United amplified the role of money in politics, or that the construct of “colorblindness” has become entrenched in constitutional doctrine and helps sustain structural racism. In our view these are not isolated changes, but part of an orientation—an ideology about markets, governments, and law that has become foundational to our legal infrastructure. We call this orientation the “Twentieth-Century Synthesis” in legal thought.

    #corruption_légale #états-unis #néolibéralisme #droit

    • Une nouvelle définition politique du soin (ici pour une trad viteuf)

      For many of us, the last few weeks have marked a new phase of our corona-lives—a dark and lonely corridor that stretches before us, no end in sight. Earlier, we counted this crisis in days and weeks. Now we are coming to see that this virus will in all likelihood be with us for months and years. We can’t stand social distancing any longer, but we also can’t stop, because there is no infrastructure in place to safely allow us to go back to school and work.

      A Community Health Corps is one place to start to build a new movement that heals us and our body politic, and that will allow us—all of us—to survive a pandemic, and then, to thrive.
      Our federal leadership remains ruinous. President Trump, obsessed with ratings, still cannot seem to think beyond the twenty-four-hour news cycle. In the last week he first insisted he would reopen things in May, then abandoned the idea, perhaps having learned that he lacked the necessary power. He then cast around for others to blame, taking to Twitter to cheer on tiny and malevolent groups of protesters calling for a reopening the economy, damn the consequences. Tragically, in the wake of the president’s remarks, Governor Brian Kemp of Georgia announced he would let many businesses resume operations, though the state is flush with new cases, and there is no viable plan for containment going forward. Trump tried to walk back his remarks, saying he disagreed with Kemp, but the damage was done, and Georgia is proceeding full-steam ahead. The press to return to school and work will only intensify, for all of us—while Georgia, and other states that are making similar rumblings, have nothing to offer their citizens but decimation.

      What other way forward is there, over these coming months? As in the early phase, leadership and vision is going to come from elsewhere. It’ll come from reality-based local leaders, perhaps from Congress, and from us. As the timescale of our response to COVID-19 shifts to months and years, it’s time to ask: The day after all this is over, what do we want the world we share to look like? What are we willing to fight for? And how do we connect a long-term vision of that world worth fighting for with the things we need to do to mitigate the damage now?

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      Any response to the moment has to address two, twinned crises: the threat of a virus run out of control, and the carnage being visited on working people and families by the measures we need to undertake to contain the virus. While COVID-19 cuts its deadly swath from coast to coast, the disease follows the same patterns of inequality we’ve always seen embedded in the U.S. landscape, where the death rate for predominantly African American counties is six-fold higher than in predominantly white counties across the country, and where this crisis is just heaped upon others, which have been plaguing these communities for generations.

      Meanwhile, as millions of Americans stay at home in solidarity with their neighbors to protect them from infection, the economic contraction has come at great cost to families and individuals, dragging them to the brink in the most spectacular economic collapse since the 1930s. We are in the middle of a disaster scene today, aided and abetted by a political culture that has rushed to give corporations billions in bailouts but has largely hung ordinary people out to dry. Food pantries are running empty as farmers—themselves facing bankruptcy—plow their crops into the soil. Last week, the number of people who filed for unemployment benefits surged to more than twenty-six million. Poorer families and school districts don’t have the resources for online learning, meaning that we are leaving millions of kids behind. Rent strikes are popping up from coast to coast.

      We must build for a better future, not just climb out of the rubble of this pandemic, brush ourselves off, and start up in the same place we found ourselves in January 2020.
      With a disruption looming that may be as severe as the Great Depression, our ambition to confront it should be at the same scale. But our answer to these twin immediate crises must connect to a broader politics and vision that addresses the deep structural roots of the problems we face in America. We must build for a better future, not just climb out of the rubble of this pandemic, brush ourselves off, and start up in the same place we found ourselves in January 2020. In our earlier pieces in these pages, we’ve argued for a new politics of care, one organized around a commitment to universal provision for human needs; countervailing power for workers, people of color, and the vulnerable; and a rejection of carceral approaches to social problems. The question now is how to connect that vision to programmatic responses that address the needs of the moment and beyond. We need to aim at “non-reformist reforms”—reforms that embody a vision of the different world we want, and that work from a theory of power-building that recognizes that real change requires changing who has a say in our political process.

      Here’s one such reform: a massive new jobs program. Call it the Community Health Corps. Funded federally and organized locally, it would put millions of Americans to work caring for one another, and with far more sweeping goals than just turning around the sky-rocketing unemployment figures we see today. It would serve our needs for a vast force that can track and trace the virus, but add to it workers who can support those in need, all while securing our health and building real solidarity among us. Such a program, operating all around the country, in rural and urban areas alike, could help us get through this pandemic and mitigate the cataclysmic employment dislocation of the coming months and years.

      In truth, this is just a new form of an old idea—a Works Progress Administration (WPA) for an age of pandemics. But the aim is larger, to bring us through the crisis by calling into being government as we wish it to be—caring for us, bringing us together, while also enabling us to live our different lives. It would go beyond providing care to communities by stitching back together the personal connections among us torn asunder by our self-enforced isolation and by building power together, as workers and patients are tied to each other through the act of caregiving. It wouldn’t just create jobs to fill a hole during the crisis—it would develop skills and foster solidarity that will form the basis of the post-crisis economy, too.

      What jobs are needed? Start with contact tracing. The need here is straightforward and urgent. We cannot shelter in place forever, but reopening without measures to track the virus and sequester those exposed runs the same risk of swamping the health care system—infections and deaths will just come roaring back. Beyond the medical tragedy, such an outcome would also make a mockery of the sacrifices that millions of Americans have made over the past few months. That’s why every serious plan for reopening requires a massive scale-up in testing and contact tracing. The better we are at catching cases, notifying contacts, and supporting people who are sick or sequestered, the better control we will have over the virus, and the more “normal” life can be for those unexposed.

      Think of the people hired for contact tracing as virus detectives, who also have the under-appreciated skill of being able to talk to others with ease and empathy. They will engage people infected with SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID19) in a process of recalling everyone they’ve seen and everywhere they’ve been for days, while recording all this information in detail. They will then reach out to these contacts, advise them on testing and quarantine, refer them for testing, and link them to necessary resources to help them through their quarantine, from start to finish. Despite all the talk about technological shortcuts, this old-fashioned shoe-leather epidemiology is going to be the mainstay of our next phase of attempts to control COVID-19. Contact tracing in its most basic form has been around since the smallpox outbreaks in Leicester in the United Kingdom in the 1870s. We know how to do it, and it can be scaled up locally.

      Shoring up the foundations of U.S. health care by valuing care itself isn’t just the first step towards a more rapid, effective response to health threats in the future. It will also move us toward a new politics of care, that starts from the ground up.
      Technology can help supplement these human tasks but cannot replace them. The idea that apps alone will solve the problem of contact tracing is the product of the technological “solutionism” that writers such as Evgeny Morozov have rightly argued is endemic to our culture today: the notion that no matter the problem, an app can efficiently solve it. Why won’t apps be a silver bullet? For one thing, they raise serious privacy issues, especially if they are not voluntary. There are technical issues too. It will be difficult for some technologies, like those that rely on GPS, to distinguish true contacts from false ones in crowded, dense urban environments. The myriad apps under development now have not been beta-tested, let alone rolled out in the midst of a pandemic at such a scale. It also isn’t clear that app developers have spent time talking to the potential end-users of their products, building their tools to meet the needs of, and benefit from the expertise and experience of, local health departments. Finally, technological solutions almost always leave out many of those who lack full participation rights in a digitally enabled society. For example, in the rush to move our financial transactions online and replace paper money with electronic payments with apps from banks and start-ups such as Venmo, we’ve left out many from low-income communities, particularly from communities of color. Apps can help make contact tracing more effective, but we need to act now, hiring people to do this work that no app can do.

      Spend a moment imagining a day in the life of a contact tracer working in Queens or Sioux Falls and you quickly see why an app alone cannot address the rippling crises that SARS-CoV-2 unleashes in every family. You also see the insufficiency, even, of contact tracing alone. Imagine you reach out to your first contact, who has tested positive and been sent home because they do not require hospitalization. Someone who has just learned that they have been exposed will have a myriad of important questions and needs. A father may wonder how, if he cannot leave his room, he will get food to his kids who are home from school. A shift worker who is wrongly fired for being sick will need help accessing unemployment insurance and legal support. A daughter may need help finding someone to provide essential daily care for a mother with dementia. Someone living alone will need help to walk the dog. We will need another group of workers to help them navigate these kinds of problems, which will require a mix of social work, advocacy, and even perhaps basic legal skills or the ability to make referrals to those who have them real-time.

      Those going out to trace contacts are going to find more than just SARS-CoV-2 in the places they visit. There will be some homes they call where no one has been exposed to the virus, but where families are struggling to make ends meet, having trouble with their landlords or their utility companies, or struggling with lost or unhelpful health insurance. Recent data has shown that during this pandemic domestic abuse has become “more frequent, more severe and more dangerous” and that mental health and substance issue on the rise. We can’t just walk away from these people, our neighbors in crisis. In the narrowest sense, ignoring these needs will make it harder for people to keep social distancing. In a broader sense, if we use our politics at a time of existential need to impose an unlivable life on our fellow citizens—if we fail those for whom staying at home might be more dangerous than the virus—we will tear away at the fabric of solidarity and trust that we need to maintain the shared project that is democracy.

      Right now we’re leaving help with all of this largely to individuals, families, and voluntary support. Most of us know people who are cutting corners with social distancing because they just can’t meet their daily needs any other way. In the next phase of the pandemic, we will need a much more precise and effective system of sequestering people if we are to get and keep the virus under control. While the mutual aid networks springing up around the country can handle a few requests for support, as we scale-up testing, the need of these kinds of social services and economic aid will explode. This can’t be handled simply as a matter of volunteerism even if “conservatives dream of returning to a world where private charity fulfilled all public needs.”

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      What is the alternative to genuine, public support for those who must remain isolated? Doctors Jim Yong Kim and Harvey Fineberg made the case in the New York Times recently that the ill, and their exposed families, should all be moved to facilities where they could be isolated from each other and the wider community, but they didn’t provide much guidance on how to do this humanely. Nor did they grapple with what it might mean to propose this sort of measure in a country with our history of state violence, especially as visited on families of color, who are vastly overrepresented among the sick today. We need to protect families from their sick loved ones, but forcibly warehousing families or the mildly symptomatic is not the way. We need a politics of support and care, not separation and deprivation. It’s clear that following public health advice isn’t as easy as it sounds—and its costs do not fall evenly. So we need support people to undertake this act of solidarity.

      We need a politics of support and care, not separation and deprivation.
      Alongside the test-and-trace brigade, then, we need other brigades too. We need a cadre of social workers who can provide specific help to individuals infected and affected by COVID, to enable them to follow public health and medical advice. We need a vastly scaled up testing workforce. Some will be dressed up in personal protective equipment (PPE), working at drive-through testing sites, visiting apartment buildings and nursing homes, and stationed outside of grocery stores and other businesses that remained highly trafficked even in the midst of the pandemic.

      Others will be working in labs or transporting samples, helping to process the millions of tests we will need each week, possibly each day. If evidence mounts that early intervention and close monitoring is essential to saving lives, we will also need a new brigade of health workers who can make virtual or home visits. We can additionally train local workers to help us gather evidence—for example mapping local health and services needs through surveys, building on successful models of community-based research, and working to better guide local programs. These programs will not only help us understand and respond to the spread of the virus but help us build better health programs when it recedes.

      We also need to address the explosion of infections in the workplace. We’ve seen outbreaks, large and small in meat processing plants across the country, in Amazon warehouses and Walmarts, leading to walkouts and lawsuits. As more and more businesses re-open, employees and employers need help to keep themselves and their customers and clients safe. Areas for employees and customers must be re-configured to maximize social distancing, and new workplace protocols need to be developed. Employers should be held responsible for taking the steps needed to protect their workers and the public, and some of this will likely not come without a stronger role for labor—via labor-management commissions, for example. An infection control brigade could work in cooperation with employees and employers, advising them on best practices in infection control, and assuring that supplies of PPE, from masks to gloves to physical barriers like plexiglass shields for cashiers are available. They can also ensure that early signs of failures in infection control are discovered and addressed immediately.

      We are already seeing small steps in this direction. In Massachusetts, Partners in Health (PiH), which has experience building community health workforces in places hit by disease and disaster around the globe, has been asked by the state to spearhead their new contact-tracing program. In a matter of weeks, they have hired and trained close to a thousand people for these important and complex jobs. Aware of the importance of the work and the demands of the job, PiH is paying them the same rate as U.S. Census takers, $27 an hour, providing them with health insurance and making an emphasis on hiring the unemployed and building a diverse workforce. About 17,000 people have applied for these jobs, showing that there is clearly a deep pool of people willing and able to do this work. That should come as no surprise, given the staggering loss of work in recent weeks and the inadequacy of the current government supports, and the outpouring of support we’ve seen in communities and mutual aid networks. People want to help. We just need to organize them.

      The problem is, while these efforts are admirable, state-level programs are vastly underpowered and underfunded. Before the crisis public health departments employed fewer than 2,000 contact tracers in the country. The best estimate we have projects that we will need to hire as many as 300,000 of them to address this outbreak. We have cohorts to build on for caseworkers and legal support too. One such pool derives from so-called community health worker (CHW) programs, which have a long history both in the United States and around the world.

      The United States is sicker now with COVID-19, but we’ve been sick for long while in many other ways.
      Today, we have about 120,000 community health care workers in cities and towns around the country doing health education and prevention work, collecting data, making links between local residents and the services they need. They are most often from the communities they serve and which have been underserved historically by the patchwork of a health system we have in the United States. In the context of need for testing-tracing-isolating in the age of COVID-19, local CHWs will go a long way to establishing trust and comfort in these troubling times. Contact tracers too should be recruited from local communities. Having a neighbor show up at your door (or on your screen) asking about your health and your personal contacts is more likely to be successful than a phone vibrating in your pocket telling you that you make have come in contact with someone with COVID-19.

      There are also models for the caseworker and legal support component in the medical-legal partnerships (MLPs) that have emerged all around the U.S. in recent years. Driven by the recognition that illness—and healthcare costs—are shaped by factors that doctors alone cannot control (like access to safe housing and benefits), hospitals and non-profits around the country have hired legal professionals to assist clinicians, social workers, and case managers address larger structural issues affecting patients’ health and well-being. As of early 2019 there were MLPs active in about 330 hospitals and health centers in 46 states with evidence that MLPs can improve patient health outcomes and well-being, improve mental health, remove barriers to health care for low-income families, increase access to stable housing and other social support.

      The idea is to build on these successes, which operate in small and disjointed ways, by integrating them into a federally funded Works Progress Administration for the age of COVID-19 and its aftermath. It will require significant federal funding, especially as states are forced into austerity by plummeting tax revenues and balanced budget requirements. But the cost will be small compared to the recent $2 trillion stimulus. Reports show that we can scale up contact tracing for just a few billion dollars—a fraction of the bailout we’ve handed over to big businesses. Some in Congress have already seen the need, and a federal bill awaiting the president’s signature provides some funds that could go towards such jobs, along with the massive scale up in testing that we need—though not nearly enough. Even a vastly larger program, hiring five million Americans for the duration of the crisis, would still cost less than the corporate bailout. This is a deal, if we consider what it can do to help not only save lives but also help employ people and buffer us against economic depression.

      We could also mold the program to help shore up the present and future of those who are at grave risk, but not of dying from COVID-19. Many young people today are facing down a terrifying future. With more than twenty-six million unemployed and more to come, who will hire someone just out of high school? How will students get that first job to pay off their college loans?

      By whatever accident of grace, young people are least at risk of developing serious complications of COVID-19, making them an obvious priority for a jobs program. The staggering health disparities of the pandemic make another priority clear. We need care workers who are from, and trusted, in local communities, both to reach those most in need, and to help build resources and power in those same communities. We also should demand a program that can hire those who are hardest hit by this downturn, and who we’ve cast aside for too long.

      This means not focusing only on workers who are already highly skilled (much less volunteers, who will always skew toward those who need not worry about their daily bread). Some of these new recruits will need significant training, but we should not think of that as a problem—these are the same jobs we will need after COVID-19, and we have chronic shortages of exactly those skills nursing care and home health care workers that we will need to address this pandemic. And many of these jobs will use skills that come far more quickly: contact tracers can be trained in days, as can those who they will deliver food, masks, and hand sanitizer to families.

      We know from the work of those who study the impact of jobs guarantees—including programs that have been running for many years in other countries—that such programs can be scaled up quickly, and provide essential counter-cyclical stability, as well discipline the private labor market. Especially now, creating alternatives to exploitative jobs is urgent, the only right thing to do. Many “essential jobs”—in janitorial positions, as cashiers in grocery stores, delivery workers—look a lot like forced labor today. With few exceptions, if you quit, you aren’t eligible for unemployment, and other forms of support like those elusive $1200 checks are too small, and not available to many. A Community Health Corps could provide better jobs, driving up the pay of those workers that we call essential, but do not pay that way. If these Corps jobs stick around (folded in, perhaps, to a Medicare for All program), they can help not only address our needs for care, but also our needs for decent work—and our needs to benefit collectively from the talents of so many who are now relegated to the margins, locked up or tossed away. We can also build the Corps as a springboard for further training, where those who have served their country can be funneled into higher education, in a new GI Bill for the age of COVID-19.

      Getting back to normal was never going to be a solace for many in our country. Business as usual is precisely what has made us all more vulnerable to disasters like the one we are currently experiencing.
      The United States may have the most technologically advanced health care system in the world, but we’re leading the number of worldwide coronavirus cases because we’ve badly trailed other industrialized nations in health outcomes for years. Many of the hardest-hit communities in the COVID-19 pandemic have been reeling from long-term health crises, from the opioid epidemic and deaths of despair in Appalachia to the burden of maternal deaths and the ongoing HIV epidemic in the South, to an explosion of obesity across the country with its downstream effects: type 2 diabetes, hyperlipidemia, high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and cancer. The United States is sicker now with COVID-19, but we’ve been sick for long while in many other ways.

      Beyond helping to manage the current crisis, then, a Community Health Corps would help to improve the health of people historically left out of the circle of care. For too long we’ve focused at the top, spending on expensive, technologically advanced specialty care, while neglecting primary and community care and underpaying caregivers themselves. Even in the midst of the pandemic, community health centers, which should be the core of our health approach, have teetered on financial ruin. Meanwhile, the domestic workers and home health aides who perform the essential act of care have been underpaid and left out of federal labor protections. Not to mention that much of the work of caring is still done at home, falling disproportionately on women and people of color.

      Shoring up the foundations of U.S. health care by valuing care itself isn’t just the first step towards a more rapid, effective response to health threats in the future. It will also move us toward a new politics of care, that starts from the ground up, in the places, we live, work and socialize. A politics that builds power among the caregivers, as the act of caring becomes publicly recognized and compensated for the productive work it is. Done right—and without the racialized and gendered exclusions that characterized the WPA—these new jobs can be a source of power for those who have never been fully allowed a voice in our democracy.

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      To scale this up quickly, we will need to bring together organizations like Partners in Health, who are experienced at mobilizing in a community though largely in the global South, and who are trusted and effective in their work on health, with local organizations, working on civil, social and economic rights such as national groups like the Center for Popular Democracy and Community Change, and their diverse roster of local community organizations.

      Will it be easy to get our creaking, divided democracy to funnel resources into these programs? Probably not. But COVID-19 is conspiring to show us, all at once and in a way that no one can ignore, how central care is to a healthy society.
      Over the past four decades we’ve seen the erosion of government as a force for good in people’s lives, most often by design as conservatives have looked to shrink the state, weaken its effectiveness, and privatize its functions. Liberals have gone along and lost their faith in the kind of government that built their political base while helping millions in the modern era, starting with the New Deal, and the civil rights, social and economic programs that were the hallmark of the Great Society period in the 1960s. The U.S. state is so weak and untrusted right now that banks have had to take over as the vehicle for the provision of many of the billions just released under the emergency appropriations by Congress, as many Americans cursed the IRS because of delays in the small checks they were promised in COVID-19 relief.

      A Community Health Corps could be part of the remedy—in terms of the direct services and employment it could offer millions of Americans, in the ways in which this effort could lift up the health and well-being of so many, and also in terms of renewing faith in the power of government to help. The Corps would also be a prophylaxis—a first line in the response to the next challenges we face, whether it’s a seasonal return of COVID-19 or another pandemic, or the monumental troubles that climate change will rain down on our communities.

      It would also serve as a model, a test of one essential component of a Green New Deal: the creation of millions of good green jobs. Green jobs, after all, are not just in construction, and many directly benefit health. That is why the most compelling versions of such a proposal prioritize new care work jobs, as well as jobs restoring our trails and parks, and even making a place for the artists and writers whose work is some of the greatest legacy of the WPA. Some of these jobs might even be initiated as part of the Community Health Corps. With so little traffic on the roads, there is no better time to build bike lanes—and green housing too, if the safety of workers can be assured. Greening our cities and improving housing for low-income communities are an essential component of a healthier society, as well as a healthier planet. Climate change is the largest foreseeable threat to our health; we can start to address this looming crisis right now, as we combat this pandemic.

      We need more than a jobs program at this moment of national crisis, to be sure. We also need more SARS-COV-2 tests, more basic income, and better data about the pandemic, to name just a few. But rising up from under the cruel weight of this pandemic, we should also aim for something lasting and better. Getting back to normal was never going to be a solace for many in our country. Business as usual is precisely what has made us all more vulnerable to disasters like the one we are currently experiencing.

      Will it be easy to get our creaking, divided democracy to funnel resources into these programs? Probably not. But COVID-19 is conspiring to show us, all at once and in a way that no one can ignore, how central care—writ large, broadly conceived—is to a healthy society. Rudolf Virchow, the father of social medicine, once said: “Medicine is a social science and politics is nothing else but medicine on a large scale. Medicine as a social science, as the science of human beings, has the obligation to point out problems and to attempt their theoretical solution; the politician . . . must find the means for their actual solution.” A Community Health Corps is one actual solution, one place to start to build a new movement that heals us and our body politic, and that will allow us—all of us—to survive a pandemic, and then, to thrive.

      GREGG GONSALVES, AMY KAPCZYNSKI

      #soin #santé #politique_du_soin #santé_communautaire #pandémie #recherche_des_contacts #emploi #agents_de_santé_communautaire #aptitude_à_parler #médecine_sociale vs #solutionnisme_technologique #green_new_deal

  • All in the Family Debt | Boston Review
    http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/melinda-cooper-all-family-debt

    The poor laws went on to see several iterations both in England and America. The early American colonies imported them virtually word for word and later incorporated them into state legal systems. But despite the many policy tweaks and changes that have occurred since, one element of the original poor laws has remained stubbornly in place: the foundational role of familial responsibility. Indeed, save for a brief respite in the 1960s, American social welfare policy and ideology has maintained a persistent—and damaging—attachment to that framework. Some ramifications are obvious—such as when legal relationships of spousal support and paternity are enforced without consent from either party—but some are more nuanced. The current crises of tuition costs and college debt, for instance, are the downstream effects of limiting a free public good and reinstating “familial responsibility.”

    #famille #dettes

  • How to Think About #Empire | Boston Review
    http://bostonreview.net/literature-culture-global-justice/arundhati-roy-avni-sejpal-challenging-%E2%80%9Cpost-%E2%80%9D-postcolo

    Another “update” that we ought to think about is that new technology could ensure that the world no longer needs a vast working class. What will then emerge is a restive population of people who play no part in economic activity—a surplus population if you like, one that will need to be managed and controlled. Our digital coordinates will ensure that controlling us is easy. Our movements, friendships, relationships, bank accounts, access to money, food, education, healthcare, information (fake, as well as real), even our desires and feelings—all of it is increasingly surveilled and policed by forces we are hardly aware of. How long will it be before the elite of the world feel that almost all the world’s problems could be solved if only they could get rid of that #surplus #population? If only they could delicately annihilate specific populations in specific ways—using humane and democratic methods, of course. Preferably in the name of justice and liberty. Nothing on an industrial scale, like gas chambers or Fat Men and Little Boys. What else are smart nukes and germ warfare for?