• Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • Energy, Power and Transition. State of Power 2024

    The fossil fuel based energy system has shaped capitalism and our geopolitical order. Our 12th State of Power report unveils the corporate and financial actors that underpin this order, the dangers of an unjust energy transition, lessons for movements of resistance, and the possibilities for transformative change.

    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/energy-power-and-transition

    #transition_énergétique #énergie #énergie_fossile #rapport #tni #capitalisme #pétrole #résistance #

  • Repackaging Imperialism. The EU – IOM border regime in the Balkans

    In November 2023, European Commission President #Ursula_von_der_Leyen concluded a Balkan tour, emphasizing EU enlargement’s priority for peace and prosperity. However, scrutiny intensified over EU practices, especially in the Balkans, where border policies, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), reflect an imperialist approach. This report exposes the consequences – restricted migration, erosion of international norms, and deadly conditions along migrant routes. The EU’s ’carrot and stick’ strategy in the Balkans raises concerns about perpetual pre-accession status and accountability for human rights abuses.

    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/repackaging-imperialism

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #IOM #OIM #impérialisme #frontières #rapport #tni #paix #prospérité #droits_humains #militarisation_des_frontières #route_des_Balkans #humanitarisme #sécurisation #sécurité #violence #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #hotspot #renvois #retours_volontaires #joint_coordination_plateform #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #décès

  • « Les #réfugiés sont les #cobayes des futures mesures de #surveillance »

    Les dangers de l’émigration vers l’Europe vont croissant, déplore Mark Akkerman, qui étudie la #militarisation_des_frontières du continent depuis 2016. Un mouvement largement poussé par le #lobby de l’#industrie_de_l’armement et de la sécurité.

    Mark Akkerman étudie depuis 2016 la militarisation des frontières européennes. Chercheur pour l’ONG anti-militariste #Stop_Wapenhandel, il a publié, avec le soutien de The Transnational Institute, plusieurs rapports de référence sur l’industrie des « #Safe_Borders ». Il revient pour Mediapart sur des années de politiques européennes de surveillance aux frontières.

    Mediapart : En 2016, vous publiez un premier rapport, « Borders Wars », qui cartographie la surveillance aux frontières en Europe. Dans quel contexte naît ce travail ?

    Mark Akkerman : Il faut se rappeler que l’Europe a une longue histoire avec la traque des migrants et la sécurisation des frontières, qui remonte, comme l’a montré la journaliste d’investigation néerlandaise Linda Polman, à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et au refus de soutenir et abriter des réfugiés juifs d’Allemagne. Dès la création de l’espace Schengen, au début des années 1990, l’ouverture des frontières à l’intérieur de cet espace était étroitement liée au renforcement du contrôle et de la sécurité aux frontières extérieures. Depuis lors, il s’agit d’un processus continu marqué par plusieurs phases d’accélération.

    Notre premier rapport (https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars) est né durant l’une de ces phases. J’ai commencé ce travail en 2015, au moment où émerge le terme « crise migratoire », que je qualifierais plutôt de tragédie de l’exil. De nombreuses personnes, principalement motivées par la guerre en Syrie, tentent alors de trouver un avenir sûr en Europe. En réponse, l’Union et ses États membres concentrent leurs efforts sur la sécurisation des frontières et le renvoi des personnes exilées en dehors du territoire européen.

    Cela passe pour une part importante par la militarisation des frontières, par le renforcement des pouvoirs de Frontex et de ses financements. Les réfugiés sont dépeints comme une menace pour la sécurité de l’Europe, les migrations comme un « problème de sécurité ». C’est un récit largement poussé par le lobby de l’industrie militaire et de la sécurité, qui a été le principal bénéficiaire de ces politiques, des budgets croissants et des contrats conclus dans ce contexte.

    Cinq ans après votre premier rapport, quel regard portez-vous sur la politique européenne de sécurisation des frontières ? La pandémie a-t-elle influencé cette politique ?

    Depuis 2016, l’Europe est restée sur la même voie. Renforcer, militariser et externaliser la sécurité aux frontières sont les seules réponses aux migrations. Davantage de murs et de clôtures ont été érigés, de nouveaux équipements de surveillance, de détection et de contrôle ont été installés, de nouveaux accords avec des pays tiers ont été conclus, de nouvelles bases de données destinées à traquer les personnes exilées ont été créées. En ce sens, les politiques visibles en 2016 ont été poursuivies, intensifiées et élargies.

    La pandémie de Covid-19 a certainement joué un rôle dans ce processus. De nombreux pays ont introduit de nouvelles mesures de sécurité et de contrôle aux frontières pour contenir le virus. Cela a également servi d’excuse pour cibler à nouveau les réfugiés, les présentant encore une fois comme des menaces, responsables de la propagation du virus.

    Comme toujours, une partie de ces mesures temporaires vont se pérenniser et on constate déjà, par exemple, l’évolution des contrôles aux frontières vers l’utilisation de technologies biométriques sans contact.

    En 2020, l’UE a choisi Idemia et Sopra Steria, deux entreprises françaises, pour construire un fichier de contrôle biométrique destiné à réguler les entrées et sorties de l’espace Schengen. Quel regard portez-vous sur ces bases de données ?

    Il existe de nombreuses bases de données biométriques utilisées pour la sécurité aux frontières. L’Union européenne met depuis plusieurs années l’accent sur leur développement. Plus récemment, elle insiste sur leur nécessaire connexion, leur prétendue interopérabilité. L’objectif est de créer un système global de détection, de surveillance et de suivi des mouvements de réfugiés à l’échelle européenne pour faciliter leur détention et leur expulsion.

    Cela contribue à créer une nouvelle forme d’« apartheid ». Ces fichiers sont destinés certes à accélérer les processus de contrôles aux frontières pour les citoyens nationaux et autres voyageurs acceptables mais, surtout, à arrêter ou expulser les migrantes et migrants indésirables grâce à l’utilisation de systèmes informatiques et biométriques toujours plus sophistiqués.

    Quelles sont les conséquences concrètes de ces politiques de surveillance ?

    Il devient chaque jour plus difficile et dangereux de migrer vers l’Europe. Parce qu’elles sont confrontées à la violence et aux refoulements aux frontières, ces personnes sont obligées de chercher d’autres routes migratoires, souvent plus dangereuses, ce qui crée un vrai marché pour les passeurs. La situation n’est pas meilleure pour les personnes réfugiées qui arrivent à entrer sur le territoire européen. Elles finissent régulièrement en détention, sont expulsées ou sont contraintes de vivre dans des conditions désastreuses en Europe ou dans des pays limitrophes.

    Cette politique n’impacte pas que les personnes réfugiées. Elle présente un risque pour les libertés publiques de l’ensemble des Européens. Outre leur usage dans le cadre d’une politique migratoire raciste, les technologies de surveillance sont aussi « testées » sur des personnes migrantes qui peuvent difficilement faire valoir leurs droits, puis introduites plus tard auprès d’un public plus large. Les réfugiés sont les cobayes des futures mesures de contrôle et de surveillance des pays européens.

    Vous pointez aussi que les industriels qui fournissent en armement les belligérants de conflits extra-européens, souvent à l’origine de mouvements migratoires, sont ceux qui bénéficient du business des frontières.

    C’est ce que fait Thales en France, Leonardo en Italie ou Airbus. Ces entreprises européennes de sécurité et d’armement exportent des armes et des technologies de surveillance partout dans le monde, notamment dans des pays en guerre ou avec des régimes autoritaires. À titre d’exemple, les exportations européennes au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord des dix dernières années représentent 92 milliards d’euros et concernent des pays aussi controversés que l’Arabie saoudite, l’Égypte ou la Turquie.

    Si elles fuient leur pays, les populations civiles exposées à la guerre dans ces régions du monde se retrouveront très certainement confrontées à des technologies produites par les mêmes industriels lors de leur passage aux frontières. C’est une manière profondément cynique de profiter, deux fois, de la misère d’une même population.

    Quelles entreprises bénéficient le plus de la politique européenne de surveillance aux frontières ? Par quels mécanismes ? Je pense notamment aux programmes de recherches comme Horizon 2020 et Horizon Europe.

    J’identifie deux types d’entreprises qui bénéficient de la militarisation des frontières de l’Europe. D’abord les grandes entreprises européennes d’armement et de sécurité, comme Airbus, Leonardo et Thales, qui disposent toutes d’une importante gamme de technologies militaires et de surveillance. Pour elles, le marché des frontières est un marché parmi d’autres. Ensuite, des entreprises spécialisées, qui travaillent sur des niches, bénéficient aussi directement de cette politique européenne. C’est le cas de l’entreprise espagnole European Security Fencing, qui fabrique des fils barbelés. Elles s’enrichissent en remportant des contrats, à l’échelle européenne, mais aussi nationale, voire locale.

    Une autre source de financement est le programme cadre européen pour la recherche et l’innovation. Il finance des projets sur 7 ans et comprend un volet sécurité aux frontières. Des programmes existent aussi au niveau du Fonds européen de défense.

    Un de vos travaux de recherche, « Expanding the Fortress », s’intéresse aux partenariats entre l’Europe et des pays tiers. Quels sont les pays concernés ? Comment se manifestent ces partenariats ?

    L’UE et ses États membres tentent d’établir une coopération en matière de migrations avec de nombreux pays du monde. L’accent est mis sur les pays identifiés comme des « pays de transit » pour celles et ceux qui aspirent à rejoindre l’Union européenne. L’Europe entretient de nombreux accords avec la Libye, qu’elle équipe notamment en matériel militaire. Il s’agit d’un pays où la torture et la mise à mort des réfugiés ont été largement documentées.

    Des accords existent aussi avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie, le Maroc, la Jordanie, le Liban ou encore l’Ukraine. L’Union a financé la construction de centres de détention dans ces pays, dans lesquels on a constaté, à plusieurs reprises, d’importantes violations en matière de droits humains.

    Ces pays extra-européens sont-ils des zones d’expérimentations pour les entreprises européennes de surveillance ?

    Ce sont plutôt les frontières européennes, comme celle d’Evros, entre la Grèce et la Turquie, qui servent de zone d’expérimentation. Le transfert d’équipements, de technologies et de connaissances pour la sécurité et le contrôle des frontières représente en revanche une partie importante de ces coopérations. Cela veut dire que les États européens dispensent des formations, partagent des renseignements ou fournissent de nouveaux équipements aux forces de sécurité de régimes autoritaires.

    Ces régimes peuvent ainsi renforcer et étendre leurs capacités de répression et de violation des droits humains avec le soutien de l’UE. Les conséquences sont dévastatrices pour la population de ces pays, ce qui sert de moteur pour de nouvelles vagues de migration…

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/040822/les-refugies-sont-les-cobayes-des-futures-mesures-de-surveillance

    cité dans l’interview, ce rapport :
    #Global_Climate_Wall
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall
    déjà signalé ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/934948#message934949

    #asile #migrations #complexe_militaro-industriel #surveillance_des_frontières #Frontex #problème #Covid-19 #coronavirus #biométrie #technologie #Idemia #Sopra_Steria #contrôle_biométrique #base_de_données #interopérabilité #détection #apartheid #informatique #violence #refoulement #libertés_publiques #test #normalisation #généralisation #Thales #Leonardo #Airbus #armes #armements #industrie_de_l'armement #cynisme #Horizon_Europe #Horizon_2020 #marché #business #European_Security_Fencing #barbelés #fils_barbelés #recherche #programmes_de_recherche #Fonds_européen_de_défense #accords #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #Égypte #Libye #Tunisie #Maroc #Jordanie #Liban #Ukraine #rétention #détention_administrative #expérimentation #équipements #connaissance #transfert #coopérations #formations #renseignements #répression

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Le système électronique d’#Entrée-Sortie en zone #Schengen : la biométrie au service des #frontières_intelligentes

      Avec la pression migratoire et la vague d’attentats subis par l’Europe ces derniers mois, la gestion des frontières devient une priorité pour la Commission.

      Certes, le système d’information sur les #visas (#VIS, #Visa_Information_System) est déployé depuis 2015 dans les consulats des États Membres et sa consultation rendue obligatoire lors de l’accès dans l’#espace_Schengen.

      Mais, depuis février 2013, est apparu le concept de « #frontières_intelligentes », (#Smart_Borders), qui recouvre un panel ambitieux de mesures législatives élaborées en concertation avec le Parlement Européen.

      Le système entrée/sortie, en particulier, va permettre, avec un système informatique unifié, d’enregistrer les données relatives aux #entrées et aux #sorties des ressortissants de pays tiers en court séjour franchissant les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

      Adopté puis signé le 30 Novembre 2017 par le Conseil Européen, il sera mis en application en 2022. Il s’ajoutera au « PNR européen » qui, depuis le 25 mai 2018, recense les informations sur les passagers aériens.

      Partant du principe que la majorité des visiteurs sont « de bonne foi », #EES bouleverse les fondements mêmes du #Code_Schengen avec le double objectif de :

      - rendre les frontières intelligentes, c’est-à-dire automatiser le contrôle des visiteurs fiables tout en renforçant la lutte contre les migrations irrégulières
      - créer un #registre_central des mouvements transfrontaliers.

      La modernisation de la gestion des frontières extérieures est en marche. En améliorant la qualité et l’efficacité des contrôles de l’espace Schengen, EES, avec une base de données commune, doit contribuer à renforcer la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme ainsi que les formes graves de criminalité.

      L’#identification de façon systématique des personnes qui dépassent la durée de séjour autorisée dans l’espace Schengen en est un des enjeux majeurs.

      Nous verrons pourquoi la reconnaissance faciale en particulier, est la grande gagnante du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Dans ce dossier web, nous traiterons des 6 sujets suivants :

      - ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection
      - La remise en cause du code « frontières Schengen » de 2006
      - EES : un accès très réglementé
      - La biométrie faciale : fer de lance de l’EES
      - EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité
      - Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Examinons maintenant ces divers points plus en détail.

      ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection

      Les activités criminelles telles que la traite d’êtres humains, les filières d’immigration clandestine ou les trafics d’objets sont aujourd’hui la conséquence de franchissements illicites de frontières, largement facilités par l’absence d’enregistrement lors des entrées/ sorties.

      Le scénario de fraude est – hélas – bien rôdé : Contrôle « standard » lors de l’accès à l’espace Schengen, puis destruction des documents d’identité dans la perspective d’activités malveillantes, sachant l’impossibilité d’être authentifié.

      Même si EES vise le visiteur « de bonne foi », le système va constituer à terme un puissant dispositif pour la prévention et la détection d’activités terroristes ou autres infractions pénales graves. En effet les informations stockées dans le nouveau registre pour 5 ans– y compris concernant les personnes refoulées aux frontières – couvrent principalement les noms, numéros de passeport, empreintes digitales et photos. Elles seront accessibles aux autorités frontalières et de délivrance des visas, ainsi qu’à Europol.

      Le système sera à la disposition d’enquêtes en particulier, vu la possibilité de consulter les mouvements transfrontières et historiques de déplacements. Tout cela dans le plus strict respect de la dignité humaine et de l’intégrité des personnes.

      Le dispositif est très clair sur ce point : aucune discrimination fondée sur le sexe, la couleur, les origines ethniques ou sociales, les caractéristiques génétiques, la langue, la religion ou les convictions, les opinions politiques ou toute autre opinion.

      Sont également exclus du champ d’investigation l’appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance, un handicap, l’âge ou l’orientation sexuelle des visiteurs.​

      La remise en cause du Code frontières Schengen

      Vu la croissance attendue des visiteurs de pays tiers (887 millions en 2025), l’enjeu est maintenant de fluidifier et simplifier les contrôles.

      Une initiative particulièrement ambitieuse dans la mesure où elle remet en cause le fameux Code Schengen qui impose des vérifications approfondies, conduites manuellement par les autorités des Etats Membres aux entrées et sorties, sans possibilité d’automatisation.

      Par ailleurs, le Code Schengen ne prévoit aucun enregistrement des mouvements transfrontaliers. La procédure actuelle exigeant seulement que les passeports soient tamponnés avec mention des dates d’entrée et sortie.

      Seule possibilité pour les gardes-frontières : Calculer un éventuel dépassement de la durée de séjour qui elle-même est une information falsifiable et non consignée dans une base de données.

      Autre contrainte, les visiteurs réguliers comme les frontaliers doivent remplacer leurs passeports tous les 2-3 mois, vue la multitude de tampons ! Un procédé bien archaïque si l’on considère le potentiel des technologies de l’information.

      La proposition de 2013 comprenait donc trois piliers :

      - ​La création d’un système automatisé d’entrée/sortie (Entry/ Exit System ou EES)
      - Un programme d’enregistrement de voyageurs fiables, (RTP, Registered Traveller Program) pour simplifier le passage des visiteurs réguliers, titulaires d’un contrôle de sûreté préalable
      – La modification du Code Schengen

      Abandon de l’initiative RTP

      Trop complexe à mettre en œuvre au niveau des 28 Etats Membres, l’initiative RTP (Registered Travelers Program) a été finalement abandonnée au profit d’un ambitieux programme Entry/ Exit (EES) destiné aux visiteurs de courte durée (moins de 90 jours sur 180 jours).

      Précision importante, sont maintenant concernés les voyageurs non soumis à l’obligation de visa, sachant que les détenteurs de visas sont déjà répertoriés par le VIS.

      La note est beaucoup moins salée que prévue par la Commission en 2013. Au lieu du milliard estimé, mais qui incluait un RTP, la proposition révisée d’un EES unique ne coutera « que » 480 millions d’EUR.

      Cette initiative ambitieuse fait suite à une étude technique menée en 2014, puis une phase de prototypage conduite sous l’égide de l’agence EU-LISA en 2015 avec pour résultat le retrait du projet RTP et un focus particulier sur le programme EES.

      Une architecture centralisée gérée par EU-LISA

      L’acteur clé du dispositif EES, c’est EU-LISA, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle dont le siège est à Tallinn, le site opérationnel à Strasbourg et le site de secours à Sankt Johann im Pongau (Autriche). L’Agence sera en charge des 4 aspects suivants :

      - Développement du système central
      - Mise en œuvre d’une interface uniforme nationale (IUN) dans chaque État Membre
      - Communication sécurisée entre les systèmes centraux EES et VIS
      - Infrastructure de communication entre système central et interfaces uniformes nationales.

      Chaque État Membre sera responsable de l’organisation, la gestion, le fonctionnement et de la maintenance de son infrastructure frontalière vis-à-vis d’EES.

      Une gestion optimisée des frontières

      Grâce au nouveau dispositif, tous les ressortissants des pays tiers seront traités de manière égale, qu’ils soient ou non exemptés de visas.

      Le VIS répertorie déjà les visiteurs soumis à visas. Et l’ambition d’EES c’est de constituer une base pour les autres.

      Les États Membres seront donc en mesure d’identifier tout migrant ou visiteur en situation irrégulière ayant franchi illégalement les frontières et faciliter, le cas échéant, son expulsion.

      Dès l’authentification à une borne en libre–service, le visiteur se verra afficher les informations suivantes, sous supervision d’un garde-frontière :

      - ​Date, heure et point de passage, en remplacement des tampons manuels
      - Notification éventuelle d’un refus d’accès.
      - Durée maximale de séjour autorisé.
      - Dépassement éventuelle de la durée de séjour autorisée
      En ce qui concerne les autorités des Etats Membres, c’est une véritable révolution par rapport à l’extrême indigence du système actuel. On anticipe déjà la possibilité de constituer des statistiques puissantes et mieux gérer l’octroi, ou la suppression de visas, en fonction de mouvements transfrontières, notamment grâce à des informations telles que :

      - ​​​Dépassements des durées de séjour par pays
      - Historique des mouvements frontaliers par pays

      EES : un accès très réglementé

      L’accès à EES est très réglementé. Chaque État Membre doit notifier à EU-LISA les autorités répressives habilitées à consulter les données aux fins de prévention ou détection d’infractions terroristes et autres infractions pénales graves, ou des enquêtes en la matière.

      Europol, qui joue un rôle clé dans la prévention de la criminalité, fera partie des autorités répressives autorisées à accéder au système dans le cadre de sa mission.

      Par contre, les données EES ne pourront pas être communiquées à des pays tiers, une organisation internationale ou une quelconque partie privée établie ou non dans l’Union, ni mises à leur disposition. Bien entendu, dans le cas d’enquêtes visant l’identification d’un ressortissant de pays tiers, la prévention ou la détection d’infractions terroristes, des exceptions pourront être envisagées.​

      Proportionnalité et respect de la vie privée

      Dans un contexte législatif qui considère le respect de la vie privée comme une priorité, le volume de données à caractère personnel enregistré dans EES sera considérablement réduit, soit 26 éléments au lieu des 36 prévus en 2013.

      Il s’agit d’un dispositif négocié auprès du Contrôleur Européen pour la Protection des Données (CEPD) et les autorités nationales en charge d’appliquer la nouvelle réglementation.

      Très schématiquement, les données collectées se limiteront à des informations minimales telles que : nom, prénom, références du document de voyage et visa, biométrie du visage et de 4 empreintes digitales.

      A chaque visite, seront relevés la date, l’heure et le lieu de contrôle frontière. Ces données seront conservées pendant cinq années, et non plus 181 jours comme proposé en 2013.

      Un procédé qui permettra aux gardes-frontières et postes consulaires d’analyser l’historique des déplacements, lors de l’octroi de nouveaux visas.
      ESS : privacy by design

      La proposition de la Commission a été rédigée selon le principe de « respect de la vie privée dès la conception », mieux connue sous le label « Privacy By Design ».

      Sous l’angle du droit, elle est bien proportionnée à la protection des données à caractère personnel en ce que la collecte, le stockage et la durée de conservation des données permettent strictement au système de fonctionner et d’atteindre ses objectifs.

      EES sera un système centralisé avec coopération des Etats Membres ; d’où une architecture et des règles de fonctionnement communes.​

      Vu cette contrainte d’uniformisation des modalités régissant vérifications aux frontières et accès au système, seul le règlement en tant que véhicule juridique pouvait convenir, sans possibilité d’adaptation aux législations nationales.

      Un accès internet sécurisé à un service web hébergé par EU-LISA permettra aux visiteurs des pays tiers de vérifier à tout moment leur durée de séjour autorisée.

      Cette fonctionnalité sera également accessible aux transporteurs, comme les compagnies aériennes, pour vérifier si leurs voyageurs sont bien autorisés à pénétrer dans le territoire de l’UE.

      La biométrie faciale, fer de lance du programme EES

      Véritable remise en question du Code Schengen, EES permettra de relever la biométrie de tous les visiteurs des pays tiers, alors que ceux soumis à visa sont déjà enregistrés dans le VIS.

      Pour les identifiants biométriques, l’ancien système envisageait 10 empreintes digitales. Le nouveau combine quatre empreintes et la reconnaissance faciale.

      La technologie, qui a bénéficié de progrès considérables ces dernières années, s’inscrit en support des traditionnelles empreintes digitales.

      Bien que la Commission ne retienne pas le principe d’enregistrement de visiteurs fiables (RTP), c’est tout comme.

      En effet, quatre empreintes seront encore relevées lors du premier contrôle pour vérifier que le demandeur n’est pas déjà répertorié dans EES ou VIS.

      En l’absence d’un signal, l’autorité frontalière créera un dossier en s’assurant que la photographie du passeport ayant une zone de lecture automatique (« Machine Readable Travel Document ») correspond bien à l’image faciale prise en direct du nouveau visiteur.

      Mais pour les passages suivants, c’est le visage qui l’emporte.

      Souriez, vous êtes en Europe ! Les fastidieux (et falsifiables) tampons sur les passeports seront remplacés par un accès à EES.

      La biométrie est donc le grand gagnant du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Certains terminaux maritimes ou postes frontières terrestres particulièrement fréquentés deviendront les premiers clients de ces fameuses eGates réservées aujourd’hui aux seuls voyageurs aériens.

      Frontex, en tant qu’agence aidant les pays de l’UE et les pays associés à Schengen à gérer leurs frontières extérieures, va aider à harmoniser les contrôles aux frontières à travers l’UE.

      EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité

      Le dispositif EES est complexe et ambitieux dans la mesure où il fluidifie les passages tout en relevant le niveau des contrôles. On anticipe dès aujourd’hui des procédures d’accueil en Europe bien meilleures grâce aux eGates et bornes self-service.

      Sous l’angle de nos politiques migratoires et de la prévention des malveillances, on pourra immédiatement repérer les personnes ne rempliss​​ant pas les conditions d’entrée et accéder aux historiques des déplacements.

      Mais rappelons également qu’EES constituera un puissant outil de lutte contre la fraude à l’identité, notamment au sein de l’espace Schengen, tout visiteur ayant été enregistré lors de son arrivée à la frontière.

      Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Thales est particulièrement attentif à cette initiative EES qui repose massivement sur la biométrie et le contrôle des documents de voyage.

      En effet, l’identification et l’authentification des personnes sont deux expertises majeures de Thales depuis plus de 20 ans. La société contribue d’ailleurs à plus de 200 programmes gouvernementaux dans 80 pays sur ces sujets.

      La société peut répondre aux objectifs du programme EES en particulier pour :

      - Exploiter les dernières technologies pour l’authentification des documents de voyage, l’identification des voyageurs à l’aide de captures et vérifications biométriques, et l’évaluation des risques avec accès aux listes de contrôle, dans tous les points de contrôle aux frontières.
      - Réduire les coûts par l’automatisation et l’optimisation des processus tout en misant sur de nouvelles technologies pour renforcer la sécurité et offrir davantage de confort aux passagers
      - Valoriser des tâches de gardes-frontières qui superviseront ces dispositifs tout en portant leur attention sur des cas pouvant porter à suspicion.
      - Diminuer les temps d’attente après enregistrement dans la base EES. Un facteur non négligeable pour des frontaliers ou visiteurs réguliers qui consacreront plus de temps à des activités productives !

      Des bornes d’enregistrement libre-service comme des frontières automatiques ou semi-automatiques peuvent être déployées dans les prochaines années avec l’objectif de fluidifier les contrôles et rendre plus accueillant l’accès à l’espace Schengen.

      Ces bornes automatiques et biométriques ont d’ailleurs été installées dans les aéroports parisiens d’Orly et de Charles de Gaulle (Nouveau PARAFE : https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/controle-aux-frontieres).

      La reconnaissance faciale a été mise en place en 2018.

      Les nouveaux sas PARAFE à Roissy – Septembre 2017

      Thales dispose aussi d’une expertise reconnue dans la gestion intégrée des frontières et contribue en particulier à deux grand systèmes de gestion des flux migratoires.

      - Les systèmes d’identification biométrique de Thales sont en particulier au cœur du système américain de gestion des données IDENT (anciennement US-VISIT). Cette base de données biographiques et biométriques contient des informations sur plus de 200 millions de personnes qui sont entrées, ont tenté d’entrer et ont quitté les États-Unis d’Amérique.

      - Thales est le fournisseur depuis l’origine du système biométrique Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy System) qui est le plus important système AFIS multi-juridictionnel au monde, avec ses 32 pays affiliés. Le système Eurodac est une base de données comportant les empreintes digitales des demandeurs d’asile pour chacun des états membres ainsi que des personnes appréhendées à l’occasion d’un franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière.

      Pour déjouer les tentatives de fraude documentaire, Thales a mis au point des équipements sophistiqués permettant de vérifier leur authenticité par comparaison avec les modèles en circulation. Leur validité est aussi vérifiée par connexion à des bases de documents volés ou perdus (SLTD de Interpol). Ou a des watch lists nationales.

      Pour le contrôle des frontières, au-delà de ses SAS et de ses kiosks biométriques, Thales propose toute une gamme de lecteurs de passeports d’équipements et de logiciels d’authentification biométriques, grâce à son portefeuille Cogent, l’un des pionniers du secteur.

      Pour en savoir plus, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter.​

      https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/biometrie/systeme-entree-sortie
      #smart_borders #Thales #overstayers #reconnaissance_faciale #prévention #détection #fraude_à_l'identité #Registered_Traveller_Program (#RTP) #EU-LISA #interface_uniforme_nationale (#IUN) #Contrôleur_Européen_pour_la_Protection_des_Données (#CEPD) #Privacy_By_Design #respect_de_la_vie_privée #empreintes_digitales #biométrie #Frontex #bornes #aéroport #PARAFE #IDENT #US-VISIT #Eurodac #Gemalto

  • Global Climate Wall | Transnational Institute
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall

    This report finds that the world’s biggest emitters of green house gases are spending, on average, 2.3 times as much on arming their borders as they are on climate finance. This figure is as high as 15 times as much for the worst offenders. This “Global Climate Wall” aims to seal off powerful countries from migrants, rather than addressing the causes of displacement.

    #climate_change #borders #critical_border_studies

  • L’industrie de la #sécurité tire profit de la crise climatique

    Les pays riches, pires contributeurs au #changement_climatique, dépensent bien plus d’argent à renforcer leurs #frontières qu’à contribuer au #développement des pays pauvres : c’est ce qu’a étudié un rapport du Transnational Institute. Les habitants de ces pays sont pourtant les premières victimes de l’alliance occidentale entre business du #pétrole et de la sécurité.

    Le changement climatique est bon pour le #business. Du moins celui de la sécurité. C’est ce que démontre un #rapport publié ce lundi 25 octobre par l’organisation de recherche et de plaidoyer Transnational Institute. Intitulé « un mur contre le climat », il démontre que les pays les plus riches dépensent bien plus pour renforcer leurs frontières contre les migrants que pour aider les pays pauvres, d’où ils viennent, à affronter la crise climatique.

    Il décortique les #dépenses, dans ces deux domaines, des sept pays riches historiquement les plus émetteurs de gaz à effet de serre que sont les États-Unis, l’Allemagne, la France, le Japon, l’Australie, le Royaume-Uni et le Canada. Ils sont à eux sept responsables de 48 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans le monde. Le Brésil, la Chine et la Russie, qui font partie des dix plus gros émetteurs aujourd’hui, ne sont pas inclus car, s’étant enrichis beaucoup plus récemment, ils ne sont pas considérés comme des responsables historiques.

    2,3 fois plus de dollars pour repousser les migrants que pour le climat

    Pour les États étudiés, les auteurs ont regardé leur contribution au « #financement_climatique » : prévu par les négociations internationales sur le climat, il s’agit de fonds que les pays riches s’engagent à verser aux pays dits en développement pour les aider à faire face à la crise climatique. Ils ont ensuite traqué les sommes allouées par chaque pays aux contrôles frontaliers et migratoires. Résultat : entre 2013 et 2018, ces sept pays ont en moyenne dépensé chaque année au moins 2,3 fois plus pour repousser les migrants (33,1 milliards de dollars) que pour contribuer au financement climatique (14,4 milliards de dollars). Et encore, les auteurs du rapport signalent que les pays riches ont tendance à surestimer les sommes allouées au financement climatique.

    Une disproportion encore plus criante quand on regarde en détail. Le Canada a dépensé 15 fois plus, l’Australie 13,5 fois plus, les États-Unis 10,9 fois plus. À noter que ces derniers sont en valeur absolue les plus dépensiers, ils ont à eux seuls mis 19,6 milliards dans la sécurité de leurs frontières sur la période, soit 59 % de la somme totale allouée par les sept pays réunis.

    Le cas des pays européens est moins explicite. La France pourrait avoir l’air de bon élève. A priori, elle dépense moins dans les contrôles aux frontières (1 milliard) que dans le financement climatique (1,6 milliard). Idem pour l’Allemagne (3,4 milliards dans la militarisation des frontières contre 4,4 milliards dans le financement climatique). Mais ce serait oublier qu’une grande partie des dépenses sécuritaires est déportée au niveau de l’Union européenne et de l’agence de contrôle des frontières Frontex. Celle-ci a vu son budget exploser, avec une augmentation de 2 763 % entre 2006 et 2021.

    Cet argent est très concrètement dépensé dans diverses #technologies#caméras, #drones, systèmes d’#identification_biométriques, et dans l’embauche de #gardes-frontières et de #gardes-côtes. « Il y a aussi une #externalisation, avec par exemple l’Union européenne qui conclue des accords avec les pays d’Afrique du Nord et des régimes totalitaires, pour qu’ils empêchent les migrants d’arriver jusqu’à leurs frontières », décrit Nick Buxton, un des auteurs du rapport interrogé par Reporterre. Ces partenariats contribuent à la multiplication des murs anti-migrants partout dans le monde. « La plupart des grands constructeurs de murs du monde ont reçu une aide des programmes d’externalisation de l’Union européenne ou des États-Unis (ou des deux, dans le cas de la Jordanie, du Maroc et de la Turquie) », pointe le rapport.

    L’édification de ces murs empêche-t-elle les pays riches de voir le drame qui se déroule derrière ? À travers divers exemples, les auteurs tentent de montrer l’injustice de la situation : en Somalie, à la suite d’une catastrophe climatique en 2020, un million de personnes ont dû se déplacer. Pourtant, le pays n’est responsable que « de 0,00027 % du total des émissions depuis 1850. » Au Guatemala, l’ouragan Eta ainsi que les inondations fin 2020 ont provoqué le déplacement de 339 000 personnes. Le pays « a été responsable de seulement 0,026 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre ». Nombre de ces migrants Guatémaltèques tentent désormais d’atteindre les États-Unis, responsables à eux seuls de 30,1 % des émissions depuis 1850.

    Pourtant, parmi les pays riches, « les stratégies nationales de #sécurité_climatique, depuis le début des années 2000, ont massivement présenté les migrants comme des « menaces » et non comme les victimes d’une injustice », indique la synthèse du rapport. Le 11 septembre 2001, en particulier, a accéléré la tendance. Qui s’est maintenue : les budgets de militarisation des frontières ont augmenté de 29 % entre 2013 et 2018. Une orientation politique mais aussi financière, donc, saluée par l’industrie de la sécurité et des frontières.
    Taux de croissance annuel : 5,8 %

    « Des prévisions de 2019 de ResearchAndMarkets.com annonçaient que le marché de la sécurité intérieure des États allait passer de 431 milliards de dollars en 2018 à 606 milliards en 2024, avec un taux de croissance annuel de 5,8 % », indique le rapport. Une des raisons majeures invoquée étant « l’augmentation des catastrophes naturelles liées au changement climatique ». Il cite également la sixième entreprise mondiale en termes de vente de matériel militaire, Raytheon. Pour elle, l’augmentation de la demande pour ses « produits et services militaires […] est le résultat du changement climatique ».

    Transnational Institute, qui travaille sur cette industrie depuis un certain temps, a ainsi calculé qu’aux États-Unis, entre 2008 et 2020, les administrations de l’immigration et des frontières « ont passé plus de 105 000 contrats d’une valeur de 55 milliards de dollars avec des entreprises privées. » Si le mur de Trump a défrayé la chronique, « Biden n’est pas mieux », avertit Nick Buxton. « Pour financer sa campagne, il a reçu plus d’argent de l’industrie de la sécurité des frontières que Trump. »

    L’Union européenne aussi a droit à son lobbying. « Ces entreprises sont présentes dans des groupes de travail de haut niveau, avec des officiels de l’UE. Ils se rencontrent aussi dans les salons comme celui de Milipol », décrit Nick Buxton.

    #Pétrole et sécurité partagent « le même intérêt à ne pas lutter contre le changement climatique »

    Le rapport souligne également les liens de cette industrie de la sécurité avec celle du pétrole. En résumé, il décrit comment les majors du pétrole sécurisent leurs installations en faisant appel aux géants de la sécurité. Mais il souligne aussi que les conseils d’administration des entreprises des deux secteurs ont beaucoup de membres en commun. Des liens concrets qui illustrent, selon Nick Buxton, le fait que « ces deux secteurs ont le même intérêt à ne pas lutter contre le changement climatique. L’industrie pétrolière car cela va à l’encontre de son business model. L’industrie de la sécurité car l’instabilité provoquée par la crise climatique lui apporte des bénéfices. »

    Autant d’argent dépensé à protéger les énergies fossiles et à refouler les migrants, qui « ne fait que maintenir et générer d’immenses souffrances inutiles » dénonce le rapport. Les pays riches avaient promis d’atteindre 100 milliards de financements climatiques annuels pour les pays en développement d’ici 2020. En 2019, ils n’en étaient qu’à 79,6 milliards selon l’OCDE. Et encore, ce chiffre est très surévalué, estime l’ONG Oxfam, qui en déduisant les prêts et les surévaluations aboutit à environ trois fois moins. C’est cette estimation que les experts du Transnational Institute ont adoptée.

    « Il est évident que les pays les plus riches n’assument pas du tout leur responsabilité dans la crise climatique », conclut donc le rapport. Il prône des investissements dans la lutte contre le changement climatique, et des aides pour que les pays les plus pauvres puissent gérer dignement les populations contraintes de se déplacer. À l’inverse, le choix de la militarisation est « une stratégie vouée à l’échec, même du point de vue de l’intérêt personnel des pays les plus riches, car elle accélère les processus d’instabilité et de migration induite par le climat dont ils s’alarment. »

    https://reporterre.net/L-industrie-de-la-securite-tire-profit-de-la-crise-climatique

    #complexe_militaro-industriel #climat

    –-

    déjà signalé ici par @kassem
    https://seenthis.net/messages/934692

    • Global Climate Wall. How the world’s wealthiest nations prioritise borders over climate action

      This report finds that the world’s biggest emitters of green house gases are spending, on average, 2.3 times as much on arming their borders as they are on climate finance. This figure is as high as 15 times as much for the worst offenders. This “Global Climate Wall” aims to seal off powerful countries from migrants, rather than addressing the causes of displacement.

      Executive summary

      The world’s wealthiest countries have chosen how they approach global climate action – by militarising their borders. As this report clearly shows, these countries – which are historically the most responsible for the climate crisis – spend more on arming their borders to keep migrants out than on tackling the crisis that forces people from their homes in the first place.

      This is a global trend, but seven countries in particular – responsible for 48% of the world’s historic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – collectively spent at least twice as much on border and immigration enforcement (more than $33.1 billion) as on climate finance ($14.4 billion) between 2013 and 2018.

      These countries have built a ‘Climate Wall’ to keep out the consequences of climate change, in which the bricks come from two distinct but related dynamics: first, a failure to provide the promised climate finance that could help countries mitigate and adapt to climate change; and second, a militarised response to migration that expands border and surveillance infrastructure. This provides booming profits for a border security industry but untold suffering for refugees and migrants who make increasingly dangerous – and frequently deadly – journeys to seek safety in a climate-changed world.
      Key findings:

      Climate-induced migration is now a reality

      - Climate change is increasingly a factor behind displacement and migration. This may be because of a particular catastrophic event, such as a hurricane or a flash flood, but also when the cumulative impacts of drought or sea-level rise, for example, gradually make an area uninhabitable and force entire communities to relocate.
      – The majority of people who become displaced, whether climate-induced or not, remain in their own country, but a number will cross international borders and this is likely to increase as climate-change impacts on entire regions and ecosystems.
      – Climate-induced migration takes place disproportionately in low-income countries and intersects with and accelerates with many other causes for displacement. It is shaped by the systemic injustice that creates the situations of vulnerability, violence, precarity and weak social structures that force people to leave their homes.

      Rich countries spend more on militarising their borders than on providing climate finance to enable the poorest countries to help migrants

      – Seven of the biggest emitters of GHGs – the United States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Australia – collectively spent at least twice as much on border and immigration enforcement (more than $33.1 billion) as on climate finance ($14.4 billion) between 2013 and 2018.1
      - Canada spent 15 times more ($1.5 billion compared to around $100 million); Australia 13 times more ($2.7 billion compared to $200 million); the US almost 11 times more ($19.6 billion compared to $1.8 billion); and the UK nearly two times more ($2.7 billion compared to $1.4 billion).
      - Border spending by the seven biggest GHG emitters rose by 29% between 2013 and 2018. In the US, spending on border and immigration enforcement tripled between 2003 and 2021. In Europe, the budget for the European Union (EU) border agency, Frontex, has increased by a whopping 2763% since its founding in 2006 up to 2021.
      - This militarisation of borders is partly rooted in national climate security strategies that since the early 2000s have overwhelmingly painted migrants as ‘threats’ rather than victims of injustice. The border security industry has helped promote this process through well-oiled political lobbying, leading to ever more contracts for the border industry and increasingly hostile environments for refugees and migrants.
      - Climate finance could help mitigate the impacts of climate change and help countries adapt to this reality, including supporting people who need to relocate or to migrate abroad. Yet the richest countries have failed even to keep their pledges of meagre $100 billion a year in climate finance. The latest figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported $79.6 billion in total climate finance in 2019, but according to research published by Oxfam International, once over-reporting, and loans rather than grants are taken into account, the true volume of climate finance may be less than half of what is reported by developed countries.
      – Countries with the highest historic emissions are fortifying their borders, while those with lowest are the hardest hit by population displacement. Somalia, for example, is responsible for 0.00027% of total emissions since 1850 but had more than one million people (6% of the population) displaced by a climate-related disaster in 2020.

      The border security industry is profiteering from climate change

      - The border security industry is already profiting from the increased spending on border and immigration enforcement and expects even more profits from anticipated instability due to climate change. A 2019 forecast by ResearchAndMarkets.com predicted that the Global Homeland Security and Public Safety Market would grow from $431 billion in 2018 to $606 billion in 2024, and a 5.8% annual growth rate. According to the report, one factor driving this is ‘climate warming-related natural disasters growth’.
      – Top border contractors boast of the potential to increase their revenue from climate change. Raytheon says ‘demand for its military products and services as security concerns may arise as results of droughts, floods, and storm events occur as a result of climate change’. Cobham, a British company that markets surveillance systems and is one of the main contractors for Australia’s border security, says that ‘changes to countries [sic] resources and habitability could increase the need for border surveillance due to population migration’.
      – As TNI has detailed in many other reports in its Border Wars series,2 the border security industry lobbies and advocates for border militarisation and profits from its expansion.

      The border security industry also provides security to the oil industry that is one of main contributors to the climate crisis and even sit on each other’s executive boards

      - The world’s 10 largest fossil fuel firms also contract the services of the same firms that dominate border security contracts. Chevron (ranked the world’s number 2) contracts with Cobham, G4S, Indra, Leonardo, Thales; Exxon Mobil (ranking 4) with Airbus, Damen, General Dynamics, L3Harris, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin; BP (6) with Airbus, G4S, Indra, Lockheed Martin, Palantir, Thales; and Royal Dutch Shell (7) with Airbus, Boeing, Damen, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Thales, G4S.
      – Exxon Mobil, for example, contracted L3Harris (one of the top 14 US border contractors) to provide ‘maritime domain awareness’ of its drilling in the Niger delta in Nigeria, a region which has suffered tremendous population displacement due to environmental contamination. BP has contracted with Palantir, a company that controversially provides surveillance software to agencies like the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to develop a ‘repository of all operated wells historical and real time drilling data’. Border contractor G4S has a relatively long history of protecting oil pipelines, including the Dakota Access pipeline in the US.
      - The synergy between fossil fuel companies and top border security contractors is also seen by the fact that executives from each sector sit on each other’s boards. At Chevron, for example, the former CEO and Chairman of Northrop Grumman, Ronald D. Sugar and Lockheed Martin’s former CEO Marilyn Hewson are on its board. The Italian oil and gas company ENI has Nathalie Tocci on its board, previously a Special Advisor to EU High Representative Mogherini from 2015 to 2019, who helped draft the EU Global Strategy that led to expanding the externalisation of EU borders to third countries.

      This nexus of power, wealth and collusion between fossil fuel firms and the border security industry shows how climate inaction and militarised responses to its consequences increasingly work hand in hand. Both industries profit as ever more resources are diverted towards dealing with the consequences of climate change rather than tackling its root causes. This comes at a terrible human cost. It can be seen in the rising death toll of refugees, deplorable conditions in many refugee camps and detention centres, violent pushbacks from European countries, particularly those bordering the Mediterranean, and from the US, in countless cases of unnecessary suffering and brutality. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) calculates that 41,000 migrants died between 2014 and 2020, although this is widely accepted to be a significant underestimate given that many lives are lost at sea and in remote deserts as migrants and refugees take increasingly dangerous routes to safety.

      The prioritisation of militarised borders over climate finance ultimately threatens to worsen the climate crisis for humanity. Without sufficient investment to help countries mitigate and adapt to climate change, the crisis will wreak even more human devastation and uproot more lives. But, as this report concludes, government spending is a political choice, meaning that different choices are possible. Investing in climate mitigation in the poorest and most vulnerable countries can support a transition to clean energy – and, alongside deep emission cuts by the biggest polluting nations – give the world a chance to keep temperatures below 1.5°C increase since 1850, or pre-industrial levels. Supporting people forced to leave their homes with the resources and infrastructure to rebuild their lives in new locations can help them adapt to climate change and to live in dignity. Migration, if adequately supported, can be an important means of climate adaptation.

      Treating migration positively requires a change of direction and greatly increased climate finance, good public policy and international cooperation, but most importantly it is the only morally just path to support those suffering a crisis they played no part in creating.

      https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall

  • Smoking guns. How European arms exports are forcing millions from their homes

    The #nexus between the arms trade and forced displacement is rarely explored and the role of European arms trade policies that facilitate gross human rights violations in third countries is often absent from displacement and migration studies. This report joins the dots between Europe’s arms trade and forced displacement and migration.

    Key findings

    - Arms and military equipment manufactured and licensed in Europe and sold to third countries provokes forced displacement and migration. This arms trade is motivated by how highly lucrative the industry is and current control and monitoring mechanisms facilitate rather than curtail problematic licensing and exportation.

    – The arms trade is political and is driven by profit but is under-regulated. Although other sectors, such as food and agriculture, do not undermine the fundamental right to life and other human rights in the same way that the arms trade does, they are far more stringently regulated.

    - It is possible to methodically trace arms, military equipment and technology, from the point of origin and export to where these were eventually used, and document their devastating impact on the local population. The report confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that European arms are directly used not to defend populations or to enhance local or regional security as is often claimed, but to destabilise entire countries and regions.

    - The arms industry is involved in clear violations of non-transfer clauses and end user agreements (EUAs) despite a supposedly robust system of controls. The evidence shows that once arms are traded, and although they may be traced, it is virtually impossible to control how they may eventually be used. Furthermore, although importing countries were known to have breached EUAs, EU member states continued to sell them arms and military equipment.

    - Regardless of whether arms were exported to official state security forces or were eventually used by non-state armed actors, or whether EUAs and other control mechanisms were respected, the result was the same – European arms were used in military operations that led to destabilisation and resulting forced displacement and migration. The destabilisation, facilitated by arms supplied by Europe, then contributed to Europe hugely expanding its border security apparatus to respond to the apparent threat posed by refugees attempting to arrive and seek asylum.

    - European countries are among the top exporters of lethal arms equipment worldwide, comprising approximately 26% of global arms exports since 2015. The top five European arms exporters are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – together accounting for 22% of global arms exports in the 2016–2020 period.

    - Arms exports from Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania have soared in recent years, a large proportion of which is exported to West Asian countries. For example, before 2012, Croatia exported ammunition worth less than €1 million a year, but with the start of the Syrian war this surged every year to reach €82 million in 2016. The European Parliament called on Bulgaria and Romania to stop arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the US (if there was a risk that these arms may be diverted), so far to no avail.

    – In Syria an estimated 13 million people need humanitarian assistance and more than half of the population remains displaced from their homes – including 6.6 million refugees living in neighbouring countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, who subsequently attempt to flee to Europe in a reverse movement to the arms that displaced them. Another 6.7 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Syria.

    –-

    Five case studies document that:

    Italian T-129 ATAK helicopter components were exported to Turkey and used in 2018 and 2019 in two attacks in the district of Afrin in Northern Syria as part of Operation Olive Branch and in Operation Peace Spring on the Turkish–Syrian border. According to UN figures, 98,000 people were displaced during the Afrin offensive between January and March 2018, while 180,000, of whom 80,000 were children, were displaced, in October 2019 as a result of Operation Peace Spring.

    Bulgaria exported missile tubes and rockets to Saudi Arabia and the US, which eventually ended up in the hands of IS fighters in Iraq. The equipment was diverted and used in Ramadi and the surrounding region, where the International Organisation for Migration reported that from April 2015, following the outbreak of the Ramadi crisis, over half a million people were displaced from Anbar province, of which Ramadi is the capital city, while 85,470 were displaced specifically from Ramadi City between November 2015 and February 2016. Around 80% of all housing in Ramadi was severely damaged after the offensive. In 2017 another missile tube originating in Bulgaria was found to have been used by IS forces in the town of Bartella, located to the east of Mosul. At least 200,000 people from minority groups were displaced from the greater Mosul area between 2014 and January 2017. By July 2019, over two years after military operations had ended in Mosul, there were still over 300,000 people displaced from the city.

    British, French, and German components and production capacity, including missiles, missile batteries, and a bomb rack, were exported to Turkey, where they were mounted on Turkish-made drones and exported to Azerbaijan. These same drones, loaded with European-manufactured arms components, were used in the 44-day conflict in Naghorno- Karabakh, which provoked the forced displacement of half of the region’s Armenian population – approximately 90,000 people.

    Between 2012 and 2015 Bulgaria exported assault rifles, large-calibre artillery systems, light machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) national police and military. The conflict in DRC is one of the world’s longest, yet Europe continues to supply arms that are used to perpetrate gross human rights violations. In 2017, Serbia exported 920 assault rifles and 114 light machine guns that were originally manufactured in Bulgaria. That same year, 2,166,000 people were forcibly displaced, making it one of the worst since the conflict began. Specifically, Bulgarian weapons were in use in North Kivu in 2017 coinciding with the forced displacement of 523,000 people.

    At least four Italian Bigliani-class patrol boats were donated to Libya and used by its coastguard to forcibly pull back and detain migrants who were fleeing its shores. In 2019, the Libyan coastguard mounted a machine gun on at least one of these boats and used it in the internal conflict against the Libyan National Army. Many of those fleeing Libya had most likely already fled other conflicts in other African and West Asian countries that may have purchased or were in receipt of European arms, so that at each step along their journey from displacement to migration, the European arms trade is making massive profits by firstly displacing them, and then later deterring and pushing them back.

    The arms companies we identified in these case studies include: Airbus (Franco-German), ARSENAL (Bulgaria), BAE Systems (UK), Baykar Makina (Turkey), EDO MBM (UK), Intermarine (Italy), Kintex (Bulgaria), Leonardo (Italy), Roketsan (Turkey), SB Aerospatiale (France), TDW (Germany), Turkish Aerospace Industry (Turkey), and Vazovski Mashinostroitelni Zavodi ЕAD (Bulgaria).

    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/smoking-guns
    #rapport #tni
    #armes #commerce_d'armes #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Europe #armée #militaire #industrie_de_l'armement #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #France #Allemagne #Italie #UK #Angleterre #Espagne #Bulgarie #Croatie #Roumanie #Arabie_Saoudite #Syrie #T-129_ATAK #Turquie #Operation_Olive_Branch #Operation_Peace_Spring #Irak #Ramadi #Bartella #Azerbaïjan #arméniens #Congo #RDC #République_démocratique_du_Congo #Serbie #Kivu #Nord_Kivu #Bigliani #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyiens #complexe_militaro-industriel
    #Airbus #ARSENAL #BAE_Systems #Baykar_Makina #EDO_MBM #Intermarine #Kintex #Leonardo #Roketsan #SB_Aerospatiale #TDW #Turkish_Aerospace_Industry #Vazovski_Mashinostroitelni_Zavodi_ЕAD

  • Attivarsi ovunque contro le frontiere assassine

    Guido Viale, presidente dell’#Osservatorio_solidarietà della #Carta_di_Milano, ha aperto i lavori della conferenza Solidarietà attraverso i confini, il 25 marzo a Fa’ la cosa giusta, illustrando semplicemente che la viva voce dei tanti protagonisti presenti avrebbe dato il senso dell’iniziativa oggi ancora più importante dopo il sequestro della nave di Proactivia Openarms operato in dispregio delle leggi italiane e internazionali come atto intimidatorio contro chi nel pieno rispetto delle leggi e dei Diritti umani è impegnato per salvare vite umane che i governi della Fortezza Europa, Italia in testa, vorrebbero si concludessero senza clamore in fondo al mare nostrum. Dopo una sintetica illustrazione di Daniela Padoan delle attività dell’Osservatorio solidarietà e una poesia di Ahmed, letta da Denise Rogers, una ragazza argentina che ha dato voce ai tanti migranti morti, si sono susseguite le testimonianze da Ventimiglia, Bolzano, Lesbo, Atene, Como formando un quadro tragico della situazione ma dimostrando anche che c’è un’Europa della solidarietà e dei diritti che lotta contro leggi e governi custodi implacabili di frontiere assassine.

    https://ecoinformazioni.wordpress.com/2018/03/25/attivarsi-ovunque-contro-le-frntiere-assassine

    #solidarité #mer #terre #Méditerranée #Alpes #frontière_sud-alpine #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #délit_de_solidarité #sauvetage

    J’aimerais ici reprendre les propos de Charles Heller, qui ont été publié dans une interview dans Libé :

    Ceux qui ont imposé le contrôle des frontières de l’espace européen utilisent le terme de #integrated_border_management, la « #gestion_intégrée_des_frontières » : il ne suffit pas de contrôler la limite de la frontière territoriale, il faut contrôler avant, sur et après la frontière. La violence du contrôle s’exerce sur toute la trajectoire des migrants. De la même manière, les pratiques de solidarité, plus ou moins politisées, s’exercent sur l’ensemble de leur trajectoire. On pourrait imaginer une « #solidarité_intégrée », qui n’est pas chapeautée par une organisation mais qui de fait opère, petit bout par petit bout, sur les trajectoires.

    https://www.pacte-grenoble.fr/sites/pacte/files/files/liberation_20171215_15-12-2017-extrait.pdf
    cc @isskein

    • Crimes of solidarity. Migration and containment through rescue

      ‘Solidarity is not a crime.’ This is a slogan that has circulated widely across Europe in response to legal prosecutions and municipal decrees, which, especially in Italy and France, have been intended to act against citizens who provide logistical and humanitarian support to transiting migrants. Such criminalisation of individual acts of solidarity and coordinated platforms of refugee support is undertaken both in the name of national and European laws, in opposition to the facilitation of irregular entries, and through arbitrary police measures. In Calais on the French coast, for example, locals have been prohibited from allowing migrants to take showers in their homes or to recharge their mobile phones, while in the Roya Valley at the Italian-French border, many locals have been placed on trial, including the now famous ploughman Cedric Herrou. Responding to accusations that he has been one of the main facilitators along the French-Italian underground migrant route, Herrou has replied that ‘it is the State that is acting illegally, not me’, referring to the French State’s own human rights violations. 1

      ‘Crimes of solidarity’, to use the expression employed by activists and human rights organisations, are defined and prosecuted according to the 2002 EU Directive which prevents and penalises ‘the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence’ of migrants. In both Italy and France there are national laws that criminalise the facilitation and the support of ‘irregular’ migration; what in France activists call ‘délit de solidarité’. Notably, citizens who help migrants to cross national borders are prosecuted in Italy under the same law that punishes smugglers who take money from migrants. In France, the ‘humanitarian clause’, which exempts from sanctions citizens who support migrants whose life, dignity and physical integrity is at risk, is often disregarded. Nonetheless, the expression ‘crimes of solidarity’ should not lead us to overstate the legal dimension of what is at stake in this. Indeed, the ‘crime’ that is posited here goes well beyond the legal boundaries of European law, as well as national ones, and acquires an ethical and political dimension. In particular, the criminalisation of individuals and groups who are facilitating the crossing of migrants, without making a profit from doing so, opens up the critical question of exactly ‘who is a smuggler?’ today. Significantly, the very definition of ‘smuggling’ in European and international documents is a fairly slippery one, as the boundaries between supporting migrants for one’s own financial benefit or for ‘humanitarian’ reasons are consistently blurred. 2

      In a 1979 interview, Michel Foucault stressed the potential strategic role that might be played by ‘rights’ to ‘mark out for a government its limit’. 3 In this way, Foucault gestured towards an extralegal conceptualisation and use of rights as actual limits to be set against governments. In the case of crimes of solidarity, we are confronted less, however, with the mobilisation of rights as limits to states’ action than with what Foucault calls ‘infra-legal illegalisms’; 4 namely, with practices of an active refusal of states’ arbitrary measures that are taken in the name of migration containment, regardless of whether or not the latter are legally grounded or in violation of the law.

      NGOs and independent organisations that undertake search and rescue activities to save migrants in the Mediterranean have also been under attack, accused of collaborating with smuggling networks, of constituting a pull-factor for migrants, and of ferrying them to Europe. Three years after the end of the military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum, which was deployed by the Italian Navy to save migrant lives at sea, the Mediterranean has become the site of a sort of naval battle in which the obligation to rescue migrants in distress is no longer the priority. The fight against smugglers and traffickers has taken central stage, and the figure of the shipwrecked refugee has consequently vanished little by little. Today, the war on smugglers is presented as the primary goal and, at the same time, as a strategy to protect migrants from ‘traffickers’. The criminalisation of NGOs, like Doctors without Borders, Save the Children and SOS Mediterranee, and of independent actors, including Sea-Eye, Sea-Watch, Jugend-Rettet and Arms Pro-Activa, who conduct search and rescue operations, started with the simultaneous implementation of the Libyan mobile sea-barrier, which charges the Libyan Coast Guard with responsibility for intercepting migrant vessels and bringing them back to Libya. As a consequence of this agreement, being rescued means being captured and contained.

      Following the signing of a new bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy in March 2017, in July, the Italian government put pressure on one of the three Libyan governments (the one led by Fayez al-Serraj) demanding better cooperation in intercepting and returning migrants who head to Europe by sea. In order to accelerate this process, Italy sent two Navy ships into Libyan national waters, with the purpose of ‘strengthening Libyan sovereignty by helping the country to keep control of its national waters’. 5

      Far from being a smooth negotiation, however, the Libyan government led by General Khalifa Haftar threatened to shoot in the direction of the Italian ships if they were to violate Libya’s sovereignty by entering their national territory. 6

      Overall, the ‘migration deal’ has been made by the EU and Italy in the context of different asymmetric relationships: on the one hand, with a ‘rogue state’ such as Libya, characterised by a fragmented sovereignty, and on the other, with non-state actors, and more precisely with the same smugglers that Europe has supposedly declared war on. Indeed, as various journalistic investigations have proved, Italy has paid Libyan militias and smuggling networks to block migrants’ departures temporarily in exchange for fewer controls on other smuggling channels, specifically those involving drugs and weapons. In this way, smugglers have been incorporated into a politics of migration containment. Governing migration through and with smugglers has become fully part of the EU’s political agenda. As such, a critical appraisal of the criminalisation of migrant smuggling requires undoing the existing narrative of a war on smugglers, as well as challenging those analyses that simply posit smugglers as the straightforward enemies of society.

      The naval battle in the Mediterranean has not been an exclusive affair of Italy and Libya. On the contrary, it is within this type of geopolitical context that the escalating criminalisation of sea rescue is more broadly taking place. 7 On July 31, at the request of the European Commission, the Italian Home Office released a ‘Code of Conduct’ that NGOs have been asked to sign if they want to continue search and rescue activities. Given that the code of conduct imposes on NGOs the obligation to have armed judicial police on board, 8 some organisations, including Doctors without Borders, Sea Watch and Jugend Rettet, have refused to sign, arguing that through the enforcement of the Code of Conduct, and under pressure from the European Commission, Italy has turned towards a militarisation of humanitarianism and of independent actors. As a consequence of the refusal to sign, their ships have been prevented from docking in Italian ports and the rescuers of the Jugend Rettet are currently on trial, accused of collaborating with Libyan smugglers. On August 11, Libya traced new virtual restrictive sea borders for NGOs, declaring that search and rescue ships will not be allowed to get closer than one hundred miles from the Libyan coast. The humanitarian scene of rescue has been shrunk.

      In such a political context, two interrelated aspects emerging from the multiplication of attacks against refugee support activities and against search and rescue operations are worth considering. The first concerns a need to unpack what is now meant by the very expression ‘crime of solidarity’ within the framework of this shift towards the priority of fighting smugglers over saving migrants. This requires an engagement with the biopolitical predicaments that sustain a debate centered on the question of to what extent, and up to which point, rescuing migrants at sea is deemed legitimate. The second, related point concerns the modes of containment through rescue that are currently at work in the Mediterranean. One consequence of this is that the reframing of the debate around migrant deaths at sea has lowered the level of critique of a contemporary politics of migration more generally: the fight against smugglers has become the unquestioned and unyielding point of agreement, supported across more or less the entire European political arena.

      The criminalisation of NGOs, accused of ferrying migrants to Europe, should be read in partial continuity with the attack against other forms of support given to migrants in many European countries. The use of the term ‘solidarity’ is helpful in this context insofar as it helps to highlight both actions undertaken by citizens in support of refugees and, more importantly, the transversal alliances between migrants and non-migrants. In fact, acting in solidarity entails supporting migrant struggles – for example, as struggles for movement or struggles to stay in a certain place – more than it does acting in order to save or bring help to them. 9 As Chandra Mohanty argues, practices of solidarity are predicated upon the recognition of ‘common differences’, 10 and in this sense they entail a certain shared political space and the awareness of being governed by the same mechanisms of precaritisation and exploitation. 11 In other words, solidarity does not at all imply a simple politics of identity, but requires building transversal alliances and networks in support of certain struggles. The reduction of migrants to bodies to be fished out of the water, simultaneous with the vanishing of the figure of the refugee, preemptively denies the possibility of establishing a common ground in struggling for freedom of movement and equal access to mobility.

      Despite the many continuities and similarities between the criminalisation of refugee support activities on the mainland and at sea, if we shift the attention to the Mediterranean Sea, what is specifically at stake here is a biopolitics of rescuing or ‘letting drown’. Under attack in the Mediterranean scene of rescue and drowning are what could be termed crimes of humanitarianism; or, that is, crimes of rescue. Humanitarianism as such, precisely in its acts of taking migrants out of the sea through independent search and rescue operations that exercise an active refusal of the geographical restrictions imposed by nation states, has become an uncomfortable and unbearable mode of intervention in the Mediterranean.
      Geographies of ungrievability

      The criminalisation of alliances and initiatives in support of migrants’ transit should not lead us to imagine a stark opposition between ‘good humanitarians’, on the one side, and bad military actors or national authorities, on the other. On the contrary, it is important to keep in mind the many entanglements between military and humanitarian measures, as well as the role played by military actors, such as the Navy, in performing tasks like rescuing migrants at sea that could fall under the category of what Cuttitta terms ‘military-humanitarianism’. 12 Moreover, the Code of Conduct enforced by the Italian government actually strengthens the divide between ‘good’ NGOs and ‘treacherous’ humanitarian actors. Thus, far from building a cohesive front, the obligation to sign the Code of Conduct produced a split among those NGOs involved in search and rescue operations.

      In the meantime, the figure of the refugee at sea has arguably faded away: sea rescue operations are in fact currently deployed with the twofold task of not letting migrants drown and of fighting smugglers, which de facto entails undermining the only effective channels of sea passage for migrants across the Mediterranean. From a military-humanitarian approach that, under Mare Nostrum, considered refugees at sea as shipwrecked lives, the unconditionality of rescue is now subjected to the aim of dismantling the migrants’ logistics of crossing. At the same time, the migrant drowning at sea is ultimately not seen any longer as a refugee, i.e. as a subject of rights who is seeking protection, but as a life to be rescued in the technical sense of being fished out of the sea. In other words, the migrant at sea is the subject who eventually needs to be rescued, but not thereby placed into safety by granting them protection and refuge in Europe. What happens ‘after landing’ is something not considered within the framework of a biopolitics of rescuing and of letting drown. 13 Indeed, the latter is not only about saving (or not saving) migrants at sea, but also, in a more proactive way, about aiming at human targets. In manhunting, Gregoire Chamayou explains, ‘the combat zone tends to be reduced to the body of the enemy’. 14 Yet who is the human target of migrant hunts in the Mediterranean? It is not only the migrant in distress at sea, who in fact is rescued and captured at the same time; rather, migrants and smugglers are both considered the ‘prey’ of contemporary military-humanitarianism.

      Public debate in Europe about the criminalisation of NGOs and sea rescue is characterised by a polarisation between those who posit the non-negotiable obligation to rescue migrants and those who want to limit rescue operations in the name of regaining control over migrant arrivals, stemming the flows and keeping them in Libya. What remains outside the order of this discourse is the shrinking and disappearing figure of the refugee, who is superseded by the figure of the migrant to be taken out of the sea.

      Relatedly, the exclusive focus on the Mediterranean Sea itself contributes to strengthening geographies of ungrievability. By this I mean those produced hierarchies of migrant deaths that are essentially dependent on their more or less consistent geographic distance from Europe’s spotlight and, at the same time, on the assumption of shipwrecked migrants as the most embodied refugee subjectivities. More precisely, the recent multiplication of bilateral agreements between EU member states and African countries has moved back deadly frontiers from the Mediterranean Sea to the Libyan and Niger desert. As a consequence, migrants who do not die at sea but who manage to arrive in Libya are kept in Libyan prisons.
      Containment through rescue

      On 12 August 2017, Doctors without Borders decided to stop search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean after Libya enforced its sea-barrier by forbidding NGOs to go closer than about one hundred miles from the Libyan coast, and threatening to shoot at those ships that sought to violate the ban. In the space of two days, even Save the Children and the independent German organisation Sea-Eye declared that they would also suspend search and rescue activities. The NGOs’ Mediterranean exit has been presented by humanitarian actors as a refusal to be coopted into the EU-Libyan enforcement of a sea barrier against migrants. Yet, in truth, both the Italian government and the EU have been rather obviously pleased by the humanitarians’ withdrawal from the Mediterranean scene of drown and rescue.

      Should we therefore understand the ongoing criminalisation of NGOs as the attempt to fully block migrant flows? Does it indicate a return from the staging of a ‘good scene of rescue’ back to an overt militarisation of the Mediterranean? The problem is that such an analytical angle risks, first, corroborating the misleading opposition between military intervention and humanitarianism in the field of migration governmentality. Second, it re-instantiates the image of a Fortress Europe, while disregarding the huge ‘migration industry’ that is flourishing both in Libya, with the smuggling-and-detention market, and on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean. 15 With the empty space left by the NGOs at sea, the biopolitics of rescuing or letting drown has been reshaped by new modes of containment through rescue: migrants who manage to leave the Libyan coast are ‘rescued’ – that is, intercepted and blocked – by the Libyan Coast Guard and taken back to Libya. Yet containment should not be confused with detention nor with a total blockage of migrants’ movements and departures. Rather, by ‘containment’ I refer to the substantial disruptions and decelerations of migrant movements, as well as to the effects of more or less temporary spatial confinement. Modes of containment through rescue were already in place, to some extent, when migrants used to be ‘ferried’ to Italy in a smoother way, by the Navy or by NGOs. Indeed, from the moment of rescue onward, migrants were transferred and channelled into the Hotspot System, where many were denied international protection and, thus, rendered ‘illegal’ and constructed as deportable subjects. 16 The distinction between intercepting vessels sailing to Europe and saving migrants in distress has become blurred: with the enforcement of the Libyan sea barrier, rescue and capture can hardly be separated any longer. In this sense, visibility can be a trap: if images taken by drones or radars are sent to Italian authorities before migrants enter international waters, the Italian Coast Guard has to inform Libyan authorities who are in charge of rescuing migrants and thus taking them back to Libya.

      This entails a spatial rerouting of military-humanitarianism, in which migrants are paradoxically rescued to Libya. Rather than vanishing from the Mediterranean scene, the politics of rescue, conceived in terms of not letting people die, has been reshaped as a technique of capture. At the same time, the geographic orientation of humanitarianism has been inverted: migrants are ‘saved’ and dropped in Libya. Despite the fact that various journalistic investigations and UN reports have shown that after being intercepted, rescued and taken back to Libya, migrants are kept in detention in abysmal conditions and are blackmailed by smugglers, 17 the public discussion remains substantially polarised around the questions of deaths at sea. Should migrants be saved unconditionally? Or, should rescue be secondary to measures against smugglers and balanced against the risk of ‘migrant invasion’? A hierarchy of the spaces of death and confinement is in part determined by the criterion of geographical proximity, which contributes to the sidelining of mechanisms of exploitation and of a politics of letting die that takes place beyond the geopolitical borders of Europe. The biopolitical hold over migrants becomes apparent at sea: practices of solidarity are transformed into a relationship between rescuers and drowned. 18

      The criminalisation of refugee support activities cannot be separated from the increasing criminalisation of refugees as such: not only those who are labelled and declared illegal as ‘economic migrants’, but also those people who are accorded the status of refugees. Both are targets of restrictive and racialised measures of control. The migrant at sea is presented as part of a continuum of ‘tricky subjectivities’ 19 – which include the smuggler, the potential terrorist and the refugee – and as both a ‘risky subject’ and a ‘subject at risk’ at the same time. 20 In this regard, it is noticeable that the criminalisation of refugees as such has been achieved precisely through the major role played by the figure of the smuggler. In the EU’s declared fight against smuggling networks, migrants at sea are seen not only as shipwrecked lives to be rescued but also as potential fake refugees, as concealed terrorists or as traffickers. At the same time, the fight against smugglers has been used to enact a further shift in the criminalisation of refugees, which goes beyond the alleged dangerousness of migrants. Indeed, in the name of the war against the ‘illegal’ smuggling economy, as a shared priority of both left- and right-wing political parties in Europe, the strategy of letting migrants drown comes, in the end, to be justified. As Doctors without Borders have pointed out, ‘by declaring Libya a safe country, European governments are ultimately pushing forward the humanitarianisation of what appears at the threshold of the inhuman.’ 21

      The migrant at sea, who is the subject of humanitarianism par excellence, is no longer an individual to be saved at all costs, but rather the object of thorny calculations about the tolerated number of migrant arrivals and the migrant-money exchange with Libya. Who is (in) danger(ous)? The legal prosecutions and the political condemnation of ‘crimes of rescue’ and of ‘crimes of solidarity’ bring to the fore the undesirability of refugees as refugees. This does not depend so much on a logic of social dangerousness as such, but, rather, on the practices of spatial disobedience that they enact, against the restrictions imposed by the European Union. Thus, it is precisely the irreducibility of migrants to lives to be rescued that makes the refugee the main figure of a continuum of tricky subjectivities in a time of economic crisis. Yet, a critical engagement with the biopolitics of rescuing and drowning cannot stick to a North-South gaze on Mediterranean migrations. In order not to fall into a Eurocentric (or EU-centric) perspective on asylum, analyses of crimes of solidarity should also be articulated through an inquiry into the Libyan economy of migration and the modes of commodification of migrant bodies, considering what Brett Neilson calls ‘migration as a currency’; 22 that is, as an entity of exchange and as a source of value extraction.

      Crimes of solidarity put in place critical infrastructures to support migrants’ acts of spatial disobedience. These infra-legal crimes shed light on the inadequacy of human rights claims and of the legal framework in a time of hyper-visible and escalating border violence. Crimes of solidarity consist of individual and collective active refusals of states’ interventions, which are specifically carried out at the very edges of the law. In this way, crimes of solidarity manage to undo the biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown by acting beyond the existing scripts of ‘crisis’ and ‘security’. Rather than being ‘rescued’ from the sea or ‘saved’ from smugglers, migrants are supported in their unbearable practices of freedom, unsettling the contemporary hierarchies of lives and populations.
      Notes

      See the interview with Herrou in l’Humanité, accessed 30 September 2017, https://www.humanite.fr/cedric-herrou-cest-letat-qui-est-dans-lillegalite-pas-moi-629732. ^

      Economic profit is an essential dimension of ‘smuggling’, as it is defined by the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). However, it is not in the 2002 EU Council Directive defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. ^

      Michel Foucault, ‘There can’t be societies without uprisings’, trans. Farès Sassine, in Foucault and the Making of Subjects, ed. Laura Cremonesi, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 40. ^

      See Michel Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973, trans. Graham Burchell (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2015). ^

      See ‘Il governo vara la missione navale, prima nave italiana in Libia’, La Stampa, 18 July 2017, http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2017/07/28/ASBvqlaI-parlamento_missione_italiana.shtml. ^

      See, for example, the report in Al Arabiya, 3 August 2017, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/08/03/Haftar-instructs-bombing-Italian-warships-requested-by-Fayez-al-S ^

      See Liz Fekete, ‘Europe: crimes of solidarity’, Race & Class 50:4 (2009), 83 – 97; and Eric Fassin, ‘Le procès politique de la solidarité (3/4): les ONG en Méditerranée’ (2017), Mediapart, accessed 30 September 2017, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/eric-fassin/blog/170817/le-proces-politique-de-la-solidarite-34-les-ong-en-mediterranee ^

      The Code of Conduct can be found at: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/codice_condotta_ong.pdf; see also the transcript by Euronews, 3 August 2017, http://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrant-rescue ^

      Sandro Mezzadra and Mario Neumann, ‘Al di la dell’opposizione tra interesse e identità. Per una politica di classe all’altezza dei tempi’ (2017), Euronomade, accessed September 30 2017, http://www.euronomade.info/?p=9402 ^

      Chandra Mohanty, “‘Under western eyes’’ revisited: feminist solidarity through anticapitalist struggles’, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28:2 (2003), 499-–535. ^

      As Foucault puts it, ‘In the end, we are all governed, and in this sense we all act in solidarity’. Michel Foucault, ‘Face aux gouvernement, les droits de l’homme’, in Dits et Ecrits II (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 1526. ^

      P. Cuttitta, ‘From the Cap Anamur to Mare Nostrum: Humanitarianism and migration controls at the EU’s Maritime borders’, in The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: Enhancing Protection in Times of Emergency, ed. Claudio Matera and Amanda Taylor (The Hague: Asser Institute, 2014), 21–-38. See also Martina Tazzioli, ‘The desultory politics of mobility and the humanitarian-military border in the Mediterranean: Mare Nostrum beyond the sea’, REMHU: Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana 23:44 (2015), 61-–82. ^

      See Lucia Ciabarri and Barbara Pinelli, eds, Dopo l’Approdo: Un racconto per immagini e parole sui richiedenti asilo in Italia (Firenze: Editpress, 2016). ^

      Gregoire Chamayou, ‘The Manhunt Doctrine’, Radical Philosophy 169 (2011), 3. ^

      As a matter of fact, the vessels of the EU naval operation EU Navfor Med and the vessels of the Frontex operation ‘Triton’ were increased in number a few days after the pull-out of the NGOs. ^

      Nicholas De Genova, ‘Spectacles of migrant “illegality”: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36:7 (2013), 1180-–1198. ^

      See, for instance, the UN Report on Libya (2017), accessed 30 September 2017,http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1711623.pdf. ^

      Tugba Basaran, ‘The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of security’, Security Dialogue 46:3 (2015), 205 – 220. ^

      Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, ‘The Biopolitical Warfare on Migrants: EU Naval Force and NATO Operations of migration government in the Mediterranean’, in Critical Military Studies, forthcoming 2017. ^

      Claudia Aradau, ‘The perverse politics of four-letter words: risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking’, Millennium 33:2 (2004), 251-–277. ^

      Interview with Doctors without Borders, Rome, 21 August 2017. ^

      Brett Neilson, ‘The Currency of Migration’, in South Atlantic Quarterly, forthcoming 2018.

      https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/crimes-of-solidarity

      signalé par @isskein sur FB

  • Plus de 150 syndicats européens, partis politiques et associations demandent à l’UE de cesser son financement à l’industrie militaire israélienne
    BDS France - 18 avril 2018
    https://www.bdsfrance.org/plus-de-150-syndicats-europeens-partis-politiques-et-associations-demande

    Pas de financement de l’UE pour l’industrie militaire israélienne

    L’UE doit arrêter de contribuer à la militarisation et aux profits tirés des violations des droits humains dans les territoires palestiniens occupés.

    L’Union européenne subventionne la recherche de l’industrie de la sécurité depuis de nombreuses années. https://www.tni.org/en/publication/market-forces-the-development-of-the-eu-security-industrial-complex. Cet argent des contribuables européens va à des entreprises militaires, parmi lesquelles de nombreuses firmes israéliennes, sous le masque de la recherche et la promesse que technologies et techniques développées seront affectées seulement à des usages civils.

    L’une des voies par lesquelles les entreprises militaires et d’armement ont eu accès aux fonds européens a été l’actuel programme de Recherche et d’Innovation Horizon 2020, qui inclut de nombreuses entreprises militaires israéliennes. Bien que l’UE proclame que ces fonds pour la recherche soient uniquement allés à des projets à applications civiles, nombre de ces projets approuvés sont de nature duale, servant aussi bien les intérêts militaires que civils. Bien d’autres servent des politiques de restriction ou de violation des droits des réfugiés, et militarisent nos sociétés.

    (...)
    #BDS #Embargo

  • Manufactured Consent | Transnational Institute
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/manufactured-consent

    (Via Evgeny Morozov)

    Corporations don’t just shape our politics or economics, they also seek to change public opinion to serve their interests. Which corporations play the biggest role in shaping knowledge and news? What do they fund? Who do they represent? What role have they played in the rise of authoritarian populists? This infographic for State of Power 2017 exposes those ’manufacturing consent’.

  • Commons Transition and P2P | Transnational Institute
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/commons-transition-and-p2p

    The Commons, as an idea and practice, has emerged as a new social, political and economic dynamic. Along with the market and the state, the Commons is a third mode of societal organization. The Commons and Peer to Peer (P2P) together form a system based on the practices and needs of civil society and the environment it inhabits, evolving away from obsolete, centrally planned systems or the competitive dictates of market economies. But what are the Commons and P2P, and how do they interrelate? This Primer explores these concepts.
    Authors
    Michel Bauwens, Vasilis Kostakis, Stacco Troncoso, Ann Marie Utratel
    Projects
    Public Sector Alternatives

    The Commons is a concept and practice that has been steadily gathering increased attention and advocates. Deeply rooted in human history, it’s difficult to settle on a single definition that covers its broad potential for social, economic, cultural and political change. The Commons is now demonstrating its power as a “key ingredient” for change in diverse locations and contexts around the world.

    The P2P Foundation, with its particular focus on the relationship of the Commons and P2P practices, is supporting this Commons transition by helping to share knowledge and develop tools to create common value and facilitate open, participatory input across society. This short primer explains the Commons and P2P, how they interrelate, their movements and trends, and how a Commons transition is poised to reinvigorate work, politics, production, and care, both interpersonal and environmental.

    #communs #P2P #Michel_Bauwens #transition

    • The EU has built #1000_km of border walls since fall of Berlin Wall

      European Union states have built over 1,000km of border walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a new study into Fortress Europe has found.

      Migration researchers have quantified the continent’s anti-immigrant infrastructure and found that the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to 15 by 2017.

      Ten out of 28 member states stretching from Spain to Latvia have now built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 migration panic, when seven new barriers were erected.

      Despite celebrations this year that the Berlin Wall had now been down for longer than it was ever up, Europe has now completed the equivalent length of six Berlin walls during the same period. The barriers are mostly focused on keeping out undocumented migrants and would-be refugees.

      The erection of the barriers has also coincided with the rise of xenophobic parties across the continent, with 10 out of 28 seeing such parties win more than half a million votes in elections since 2010.

      “Europe’s own history shows that building walls to resolve political or social issues comes at an unacceptable cost for liberty and human rights,” Nick Buxton, researcher at the Transnational Institute and editor of the report said.

      “Ultimately it will also harm those who build them as it creates a fortress that no one wants to live in. Rather than building walls, Europe should be investing in stopping the wars and poverty that fuels migration.”

      Tens of thousands of people have died trying to migrate into Europe, with one estimate from June this year putting the figure at over 34,000 since the EU’s foundation in 1993. A total of 3,915 fatalities were recorded in 2017.

      The report also looked at eight EU maritime rescue operations launched by the bloc, seven of which were carried out specifically by the EU’s border agency Frontex.

      The researchers found that none of the operations, all conducted in the Mediterranean, had the rescue of people as their principal goal – with all of them focused on “eliminating criminality in border areas and slowing down the arrival of displaced peoples”.

      Just one, Operation Mare Nostrum, which was carried out by the Italian government, included humanitarian organisations in its fleets. It has since been scrapped and replaced by Frontex’s Operation Triton, which has a smaller budget.

      “These measures lead to refugees and displaced peoples being treated like criminals,” Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, researcher for Delàs Center and co-author of the report said.

      At the June European Council, EU leaders were accused by NGOs of “deliberately condemning vulnerable people to be trapped in Libya, or die at sea”, after they backed the stance of Italy’s populist government and condemned rescue boats operating in the sea.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-border-wall-berlin-migration-human-rights-immigration-borders-a862

    • Building walls. Fear and securitization in the European Union

      This report reveals that member states of the European Union and Schengen Area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls, the equivalent of more than six times the total length of the Berlin Walls, since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. These physical walls are accompanied by even longer ‘maritime walls’, naval operations patrolling the Mediterranean, as well as ‘virtual walls’, border control systems that seek to stop people entering or even traveling within Europe, and control movement of population.
      Authors
      Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Pere Brunet
      In collaboration with
      Stop Wapenhandel, Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau
      Programmes
      War & Pacification

      On November 9th 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, marking what many hoped would be a new era of cooperation and openness across borders. German President Horst Koehler celebrating its demise some years later spoke of an ‘edifice of fear’ replaced by a ‘place of joy’, opening up the possibility of a ‘cooperative global governance which benefits everyone’. 30 years later, the opposite seems to have happened. Edifices of fear, both real and imaginary, are being constructed everywhere fuelling a rise in xenophobia and creating a far more dangerous walled world for refugees fleeing for safety.

      This report reveals that member states of the European Union and Schengen Area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls, the equivalent of more than six times the total length of the Berlin Walls, since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. These physical walls are accompanied by even longer ‘maritime walls’, naval operations patrolling the Mediterranean, as well as ‘virtual walls’, border control systems that seek to stop people entering or even traveling within Europe, and control movement of population. Europe has turned itself in the process into a fortress excluding those outside– and in the process also increased its use of surveillance and militarised technologies that has implications for its citizens within the walls.

      This report seeks to study and analyse the scope of the fortification of Europe as well as the ideas and narratives upon which it is built. This report examines the walls of fear stoked by xenophobic parties that have grown in popularity and exercise an undue influence on European policy. It also examines how the European response has been shaped in the context of post-9/11 by an expanded security paradigm, based on the securitization of social issues. This has transformed Europe’s policies from a more social agenda to one centred on security, in which migrations and the movements of people are considered as threats to state security. As a consequence, they are approached with the traditional security tools: militarism, control, and surveillance.

      Europe’s response is unfortunately not an isolated one. States around the world are answering the biggest global security problems through walls, militarisation, and isolation from other states and the rest of the world. This has created an increasingly hostile world for people fleeing from war and political prosecution.

      The foundations of “Fortress Europe” go back to the Schengen Agreement in 1985, that while establishing freedom of movement within EU borders, demanded more control of its external borders. This model established the idea of a safe interior and an unsafe exterior.

      Successive European security strategies after 2003, based on America’s “Homeland Security” model, turned the border into an element that connects local and global security. As a result, the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became increasingly militarised, and migration was increasingly viewed as a threat.

      Fortress Europe was further expanded with policy of externalization of the border management to third countries in which agreements have been signed with neighbouring countries to boost border control and accept deported migrants. The border has thus been transformed into a bigger and wider geographical concept.
      The walls and barriers to movement

      The investigation estimates that the member states of the European Union and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls on their borders since nineties, to prevent the entrance of displaced people and migration into their territory.


      The practice of building walls has grown immensely, from 2 walls in the decade of the 1990s to 15 in 2017. 2015 saw the largest increase, the number of walls grew from 5 to 12.

      Ten out of 28 member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built walls on their borders to prevent immigration, all of them belonging to the Schengen area except for Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.

      One country that is not a member of the European Union but belongs to the Schengen area has built a wall to prevent migration (Norway). Another (Slovakia) has built internal walls for racial segregation. A total of 13 walls have been built on EU borders or inside the Schengen area.

      Two countries, both members of the European Union and the Schengen area, (Spain and Hungary) have built two walls on their borders for controlling migration. Another two (Austria and the United Kingdom) have built walls on their shared borders with Schengen countries (Slovenia and France respectively). A country outside of the European Union, but part of of the so-called Balkan route (Macedonia), has built a wall to prevent migration.


      Internal controls of the Schengen area, regulated and normalized by the Schengen Borders Code of 2006, have been gone from being an exception to be the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control and political events (such as political summit, large demonstrations or high profile visitors to a country). From only 3 internal controls in 2006, there were 20 in 2017, which indicates the expansion in restrictions and monitoring of peoples’ movements.


      The maritime environment, particularly the Mediterranean, provides more barriers. The analysis shows that of the 8 main EU maritime operations (Mare Nostrum, Poseidon, Hera, Andale, Minerva, Hermes, Triton and Sophia) none have an exclusive mandate of rescuing people. All of them have had, or have, the general objective of fighting crime in border areas. Only one of them (Mare Nostrum) included humanitarian organisations in its fleet, but was replaced by Frontex’s “Triton” Operation (2013-2015) which had an increased focus on prosecuting border-related crimes. Another operation (Sophia) included direct collaboration with a military organisation (NATO) with a mandate focused on the persecution of persons that transport people on migratory routes. Analysis of these operations show that their treatment of crimes is sometimes similar to their treatment of refugees, framed as issues of security and treating refugees as threats.

      There are also growing numbers of ‘virtual walls’ which seek to control, monitor and surveil people’s movements. This has resulted in the expansion, especially since 2013, of various programs to restrict people’s movement (VIS, SIS II, RTP, ETIAS, SLTD and I-Checkit) and collect biometric data. The collected data of these systems are stored in the EURODAC database, which allows analysis to establish guidelines and patterns on our movements. EUROSUR is deployed as the surveillance system for border areas.

      Frontex: the walls’ borderguards

      The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) plays an important role in this whole process of fortress expansion and also acts and establishes coordination with third countries by its joint operation Coordination Points. Its budgets have soared in this period, growing from 6.2 million in 2005 to 302 million in 2017.


      An analysis of Frontex budget data shows a growing involvement in deportation operations, whose budgets have grown from 80,000 euros in 2005 to 53 million euros in 2017.

      The European Agency for the Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) deportations often violate the rights of asylum-seeking persons. Through Frontex’s agreements with third countries, asylum-seekers end up in states that violate human rights, have weak democracies, or score badly in terms of human development (HDI).


      Walls of fear and the influence of the far-right

      The far-right have manipulated public opinion to create irrational fears of refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people, who then demand physical walls. The analysed data shows a worrying rise in racist opinions in recent years, which has increased the percentage of votes to European parties with a xenophobic ideology, and facilitated their growing political influence.

      In 28 EU member states, there are 39 political parties classified as extreme right populists that at some point of their history have had at least one parliamentary seat (in the national Parliament or in the European Parliament). At the completion of this report (July 2018), 10 member states (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Sweden) have xenophobic parties with a strong presence, which have obtained more than half a million votes in elections since 2010. With the exception of Finland, these parties have increased their representation. In some cases, like those in Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden, there has been an alarming increase, such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) winning 94 seats in the 2017 elections (a party that did not have parliamentary representation in the 2013 elections), the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland winning 235 seats after the 2015 elections (an increase of 49%), and Lega Nord’s (LN) strong growth in Italy, which went from 18 seats in 2013 to 124 seats in 2018.

      Our study concludes that, in 9 of these 10 states, extreme right-wing parties have a high degree of influence on the government’s migration policies, even when they are a minority party. In 4 of them (Austria, Finland, Italy and Poland) these parties have ministers in the government. In 5 of the remaining 6 countries (Germany, Denmark, Holland, Hungary, and Sweden), there has been an increase of xenophobic discourse and influence. Even centrist parties seem happy to deploy the discourse of xenophobic parties to capture a sector of their voters rather than confront their ideology and advance an alternative discourse based on people’s rights. In this way, the positions of the most radical and racist parties are amplified with hardly any effort. In short, our study confirms the rise and influence of the extreme-right in European migration policy which has resulted in the securitization and criminalization of migration and the movements of people.

      The mental walls of fear are inextricably connected to the physical walls. Racism and xenophobia legitimise violence in the border area Europe. These ideas reinforce the collective imagination of a safe “interior” and an insecure “outside”, going back to the medieval concept of the fortress. They also strengthen territorial power dynamics, where the origin of a person, among other factors, determines her freedom of movement.

      In this way, in Europe, structures and discourses of violence have been built up, diverting us from policies that defend human rights, coexistence and equality, or more equal relationships between territories.

      https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls
      #rapport

      Pour télécharger le rapport:
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/building_walls_-_full_report_-_english.pdf

      #murs_virtuelles #surveillance #murs_maritimes #murs_terrestres #EUROSUR #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #racisme #xénophobie #VIS #SIS #ETIAS #SLTD

  • Repercussions in Colombia of the free trade agreement with the European Union after three years of implementation | Transnational Institute
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/repercussions-in-colombia-of-the-free-trade-agreement-with-the-european-union-a

    Various points of interest emerged during the discussions around the negotiation and ratification of this Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and after three years of its provisional implementation, it is a good time to revisit these issues.

    In public statements and publicity material, both the Colombian government and the European Commission asserted, for example, that the FTA was going to help to diversify the Colombian economy. They stated that the objective was to support sustainable development, that it was going to provide a legal basis on which to promote an improvement in the human rights situation, and that a road map would be agreed with the Colombian government for that purpose. At the same time, warnings were sounded about risks such as tax evasion and money laundering. This report looks at developments in some of these issues over the three years of provisional implementation of the agreement, and offers some suggestions for effective follow-up and monitoring.

    #Colombie #UE #libre_échange

  • Comment les vendeurs d’armes européens profitent à la fois des guerres au Moyen Orient et de la militarisation des frontières
    http://multinationales.org/Comment-les-vendeurs-d-armes-europeens-profitent-a-la-fois-des-guer

    Les exportations d’armes des entreprises européennes à destination du Moyen Orient ont explosé ces dernières années, alimentant les conflits et la répression qui ravagent cette région du monde. Mais les mêmes industriels bénéficient également de la militarisation croissante des frontières du vieux continent face à l’afflux des réfugiés. « En d’autres termes, les entreprises qui créent la crise sont celles qui en profitent », souligne un nouveau rapport du Transnational Institute. Près de 8 milliards d’euros, (...)

    Actualités

    / Airbus (ex EADS), #Thales, #Safran, #France, #Allemagne, Défense et sécurité, #union_européenne, #influence, (...)

    #Airbus_ex_EADS_ #Défense_et_sécurité #armement
    « https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars »
    « http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/ruestungsexportbericht-2015,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.p »

  • Comment les vendeurs d’armes européens profitent à la fois des guerres au Moyen Orient et de la militarisation des frontières
    http://multinationales.org/Comment-les-vendeurs-d-armes-europeens-profitent-doublement-des-gue

    Les exportations d’armes des entreprises européennes à destination du Moyen Orient ont explosé ces dernières années, alimentant les conflits et la répression qui ravagent cette région du monde. Mais les mêmes industriels bénéficient également de la militarisation croissante des frontières du vieux continent face à l’afflux des réfugiés. « En d’autres termes, les entreprises qui créent la crise sont celles qui en profitent », souligne un nouveau rapport du Transnational Institute. Près de 8 milliards d’euros, (...)

    Actualités

    / Airbus (ex EADS), #Thales, #Safran, #France, #Allemagne, Défense et sécurité, #union_européenne, #influence, (...)

    #Airbus_ex_EADS_ #Défense_et_sécurité #armement
    « https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars »
    « http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/ruestungsexportbericht-2015,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.p »

  • Peoples Sovereignty vs Impunity Inc. | Transnational Institute
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/peoples-sovereignty-vs-impunity-inc

    In eight articles various cases are presened that aim to serve as tools of action for activists to use in their fight for justice against the systematic violation of human rights and other crimes committed by transnational corporations.

    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/impunidadsaen.pdf

    #droits_humains #ressources_naturelles #biens_communs #multinational #justice