The opioid crisis isn’t just the Sacklers’ fault – and making Purdue Pharma pay isn’t enough on its own to fix the pharmaceutical industry’s deeper problems

The opioid crisis isn’t just the Sacklers’ fault ...
►https://theconversation.com/the-opioid-crisis-isnt-just-the-sacklers-fault-and-making-purdue-ph

#merci @kassem
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/969659

Initialement trois frères médecins ont eu l’idée qu’on pouvait mieux gagner en vendant des drogues qu’en traitant des patients.

Who are ‘the Sacklers’?

Their story began with Arthur, Mortimer and Raymond Sackler, three brothers who were all doctors and made a collective fortune in medical marketing. They acquired what was then called Purdue Frederick Co. in 1952.

After Arthur died in 1987, Mortimer and Raymond bought their brother’s stake in the company from his family for $22 million. For that reason, Arthur Sackler’s heirs aren’t involved in opioid-related litigation that’s on track to be resolved through Purdue’s bankruptcy settlement.

Plus tard les plus affairistes de la bande ont organisé la transformation du marché des drogues utilisés comme médicaments suivant les règles du néolibéralisme.

Purdue’s real innovation with OxyContin was commercial, not scientific. The company was the first to market a powerful opioid using the most aggressive strategies other drug companies regularly used to get pharmaceutical innovations into bodies with great speed and efficiency – while maximizing profits.

Once Purdue showed it could be done, competitors quickly followed suit. The industry replaced U.S. medicine’s century-old habits of opioid precautions with a reckless boosterism.

Avec l’aide de l’industrie pharmaceutique et pour le profit mutuel en 26 ans les médecins étatsuniens on tué 500.000 patients avec des opioïdes. On pourrait aussi appeller ce processus d’extermination des malades une transformation de temps de vie en profit, la vie raccourcie de centaines de milliers ou de millions à plus grande échelle correspondant à d’énormes profits pour un petit nombre. Dans le cas présent les capitalistes et les médecins qui profitent de l’affaire sont les mêmes personnes.

Purdue, that is, didn’t act alone.

Other drugmakers such as Endo and Janssen imitated and even surpassed Purdue’s example once the taboo had been broken.

Generic manufacturers such as Allergan and Teva then profited by expanding and prolonging the boom, as did wholesale drug distributors and retail chain pharmacies. Even the prestigious McKinsey consulting firm got into the game, advising others how to maximize sales.

Sans l"aval des médecins traitant et sans la complicité des médecins travaillant au sein des entreprises phamaceutiques et financières l’affaire des opioïdes n’aurait pas été possible. La repartition exacte des tâches dans l’affaire criminelle et dans les affaires couvertes par la loi et la morale reste à évaluer.

The complicity of so many industries makes opioid litigation complex and hard to follow. Cities, states and other plaintiffs didn’t just sue Purdue. They turned to the legal system to make sure that all the other companies pay to repair the harms they caused in building the historic opioid boom that has contributed to more than 500,000 overdose deaths since 1996.

#iatrocratie #drogues #médicaments #dépendance #marketing #capitalisme #néolibéralisme #toxicomanie

The opioid crisis isn’t just the Sacklers’ fault – and making Purdue Pharma pay isn’t enough on its own to fix the pharmaceutical industry’s deeper problems
►https://theconversation.com/the-opioid-crisis-isnt-just-the-sacklers-fault-and-making-purdue-ph

Until the Food and Drug Administration approved #OxyContin in 1995, […] #marketing techniques were forbidden for opioids, which authorities considered to be too dangerous for them.

[…]

In 1949, Endo Products claimed that Percodan, its new oxycodone product, shouldn’t face strict federal controls because it was chemically similar to codeine, a relatively weak opioid used in cough syrups. The company insisted it wasn’t addictive when used as prescribed.

Expert pharmacologists working with federal regulators pushed back. Noting that oxycodone produced an “intense” addiction, they pointed out that people did not always follow doctors’ orders – especially with addictive drugs.

Purdue’s real innovation with OxyContin was commercial, not scientific. The company was the first to market a powerful opioid using the most aggressive strategies other drug companies regularly used to get pharmaceutical innovations into bodies with great speed and efficiency – while maximizing profits.

Once Purdue showed it could be done, competitors quickly followed suit. The industry replaced U.S. medicine’s century-old habits of opioid precautions with a reckless boosterism.

Purdue, that is, didn’t act alone.

Other drugmakers such as Endo and Janssen imitated and even surpassed Purdue’s example once the taboo had been broken.

Generic manufacturers such as Allergan and Teva then profited by expanding and prolonging the boom, as did wholesale drug distributors and retail chain pharmacies. Even the prestigious #McKinsey consulting firm got into the game, advising others how to maximize sales.

The complicity of so many industries makes opioid litigation complex and hard to follow. Cities, states and other plaintiffs didn’t just sue Purdue. They turned to the legal system to make sure that all the other companies pay to repair the harms they caused in building the historic opioid boom that has contributed to more than 500,000 overdose deaths since 1996.

To date the largest national opioid settlement is with the three main opioid distributors and Johnson & Johnson, manufacturer of the Duragesic and Nucynta opioids. It totals $26 billion, significantly more than what Purdue and the Sacklers are paying.

But financial settlements cannot solve every problem that made this crisis possible. Purdue and its competitors were able to put profits over consumer safety for so long, in part, because their marketing strategies closely approximated how other medicines are sold in the U.S.

The opioid crisis, in other words, revealed in an exaggerated fashion problems prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry more generally. Until those broader problems are resolved, the unhappy history of addictive prescription drugs will keep repeating itself.

Dommage que la responsabilité des « #autorités » ne soit qu’implicitement évoquée.

#pharma #opioides #opiacés #mode #états-unis