Why the West Still Backs Israel Despite a Year of War With Hamas and Hezbollah - Israel News - Haaretz.com
▻https://archive.ph/2024.10.06-153027/https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-10-06/ty-article/.premium/why-the-west-still-backs-israel-despite-a-year-of-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah/00000192-614a-da6d-afda-7ddbacb10000
There are myriad explanations for the lack of effective pressure. One is the unique relationship U.S. President Joe Biden has with Israel, and the weakness of other Western leaders who are preoccupied with domestic troubles.
Another is the timing of the war, coming as it does in a U.S. election year. The fact that the Arab countries with which Israel already has diplomatic relations haven’t threatened to sever them is also a factor.
Why should the West exert itself when the Arabs are just paying lip service in public and in private hoping that Israel finishes off Hamas?
All of these factors and others played a part. However, there is an underlying reality that has somehow been overlooked in much of the coverage, which explains the reluctance to apply the kind of pressure Israel wouldn’t be able to resist.
In today’s geopolitical reality, with the United States and its allies facing challenges spanning the globe from Ukraine to Venezuela to Taiwan, Israel is a crucial part of the alliance, providing military technology and experience while confronting Iran – a key link in the rival axis.
It may not be a popular thing to say, especially when Israel is led by an unpopular leader, but the West needs Israel as an ally, and that is the real limit on any pressure. What Israel brings to the alliance can be summarized in two words.
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[…] the calculations in Western capitals on whether to continue supporting Israel are not, and will not be, dictated by the footage of carnage in Gaza, but by those same pragmatic calculations that could be upended by an all-out war with Iran – and its wider geopolitical impact on the global energy and on China.
Israel’s Iron Dome advantage makes it an asset to the Western alliance, and has bought it a year in which it has been able to operate in Gaza and Lebanon with very few constraints. That will no longer be the case if the Iranian front continues to escalate.
In the second year of war, it may discover that it is becoming more of a liability than an asset.