• Twitter May Be Dying. It’s Time to Build Our Own Social Network.
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/twitter-musk-blogs-discourse-social-media

    ...mmmenfin... #seenthis ...

    23.11.2022 by Owen Hatherley - Around twelve years ago, an online network I was part of dissolved. Although those who participated in them are mostly only in early middle age, talking about “blogging” — the maintenance, on Blogspot or WordPress, of your own named and curated personal site with your own journal-like posts — can make you sound like the Old Man of the Internet.

    In the second half of the 2000s, I was lucky enough to be part of a particular circle of bloggers who gradually came to know each other “IRL” — or as the hub of that group would have put it, via William Gibson, in “meatspace.” It was a way of learning how to write in public, in a dialogue with a load of people much smarter than me, and I owe it almost everything, but it fell apart, as these things do, for reasons both technological and personal. The latter, the commonplace straining of intense but brief friendships, won’t detain us here, but the technological reasons are more interesting. Especially now, as we watch the blogs’ main successor, Twitter, fall to pieces in a rather more dramatic fashion.

    The appeal of blogs, aside from their simplicity (you didn’t even need to know any code! At least, aside from a little bit in the early days if you wanted to post pictures) was a DIY appeal. Many bloggers were raised on the music press; some had made zines beforehand (and some still do) — and common to this was an idea of cultural accessibility, the writing equivalents of learning three chords, photocopying a sleeve, and printing up your own record — “it was easy, it was cheap, go and do it,” except this was easier still. There was a corporation in there, in the background — Blogger was acquired by Google in 2003 — but it was relatively easily ignored, compared with what came next. It’s important not to romanticize blogs (however nasty Twitter can be, it is only in my time blogging that I ever received a specific death threat). They were free work, and for many bloggers, its replacement with “real” books and “real” journalism and “real” academic jobs was highly welcome. Most of all, because Twitter and Facebook killed them off so comprehensively.

    What was the appeal of these new networks? One, let’s face it, was the relative lack of effort. It didn’t feel like work, at least not at first. A lot of blog writing was dreadful, but it all involved effort, actually writing at moderate length and trying to be coherent and cogent. Posting was easy, and it didn’t need to make sense — over time it was clear that Twitter was better if the tweets didn’t quite make sense, which is why the essence of the medium is and always will be Dril. Yet at the time, around 2010, it didn’t seem like Twitter was replacing blogs as such, but replacing forums, the blog-linked hiveminds such as ILX and Dissensus, where friendships were formed, enemies observed, and flame wars prosecuted. Twitter was like a forum where you had a lot less space, but without the initiation ceremonies, and with cliques a little less obvious. Within a year on Twitter, I found a whole load of people a few years younger than me who were phenomenally intelligent and extremely funny and found to my great surprise that most of them didn’t particularly want to be professional writers. Just because they had interesting things to say didn’t mean they wanted to try and build a career out of it.

    As Elon Musk destroys or bankrupts Twitter or transforms it into a more comprehensively monetized version of 4Chan, it’ll be easiest to recall all the awful things about it — its self-righteousness, its torrents of racist abuse, its incessant, grotesquely pious intragroup policing, all those insufferable “y’all need to know” buckle-up threads, the eggman accounts patronizingly telling you things you already know, the intensification of false or exaggerated claims, the bite-size threads of poor history, and the straightforward obnoxiousness. Crucially, its owners recognized the importance of these over time in drawing people again and again to the site, creating algorithms that intensified all of this cruelty. Posting is amoral, and any regular on Twitter will recognize just a little of themselves in the bizarre, splenetic word salad of Donald Trump’s tweets (and he was truly a master of the form).

    All these issues are outlined very well in Richard Seymour’s excellent The Twittering Machine, and if the site does die, nobody will miss them. But, for the most part, until very recently, I enjoyed Twitter. I enjoyed its accessibility, the way that I could instantly ask or be asked all sorts of things. I learned a lot through it, and I met many lovely people. Years ago, when reading a well-meant account of the 2017 election that seemed oddly deficient, I realized what it was missing. Twitter — and the hysterical momentum of the campaign as it was expressed on there, with Corbynite accounts becoming ever more giddily euphoric as it became clear what was happening. Put simply, you’ll never understand the fact — and it is a fact — that Jeremy Corbyn came within a few thousand votes of being prime minister in June 2017 if you don’t understand the “Absolute Boy” meme.

    Conversely, the proximate cause for minimizing my own use — I deactivate now for weeks at a time, and yes, I am self-important enough to have requested a download of my Twitter archive — was the 2019 election and its ongoing fallout. Just as Twitter once amplified and intensified the euphoria of Corbynism, so it has turned the discussion of politics on the British left into a landscape of constant bitterness, dragging debate further and further into depression and despair. It seems to matter immensely to make the same point again and again — the media is crooked, the Labour Party is corrupt, and hey, one day we’ll get revenge, but for now, let’s wallow in our defeat, let’s marinade ourselves in it. I say this not to lecture anyone. I might find it annoying when getting no engagement on “here is an interesting article I wrote or read” but a standing ovation for “let me count the ways I dislike Sir Keir Starmer QC,” but I know this is exactly what I do when I log on. I too want to scratch the itch and pick the scab.

    If “Left Twitter” was at its best during the 2017 election, now its main use is in insisting, against a chorus to the contrary, that the 2017 election actually happened; whether it mattered no longer seems so important. The insistence — once, broadly true — that Twitter user @yunglinbiao94 had a better grasp on what was actually happening in British politics than a salaried journalist means a lot less when all they are doing is complaining about salaried journalists. By now, the main political purpose of all this is in briefly comforting invective whose eventual effect on politics will be the exclusion of some aspiring socialist MP or councilor because they liked your “Keith Starmer is a poo bum’ tweet. In that sense, the South African Bond Villain has come along at exactly the right time for us, merely offering the coup de grâce.

    And yet, sometimes the energy is there again, as anyone who followed Limmy in the weeks of official mourning for Elizabeth II will be fully aware. Twitter serves a purpose, albeit one grossly twisted and monetized. So what happens next? For writers and readers, other social networks obviously don’t have the same appeal — they’re primarily visual, a matter either of pictures or, increasingly, bite-size clips; and anyone old enough to have blogged is far too old for TikTok. Smaller, monetized fragments of “the discourse” will survive on Substacks and Patreons, and they all at least have the virtue of forcing their users to actually think a little before they post.

    But none of this will solve the central question. What Musk calls our “town square” does indeed resemble a contemporary town square, somewhere like, let’s say, MoreLondon or Piccadilly Gardens — privately owned, constantly surveilled, designed wholly to make money, with only the occasional nasty little scuffle enlivening the boredom. But we do need town squares, and we need a place to talk to each other. Isn’t it the time now to build our own?

  • France’s Weapons Industry Is Growing Rich off Dictatorships
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/france-arms-exports-authoritarian-europe-military-industrial-complex

    11.6.2022 by Harrison Stetler - All things considered, 2021 was another good year for France’s arms industry. According to the annual report to parliament released in late September by the Ministry of Armed Forces, French corporations sold upward of €11.7 billion worth of weapons and other military-related technology to foreign states.

    Bouncing back from a pandemic-induced lull in big-ticket deals, 2021 will go down as the French defense industry’s third-best year on record in terms of exports — after 2015 and 2016, which saw €16.9 billion and €13.9 billion worth of sales, respectively. The Australian government’s September 2021 headline-grabbing rupture of its contract for twelve submarines from the French shipbuilder Naval Group provoked anxiety in Paris over the appeal of French weaponry, and less-than-subtle accusations of American treachery. This year’s report should provide some consolation: 2021’s haul confirms France’s position in third place among global arms exporters, behind the United States and Russia.

    Egypt, Greece, Croatia, Saudi Arabia, and India round out the pack of France’s top export clients. Against the backdrop of simmering maritime and diplomatic tensions between Greece and Turkey, the French and Greek governments signed a contract for the sale of three frigates (from the Naval group) for over €3 billion in September 2021. The sale came on the heels of Greece’s January 2021 purchase of eighteen used and new Rafale fighter jets.

    The Greek deal, and the sale of twelve used Rafale jets from the French air force to Croatia — coupled with a replacement order to the French aviation company Dassault — are part of a move by France to deepen military-commercial ties within the European Union (EU). The ministerial report boasts of the growing share of French arms that are going toward European states, which as a portion of exports has grown from a little over 10 percent in 2012 to over one-third a decade later. This is a pivot that French military suppliers (and their relays in the defense ministry and foreign office) are eager to accelerate, in the hope of carving out a sizeable market share of EU procurements as member states expand their military budgets in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

    But the crux of France’s increasing arms exports remains its partnerships with non-European, and in many cases authoritarian governments. Egypt, France’s top client of 2021 at €4.5 billion of purchases, ordered thirty Rafale jets, the latest deal in its deepening military partnership with the French government. To the outrage of human-rights advocates, in December 2020 Egypt’s authoritarian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, France’s highest order of merit.

    2022 promises to be an equally lucrative year for French suppliers. And especially for the Rafale jet’s manufacturer, Dassault Aviation, namesake of a multigenerational political dynasty — and France’s sixth largest family fortune — whose latest scion, Victor Habert-Dassault, won his late uncle Olivier Dassault’s seat in parliament in a 2021 by-election, with the right-wing Les Républicains.

    In February, the Indonesian and French governments concluded the sale of six Rafales, the first tranche of what is expected to be a deal totaling forty-two jets. December 2021’s sale of eighty Rafales to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will likewise be accounted for in the 2022 rendition of the report. The contract, alongside the sale of twelve Airbus helicopters, was officially signed in April of this year for the plump sum of €17 billion, nearly half of France’s €41 billion annual defense budget. It’s the jet’s largest foreign sale to date.

    In addition to laying out the strategic vision supposedly guiding French officials in their dealings with foreign governments, the annual report to parliament is the only public document that tallies French arms exports. Its annexes claim to give an itemized overview of French sales, including the figures transmitted to the United Nations, in conformity with the international Arms Trade Treaty signed in 2013.

    But human rights and transparency advocates claim that the document is still shrouded in opacity and bureaucratese, especially when it comes to dodging critiques that certain arms sales flout international law, contracting with buyers who use the acquired weapons against civilians.

    “It’s a promotional report for France’s military-industrial base,” Aymeric Elluin, campaigner at Amnesty International France, told Jacobin. “It’s not a report that permits parliamentary oversight and regulation.”

    In recent years, the French government has been the target of a growing tide of criticism for its eagerness to deal with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The investigative media outlet Disclose revealed in 2019 that the latter two powers, engaged in a devastating civil war in Yemen, used French weapons in unscrupulous bombardments of civilians, to the knowledge of French government officials.

    In 2021, France sold upward of €780 million of arms to Saudi Arabia. But that amount would not easily account for the handful of helicopters, rocket launchers, cannons, and other small arms reportedly sold to the monarchy, Amnesty International argues in a note published on September 26. The organization likewise judges the €230 million of announced sales to the UAE to be an understatement, one hypothesis being that the transfer included technology not covered by the convention of the Arms Trade Treaty. “We don’t know what we sent to the United Arab Emirates, which is a major problem,” says Elluin.

    Like for all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, arms sales have been a component of French foreign policy for decades. But since the mid-2010s and the presidency of François Hollande, there’s been a marked acceleration of what Elluin calls a new “arms diplomacy.” This has been especially prevalent in French dealings with key powers like India, or the Middle East trio of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Initially released on the market in the early 2000s, the Rafale — currently the crown jewel of French arms exports — struggled to find foreign buyers until the February 2015 signing of a breakthrough contract with Egypt for twenty-four jets.

    France’s new “arms diplomacy” proved timely, as the deal with Egypt coincided with a chill of the country’s relations with the United States. Following el-Sisi’s seizure of power in 2014, the Obama administration imposed a two-year arms embargo on the Egyptian state. The United States is still the dominant supplier across the region, but France has tried to seize on the straining of relations between the United States and its Middle Eastern supports, and the latter’s desires to diversify arms suppliers.

    “As soon as there’s an opening, the French have rushed into it,” says Elluin, coauthor of the 2021 book, Ventes d’armes, une honte française (Arms sales — France’s shame).

    One of the arguments raised by those who defend selling arms, even to less-than-savory authoritarian powers, is that it gives a country like France leverage to enforce or pursue other priorities. “It’s not true,” says Elluin. “Since 2015 in Saudi Arabia, arms diplomacy has not given [France] a supplementary weight to make Saudi Arabia cease air strikes in Yemen. In Egypt, this kind of diplomacy has given no leverage to allow France to change the nature of the Sisi regime.”

    ‘“Arms diplomacy’ . . . really doesn’t exist,” Elluin concludes. “It’s just about economic markets, which has given France no influence. What’s more, it gives the impression that France is dependent on these clients. Without them, we’d lose the capacity to produce our own arms.”

    In December 2021, Saudi Arabia closed down the UN bureau investigating war crimes in Yemen. The French and Western charm offensive — Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman was welcomed to Paris this summer — has likewise proven unable to wrestle increases in oil and gas production from the Gulf monarchies.

    The same might be said of France’s dealings with Russia. Thales — a French multinational which produces sophisticated military technology and software —delivered nearly €7 million euros worth of goods to the Russia in 2021, despite the imposition of a European embargo from 2014. Between 2015 and 2020, French suppliers delivered over €150 million worth of supplies to the Russian military, exploiting a loophole in the European embargo that protected contracts signed prior to 2014.

    Aggressivity on arms exports responds to what French leaders refer to as a strategic necessity. The French military, the largest in the European Union on budgetary terms, would be unable to support by its own procurements the full range of suppliers needed to outfit a modern military. Exports are what enables the country to maintain a strategic and military “autonomy” — a word that riddles the Ministry of the Armed Forces’ report to parliament.

    2021’s sales are “good news for the sustainability of an independent national industry of which our armed forces are the primary beneficiaries, but also for employment throughout our country,” Sébastien Lecornu, Minister of the Armies, writes in the introductory letter to the report.

    France’s “Industrial and technological defense base” (BITD) — the web of over four thousand contractors and subcontractors that makes up the country’s military-industrial complex — employs upward of two hundred thousand workers. Taken together, France’s BITD saw annual revenue flows of €30 billion, in a global defense market of over €531 billion of revenues in 2020 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s index of the industry’s largest businesses.

    The US defense industry dominates the pack within the North Atlantic bloc. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has likewise reinforced the argument — advanced by eastern members in the European Union — that European and American militaries need to remain closely wedded diplomatically in terms of technology and matériel.

    Since the invasion, there’s been an uptick in European contracts for US suppliers like Lockheed Martin and Boeing — purchases that the French would like to see reoriented toward the reinforcement of Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” as President Emmanuel Macron has long defined his vision of what the bloc needs to develop diplomatically and militarily. For example, Germany’s purchase, announced in March 2022, of thirty-five F-35 jets from the United States is perceived in Paris as a snub to French-led attempts to deepen military integration through plans to develop EU alternatives.

    “Europe has long thought of itself as a market,” Macron said during his inaugural address at the June 2022 Eurosatory defense industry expo outside Paris, announcing that Europe is now entering a “war economy, in which, I think, we’ll have to plan for the long haul.” European governments will be spending and buying more hardware in the coming years, and so the president-salesman had one piece of advice: “let’s not go back to repeating the errors of the past — spending a lot only to buy from elsewhere is not a good idea.”

    #France #armement #impérialime

  • Cory Doctorow Wants You to Fight Big Tech
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/cory-doctorow-chokepoint-capitalism-monopoly-tech

    We talked to author and activist Cory Doctorow about his new book, Chokepoint Capitalism, copyright scams, surveillance capitalism, the lies of Big Tech, and the fight for the freedom to create.
    ...
    Cory Doctorow:

    We tell this story in the book about Uber drivers, and it’s interesting because Uber drivers are also in a chokepoint capitalist market. There are riders who want rides, and there are drivers who want to give rides. And then, in the middle, there’s this rent seeker, and there’s no way for drivers to reach riders without passing through the chokepoint that Uber has erected for itself. And they are the most atomized and vulnerable workers imaginable. They’re not even supposed to have any way to meet each other, let alone talk to each other or coordinate holistic action.

    In California, these workers who are so atomized and so divided were forced by their contracts to sign off on something called binding arbitration. That means that if Uber steals from you, you’re not allowed to sue them. You can only go to an arbitrator, who’s a fake, corporate judge — someone who’s paid by Uber to decide whether Uber is guilty of screwing you over. Even if you convince them that Uber is screwing over workers — and statistically, it’s far more likely with these arbitrations that they find in favor of their paymasters than they do in in favor of the people their paymasters are said to have wronged — it’s administrative. It has no evidentiary value. There’s no precedent. The next person who comes along can’t cite your case in order to win theirs. This is all of great advantage to Uber, who immediately set about stealing wages from their drivers.

    The drivers came together with technologists and a law firm and figured out how to automate arbitration claims. Now, for each arbitration claim the rewards that can be awarded to damaged parties are much smaller than you would get out of any courtroom. You’re not going to get punitive damages and so on. But they’re actually pretty expensive administratively. It costs a couple thousand dollars to pay the arbitrator to hear the case.

    Thousands and thousands of Uber drivers all filed arbitration claims at once. In aggregate, the cost of paying the arbitrators, even if Uber won every one of those cases, would exceed the amount that they would have to pay if the drivers could just bring a straightforward class-action suit. And Uber, in an amazing turn, had to go to court and say, “Your honor, what kind of idiot would think that these binding arbitration clauses could possibly be enforceable? This is clearly unreasonable. It had no business being in his contract.”

    They ended up paying the Uber drivers $150 million. This is the power of solidarity, even among these atomized workers. Solidarity combined with technology, combined with ingenuity, combined with coordination.
    ...
    Whether it’s pharma, finance, beer, athletic shoes, eyeglasses — every one of these is controlled by a cartel or an oligopoly or an oligopsony. In every circumstance, they’re hurting workers and customers and eroding our ability to make good policy. Because when there’s only three or four companies in a sector and it’s time to regulate them, it’s pretty easy for them to come together and come up with a common position and say, “Look, anything except this would mean the death of our industry.”

    We need to figure out how to turn anger about all of these seemingly different issues into one movement. If we can figure out how to get people to recognize that they’re not angry about running shoes or cheerleading or professional wrestling or beer or eyeglasses — what they’re actually angry about is capitalist monopoly, and what they actually want is pluralism — then we have the basis for a mass movement that really can make political change.

    #Uber #Arbeitskampf #Justiz #Privatisierung

  • Canada Has a Nazi Monument Problem
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/roman-shukhevych-monument-canada-nazi-ukrainian-ultranationalism

    7.11.2022 by Taylor C. Noakes - On October 14 2022 the Edmonton Police Service filed a mischief under $5,000 charge against journalist Duncan Kinney, claiming he spray-painted the words “actual Nazi” on a bust of Roman Shukhevych, a World War II–era Ukrainian ultranationalist and Nazi collaborator. The charge relates to an August 2021 incident in which the monument, located on the grounds of the Ukrainian Youth Unity Complex in North Edmonton, was found to have been vandalized.

    Kinney is an independent journalist and the editor and primary contributor to the Progress Report, a media project of Progress Alberta that includes a weekly podcast, a newsletter, and regular investigative reporting. Kinney has reported on the Shukhevych monument, including the vandalism against it, several times in recent years.

    This is not the first time the Shukhevych monument has been vandalized with graffiti pointing out that the man was a Nazi collaborator: in December of 2019 it was tagged with the words “Nazi scum.” Kinney reported in 2020 that representatives of the Ukrainian Youth Unity Complex and the League of Ukrainian Canadians’ Edmonton Branch had contacted Progress Alberta to indicate their belief the Edmonton police were investigating the incident as a possible hate crime, though this was not confirmed at the time.

    In a statement issued on October 31, 2022, Kinney explained that he was arrested by a constable from the Edmonton police’s Hate Crimes and Violent Extremism Unit, accompanied by three other offices.

    The Shukhevych monument is not alone among commemorations to World War II Ukrainian collaborators in Canada. The monument is located near a cenotaph in Edmonton’s St. Michael’s Cemetery which is dedicated to the veterans of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, also known as the Galicia Division, a volunteer division composed of Ukrainian nationalists. That monument was vandalized in 2021 with the words “Nazi Monument 14th Waffen SS.” Jewish and Polish groups in Canada have been calling for the monuments’ removal for decades and, in the wake of recent incidents, have renewed their demands.

    Shukhevych was the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the armed wing of the Stepan Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). During World War II Shukhevych commanded various military units composed of Ukrainian ultranationalists serving in the German army. He was one of those responsible for a genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out to against the Polish population of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, in pursuit of the goal of creating an ethnically homogenous Ukraine. The death toll from that campaign is estimated to range from sixty thousand to one hundred thousand.

    The historical consensus is that Shukhevych was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands, including Poles, Jews, Belarusians, Russians, and even other Ukrainians (particularly communist partisans allied to the Red Army). In his role as a Nazi collaborator and leader of the UPA, Shukhevych was directly responsible for the Holocaust in Ukraine. According to historian John-Paul Himka, through the winter of 1943–44 Shukhevych’s UPA forces lured Ukrainian Jews from their refuges in the forests of Western Ukraine to be murdered.

    The St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Cemetery in Oakville, Ontario is home to a memorial to the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army. The Ukrainian National Army was created by the Nazis with some of the personnel who had fought with the 14th Waffen SS Division. When the Oakville monument was defaced with the words “Nazi war monument” in 2020, Halton Regional Police initially opened a hate crime investigation. The same cemetery also has a separate monument to the UPA.

    Shukhevych was also listed — along with other Nazi collaborators, assorted fascist groups, and war criminals — on a list of hundreds of individuals who were supposed to be commemorated at Ottawa’s as yet incomplete $7.5 million “Memorial to the Victims of Communism.” The Edmonton branch of the League of Ukrainian Canadians has purchased several “virtual bricks” in tribute to Shukhevych as part of a “buy-a-brick” campaign meant to help finance the construction of the memorial.

    Photos of Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera can be found in Ukrainian cultural and community centers across Canada. They are considered heroes amongst Ukrainian ultranationalists today, both in Ukraine and among the Ukrainian diaspora community. Shukhevych and Bandera feature prominently in commemorative demonstrations, such as the “Embroidery Marches” which have been held in L’viv and Kyiv.

    The marches earned condemnation from Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, in no small part for the overt displays of Nazi symbols. The resurrection of Bandera and Shukhevych, in the form of monuments, place names, and the renaming of streets and stadiums, has caused diplomatic crises between Ukraine and Poland and Israel.

    How there came to be so many monuments dedicated to Ukrainian Nazi collaborators in Canada is rooted in some dark chapters in Canadian history. After Russia, Canada has the world’s second-largest Ukrainian diaspora community, with approximately 1.36 million Canadians claiming full or partial Ukrainian descent, roughly 4 percent of the national population. Initial waves of Ukrainian immigration began in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Ukrainians, among other Central and Eastern European ethnic groups, were incentivized to settle and farm the prairies of Western Canada, which had at the time been recently cleared of their indigenous inhabitants by force.

    As with many cultural minority communities who were trying to establish their roots in Canada, particularly around the turn of the twentieth century, Ukrainians faced discrimination and, as a consequence, formed fraternal and benevolent organizations. Some of these groups evolved into more overtly socialist organizations, including the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party of Canada, which was shut down and had its leadership arrested by the Canadian government in 1918.

    Because Ukrainians were considered by the Canadian government to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the time of World War I, about eight thousand Ukrainian Canadians were forced into slave labor and interned in concentration camps. In some cases, this forced labor continued into 1920, nearly two years after the war had ended. Roughly eighty thousand Ukrainians were required to register as “enemy aliens” during the same time. Though many were paroled circa 1916–17, Ukrainians were then rearrested after the Russian Revolution, part of a Red Scare in Canada at the time.

    After World War II, Canada received another wave of Ukrainian immigration. This wave included displaced persons found in Germany and Allied prisoner-of-war camps at the conclusion of the conflict. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rumors that high-ranking Nazis and Nazi collaborators had found refuge in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia began to circulate. This prompted investigations by the respective governments.

    In 1985, a commission of inquiry was called by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, headed by the justice Jules Deschênes. The inquiry was set up in the wake of the publication of None Is Too Many, a landmark historical examination of Canada’s antisemitic immigration policies. These policies, still in effect even after World War II, prevented European Jews from immigrating to Canada (partly due to misguided concerns that Jews would bring communism to Canada). Canadian authorities simultaneously allowed known or suspected Nazi collaborators to immigrate because they could be considered “reliably anti-Communist.”

    The Deschênes Commission was severely constrained. Its scope was limited and it failed to consult Soviet and Eastern European archives — a failing that was largely due to pressure from Eastern European diaspora groups, who insisted without evidence that any Soviet or Eastern Bloc documentation would be unreliable.

    The commission also suppressed and censored other documentary evidence and failed to consult the findings of the Nuremberg Trials and other historical precedents. The Mulroney government also pressured the ostensibly independent commission to conclude quickly, irrespective of what it discovered. In the end, the commission’s findings — it concluded that the number of suspected war criminals in Canada had been greatly exaggerated — was dubious.

    The inquiry stirred up considerable animosity between Canada’s Jewish community and its postwar Eastern European émigré communities. The latter claimed that allegations of Canada harboring war criminals or collaborators were nothing but Soviet attempts to destabilize Canadian society. Similar statements have been made by representatives of Canada’s Ukrainian community over the course of the last few years, as the issue of these monuments and concerns over the wartime record of Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland’s maternal grandfather (who edited a pro-Nazi newspaper) have been raised by Russian diplomatic officials.

    In March of 2022, Freeland was photographed holding a scarf with the black and red colors of the UPA, which was embroidered with the slogan “Slava Ukraini, Heroyam Slava”(Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes), their wartime slogan. The image, along with the slogan, appeared on Freeland’s twitter account only to be deleted shortly thereafter. When the Canadian Press reached out to Freeland’s office for comment, they received a response from the president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.

    According to journalist and researcher Moss Robeson, Canada’s two primary Ukrainian organizations — the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) and the League of Ukrainian Canadians — are strongly influenced by followers and admirers of Stepan Bandera. As reported by Robeson, former UCC president Paul Grod “requested Canadian recognition of the OUN and UPA as ‘designated resistance fighters,’ proposing that Canadian taxpayers should pay pensions for its veterans.” Furthermore, he “vehemently and categorically deni(ed) Ukrainian nationalist involvement in the Holocaust.” Grod sat on the board of Tribute to Liberty, which raised funds and lobbied the government for the construction of the Victims of Communism memorial in Ottawa.

    Ultimately, additional research carried out by Canadian Jewish groups determined that more than two thousand members of the Galicia Division settled in Canada after the war, at the request of the British government. This was in addition to another thousand or so collaborators from the Baltic states who had served the SS in a similar capacity. Despite the evidence, no additional actions were taken by the Canadian government to investigate.

    Though the Shukhevych monument in Edmonton is the private property of the Ukrainian Youth Unity Complex, the complex was partially funded, in the early 1970s, by the government of Alberta to the tune of $75,000 in grant money. In 2020, the complex received a $35,000 grant from the federal government for a security system to protect it from “hate crimes.” Most of the other applicants to the grant program included mosques and synagogues.

    A Public Security Canada spokesperson stated that the complex had “sufficiently demonstrated in their application that their community and project site was at-risk of hate-motivated crime to qualify for funding under the Program.” It did not, however, provide any further details concerning what hate crimes had been directed at Edmonton’s Ukrainian community or its youth center.

    Coverage of the incident has largely focused on the possibility of a journalist committing an act of vandalism to then report on it, and the possible ethical breach such an alleged action would entail. That there is a monument to a Nazi collaborator and war criminal responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands was not the primary focus of much of the coverage. Kinney is a particularly vocal critic of the Edmonton Police Service, to the extent that they refuse to recognize him as a journalist.

    Not everyone is concerned about the alleged ethical breach: the Canadian Anti-Hate Network tweeted: “Duncan Kinney has been charged with accurately labelling a Nazi statue and being super cool. We have no idea if it was him. If we ever find out who actually did it, we’ll buy them lunch. The stunt was an amazing public service.”

    #Canada #Ukraine #nazis #histoirw #politique

  • The Democrats Will Probably Lose the Midterms, Because Our Society Is Falling Apart
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/the-democrats-will-probably-lose-the-midterms-because-our-society-is-fallin

    Mental illness and economic precarity are two of the leading correlates of crime, and neither can be addressed cheaply. That means problems like this can’t be solved by leadership still wedded to the 1 percent. With their big donors in the real estate industry and the boss class, the Democrats can’t address human needs at a scale that might make inroads in problems like crime.

  • The Radical Imagination of Mike Davis
    https://jacobin.com/2022/11/mike-davis-southern-california-capitalism-struggle

    When Mike Davis died last month, he was a celebrity, but hardly one drawn to his effervescent fame. City of Quartz, his surprise bestseller, won him an international audience in 1990. Davis later reported himself “utterly shocked” by the book’s success. Thereafter, he might have spent decades on the lecture circuit, but Davis plowed ahead, turning out one volume of Marxist-inflected social criticism after another, often contemplating an amazingly disparate set of apocalyptic challenges: climate change, world hunger, viral pandemics, and the rise of homegrown fascism.

    Je vous propose de lire l’extrait suivant de son introduction dans City of Quartz. On y découvre une comparaison statistique qui en dit long sur l’intensité de la violence à laquelle sont exposés les classes populaires du pays qui se réserve le droit exclusif de faire valoir ses intérêts manu militari .

    Homicide is still the largest single cause of death for children under eighteen in Los Angeles County. Years ago, I used the Sheriff Department’s ‘gang-related homicide’ data to estimate that some 10,000 young people had been killed in the L.A. area’s street wars, from the formation of the first Crips sets in 1973—4 until 1992. This, of course, is a fantastic, horrifying figure, almost three times the death toll of the so-called ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland over a roughly similar time span. It is even more harrowing when we consider that most of the homicides have been concentrated in a handful of police divisions. Add to the number of dead the injured and permanently disabled, as well as those incarcerated or on parole for gang-related violations, and you have a measure of how completely Los Angeles – its adult leaderships and elites – has betrayed several generations of its children.

    Cette brève mise en relation nous fait comprendre que ces films dits de suspence comme The Warriors et Assult on Precinct 13 constituent effectivement des reconstitutions dramaturgiques de la réalité vécue par nos amis étatsuniens.

    The Warriors
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Warriors_(film)

    Assault on Precinct 13
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assault_on_Precinct_13_(1976_film)

    On trouve les oeuvres de Mike Davis chez notre vendeur préféré de livres anglais et dans les bibliothèques clandestines de l’internet. Cet auteur exceptionnel nous indique toujours le chemin vers une compréhension des conditions d’existence sous l’impérialisme

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_Davis_(scholar)

    Books
    Nonfiction

    Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class (1986, 1999, 2018)
    City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (1990, 2006)
    Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (1998)
    Casino Zombies: True Stories From the Neon West (1999, German only)
    Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the U.S. Big City (2000)
    Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (2001)
    The Grit Beneath the Glitter: Tales from the Real Las Vegas, edited with Hal Rothman (2002)
    Dead Cities, And Other Tales (2003)
    Under the Perfect Sun: The San Diego Tourists Never See, with Jim Miller and Kelly Mayhew (2003)
    The Monster at Our Door: The Global Threat of Avian Flu (2005)
    Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Working Class (2006)
    No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border, with Justin Akers Chacon (2006)
    Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (2007)
    In Praise of Barbarians: Essays against Empire (2007)
    Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism, edited with Daniel Bertrand Monk (2007)
    Be Realistic: Demand the Impossible (2012)
    Old Gods, New Enigmas: Marx’s Lost Theory (2018)
    Set the Night on Fire: L.A. in the Sixties, co-authored by Jon Wiener (2020)

    Fiction

    Land of the Lost Mammoths (2003)
    Pirates, Bats, and Dragons (2004)

    #USA #Los_Angeles #violence #jeunesse #marxisme #sciences #guerre