• Pakistani-Ruled Kashmir Is Facing a Brutal State Crackdown
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/kashmir-pakistan-protests-democracy-economy

    The Pakistan-administered territory of Jammu Kashmir is witnessing the broadest confrontation between the masses and the Pakistani state in decades. Since early June, state security forces have killed dozens of protesters in a bid to crush the movement. (AFP / Getty Images)

    31.7.2026 by Umair KhurshidFarooq SulehriaHarris Qadeer - The areas of Kashmir under Pakistani administration are supposed to have political autonomy, but that has long been a sham. The Pakistani authorities have responded to popular protests demanding real democracy with brutal repression.

    The Pakistan-administered territory of Jammu Kashmir (PaJK) is witnessing the most extensive confrontation between the masses and the Pakistani state in decades. Between June 5 and July 27, at least forty-five people were killed as Islamabad sought to crush the movement before it could consolidate.

    On July 27, security forces opened fire on thousands of unarmed protesters marching towards the town of Rawalakot, killing twenty-one people. The following day, another fourteen were gunned down in Rawalakot, Mirpur, and other towns, while two more protesters were killed on July 29, bringing the death toll from the latest crackdown to at least thirty-seven. There has been an internet shutdown in place since June 5. Cellular networks have also ceased to function. Such shutdowns routinely accompany state violence.

    The present confrontation started on June 5 and represents the third major phase of an Intifada-like uprising that has unfolded since 2023. Two previous uprisings won huge victories against the implementation of neoliberal measures: for instance, subsidies were revived while unbearably inflated utility bills were slashed.

    The recent killings are not an exceptional breakdown of state authority but express the logic of a political order whose survival depends upon denying the people in PaJK any meaningful control over the conditions of their own existence. The PaJK, unlike Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir (IaJK), is not integrated into the Pakistani state and enjoys formal (though highly symbolic) autonomy. Its population of 4.3 million people is approximately one-third that of the Indian-ruled territories, and it covers less than one-quarter of their land area.

    In practice, the ongoing dispute involves election manipulation, especially through so-called reserve seats. Islamabad rigs and manipulates elections to install a puppet government in PaJK.

    The present uprising cannot be understood through the language of economic crisis alone. Rising electricity tariffs, soaring fuel prices, inflation, and declining living standards supplied the immediate grievances around which the movement crystallized. But these conditions were themselves products of a deeper political relationship. They reflected the organization of power in PaJK where the population bears the consequences of economic decisions over which it exercises no effective control.

    The territory’s constitutional framework has long separated political responsibility from political power. While elections produce governments and assemblies, decisive authority over fiscal policy, energy, natural resources, and major administrative questions remains concentrated in Islamabad. The institutions that appear to constitute self-government therefore perform a contradictory function. They are expected to absorb public anger while lacking the capacity to resolve the conditions that generate it.

    The result is a colonial-style political economy in which democratic forms coexist with the systematic denial of popular sovereignty. The state appears local but governs through institutions whose ultimate authority lies elsewhere. Economic exploitation and political subordination, therefore, reinforce one another. The extraction of resources, the imposition of austerity, and the transfer of decision-making power to Islamabad are not separate processes but different expressions of the same structure of domination.

    Economic hardship alone, however, does not produce mass mobilization. Similar conditions have existed elsewhere without generating a movement of comparable scale. The decisive question is how social grievances acquire organization. That process had been unfolding for years before the present uprising.

    The revocation of Article 370, which granted IaJK limited autonomy, by the Indian state in August 2019 transformed political debate across the divided state of Jammu Kashmir. Although the constitutional changes were implemented in IaJK, their significance extended far beyond the Line of Control (the de facto line dividing PaJK from IaJK). They exposed the extent to which competing states claimed the authority to determine the future of Jammu Kashmir while excluding its people from that process. Questions of sovereignty, democratic power, and political representation acquired a renewed urgency throughout the territory.

    The developments of 2019 also exposed the exhaustion of the dominant political parties in PaJK. For decades, they had alternated between the roles of government and opposition while operating within institutions whose purpose was not to transfer sovereignty to the people but to administer a subordinate territory.

    The contradiction became increasingly difficult to sustain. The left-wing organizations, nationalist currents, student movements, and democratic activists sought to construct broader political alliances capable of challenging the existing order. Consequently, the People’s National Alliance (PNA) was founded in 2019 and generated considerable enthusiasm and revealed the existence of a substantial constituency seeking political change. Yet they struggled to establish durable organizational roots because they were unable to fuse the constitutional question with the increasingly urgent material concerns of workers, students, and the urban poor.

    By the early 2020s, those contradictions had begun to converge. An economic discontent merged with a growing recognition that these conditions could not be separated from the political structure through which the territory was governed. It was from this convergence of class grievances and democratic aspirations that the present movement emerged.

    The earliest campaigns focused on electricity tariffs, wheat prices, and the increasing cost of living. Demonstrations against inflation, symbolic burning of electricity bills, nonpayment campaigns, sit-ins, and shutter-down strikes spread through towns and villages during 2022 and 2023. What initially appeared as scattered local disputes gradually revealed a common political reality. Regardless of locality, protesters confronted the same institutions, the same administrative indifference, and ultimately the same state power standing behind every decision that shaped their lives.

    This convergence was not simply geographical but reflected the gradual formation of a common political consciousness among social groups that had previously entered struggle through different experiences. Workers faced declining wages, there were shrinking opportunities for students along with phenomenal fee hikes, and small traders were struggling with falling purchasing power as well as rising operating costs. These experiences did not erase the differences between classes and social layers, but they increasingly pointed toward a common source of authority lying beyond the institutions of local government.

    The city of Rawalakot, which has long served as a center of radical left politics and secular democratic activism, became one of the earliest centers of sustained mobilization. Demonstrations over wheat prices evolved into prolonged occupations that repeatedly frustrated attempts by the authorities to disperse them. The city acquired political significance because it demonstrated that disciplined mass mobilization could withstand routine police repression and maintain control of public space for extended periods. Each successful mobilization encouraged similar initiatives elsewhere, enabling participants in local struggles to recognize themselves as forming part of a wider territorial movement rather than isolated episodes of protest.

    As mobilization expanded, it became increasingly clear that fragmented campaigns could not exert sufficient pressure upon a state capable of containing localized dissent. Activists, therefore, sought an organizational form capable of coordinating action across the territory while preserving the broad social coalition emerging through struggle. This process culminated in the formation of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which united local action committees into a territory-wide coordinating body in September 2023.

    One of the most important developments within the uprising has been the scale and visibility of women’s participation. PaJK remains deeply shaped by patriarchal social relations that have historically confined women to the private sphere while restricting their presence in political life. Public leadership has largely remained the preserve of men, and women’s political activity has frequently been treated as secondary to struggles defined and directed through male-dominated institutions.

    The present movement has disrupted that order in significant ways. Women have organized demonstrations, addressed public meetings, participated in sit-ins, and marched alongside men despite the certainty of police violence and arrest. They have not appeared merely as supporters of a movement led by others but as political actors whose participation has altered the movement’s social composition and expanded its democratic horizons.

    This transformation carries implications extending beyond questions of representation. Patriarchal authority and colonial rule are historically distinct forms of domination, yet they reinforce one another by restricting who may legitimately exercise political agency. A population is more easily governed when political participation is confined within established hierarchies, whether those hierarchies are maintained by the state or by conservative social relations.

    Women’s emergence as organizers, therefore, challenges both simultaneously. Every woman who occupies political space denied to her weakens structures of authority that depend upon exclusion as a condition of their reproduction.

    These developments have unfolded unevenly. Conservative tendencies within the movement have at times sought to marginalize women’s leadership or limit their role in decision-making. Such contradictions reflect the movement’s broad social composition rather than an external pressure imposed upon it. Yet these tensions cannot obscure the transformation already underway.

    Women have stood on the front lines of demonstrations, endured arrests, faced live ammunition, and mourned those martyred in the struggle. Their participation has become part of the political memory of the uprising and whatever course the movement ultimately takes, it has already altered the social landscape from which future struggles will emerge.

    For decades, the Pakistani state has sought to legitimize its authority through constitutional arrangements that preserve the appearance of self-government while concentrating decisive power elsewhere. This contradiction has become increasingly obvious and difficult to manage.

    As living standards declined and democratic institutions repeatedly proved incapable of responding to popular demands, broader sections of society began to recognize that meaningful economic reform could not be secured without challenging the political framework that produced those conditions. The struggle has, therefore, moved beyond a contest over policy. It has become a confrontation over sovereignty itself.

    This explains the ferocity of the state’s response. The Pakistani ruling class is not merely defending a particular government or protecting a single administrative institution. It is defending an entire structure of domination whose stability depends upon preventing the people of Jammu Kashmir from exercising effective control over their political and economic future.

    Every successful mobilization threatens to weaken that structure by demonstrating that collective organization can impose limits upon state power. Every concession won through struggle encourages new demands, broader participation, and greater confidence among those who have long been excluded from political decision-making.

    The significance of the uprising, therefore, extends beyond the boundaries of PaJK. Across South Asia, declining living standards, deepening inequality, and increasingly authoritarian forms of rule have generated recurring waves of popular resistance. Governments have responded with familiar methods: criminalizing dissent, militarizing civilian life, restricting democratic freedoms, and presenting repression as the defense of public order. The confrontation unfolding in Rawalakot belongs to this wider historical moment, in which ruling classes increasingly rely upon coercion to preserve political arrangements that command diminishing social legitimacy.

    Whatever immediate outcome emerges from the present confrontation, the uprising has transformed the relationship between the people of Jammu Kashmir and the state. A generation that has experienced its own collective strength is unlikely to return quietly to the political passivity upon which colonial-style rule depends. The question now is not whether the old order has entered into crisis. It is whether the forces that have brought it to that crisis can develop the organization, political clarity, and solidarity necessary to carry the struggle beyond resistance and toward genuine popular sovereignty.

  • Spain’s Social Revolution Against Fascism
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/spain-revolution-civil-war-anarchism

    In the parts of Spain that remained under republican control during the civil war, the struggle against fascism took on a revolutionary form. The revolution’s cornerstone was a unique experiment in workers’ self-management of industry and agriculture. Hulton-Deutsch Collection

    Les guerres sont les catastrophes qui imposent l’abandon du réformisme. Les mouvement populaires deviennent alors des mouvements révoluzionnaites ou sont voués à l’échec. Préparons-nous à la guerre.

    17.7.2026 by Andy Durgan - Francisco Franco launched his uprising against the Spanish Republic 90 years ago today. The resistance to fascism developed into a social revolution in Republican-held areas that challenged the power of capitalists and landowners.

    The Spanish Civil War is often portrayed as a struggle between democracy and fascism. But such an approach clashes with the sociopolitical reality of Spain in the 1930s. Social, economic, and political polarization in Spain in the years leading up to the civil war, along with the resulting failure of a bourgeois-democratic republic (1931–36), led to the outbreak of both the war and the revolution.

    The Popular Front’s electoral triumph in February 1936, rather than ushering in a new era of social reform, laid bare the inability of Republican democracy to overcome a ruling class determined to prevent any challenge to its power. The Popular Front’s victory sparked a new wave of mobilizations by the working masses, both urban and rural, which the Republican government attempted to suppress, as it had in 1931. The Right, for its part, abandoned any hope of dismantling the republic from within and opted for a military coup.

    The future of the republic depended not only on its right-wing enemies but also on the labor movement. In the case of the Socialist Party (PSOE), the “revolutionary” left faction, led by Francisco Largo Caballero, refused to repeat the experience of the Republican-Socialist government of 1931–33 and insisted that the Socialists (PSOE) should not participate in the new government, leaving it to the Republicans to “complete the bourgeois revolution.” This simplistic view of Marxism meant that Largo Caballero and his followers had no strategy for seizing power; instead, they were to wait passively for the Republicans to pave the way for a socialist government.

    In contrast, the more social democratic faction led by Indalecio Prieto, supported by the Communist Party (PCE), argued for the need to return to a coalition government to complete the Republican reformist program. It was this latter position that would be adopted by the Socialist movement in the midst of the Civil War. The Left, having lost part of its base to Stalinism, particularly the Socialist Youth (FJS), which would merge with the Young Communists to form the JSU (Juventud Socialista Unificada), was overtaken by events and ultimately accepted the same position as its social democratic rivals.

    On the eve of the civil war, the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) still wielded considerable influence within the most significant labor movement in the Spanish state, in Catalonia, and maintained a very strong presence in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia. Furthermore, in Asturias and Madrid, where the Socialists had historically been the dominant force among organized workers, the CNT enjoyed sizable minority support.

    Inside the CNT, activists and union leaders were divided between anarcho-syndicalists and various radical anarchist factions, the most important of which was the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI). One thing all these factions had in common was their apoliticism. However, weakened by repression and ideologically divided, the CNT would adopt a less intransigent stance in its relations with the Left during the first months of 1936, a move that would prove to be a prelude to its direct participation in government during the civil war.

    During the February 1936 elections, to secure the release of its thousands of imprisoned members, the CNT did not organize a campaign of abstention, as it had done in 1933, and this de facto call to vote would contribute to the Popular Front’s victory. In May 1936, the CNT held its fourth congress in Zaragoza. It would prove to be a milestone in the union’s history.

    Faced with the bloody repression of the Asturian commune in October 1934, delegates called for a revolutionary alliance with the Socialist Unión General de los Trabajadores (UGT) as a first step toward social revolution. But the congress also revealed the limitations of the CNT’s turn away from its apolitical sectarianism. While there was a long and abstract debate on the nature of libertarian communism, there was no discussion of the political situation, especially the threat of a military coup.

    The newly formed Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM) also defended workers’ unity but through the reorganization of the Workers’ Alliances, which had played a key role in the revolutionary movement of 1934. The POUM contrasted the Workers’ Alliance, seen as essential for smashing capitalism, with the Popular Front, an electoral alliance subordinated to petty-bourgeois republicanism.

    At the same time, it identified the absence of a mass revolutionary party as having been central to the defeat of the revolutionary movement in 1934. The POUM hoped to win over the most radical sectors of the Socialists, especially the youth. The FJS’s falling under Stalinist influence in the spring of 1936 would deal a fatal blow to those hopes.

    The revolution that broke out in response to the military uprising in July 1936 marked the end of the European revolutionary cycle that had begun with the Bolshevik victory in 1917. In a matter of days, as the leader of the POUM, Andreu Nin, would insist in September 1936, the working class, arms in hand, had resolved the “fundamental problems” of the democratic revolution that the “liberal bourgeoisie” had failed to resolve in five years. Grossly unequal land ownership had been swept aside with collectivization or redistribution; the power of the church and the army had been destroyed, and Catalonia had ceased to be subordinated to a centralist state. But the working class, Nin clamed, was not fighting for a democratic republic but for socialism.

    The cornerstone of this revolution was a unique experiment in workers’ self-management with the collectivization of industry and land. In many cases, the takeover of companies or land was a spontaneous process and was only subsequently supported by the workers’ organizations. Urban collectivization went furthest in Catalonia, where half of Spain’s industry at the time was concentrated. In the Valencia region, collectivization was also widespread, especially in agriculture.

    The best-known agricultural collectives were those organized by anarchists in eastern Aragon. And although the presence of CNT militias in the area would influence their development, the initiative was often local, especially in towns where libertarian communism had been briefly established during the anarchist uprising of December 1933. Agrarian collectivization was also present in Andalusia and New Castile. Elsewhere with the notable exception of the Basque Country, the working class played a decisive role in the economy through different forms of workers’ control and the expropriation of workplaces and farms abandoned by supporters of the rebels.

    The revolution also meant the widespread occupation of urban space, with buildings being seized and converted into schools, hospitals, popular restaurants, and the headquarters for antifascist organizations. As Mary Nash has argued, the revolution and the war represented for many women “a breakdown in the traditional confinement of women to the home and gave them public visibility.” They entered political life for the first time, joining antifascist women’s organizations en masse, working in factories, and, in a minority of cases, participating in the armed struggle.

    At the heart of the resistance to the military rebels were the workers’ organizations, and not only in the areas where the social revolution was strongest. Throughout what would become the Republican zone, unions and workers’ parties quickly organized militias to fight the rebels. By the summer of 1936, there were already some 150,000 militiamen (and a minority of women) fighting on various fronts.

    Faced with the military superiority of the rebels, who were heavily supplied by the fascist powers, the main parties of the Popular Front (Republicans, Socialists, and Communists) argued that it was necessary to present the war as a defense of bourgeois democracy in order to maintain the support of the middle classes and to secure military aid from the Western democracies. This was a position that meant suppressing, or at least concealing, the social revolution underway in much of the Republican zone.

    Both in historiography and at the time, the left Republican parties have been seen as representing the “middle classes” or at least a sector of them. The fact that these parties played a central role in the republican governments of 1931 and 1936 has reinforced the idea of their political importance. However, their social and electoral base was limited. Outside of Catalonia, the only place where left republicanism enjoyed massive support (through Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), it had a narrow social base, consisting mainly of the urban petty bourgeoisie and very specific sectors such as schoolteachers.

    The electoral results of the Left Republicans clearly illustrate the limitations of their support. In 1931, excluding Catalonia, 111 Left Republican deputies were elected in coalition with the PSOE and the moderate republican Radical Party, and in 1936, 129 were elected as part of the Popular Front. In 1933, without being part of a national coalition, the Left Republicans won only fourteen seats (compared to twenty-one in Catalonia), nine of them thanks to local agreements with the Radicals and five due to local support from the PSOE.

    At an international level, the republic’s seemingly natural allies, the liberal democracies, with the notable exception of Mexico, not only abandoned the legitimate government by refusing to send it the weapons necessary for its defense but also promoted the farce of the “nonintervention” policy, which would result in the almost total isolation of loyalist Spain (as the republic was known). The participation of Germany and Italy in the nonintervention committee would be the clearest example of the cynicism of this infamous agreement.

    Neither France nor Great Britain had any interest in supporting an apparently weak government in a context of intense political and social radicalization. The French Popular Front government, under pressure from the ruling classes, the army, and British imperialism, quickly backed down from sending arms to the republic. The British government viewed the Left Republican leader, Manuel Azaña, the first Popular Front prime minister, as the “Kerensky of Spain.” When the Civil War began, it believed that “Bolshevism” was on the verge of seizing power. Statements abounded among its ministers about how Francisco Franco was the best option for protecting British imperialist and capitalist interests.

    With the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and Joseph Stalin’s rise to power, the communist parties had become completely subordinate to Moscow’s political needs. The Comintern’s shift toward the Popular Front policy was driven, above all, by the need to contain the threat that Nazi Germany posed to the very survival of the USSR. This threat made it urgent to forge, at the international level, an alliance with the democracies, especially France, against the fascist powers. The Popular Front was thus the national expression of Soviet foreign policy, and the uniform adoption of this new orientation by the communist parties at that time was not based on any analysis of the specific sociopolitical situation in each country.

    However, in contrast to the disastrous previous line that had identified the socialist parties as “social fascists” and the greatest danger to the working class, the Popular Front responded to the need to confront the threat from the far right and would result in a surge in communist influence in many countries, including Spain. During the Civil War, the PCE would become the most powerful political party in the Republican zone. By mid-1937, it had around 300,000 members, ten times more than before July 1936, while its Catalan equivalent, the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), more than 50,000, and the JSU about 250,000.

    There were several reasons for this growth in influence. The staunch defense of the Popular Front by the Communists attracted to the party newly politicized people opposed to the military uprising and fascism, including petty-bourgeois sectors frightened by the “excesses” of the revolution and the attacks on private property. By defending military centralization and iron discipline, the Communists also won the support of many professional military officers who had remained loyal to the republic. But above all, the USSR’s military support for the republic contributed to the rise in the PCE’s prestige.

    A factor often overlooked in explaining the growth of the Communists’ influence in Spain was the persistence of their image as “the party of the Russian Revolution” and their self-identification as revolutionaries. The fact that the PCE, despite its commitment to defending republican democracy, spoke of the need for a “new kind of democracy,” a “people’s revolution,” and a “national revolutionary war” reflected the difficulties the party had in the context of the political and social realities in the Republican zone.

    The extensive use of Soviet imagery and revolutionary methods to mobilize the population of Madrid in November 1936 was another example of the Communists’ seemingly ambiguous relationship with bourgeois democracy. From there, it was not difficult to conclude that the Popular Front was a necessary tactical interlude, a preliminary phase leading up to the establishment of socialism. Such ambiguities help explain the appeal of Stalinism to a significant sector of the FJS.

    Ultimately, only the PCE (in Catalonia, the PSUC), with its discipline and “Leninist” structure, and not the liberal and reformist factions, was capable of both putting an end to the social revolution underway in the Republican zone and leading politically the Popular Front’s war effort.

    After the defeat of the military uprising in nearly two-thirds of Spain, power was exercised by countless local antifascist committees, mostly made up of the Popular Front parties, the UGT, and the CNT. In Catalonia, the committees reflected the influence of the revolution and were often dominated by the anarchists and the POUM. Few of the committees were elected by the local population but tended to be made up of delegates nominated by the different antifascist organizations.

    To overcome the lack of coordination and the fragmentation of power during the first weeks in the Republican zone, various types of bodies were organized at the regional and provincial levels, almost all of which were supported by the local Popular Front, along with the CNT. Their autonomy and radicalism varied from place to place. The most important of these was the Central Committee of Antifascist Militias (CCMA) in Catalonia, formed on July 21.

    Despite having a Popular Front majority, the CCMA’s decisions reflected the strength of the revolution. In addition to military organization, the Catalan committee took the first steps to control the economy, organizing food distribution, freezing the bank accounts of those who had supported the uprising, and implementing measures to help workplaces already in workers’ hands to continue paying wages.

    In much of the rest of the Republican zone, committees were formed that, like the CCMA, effectively held power during the first weeks of the war. The political orientation of most of these committees did not always reflect the politics of the Popular Front, despite the fact that its supporters usually made up most of the delegates. For example, in Aragon, Cartagena, Gijón, Málaga, and Valencia the committees, dominated by the unions, acted in an openly revolutionary fashion.

    But with the fragmentation of power, the revolution could not fully triumph. Faced with this reality, the future of the revolution depended on the CNT, whose power appeared unassailable in the first weeks of the Civil War and soon would double its membership to reach some 1,500,000. But the anarchists rejected on principle the seizure of power.

    The revolution existed for them in the sense that the working class controlled the streets, the factories, and the land. “Power” would be exercised below in local communes or the workplace. But the workers’ organizations, for example, did not control communications, foreign trade, or the banking system. Above all, with the formation of the People’s Army of the Republic in the fall of 1936, they lost control of the key element of the war and the revolution: the armed forces.

    The dilemma the anarchists faced with the vacuum left by the near collapse of the republican state would soon become apparent. At a hastily called meeting of Catalan CNT delegates in Barcelona on July 21, Juan García Oliver, one of the most influential leaders of radical anarchism, argued that the CNT faced two alternatives: “going all out,” which would mean establishing “an anarchist dictatorship,” or collaborating with the other antifascist forces. Since “a dictatorship” was anathema to the anarchists, and given the significant presence of other forces (especially the Socialists), particularly outside of Catalonia, they opted for “collaboration.”

    The anarchist leaders would quickly find themselves trapped in the contradiction between their defense of the revolution and their complicity with the bourgeois state, or what was left of it. The dichotomy was not between “dictatorship” and “collaboration” but between workers’ unity, extending beyond the ranks of the anarchists, with the aim of seizing power, or subordination to the Popular Front, which would sooner or later spell the end of the revolution.

    Opposed to creating another state, the anarchists ended up collaborating with the existing state or, to be more precise, with the reconstruction of the republican state. In early November 1936, as the military situation grew increasingly critical, in an unprecedented move, four anarchists became ministers in the Republican government.

    The counterrevolutionary process within the Republican zone would reach its peak with the street fighting in early May 1937. The formation a week later of a government headed by the moderate socialist Juan Negrín, without the participation of the anarchists, represented the definitive consolidation of the bourgeois state.

    It also led to the suppression of the POUM, victim of a fierce campaign of slander by the Stalinists. The last bastion of the revolution, the anarchist-dominated Council of Aragon, was dissolved in August. In February 1938, the CNT, now fully committed to collaborating with the republican state, returned to the government.

    Was there an alternative to the Popular Front’s approach of waging a war in defense of democracy at the expense of social revolution? The Republican government’s military strategy rejected the use of unorthodox or revolutionary tactics, due in part to its need to maintain control of the political situation within its territory, as well as to present itself to the world as a liberal government. However, given the enemy’s significant material advantage, adherence to an orthodox military strategy had little chance of success.

    The idea that the Popular Front, and the suppression of the revolution, was purely due to the republic’s military needs is a fallacy. The Popular Front’s policies, especially its subordination to imperialist interests, had military consequences. For example, the Spanish fleet, which was under the control of the sailors, was withdrawn from the Strait of Gibraltar from the very beginning due to pressure from the British government, thus giving the rebels free rein to transport thousands of troops from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula. Another case in point is the refusal, out of concern for not harming French interests, to declare Morocco’s independence and support a nationalist uprising behind the fascist lines.

    An alternative strategy would have included the mass mobilization of the population (as was the case during the siege of Madrid in November 1936), a defensive, positional war, and the launching of more limited raids combined with guerrilla warfare, thereby avoiding massive clashes between two armies with markedly unequal capabilities. One can only speculate, of course, whether a strategy of revolutionary war could have succeeded, although the defense of Madrid is illustrative in this regard.

    Another problem facing the revolution was an unfavorable international situation, in which both the communist and social democratic parties wielded great influence. It is impossible to know what impact the existence of a revolutionary power in Spain would have had on the labor movement beyond its borders. The precedent of 1917 raises the possibility that it might have served as a catalyst and, as a result, led other political currents to exert greater influence on the class struggle.

    In the historiography of the Civil War, the division among the antifascist forces is often presented as a split between those who wanted to prioritize the war (Communists, Republicans, and Socialists) and the CNT and the POUM, who placed the interests of the revolution above those of the war: a choice between war or revolution. This was never the case. Both the CNT and the POUM defended the need to wage war and carry out the revolution simultaneously — to wage a revolutionary war.

    The two were intrinsically linked. The POUM had a clear military policy that called for the creation of a revolutionary army, modeled on the Soviet Red Army during the Russian Civil War. But such an army could not be built without a revolutionary government based on democracy from below, on committees of workers, peasants, and militia members.

    The POUM maintained that, to consolidate the revolution, at least in Catalonia, the working class had to seize power. But without the CNT, such a goal was impossible. Convincing the CNT, or at least part of it, of this point very quickly became the POUM’s primary political concern. However, as we have seen, it had to overcome the conviction held by the anarchists that any form of “power” or revolutionary state would inevitably lead to dictatorship.

    Ultimately, what was sorely lacking in the Spanish Revolution was a revolutionary organization with the strength necessary to have led the seizure of power. There were several obstacles preventing the POUM, the “only party of the revolution,” according to Andreu Nin, from becoming such an organization. Its lack of a base outside Catalonia and its short history — it had been formed just a year earlier — were obstacles that were difficult to overcome. Without national political leadership, the revolution was doomed to defeat.

  • Everybody Should Welcome Nationalizing AI
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/ai-nationalization-sanders-libertarians-property

    Cet article est un merveilleux exemple de pensée libérale. D’un point de vue marxiste il faudrait nationaliser l’entière industrie de l’IA parce qu’elle repose à cent pour cent sur des biens mal acquis.

    Rappellons que toute valeur est le produit de travail humain et que l’approprioration de la plus value par les capitalistes est toujours du vol que les voleurs ont légalisé par des lois écrites et imposées par leurs hommes de main.

    Le but de toute politique marxiste est l’expropriation des expropristeurs parce qu’elle constitue la condition préalable et incontournable sans en constituer l’unique oindition requise de la création d’une société socialiste.

    13.7.2026 by Ben Burgis - Bernie Sanders wants to nationalize half the stock of major AI companies and create a sovereign wealth fund for the American people. The case for going even further is stronger than most people realize.

    No figure in recent decades has done more to direct public attention and left-wing energy to universalistic left-wing policy proposals than Bernie Sanders. During his two runs for the presidency, he introduced “Medicare for All” into the lexicon of American politics. Now he’s made waves with a proposal to create a sovereign wealth fund by nationalizing half the stock of major AI companies.

    His rationale is simple and compelling. “Since A.I. is built on the collective knowledge of humanity,” Senator Sanders writes, “the wealth it generates must benefit humanity.”

    Several prominent tech executives have made apocalyptic predictions about how AI-fueled automation will sweep across the economy, destroying a massive percentage of existing jobs. The industry’s critics argue that most of this is hype. We’ll see.

    If it turns out that tech executives are telling the truth about the devastating effects their products will have on the livelihoods of massive swaths of the American population, they can hardly turn around and complain that it’s unfair for their industry to be singled out for partial nationalization. If I build a robot that stomps around my neighborhood, destroying my neighbor’s houses and cars and workplaces, and then I sell the robot for hundreds of billions (or trillions) of dollars, I shouldn’t complain if a judge forces me to put half the profits into a fund to help those neighbors rebuild their lives. I should be grateful that he let me keep the other half.

    Libertarians may be tempted to argue that no one deserves redress because of suffering incurred by automation and other by-products of letting the chips fall where they may in a free market, and that taking away some of the stock of OpenAI or Anthropic against the will of the current owners is a morally unacceptable transgression against property rights. Even on classical libertarian principles, though, it’s far from clear that this argument would go through in this case.

    Twentieth-century libertarian thinkers like Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard built on the seventeenth-century theories of John Locke. The Lockean conception of property rights emphasizes origins. If Person A buys something from Person B who was given it as a gift by Person C, the legitimacy of the whole chain depends on C’s claim. Someone who starts a farm by homesteading previously unowned land, for example, is engaged in what Nozick called a “just act of original acquisition.”

    Some of the most thoughtful libertarians have realized that, to be consistent, in some cases they have to recognize collective claims to just original acquisition. Libertarian philosopher Roderick Long offers this example:

    Consider a village near a lake. It is common for the villagers to walk down to the lake to go fishing. In the early days of the community it’s hard to get to the lake because of all the bushes and fallen branches in the way. But over time, the way is cleared and a path forms — not through any centrally coordinated effort, but simply as a result of all the individuals walking that way day after day.

    The cleared path is the product of labor — not any individual’s labor, but all of them together. If one villager decided to take advantage of the now-created path by setting up a gate and charging tolls, he would be violating the collective property right that the villagers together have earned.

    This is exactly what John Locke thought a just act of original acquisition looked like. Person C mixes his labor with the natural world and thus forms a property claim that can ground any subsequent claims made by B and A. In this case, however, Person C is a whole village.

    If you believe that intellectual property works like property claims on objects in the physical world, then the use of the collective intellectual products of the human race as the foundation of large language models (LLMs) looks a great deal like Long’s village-created path to the lake. Trying to disentangle which individual intellectual property owners are owed how much of the product would be a fool’s errand. But if we aren’t going to rip out the toll booth, turning half of the tolls into a wealth fund for the whole village might be the beginning of justice.

    On the other hand, if you don’t believe that intellectual property claims have the same force as claims to material property, Anthropic and Open AI and the rest have no legitimate claim to proprietary algorithms. If public policy went that way, the question of how to share these firms’ profits would quickly become moot.

    Finally, if you reject libertarianism root and branch and believe as I do that questions of how property should be distributed are downstream of questions about equality, dignity, and other fundamental human values, the case for partial (or perhaps even full) nationalization of AI companies becomes irresistible. Mainstream tech boosters might try to argue that the industry should be allowed to run its course without any interference as dramatic as what Senator Sanders proposed on the grounds that automation will tend to work out to the long-term benefit of the human race. Last year, for example, Bill Gates made headlines by predicting that the development of AI would lead to the shortening of the workweek to two or three days.

    But socialists know better. At this point, we have centuries of relevant data points, and we know that this is never how things have played out in the history of capitalism. As long as the means of production are owned by a private class of nonworkers, if the work it took a thousand people five days to do now takes only two and a half, capitalists have no incentive to keep paying everyone just as much as ever for working two and a half days and every incentive to lay off half the workforce and keep the remaining five hundred workers as hard at work as ever. In the United States, it’s been more than eight decades since the Fair Labor Standards Act capped the workweek at forty hours. The free market hasn’t reduced that number by a minute since then, and that certainly isn’t because technological progress stopped during the Great Depression.

    Conversely, some of my friends and comrades on the Left would probably prefer that, instead of nationalizing these firms, we simply direct the Air Force to bomb all the data centers and salt the earth so nothing can grow there again. I’ll admit that a large part of me concurs. Seeing undergraduates “write” papers with the “help” of LLMs makes me despair for the human race, and seeing older writers and journalists do the equivalent fills me with rage. Even in a world that enforced appropriate taboos against this behavior, though, many use cases of AI would remain stubbornly useful.

    One of the most basic premises of historical materialism is that no society ever has shrunk or ever will voluntarily shrink its productive forces. This is unlikely to be the first case. The technology is here to stay, for better or worse. Our best shot at “for better” is collective option to seize hold of the machinery and operate it for the benefit of all.

    #IA #capitalisme #expropriation

  • As Mass Incarceration Rose, Corporate Crime Ran Amok - Interview withMarie Gottschalk
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/mass-incarceration-corporate-crime-violence

    Les paroles de la chanson sont démenties par la réalité. Paris New Yorck, New Yorck Paris, dans dix an comme là bas ici n’est plus vrai, avec le déclin se son pouvoir dans le moinde, la désindustrialisation et le tournant sécuritaire de l’Europe centrale nous sommes aujourd’hui beaucoup plus proches des problèmes aux États Unis que dans les années quatre vingt. Écoutons ce que dit une criminologue états-unienne .

    13.7.2026 Interview by Meagan Day - We spoke to political scientist Marie Gottschalk about how corporate criminals have been let off the hook as prisons have exploded and what the path to ending mass incarceration might look like.

    Marie Gottschalk has spent more than two decades meticulously researching the origins and documenting the consequences of American mass incarceration. Her books The Prison and the Gallows and Caught are both foundational texts for anyone seeking to understand how the United States built the world’s largest penal system.

    In her new book, Crime and No Punishment: Wealth, Power, and Violence in America, Gottschalk turns her attention to the crimes that never end up penalized, from the corporate malfeasance behind the 2008 financial crisis to the engineered opioid epidemic to the slow-motion violence of state neglect. For Gottschalk, mass incarceration and the mass decriminalization of corporate and white-collar crime are not separate stories but two facets of the same phenomenon of ultramagnified inequality.

    Gottschalk is the Edmund J. Kahn distinguished professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Jacobin’s Meagan Day spoke with her about “street crime” and “suite crime,” how rural America has quietly become subject to incarceration patterns previously associated with urban environments, whether there’s a role for police and prisons in an ideal society, and the concept of “radical penal minimalism” — a framework she thinks may offer the Left a way out of the trap of maximalist abolitionism versus reflexive law-and-order politics.

    Meagan Day

    Let’s start with the differential treatment of street crime versus white-collar crime. One will get you plunged into the world’s most vast and sophisticated carceral apparatus, possibly never to return. The other will either get you a slap on the wrist or be ignored. Certain flavors of white-collar crime, especially in the era of Donald Trump, will even be ostentatiously rewarded. How do you think about that selective approach to criminalization?

    Marie Gottschalk

    White-collar and corporate crime is largely invisible to us. We don’t count it; we don’t measure it. Official crime statistics are based on the FBI’s index crimes — murder, rape, arson, and so on — and those are what determine whether people believe crime is going up or down. Corporate crime doesn’t figure into that picture at all.

    My book is partly a mea culpa. Those of us who study criminal justice have spent so much energy on mass incarceration — who goes to prison, at what rate, and why — that we missed the other half of the story: while the United States was building the largest incarceration system in the world, it was simultaneously carrying out a radical decriminalization of corporate crime. The book is about how those two trends are connected. What I try to do in Crime and No Punishment is get readers to step back from a narrow definition of “crime” — which in most people’s minds means interpersonal violence, or street crime — and think instead about violence writ large: who is causing harm, who is causing premature death.

    The US has become one of the most violent countries in the developed world, whether you measure that by declining life expectancy, traffic deaths, incarceration rates, or the militarization of police and the resulting civilian deaths. At the same time, we have staggering income inequality contributing to that decline in life expectancy, and we have what the geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls the “anti-state state” — a state that no longer feels it has a duty to protect the society it governs. That combination produces what I borrow from Friedrich Engels to call “social murder.” It’s not one person killing another by hand; it’s underlying structures producing death and harm at scale.

    The 2008 financial crisis is a good example. I call it an act of violence. People lost homes, pensions, jobs — and unlike past recessions, the recovery was radically uneven. The coasts and the tech hubs bounced back; large parts of “flyover country” never really did. The opioid crisis is another. At its peak a few years ago, close to 110,000 Americans a year were dying of overdoses. To put that in perspective: over the entire decade the United States was in Vietnam, about 55,000 Americans were killed, an experience that seared itself into the national memory. Here we have twice that many deaths in a single year, and we’ve simply tolerated it.

    Meagan Day

    You’ve observed that incarceration and police violence are becoming less exclusively an urban, racialized phenomenon. Could that actually be a hopeful political development? There were understandable reasons to racialize the national conversation about incarceration, given the hugely disproportionate impact on black communities. But that framing may also have kept out people who don’t see themselves as positioned in a particular way in the broader culture wars.

    Marie Gottschalk

    What I’m trying to do in the book is push people toward a bigger political-economy view. And one important piece of that bigger picture is that the carceral state is not static — it’s changing geographically. It made sense in the 1970s, ’80s, and early ’90s to focus on urban areas, because that’s where incarceration was most intense. But over the last decade, we’ve seen something close to a flip: if you live in a rural or suburban area today, you have a better chance of being incarcerated than if you live in a city.

    Some of that is the effect of progressive prosecutors and criminal-justice-reform coalitions anchored in urban centers, but we also see pronounced changes in rural areas. Look at New York state: the decline in incarceration is being driven by New York City, while rural areas are seeing increases. Pennsylvania shows the same pattern: a dramatic decline in Philadelphia, an increase out in the rural counties. That complicates how we think about race and incarceration, because some of the whitest, most rural counties in my state incarcerate people at very high rates, often in some of the most decrepit jails in the country, buildings well over a hundred years old.

    This matters for coalition-building. If we want to challenge the carceral state, we need to understand what’s happening in rural America too. The same is likely true of police violence — we don’t have great data, but you probably have a higher chance of being shot and killed by police in a rural area than an urban one. Those deaths are undercounted because they happen in places without strong advocacy organizations or local media to publicize them.

    Rural America has also disproportionately carried the physical burden of the forever wars. People in rural areas were far more likely to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. Actual combat deaths were relatively low, but the number of veterans who came home with serious physical or mental injuries was high — and this happened just as the country was cutting benefits for veterans and National Guard members. That’s another form of state violence that stays largely invisible. All of this is part of why I think it’s too simple to say that rural voters went for Trump purely out of misogyny and racism. There are many factors that have been brewing for a long time, and in some ways Trump is almost incidental to the underlying story.

    If you actually want to reduce violence, you have to invest in the welfare-state side of things — jobs, health care, schools, neighborhoods — and you have to reinvest in corporate regulation. If we only focus on the police and the prisons as “the problem,” there simply isn’t enough money to squeeze out of that system to fund what’s actually needed. If activists are focused narrowly on defunding the police, there just isn’t enough there to fund the things that need to be funded. We have to look concretely at tax policy, redistribution, and winding down the military budget.

    Meagan Day

    Let’s talk about the order of operations. Someone might hear that and say: I agree, which is why we need to build the welfare state first, to address the root causes of crime, and only then will we have earned the ability to decarcerate. If we decarcerate before building that foundation, we’ll see a crime spike that sets the whole movement back. What do you say to that?

    Marie Gottschalk

    If your position is that we have to fix everything before we can make progress on decarceration, that’s ignoring some very obvious issues we can address right now. For example, if you just look at age demographics, leaving aside class or geography, the highest-crime population is young people in their late teens and early twenties, particularly young men. We can observe a kind of “criminal menopause,” where offending drops off sharply with age. So what’s the purpose of keeping people incarcerated for decades after that? It’s now costing roughly $120,000 a year to house someone in a California state prison, and the vast majority of incarcerated people are eventually going to come out anyway.

    So yes, we can identify areas like these and start decarcerating now. A lot of the fear here rests on an overreliance on recidivism statistics, which are much shakier than people assume. You’ll often hear that two-thirds of people released “recidivate” within three years, without any explanation of what that means. In many cases, it’s a technical parole violation or a minor offense that, absent a prior record, wouldn’t have led to incarceration at all. In a lot of European countries, a prior record barely factors into sentencing. Our recidivism statistics are not actually a good predictor of public safety.

    Meagan Day

    Police and prisons are functioning in tandem right now to produce a metastasizing, highly punitive carceral state that extinguishes futures, proliferates inhumanity, and creates as many social problems as it solves. Consequently, the abolitionist line that a lot of people encounter when they first catch wind of those politics is: eliminate prisons, eliminate police — no distinction made between them, no exceptions.

    But if you think about it seriously, you might conclude that a selectively recruited, democratically controlled, well-trained, community-rooted, and adequately restrained police force could be useful to the project of decarceration. It could respond in high-stakes situations without functioning as an automatic feeder system into prisons or brutalizing populations the state has otherwise abandoned. It could turn the temperature down in a way that obviates the justification for America’s vast mesh of jails and prisons.

    Is there a role for police in decarceral politics or an afterlife for them in a decarcerated world? What about prisons themselves — is it possible to defend the existence of separate institutions to which violators of our social contract are removed?

    Marie Gottschalk

    Police are on the front lines of everything that’s failing: drugs, poverty, and the absence of adequate jobs, housing, and mental health care. We hand them that tray and say, “Fix it,” and all we actually give them are guns and more military hardware. As a society, we need to own those problems instead of just dumping them on police and saying policing can never work.

    I do believe, after years of thinking about this, that a genuinely different law enforcement institution is possible — one that does what it’s supposed to do. It would probably look different enough from what we have now that we might reasonably call it something else. But police forces exist all over the world, under that name, functioning very differently from ours. I’ve visited prisons all over the world too, and a prison in Berlin operates nothing like the state’s largest facility just outside Philadelphia. Becoming a police officer in Norway is nearly as competitive as getting into Harvard, and it requires three years of training. In many US states, you need more training and licensing to become a hairstylist or a nail technician than to become a police officer. That’s a real, fixable failure, not a reason to conclude that the institution itself is beyond redemption.

    There will probably always be some role for police in any functioning society. Sometimes you need the police to intervene. If someone’s breaking into your house with a gun, you’re not going to want a peace circle. But you also don’t necessarily want ten officers and a SWAT response that endangers everyone even more. There’s a middle ground. It’s also worth thinking right now about Charlottesville, where the police stood down while a white nationalist drove his car into a crowd and killed Heather Heyer. If you want to defund or eliminate the police at a moment when the Right is actively organizing and marching, you have to think hard about what that means.

    My book does document how, in a number of places, police forces are increasingly infiltrated by the Right, and how police and military service function as recruiting grounds for white supremacist organizations. We have to acknowledge that reality. But I don’t think it’s accurate to lump “the police” together as a single undifferentiated entity. Albuquerque has an extraordinarily high rate of police killings of civilians compared to New York City. Those differences matter. Insisting that police everywhere are equally bad and should simply be abolished flattens real variation, and I think that’s its own kind of arrogance.

    If we actually believe interpersonal violence has root causes — poverty, class inequity, racial inequity — then we have to recognize that in certain communities, violence tracks those indicators regardless of things like the “war on drugs.” Police need to be available to intervene and, where they can’t, to solve crimes. Roughly half of homicides in this country go unsolved. The families of murder victims generally aren’t demanding the death penalty or even necessarily a life sentence, but they do want some acknowledgment of the magnitude of their loss and some assurance that the person responsible won’t do it again. We need not only police for that but a whole functioning criminal justice system.

    As for prisons, punishment serves a social function beyond direct incapacitation. It’s a statement that a given act is unacceptable. But it doesn’t have to involve torture or the conditions in most American prisons and jails today. When I teach my own book and we get to the final chapter on corporate violence and particularly the villains of the financial crisis, my students say: these people caused enormous harm; they should go to prison. And I tell them truthfully: that would satisfy a retributive impulse, but it wouldn’t solve the underlying structural problems.

    Still, I don’t want to see them writing best-selling memoirs either. I’d like to see truth commissions. I’d like to see corporate executives personally charged, rather than corporations alone facing deferred-prosecution agreements that function as get-out-of-jail-free cards. There’s a wide range of sanctions available short of imprisonment. And some people probably do need to end up in prison or jail but not be subjected to current inhumane conditions.

    Meagan Day

    Many sympathetic people I know call themselves abolitionists. When someone asks, “So you really want to get rid of all police and prisons, forever?” they often start talking about horizons or hermeneutics. This is not how the term “abolition” was used in the context of slavery. It was an uncomplicated statement of moral principle: slavery had no defensible social function, and society would not miss it. It was not a horizon or a hermeneutic but a concrete demand for immediate eradication.

    That’s not really the politics of most serious people using the term “abolition” today, because police and prisons are not actually structurally identical to slavery. Their actual position is closer to: we have a system running on its own barbaric internal logic rather than what it purports to do — minimize overall harm and enforce and uphold a democratically agreed-upon social contract — and we need to replace it with something that actually does those things. I agree with that, but I think calling it “abolition” confuses the issue.

    Marie Gottschalk

    I’m a real admirer of many people who identify as abolitionists, and I think “abolition” can be a capacious term. But I’ve become drawn to another phrase some people are using now: radical penal minimalism. Paradoxically, radical penal minimalism might actually mean investing more in certain parts of the system in order to shrink it overall.

    For example, Pennsylvania is nearly the worst state in the country for funding public defenders. The state itself put essentially zero dollars toward it until very recently, and it still lags far behind other states; counties are left to cover it, and the American Civil Liberties Union just filed a lawsuit over conditions here. A purist abolitionist might balk at “expanding” any part of the criminal legal apparatus. But if expanding it means better public defenders, more diversion programs, more opportunities for community service, more careful attention to mitigation, or even potentially better-paid and better-trained prosecutors who stay in the work rather than burning out, then that’s a path to radical penal minimalism in practice.

    Meagan Day

    I much prefer that phrase. But do you think the American public will balk at the “minimalism” part of this formula too? People often report wanting more police, or at least more reliable and responsive law enforcement.

    Marie Gottschalk

    On this point, I’m heavily influenced by James Forman Jr, a Yale Law professor and former Washington, DC, public defender who wrote Locking Up Our Own — a deep dive into why DC, a majority-black city with a black city council and black mayor, became one of the most punitive jurisdictions in the country. His answer was that black communities have genuine, well-founded fears of street crime but also that it’s not as simple as “people want more police.”

    Polling consistently shows that people in those communities simultaneously feel that they are being overpoliced and underprotected. In truth, public opinion in these communities tends to be “all of the above.” Philadelphia’s last mayoral race had local polling on this, and Los Angeles’s recent polling shows the same pattern. The press likes to quote it selectively as “people want more police,” but if you also ask whether they want more spending on schools, jobs, clean streets, libraries, and community centers, the answer is overwhelmingly yes to all of it.

    Meagan Day

    Offloading certain calls to mental-health responders, drug counselors, service providers, and other nonpolice entities — and giving police real training and the capacity to respond safely to the calls that genuinely require them — matters enormously. But I do think that in a country with this many privately owned guns, the state probably needs to retain a near-monopoly on legitimate force. It might be easier to shrink the role of police if we could actually disarm the population and then also make this population less aggrieved and disturbed.

    Marie Gottschalk

    That’s the hardest question in the book really — whether we’re in a cycle of violence, and I don’t just mean interpersonal violence. We have the highest rate of private gun ownership of any country in the world. How do you run a functioning society that is that heavily armed? Some of the explanation for higher rural police-shooting rates is that officers know nearly everyone is carrying, and there are fewer mental-health services available to divert people before a crisis. That’s an extremely combustible combination, especially with smaller departments, less training, and sheriffs who are largely unaccountable to the public.

    The book can be bleak on this point. Are we becoming a dysfunctional state, one that’s failing at the basic obligation to protect its people from violence in all its forms, including drugs, including opioids? I often think about how shocked people were in the 1990s that life expectancy was declining in the collapsing Soviet Union. It was treated as proof of systemic failure. The United States has had its own unprecedented decline in life expectancy, in a country that spent the twentieth century as a leader in exactly that metric. And it’s declining unevenly, dropping fastest among poor and working-class white people, even as black and white life expectancy converge. Some of that convergence reflects real gains for black Americans, but a lot of it reflects a decline for white Americans. Is that really an achievement, equality reached by leveling down?

    Meagan Day

    Gulags are probably the best-known example of Soviet repression. Yet the US prison population is comparable to what the gulag system held at its height. We make a pretty remarkable exception for our own trajectory. Perhaps our society is not in spectacular health either.

    Marie Gottschalk

    I used to call the United States a “carceral democracy.” Now I’m not sure the “democracy” half still holds; even that’s been enfeebled. My book comes around to the idea that the fundamental legitimacy of the state is genuinely in question, and when that legitimacy is in question, it hollows out democratic institutions themselves. That adds a special urgency to our effort to understand the crimes committed and violence perpetrated not only on the streets but by people in power.

    #USA #prison #criminalité #violence #police #injustice #inégalité

  • Multinationals Sold Kenyan Farmers a Lethal Harvest
    https://jacobin.com/2026/07/kenya-agriculture-pesticides-health-cancer

    9.7.2026 by Jaclynn Ashly - European and US companies continued to sell pesticides abroad years after they were banned at home. Our reporter traveled to Kenya to learn how farmers are paying the price for these chemical products with their health — and how they’re fighting back.

    The word dawa, Swahili for “medicine,” threads through Francis Marete Mboroki’s speech as he describes the chemicals he spent decades spraying across his small farm on the fertile slopes of Mount Kenya. They were sold as the tools of progress: modern seeds, bigger harvests, prosperity.

    Even as European and US regulators banned or restricted these chemicals at home, Mboroki kept spraying them, unaware they could be poisoning him. Today his doctors believe those pesticides caused the throat cancer slowly consuming his body. “If I knew these pesticides caused cancer, I wouldn’t have used them at all,” the seventy-nine-year-old says. “But no one ever informed me of the dangers.”

    A slight man with heavily calloused hands, Mboroki has farmed nearly his entire life. Before pesticides, he relied on indigenous pest-control methods passed down through generations: seeds stored in underground granaries lined with medicinal leaves, ash from cooking fires dusted over crops, manure used to nourish the soil.

    “The indigenous crops grew well,” he says softly, hands clasped in his lap. “We weren’t rich from them, but we always had enough. The food was nutritious.”

    Photo
    Francis Marete Mboroki outside his home in Meru. Francis Marete Mboroki outside his home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Mboroki is now one of eighty-seven Kenyan farmers and farmworkers who have joined a landmark constitutional petition in Kenya’s courts. Many are battling cancers, respiratory illnesses, and neurological disorders they believe are tied to decades of pesticide exposure. The case represents the country’s first major legal challenge to the multinational corporations that continued marketing these chemicals in Kenya long after they were banned or restricted in their home countries.

    “We never imagined these chemicals could kill us like this,” Mboroki adds. “The people where they came from were protected from them. Here we are only discovering the danger after they already made us sick.”

    As Mboroki grew up in rural Kenya in the 1950s and ’60s, he had no idea that a postwar transformation was underway in the West within the chemical industry. Companies that had manufactured synthetic compounds for military purposes during World War II repurposed them for agriculture, selling pesticides as the future of farming.

    At first, it was not purely a commercial project. Beginning in the 1940s, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations funded the plant-breeding programs that became the Green Revolution, introducing high-yielding wheat and rice varieties across Mexico before expanding into India and Pakistan. By the mid-1960s, cereal yields on the Indian subcontinent were nearly 60 percent higher than they had been two decades earlier, helping avert the famines many had predicted and, by some estimates, saving up to a billion lives.

    But the gains came at a cost. The new seeds depended on fertilizer, irrigation, and increasing amounts of pesticides. As yields rose, so did farmers’ reliance on purchased inputs. In time, soils became degraded and water supplies dwindled, laying the foundations for the corporate control of agriculture that followed.

    Scientific evidence soon began to implicate the industry’s own products. Across Europe and the United States, research linked many of the chemicals to cancer, reproductive harm, developmental disorders, neurological disease, and ecological collapse. But as restrictions spread, the chemicals did not disappear.

    Instead, many found new markets in the Global South, carried alongside this agricultural model built on monocultures, hybrid commercial seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and chemical pesticides. Across Africa, these packages continued to be promoted as the path to modernity, higher yields, and prosperity.

    Photo
    The Meru landscape in Kenya’s eastern highlands Once home to drought-hardy traditional crops like sorghum and finger millet, the fields of Meru, in Kenya’s eastern highlands, now depend on imported hybrid seeds and the chemical packages that accompany them. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    In Kenya, the shift accelerated through the 1980s and ’90s as imported hybrid seeds were promoted through radio, agricultural supply stores (known as agrovets), and government extension campaigns, each variety tied to its own chemical package — marketed as dawa.

    “You couldn’t go anywhere without hearing about these new seeds and the medicine [chemicals] that came with them,” explains Mboroki. “On the radio, at the markets — that’s all they talked about.” He lets out a dry scoff and shakes his head. “All of us embraced it. We thought it was going to make us rich.”

    In 2006, the model was formalized when the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations launched the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, or AGRA, promising to double yields and incomes for thirty million smallholder households. It promoted the same input-intensive model of agriculture built on commercial seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and pesticides, even as many of the chemicals it relied on were already being restricted in the countries that produced them.

    In one sense it succeeded: commercial seeds spread through subsidy programs and village extension officers. What never arrived, however, was the promised prosperity. By AGRA’s own 2020 deadline, neither yields nor incomes had doubled, and across its priority countries the number of hungry people had risen, leaving farmers with debt, degrading soils and dependence on inputs they could no longer afford or abandon.

    For Mboroki, the true consequences arrived decades later.

    In the front room of his concrete house in Meru County, chemotherapy printouts, hospital receipts, and lab reports lie scattered across a table. Together they document paraquat and glyphosate in his urine at eighty-eight and twenty-one times the international reference limits.

    Glyphosate — the active ingredient in Roundup, developed by Monsanto and now owned by Bayer — was classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), part of the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2015 as “probably carcinogenic to humans,” yet remains legal across much of the world.

    Switzerland, home to Syngenta, had outlawed paraquat, a weed killer that can be fatal after a single swallow, from its own fields in 1989. Two decades later, in 2007, the EU also banned it. Chronic paraquat exposure has been linked to Parkinson’s disease and kidney failure. Yet Syngenta kept manufacturing it for export to Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

    The Paraquat Papers revealed in 2021 that Syngenta knew for decades of evidence linking paraquat to brain and nervous-system damage, suppressed its own internal findings, and worked covertly to influence regulators. Earlier this year, facing thousands of US lawsuits, the company announced it would close its last paraquat facility in Huddersfield, England, by the end of June 2026.

    Dimethoate and chlorpyrifos — organophosphate insecticides from the same chemical family whose development produced the first nerve agents — were linked to neurological, endocrine, and reproductive harm, and were removed from the European market in 2019 and 2020. In the United States, chlorpyrifos was pulled from food crops in 2021 over harm to children’s developing brains but was reinstated in 2023 after a federal court overturned the ban, and it continues to be used on a wide range of food crops.

    Unaware of the risks, Mboroki sprayed his maize, beans, and coffee with products like Gramoxone, Roundup, dimethoate and Karate — with no mask, gloves, or protective gear.

    Photo
    The landscape of Meru, in Kenya’s eastern highlands. The fertile slopes of Meru have seen rising pesticide use transform both the landscape and the health of its communities. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    The imported hybrid seeds initially produced higher yields, Mboroki says, though many farmers say the crops lacked the nutrition of those they replaced. But they could not be reliably replanted: seed saved from one season often produced weak harvests the next, forcing farmers to buy new seed, fertilizer, and pesticides for each growing season.

    Drought-hardy traditional staples that had sustained communities for generations — sorghum, finger millet, cowpea — disappeared from fields and markets. Land that had once produced reliably became harder and less fertile, demanding ever more fertilizer for the same yields. To stop buying the chemicals was to gamble with the next harvest.

    “Before, the yields were lower, but the crops were nutritious,” Mboroki tells me. “Then the yields become higher, and everybody is now getting sick. But we have no choice. Our indigenous seeds in this area are mostly gone. We can only plant what is available now, and those crops depend on the chemicals. If we stop spraying, they won’t grow.”

    Photo
    Kenyan farmer Francis Marete Mboroki
    Francis Marete Mboroki at his concrete home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    This dependence extends beyond individual farms. Kenya’s pesticide imports rose from 6,400 metric tons in 2015 to 15,600 metric tons in 2018. A 2023 Route to Food Initiative report found that 76 percent of pesticides sold in Kenya contained at least one highly hazardous ingredient, while 44 percent of the pesticide volume consisted of products already banned in Europe. Safer biopesticides were just 2 percent of the market. Five companies led the sector, headed by Switzerland’s Syngenta and Germany’s Bayer. Nearly 68 percent of Syngenta’s pesticide volume in Kenya was classified as highly hazardous.

    The Swiss organization Public Eye, with the Greenpeace UK unit Unearthed, found European companies filed notifications to export roughly 122,000 metric tons of pesticides in 2024 containing seventy-five active ingredients banned on European farms — a 50 percent increase from 81,000 metric tons in 2018. Roughly 9,000 metric tons were bound for Africa, with Kenya alone set to receive 473,000 kilograms.

    None of that was visible from Mboroki’s farm in the eastern highlands. The scientific studies, regulatory restrictions, and legal battles unfolding abroad were far removed from the Kenyan farmers using the chemicals every day.

    Mboroki pauses, staring through the open doorway toward the patchwork of green fields beyond. “I’ve learned the hard way that you should never go looking for gold,” he says, almost to himself. “There’s never gold on the other side of promises.”

    Older residents across Meru say cancer was once so rare that people often associated it with witchcraft; today many describe cancers, respiratory illnesses and neurological problems as commonplace.

    For Dr Zakayo Thaimuta, a forensic pathologist at the University of Nairobi who codeveloped a screening method for pesticide-related illness, the pattern became impossible to ignore. “There is a very sharp spike in cancer in Meru,” says Thaimuta, a Meru native who has watched the trend unfold firsthand. “The levels are far outside anything you would expect to observe in a normal population.”

    In a study of seventy farmers in the Meru village of Mbaria last year, Thaimuta and colleagues found that all of them carried paraquat in their blood and urine. Within the group, he documented clusters of respiratory disease, kidney failure, liver damage, anemia, Parkinson’s disease, and profound toxicant-induced immunosuppression.

    Local clinics, however, lacked the diagnostic capacity to identify chemical injuries, and many cases were repeatedly misdiagnosed. “Chemical pharyngitis [severe throat inflammation caused by airborne pesticide exposure] was consistently misidentified and treated as pneumonia,” Thaimuta explains. “When patients failed to respond to pneumonia treatments, doctors routinely rotated them onto tuberculosis treatments.” When those failed, patients were referred to specialized medical centers in Nairobi.

    Of the seventy farmers in Mbaria, only two could afford the trip. The undiagnosed never enter the medical record.

    This blind spot has masked the rapid development of toxicant-induced pulmonary fibrosis, Thaimuta says. Driven by paraquat accumulating in the lungs’ alveolar cells, the disease scars lung tissue, leaving victims unable to oxygenate their blood. It was the most pervasive severe injury found across the cohort.

    Thaimuta describes a sixteen-year-old boy whose mother spent more than twenty years on pesticide-intensive farms. The teenager tested positive for paraquat and glyphosate, suffered kidney failure and severe reproductive abnormalities, and later had his testes removed. Thaimuta suspects the teenager’s exposure began in the womb and continued through breastfeeding, raising concerns that the effects of the pesticides may already be crossing generations.

    “Collecting the history around these places, you will find that they have experienced many deaths, some of which have not even been documented,” Thaimuta tells me. “And I’m afraid that most of these deaths are related to exposure to these chemicals.”

    Nancy Wanjiru, seventy-two, is among the people behind those statistics. She spent thirty years with a sprayer strapped to her back. For five of those years, she worked at Ibis Farm, a high-altitude vegetable farm operated by Flamingo Horticulture Kenya Ltd. There she sprayed crops destined for British and other European supermarket shelves, including Tesco and Marks & Spencer. For the remaining twenty-five years she sprayed for local farmers, working almost every day without a mask or gloves.

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    Kenyan farmer Nancy Wanjiru
    Nancy Wanjiru spent three decades spraying pesticides across farms in Meru without protective gear. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Wanjiru had little reason to question what she was handling. “I never thought it was harmful,” she says from her small home in rural Meru. “There was no basic education about the chemicals. And you could not ask too many questions.”

    “The pay was very little,” she adds, “and if you caused problems or complained openly, someone else would take your place.”

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    Kenyan farmer Nancy Wanjiru at her home in rural Meru Nancy Wanjiru at her home in rural Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Years ago, her health began to deteriorate: chest pain, weakness in her arms and legs, tremors, hands too weak to grip, failing eyesight, and stomach problems that eventually required surgery. Doctors told her the cause was the pesticides she had sprayed for decades. She now depends on her children to survive.

    “If I didn’t have my children to help me and take me to the hospital,” she says, “I would have surely died by now.”

    Nowhere is exposure more direct than on Kenya’s flower farms, where workers spray chemicals banned in Europe onto blooms cut, boxed, and flown to European supermarkets the next morning. The trade exploits a regulatory gap: cut flowers are ornamental, not food, so the EU, UK, and United States set no pesticide residue limits for them. A rose grown with a chemical banned on European farms can be sold freely in a European shop the next day because, unlike screened fruit and vegetables, it was never meant to be eaten.

    Stephen Muriungi, forty-seven, spent two and a half years as one of these workers. At an export-oriented flower farm he sprayed cut blooms daily with a mix of organophosphates banned in the EU, including dimethoate and chlorpyrifos. He wore no protective equipment, earning 9,000 Kenyan shillings a month (about $70).

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    Kenyan farmer Stephen Muriungi Stephen Muriungi goes through medical documents inside the cramped one-room shack on his sister’s property where he now lives. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    When that contract ended, he spent another year spraying for smallholder farms, earning 250 to 300 shillings a day — less than $3. “You could feel the chemicals entering your body, but the reactions did not seem serious at first, so we just kept working,” Muriungi tells me. “After a while, I could smell the chemicals coming out through my sweat.”

    Then his body began to swell. First his legs, then his torso, then his hands. He gradually lost the ability to walk and speak normally. “It felt as if my skin was on fire,” he says, lifting his trousers to reveal what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs.
    Stephen Muriungi reveals what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs.
    Stephen Muriungi reveals what appear to be chemical burns running down both legs. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    “For the last three years, I have not been able to work,” he continues. “I still struggle to walk and sometimes it’s difficult to speak. My hands shake and my legs are in constant pain.”

    Doctors tested him for tuberculosis and HIV; both came back negative. No diagnosis followed. “Up to now, the doctors have never been able to tell me exactly what I’m suffering from,” Muriungi says. The link to pesticides emerged only after a doctor connected his symptoms to other agricultural workers.

    He now lives in his sister’s house, where she feeds and bathes him on the days he cannot manage. “This has caused me so much pain and misery,” he says, slumped on a bed inside a cramped one-room shack on his sister’s property. “I have been left to deal with this alone. The companies are not helping me, my former employers are not helping me, and neither is the government.”

    Muriungi’s case is not unique in Kenya. In Naivasha, ninety kilometers northwest of Nairobi and the center of the country’s flower industry, advocate Gilbert Njoroge arranged testing for sixty-three flower-farm clients; fifteen showed dangerously elevated levels of glyphosate and paraquat. In Thika, legal advocates represent more than one hundred cancer patients who trace their illnesses to flower plantations, where workers describe mixing chemicals with bare hands and being issued little more than gunny bags and dust masks.

    In a region where nearly everyone depends on farming, avoiding the chemicals feels impossible.

    “The doctors tell me to stay away from the pesticides,” Muriungi says. “But I still smell them everywhere — in food, when I walk around, when people are working nearby. It affects me so much.”

    Wanjiru and Muriungi are among the petitioners named in a constitutional case before Kenya’s Environment and Land Court. The petition — Petition E048 of 2022 — seeks the withdrawal of harmful pesticide active ingredients, including glyphosate, paraquat, chlorpyrifos, and imidacloprid, a widely used neurotoxic insecticide. Several are classified as highly hazardous under the joint criteria of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WHO; several of the others are banned in the EU over risks to human health and pollinators.

    It names fourteen respondents, including the local subsidiaries and distributors of Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, and BASF, along with Twiga Chemicals, the Agrochemicals Association of Kenya, and several state regulators. The petition argues that they failed to warn farmers and consumers and allowed hazardous pesticides to remain on the market long after their risks were clear.

    When Wanjiru’s urine was tested this year as part of the case, paraquat came back more than ninety times the reference limit and glyphosate more than twenty. Every other petitioner whose urine was tested also showed both chemicals above laboratory reference levels, with no exceptions.

    Paraquat readings reached more than five hundred times the reference limit, while glyphosate readings reached up to 128 times. Two independent international laboratories corroborated the findings.

    “When I learned these chemicals were banned in Europe,” Wanjiru says, “I could not understand it. If they are too dangerous for the people there, why are they being sold to us here? And where is our government? Isn’t it supposed to protect us?”

    Last year the court granted the petition class-action status, ordering the case advertised in national newspapers so that any Kenyan claiming harm from the chemicals could join. “Thousands of Kenyan farmers and consumers who have been directly or indirectly affected by these highly hazardous pesticides now have legal recourse similar to that accorded to American citizens,” says Kelvin Mugambi Kubai, the advocate heading the case.

    In the United States, Bayer has paid more than $10 billion since acquiring Monsanto in 2018 to settle claims that glyphosate-based Roundup caused cancer, while tens of thousands of cases remain active in US courts. Kenyan farmers have used the same chemical for decades. Yet while US plaintiffs have secured settlements and jury awards, Kenyan victims have received neither compensation nor acknowledgment from the companies involved.

    Beyond withdrawing the pesticides, the petitioners are seeking compensation for those already sickened, court-ordered medical coverage for affected communities, and a declaration that both the state and the manufacturers violated Kenyans’ constitutional rights to life, health, and a clean environment by allowing the products to remain on the market. The companies and government agencies named in the case deny the chemicals are unsafe.

    “The [Kenyan] government’s response has largely been to shift responsibility onto the users rather than acting as a regulator,” explains Kubai. “They blame the victims and say that if the pesticides had been used properly, these harms would not have occurred.”

    “The industry often talks about safe use, but that assumes a level of protection that simply does not exist for many smallholder farmers,” he continues. “When highly hazardous pesticides are used without adequate safeguards, exposure is not an accident. It is a predictable outcome.”

    Last year, the Kenyan government announced the withdrawal of seventy-seven pesticide products, the restriction of 202 others, and the suspension of 151 pending further review following the Pest Control Products Board assessment of 430 products on the market. Many of the chemicals targeted, however, had already fallen out of use or been banned globally decades earlier. Campaigners welcomed the review but argued it left the pesticides of greatest concern largely intact. Glyphosate and paraquat — the two chemicals most heavily detected in the petitioners’ urine — remained on sale, while chlorpyrifos was merely restricted to termite control rather than withdrawn altogether.

    For Silke Bollmohr, an ecotoxicologist whose 2023 Route to Food Initiative study documented the scale of highly hazardous pesticide use in Kenya, the key question is why some hazardous pesticides were targeted while others were not.

    “What remains unclear is why the government chose to ban specific products that seem to protect export markets and look good for the public, while leaving high-use, health-ravaging pesticides on the market,” she says. The chemicals left on the market, she adds, are killing pollinators and soil life — the foundation of resilient food production — placing farmers under further pressure.

    Bollmohr believes the move was driven as much by efforts to safeguard export markets as by concerns about human health. Kenyan agricultural exports, including coffee, have faced restrictions and rejections abroad over pesticide residues, raising questions about whether protecting export markets has taken precedence over protecting the health of Kenyan consumers and farmworkers.

    For Kubai, the withdrawal reinforces the case. “It appears the government is agreeing with the gist of our petition,” he tells me. “These pesticides are highly hazardous and should not be sold within the Kenyan market.”

    The move, he argues, also undermines the claims that tighter regulation would cripple agriculture. “The government has spent years arguing that banning these pesticides would devastate the sector,” he says. “Yet dozens have now been withdrawn, and that disruption has not occurred.”

    The contamination does not stop at the edge of the field. It moves through soil and waterways, enters food supply chains, and travels hundreds of kilometers from the farms where it was first sprayed. Tomatoes grown in Meru are sold in Nairobi. Rice cultivated in central Kenya is distributed across the country. By the time the chemicals arrive on dinner tables, they are no longer a problem confined to farmers — they have become part of the daily diet of millions of Kenyans.

    “Herbicides are omnipresent,” says Thaimuta, from the University of Nairobi. “They are everywhere.” Rainfall and runoff carry paraquat far beyond where it is first applied, and once in the water it moves downstream.

    “If water in Mount Kenya comes into contact with paraquat, it will be transported downstream,” Thaimuta says. “Anybody who eats fresh vegetables and fruits would likely have these chemicals in their blood as well.”

    The sick farmers, he says, are only the most visible part of the problem. “What we know so far is just the tip of the iceberg. It’s a growing health crisis. [These chemicals] contaminate the environment and the plants. And the consumers — the human beings — are paying a heavy price for it.”

    Rosaria Rigiri spent more than three decades spraying her Meru farm, raising onions, potatoes, beans, and maize. Two years ago, her hand began to swell, then came pain beneath her arm and breast. She was diagnosed with cancer and underwent a mastectomy; it spread, and a later scan found tumors in her brain.

    At sixty-four she can no longer work and, in recent months, has experienced periods of unconsciousness. The family’s livelihood has gone into scans, surgery, and chemotherapy — one course of medication alone runs more than 125,000 Kenyan shillings (more than $900) a month — and for over six months she has gone without treatment, because the family has run out of money.

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    Kenyan farmer Rosaria Rigiri photographed with her medications in the foreground
    Rosaria Rigiri seated in her home in Meru, where piles of medicine bottles and blister packs crowd a table. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    Rigiri’s urine showed paraquat more than sixty-six times the laboratory’s reference limit and glyphosate more than fifteen. She learned what the chemicals had done to her only when researchers came to the village and explained it.

    “As things are now, there is no possibility of stopping the chemicals,” she tells me, seated in her home in Meru, where medicine bottles and blister packs crowd a table. “We know they are harmful, but if we stop using them, nothing will grow.”

    “I really wonder, if these companies can make these chemicals that kill us, why can’t they make ones that are safe for human beings?”

    Uncertainty hangs over the next generation, already stooped in the fields. Rigiri’s daughter, forty-seven-year-old Lucy Makena, farms the same land — and has tested positive for the same chemicals herself.

    “I’m very worried about my own health,” Makena says. “I see my mother’s situation, and she is the one who gave birth to me. I’m using the same pesticides that did this to her.”

    Yet she keeps spraying. “I don’t have any choice. We can’t grow anymore in the traditional way, and no one can shift to organic without outside or government support. I would give up farming to save my health, but there are no other jobs here. . . . We are stuck.”

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    Rosaria Rigiri and her daughter, Lucy Makena, at their home in Meru. (Jaclynn Ashly / Jacobin)

    The family wears protective equipment when it can afford it, but Makena says that means little where every field is sprayed. “There’s nothing you can do to protect yourself when the medicine [chemicals] are all around you,” she says.

    A community that once attributed cancer to witchcraft has become one where sickness no longer shocks anyone. Neighbors who once pooled money for a stricken family now have stricken families of their own. “Sickness has become a lifestyle here,” Makena explains.

    Even now, as Makena describes the cancer that has ravaged her mother’s body and her fears of what the chemicals may do to her next, she keeps returning to the word dawa.

    Rigiri listens quietly, visibly worn by fatigue. For decades, the pesticides promised bigger harvests and a better life. Now she watches her daughter walk into the same fields carrying the same chemicals — armed with the knowledge she never had, yet caught in the same trap.