• Three and a half reasons why Russia might be planning to withdraw from Ukraine (or some of it, anyway) - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/31/three-and-a-half-reasons-why-russia-might-be-planning-to-withdraw-fr

    On Aug. 9, 2015, a senior Russian general declared that if the Ukrainian military crosses Russia’s red line and attempts to recapture the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, Russia would respond with overwhelming force. This statement reaffirms the Kremlin’s official line that Russia needs to hold onto territory it has virtually annexed in Donbas to ensure the viability of its puppet republics, Donetsk and Luhansk.

    But is it true?

    Here’s another theory. It could be that President Vladimir Putin regards the takeover of Donbas territories as temporary, and is evaluating this occupation with a strict cost-benefit analysis. Right now, he has concluded that small military victories in the Donbas generate more than enough political capital in Russia to offset the Russian public’s disdain for the hardships of sanctions-induced austerity.

    [Hey, Putin, have you seen how much China is investing in Ukraine?]

    Should that assessment change, Putin is very likely to tactically withdraw from Donbas on his own terms. Putin will not regard this withdrawal as a defeat, as Russia will retain a military force in Crimea that could be used to destabilize Ukraine if it tries to join NATO.

    Three factors suggest that Putin’s commitment to retaining control over the territories is weaker than his regime’s rhetoric indicates:

    • Russia’s military presence in and occupation of Donbas territory is much less popular among Russian-speaking Ukrainians than Putin initially predicted in 2014.
    • The Ukrainian government has more power than it has used in the conflict thus far, and it could use this influence to force Putin to back down sooner than expected in Donbas.
    • There is compelling evidence that Putin’s long-term goal is to create a “frozen conflict” in Donbas, a scenario in which active fighting is suspended but ethnic tensions remain and can reignite at any time.

    In addition, withdrawal from territories in Donbas would relieve Russia of the costs of occupation.

    Let’s examine these factors in turn.
    […]

  • Thinking beyond the two-state solution - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/25/thinking-beyond-the-two-state-solution

    Believing in a two-state #solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today is a little like looking for unicorns on the moon — it doesn’t matter how much you search, you still won’t find any. As recognition of this fact has become increasingly widespread, grappling with its implications has been hampered by the lack of normatively attractive or politically viable alternatives. In his review of Padraig O’Malley’s “The Two State Delusion,” Peter Beinart calls the book and its research impressive but nevertheless faults the author for not telling us how the story ends.

    Although Beinart and others committed to a two-state solution make it sound like the alternatives are a great mystery, the search for unicorns has been distracting them from increasingly plausible outcomes. As the two-state solution fades into history, its alternatives become increasingly likely: civil war, ethnic cleansing or a non-democratic state. Although all three are possible, the third is rising on the horizon. Whether it goes by the name of an #apartheid state, an illiberal democracy, a less than free society or a competitive authoritarianism, the dominant theme will be a Jewish minority ruling over a non-Jewish majority. Although such an outcome would be an emotional blow to those who favor the two-state solution as a way to maintain Israel’s democratic and Jewish character, it looks quite familiar in a world where liberal democracy not only remains the exception but has actually lost ground over the last decade.

    #Israël #Palestine #Israel #démocratie #aveuglement_fanatique

  • Why haven’t Syrian banks collapsed under sanctions and war ? - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/03/why-havent-syrian-banks-collapsed-under-sanctions-and-war

    La résilience du secteur bancaire syrien malgré bientôt 5 ans de guerre.

    My recent research on disclosures made by publicly listed private banks investigates this resilience. Although the Syrian banks have indeed taken a hard beating, struggling with the shrinking economy, international sanctions, and absence of public and private investments, none of the six state-owned banks have suspended their operations.

    Additionally, the 14 private banks — primarily subsidiaries of regional Arab banks in Lebanon, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain — have decided to stay put until the resolution of the conflict and will likely remain in the country for the long haul. These banks have endured physical destruction of their branches and offices in violence-ridden cities, robberies by gangs and militias on both warring sides, tighter inspection of their foreign-currency operations and embezzlement by some of their own staff.

    (...)

    More than four years of biting sanctions have not resulted in any critical mass of businessmen abandoning the embattled regime. While very few have decided to divest from these banks, others have actually increased their investments in spite of the severe operational, security and reputational risks. The considerable investments they have made and the need for a privately and internationally funded nationwide reconstruction plan after the end of the conflict will outweigh the prospects for an exit from the country. Ironically, the future rebuilding of the country might rest in their hands, unless a new government decides to confiscate those businessmen’s assets and deal a strong blow to the sector.

    Pour me citer moi-même, les médias s’étonneront-ils un jour qu’un pays vivant sous une dictature aussi épouvantable depuis tant d’années conserve aussi longtemps (5 ans) autant d’hommes d’affaires fidèles ?

  • Why haven’t Syrian banks collapsed under sanctions and war?
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/03/why-havent-syrian-banks-collapsed-under-sanctions-and-war/?postshare=7051438620324954

    In their effort to isolate the Syrian regime, the United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions on dozens of security officials, politicians, and businessmen, some of whom are shareholders and board members of these private banks. Sanctions were intended to disrupt the close linkages between business and politics in the country and drive a wedge between these closely forged relationships. However, this policy has largely failed. Most of these businessmen have substantial investments in the country that outweighed their overseas assets and commercial interests. Their inextricable connections with the ruling political elite have made them highly invested in the survival of the regime.

    More than four years of biting sanctions have not resulted in any critical mass of businessmen abandoning the embattled regime. While very few have decided to divest from these banks, others have actually increased their investments in spite of the severe operational, security and reputational risks. The considerable investments they have made and the need for a privately and internationally funded nationwide reconstruction plan after the end of the conflict will outweigh the prospects for an exit from the country. Ironically, the future rebuilding of the country might rest in their hands, unless a new government decides to confiscate those businessmen’s assets and deal a strong blow to the sector.