Cable : 06DAMASCUS5399_a

Wikileaks met en avant deux documents que « chacun devrait lire pour comprendre la crise en Syrie ».

▻https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/20/204627_re-insight-military-intervention-in-syria-post-withdrawal.html
▻https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html#efmBJqBLX

Decoding the current war in Syria : The WikiLeaks Files - Robert Naiman
▻http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2219-decoding-the-current-war-in-syria-the-wikileaks-files

By 2014, the sectarian Sunni-Shia character of the civil war in Syria was bemoaned in the United States as an unfortunate development. But in December 2006, the man heading the US embassy in Syria advocated in a cable to the Secretary of State and the White House that the US government collaborate with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to promote sectarian conflict in Syria between Sunni and Shia as a means of destabilizing the Syrian government. At that time, no one in the US government could credibly have claimed innocence of the possible implications of such a policy. This cable was written at the height of the sectarian Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq, which the US military was unsuccessfully trying to contain. US public disgust with the sectarian civil war in Iraq unleashed by the US invasion had just cost Republicans control of Congress in the November 2006 election. The election result immediately precipitated the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. No one working for the US government on foreign policy at the time could have been unaware of the implications of promoting Sunni-Shia sectarianism.

L’auteur évoque le plan de déstabilisation proposé dans le cable 06DAMASCUS5399_a (note : il faut absolument lire ce câble) :
▻https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html

–- Vulnerability:

–- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking necessary support while not completely alienating Syria’s moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests. Bashar’s decision to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran following FM Moallem’s trip to Iraq can be seen as a manifestation of Bashar’s sensitivity to the Arab optic on his Iranian alliance.

–- Possible action:

–- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through activities ranging from mosque construction to business. Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.

#cablegate #wikileaks

Note : câble référencé ici en septembre 2013 :
▻http://seenthis.net/messages/177610