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  • Zohran Mamdani Just Created an Office of Worker Power
    https://jacobin.com/2026/09/zohran-mamdani-labor-organizing-nyc

    Zohran Mamdani vient de créer la structute administrative que la gauche au gouvernement à Berlin a refusé d’introduire pour nous. Les senateurs du parti Die Linke ont rempli leur fonction de ministes dsns un état bourgeoos sans jamais abandonner le mythe de l’impartialité du gouvernement et du « partenariat social » nous trahissant en refusant de nous donner les structures administratives nécessaires pour améliorer nos conditions de vie et du travail.

    Il faudra tout faire pour faire élir la maire de gauche et l’obliger à ne pas nous trahir pour l’énième fois.

    7.9.2026 Interview withZ ohran Mamdani by Spencer Snyder

    On Thursday, Mayor Zohran Mamdani signed an executive order creating the Mayor’s Office of Worker Power (MOWP), the nation’s first municipal agency built to help workers organize.

    Tony Perlstein will run the MOWP, reporting to Deputy Mayor for Economic Justice Julie Su. A former longshoreman and union organizer born and raised in New York, Perlstein served as an organizing director for the United Auto Workers, where he helped lead a national campaign to lift pay and protect jobs from automation.

    As part of its mandate, the MOWP will regularly bring union leaders and rank-and-file members together to discuss worker issues and organizing drives. It also aims to reach unorganized workers, like immigrants and gig drivers, and connect them to worker centers and other resources. The office plans to hold public hearings, teach workers what protections they already have, and steer them toward organizations that can help.

    Mamdani spoke about the new office with Jacobin’s Spencer Snyder.

    Spencer Snyder

    Tell me a little bit about the Office of Worker Power.

    Zohran Mamdani

    This is a first-of-its-kind office in the country, and we’re setting it up to help workers organize in an economy where more and more is stacked against them. This is a way we can help workers fight for the kinds of protections workers won in the past that we now celebrate as just a part of life. Like the weekend.

    Spencer Snyder

    How did the idea come about? Is this something you were thinking about on the campaign trail?

    Zohran Mamdani

    On the campaign, we talked about the cost-of-living crisis in this city and the need for an affordability agenda. Workers feel that every day. This office is born of our belief that we can make the nation’s most expensive city affordable. It’s also informed by the success of our Mayor’s Office to Protect Tenants and how it’s delivered for tenants across the city. Now we have the opportunity to do the same for workers.

    Spencer Snyder

    What kinds of issues is this office meant to address?

    Zohran Mamdani

    At the heart of it is the fact that what used to create a middle-class life no longer does. Many workers are grappling with the emptiness of the promise that working nine to five can be enough to live in this city. They’re having to take on two or three jobs. They’re having to engage with a gig economy that is actively growing while also failing to provide a dignified life for so many of the people who participate in it.

    What we’re going to have in this office is a commitment to assisting workers wherever and however they want to organize — and to doing that in more languages than just English.

    Spencer Snyder

    How do you hope this office will affect the work landscape in the city more broadly?

    Zohran Mamdani

    I hope it will help workers not only understand the power they have but build more of that power. We’ve seen that when workers come together, it’s something that benefits everybody across the city and across this country. We want to make sure that we at city hall are using every tool at our disposal to help workers do exactly that.

    Spencer Snyder

    Can you tell me about the public hearings?

    Zohran Mamdani

    One of the many things this office is going to do is hold public hearings and conduct research, to bring out into the open a lot of the struggles that workers are facing privately. The point is to start a conversation that isn’t just public but that also provides the information workers need in order to organize.

    Spencer Snyder

    Why would someone come to this office?

    Zohran Mamdani

    Someone might come to this office because they’re a worker and they want to better their own conditions, or the conditions of those around them, and they’re not sure where to go next. In New York City, it’s very hard to know who you should call about any of these issues. Now we’re saying you will soon be able to go to nyc.gov/workerpower and finally get the kind of information you need, so that you know what rights you already have available to you and what rights you can win.

    We’ve seen this with tenants when we’ve held “Rental Ripoff” hearings. Tenants finally had an avenue, no matter what borough they call home, to come forward and say, “These are the ways in which I’m facing struggles in the housing market today.” That then informed the policies we’ve been putting forward over the last few months.

    Spencer Snyder

    What would the ideal outcome be for a worker who comes to the office and says they want to start organizing?

    Zohran Mamdani

    To me, it’s that a worker leaves the office with a better understanding of the rights they already have, and the ways in which they can win the rights they deserve. It’s hard enough to survive in this city without the added responsibility of knowing what is often an arcane landscape of laws and regulations. Now city government will be there to say, “This is the landscape as it exists today, and these are the tools you have at your disposal to win the landscape of tomorrow.”

    Spencer Snyder

    To what extent does this office go beyond being an educational resource?

    Zohran Mamdani

    I’ll go back to the Mayor’s Office to Protect Tenants. In that office, we inform tenants of the rights they have, but we also assist tenants when they express interest in setting up a tenant union. And we’ve spoken to tenants and had their testimony provide us with the foundation of new policy.

    One example coming out of the “Rental Ripoff” hearings: on October 1, for the first time in New York City history, we are going to investigate every single heat complaint registered with the city. That’s a direct result of tenants coming forward and speaking about the pernicious effects of not having accountability for this specific kind of housing violation. To me, that’s a clear model of what can come from finally creating a part of city government whose job is not just to work with workers but also to help them organize for themselves.

  • Zohran Mamdani vient de créer un bureau chargé de soutenir l’organisation des travailleurs et des travailleuses

    ENTRETIEN AVEC ZOHRAN MAMDANI

    Le maire de New York, Zohran Mamdani, a signé un arrêté créant la première agence municipale du pays dédiée explicitement à aider les travailleurs et les travailleuses à s’organiser. Il s’est entretenu avec Jacobin sur la manière dont ce nouveau bureau contribuera à faire avancer son programme en faveur de l’accessibilité financière.

    https://jacobin.com/2026/09/zohran-mamdani-labor-organizing-nyc

    #usa

  • The Canton–Hong Kong Strike Changed China’s History
    https://jacobin.com/2026/09/china-general-strike-communists-kuomintang

    Voici un peu d’histoire du mouvement ouvrier à la sauce trotzkyste. Il est bon de nous rappeller que la victoire du peuple chinois contre l’impérialisme et les fascistes chinois est le fruit des luttes et défaites du parti communiste et des millions de paysans et ouvriers sous sa commande.

    Avec un peu d’optimisme on pourrait formuler la thèse que nous sommes en train d’entrer dans le siècle de la consolidation du succès du communisme en Chine et de la lutte pour la défaite de l’impérialisme occidental après deux siècles de déclin et d’humiliation puis de résistance et ’d’unification nationale.

    Aujourd’hui les Chinois ont obtenu le niveau de productivité nécessaire pour entamer la transformation socialiste de la société qui a échoué dans le passé à cause de l’agressson impérialiste et du développement trop peu avancé de la productivité du pays.

    7.9.2026 by Promise Li - This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Canton–Hong Kong strike, one of the longest general strikes in history. The strike was a remarkable experiment in working-class democracy and its outcome shaped the course of 20th-century China.

    A century ago, workers in Hong Kong and Guangzhou — then generally known in English as Canton — waged one of the longest continuous general strikes in history. At the time, foreign powers such as Britain and Japan had carved China into spheres of influence. Wave after wave of students’ and workers’ movements struggled against this imperialist control, especially the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

    This anti-imperialist upsurge reached a fever pitch on May 30, 1925. That day, the police opened fire on students who were marching toward the British-controlled part of Shanghai to protest the murder of a Chinese worker at a Japanese-owned cotton factory during a recent strike.

    The May 30 massacre spurred workers in Hong Kong, then under direct British colonial rule, to strike in June. The Canton–Hong Kong strike lasted sixteen months, shutting down a central British commercial outpost. It was also the impetus for China’s national reunification for the first time outside of monarchical rule. Aided by the organizing acumen of a nascent Communist Party of China (CPC), then operating within the big-tent Kuomintang (KMT), Chinese workers governed Canton and paralyzed Hong Kong.

    China’s political context has completely changed since the strike. The KMT brutally crushed the CPC six months after the strike’s end, and the Communists retreated from the cities to rebuild in rural areas over the next two decades, eventually managing to defeat the KMT in 1949. The CPC has since led China as a one-party state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), changing ideological direction in the 1980s and leading China’s turn to capitalism.

    Today Beijing has become a global superpower rivaling Washington. The PRC has prohibited workers’ movements from coalescing into independent organizations that can contest for political power. Its official histories have converted the experience of workers’ revolt a century ago into merely an expression of patriotism, and we need to reclaim the memory of that experience.

    Those workers built democratic unions to fight imperialism while transforming bureaucratic unions along the way. The strike showed that the working class led Hong Kong’s first struggle for universal suffrage — a demand ignored by the British and still refused by today’s PRC. The strike’s legacy thus offers an alternative to the PRC’s great-power nationalism and chauvinism that is grounded in workers’ independent organization and democracy.

    China underwent a massive political transformation throughout the 1920s. The decade began with disarray and fragmentation. Rival military cliques backed by different imperialist powers divided the country starting in the 1910s. They jockeyed for power after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and former Qing General Yuan Shi-kai’s rule.

    By 1928, the KMT had unified the entire country under its rule by defeating these warlords. The party traced its roots to anti-Qing revolutionary groups in the 1900s linked to Cantonese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen. Sun and his followers were mainly intellectuals, supported by some triad-linked brotherhoods and secret societies, advancing a vision of modernizing and unifying China.

    In the 1910s, the KMT’s organizational infrastructure and political program were loose and ill-defined. It also lacked a well-organized military unit. This changed when a Cantonese general, Chen Jiong-ming, took power in Canton and welcomed Sun back from exile to his home region in 1920.

    Shortly after, Sun broke with Chen and set up a government in the region under a reorganized KMT. The main foreign power that backed him was the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik international strategy at the time rested on supporting Communist forces in alliance with broad nationalist movements to overthrow colonial empires.

    With the help of Bolshevik advisers, Sun transformed the KMT into a cohesive political party with a regional base in Canton in the early 1920s. The reorganized KMT allowed Communists to join as individuals while also incorporating China’s weak but emerging capitalist class under its political umbrella. Anti-imperialism became a bedrock of the KMT’s nationalist program, unifying the Left and the Right within the KMT. When Sun died in early 1925, his successor, Wang Jing-wei, continued his alliance with the Communists as the first president of the KMT’s Canton government.

    The CPC, formed by revolutionary intellectuals in 1921, began organizing workers in northern and central China. This period saw the organized working class emerging for the first time in China’s political arena. Workers resisted rampant labor abuses and exploitation, exacerbated by the competition between foreign firms and local employers as industry started to develop in China. Although anarchists and Communists led some of these struggles, traditional guilds and other conservative labor organizations dominated many workers’ organizations.

    The influence of reactionary labor forces was particularly acute in Canton and Hong Kong, where craft guilds, corrupt “yellow” unions, and triad-linked secret societies were the main tendencies organizing workers. The KMT enjoyed great prestige in these regions during the early 1920s, especially among militant workers deeply inspired by their kinsman Sun’s nationalism.

    All this made it hard to organize workers independently. Canton had little by way of large-scale heavy industry, unlike China’s other major cities, like Shanghai. Most Cantonese workers were scattered across small-shop handicraft and household industries. Hong Kong had more modern industries, mainly British monopolies, like transport, utilities, commerce, and shipbuilding.

    Though divided in terms of sovereignty, workers in Canton and Hong Kong shared strong bonds. The Chinese in Hong Kong were mostly migrants from other provinces. The great majority came from Canton, which was adjacent to Hong Kong. These links were crucial for workers’ solidarity during the strike. Nonetheless, compared with the north, conditions in the south did not seem as favorable to the growth of an industrial union movement.

    When the CPC sent its best labor organizer, Deng Zhong-xia, to Hong Kong to organize a general strike in solidarity with Shanghai’s anti-imperialist movement, he thus had few expectations of success. Deng came from a different region and spoke a different dialect: he relied on a Hong Kong Communist worker, Su Zhao-zheng, who had led a seamen’s strike in 1922, to build trust with Cantonese workers.

    Still, Deng was not completely unknown among the Cantonese workers. As the early CPC’s main labor leader, Deng had just organized China’s second national labor congress. This congress proved pivotal for the party in clarifying a labor strategy that it put into practice in the Canton–Hong Kong strike.

    Held just before the May 30 massacre, this gathering called on workers to form their own organizations independent from the bourgeoisie. It also established that workers’ economic and political struggles were inseparable. In other words, Communists had to extend the scope of workers’ struggles for better working conditions to fight the alliance of the capitalist class with warlords and imperialists.

    Some of Canton and Hong Kong’s most powerful unions, such as the employer-friendly mechanics’ union, boycotted the congress and protested its militant tone. Deng knew he would face the difficult task of dealing with these unions as he arrived in Hong Kong. But when Deng and Su held a cross-union meeting to call for a strike, a majority, including these yellow unions, voted to authorize it.

    In a later reflection, Deng suggested that even corrupt union leaders believed they could benefit from a strike at that moment. They were keen to siphon money from the strike fund and increase their prestige and power in the labor movement. The CPC leaders also helped persuade the yellow union leaders by inviting them to participate in the strike committee.

    But there was another crucial element to the strike vote. The massacre in Shanghai was a turning point for Cantonese workers’ hatred of British imperialism. Sensing this opportunity, Deng, Su, and the CPC’s Hong Kong branch — then only a handful of dockworkers and students — went directly into the factories to agitate the workers. Though the seamen’s union was taken over by corrupt leaders after the 1922 strike, seamen and dockworkers still revered Su, who easily rallied them for the general strike.

    As historian Daniel Kwan has documented, another CPC cadre, Yang Yin, passionately appealed to a sense of patriotism in seeking to persuade even triad and secret society labor leaders that they had a role to play in a time of national crisis. Thus, as Deng explained, the CPC had a two-pronged strategy: persuading union leaders directly while also agitating among workers to push their own leaders to act.

    Despite their support, many conservative labor leaders dragged their feet, resulting in the CPC-friendly unions — led by tram workers, seamen, typesetters, and foreign-firm workers — striking first on June 19. But the feelings of anger and restlessness among the union’s rank and file were too strong for Hong Kong’s conservative union bureaucracy to contain.

    Rank-and-file mechanics struck on their own without official approval from their union leadership. The seamen even physically threatened their union leader to issue an order to strike. If he refused, the workers declared, they would “greet him with their fists.”

    The Canton–Hong Kong strike uplifted the anti-imperialist demands coming from the movement in Shanghai to abolish China’s unequal treaties with imperialist powers. But its horizon did not stop there. The strike demands were as follows:

    absolute freedom of the Chinese to gather, organize, speak, publish, and strike;

    equal treatment of all Hong Kongers, whether Chinese or Western, under the law, and the immediate abolition of all laws and actions targeting Chinese residents for deportation and cruel punishment;

    every Chinese worker must be granted the right to vote, to satisfy the basic principle of universal suffrage;

    the introduction of labor laws, including an eight-hour day and a minimum wage, the abolition of contract labor, improvements to the livelihoods of women and child workers, and the implementation of workers’ insurance, with representatives from labor unions included when drafting these laws;

    the cancellation of proposed rent increases on July 1, with a 40 percent cut to rents instead;

    freedom of residence to the Chinese in Hong Kong.

    The strike combined economic and political demands that identified the roots of the workers’ exploitative conditions in colonial rule. Most significantly, it was the earliest moment at which Hong Kongers demanded universal suffrage in a mass movement. This echoed the early CPC’s demand for a wider struggle for democracy across China. The strike showed that the working class was the vanguard of Hong Kong’s fight for decolonization and democracy.

    A massacre by British troops transformed the strike into a mass movement. On June 23, one hundred thousand people from Canton held a march to Hong Kong in solidarity with the strike. When they passed by Shaji Road, British soldiers in the occupied district of Shamian across the river opened fire and killed dozens of protesters.

    The massacre drastically broadened the scale of the strike. Workers demanded that London compensate and apologize for the killings. Tens of thousands of workers in Hong Kong then joined the strike and left for Canton.

    The strike had a major impact on Hong Kong. The central strategy was to block access to Hong Kong for sea traffic. Two months in, the strikers decided to only target British ships, a boycott that lasted until October 1926. This strategic shift discouraged Cantonese merchants from opposing the strike and prevented a united front among imperialist powers from crushing it.

    Meanwhile, Hong Kong was in a state of shambles. Deng recalled that the number of ships passing through Hong Kong in 1925 was only 16 percent of the 1924 level. Hyperinflation reigned, and the city’s major industry, shipping, almost ground to a halt. Hong Kong’s financial institutions nearly went bankrupt. Rocked by its own wave of labor unrest back home, London had little will to amass a military invasion force that could end the strike.

    CPC cadres organized workers to maintain the strike with a highly disciplined formation governed by a robust democratic structure. The highest decision-making body was the Strikers’ Delegates Congress, which featured eight hundred delegates from unions, each representing one hundred workers. This body met every second day for more than a year to discuss the strike’s direction and organization. The committee openly published its minutes and resolutions in a magazine, Workers’ Road, that the strikers closely followed.

    The other main leadership body was an elected strike committee, chaired by Su, that was responsible for implementing the decisions made by the congress. Beneath the committee and congress were a host of departments in charge of different types of organizing, from coordinating finances and other logistical tasks to political education.

    The CPC built influence by helping to design and administer this efficient structure. It also provided political leadership by enabling strikers to participate in these institutions of workers’ democracy. Deng and other party cadres led an advisory committee that helped develop resolutions for discussion and debate in the congress.

    CPC cadres mobilized workers’ representatives to put forward motions and win others over to their tactics and positions. They organized worker leaders to read articles from Workers’ Road to strikers patrolling to enforce the boycott before their duties each morning, so workers could stay informed about political affairs.

    This guidance provided a mostly illiterate population of workers with an invaluable opportunity to practice expressing themselves politically and making decisions on how society should be run. All of this was still being organized under the aegis and financial support of the KMT regime, but Deng hoped that these experiments in workers’ democracy could develop into the seeds of a workers’ soviet. He even called the Strikers’ Delegates Congress the “herald of the future Chinese workers’ government.”

    For over a year, the scale of the strike expanded so much that the strikers’ organization became nearly indistinguishable from regional governance itself. The congress tasked workers with forming groups to patrol provincial borders and ports, making sure that British goods did not circulate. This “patrolling” often involved violent battles, as the strikers clashed with smugglers and other disrupters. Over a hundred workers lost their lives throughout the course of the strike in these pickets.

    One early threat to the strike came from Chen’s troops, who now received British support. But the workers’ patrols were so militarily effective that Wang could mainly rely on them to defeat Chen. These patrols practically became a workers’ militia that defended the authority of the strikers’ congress and the jurisdiction of the KMT itself.

    The success of the strike and the anti-Chen campaign initially strengthened the influence of Wang and the KMT’s left wing over the Canton KMT government. Wang largely left the congress in charge of the strike, and the strike committee commandeered and repurposed civic spaces to conduct its daily affairs. It ordered gambling houses, brothels, temples, and clan buildings to be turned into hostels and dining halls for strikers.

    The congress even set up its own court to arbitrate any disputes that arose during the strike. This court became a democratic judiciary that partly ran the city. An American correspondent from The Nation declared it to be “the only court in China where civil cases were properly tried.”

    The strike was an occasion for Cantonese workers to practice governing through workers’ democracy in a region long mired in conservative trade unionism. The congress empowered workers to elect their leaders, formulate structured political proposals, decide on political priorities, and act collectively to execute these decisions. Workers debated and passed nearly three hundred political resolutions within a year of the strike.

    The resolutions broke with many long-standing Cantonese union practices. For one, they mandated unions to be organized democratically with an elected committee, hold regular meetings, and act as vehicles for class struggle. As historian Jean Chesneaux noted, workers formed over eighty unions within a year of the strike, and elected committees ran all but twelve of the 168 Cantonese unions at its height.

    At the strike’s height, as Chesneaux described, “the strategy and organization of the strike were essentially in the hands of Communist cadres, and neither the nationalist government nor the people of Canton had any illusions about this.” But the inability of the Communists to form genuinely independent workers’ organizations ultimately contributed to the strike’s failure.

    At the beginning of the strike, the CPC was able to contain the ambitions of Canton’s merchants. It would have been impossible to gather broad union support for the strike without some compromises. The decision to narrow the scope of the boycott to just British goods meant there would be less competition and more profit for the local bourgeoisie. Deng summed up the CPC’s approach toward this conditional alliance as such: “Not yielding a foot in important matters, but being flexible in secondary matters . . . we will find a way to divide their forces later.”

    The power of the Communists lay in being the most organized force in the strike committee. Deng argued that the best way to combat the reactionary unions was through workers’ democracy. This meant centralizing major decisions in the congress, where striking workers were most concentrated and had the most power to decide on their own affairs. They opposed their corrupt union leaders by contesting their tactics in open view of the elected representatives of the working class.

    At the same time, the Canton CPC was not visible enough to organize workers independently from the KMT. The KMT was responsible for a significant amount of the funding of the strike, supporting the strike committee with a sizable monthly stipend to run its affairs. Though the KMT played a passive role in the strike, it nevertheless ran the Canton administration and backed the strike committee.

    The dual party affiliations of the Communists and their deep involvement in the day-to-day spadework of the strike made it hard to concentrate on recruitment into the CPC. Even when striking unions represented over 150,000 workers one year into the strike, there were still only around three hundred party members. Despite the power of the congress, it did not express a political infrastructure independent from the KMT into which the CPC could rally workers.

    This lack of class independence was the key weakness of the Communist strategy. The Communists were unable to organize workers under their own banner and program. This left an opening that the capitalist class and the KMT right could exploit.

    The Left’s hegemony was never quite secure. The cracks were showing even at the height of the strike committee’s power. Less than two months into the strike, Liao Zhong-kai, one of the top pro-Soviet and left-wing leaders in the KMT Executive Committee, was mysteriously assassinated. Many suspected the KMT right, but no proof was ever found.

    Liao’s assassination did not immediately benefit the KMT right. Wang ousted a few leaders of the KMT right such as Xu Chong-zhi, who led the KMT armed forces. By early 1926, however, the KMT right discovered a new champion — Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was a KMT military officer who rapidly rose in the KMT ranks after taking leadership of the KMT armed forces after Xu’s dismissal.

    Publicly, Chiang supported Wang’s maneuvers against the right after Liao’s assassination. He helped unify newly trained KMT military forces and the strikers to defeat Chen. But privately, Chiang sympathized with the KMT right’s anti-communism and waited for his moment to act against the Left.

    Chiang found his first opportunity on March 20, 1926. He accused a pro-Communist KMT navy captain of starting a coup. With this excuse, he abruptly declared martial law in Canton and mobilized KMT military units loyal to him to round up and detain Communist strike leaders. The Communists were caught completely off guard.

    However, Chiang knew it was not yet the right time to fully smash the Left. The national priorities of both parties were shifting. Thanks to the strike, the KMT had grown into a strong regional power with a base in southern China. Popular fervor against the imperialists and warlords continued to stir across the nation. Both the KMT and the CPC agreed that it was an opportune moment to launch a national military campaign heading north to defeat the warlords and unify China.

    The KMT had a different conception of what fighting imperialism meant than the CPC. For the former, breaking with imperialism was necessary only insofar as it allowed the Chinese bourgeoisie an equal chance to develop and compete in capitalist markets. For the latter, the goal was to overthrow the imperialist system, summon a national people’s assembly, and eventually found a workers’ state.

    The Communists in Canton were caught in a difficult position. They knew that much of their support with the working class still rested on a united front with the KMT against the British. The workers still overwhelmingly identified with the KMT, whose stature was further enhanced by its support of the strike.

    While Chiang wanted to eradicate the Communists from the KMT, he needed them to mobilize the masses for the campaign, so both sides compromised for now. Chiang backed off and released the Communists who had been arrested. He publicly criticized the KMT right and promised to preserve the alliance with the Communists.

    At the same time, he pressured Wang to resign and temporarily leave the country and decisively solidified his control and that of the military over the KMT. Chiang also required the Communists to hand over their list of members in the KMT and agree not to control more than a third of any KMT city, regional, or national party committees.

    Chiang’s show of force was the beginning of the strike’s drawn-out end. The CPC’s reaffirmation of the united front exposed their weaknesses to the KMT right, which rapidly gained power over the KMT in the ensuing months. Without organizing workers to oppose the KMT’s attempted assault on their ranks, the Communists let the KMT right push their limits, and Chiang began disarming the workers’ pickets as early as April. By May, the KMT right controlled the KMT Executive Committee.

    The Chiang-led KMT began openly calling for a strike settlement and strengthened KMT police authority over the congress. The government curtailed the strike committee’s ability to make arrests and reopened some businesses that had been used to house strikers since the previous June. Yellow union leaders began pushing back against the strikers’ authority.

    By the summer, the CPC itself was divided over whether to end the strike. Some saw the strike as a distraction from the Northern Expedition, while other cadres, like Huang Ping, argued against the view the striking during the expedition was “counterrevolutionary”: “We might as well tell workers that they should not eat during the expedition, as eating would be counterrevolutionary.”

    The negotiations with the British, led by the KMT rather than the strikers, stretched on until October. In the end, the strikers won few of their original demands.

    The Northern Expedition was a success, at least by the KMT’s standards. In March 1927, the KMT army, supported by the CPC, entered Nanjing. But many of the original Cantonese strikers who formed the popular base for the Northern Expedition did not make it that far. The KMT military dismissed many along the way and left them with few provisions.

    But the worst was still to come. Shortly after entering Nanjing, Chiang’s KMT finally purged the Communists for good. It hunted and shot thousands of Communists in the following weeks. The CPC organized scattered rebellions in different cities, including Canton, to resist. But all failed disastrously. Wang soon also joined Chiang and helped purge the Communists (Wang later turned further to the right and led Japan’s puppet regime in China during World War II).

    Only one in six CPC members survived 1927. The CPC’s connection to the urban working class was severed for two decades. At first, Deng evaded arrest and continued to organize underground. But in 1933, the KMT finally captured him in Shanghai and executed him.

    The CPC’s rebirth is now a legendary tale. Throughout the 1930s, the remnants of the party rebuilt its forces under Mao Zedong’s leadership in the countryside, eventually defeating both Japan and the KMT. But the CPC that eventually took power in 1949 fostered a different relationship with China’s industrial working class than before.

    By then, the party needed the working class for nation-building and sovereign development. The idea of workers’ democracy that the 1920s CPC had cultivated gave way to the practice of a ruling party that alone claimed to represent the entire class, permitting no alternatives.

    The Canton–Hong Kong strike remains a part of the PRC’s nationalist mythmaking. Last year, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions’ centennial event mainly praised the strikers as “patriotic,” with little attention to how they organized. Hong Kong’s labor secretary, Chris Sun, declared that the strike’s legacy involves Hong Kong “fully taking advantage of its privileged position as an international financial center.”

    A hundred years ago, the CPC did not see patriotism as an end goal, but a way to bridge workers’ national consciousness to a larger fight for socialism. Ultimately, Deng and his comrades failed to move the workers toward a socialist movement beyond national reunification. The strike’s failure shows that nationalism is not enough to build workers’ movements to dismantle capitalism.

    This lesson is salient for Chinese workers today, at home and overseas. China’s emergence as a capitalist superpower means that Chinese national consciousness is no longer simply an expression of the oppressed. It has a progressive side, when Chinese and Chinese diaspora workers resist US imperialism and chauvinism. It also has a reactionary side, when the PRC subordinates workers’ power and democracy to great-power nationalism.

    The strike’s centennial should remind us that Hong Kong’s long and incomplete fight for democracy began with workers’ struggle. Like the European working classes in 1848, Chinese workers did not win power. Still, they once governed on a regional scale, with little at their disposal. When they did, they dealt a major blow to imperialism and unified their country. Today, in a world wrought by new imperialist powers and a crisis of democracy, the Chinese working class has no dearth of world-historic tasks it can still accomplish.

    #histiire #Chine #communistes #mouvement_ouvrier

  • The Israel Lobby Is Out of Control
    https://jacobin.com/2026/09/israel-lobby-aipac-netanyahu-iran

    SETH ACKERMAN
    Almost twenty years ago, the international relations scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt wrote a very famous and very controversial book called The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Your book is in many ways a sequel to theirs. What made you decide the time was right for a book like this?

    ELI CLIFTON
    A lot has changed since 2007. Steve Walt and John Mearsheimer identified some of the global strategic costs that the lobby’s activities were imposing on Americans, and those have continued to amplify and magnify. But some of the other costs are more domestic in nature, and those were enabled by changes in our laws, which Steve and John could not have foreseen.

    In their book’s conclusion, they argued that support for a “no daylight” relationship with Israel was slowly seeping away. They identified that trend as having begun around 1999 or 2000, with the death of the Oslo Accords and the closing of the window on the two-state solution. And they predicted that that slow decline would be met by the rise of other institutions — such as J Street, Jewish Voice for Peace, and others — that would be able to advocate for a more normal and balanced US-Israel relationship and make it possible to wean US politics off the influence of the lobby.

    But in 2010, the Citizens United and SpeechNow decisions came down. That opened the floodgates of our campaign finance system. Starting in 2012, which was the first post–Citizens United election, when you look at who the biggest donors were, it was Sheldon Adelson and other pro-Israel billionaire megadonors. And they said very explicitly that they were doing this for Israel.

    So in the face of declining public support for Israel — which really accelerated post–October 7 across pretty much every demographic — that allowed them to create a stopgap.

  • Starbucks Workers Are Calling for a Nationwide Boycott
    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/starbucks-union-boycott-strike-contract

    29.8.2026 by Jenny Brown - Hoping to pressure Starbucks to finally sign a contract with its 12,000 unionized baristas, Starbucks Workers United has called for a boycott of the company. It is asking individuals as well as organizations and unions to stop patronizing the coffee giant.

    Seeking to pressure Starbucks to finally sign a contract with its 12,000 unionized baristas, Starbucks Workers United announced a boycott of the chain August 25. In addition to individual customers, they are asking organizations and unions to stop patronizing the coffee giant, including avoiding catering and sponsorships, until they get a contract.

    The AFL-CIO has already signed on, and the 25,000-strong Chicago Teachers Union voted to boycott on August 26.

  • AI Isn’t Coming for Our Jobs. It’s Coming for Our Wages.
    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/ai-job-loss-wages-capital

    308.2026 by Nuno Teles - Over the short term, AI may create more jobs than it destroys. But bosses will use it to de-skill work and suppress wages unless workers make it a terrain of class struggle and fight to put it under public control.

    The Economist recently ran a cover entitled “Prepare for an AI jobs apocalypse,” citing widespread fear among the American public of artificial-intelligence-induced job losses. Such fearmongering is far from new. Information technology breakthroughs have led to many such announcements over the last few decades.

    In the 1990s, we had the computer scare, prompted by best-selling authors such as Jeremy Rifkin and Viviane Forrester. More recently, in 2013, we had the robot menace, when an Oxford study estimated that 47 percent of jobs in the United States were at risk of computerization. At both times, such prophecies coincided with mass unemployment, not caused by technology but by economic recessions driven by financial instability and austerity policies. Yet such stories helped to naturalize and depoliticize unemployment.

    As The Economist points out, the scenario today is different. The predicted mass destruction of jobs coincides, in fact, with historically high employment. Given the ongoing investment boom not only in data center infrastructure but also in upstream utilities such as water and electricity supply, the AI frenzy is now arguably creating more jobs than it is destroying. Another peculiarity is that the current narrative of the job-apocalypse story is driven by AI giants as a marketing strategy to sell their large language models (LLMs) to financial investors and, therefore, feed the ongoing financial euphoria. Nonetheless, the Left should not dismiss the potential systemic effects of AI in the labor process, notably its role in de-skilling and devaluing labor. AI needs to be historically understood and situated as a breakthrough born from concentration and centralization — and of capital’s struggle with labor.

    #IA #travail

  • Une menace pour l’autoritarisme de Trump

    L’administration Trump tente de criminaliser des syndicalistes pour s’être mobilisé·es contre sa campagne de répression en matière d’immigration menée dans le Minnesota au début de l’année. En effet, elle considère à juste titre le mouvement syndical comme une menace pour ses visées autoritaires.

    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/organized-labor-indictments-minnesota-ice

    #usa

  • Don’t Just Tax the Rich — Attack Inequality at the Root
    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/taxes-inequality-markets-regulation-finance

    Many discussions of US income inequality propose to solve the problem by taxing the rich more heavily. That would be a good start. But we can also reshape markets so that they don’t generate so much pretax inequality. photo Scott Olson

    Voilà une belle analogie entre la circulation et la société en général : le déclin du nombre de morts par accidents de voiture n’est pas le résultat du progrès médical mais de la régulation de la circulation automobile et de voitures moins gangereuses pour les utilisateurs. Il ne suffit pas d’imposer davantage les riches. Il faut lutter cintres les causes de la répartition injuste des fortunes et revenus.

    8.8.2026 by Arthur MacEwan - To address the US’s severe inequality, we can and should raise taxes on the rich. But we can also restructure markets so that they don’t produce such unequal incomes in the first place, by reining in corporate power and our predatory financial sector.

    Economic inequality in the United States has risen dramatically over the last sixty years. Indeed, the degree of inequality today is probably greater than at any point in the country’s history. This severe inequality is a severe social malady. So, what should we do about it?

    Consider the following analogy. Suppose that, in response to the high rate of fatalities from automobile accidents, the United States had undertaken major investments in hospital trauma centers, improving the medical system’s means of caring for people who had been injured in such accidents. These investments would have included funds for the extensive training of doctors and for emergency room equipment.

    In fact, over the last several decades, there has been a dramatic decline in fatalities from automobile accidents. Perhaps some of the decline has come from improved trauma care. However, the really important changes that account for this decline have been seat belts and airbags (and, most recently, safety technology built into cars), improved road design and traffic control, and campaigns (and laws) against drunk driving.

    In other words, the reduction in car accident deaths has been due to changes that have reduced the number, or at least the severity, of accidents, not from the treatment of people who have been seriously injured in accidents. As a society, we have intervened in causes of car accident deaths rather than just trying to fix up the injured people after the accidents have happened. We might learn from this experience and apply the same approach to severe inequality in the United States.

    Like fixing up people after automobile accidents, higher taxes on the rich are an after-the-fact fix-up to the problem of great economic inequality. And like helping people recover after automobile accidents, higher taxes on the rich are certainly desirable. (A good place to start would be making tax rates on capital gains as high as tax rates on labor income.) But in both cases, these treatments do not address the origins of the problems — the high rate of severe injuries from car accidents and the rising share of income going to the very rich.

    There is an added problem. A policy of focusing on repairing the injured people after the accidents can draw attention away from eliminating or reducing the cause of the damage. Likewise, a policy of focusing on taxing the rich after they have become exorbitantly wealthy can draw attention away from the causes of our great inequality and perhaps imply that there is nothing we can do about those causes.

    At the same time as we tax the rich, there are things we can do about the causes of great inequality. The severe inequality we face is not simply the result of the way “free markets” operate. Indeed, there is really no such thing as “free markets.” Markets are not simply the “natural” order of things, existing beyond human control. Markets are social creations, constructed by governments and by people with social power. They are not set in stone. Perhaps a few examples will clarify the point.

    Consider, for starters, the labor market. In 2022, the US Department of the Treasury issued a report stating, “The American labor market is characterized by high levels of employer power . . . . A careful review of credible academic studies places the decrease in wages at roughly 20 percent relative to the level [they would be] in a fully competitive market.” Among the factors that generate this result are “noncompete agreements,” which prevent employees from taking jobs with other competing firms, and labor laws that tend to favor employers. When the laws themselves don’t favor employers, the administration and lack of enforcement of the laws often serve that function

    Then there are international markets. For millennia, governments have been involved in commerce around the globe, setting the rules for who could trade in what, protecting ships at sea, building and maintaining seaports and airports and roads, restricting and taxing trade in many commodities, and establishing trade arrangements among countries. In the current era, it has become especially clear that trade agreements tend to favor the interests of powerful businesses, while placing workers in various countries in competition with one another. One of the interesting — and perverse — aspects of US trade agreements in recent decades is that they are often called “free-trade agreements”; in fact, they generally extend monopoly power by including extensions of US patent and copyright laws. Monopoly power is not confined to international commerce. It has also been increasing within the United States and has provided a basis for rising corporate profits. There are, of course, laws in place to restrict monopolies; these laws are themselves examples of government involvement in the operation of markets. Yet in recent decades (with a brief exception during the Biden administration), these laws have not been effectively enforced. Here, one might say, it was not the anti-monopoly laws that constructed the market, but the government’s choice to ignore those laws. And as is the case internationally, patent and copyright laws support monopoly power within the United States.

    There are other important examples of government’s role in shaping markets in ways that impact economic inequality. Long-existing subsidies to fossil fuel firms and operating school systems that continually recreate social inequality are important examples.

    And connecting all the markets for goods and services is the financial system, which, through deregulation, has become detached from its traditional role of allocating funds to enterprises — a useful function in a market economy. According to Oren Cass, the chief economist at the American Compass, which the New York Times describes as “a conservative economic think tank,” the “finance industry is a grift.” Cass points out that the industry has generated “financialization,” which he describes as follows:

    The term for making financial markets and transactions ends unto themselves, disconnected from — and often at the expense of — the societal benefits that support human flourishing and are capitalism’s proper purpose. Chief among those benefits are good jobs that support families, and products and services that improve people’s lives.

    Financialization has made American businesses less resilient, less innovative and less competitive. It has been a major cause of slow wage growth and rising inequality. It has fueled the loss of manufacturing jobs across the heartland.

    And financialization has been very profitable for a small group of people and thus an important generator of rising inequality!

    The lesson of all this — this brief account of how markets are structured in ways that generate extreme inequality in the United States — is that we had better focus some attention on the way markets are constructed and undertake some restructuring.

    One might argue that reconstructing markets is not enough. It would, of course, be good to make labor markets more worker-friendly, to disrupt monopoly power in many markets, and to organize global trade to undermine its exacerbation of inequality — to say nothing of reining in financialization. Yet beyond focusing on these broad markets, we could benefit from a systemic approach through a general extension of social control of economic activity and a reduction in the heavy reliance on markets as the foundation of economic relations. Similarly, returning to automobile deaths, we might argue that the real solution lies in a much more extensive public transportation system, rather than simply safer cars and driving conditions.

    These would be reasonable arguments and well worth considering. But neither social control of the economy nor widespread effective public transportation will come into being overnight. In the meantime, we need to do what we can to make society, including transportation, work as well as possible. This will not solve all our economic ills, but it would move things in the right direction.

    #USA #capitalisme #lutte_des_classes

  • The Fight for Abortion Rights Was Won in the Streets
    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/feminist-movement-abortion-choice-roe

    Roe v. Wade wasn’t won quietly behind the scenes — it was won by a mass movement with national demands. Photo Bob Parent

    La lutte ppur le droit à l’IVG continue. C’est une lutte internationale essentielle pour la liberté de toutes et tous.

    8.8.2026 by Nancy Rosenstock - Half a century ago, feminists won Roe v. Wade with mass demonstrations and a sweeping national vision. A veteran of that movement argues that today’s fight requires the same strategy.

    Four years after the Supreme Court’s decision overturning Roe v. Wade and the federal right to abortion, the rate of abortion has actually increased.

    According to the Society of Family Planning, in 2022 there were 80,000 abortions per month in the United States; in the first half of 2025, that figure had risen to 99,000. This increase, despite bans and other restrictions, is telling. Alongside it are advances in reproductive care, most notably the widespread use of medication abortion, often obtained through telemedicine. In the first half of 2025, for example, 27 percent of all abortions were provided through telehealth.

    Nevertheless, thirteen states have imposed total bans on abortion, and seven others have partial bans. These have resulted in hardship and sometimes death. Despite these outcomes, the attacks on abortion access continue. In response, organizations that support women seeking abortions have proliferated, employing a range of methods, from legislative campaigns to abortion funds that raise money, organize transportation, and otherwise ease the burden on those trying to end their pregnancies.

    In this light, it’s useful to step back and look at how we won legal abortion nationally the first time: what groups existed and what strategies and tactics they employed. Not all of it remains applicable today, but the history contains lessons for those fighting to regain abortion rights. This article will focus on one group in particular: the Women’s National Abortion Action Coalition, known as WONAAC, of which I was an active member.

    Understanding the landscape women faced in the years before 1973 helps explain what drove abortion rights activists. Those of us in Boston Female Liberation, for example, confronted a particularly reactionary situation. Massachusetts had a 124-year-old statute on the books, the Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order law, which not only banned nearly all abortions but prohibited unmarried women from getting birth control information — much less actual contraceptives — even from licensed physicians. The only way to obtain a legal abortion in the state was to secure the approval of at least two doctors, including a psychiatrist, attesting that carrying the pregnancy to term would cause serious physical or mental harm.

    The facts show a stark reality. According to the Guttmacher Institute, by 1965 the number of deaths from illegal abortions had fallen to just under two hundred — but illegal abortions still accounted for 17 percent of all deaths attributed to pregnancy and childbirth that year. In New York City in the early 1960s, one in four childbirth-related deaths among white women was due to abortion; among black and Puerto Rican women, it was one in two.

    The abortion issue was central to the new wave of feminism that exploded in the late 1960s. In August 1970, fifty thousand women marched in New York City, with actions in ninety other cities, marking the public emergence of the women’s liberation movement. The Women’s Strike for Equality had three demands: free abortion on demand and no forced sterilization; free community-controlled twenty-four-hour childcare centers; and equal opportunity in jobs and education.

    Feminists like us in Boston Female Liberation saw abortion as central. We knew that without control of our bodies, we would never be able to control our lives. “Abortion: A Feminist Perspective” appeared in Female Liberation’s magazine, The Second Wave, in 1971. In it, Nancy Williamson wrote:

    We can go on dying from illegal abortions, bearing unwanted children, and suffering the guilt and pain and social stigma that is imposed upon us by this government. Or we can make a concentrated effort right now to change the laws in every state in the country. We didn’t choose the abortion issue. It chose us.

    WONAAC grew out of the campaign around Women vs. Connecticut. The plaintiffs in the case — more than one thousand women — aimed to overturn the state’s oppressive law, which at the time allowed abortion only when necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Women who had abortions, as well as anyone who performed them or helped women arrange them, could be imprisoned or fined.

    A Women vs. Connecticut organizing pamphlet from 1970 described the goal of the lawsuit:

    Women vs. Connecticut has not chosen to try and change the law because we believe in the power of the law to bring about the liberation of women, or even because we are convinced that once the law is declared unconstitutional all women who need them will be able to get abortions in Connecticut. We see changing the law only as a necessary first step toward making those things possible.

    The women involved saw the need for a national focus to the many statewide fights underway at the time.

    WONAAC held its first national conference in New York City in 1971. The call for the conference declared: “Repeal all Abortion Laws; No Forced Sterilization; No Contraception Laws; Abortion: A Woman’s Right to Choose.” Elaborating on the centrality of the abortion issue, it stated:

    We believe all laws that restrict a woman’s right to abortion deny us one of our most basic rights — the right to control our own bodies, the right to control our lives. Restrictive abortion laws provide the basis for legalized murder of thousands of women every year. We defend the right of every woman to decide for herself whether or not she wishes to bear children. We call upon all women to join us for a woman’s national abortion conference that will launch a powerful national action campaign for the repeal of all abortion laws.

    With a thousand women attending from twenty-three states and 253 organizations, the conference adopted a national campaign for the repeal of all abortion laws, encompassing legislation, legal action, women’s speak-outs, and demonstrations.

    The conference agenda included an opening rally, a closing plenary session, and numerous workshops. A Third World women’s proposal — one of many adopted by the conference — stated:

    Part of this struggle to control our own bodies is the fight against forced sterilization and population control schemes. The campaign to get rid of abortion laws is one of the best ways to fight forced sterilization because the lack of legal abortion has been used for years to force women to undergo sterilization. As part of this campaign, we will also fight the racist laws which have been proposed in some states, which stipulate that welfare mothers must be sterilized after they have had a certain number of children. WE ARE AGAINST FORCED STERILIZATION AND FORCED MOTHERHOOD. IT IS A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO CHOOSE.

    Coming out of the conference, demonstrations took place in Washington, DC, and San Francisco on November 20, 1971, with three thousand attending in each city. Dr Barbara Roberts, a national project director of WONAAC, opened the DC rally with a speech. “November 20 will go down in history,” she said, “because for the first time, masses of women have gathered together to tell this government in no uncertain terms that we will no longer tolerate laws that degrade, mutilate and murder women.”

    Another WONAAC campaign was the defense of Shirley Wheeler. In 1971, Wheeler, a twenty-three-year-old Florida woman, was convicted of manslaughter for having an abortion — the first woman in the United States to be convicted on such a charge. The court denied her motion for a retrial and sentenced her to two years’ probation. On the day of her sentencing, Wheeler asserted, “I’m not the criminal; the state is.” WONAAC initiated a petition in her support, and demonstrations were held in multiple cities in her defense. Nancy Stearns, a lawyer with the Center for Constitutional Rights, took on Wheeler’s case and spoke about its importance at WONAAC’s first national conference. The case became a stark example of the consequences of criminalized abortion and a rallying cry to repeal the unjust laws that denied us the right to control our own bodies.

    WONAAC’s second national conference, held in February 1972 in Boston, drew 1,300 women. The call for the conference noted the stepped-up attacks from antiabortion forces:

    The response of all women to these attacks on a woman’s right to control her own body must be to unite in even greater strength and determination, to work out a program for action through the courts, the legislatures and through our continued mobilizations in the streets of every country of the world to win the total repeal of all anti-abortion and restrictive contraception laws, to end forced sterilization and to win abortion as every woman’s right to choose.

    To involve as many women as possible ahead of the gathering, WONAAC opened its newsletter to preconference discussion and debate over strategies for winning abortion law repeal.

    The conference voted to build an Abortion Action Week in May 1972. The resolution adopted stated in part:

    We think that this proposal allows for maximum flexibility, creativity and initiative at the local level while retaining the national focus which is so important if we are all to win the right to abortion. As long as any restrictive abortion laws remain on the books, we know that partial victories in isolated states will be vulnerable to attack and that at least some of our sisters will continue to be subjected to dangerous, humiliating and illegal abortions. We want to build so powerful and compelling a campaign that women in every community and state will have the option of safe, legal abortion, will have access to reliable contraceptives, and will never fear forced sterilization.

    May 6, 1972, was the culmination of Abortion Action Week. Twelve demonstrations took place across the country, from New York City, where 1,500 marched, to Sacramento, where 250 rallied.

    In July 1972, WONAAC held its third national conference in New York City. Attended by eight hundred women, the conference decided to build an International Tribunal on Abortion, Contraception and Forced Sterilization. Promoting the tribunal, the WONAAC newsletter stated:

    The Tribunal will tell the truth. We will say: No more suffering in silence! No more fear of demanding those rights which are ours! The Tribunal will dispel the myths surrounding abortion, contraception, and forced sterilization and give voice to the millions of women who daily suffer from the laws which legislate our reproductive systems.

    Some six hundred attended the event held at the prestigious Town Hall in New York City on March 10, 1973. The tribunal had a panel of judges that included Florynce Kennedy, the renowned radical feminist, lawyer, and civil rights activist.

    The tribunal’s international character was underscored by the attendance of women from France, including a leader of the French abortion rights organization Choisir. The proceedings themselves were striking — testimony from individual women about their experiences with abortion, alongside testimony from doctors, lawyers, elected officials, and religious figures. Barbara Mutnick helped organize the tribunal. When I interviewed her in 2025, she recalled, “It was such a moving experience; it was like theater, very effective.”

    Why did all three WONAAC conferences held before the 1973 Supreme Court decision call for “repeal” rather than “reform” of abortion laws? In an article in the August 9, 1972, issue of the Guardian, the American radical newsweekly, Cindy Cisler of New Yorkers for Abortion Law Repeal explained: “In no case has reform led to repeal: on the contrary, it has bought off so much of the citizenry that efforts to achieve repeal have been set back in those states.”

    In January 1973, abortion became legal nationwide with the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade — a huge victory spurred by feminists. WONAAC held a rally and forum on February 2, 1973, in New York City to “learn the meaning of the Supreme Court decision and to celebrate this tremendous victory for women.” Speaking at the forum, Dr Barbara Roberts pointed to the shift in consciousness that had helped produce the decision:

    No political body makes decisions in a vacuum. Public opinion on abortion was changed only when feminist women stood up in public and said abortion is our right. This victory was not won working quietly behind the scenes. It wasn’t won by refusing to confront our enemies. It wasn’t won because a few influential people agreed with us, but because we convinced millions of people that we were right.

    The Supreme Court’s decision affirmed abortion as a basic constitutional right, on the premise that the right to privacy includes the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. During the first trimester — up to the twelfth week of pregnancy — no restrictions could be placed on abortion. During the second, women were required to obtain abortions in a hospital. During the last, states could prohibit abortion except when the life or health of the woman was endangered.

    Noting that the decision did not declare abortion an absolute right, WONAAC wrote in its February–March 1973 newsletter that “this is the major aspect of the decision with which the abortion rights movement disagrees.” Summing up the victory, the newsletter continued:

    With the Supreme Court decision on abortion, women in the United States have taken a major step toward gaining control of our bodies and lives. We have much work that remains to be done, but our victory this winter of 1973 should give us the confidence and prove to all that we have the power to go much further.

    Today, fifty-three years after Roe v. Wade, debate over the decision has become a feature of the fight for abortion access. Some activists say that Roe did not go far enough, that it was a compromise; others that Roe legalized abortion but that legalization without access is not enough. In my opinion, this view is ahistorical. No reform ever goes far enough; all are compromises to some extent. But in 1973, Roe v. Wade was a major step forward in a continuing struggle. Those of us involved in WONAAC never said the fight was over in 1973. We saw it as ongoing.

    One key to the fight that legalized abortion — a fight in which WONAAC played an important part — was its national focus. One result of the Dobbs decision is that the battle lines are now drawn state by state, something abortion rights activists have had to grapple with. This terrain has been forced on us, and it puts the movement in a weaker position.

    The challenges ahead are great, and we need to remain vigilant. Attempts to restrict medication abortion continue. Mifepristone remains available through telehealth following a May 14, 2026, Supreme Court ruling — but that ruling is only a pause in the litigation.

    There are many fronts in this fight: removing state bans, securing full access to medication abortion, lifting restrictions on telemedicine, resisting attempts to criminalize abortion, exposing “fake clinics,” and more. But we shouldn’t lose the national focus. We know that without the right to control our own bodies — to decide if and when we will have children — we will never be able to control our own lives.

    #USA #féminisme #avortement #iatrocratie

  • The Marxist Case for the Technofeudal Hypothesis
    https://jacobin.com/2026/08/varoufakis-tech-capital-marxism-technofeudalism

    Voici une clé pour construire les défenses contre le monstre dans l’article précédent :

    OnlyFans, Deepfakes und Doxing : Wie die Digitalisierung die Sexarbeit verändert
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1184941

    Est-ce qu’on saura organiser le mouvement populaire qui fera ltomber es techno-féodalistes suivant les idées de l’ancien minustre d’économie grec échoué ? Qui sait.

    4.8.2026 by Yanis Varoufakis - Yanis Varoufakis has called Big Tech’s overweening power to shape the modern economy “technofeudalism.” Writing for Jacobin, he argues that this isn’t a moral critique but one based in the dynamic of capital accumulation today.

    When my book Technofeudalism was published in 2023, I had not imagined that the likes of Steve Bannon would embrace it. I had, however, fully anticipated a barrage of criticism from Marxist thinkers, especially in response to the book’s provocative subtitle (What Killed Capitalism). It is now incumbent on me to present the Marxist case for the technofeudal hypothesis, which, though written for a broader audience, was Marxist in its conception.

    Karl Marx’s own method sought to bypass moralistic censure of capitalism’s penchant for injustice, monopoly, and sleaze. Instead he studied capitalism in its purest form: as an anarchic market system driven by an alien force — capital — seeking its own proliferation, a task necessitating the commodification of everything and a vicious class struggle over surplus value. Any analysis that claims to continue Marx’s work must do likewise.

    Today, I contend, a mutation of capital has gained inordinate traction. I call it cloud capital: a network of remarkable machines that produce no commodities but generate enormous rent-extracting powers by interfacing directly with us, outside anything that can usefully be called a market. Studying this novel form of capital should be every Marxist’s responsibility.

    Before focusing on cloud capital, it is important to clear away three common misunderstandings. First, no, we are not returning to feudalism. History is not going backward. Driven by unbridled capital accumulation, we are hurtling forward into a brand-new socioeconomic mode. According to the technofeudal hypothesis, capital is more dominant than ever. Wealth grows exponentially from gigantic investments in dynamic machines, not static assets. Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta, and Apple are as ruthlessly capitalist as Edison and Ford ever were. Thus, the term “technofeudal” denotes no literal regression, but rather draws an analogy with extractive power practiced outside markets.

    Second, rents are not new to capitalism. Capitalism never existed in the pure form of mainstream economics. Like our bodies need residual serpent DNA, capitalism needed remnants of feudalism to function. David Ricardo warned that ground rent would grow dangerously, as it did. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy showed how monopoly surplus was a form of rent. Since the 1970s, financialization grafted mountainous financial rents onto existing forms. So the mere proliferation of rents offers no evidence that capitalism is evolving into something else. For such a claim to be plausible, there must be evidence of a qualitative change in capital itself.

    Third, data is not the new land. The belief that our stolen data has become the new feudal estate is a form of “data fetishism” that Marxists must reject. “Surveillance capitalism” constitutes no qualitative change of the capitalist system, since legislation granting us property rights over our data would eliminate any rents extracted via its surreptitious harvesting. The real novelty lies elsewhere: in how cloud capital uses data to modify our behavior directly and “transport” us outside anything resembling a capitalist market.

    In short, the technofeudal hypothesis revolves around the notion of cloud capital. To grasp its nature, we need to start with Marx’s definition of commodities as goods or services produced for exchange in a market, of capital goods as produced means of commodity production (PMCP), and of markets as decentralized spheres of circulation where labor values turn into money and surplus values into profits, rents, and interest.

    Are Google’s machines conventional PMCP-type capital goods or cloud capital? The answer is: it depends! When Google charges you for a film on YouTube, it sells a commodity — in which case its machines function as standard PMCP. However, when Google’s machines offer you a free search result or directions on a map, they function as cloud capital: cloud-based machines that produce no commodities but enter into a relationship with you to modify your behavior. This is something no machines could achieve until recently.

    But how does cloud capital modify our behavior? By engaging us in one-on-one, two-way, real-time dialogue. Consider Amazon’s Alexa. It trains you to train it to know your preferences so as to do things for you, offer you good advice, and thus gain your trust. Then, one day, when your coffee maker dies, it suggests you buy a particular model. You click “buy.” What just happened? Cloud capital has sold you a commodity that it played no role in producing, and its owner, Jeff Bezos, pocketed up to 40 percent of the price as cloud rent, a form of absolute rent.

    Evidently, these machines are not conventional capital goods (PMCP). They have crossed the Rubicon into what I call “produced means of behavioral modification (PMBM)” — or cloud capital. Fascinatingly, cloud capital is, in Marx’s technical sense, unproductive (as it produces no commodities) but hugely powerful, its novel social power extending over consumers, over waged laborers, and over conventional capitalist producers. In the process, cloud capital replaces markets with something I call cloud fiefs, like Amazon.com.

    Why is Amazon.com nothing like a market? Recall Gosplan, the Soviet planning ministry. It too offered a top-down algorithmic system matching buyers and sellers. That was not a market — it was its opposite. Amazon is similar: a centrally planned allocation system. No one interacts with anyone unless the algorithm matches them. Given that, unlike Gosplan, Amazon is privately owned, it is best defined as a cloud fief, not a capitalist marketplace.

    Consider Instacart. It practices “perfect price optimization” — every customer gets a unique, noncomparable price. Price competition thus becomes impossible. Retailers and platforms can collude in ways the naked eye never discerns. The system is designed to be an invisible solvent of a market mechanism’s basic traits.

    Consider Uber. Yes, it looks like a monopoly reseller of drivers’ labor. But Uber also tracks drivers’ debt obligations. It offers higher rates and loans to update their cars to reluctant drivers, then lowers pay rates once they are hooked. ShiftMed does the same with nurses — offering lower rates just before their rent is due. This is algorithmic extra-market despotism, not a capitalist labor market in which, as Marx hypothesized, wages reflect the labor values of the wage goods they buy.

    And here is another insight that Marxists must grasp: for the first time, free labor helps a variant of capital enhance its powers to modify everyone’s behavior in the interests of its owners. Unlike conventional capital, which only waged labor manufactures, massive free labor helps cloud capital accumulate. With every video we post, every rating we give, every mile we drive, every purchase we make — we augment cloud capital and raise our own costs of quitting. We can leave a platform, yes. But the cost of leaving increases with every click. Formal freedom masks real unfreedom. That is the classic Marxian diagnosis, applied to the age of cloud capital.

    “But are the platforms not fiercely competing with one another?” many ask. “Are their clashes not evidence of ruthless market competition?” No, it is not. Market competition is based on price and quality and unfolds in decentralized markets. Economic rivalry, in contrast, of the sort we see today in the clashes between TikTok and Instagram, Uber and Lyft, etc., is zero-sum, territorial, pitching one fully centralized cloud fief against another. Unlike the market contest between, say, Toyota and General Motors, platforms race to lock us in their centralized trading schemes, not to offer us lower prices or higher quality.

    What about successful YouTubers and influencers? They work hard, and some of them earn well. Are they not entrepreneurs? From a Marxist perspective, they are not. Their labor produces no new exchange value and no productive capital (cloud capital itself is unproductive). It generates only use-value and helps lure unpaid users, but it does not create surplus value. Influencers are, in that sense, not capitalists but, instead, a well-remunerated, privileged layer of cloud serfs, their high pay obscuring the general condition: most of us laboring unpaid to augment cloud capital’s power over us.

    Now let me turn to macroeconomics. Marx showed that capitalism’s accumulation drive produces business cycles and a long-term falling rate of profit. In the longer paper, I extended his analysis to include cloud capital. Following Richard Goodwin’s adaptation of a prey–predator model, the analysis demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the economy’s productive department, where all value is created utilizing conventional capital and waged labor, and the technofeudal department, where cloud rents are extracted. Four phases emerge.

    At first, the technofeudal department grows at the expense of the productive department. Then, once cloud rent extraction exceeds a threshold, productive capital accumulates again and both departments grow. A third phase kicks in when, as the profit rate exceeds another threshold, cloud capital overaccumulates and its capacity to extract rent wanes. Lastly, in the fourth phase, both the profit rate and the cloud rent extraction rate decline.

    In the long run, as cloud capital accumulates and unpaid labor replaces more and more waged labor in the technofeudal department, the thresholds themselves decline and the system tends toward a collapse of both profit rates and cloud rent extraction rates. Thus the technofeudal hypothesis generalizes Marx’s falling rate of profit to a world with cloud capital, reaffirming the Marxist case for socialism as the only alternative to system failure and societal collapse.

    Since my Technofeudalism was published, artificial intelligence has become all the rage. Cloud capital did not need AI to emerge — reinforcement learning algorithms built the first cloud fiefs. But AI massively escalates cloud capital’s power. AI-powered bots will soon know us perfectly, speak to us like humans, and cultivate emotional dependence. Switching platforms will become akin to a heart-wrenching divorce. This creates what I call “artificial social relations of consumption (ASRC),” which dialectically interact with the machines themselves.

    How did capital respond, in the past, to its intensifying contradictions? Marx’s successors identified three responses: finance capital, imperialism, and legitimizing ideologies. We see the same today:

    Cloud finance: the merger of cloud capital with traditional finance has ignited a New Cold War between the United States and China. Through stablecoins and Trump’s “Genius Act” cloud finance is privatizing the dollar, giving Big Tech powers once reserved for central banks.

    Imperialism and war: AI targeting systems that brought mega-death to Gaza are the same cloud capital that Palantir and Oracle sell to Britain’s National Health Service. Technofeudalism is modern war’s handmaiden.

    Techlordism: a new ideology replacing neoliberalism. As neoliberalism deified the market, techlordism deifies cloud capital, offering a veneer of philosophical legitimacy to the replacement of human labor with rent-extracting machines, integrating Big Tech into state institutions and handing central banks over to cloud finance.

    And here is the central dialectical contradiction: the more successfully the cloudalist class concentrates all powers — industrial, financial, political, cultural, and state power — the faster it drives down both profit rates and cloud rent extraction rates. Private success breeds system failure.

    Some critics fear that by arguing that something worse than capitalism has arrived, I absolved capitalism or served bourgeois propagandists who want to return to a mythical pure capitalism. This fear is misplaced. My hypothesis is grounded firmly in the Marxist tradition. Capitalism was always monstrously irrational. Technofeudalism is a mutation internal to capitalism: it arose because the socialist transformation was averted brutally. Recognizing this does not excuse capitalism; it sharpens the need for socialism.

    Perhaps the greatest contribution of the technofeudal hypothesis is its illustration of how private capital has become inconsistent not only with social well-being but even with private ownership — except for a tiny band of techlords. AI-enabled cloud capital is collectivizing our labor, our intellect, our identity, even our audiovisual likeness. The bourgeois state is incapable of regulating Big Tech. The case for socializing both productive and cloud capital — all of society’s capital stock — emerges stronger than ever.

    Regarding our theory of change, some Marxists are critical of my call for a united front of traditional proletarians, cloud proles (waged gig workers), cloud serfs (unpaid users), and even vassal capitalists (small businesses being crushed by cloud fiefs). This is contentious, naturally. And yet Marxists have always debated alliances — with peasants, or with the petty bourgeoisie. This debate must continue within our tradition, not outside it.

    Let me end with the semantic question. Is this still capitalism, or should we call it technofeudalism? I understand the hesitation. A Marxist economist once told me, with a bitter smile, that he refused to let go of the thought that people like us came to this world to overthrow capitalism. “If capital did that without us,” he asked, “what’s our purpose?” I sympathize. I too grew up hoping the Left would have the honor of felling capitalism. But then there is Rosa Luxemburg’s devastating question: “Socialism or barbarism?” Her point was that socialism was not inevitable — that barbarism was a very real possibility. In her day, barbarism took the form of fascism. Today’s fascism rides on the coattails of technofeudalism and techlordist ideology.

    So what’s in a word? In the 1770s, Adam Smith celebrated “commercial society” even though Britain’s feudal department was still larger than its capitalist department. In the 1840s, Marx and Friedrich Engels could have called the new era “industrial feudalism.” But calling it capitalism helped people living in the nineteenth century grasp the transformation underway.

    The safe option today is to assume the cloudalist transformation is internal to capitalism. The controversial option, which I argue for, is to adopt a new term like technofeudalism to jolt our collective imagination. Both are defensible within the Marxist tradition. Neither is a reason for nastiness between Marxists.

    Dialectics teaches us that reality is built on contradiction. At the time of the original Great Transformation, society was both feudal and capitalist. Today, it is both capitalist and technofeudal. The whole point of Marxist dialectics is to recognize this puzzling coexistence, and to see in it the possibility of overcoming the contradiction through socialist transformation.

    First, we must see the contradiction. Once we do, the emancipatory potential knows no bounds.

  • Pakistani-Ruled Kashmir Is Facing a Brutal State Crackdown
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/kashmir-pakistan-protests-democracy-economy

    The Pakistan-administered territory of Jammu Kashmir is witnessing the broadest confrontation between the masses and the Pakistani state in decades. Since early June, state security forces have killed dozens of protesters in a bid to crush the movement. (AFP / Getty Images)

    31.7.2026 by Umair KhurshidFarooq SulehriaHarris Qadeer - The areas of Kashmir under Pakistani administration are supposed to have political autonomy, but that has long been a sham. The Pakistani authorities have responded to popular protests demanding real democracy with brutal repression.

    The Pakistan-administered territory of Jammu Kashmir (PaJK) is witnessing the most extensive confrontation between the masses and the Pakistani state in decades. Between June 5 and July 27, at least forty-five people were killed as Islamabad sought to crush the movement before it could consolidate.

    On July 27, security forces opened fire on thousands of unarmed protesters marching towards the town of Rawalakot, killing twenty-one people. The following day, another fourteen were gunned down in Rawalakot, Mirpur, and other towns, while two more protesters were killed on July 29, bringing the death toll from the latest crackdown to at least thirty-seven. There has been an internet shutdown in place since June 5. Cellular networks have also ceased to function. Such shutdowns routinely accompany state violence.

    The present confrontation started on June 5 and represents the third major phase of an Intifada-like uprising that has unfolded since 2023. Two previous uprisings won huge victories against the implementation of neoliberal measures: for instance, subsidies were revived while unbearably inflated utility bills were slashed.

    The recent killings are not an exceptional breakdown of state authority but express the logic of a political order whose survival depends upon denying the people in PaJK any meaningful control over the conditions of their own existence. The PaJK, unlike Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir (IaJK), is not integrated into the Pakistani state and enjoys formal (though highly symbolic) autonomy. Its population of 4.3 million people is approximately one-third that of the Indian-ruled territories, and it covers less than one-quarter of their land area.

    In practice, the ongoing dispute involves election manipulation, especially through so-called reserve seats. Islamabad rigs and manipulates elections to install a puppet government in PaJK.

    The present uprising cannot be understood through the language of economic crisis alone. Rising electricity tariffs, soaring fuel prices, inflation, and declining living standards supplied the immediate grievances around which the movement crystallized. But these conditions were themselves products of a deeper political relationship. They reflected the organization of power in PaJK where the population bears the consequences of economic decisions over which it exercises no effective control.

    The territory’s constitutional framework has long separated political responsibility from political power. While elections produce governments and assemblies, decisive authority over fiscal policy, energy, natural resources, and major administrative questions remains concentrated in Islamabad. The institutions that appear to constitute self-government therefore perform a contradictory function. They are expected to absorb public anger while lacking the capacity to resolve the conditions that generate it.

    The result is a colonial-style political economy in which democratic forms coexist with the systematic denial of popular sovereignty. The state appears local but governs through institutions whose ultimate authority lies elsewhere. Economic exploitation and political subordination, therefore, reinforce one another. The extraction of resources, the imposition of austerity, and the transfer of decision-making power to Islamabad are not separate processes but different expressions of the same structure of domination.

    Economic hardship alone, however, does not produce mass mobilization. Similar conditions have existed elsewhere without generating a movement of comparable scale. The decisive question is how social grievances acquire organization. That process had been unfolding for years before the present uprising.

    The revocation of Article 370, which granted IaJK limited autonomy, by the Indian state in August 2019 transformed political debate across the divided state of Jammu Kashmir. Although the constitutional changes were implemented in IaJK, their significance extended far beyond the Line of Control (the de facto line dividing PaJK from IaJK). They exposed the extent to which competing states claimed the authority to determine the future of Jammu Kashmir while excluding its people from that process. Questions of sovereignty, democratic power, and political representation acquired a renewed urgency throughout the territory.

    The developments of 2019 also exposed the exhaustion of the dominant political parties in PaJK. For decades, they had alternated between the roles of government and opposition while operating within institutions whose purpose was not to transfer sovereignty to the people but to administer a subordinate territory.

    The contradiction became increasingly difficult to sustain. The left-wing organizations, nationalist currents, student movements, and democratic activists sought to construct broader political alliances capable of challenging the existing order. Consequently, the People’s National Alliance (PNA) was founded in 2019 and generated considerable enthusiasm and revealed the existence of a substantial constituency seeking political change. Yet they struggled to establish durable organizational roots because they were unable to fuse the constitutional question with the increasingly urgent material concerns of workers, students, and the urban poor.

    By the early 2020s, those contradictions had begun to converge. An economic discontent merged with a growing recognition that these conditions could not be separated from the political structure through which the territory was governed. It was from this convergence of class grievances and democratic aspirations that the present movement emerged.

    The earliest campaigns focused on electricity tariffs, wheat prices, and the increasing cost of living. Demonstrations against inflation, symbolic burning of electricity bills, nonpayment campaigns, sit-ins, and shutter-down strikes spread through towns and villages during 2022 and 2023. What initially appeared as scattered local disputes gradually revealed a common political reality. Regardless of locality, protesters confronted the same institutions, the same administrative indifference, and ultimately the same state power standing behind every decision that shaped their lives.

    This convergence was not simply geographical but reflected the gradual formation of a common political consciousness among social groups that had previously entered struggle through different experiences. Workers faced declining wages, there were shrinking opportunities for students along with phenomenal fee hikes, and small traders were struggling with falling purchasing power as well as rising operating costs. These experiences did not erase the differences between classes and social layers, but they increasingly pointed toward a common source of authority lying beyond the institutions of local government.

    The city of Rawalakot, which has long served as a center of radical left politics and secular democratic activism, became one of the earliest centers of sustained mobilization. Demonstrations over wheat prices evolved into prolonged occupations that repeatedly frustrated attempts by the authorities to disperse them. The city acquired political significance because it demonstrated that disciplined mass mobilization could withstand routine police repression and maintain control of public space for extended periods. Each successful mobilization encouraged similar initiatives elsewhere, enabling participants in local struggles to recognize themselves as forming part of a wider territorial movement rather than isolated episodes of protest.

    As mobilization expanded, it became increasingly clear that fragmented campaigns could not exert sufficient pressure upon a state capable of containing localized dissent. Activists, therefore, sought an organizational form capable of coordinating action across the territory while preserving the broad social coalition emerging through struggle. This process culminated in the formation of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which united local action committees into a territory-wide coordinating body in September 2023.

    One of the most important developments within the uprising has been the scale and visibility of women’s participation. PaJK remains deeply shaped by patriarchal social relations that have historically confined women to the private sphere while restricting their presence in political life. Public leadership has largely remained the preserve of men, and women’s political activity has frequently been treated as secondary to struggles defined and directed through male-dominated institutions.

    The present movement has disrupted that order in significant ways. Women have organized demonstrations, addressed public meetings, participated in sit-ins, and marched alongside men despite the certainty of police violence and arrest. They have not appeared merely as supporters of a movement led by others but as political actors whose participation has altered the movement’s social composition and expanded its democratic horizons.

    This transformation carries implications extending beyond questions of representation. Patriarchal authority and colonial rule are historically distinct forms of domination, yet they reinforce one another by restricting who may legitimately exercise political agency. A population is more easily governed when political participation is confined within established hierarchies, whether those hierarchies are maintained by the state or by conservative social relations.

    Women’s emergence as organizers, therefore, challenges both simultaneously. Every woman who occupies political space denied to her weakens structures of authority that depend upon exclusion as a condition of their reproduction.

    These developments have unfolded unevenly. Conservative tendencies within the movement have at times sought to marginalize women’s leadership or limit their role in decision-making. Such contradictions reflect the movement’s broad social composition rather than an external pressure imposed upon it. Yet these tensions cannot obscure the transformation already underway.

    Women have stood on the front lines of demonstrations, endured arrests, faced live ammunition, and mourned those martyred in the struggle. Their participation has become part of the political memory of the uprising and whatever course the movement ultimately takes, it has already altered the social landscape from which future struggles will emerge.

    For decades, the Pakistani state has sought to legitimize its authority through constitutional arrangements that preserve the appearance of self-government while concentrating decisive power elsewhere. This contradiction has become increasingly obvious and difficult to manage.

    As living standards declined and democratic institutions repeatedly proved incapable of responding to popular demands, broader sections of society began to recognize that meaningful economic reform could not be secured without challenging the political framework that produced those conditions. The struggle has, therefore, moved beyond a contest over policy. It has become a confrontation over sovereignty itself.

    This explains the ferocity of the state’s response. The Pakistani ruling class is not merely defending a particular government or protecting a single administrative institution. It is defending an entire structure of domination whose stability depends upon preventing the people of Jammu Kashmir from exercising effective control over their political and economic future.

    Every successful mobilization threatens to weaken that structure by demonstrating that collective organization can impose limits upon state power. Every concession won through struggle encourages new demands, broader participation, and greater confidence among those who have long been excluded from political decision-making.

    The significance of the uprising, therefore, extends beyond the boundaries of PaJK. Across South Asia, declining living standards, deepening inequality, and increasingly authoritarian forms of rule have generated recurring waves of popular resistance. Governments have responded with familiar methods: criminalizing dissent, militarizing civilian life, restricting democratic freedoms, and presenting repression as the defense of public order. The confrontation unfolding in Rawalakot belongs to this wider historical moment, in which ruling classes increasingly rely upon coercion to preserve political arrangements that command diminishing social legitimacy.

    Whatever immediate outcome emerges from the present confrontation, the uprising has transformed the relationship between the people of Jammu Kashmir and the state. A generation that has experienced its own collective strength is unlikely to return quietly to the political passivity upon which colonial-style rule depends. The question now is not whether the old order has entered into crisis. It is whether the forces that have brought it to that crisis can develop the organization, political clarity, and solidarity necessary to carry the struggle beyond resistance and toward genuine popular sovereignty.

  • Spain’s Social Revolution Against Fascism
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/spain-revolution-civil-war-anarchism

    In the parts of Spain that remained under republican control during the civil war, the struggle against fascism took on a revolutionary form. The revolution’s cornerstone was a unique experiment in workers’ self-management of industry and agriculture. Hulton-Deutsch Collection

    Les guerres sont les catastrophes qui imposent l’abandon du réformisme. Les mouvement populaires deviennent alors des mouvements révoluzionnaites ou sont voués à l’échec. Préparons-nous à la guerre.

    17.7.2026 by Andy Durgan - Francisco Franco launched his uprising against the Spanish Republic 90 years ago today. The resistance to fascism developed into a social revolution in Republican-held areas that challenged the power of capitalists and landowners.

    The Spanish Civil War is often portrayed as a struggle between democracy and fascism. But such an approach clashes with the sociopolitical reality of Spain in the 1930s. Social, economic, and political polarization in Spain in the years leading up to the civil war, along with the resulting failure of a bourgeois-democratic republic (1931–36), led to the outbreak of both the war and the revolution.

    The Popular Front’s electoral triumph in February 1936, rather than ushering in a new era of social reform, laid bare the inability of Republican democracy to overcome a ruling class determined to prevent any challenge to its power. The Popular Front’s victory sparked a new wave of mobilizations by the working masses, both urban and rural, which the Republican government attempted to suppress, as it had in 1931. The Right, for its part, abandoned any hope of dismantling the republic from within and opted for a military coup.

    The future of the republic depended not only on its right-wing enemies but also on the labor movement. In the case of the Socialist Party (PSOE), the “revolutionary” left faction, led by Francisco Largo Caballero, refused to repeat the experience of the Republican-Socialist government of 1931–33 and insisted that the Socialists (PSOE) should not participate in the new government, leaving it to the Republicans to “complete the bourgeois revolution.” This simplistic view of Marxism meant that Largo Caballero and his followers had no strategy for seizing power; instead, they were to wait passively for the Republicans to pave the way for a socialist government.

    In contrast, the more social democratic faction led by Indalecio Prieto, supported by the Communist Party (PCE), argued for the need to return to a coalition government to complete the Republican reformist program. It was this latter position that would be adopted by the Socialist movement in the midst of the Civil War. The Left, having lost part of its base to Stalinism, particularly the Socialist Youth (FJS), which would merge with the Young Communists to form the JSU (Juventud Socialista Unificada), was overtaken by events and ultimately accepted the same position as its social democratic rivals.

    On the eve of the civil war, the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) still wielded considerable influence within the most significant labor movement in the Spanish state, in Catalonia, and maintained a very strong presence in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia. Furthermore, in Asturias and Madrid, where the Socialists had historically been the dominant force among organized workers, the CNT enjoyed sizable minority support.

    Inside the CNT, activists and union leaders were divided between anarcho-syndicalists and various radical anarchist factions, the most important of which was the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI). One thing all these factions had in common was their apoliticism. However, weakened by repression and ideologically divided, the CNT would adopt a less intransigent stance in its relations with the Left during the first months of 1936, a move that would prove to be a prelude to its direct participation in government during the civil war.

    During the February 1936 elections, to secure the release of its thousands of imprisoned members, the CNT did not organize a campaign of abstention, as it had done in 1933, and this de facto call to vote would contribute to the Popular Front’s victory. In May 1936, the CNT held its fourth congress in Zaragoza. It would prove to be a milestone in the union’s history.

    Faced with the bloody repression of the Asturian commune in October 1934, delegates called for a revolutionary alliance with the Socialist Unión General de los Trabajadores (UGT) as a first step toward social revolution. But the congress also revealed the limitations of the CNT’s turn away from its apolitical sectarianism. While there was a long and abstract debate on the nature of libertarian communism, there was no discussion of the political situation, especially the threat of a military coup.

    The newly formed Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM) also defended workers’ unity but through the reorganization of the Workers’ Alliances, which had played a key role in the revolutionary movement of 1934. The POUM contrasted the Workers’ Alliance, seen as essential for smashing capitalism, with the Popular Front, an electoral alliance subordinated to petty-bourgeois republicanism.

    At the same time, it identified the absence of a mass revolutionary party as having been central to the defeat of the revolutionary movement in 1934. The POUM hoped to win over the most radical sectors of the Socialists, especially the youth. The FJS’s falling under Stalinist influence in the spring of 1936 would deal a fatal blow to those hopes.

    The revolution that broke out in response to the military uprising in July 1936 marked the end of the European revolutionary cycle that had begun with the Bolshevik victory in 1917. In a matter of days, as the leader of the POUM, Andreu Nin, would insist in September 1936, the working class, arms in hand, had resolved the “fundamental problems” of the democratic revolution that the “liberal bourgeoisie” had failed to resolve in five years. Grossly unequal land ownership had been swept aside with collectivization or redistribution; the power of the church and the army had been destroyed, and Catalonia had ceased to be subordinated to a centralist state. But the working class, Nin clamed, was not fighting for a democratic republic but for socialism.

    The cornerstone of this revolution was a unique experiment in workers’ self-management with the collectivization of industry and land. In many cases, the takeover of companies or land was a spontaneous process and was only subsequently supported by the workers’ organizations. Urban collectivization went furthest in Catalonia, where half of Spain’s industry at the time was concentrated. In the Valencia region, collectivization was also widespread, especially in agriculture.

    The best-known agricultural collectives were those organized by anarchists in eastern Aragon. And although the presence of CNT militias in the area would influence their development, the initiative was often local, especially in towns where libertarian communism had been briefly established during the anarchist uprising of December 1933. Agrarian collectivization was also present in Andalusia and New Castile. Elsewhere with the notable exception of the Basque Country, the working class played a decisive role in the economy through different forms of workers’ control and the expropriation of workplaces and farms abandoned by supporters of the rebels.

    The revolution also meant the widespread occupation of urban space, with buildings being seized and converted into schools, hospitals, popular restaurants, and the headquarters for antifascist organizations. As Mary Nash has argued, the revolution and the war represented for many women “a breakdown in the traditional confinement of women to the home and gave them public visibility.” They entered political life for the first time, joining antifascist women’s organizations en masse, working in factories, and, in a minority of cases, participating in the armed struggle.

    At the heart of the resistance to the military rebels were the workers’ organizations, and not only in the areas where the social revolution was strongest. Throughout what would become the Republican zone, unions and workers’ parties quickly organized militias to fight the rebels. By the summer of 1936, there were already some 150,000 militiamen (and a minority of women) fighting on various fronts.

    Faced with the military superiority of the rebels, who were heavily supplied by the fascist powers, the main parties of the Popular Front (Republicans, Socialists, and Communists) argued that it was necessary to present the war as a defense of bourgeois democracy in order to maintain the support of the middle classes and to secure military aid from the Western democracies. This was a position that meant suppressing, or at least concealing, the social revolution underway in much of the Republican zone.

    Both in historiography and at the time, the left Republican parties have been seen as representing the “middle classes” or at least a sector of them. The fact that these parties played a central role in the republican governments of 1931 and 1936 has reinforced the idea of their political importance. However, their social and electoral base was limited. Outside of Catalonia, the only place where left republicanism enjoyed massive support (through Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), it had a narrow social base, consisting mainly of the urban petty bourgeoisie and very specific sectors such as schoolteachers.

    The electoral results of the Left Republicans clearly illustrate the limitations of their support. In 1931, excluding Catalonia, 111 Left Republican deputies were elected in coalition with the PSOE and the moderate republican Radical Party, and in 1936, 129 were elected as part of the Popular Front. In 1933, without being part of a national coalition, the Left Republicans won only fourteen seats (compared to twenty-one in Catalonia), nine of them thanks to local agreements with the Radicals and five due to local support from the PSOE.

    At an international level, the republic’s seemingly natural allies, the liberal democracies, with the notable exception of Mexico, not only abandoned the legitimate government by refusing to send it the weapons necessary for its defense but also promoted the farce of the “nonintervention” policy, which would result in the almost total isolation of loyalist Spain (as the republic was known). The participation of Germany and Italy in the nonintervention committee would be the clearest example of the cynicism of this infamous agreement.

    Neither France nor Great Britain had any interest in supporting an apparently weak government in a context of intense political and social radicalization. The French Popular Front government, under pressure from the ruling classes, the army, and British imperialism, quickly backed down from sending arms to the republic. The British government viewed the Left Republican leader, Manuel Azaña, the first Popular Front prime minister, as the “Kerensky of Spain.” When the Civil War began, it believed that “Bolshevism” was on the verge of seizing power. Statements abounded among its ministers about how Francisco Franco was the best option for protecting British imperialist and capitalist interests.

    With the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and Joseph Stalin’s rise to power, the communist parties had become completely subordinate to Moscow’s political needs. The Comintern’s shift toward the Popular Front policy was driven, above all, by the need to contain the threat that Nazi Germany posed to the very survival of the USSR. This threat made it urgent to forge, at the international level, an alliance with the democracies, especially France, against the fascist powers. The Popular Front was thus the national expression of Soviet foreign policy, and the uniform adoption of this new orientation by the communist parties at that time was not based on any analysis of the specific sociopolitical situation in each country.

    However, in contrast to the disastrous previous line that had identified the socialist parties as “social fascists” and the greatest danger to the working class, the Popular Front responded to the need to confront the threat from the far right and would result in a surge in communist influence in many countries, including Spain. During the Civil War, the PCE would become the most powerful political party in the Republican zone. By mid-1937, it had around 300,000 members, ten times more than before July 1936, while its Catalan equivalent, the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), more than 50,000, and the JSU about 250,000.

    There were several reasons for this growth in influence. The staunch defense of the Popular Front by the Communists attracted to the party newly politicized people opposed to the military uprising and fascism, including petty-bourgeois sectors frightened by the “excesses” of the revolution and the attacks on private property. By defending military centralization and iron discipline, the Communists also won the support of many professional military officers who had remained loyal to the republic. But above all, the USSR’s military support for the republic contributed to the rise in the PCE’s prestige.

    A factor often overlooked in explaining the growth of the Communists’ influence in Spain was the persistence of their image as “the party of the Russian Revolution” and their self-identification as revolutionaries. The fact that the PCE, despite its commitment to defending republican democracy, spoke of the need for a “new kind of democracy,” a “people’s revolution,” and a “national revolutionary war” reflected the difficulties the party had in the context of the political and social realities in the Republican zone.

    The extensive use of Soviet imagery and revolutionary methods to mobilize the population of Madrid in November 1936 was another example of the Communists’ seemingly ambiguous relationship with bourgeois democracy. From there, it was not difficult to conclude that the Popular Front was a necessary tactical interlude, a preliminary phase leading up to the establishment of socialism. Such ambiguities help explain the appeal of Stalinism to a significant sector of the FJS.

    Ultimately, only the PCE (in Catalonia, the PSUC), with its discipline and “Leninist” structure, and not the liberal and reformist factions, was capable of both putting an end to the social revolution underway in the Republican zone and leading politically the Popular Front’s war effort.

    After the defeat of the military uprising in nearly two-thirds of Spain, power was exercised by countless local antifascist committees, mostly made up of the Popular Front parties, the UGT, and the CNT. In Catalonia, the committees reflected the influence of the revolution and were often dominated by the anarchists and the POUM. Few of the committees were elected by the local population but tended to be made up of delegates nominated by the different antifascist organizations.

    To overcome the lack of coordination and the fragmentation of power during the first weeks in the Republican zone, various types of bodies were organized at the regional and provincial levels, almost all of which were supported by the local Popular Front, along with the CNT. Their autonomy and radicalism varied from place to place. The most important of these was the Central Committee of Antifascist Militias (CCMA) in Catalonia, formed on July 21.

    Despite having a Popular Front majority, the CCMA’s decisions reflected the strength of the revolution. In addition to military organization, the Catalan committee took the first steps to control the economy, organizing food distribution, freezing the bank accounts of those who had supported the uprising, and implementing measures to help workplaces already in workers’ hands to continue paying wages.

    In much of the rest of the Republican zone, committees were formed that, like the CCMA, effectively held power during the first weeks of the war. The political orientation of most of these committees did not always reflect the politics of the Popular Front, despite the fact that its supporters usually made up most of the delegates. For example, in Aragon, Cartagena, Gijón, Málaga, and Valencia the committees, dominated by the unions, acted in an openly revolutionary fashion.

    But with the fragmentation of power, the revolution could not fully triumph. Faced with this reality, the future of the revolution depended on the CNT, whose power appeared unassailable in the first weeks of the Civil War and soon would double its membership to reach some 1,500,000. But the anarchists rejected on principle the seizure of power.

    The revolution existed for them in the sense that the working class controlled the streets, the factories, and the land. “Power” would be exercised below in local communes or the workplace. But the workers’ organizations, for example, did not control communications, foreign trade, or the banking system. Above all, with the formation of the People’s Army of the Republic in the fall of 1936, they lost control of the key element of the war and the revolution: the armed forces.

    The dilemma the anarchists faced with the vacuum left by the near collapse of the republican state would soon become apparent. At a hastily called meeting of Catalan CNT delegates in Barcelona on July 21, Juan García Oliver, one of the most influential leaders of radical anarchism, argued that the CNT faced two alternatives: “going all out,” which would mean establishing “an anarchist dictatorship,” or collaborating with the other antifascist forces. Since “a dictatorship” was anathema to the anarchists, and given the significant presence of other forces (especially the Socialists), particularly outside of Catalonia, they opted for “collaboration.”

    The anarchist leaders would quickly find themselves trapped in the contradiction between their defense of the revolution and their complicity with the bourgeois state, or what was left of it. The dichotomy was not between “dictatorship” and “collaboration” but between workers’ unity, extending beyond the ranks of the anarchists, with the aim of seizing power, or subordination to the Popular Front, which would sooner or later spell the end of the revolution.

    Opposed to creating another state, the anarchists ended up collaborating with the existing state or, to be more precise, with the reconstruction of the republican state. In early November 1936, as the military situation grew increasingly critical, in an unprecedented move, four anarchists became ministers in the Republican government.

    The counterrevolutionary process within the Republican zone would reach its peak with the street fighting in early May 1937. The formation a week later of a government headed by the moderate socialist Juan Negrín, without the participation of the anarchists, represented the definitive consolidation of the bourgeois state.

    It also led to the suppression of the POUM, victim of a fierce campaign of slander by the Stalinists. The last bastion of the revolution, the anarchist-dominated Council of Aragon, was dissolved in August. In February 1938, the CNT, now fully committed to collaborating with the republican state, returned to the government.

    Was there an alternative to the Popular Front’s approach of waging a war in defense of democracy at the expense of social revolution? The Republican government’s military strategy rejected the use of unorthodox or revolutionary tactics, due in part to its need to maintain control of the political situation within its territory, as well as to present itself to the world as a liberal government. However, given the enemy’s significant material advantage, adherence to an orthodox military strategy had little chance of success.

    The idea that the Popular Front, and the suppression of the revolution, was purely due to the republic’s military needs is a fallacy. The Popular Front’s policies, especially its subordination to imperialist interests, had military consequences. For example, the Spanish fleet, which was under the control of the sailors, was withdrawn from the Strait of Gibraltar from the very beginning due to pressure from the British government, thus giving the rebels free rein to transport thousands of troops from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula. Another case in point is the refusal, out of concern for not harming French interests, to declare Morocco’s independence and support a nationalist uprising behind the fascist lines.

    An alternative strategy would have included the mass mobilization of the population (as was the case during the siege of Madrid in November 1936), a defensive, positional war, and the launching of more limited raids combined with guerrilla warfare, thereby avoiding massive clashes between two armies with markedly unequal capabilities. One can only speculate, of course, whether a strategy of revolutionary war could have succeeded, although the defense of Madrid is illustrative in this regard.

    Another problem facing the revolution was an unfavorable international situation, in which both the communist and social democratic parties wielded great influence. It is impossible to know what impact the existence of a revolutionary power in Spain would have had on the labor movement beyond its borders. The precedent of 1917 raises the possibility that it might have served as a catalyst and, as a result, led other political currents to exert greater influence on the class struggle.

    In the historiography of the Civil War, the division among the antifascist forces is often presented as a split between those who wanted to prioritize the war (Communists, Republicans, and Socialists) and the CNT and the POUM, who placed the interests of the revolution above those of the war: a choice between war or revolution. This was never the case. Both the CNT and the POUM defended the need to wage war and carry out the revolution simultaneously — to wage a revolutionary war.

    The two were intrinsically linked. The POUM had a clear military policy that called for the creation of a revolutionary army, modeled on the Soviet Red Army during the Russian Civil War. But such an army could not be built without a revolutionary government based on democracy from below, on committees of workers, peasants, and militia members.

    The POUM maintained that, to consolidate the revolution, at least in Catalonia, the working class had to seize power. But without the CNT, such a goal was impossible. Convincing the CNT, or at least part of it, of this point very quickly became the POUM’s primary political concern. However, as we have seen, it had to overcome the conviction held by the anarchists that any form of “power” or revolutionary state would inevitably lead to dictatorship.

    Ultimately, what was sorely lacking in the Spanish Revolution was a revolutionary organization with the strength necessary to have led the seizure of power. There were several obstacles preventing the POUM, the “only party of the revolution,” according to Andreu Nin, from becoming such an organization. Its lack of a base outside Catalonia and its short history — it had been formed just a year earlier — were obstacles that were difficult to overcome. Without national political leadership, the revolution was doomed to defeat.

  • Everybody Should Welcome Nationalizing AI
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/ai-nationalization-sanders-libertarians-property

    Cet article est un merveilleux exemple de pensée libérale. D’un point de vue marxiste il faudrait nationaliser l’entière industrie de l’IA parce qu’elle repose à cent pour cent sur des biens mal acquis.

    Rappellons que toute valeur est le produit de travail humain et que l’approprioration de la plus value par les capitalistes est toujours du vol que les voleurs ont légalisé par des lois écrites et imposées par leurs hommes de main.

    Le but de toute politique marxiste est l’expropriation des expropristeurs parce qu’elle constitue la condition préalable et incontournable sans en constituer l’unique oindition requise de la création d’une société socialiste.

    13.7.2026 by Ben Burgis - Bernie Sanders wants to nationalize half the stock of major AI companies and create a sovereign wealth fund for the American people. The case for going even further is stronger than most people realize.

    No figure in recent decades has done more to direct public attention and left-wing energy to universalistic left-wing policy proposals than Bernie Sanders. During his two runs for the presidency, he introduced “Medicare for All” into the lexicon of American politics. Now he’s made waves with a proposal to create a sovereign wealth fund by nationalizing half the stock of major AI companies.

    His rationale is simple and compelling. “Since A.I. is built on the collective knowledge of humanity,” Senator Sanders writes, “the wealth it generates must benefit humanity.”

    Several prominent tech executives have made apocalyptic predictions about how AI-fueled automation will sweep across the economy, destroying a massive percentage of existing jobs. The industry’s critics argue that most of this is hype. We’ll see.

    If it turns out that tech executives are telling the truth about the devastating effects their products will have on the livelihoods of massive swaths of the American population, they can hardly turn around and complain that it’s unfair for their industry to be singled out for partial nationalization. If I build a robot that stomps around my neighborhood, destroying my neighbor’s houses and cars and workplaces, and then I sell the robot for hundreds of billions (or trillions) of dollars, I shouldn’t complain if a judge forces me to put half the profits into a fund to help those neighbors rebuild their lives. I should be grateful that he let me keep the other half.

    Libertarians may be tempted to argue that no one deserves redress because of suffering incurred by automation and other by-products of letting the chips fall where they may in a free market, and that taking away some of the stock of OpenAI or Anthropic against the will of the current owners is a morally unacceptable transgression against property rights. Even on classical libertarian principles, though, it’s far from clear that this argument would go through in this case.

    Twentieth-century libertarian thinkers like Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard built on the seventeenth-century theories of John Locke. The Lockean conception of property rights emphasizes origins. If Person A buys something from Person B who was given it as a gift by Person C, the legitimacy of the whole chain depends on C’s claim. Someone who starts a farm by homesteading previously unowned land, for example, is engaged in what Nozick called a “just act of original acquisition.”

    Some of the most thoughtful libertarians have realized that, to be consistent, in some cases they have to recognize collective claims to just original acquisition. Libertarian philosopher Roderick Long offers this example:

    Consider a village near a lake. It is common for the villagers to walk down to the lake to go fishing. In the early days of the community it’s hard to get to the lake because of all the bushes and fallen branches in the way. But over time, the way is cleared and a path forms — not through any centrally coordinated effort, but simply as a result of all the individuals walking that way day after day.

    The cleared path is the product of labor — not any individual’s labor, but all of them together. If one villager decided to take advantage of the now-created path by setting up a gate and charging tolls, he would be violating the collective property right that the villagers together have earned.

    This is exactly what John Locke thought a just act of original acquisition looked like. Person C mixes his labor with the natural world and thus forms a property claim that can ground any subsequent claims made by B and A. In this case, however, Person C is a whole village.

    If you believe that intellectual property works like property claims on objects in the physical world, then the use of the collective intellectual products of the human race as the foundation of large language models (LLMs) looks a great deal like Long’s village-created path to the lake. Trying to disentangle which individual intellectual property owners are owed how much of the product would be a fool’s errand. But if we aren’t going to rip out the toll booth, turning half of the tolls into a wealth fund for the whole village might be the beginning of justice.

    On the other hand, if you don’t believe that intellectual property claims have the same force as claims to material property, Anthropic and Open AI and the rest have no legitimate claim to proprietary algorithms. If public policy went that way, the question of how to share these firms’ profits would quickly become moot.

    Finally, if you reject libertarianism root and branch and believe as I do that questions of how property should be distributed are downstream of questions about equality, dignity, and other fundamental human values, the case for partial (or perhaps even full) nationalization of AI companies becomes irresistible. Mainstream tech boosters might try to argue that the industry should be allowed to run its course without any interference as dramatic as what Senator Sanders proposed on the grounds that automation will tend to work out to the long-term benefit of the human race. Last year, for example, Bill Gates made headlines by predicting that the development of AI would lead to the shortening of the workweek to two or three days.

    But socialists know better. At this point, we have centuries of relevant data points, and we know that this is never how things have played out in the history of capitalism. As long as the means of production are owned by a private class of nonworkers, if the work it took a thousand people five days to do now takes only two and a half, capitalists have no incentive to keep paying everyone just as much as ever for working two and a half days and every incentive to lay off half the workforce and keep the remaining five hundred workers as hard at work as ever. In the United States, it’s been more than eight decades since the Fair Labor Standards Act capped the workweek at forty hours. The free market hasn’t reduced that number by a minute since then, and that certainly isn’t because technological progress stopped during the Great Depression.

    Conversely, some of my friends and comrades on the Left would probably prefer that, instead of nationalizing these firms, we simply direct the Air Force to bomb all the data centers and salt the earth so nothing can grow there again. I’ll admit that a large part of me concurs. Seeing undergraduates “write” papers with the “help” of LLMs makes me despair for the human race, and seeing older writers and journalists do the equivalent fills me with rage. Even in a world that enforced appropriate taboos against this behavior, though, many use cases of AI would remain stubbornly useful.

    One of the most basic premises of historical materialism is that no society ever has shrunk or ever will voluntarily shrink its productive forces. This is unlikely to be the first case. The technology is here to stay, for better or worse. Our best shot at “for better” is collective option to seize hold of the machinery and operate it for the benefit of all.

    #IA #capitalisme #expropriation

  • As Mass Incarceration Rose, Corporate Crime Ran Amok - Interview withMarie Gottschalk
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/mass-incarceration-corporate-crime-violence

    Les paroles de la chanson sont démenties par la réalité. Paris New Yorck, New Yorck Paris, dans dix an comme là bas ici n’est plus vrai, avec le déclin se son pouvoir dans le moinde, la désindustrialisation et le tournant sécuritaire de l’Europe centrale nous sommes aujourd’hui beaucoup plus proches des problèmes aux États Unis que dans les années quatre vingt. Écoutons ce que dit une criminologue états-unienne .

    13.7.2026 Interview by Meagan Day - We spoke to political scientist Marie Gottschalk about how corporate criminals have been let off the hook as prisons have exploded and what the path to ending mass incarceration might look like.

    Marie Gottschalk has spent more than two decades meticulously researching the origins and documenting the consequences of American mass incarceration. Her books The Prison and the Gallows and Caught are both foundational texts for anyone seeking to understand how the United States built the world’s largest penal system.

    In her new book, Crime and No Punishment: Wealth, Power, and Violence in America, Gottschalk turns her attention to the crimes that never end up penalized, from the corporate malfeasance behind the 2008 financial crisis to the engineered opioid epidemic to the slow-motion violence of state neglect. For Gottschalk, mass incarceration and the mass decriminalization of corporate and white-collar crime are not separate stories but two facets of the same phenomenon of ultramagnified inequality.

    Gottschalk is the Edmund J. Kahn distinguished professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Jacobin’s Meagan Day spoke with her about “street crime” and “suite crime,” how rural America has quietly become subject to incarceration patterns previously associated with urban environments, whether there’s a role for police and prisons in an ideal society, and the concept of “radical penal minimalism” — a framework she thinks may offer the Left a way out of the trap of maximalist abolitionism versus reflexive law-and-order politics.

    Meagan Day

    Let’s start with the differential treatment of street crime versus white-collar crime. One will get you plunged into the world’s most vast and sophisticated carceral apparatus, possibly never to return. The other will either get you a slap on the wrist or be ignored. Certain flavors of white-collar crime, especially in the era of Donald Trump, will even be ostentatiously rewarded. How do you think about that selective approach to criminalization?

    Marie Gottschalk

    White-collar and corporate crime is largely invisible to us. We don’t count it; we don’t measure it. Official crime statistics are based on the FBI’s index crimes — murder, rape, arson, and so on — and those are what determine whether people believe crime is going up or down. Corporate crime doesn’t figure into that picture at all.

    My book is partly a mea culpa. Those of us who study criminal justice have spent so much energy on mass incarceration — who goes to prison, at what rate, and why — that we missed the other half of the story: while the United States was building the largest incarceration system in the world, it was simultaneously carrying out a radical decriminalization of corporate crime. The book is about how those two trends are connected. What I try to do in Crime and No Punishment is get readers to step back from a narrow definition of “crime” — which in most people’s minds means interpersonal violence, or street crime — and think instead about violence writ large: who is causing harm, who is causing premature death.

    The US has become one of the most violent countries in the developed world, whether you measure that by declining life expectancy, traffic deaths, incarceration rates, or the militarization of police and the resulting civilian deaths. At the same time, we have staggering income inequality contributing to that decline in life expectancy, and we have what the geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls the “anti-state state” — a state that no longer feels it has a duty to protect the society it governs. That combination produces what I borrow from Friedrich Engels to call “social murder.” It’s not one person killing another by hand; it’s underlying structures producing death and harm at scale.

    The 2008 financial crisis is a good example. I call it an act of violence. People lost homes, pensions, jobs — and unlike past recessions, the recovery was radically uneven. The coasts and the tech hubs bounced back; large parts of “flyover country” never really did. The opioid crisis is another. At its peak a few years ago, close to 110,000 Americans a year were dying of overdoses. To put that in perspective: over the entire decade the United States was in Vietnam, about 55,000 Americans were killed, an experience that seared itself into the national memory. Here we have twice that many deaths in a single year, and we’ve simply tolerated it.

    Meagan Day

    You’ve observed that incarceration and police violence are becoming less exclusively an urban, racialized phenomenon. Could that actually be a hopeful political development? There were understandable reasons to racialize the national conversation about incarceration, given the hugely disproportionate impact on black communities. But that framing may also have kept out people who don’t see themselves as positioned in a particular way in the broader culture wars.

    Marie Gottschalk

    What I’m trying to do in the book is push people toward a bigger political-economy view. And one important piece of that bigger picture is that the carceral state is not static — it’s changing geographically. It made sense in the 1970s, ’80s, and early ’90s to focus on urban areas, because that’s where incarceration was most intense. But over the last decade, we’ve seen something close to a flip: if you live in a rural or suburban area today, you have a better chance of being incarcerated than if you live in a city.

    Some of that is the effect of progressive prosecutors and criminal-justice-reform coalitions anchored in urban centers, but we also see pronounced changes in rural areas. Look at New York state: the decline in incarceration is being driven by New York City, while rural areas are seeing increases. Pennsylvania shows the same pattern: a dramatic decline in Philadelphia, an increase out in the rural counties. That complicates how we think about race and incarceration, because some of the whitest, most rural counties in my state incarcerate people at very high rates, often in some of the most decrepit jails in the country, buildings well over a hundred years old.

    This matters for coalition-building. If we want to challenge the carceral state, we need to understand what’s happening in rural America too. The same is likely true of police violence — we don’t have great data, but you probably have a higher chance of being shot and killed by police in a rural area than an urban one. Those deaths are undercounted because they happen in places without strong advocacy organizations or local media to publicize them.

    Rural America has also disproportionately carried the physical burden of the forever wars. People in rural areas were far more likely to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. Actual combat deaths were relatively low, but the number of veterans who came home with serious physical or mental injuries was high — and this happened just as the country was cutting benefits for veterans and National Guard members. That’s another form of state violence that stays largely invisible. All of this is part of why I think it’s too simple to say that rural voters went for Trump purely out of misogyny and racism. There are many factors that have been brewing for a long time, and in some ways Trump is almost incidental to the underlying story.

    If you actually want to reduce violence, you have to invest in the welfare-state side of things — jobs, health care, schools, neighborhoods — and you have to reinvest in corporate regulation. If we only focus on the police and the prisons as “the problem,” there simply isn’t enough money to squeeze out of that system to fund what’s actually needed. If activists are focused narrowly on defunding the police, there just isn’t enough there to fund the things that need to be funded. We have to look concretely at tax policy, redistribution, and winding down the military budget.

    Meagan Day

    Let’s talk about the order of operations. Someone might hear that and say: I agree, which is why we need to build the welfare state first, to address the root causes of crime, and only then will we have earned the ability to decarcerate. If we decarcerate before building that foundation, we’ll see a crime spike that sets the whole movement back. What do you say to that?

    Marie Gottschalk

    If your position is that we have to fix everything before we can make progress on decarceration, that’s ignoring some very obvious issues we can address right now. For example, if you just look at age demographics, leaving aside class or geography, the highest-crime population is young people in their late teens and early twenties, particularly young men. We can observe a kind of “criminal menopause,” where offending drops off sharply with age. So what’s the purpose of keeping people incarcerated for decades after that? It’s now costing roughly $120,000 a year to house someone in a California state prison, and the vast majority of incarcerated people are eventually going to come out anyway.

    So yes, we can identify areas like these and start decarcerating now. A lot of the fear here rests on an overreliance on recidivism statistics, which are much shakier than people assume. You’ll often hear that two-thirds of people released “recidivate” within three years, without any explanation of what that means. In many cases, it’s a technical parole violation or a minor offense that, absent a prior record, wouldn’t have led to incarceration at all. In a lot of European countries, a prior record barely factors into sentencing. Our recidivism statistics are not actually a good predictor of public safety.

    Meagan Day

    Police and prisons are functioning in tandem right now to produce a metastasizing, highly punitive carceral state that extinguishes futures, proliferates inhumanity, and creates as many social problems as it solves. Consequently, the abolitionist line that a lot of people encounter when they first catch wind of those politics is: eliminate prisons, eliminate police — no distinction made between them, no exceptions.

    But if you think about it seriously, you might conclude that a selectively recruited, democratically controlled, well-trained, community-rooted, and adequately restrained police force could be useful to the project of decarceration. It could respond in high-stakes situations without functioning as an automatic feeder system into prisons or brutalizing populations the state has otherwise abandoned. It could turn the temperature down in a way that obviates the justification for America’s vast mesh of jails and prisons.

    Is there a role for police in decarceral politics or an afterlife for them in a decarcerated world? What about prisons themselves — is it possible to defend the existence of separate institutions to which violators of our social contract are removed?

    Marie Gottschalk

    Police are on the front lines of everything that’s failing: drugs, poverty, and the absence of adequate jobs, housing, and mental health care. We hand them that tray and say, “Fix it,” and all we actually give them are guns and more military hardware. As a society, we need to own those problems instead of just dumping them on police and saying policing can never work.

    I do believe, after years of thinking about this, that a genuinely different law enforcement institution is possible — one that does what it’s supposed to do. It would probably look different enough from what we have now that we might reasonably call it something else. But police forces exist all over the world, under that name, functioning very differently from ours. I’ve visited prisons all over the world too, and a prison in Berlin operates nothing like the state’s largest facility just outside Philadelphia. Becoming a police officer in Norway is nearly as competitive as getting into Harvard, and it requires three years of training. In many US states, you need more training and licensing to become a hairstylist or a nail technician than to become a police officer. That’s a real, fixable failure, not a reason to conclude that the institution itself is beyond redemption.

    There will probably always be some role for police in any functioning society. Sometimes you need the police to intervene. If someone’s breaking into your house with a gun, you’re not going to want a peace circle. But you also don’t necessarily want ten officers and a SWAT response that endangers everyone even more. There’s a middle ground. It’s also worth thinking right now about Charlottesville, where the police stood down while a white nationalist drove his car into a crowd and killed Heather Heyer. If you want to defund or eliminate the police at a moment when the Right is actively organizing and marching, you have to think hard about what that means.

    My book does document how, in a number of places, police forces are increasingly infiltrated by the Right, and how police and military service function as recruiting grounds for white supremacist organizations. We have to acknowledge that reality. But I don’t think it’s accurate to lump “the police” together as a single undifferentiated entity. Albuquerque has an extraordinarily high rate of police killings of civilians compared to New York City. Those differences matter. Insisting that police everywhere are equally bad and should simply be abolished flattens real variation, and I think that’s its own kind of arrogance.

    If we actually believe interpersonal violence has root causes — poverty, class inequity, racial inequity — then we have to recognize that in certain communities, violence tracks those indicators regardless of things like the “war on drugs.” Police need to be available to intervene and, where they can’t, to solve crimes. Roughly half of homicides in this country go unsolved. The families of murder victims generally aren’t demanding the death penalty or even necessarily a life sentence, but they do want some acknowledgment of the magnitude of their loss and some assurance that the person responsible won’t do it again. We need not only police for that but a whole functioning criminal justice system.

    As for prisons, punishment serves a social function beyond direct incapacitation. It’s a statement that a given act is unacceptable. But it doesn’t have to involve torture or the conditions in most American prisons and jails today. When I teach my own book and we get to the final chapter on corporate violence and particularly the villains of the financial crisis, my students say: these people caused enormous harm; they should go to prison. And I tell them truthfully: that would satisfy a retributive impulse, but it wouldn’t solve the underlying structural problems.

    Still, I don’t want to see them writing best-selling memoirs either. I’d like to see truth commissions. I’d like to see corporate executives personally charged, rather than corporations alone facing deferred-prosecution agreements that function as get-out-of-jail-free cards. There’s a wide range of sanctions available short of imprisonment. And some people probably do need to end up in prison or jail but not be subjected to current inhumane conditions.

    Meagan Day

    Many sympathetic people I know call themselves abolitionists. When someone asks, “So you really want to get rid of all police and prisons, forever?” they often start talking about horizons or hermeneutics. This is not how the term “abolition” was used in the context of slavery. It was an uncomplicated statement of moral principle: slavery had no defensible social function, and society would not miss it. It was not a horizon or a hermeneutic but a concrete demand for immediate eradication.

    That’s not really the politics of most serious people using the term “abolition” today, because police and prisons are not actually structurally identical to slavery. Their actual position is closer to: we have a system running on its own barbaric internal logic rather than what it purports to do — minimize overall harm and enforce and uphold a democratically agreed-upon social contract — and we need to replace it with something that actually does those things. I agree with that, but I think calling it “abolition” confuses the issue.

    Marie Gottschalk

    I’m a real admirer of many people who identify as abolitionists, and I think “abolition” can be a capacious term. But I’ve become drawn to another phrase some people are using now: radical penal minimalism. Paradoxically, radical penal minimalism might actually mean investing more in certain parts of the system in order to shrink it overall.

    For example, Pennsylvania is nearly the worst state in the country for funding public defenders. The state itself put essentially zero dollars toward it until very recently, and it still lags far behind other states; counties are left to cover it, and the American Civil Liberties Union just filed a lawsuit over conditions here. A purist abolitionist might balk at “expanding” any part of the criminal legal apparatus. But if expanding it means better public defenders, more diversion programs, more opportunities for community service, more careful attention to mitigation, or even potentially better-paid and better-trained prosecutors who stay in the work rather than burning out, then that’s a path to radical penal minimalism in practice.

    Meagan Day

    I much prefer that phrase. But do you think the American public will balk at the “minimalism” part of this formula too? People often report wanting more police, or at least more reliable and responsive law enforcement.

    Marie Gottschalk

    On this point, I’m heavily influenced by James Forman Jr, a Yale Law professor and former Washington, DC, public defender who wrote Locking Up Our Own — a deep dive into why DC, a majority-black city with a black city council and black mayor, became one of the most punitive jurisdictions in the country. His answer was that black communities have genuine, well-founded fears of street crime but also that it’s not as simple as “people want more police.”

    Polling consistently shows that people in those communities simultaneously feel that they are being overpoliced and underprotected. In truth, public opinion in these communities tends to be “all of the above.” Philadelphia’s last mayoral race had local polling on this, and Los Angeles’s recent polling shows the same pattern. The press likes to quote it selectively as “people want more police,” but if you also ask whether they want more spending on schools, jobs, clean streets, libraries, and community centers, the answer is overwhelmingly yes to all of it.

    Meagan Day

    Offloading certain calls to mental-health responders, drug counselors, service providers, and other nonpolice entities — and giving police real training and the capacity to respond safely to the calls that genuinely require them — matters enormously. But I do think that in a country with this many privately owned guns, the state probably needs to retain a near-monopoly on legitimate force. It might be easier to shrink the role of police if we could actually disarm the population and then also make this population less aggrieved and disturbed.

    Marie Gottschalk

    That’s the hardest question in the book really — whether we’re in a cycle of violence, and I don’t just mean interpersonal violence. We have the highest rate of private gun ownership of any country in the world. How do you run a functioning society that is that heavily armed? Some of the explanation for higher rural police-shooting rates is that officers know nearly everyone is carrying, and there are fewer mental-health services available to divert people before a crisis. That’s an extremely combustible combination, especially with smaller departments, less training, and sheriffs who are largely unaccountable to the public.

    The book can be bleak on this point. Are we becoming a dysfunctional state, one that’s failing at the basic obligation to protect its people from violence in all its forms, including drugs, including opioids? I often think about how shocked people were in the 1990s that life expectancy was declining in the collapsing Soviet Union. It was treated as proof of systemic failure. The United States has had its own unprecedented decline in life expectancy, in a country that spent the twentieth century as a leader in exactly that metric. And it’s declining unevenly, dropping fastest among poor and working-class white people, even as black and white life expectancy converge. Some of that convergence reflects real gains for black Americans, but a lot of it reflects a decline for white Americans. Is that really an achievement, equality reached by leveling down?

    Meagan Day

    Gulags are probably the best-known example of Soviet repression. Yet the US prison population is comparable to what the gulag system held at its height. We make a pretty remarkable exception for our own trajectory. Perhaps our society is not in spectacular health either.

    Marie Gottschalk

    I used to call the United States a “carceral democracy.” Now I’m not sure the “democracy” half still holds; even that’s been enfeebled. My book comes around to the idea that the fundamental legitimacy of the state is genuinely in question, and when that legitimacy is in question, it hollows out democratic institutions themselves. That adds a special urgency to our effort to understand the crimes committed and violence perpetrated not only on the streets but by people in power.

    #USA #prison #criminalité #violence #police #injustice #inégalité

  • Multinationals Sold Kenyan Farmers a Lethal Harvest
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/kenya-agriculture-pesticides-health-cancer

    9.7.2026 by Jaclynn Ashly - European and US companies continued to sell pesticides abroad years after they were banned at home. Our reporter traveled to Kenya to learn how farmers are paying the price for these chemical products with their health — and how they’re fighting back.

    The word dawa, Swahili for “medicine,” threads through Francis Marete Mboroki’s speech as he describes the chemicals he spent decades spraying across his small farm on the fertile slopes of Mount Kenya. They were sold as the tools of progress: modern seeds, bigger harvests, prosperity.

    Even as European and US regulators banned or restricted these chemicals at home, Mboroki kept spraying them, unaware they could be poisoning him. Today his doctors believe those pesticides caused the throat cancer slowly consuming his body. “If I knew these pesticides caused cancer, I wouldn’t have used them at all,” the seventy-nine-year-old says. “But no one ever informed me of the dangers.”

    A slight man with heavily calloused hands, Mboroki has farmed nearly his entire life. Before pesticides, he relied on indigenous pest-control methods passed down through generations: seeds stored in underground granaries lined with medicinal leaves, ash from cooking fires dusted over crops, manure used to nourish the soil.

    “The indigenous crops grew well,” he says softly, hands clasped in his lap. “We weren’t rich from them, but we always had enough. The food was nutritious.”

    Photo
    Francis Marete Mboroki outside his home in Meru. Francis Marete Mboroki outside his home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Mboroki is now one of eighty-seven Kenyan farmers and farmworkers who have joined a landmark constitutional petition in Kenya’s courts. Many are battling cancers, respiratory illnesses, and neurological disorders they believe are tied to decades of pesticide exposure. The case represents the country’s first major legal challenge to the multinational corporations that continued marketing these chemicals in Kenya long after they were banned or restricted in their home countries.

    “We never imagined these chemicals could kill us like this,” Mboroki adds. “The people where they came from were protected from them. Here we are only discovering the danger after they already made us sick.”

    As Mboroki grew up in rural Kenya in the 1950s and ’60s, he had no idea that a postwar transformation was underway in the West within the chemical industry. Companies that had manufactured synthetic compounds for military purposes during World War II repurposed them for agriculture, selling pesticides as the future of farming.

    At first, it was not purely a commercial project. Beginning in the 1940s, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations funded the plant-breeding programs that became the Green Revolution, introducing high-yielding wheat and rice varieties across Mexico before expanding into India and Pakistan. By the mid-1960s, cereal yields on the Indian subcontinent were nearly 60 percent higher than they had been two decades earlier, helping avert the famines many had predicted and, by some estimates, saving up to a billion lives.

    But the gains came at a cost. The new seeds depended on fertilizer, irrigation, and increasing amounts of pesticides. As yields rose, so did farmers’ reliance on purchased inputs. In time, soils became degraded and water supplies dwindled, laying the foundations for the corporate control of agriculture that followed.

    Scientific evidence soon began to implicate the industry’s own products. Across Europe and the United States, research linked many of the chemicals to cancer, reproductive harm, developmental disorders, neurological disease, and ecological collapse. But as restrictions spread, the chemicals did not disappear.

    Instead, many found new markets in the Global South, carried alongside this agricultural model built on monocultures, hybrid commercial seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and chemical pesticides. Across Africa, these packages continued to be promoted as the path to modernity, higher yields, and prosperity.

    Photo
    The Meru landscape in Kenya’s eastern highlands Once home to drought-hardy traditional crops like sorghum and finger millet, the fields of Meru, in Kenya’s eastern highlands, now depend on imported hybrid seeds and the chemical packages that accompany them. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    In Kenya, the shift accelerated through the 1980s and ’90s as imported hybrid seeds were promoted through radio, agricultural supply stores (known as agrovets), and government extension campaigns, each variety tied to its own chemical package — marketed as dawa.

    “You couldn’t go anywhere without hearing about these new seeds and the medicine [chemicals] that came with them,” explains Mboroki. “On the radio, at the markets — that’s all they talked about.” He lets out a dry scoff and shakes his head. “All of us embraced it. We thought it was going to make us rich.”

    In 2006, the model was formalized when the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations launched the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, or AGRA, promising to double yields and incomes for thirty million smallholder households. It promoted the same input-intensive model of agriculture built on commercial seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and pesticides, even as many of the chemicals it relied on were already being restricted in the countries that produced them.

    In one sense it succeeded: commercial seeds spread through subsidy programs and village extension officers. What never arrived, however, was the promised prosperity. By AGRA’s own 2020 deadline, neither yields nor incomes had doubled, and across its priority countries the number of hungry people had risen, leaving farmers with debt, degrading soils and dependence on inputs they could no longer afford or abandon.

    For Mboroki, the true consequences arrived decades later.

    In the front room of his concrete house in Meru County, chemotherapy printouts, hospital receipts, and lab reports lie scattered across a table. Together they document paraquat and glyphosate in his urine at eighty-eight and twenty-one times the international reference limits.

    Glyphosate — the active ingredient in Roundup, developed by Monsanto and now owned by Bayer — was classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), part of the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2015 as “probably carcinogenic to humans,” yet remains legal across much of the world.

    Switzerland, home to Syngenta, had outlawed paraquat, a weed killer that can be fatal after a single swallow, from its own fields in 1989. Two decades later, in 2007, the EU also banned it. Chronic paraquat exposure has been linked to Parkinson’s disease and kidney failure. Yet Syngenta kept manufacturing it for export to Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

    The Paraquat Papers revealed in 2021 that Syngenta knew for decades of evidence linking paraquat to brain and nervous-system damage, suppressed its own internal findings, and worked covertly to influence regulators. Earlier this year, facing thousands of US lawsuits, the company announced it would close its last paraquat facility in Huddersfield, England, by the end of June 2026.

    Dimethoate and chlorpyrifos — organophosphate insecticides from the same chemical family whose development produced the first nerve agents — were linked to neurological, endocrine, and reproductive harm, and were removed from the European market in 2019 and 2020. In the United States, chlorpyrifos was pulled from food crops in 2021 over harm to children’s developing brains but was reinstated in 2023 after a federal court overturned the ban, and it continues to be used on a wide range of food crops.

    Unaware of the risks, Mboroki sprayed his maize, beans, and coffee with products like Gramoxone, Roundup, dimethoate and Karate — with no mask, gloves, or protective gear.

    Photo
    The landscape of Meru, in Kenya’s eastern highlands. The fertile slopes of Meru have seen rising pesticide use transform both the landscape and the health of its communities. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    The imported hybrid seeds initially produced higher yields, Mboroki says, though many farmers say the crops lacked the nutrition of those they replaced. But they could not be reliably replanted: seed saved from one season often produced weak harvests the next, forcing farmers to buy new seed, fertilizer, and pesticides for each growing season.

    Drought-hardy traditional staples that had sustained communities for generations — sorghum, finger millet, cowpea — disappeared from fields and markets. Land that had once produced reliably became harder and less fertile, demanding ever more fertilizer for the same yields. To stop buying the chemicals was to gamble with the next harvest.

    “Before, the yields were lower, but the crops were nutritious,” Mboroki tells me. “Then the yields become higher, and everybody is now getting sick. But we have no choice. Our indigenous seeds in this area are mostly gone. We can only plant what is available now, and those crops depend on the chemicals. If we stop spraying, they won’t grow.”

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Francis Marete Mboroki
    Francis Marete Mboroki at his concrete home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    This dependence extends beyond individual farms. Kenya’s pesticide imports rose from 6,400 metric tons in 2015 to 15,600 metric tons in 2018. A 2023 Route to Food Initiative report found that 76 percent of pesticides sold in Kenya contained at least one highly hazardous ingredient, while 44 percent of the pesticide volume consisted of products already banned in Europe. Safer biopesticides were just 2 percent of the market. Five companies led the sector, headed by Switzerland’s Syngenta and Germany’s Bayer. Nearly 68 percent of Syngenta’s pesticide volume in Kenya was classified as highly hazardous.

    The Swiss organization Public Eye, with the Greenpeace UK unit Unearthed, found European companies filed notifications to export roughly 122,000 metric tons of pesticides in 2024 containing seventy-five active ingredients banned on European farms — a 50 percent increase from 81,000 metric tons in 2018. Roughly 9,000 metric tons were bound for Africa, with Kenya alone set to receive 473,000 kilograms.

    None of that was visible from Mboroki’s farm in the eastern highlands. The scientific studies, regulatory restrictions, and legal battles unfolding abroad were far removed from the Kenyan farmers using the chemicals every day.

    Mboroki pauses, staring through the open doorway toward the patchwork of green fields beyond. “I’ve learned the hard way that you should never go looking for gold,” he says, almost to himself. “There’s never gold on the other side of promises.”

    Older residents across Meru say cancer was once so rare that people often associated it with witchcraft; today many describe cancers, respiratory illnesses and neurological problems as commonplace.

    For Dr Zakayo Thaimuta, a forensic pathologist at the University of Nairobi who codeveloped a screening method for pesticide-related illness, the pattern became impossible to ignore. “There is a very sharp spike in cancer in Meru,” says Thaimuta, a Meru native who has watched the trend unfold firsthand. “The levels are far outside anything you would expect to observe in a normal population.”

    In a study of seventy farmers in the Meru village of Mbaria last year, Thaimuta and colleagues found that all of them carried paraquat in their blood and urine. Within the group, he documented clusters of respiratory disease, kidney failure, liver damage, anemia, Parkinson’s disease, and profound toxicant-induced immunosuppression.

    Local clinics, however, lacked the diagnostic capacity to identify chemical injuries, and many cases were repeatedly misdiagnosed. “Chemical pharyngitis [severe throat inflammation caused by airborne pesticide exposure] was consistently misidentified and treated as pneumonia,” Thaimuta explains. “When patients failed to respond to pneumonia treatments, doctors routinely rotated them onto tuberculosis treatments.” When those failed, patients were referred to specialized medical centers in Nairobi.

    Of the seventy farmers in Mbaria, only two could afford the trip. The undiagnosed never enter the medical record.

    This blind spot has masked the rapid development of toxicant-induced pulmonary fibrosis, Thaimuta says. Driven by paraquat accumulating in the lungs’ alveolar cells, the disease scars lung tissue, leaving victims unable to oxygenate their blood. It was the most pervasive severe injury found across the cohort.

    Thaimuta describes a sixteen-year-old boy whose mother spent more than twenty years on pesticide-intensive farms. The teenager tested positive for paraquat and glyphosate, suffered kidney failure and severe reproductive abnormalities, and later had his testes removed. Thaimuta suspects the teenager’s exposure began in the womb and continued through breastfeeding, raising concerns that the effects of the pesticides may already be crossing generations.

    “Collecting the history around these places, you will find that they have experienced many deaths, some of which have not even been documented,” Thaimuta tells me. “And I’m afraid that most of these deaths are related to exposure to these chemicals.”

    Nancy Wanjiru, seventy-two, is among the people behind those statistics. She spent thirty years with a sprayer strapped to her back. For five of those years, she worked at Ibis Farm, a high-altitude vegetable farm operated by Flamingo Horticulture Kenya Ltd. There she sprayed crops destined for British and other European supermarket shelves, including Tesco and Marks & Spencer. For the remaining twenty-five years she sprayed for local farmers, working almost every day without a mask or gloves.

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Nancy Wanjiru
    Nancy Wanjiru spent three decades spraying pesticides across farms in Meru without protective gear. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Wanjiru had little reason to question what she was handling. “I never thought it was harmful,” she says from her small home in rural Meru. “There was no basic education about the chemicals. And you could not ask too many questions.”

    “The pay was very little,” she adds, “and if you caused problems or complained openly, someone else would take your place.”

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Nancy Wanjiru at her home in rural Meru Nancy Wanjiru at her home in rural Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Years ago, her health began to deteriorate: chest pain, weakness in her arms and legs, tremors, hands too weak to grip, failing eyesight, and stomach problems that eventually required surgery. Doctors told her the cause was the pesticides she had sprayed for decades. She now depends on her children to survive.

    “If I didn’t have my children to help me and take me to the hospital,” she says, “I would have surely died by now.”

    Nowhere is exposure more direct than on Kenya’s flower farms, where workers spray chemicals banned in Europe onto blooms cut, boxed, and flown to European supermarkets the next morning. The trade exploits a regulatory gap: cut flowers are ornamental, not food, so the EU, UK, and United States set no pesticide residue limits for them. A rose grown with a chemical banned on European farms can be sold freely in a European shop the next day because, unlike screened fruit and vegetables, it was never meant to be eaten.

    Stephen Muriungi, forty-seven, spent two and a half years as one of these workers. At an export-oriented flower farm he sprayed cut blooms daily with a mix of organophosphates banned in the EU, including dimethoate and chlorpyrifos. He wore no protective equipment, earning 9,000 Kenyan shillings a month (about $70).

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Stephen Muriungi Stephen Muriungi goes through medical documents inside the cramped one-room shack on his sister’s property where he now lives. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    When that contract ended, he spent another year spraying for smallholder farms, earning 250 to 300 shillings a day — less than $3. “You could feel the chemicals entering your body, but the reactions did not seem serious at first, so we just kept working,” Muriungi tells me. “After a while, I could smell the chemicals coming out through my sweat.”

    Then his body began to swell. First his legs, then his torso, then his hands. He gradually lost the ability to walk and speak normally. “It felt as if my skin was on fire,” he says, lifting his trousers to reveal what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs.
    Stephen Muriungi reveals what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs.
    Stephen Muriungi reveals what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    “For the last three years, I have not been able to work,” he continues. “I still struggle to walk and sometimes it’s difficult to speak. My hands shake and my legs are in constant pain.”

    Doctors tested him for tuberculosis and HIV; both came back negative. No diagnosis followed. “Up to now, the doctors have never been able to tell me exactly what I’m suffering from,” Muriungi says. The link to pesticides emerged only after a doctor connected his symptoms to other agricultural workers.

    He now lives in his sister’s house, where she feeds and bathes him on the days he cannot manage. “This has caused me so much pain and misery,” he says, slumped on a bed inside a cramped one-room shack on his sister’s property. “I have been left to deal with this alone. The companies are not helping me, my former employers are not helping me, and neither is the government.”

    Muriungi’s case is not unique in Kenya. In Naivasha, ninety kilometers northwest of Nairobi and the center of the country’s flower industry, advocate Gilbert Njoroge arranged testing for sixty-three flower-farm clients; fifteen showed dangerously elevated levels of glyphosate and paraquat. In Thika, legal advocates represent more than one hundred cancer patients who trace their illnesses to flower plantations, where workers describe mixing chemicals with bare hands and being issued little more than gunny bags and dust masks.

    In a region where nearly everyone depends on farming, avoiding the chemicals feels impossible.

    “The doctors tell me to stay away from the pesticides,” Muriungi says. “But I still smell them everywhere — in food, when I walk around, when people are working nearby. It affects me so much.”

    Wanjiru and Muriungi are among the petitioners named in a constitutional case before Kenya’s Environment and Land Court. The petition — Petition E048 of 2022 — seeks the withdrawal of harmful pesticide active ingredients, including glyphosate, paraquat, chlorpyrifos, and imidacloprid, a widely used neurotoxic insecticide. Several are classified as highly hazardous under the joint criteria of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WHO; several of the others are banned in the EU over risks to human health and pollinators.

    It names fourteen respondents, including the local subsidiaries and distributors of Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, and BASF, along with Twiga Chemicals, the Agrochemicals Association of Kenya, and several state regulators. The petition argues that they failed to warn farmers and consumers and allowed hazardous pesticides to remain on the market long after their risks were clear.

    When Wanjiru’s urine was tested this year as part of the case, paraquat came back more than ninety times the reference limit and glyphosate more than twenty. Every other petitioner whose urine was tested also showed both chemicals above laboratory reference levels, with no exceptions.

    Paraquat readings reached more than five hundred times the reference limit, while glyphosate readings reached up to 128 times. Two independent international laboratories corroborated the findings.

    “When I learned these chemicals were banned in Europe,” Wanjiru says, “I could not understand it. If they are too dangerous for the people there, why are they being sold to us here? And where is our government? Isn’t it supposed to protect us?”

    Last year the court granted the petition class-action status, ordering the case advertised in national newspapers so that any Kenyan claiming harm from the chemicals could join. “Thousands of Kenyan farmers and consumers who have been directly or indirectly affected by these highly hazardous pesticides now have legal recourse similar to that accorded to American citizens,” says Kelvin Mugambi Kubai, the advocate heading the case.

    In the United States, Bayer has paid more than $10 billion since acquiring Monsanto in 2018 to settle claims that glyphosate-based Roundup caused cancer, while tens of thousands of cases remain active in US courts. Kenyan farmers have used the same chemical for decades. Yet while US plaintiffs have secured settlements and jury awards, Kenyan victims have received neither compensation nor acknowledgment from the companies involved.

    Beyond withdrawing the pesticides, the petitioners are seeking compensation for those already sickened, court-ordered medical coverage for affected communities, and a declaration that both the state and the manufacturers violated Kenyans’ constitutional rights to life, health, and a clean environment by allowing the products to remain on the market. The companies and government agencies named in the case deny the chemicals are unsafe.

    “The [Kenyan] government’s response has largely been to shift responsibility onto the users rather than acting as a regulator,” explains Kubai. “They blame the victims and say that if the pesticides had been used properly, these harms would not have occurred.”

    “The industry often talks about safe use, but that assumes a level of protection that simply does not exist for many smallholder farmers,” he continues. “When highly hazardous pesticides are used without adequate safeguards, exposure is not an accident. It is a predictable outcome.”

    Last year, the Kenyan government announced the withdrawal of seventy-seven pesticide products, the restriction of 202 others, and the suspension of 151 pending further review following the Pest Control Products Board assessment of 430 products on the market. Many of the chemicals targeted, however, had already fallen out of use or been banned globally decades earlier. Campaigners welcomed the review but argued it left the pesticides of greatest concern largely intact. Glyphosate and paraquat — the two chemicals most heavily detected in the petitioners’ urine — remained on sale, while chlorpyrifos was merely restricted to termite control rather than withdrawn altogether.

    For Silke Bollmohr, an ecotoxicologist whose 2023 Route to Food Initiative study documented the scale of highly hazardous pesticide use in Kenya, the key question is why some hazardous pesticides were targeted while others were not.

    “What remains unclear is why the government chose to ban specific products that seem to protect export markets and look good for the public, while leaving high-use, health-ravaging pesticides on the market,” she says. The chemicals left on the market, she adds, are killing pollinators and soil life — the foundation of resilient food production — placing farmers under further pressure.

    Bollmohr believes the move was driven as much by efforts to safeguard export markets as by concerns about human health. Kenyan agricultural exports, including coffee, have faced restrictions and rejections abroad over pesticide residues, raising questions about whether protecting export markets has taken precedence over protecting the health of Kenyan consumers and farmworkers.

    For Kubai, the withdrawal reinforces the case. “It appears the government is agreeing with the gist of our petition,” he tells me. “These pesticides are highly hazardous and should not be sold within the Kenyan market.”

    The move, he argues, also undermines the claims that tighter regulation would cripple agriculture. “The government has spent years arguing that banning these pesticides would devastate the sector,” he says. “Yet dozens have now been withdrawn, and that disruption has not occurred.”

    The contamination does not stop at the edge of the field. It moves through soil and waterways, enters food supply chains, and travels hundreds of kilometers from the farms where it was first sprayed. Tomatoes grown in Meru are sold in Nairobi. Rice cultivated in central Kenya is distributed across the country. By the time the chemicals arrive on dinner tables, they are no longer a problem confined to farmers — they have become part of the daily diet of millions of Kenyans.

    “Herbicides are omnipresent,” says Thaimuta, from the University of Nairobi. “They are everywhere.” Rainfall and runoff carry paraquat far beyond where it is first applied, and once in the water it moves downstream.

    “If water in Mount Kenya comes into contact with paraquat, it will be transported downstream,” Thaimuta says. “Anybody who eats fresh vegetables and fruits would likely have these chemicals in their blood as well.”

    The sick farmers, he says, are only the most visible part of the problem. “What we know so far is just the tip of the iceberg. It’s a growing health crisis. [These chemicals] contaminate the environment and the plants. And the consumers — the human beings — are paying a heavy price for it.”

    Rosaria Rigiri spent more than three decades spraying her Meru farm, raising onions, potatoes, beans, and maize. Two years ago, her hand began to swell, then came pain beneath her arm and breast. She was diagnosed with cancer and underwent a mastectomy; it spread, and a later scan found tumors in her brain.

    At sixty-four she can no longer work and, in recent months, has experienced periods of unconsciousness. The family’s livelihood has gone into scans, surgery, and chemotherapy — one course of medication alone runs more than 125,000 Kenyan shillings (more than $900) a month — and for over six months she has gone without treatment, because the family has run out of money.

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Rosaria Rigiri photographed with her medications in the foreground
    Rosaria Rigiri seated in her home in Meru, where piles of medicine bottles and blister packs crowd a table. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Rigiri’s urine showed paraquat more than sixty-six times the laboratory’s reference limit and glyphosate more than fifteen. She learned what the chemicals had done to her only when researchers came to the village and explained it.

    “As things are now, there is no possibility of stopping the chemicals,” she tells me, seated in her home in Meru, where medicine bottles and blister packs crowd a table. “We know they are harmful, but if we stop using them, nothing will grow.”

    “I really wonder, if these companies can make these chemicals that kill us, why can’t they make ones that are safe for human beings?”

    Uncertainty hangs over the next generation, already stooped in the fields. Rigiri’s daughter, forty-seven-year-old Lucy Makena, farms the same land — and has tested positive for the same chemicals herself.

    “I’m very worried about my own health,” Makena says. “I see my mother’s situation, and she is the one who gave birth to me. I’m using the same pesticides that did this to her.”

    Yet she keeps spraying. “I don’t have any choice. We can’t grow anymore in the traditional way, and no one can shift to organic without outside or government support. I would give up farming to save my health, but there are no other jobs here. . . . We are stuck.”

    Photo
    Rosaria Rigiri and her daughter, Lucy Makena, at their home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    The family wears protective equipment when it can afford it, but Makena says that means little where every field is sprayed. “There’s nothing you can do to protect yourself when the medicine [chemicals] are all around you,” she says.

    A community that once attributed cancer to witchcraft has become one where sickness no longer shocks anyone. Neighbors who once pooled money for a stricken family now have stricken families of their own. “Sickness has become a lifestyle here,” Makena explains.

    Even now, as Makena describes the cancer that has ravaged her mother’s body and her fears of what the chemicals may do to her next, she keeps returning to the word dawa.

    Rigiri listens quietly, visibly worn by fatigue. For decades, the pesticides promised bigger harvests and a better life. Now she watches her daughter walk into the same fields carrying the same chemicals — armed with the knowledge she never had, yet caught in the same trap.

  • La socialiste Melat Kiros se présente au Congrès dans le Colorado

    Entretien avec Melàt Kiros

    Les candidat·es au Congrès soutenu·es par les Socialistes démocrates d’Amérique (DSA) ont déjà remporté trois victoires lors des primaires cette année. Lors des élections qui se tiendront demain dans le Colorado, Melat Kiros espère rejoindre le groupe de plus en plus important de socialistes au Capitole.

    https://jacobin.com/2026/06/melat-kiros-congress-colorado

    #usa

  • Europe Doesn’t Know How to Respond to China
    https://jacobin.com/2026/06/europe-china-trade-protectionism-labor

    Cet article explique les raisons matérielles de l’odieuse et raciste remarque de Kallas qui vient de désigner la Chine comme un cancer qu"il faudrait enlever du tissu européen.

    Le choix de l’expression médicale montre les idées profondément biologistes et fascistes de la politicienne estonienne. Ces gens aiment la guerre car ils la considèrent comme une intervention chirurgicale pour sauver un organisme malade.

    Le caractère fasciste de la haute représentante de l’Union européenne pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité n’est pas surprenant quand on se rappelle que les minuscules états baltes et la Finlande sont initialement la création des mêmes personnes et familles nobles et militaires à l’orignie du fascisme allemand. Ceci est d’ailleurs également le cas de l’Ukraine mais avecc la participation davantage d’acteurs slaves appartenant aux mêmes classes sociales.

    Sous l’emprise des « von » (par ex. der Leyen) l’Europe en crise renoue avec l’esprit odieux et inhumain des classes belliqueuses de 1918. L’Ukraine avec ses idoles nationales génocidaires est l’incarnation mafieuse du même esprit. L’alliance de ce monde aux raçines pré-fascistes avec les russophobes de Pologne et d’Allemagne constitue un danger de mort pour tous les Européens.

    14.6.2026 by Ruth Sisask - The European Union’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas says Europe needs to take painful steps to overcome the “cancer” of dependency on China. The EU is talking about protectionism, but in reality its firms are addicted to low-wage labor outside the bloc.

    The European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, has again gained attention for provocative statements about China. In remarks last month, she compared the EU’s economic relationship with China to a “cancer,” arguing that Europe must endure the painful “chemotherapy” of export controls, investment screening, and supply chain restructuring.

    Her attitude highlights a rhetorical turn toward economic independence, recognizing the EU’s inability to manage the consequences of global capitalism. Faced with China’s growing technological and industrial power, officials in Brussels have launched industrial initiatives, discussed new trade restrictions, and sought to strengthen domestic manufacturing. Across the Atlantic, the United States has pursued similar goals through tariffs, industrial subsidies, and efforts to bring production back home.

    Over the last few years, the EU has made attempts to reposition itself as an economic powerhouse, in light of member states’ growing dependence on China’s exports and the Chinese market. Official Eurostat numbers tell a stark story. In 2024, EU imports from China reached €517.8 billion, as against €213.3 billion in EU exports to that country, leaving a goods deficit of €304.5 billion. That deficit had climbed to €98 billion in Q1 2026 alone, the highest since Q3 2022. China is now the EU’s largest source of imports, and the gap of export deficits keeps widening.

    Even leading capitalists find that the global capitalism developed since the 1980s is now in crisis. For BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink,

    The danger is that we focus so much on the noise that we forget what actually matters. The forces behind today’s headlines have been building for a long time. The old model of global capitalism is fracturing. Countries are spending enormous sums to become self-reliant — in energy, in defense, in technology.

    Fink underlines a path the EU and the United States are trying to follow. Yet the European push for independence is easier said than done.

    The Council of the EU has stated: “Europe’s productivity has been lagging behind other major economies in the last 20 years.” In particular, Andrea Butollo and his colleagues’ research demonstrates that China has become a dominant producer of batteries, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and a range of advanced industrial technologies, with Chinese companies like Huawei, ZTE, Baidu, and Xiaomi emerging as major global competitors. The concern for the Global North is that China increasingly combines technological development with manufacturing capacity. China has become a necessary partner for producing many technologies — most important, anything that uses batteries.

    The EU has responded with a wave of industrial initiatives aimed at strengthening its own high-tech production. The Industrial Accelerator Act passed this year prioritizes EU-made products across procurement, offering support schemes for made-in-EU products. Commissioners representing all twenty-seven member states have been asked to map Chinese activity across every portfolio, from trade and agriculture to defense, health, and digital infrastructure. A Guardian report suggests that Brussels is now seriously considering quotas, tariff-rate quotas, and supplier diversification requirements in strategically important sectors.

    In addition to limiting Chinese imports, Reuters explains that the European Commission wants to double the EU market share of semiconductors to 20 percent in the next four years to boost the continent’s technological sovereignty. The proposal includes faster approval processes for data centers and aims to force agreements between manufacturers and buyers to “guarantee future purchases.”

    Butollo and his colleagues’ research situates these developments within a broader turn toward economic nationalism, arguing that both the EU and the United States have adopted increasingly interventionist industrial policies in an effort to regain leadership in the global technology market. Edward Ashbee has gone further, suggesting that China’s rise may itself become the driver of deglobalization, as Western states conclude they can only develop by gaining advantage over China. Others, like Benjamin Selwyn and Christin Bernhold, maintain that global production networks are continuing to expand despite geopolitical tensions. The EU, now turning toward domestic protectionism, seeks to become an economic powerhouse of its own, much like China. The conditions under which China grew to economic dominance, however, cannot be readily recreated inside Europe.

    The European Commission in 2019 termed China “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The tension between the EU and China came out into the open with foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas’s outburst at the annual Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn. Although out of line with diplomatic practice, her statement was much in line with the EU’s latest shifts.

    The problem is that the EU has long had a trade deficit in goods with China. The prominent area of concern is “China’s drive towards import substitution and self-sufficiency.” The commission has stated, “While the EU welcomes efforts by the Chinese authorities to attract foreign direct investment, EU companies continue to face discrimination in the Chinese market, and it remains difficult for European businesses in China to compete due to the lack of a level playing field.” In claiming that the issue is China’s political system, the Europeans show (albeit without admitting to it) that their own market is lagging behind in development.

    The commission is critical of China’s economic approach, claiming that “China’s distortive industrial policies and practices — in particular with regard to widespread support for the manufacturing sector — create overcapacity in China, with negative externalities for a wide range of WTO [World Trade Organization] members.” This again confirms that Kallas’s hostile comparison is part of a bigger narrative shift, comparable to Donald Trump’s strong anti-China slogans, already adopted during his first term.

    In their recent work on capitalist value chains, Selwyn and Bernhold argue that debates about deglobalization routinely overlook a fundamental feature of capitalism: capital’s endless search for opportunities to extract surplus value from labor. Their study revealed that leading US firms are not abandoning globalization; they are reorganizing it while trying to contain China’s technological rise.

    Despite years of discussion about reshoring and economic sovereignty, global production remains deeply interconnected as companies continue to rely upon international supply chains. As production becomes more technologically complex and the need to keep costs to a minimum stays fundamental, the requirement for access to specialized suppliers, raw materials, and labor markets increases.

    As these same authors cite from studies on the semiconductor industry, front-end production may expand in Europe and the United States, but much of the world’s manufacturing capacity remains concentrated in Asia. Firms are increasingly pursuing a “China + 1” strategy, diversifying production into countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia while maintaining extensive international supply chains.

    Importing goods from China was not an issue for decades for the Global North, because the labor and thus products were cheap. But now, China has developed to control more and more of the core technologies, and the EU and United States haven’t been able to adapt, as they are not used to playing catch-up.

    Selwyn and Bernhold thus conclude that current developments reflect attempts by capitalist firms and leading states to preserve globalization while restructuring it around new geopolitical realities. But if globalization as a process continues, why are Western governments increasingly embracing protectionist rhetoric?

    Since the late 1970s, China’s role within the global economy seemed relatively clear, serving as a vast — and relatively cheap — reservoir of labor for Western firms seeking lower production costs. Selwyn and Bernhold argue that China’s economic opening changed the United States’ own approach to international deals:

    As the US state facilitated a shift in its domestic economy towards high-tech CVC (Corporate Venture Capital) nodes such as research and development “knowledge,” and professional services, it relied increasingly on importing cheap manufactured goods from China which were often produced under the control of, or for, Western firms.

    From this, it follows that the United States’ benefit from China was that American firms, controlling the technologies and the market, could use cheap Chinese labor, which helped, in turn, grow the Chinese technology sector.

    But in this development, according to Selwyn and Bernhold, the Chinese state successfully pursued a strategy that first integrated the country into labor-intensive global production networks and later facilitated increasingly sophisticated forms of industrial and technological development.

    As they claim, China followed a path of “first low-tech labor-intensive industrialization through integration into capitalist value chains, and later increasingly high-tech development.” China has successfully implemented a plan for long-term development of the national economy, comparable to its Western counterparts’ strategies. China had changed position from a workshop to a challenger to US (and EU) firms.

    China’s rise has encouraged Western governments to pursue policies designed to restore industrial competitiveness and technological leadership. In the United States, this trend has become associated with reshoring, industrial subsidies, and what policymakers often describe as “friend-shoring.” Both the Biden and Trump administrations have sought to encourage domestic investment while reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains.

    This approach has extended to the EU, with both administrations pressuring the European Union to decouple from China. The first notable example of this was back in 2020 already, when the Guardian reported that the United States urged the EU to bar Huawei from 5G networks. Today EU policymakers speak of strategic autonomy, battery independence, technological sovereignty, and industrial resilience. Tariffs and industrial policy are increasingly viewed as necessary tools for defending European competitiveness.

    These sentiments stress how significant the shift is in rhetoric and policy, as the whole point of the EU has been to support the free market: as its own website boasts, “The European Union is one of the most outward-oriented economies in the world. It is also the world’s largest single market area. Free trade among its members was one of the EU’s founding principles, and it is committed to opening up world trade as well.” Now as the trade deficit with China is rising, there is a need for a change.

    Europe can invest into new technologies. It can subsidize strategic industries. It can support battery production and semiconductor manufacturing. Indeed, as Butollo and his colleagues argue, both the EU and the United States already have implemented more interventionist policies in a bid to regain technological leadership. Yet what the Europeans can’t do is recreate the conditions that initially facilitated China’s competitive edge.

    One simple reason for this is that European economies are not built upon vast pools of low-cost industrial labor, at least not inside the EU. European workers enjoy higher wages, protections, and social rights. As a result, Europe’s pursuit of economic sovereignty remains structurally dependent on globalization and cheap products based on low labor costs. This frustration was emphasized by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who claimed that “work-life balance and a four-day week will not be enough to maintain our country’s current level of prosperity in the future, which is why we need to work harder.”

    Global capitalism has relied on inequality of costs and wealth between trading partners. With China, the inequality is leveling. The EU needs to find new “partners” that have low labor costs, if they want to keep down production costs, stop fueling China’s market, and keep the welfare benefits.

    As an example, consider the recently concluded agreement between the European Union and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) with the goal of securing critical raw-material supplies. These materials will have lower tariffs for the EU, which, based on its own press release, will bring more exports from Mercosur and make the EU more competitive thanks to reduced costs: the EU claims that “removing high Mercosur tariffs will enable EU exporters to save over 4 billion euros in customs duties per year.”

    The EU’s strategy increasingly has two objectives. One is defensive: containing China’s rise through tariffs, restrictions, and industrial policy. The other is expansive: constructing alternative global supply chains through Mercosur, Southeast Asia, and other regions.

    The system rewards those capable of combining access to labor with technological development. China succeeded in doing both. Europe now seeks to recover its position within the global economy. To compete, the EU must continue relying on new global production networks as an alternative to both Chinese supply chains and domestic production.

    This logic might hold were the world not already so deeply globalized. Kaja Kallas’s chemotherapy metaphor is poorly chosen: chemotherapy targets a foreign body, but China is is structurally embedded in the global market. A conjoined twin is the more apt image: painful separation may be conceivable, but you still share a world with the other afterward. The ambition to decouple from China is risky because the EU lacks both the productive capacity and the raw materials for genuine independence, leaving it reliant on new supply chains that China is equally positioned to penetrate.

    #Europe #fascisme #russophobie #guerre #Chine #économie

  • The Super-Elite Is Tightening Its Grip on Combat Sports
    https://jacobin.com/2026/06/ufc-freedom-trump-white-saudis

    UFC Freedom 250 isn’t just a birthday party for Donald Trump. It’s a gathering of the fight-sport industry’s biggest power brokers — private equity, the Saudi government, and media elites — at the seat of American power. Phiti Chip Somodevilla

    Les USA ressemblent de plus en plus au États-Unis dans Idiocracy avec un apport non négligeable des tortionnaires saoudiens. Pourtnt il n’y a pas grand chose de nouveau quand on se souvient des coutumes des colonialistes anglais dans Tai Pan de James Clavell.

    13.6.2026 by Ben Case - Beneath the spectacle of fighters beating each other bloody on the White House South Lawn, fight promoters, tech billionaires, and the Saudi government are working to concentrate wealth and power in fewer, richer hands.

    Two thousand years ago, Roman emperors celebrated their birthdays with gladiator shows. The tradition lives on in President Donald Trump, who for his eightieth birthday will host mixed martial arts (MMA) fights at the White House. On Sunday, June 14, in an event promoted by the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), fighters will square off in front of a 4,500-person audience handpicked by Trump. The event, dubbed UFC Freedom 250, doubles as a celebration of Trump’s birthday and the country’s 250th anniversary.

    Trump has spent years cultivating the UFC world as a cultural home base, using it to associate himself with toughness, violence, and dominance — and to pull angry young men into his orbit. The president not only frequents UFC events but gets his own entrance music, a ritual normally reserved for fighters. He has a close, decades-long friendship with Dana White, the UFC’s president, who introduced him at the 2024 Republican National Convention. Many of Trump’s highest-profile boosters, like the podcaster Joe Rogan, have deep roots in the UFC world. If it’s true, as the late right-wing pundit Andrew Breitbart said, that politics is downhill from culture, then much of MAGA is downhill from the UFC.

    But there’s more to the story. Behind the scenes, UFC Freedom 250 is a tribute to the would-be emperor gifted by capital interests angling to monopolize the fight-sport industry, in alliance with some of the richest people in the world. It’s likely to be a pivotal moment in the consolidation of the fight-sport industry in a small number of enormously powerful hands.

    In what feels like a previous life, I was a professional Muay Thai boxer. I represented the United States at the Muay Thai world championships, the sport’s version of the Olympic Games, and went on to win a minor world title. I would split the year between stints in Thailand, where I lived in a gym and trained and fought full time, and the states, where I worked various day jobs to support my training. I spent four years teaching at a UFC gym in my hometown in New Jersey, where I instructed and trained alongside athletes in MMA, Muay Thai, jiujitsu, and boxing.

    Of all fight sports, MMA is the closest to the type of stereotypical machismo you might expect from UFC marketing. There’s just something about the ground-and-pound, MMA’s signature move, that evokes brute male violence in its most primitive and archetypal form. Still, like all sports, MMA takes all kinds. There are MMA-based “active clubs” that recruit white supremacists, and there are openly anarchist fight clubs. There are MMA gyms for people who want to get healthy and have fun and others for elite athletes looking to compete professionally. There are religiously affiliated MMA programs and queer and trans fight clubs.

    People seek out combat sports for a host of reasons, such as fitness, confidence, and self-defense. Some people just kind of like getting punched in the face, or punching others in the face, and combat sports are a socially sanctioned way to do it. For me, it was a combination. As a formerly angry young man myself, I needed an outlet for that anger after graduating out of high school football and dropping out of a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program over opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. I found boxing, then Muay Thai. Angry young men get a bad rap, often deservedly so, but there are many things to be angry at, many of them legitimate. Say what you will about the violence of fight sports, but at least it’s consensual.

    Despite MMA’s association with the political right, at the core of all fight sports is a culture of respect that is grounded in one thing only: what you can or can’t do when faced one-on-one with an opponent who wants to hurt you. No one can save you once you’re in the ring, not your training partners or coaches. The fundamental premise is performance under equal opportunity pressure. Fighters are matched by weight, experience, and fight record, but even when mismatches occur — and these are endemic — the rules are still applied more or less equally. And fighting is the only set of sports that can end at any moment with a knockout. Each fighter in every fight has what we call a puncher’s chance to land the right shot and win.

    It’s this idea of proving oneself on a level playing field, not just the aesthetic of belligerence and dominance, that draws Trump and his circle to the sport. Capitalism’s winners want to imagine and portray themselves as having proven their mettle in an environment of pure, unadulterated, equalizing competition. But capitalism is not like that at all. It runs on cronyism, inherited advantage, rigged rules, uneven matchups, and political favor — and the capitalist enterprises behind the fights are no exception.

    According to Dana White, UFC’s all-American business success story started with John McCain.

    Versions of sport fighting date to antiquity in all corners of the globe. The second event introduced into the Ancient Greek Olympic Games was wrestling, following the footrace. Soon after, they would add boxing and a free-for-all fight sport called pankration, in which biting, eye gouges, and groin strikes were the only banned techniques. The UFC was founded in 1993 with these same basic rules.

    In its first incarnation, UFC was part underground martial arts competition, part street fight. There were no weight classes or time limits, and fights, which took place in a chain-link-fence cage, went on until one fighter yielded or was left unconscious. The sport’s appeal lay in the opportunity to answer in real life questions that previously had only been askable in movies or video games, such as, what happens if a middle-aged Dutch karate champion fought a four-hundred-pound Samoan sumo wrestler? That was, in fact, the inaugural UFC fight; the karate guy won by kicking the sumo wrestler in the face after the latter had lost his footing, sending a tooth flying into the crowd.

    As the story goes, Senator John McCain soon caught wind of the UFC and was mortified, deriding it as “human cockfighting.” Notwithstanding the fact that cockfighting was legal in McCain’s home state of Arizona at the time, the presidential hopeful went on a high-publicity crusade to ban the human version and very nearly succeeded. By 1997, MMA was outlawed in thirty-seven states and forbidden on pay-per-view, relegating its distribution to the depths of the video stores of that era, somewhere between the pornography and professional wrestling sections — which is where I first encountered it in my youth.

    In response to the political blowback, MMA was forced to professionalize. Rules were invented. Judges, gloves, and timed rounds were added. Dana White took over as UFC president in 2001, the year it officially codified its new “unified rules of mixed martial arts,” rebranding as a legitimate sport and lobbying state athletic commissions for approval.

    It worked. Slowly working its way up the ladder of public respectability, White balanced a commitment to full legality with a promotional style hearkening to the sport’s brutal underground origins. UFC brought in announcers, including Joe Rogan, who would continually educate audiences about the sport’s rules while reminding everyone that the fighters were serious athletes. Still, UFC broadcasts began with a video montage of Roman gladiators, set to a heavy metal soundtrack. The UFC’s branding threaded a needle between boxing, which is definitely a sport, and professional wrestling, which is definitely a show, to create a niche that would draw in hordes of mostly young men drawn to ostentatious displays of toughness.

    But UFC’s rise to the world’s most profitable combat-sport promotion owed to more than an organic fan base of angry young men. It also had heavily invested corporate sponsors. In 2001, the year of its relaunch, a pair of casino executives in Las Vegas bought UFC under a parent company called Zuffa. In 2016, Zuffa was purchased by media management giant Endeavor, which also represented the NFL and NHL. In 2023, Endeavor announced the merger of UFC with the World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE), the main professional wrestling promotion (“professional wrestling” meaning fake, circus-style fighting) into a new company, TKO Group Holdings.

    Two years later, Endeavor was wholly acquired by Silver Lake, one of the world’s largest private equity firms, which focuses on technology-sector investing. For TKO, two big moves rapidly followed the buyout. First, a seven-year, exclusive rights deal with David Ellison’s Paramount for nearly $8 billion. Second, a new campaign to take over America’s premier traditional fight sport, boxing, under the banner of yet another new subsidiary, Zuffa Boxing.

    Zuffa is trying to do to boxing what Trump has done to the United States government: use legitimate critique of a bad system as justification to impose one that is far worse, with the goal of consolidating more power and profit in fewer, richer hands.

    Like any enterprise in capitalism, the professional fight game is organized around money-making, and it’s a famously grimy sector of sports entertainment. Athletes in major team sports like football, basketball, baseball, soccer, and hockey are represented by labor unions. Fighters are not. In combat sports, contracts are negotiated between promoters and managers, if a fighter is successful or connected enough to have one, and otherwise between promoters and coaches or even the athletes themselves. Historically, this has enabled gross exploitation in a sport that exacts a severe physical toll.

    In 2000, Congress passed the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act designed to protect boxers from exploitation by sanctioning organizations, promoters, and managers. Introduced by McCain, the Ali Act essentially applied baseline guardrails against corruption and coercion.

    The Ali Act was passed in the years following the sport’s devolution into a profiteering mess. Fighters were at the mercy of the deals cut between their managers and sanctioning organizations that dictated athletes’ standing and opportunities. Since the 1980s, there have been four main sanctioning bodies in the world, each with its own champions and ranking systems across weight classes and of course its own fees and networks. The heavyweight champion of the world used to be considered one of the most important titles in sports; now there can be four of them at the same time.

    The Ali Act was a vast improvement, but it still left the sport disjointed into cliques, with loopholes enabling different institutions and rules across sanctioning bodies and states. Making “unification” fights — and, depending on the state, making fights at all — hinges on whose pockets get lined and little else, resulting in a sport where fighters couldn’t advocate for themselves and the best rarely fought the best.

    Enter the Saudi royal family. As part of its bid to sportswash the country’s well-earned reputation for human rights abuses, head of the Saudi General Entertainment Authority Turki Al-Sheikh made a strategic intervention in boxing. The idea was to dump so much money into the sport that it incentivizes the unification fights fans were craving. Made possible through the application of essentially unlimited resources that the Saudis did not expect to turn a profit on — after all, they were buying legitimacy, not doing business, at least in the short term — boxing was transformed virtually overnight, with Riyadh quickly hosting the biggest fights fans could only dream of in the years prior. Instead of only pursuing the rankings of different sanctioning bodies, fighters and their promoters started auditioning for Turki.

    This looked good to Dana White, whose UFC had pursued a similar model with a newer, growing sport. While they are often used interchangeably, MMA is a sport; UFC is a sanctioning body. There are others, such as ONE Championship, Professional Fighters League, and Bellator, but UFC dominates with more than 90 percent of the global MMA market.

    For MMA fighters, it’s a bit like being an independent contractor where the UFC is at once the licensing bureau, the recruitment agency, and the only employer in town. One of the consequences is that base pay is extremely low. In most professional sports leagues, athletes’ pay accounts for upward of half the total revenue. In the UFC, it’s less than 20 percent.

    For years, UFC has been mired in labor disputes and antitrust lawsuits. But with no major alternatives and without a union like athletes in major team sports have, MMA fighters are acutely vulnerable to exploitation in a business that takes an extreme physical toll. This looked good to Turki Al-Sheikh; he and Dana White cofounded Zuffa Boxing to merge the Saudi approach to boxing with UFC’s near-monopoly on MMA.

    Zuffa is sponsoring new legislation, the Muhammad Ali Revival Act, which would allow Zuffa to become a “unified boxing organization” (UBO) governing boxing across states the way UFC functions in MMA. The legislation frames itself as giving fighters a choice between the old system and the UBO, but this is essentially the “choice” of right-to-work laws.

    It’s a brilliant intervention in the way Turki Al-Sheikh’s was. Boxing experts and fans have long clamored for a national commission that could standardize the sport and mitigate corruption, and this appears to do just that. In reality, it enables a bad actor to seize control over the entire industry.

    UFC Freedom 250 is a crash course in Trumpian politics. The birthday celebration, the fan base, the spectacle of violence and domination on the South Lawn, the exclusive access event are all a gift to curry favor with the self-styled strongman. TKO is expecting to lose at least $30 million on the White House fights, even after bringing in corporate sponsors. Trump, by the way, bought stock in TKO in March.

    In essentially putting on the show as a tribute to the president, TKO is taking a page from Paramount’s book — the company run by a close Trump ally and the second richest man in the world behind Elon Musk, now exclusively broadcasting UFC fights on its streaming service. In 2025, while Paramount’s $8 billion merger with Skydance was pending approval by the Trump-appointed FCC chair, the company abruptly agreed to pay Trump a $16 million settlement in a suit Trump had brought against Paramount subsidiary CBS. The merger was approved, and soon thereafter, Paramount bought Warner Brothers in a record media acquisition worth well over $100 billion.

    With UFC Freedom 250, Trump gets many things he loves. There’s money, in the form of cage-side seats that are reportedly costing upward of $1.5 million apiece. There’s social power, in the form of an exclusive event where he can handpick the invitees. He gets to merge his own birthday celebration with America’s, a flourish of self-flattering mythmaking. And he can literally reshape the White House for it; he’s now claiming the arena being built will stay.

    Is all this technically a bribe to the man who wields unprecedented influence over a party in control of all three branches of government? No. But with pending lawsuits and TKO’s de facto command over American combat sports in the balance, will the gesture hurt their chances? Also no.

    Trumpian politics is akin to a series of stage magician’s tricks, constantly drawing attention to a shiny object over here while making a lot of money disappear over there. Rarely, however, does a singular event so tightly converge the political, social, and economic forces that define an era of politics.

    Dana White can claim that UFC Freedom 250 is an apolitical event, and there is probably a sense in which he is being honest. It isn’t about “red or blue or politics,” as he puts it. It’s about using flag-waving to squeeze the maximum amount of profit and influence out of everyone, as long as Trump is in on it — a single-minded goal that is the core of the Trumpian ideology.

    #USA #sport #MMA #trumpisme