Saudi King Salman purging monarchy of Abdullah’s inner circle - Middle East - Israel News

/.premium-1.654210

  • Saudi King Salman purging monarchy of Abdullah’s inner circle - Middle East - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.654210

    After the first purge carried out by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in January, a few days after the death of his predecessor King Abdullah, comes the second round. It is not likely to be the last.

    The first to be ousted was Abdullah’s inner orbit of loyalists, including his bureau chief, Khaled al-Tuwaijri, his two sons, Mashal (governor of Mecca) and Turki (governor of Riyyad), his intelligence chief Khalid bin Bandar and the latter’s father, Bandar bin Sultan, who headed the National Security Council.

    The current round aims to ensure the line of succession. Among others, Salman ousted the crown prince, Muqrin bin Abdulaziz – Abdullah’s favorite – replacing him with the powerful Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef. The king appointed his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as deputy crown prince – that is, the man who will inherit the kingdom if Mohammed bin Nayef departs.

    These moves are not surprising. From the beginning of Salman’s rule, it was clear that Prince Muqrin, once the failed intelligence chief, would not remain crown prince for long. Even Mohammed bin Salman’s appointment as deputy crown prince was expected, and not only because of his diplomatic skills and expertise on terrorism, which he acquired in numerous courses he took at the FBI Academy.

    The distancing of Abdullah’s loyalists and strengthening of the Sudairi branch of the ruling family, of which Mohammed bin Nayef is a member, is part of a settling of scores with King Abdullah, whose reign saw a waning of the influence of the Sudairi princes – the sons of Hassa al-Sudairi, one of the 10 wives of Saudi Arabia’s first king, Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud).

    If there is a surprise appointment, it is that of Adel al-Jubeir as foreign minister, replacing Saud al-Faisal, who designed and implemented Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy for four decades. Al-Faisal, 75, has Parkinson’s disease and it seems his request to leave office was authentic. Jubeir is the first Saudi foreign minister who is not a member of the royal family.

    No change in foreign policy due

    These appointments are part of internal housekeeping; they do not change the kingdom’s foreign policy. King Salman, despite his own health issues – he apparently suffers from Alzheimer’s – immediately made his mark when he intensified official public discourse against Iran, supported the establishment of an Arab intervention force and initiated the attack on the Houthis in Yemen to root out Iran’s influence in that country.

    The strong man in the kingdom is no doubt Nayef, who will continue to serve both as interior minister and head of the National Security Council. He is the man who will implement foreign policy, one of whose principles is the effort to establish a “Sunni axis” against Iran.

    As part of this effort, Saudi Arabia has changed its policy toward Turkey, and despite the rift between Egypt and Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was invited to visit the king. Nayef, who met with Erdogan in Turkey before that visit, set its agenda.

    It seems that as part of the efforts toward a “Sunni axis,” Saudi Arabia will encourage Hamas to cut itself off entirely from Iran and return to the “Arab fold,” despite the ongoing enmity between Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s ally, and Hamas.

    Salman’s son Mohammed, who is defense minister, is in his 30s, too young to be seen as successor to the throne, but that could change.

    The main challenge before the new regime is to absorb the strategic changes expected to accompany the emerging nuclear agreement with Tehran, and the rapprochement between Iran and the United States. If and when sanctions on Iran are lifted, new oil will flow that is expected to grab an important share of the Saudi market. Saudi Arabia will also have to build up its influence in Syria and Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian power in those countries, especially if Iran proposes its own solution to the crisis in Syria.