Council of the European Union

En 2024, les Etats-Unis n’ont exporté que 166 milliards de dollars de gaz et de pétrole.
Merci du rappel !

Capacités d’importation de GNL de l’Europe :

En 2023, l’UE en a importé plus de 120 milliards de mètres cubes.
Grâce à ces investissements, la capacité d’importation de GNL de l’UE a augmenté de 40 milliards de m³ en 2023, et 30 milliards de m³ supplémentaires devraient être disponibles en 2024.
Des terminaux de GNL sont opérationnels en Espagne, en France, en Italie, au Portugal, en Belgique, aux Pays-Bas, en Croatie, en Pologne, en Grèce, en Finlande et en Lituanie.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/lng-infrastructure-in-the-eu

European Peace Facility: Council adopts third assistance measure in support of the Armed Forces of Mauritania

The Council today adopted a third assistance measure worth €20 million under the European Peace Facility to provide the Mauritanian armed forces with military equipment.

This decision comes in addition to two other assistance measures worth €12 million and €15 million, adopted on 1 December 2022 and 22 July 2024 respectively. They support the efforts of the Mauritanian armed forces to promote stability in the Sahel, counter the risk of destabilisation and protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mauritania and its civilian population against internal and external aggression.

The EU’s overall support for Mauritania under the European Peace Facility now totals €47 million.

As part of this package, the EU is already providing the Mauritanian armed forces with capacities needed to carry out military activities on land and at sea, whether in terms of surveillance, deterrence or operations.

The newly adopted assistance measure will complement the existing package and will equip the army with mobile land surveillance assets and the navy with a second patrol boat, identical to the one expected under the assistance measure adopted in 2024.

This equipment will support the Mauritanian Armed Forces’ efforts to increase situational awareness on national territory. They will also contribute to a permanent presence at sea, in support of maritime security and in cooperation with the existing Yaoundé architecture.

Background:

The European Peace Facility was established in March 2021 to finance EU external actions with military or defence implications, with the aim of preventing conflict, preserving peace and strengthening international security and stability. In particular, the EPF allows the EU to finance actions designed to strengthen the capacities of third states and regional and international organizations as regards military and defence matters.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/24/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-third-assistance-measure-in-

Border controls: EU updates Schengen rules despite racial profiling concerns

The Schengen Border Code will be updated as the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU and negotiators from the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on the adjustment of the border rules, announced Interior Minister Annelies Verlinden (CD&V).

The update clarifies the rules on (re)introducing border controls between the 27 European countries who are part of the Schengen area, and ensures that they remain “a last resort,” Verlinden’s office said in a press release.

“Smooth movement across our internal borders and the security of our external borders are the two cornerstones of the Schengen area,” she said. “This agreement on the revision of the Schengen Borders Code will clarify and strengthen these two pillars.”

The Schengen Borders Code provides for the absence of internal border controls in the Schengen area, which in principle allows over 420 million people to travel freely between the Member States. From 31 March 2024, Bulgaria and Romania will also become part of the area.

Introducing border controls

In recent years, discussions about updating the border rules of the area flared up several times, as a result of the debate around migration but also due to travel restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The amended Schengen Borders Code will provide Member States with new opportunities to effectively manage the EU’s external borders in a situation where migrants are used for political gain. “This includes limiting the number of border crossing points or shortening their opening hours.”

In practice, this means that the deal would allow internal checks and increased policing in situations of so-called “instrumentalisation of migration,” which is when a Member State claims that a non-EU country or ’hostile non-state actor’ is pushing migrants towards external EU borders for political reasons.

“This is an extremely problematic concept, whose codification into EU law would introduce broad derogations to fundamental rights, including the right to asylum and freedom of movement,” said PICUM, a Brussels-based network of over 160 NGOs working to advance the rights of undocumented people. They added that the new deal would de facto legitimise racial profiling in border checks.

While the reform of the Schengen Borders Code aims to reduce the amount of temporary generalised internal EU border checks, PICUM stressed that it would escalate checks on specific groups of people. The deal would allow police authorities in joint patrols to carry out “random” document checks near internal EU borders, under the guise of apprehending people without valid travel or residence documents.

Research has already shown that police tend to stop people for checks based on racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics. It is clear that these checks will depend on the police’s decisions about who “looks like” a person without valid papers, the network said.

“This agreement embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders without valid documents are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing, while de facto encouraging racial profiling,” said Silvia Carta, Advocacy Officer at PICUM.

Internal pushbacks, no safeguards

The new code also introduces “alternative measures” to counter unauthorised movements of third-country nationals staying in the Schengen area. If they are apprehended in the border area, a new procedure will allow Member States to return them to the Member State from which they arrived directly. The arrest must take place in the context of a bilateral partnership, the deal states.

However, PICUM stressed that this would legalise the violent practice of “internal pushbacks,” which consists of apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the Member State the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.

It is still unclear which “safeguards” have been introduced to protect children, who are not explicitly excluded from such transfer procedures.

The deal would most likely also escalate the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies that do not apply relevant safeguards and would be at odds with existing EU data protection legislation and fundamental rights.

If there is a serious threat to public order or internal security, the deal will also allow Member States to exceptionally (re)introduce border controls. However, this will only be possible after assessing “the necessity and proportionality” of this reintroduction, and ensuring that other measures are not sufficient.

Controls will be able to be introduced immediately if threats to public order or security are unpredictable. In that case, the Commission, Member States and the European Parliament are required to be informed at the same time. “These controls may then be reintroduced for a period of up to one month and extended for up to three months.”

Internal border controls for foreseeable threats – which have been communicated to the Commission, other Member States and the European Parliament before being reintroduced – can remain in force for a maximum of six months. They can be extended for a renewable period of up to six months, with a maximum duration of two years.

In serious exceptional situations relating to a persistent threat, internal border controls may be extended after two years for a maximum of six more months, which may then be extended once more (total duration of one year).

Another health crisis

In the event of another large-scale public health emergency, the Council can decide to authorise temporary travel restrictions at the EU’s external border. The decision may also include health-related travel restrictions, such as testing, quarantine and self-isolation. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU could only make non-binding recommendations to Member States.

Certain categories of people – those enjoying the right of free movement, long-term residents and people enjoying international protection – will be exempted from the entry restrictions.

Now, this provisional agreement will be submitted to the representatives of the Member States in the Council for confirmation. After that, it must still be formally adopted by both institutions.

▻https://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/914176/reintroducing-border-controls-eu-agrees-on-schengen-code-update

#profilage_racial #instrumentalisation_de_la_migration #contrôles_au_faciès #refoulements #refoulements_internes #push-backs

Schengen : le Conseil et le Parlement européen conviennent d’une révision du code frontières de l’UE

La présidence belge du Conseil de l’UE et les négociateurs du Parlement européen sont parvenus aujourd’hui à un accord provisoire sur la modification du droit de l’UE qui fixe les règles de fonctionnement de l’espace Schengen aux frontières extérieures et intérieures. Les modifications convenues, qui devront être approuvées et adoptées formellement par les deux institutions, renforceront la coordination de l’UE et amélioreront les outils dont disposent les États membres pour faire face aux difficultés rencontrées aux frontières de l’UE.

« Le franchissement sans entrave de nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord intervenu aujourd’hui en vue de la révision du code frontières Schengen clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers. » (Annelies Verlinden, ministre de l’intérieur, des réformes institutionnelles et du renouveau démocratique de la Belgique)

La mise à jour clarifie en particulier les règles relatives au rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières en veillant à ce qu’ils restent une mesure de dernier recours, propose des solutions pour les situations dans lesquelles les migrants sont instrumentalisés et permet d’introduire des mesures communes pour harmoniser les restrictions de déplacement en cas d’urgence de santé publique.
Lutte contre l’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

Le code frontières Schengen modifié mettra à disposition des États membres de nouvelles mesures pour une gestion efficace des frontières extérieures de l’UE dans les cas d’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques. Cela passe notamment par une limitation du nombre de points de passage aux frontières ou par la réduction de leurs heures d’ouverture.

On parle d’instrumentalisation lorsqu’un pays tiers ou un acteur non étatique encourage ou facilite le déplacement de ressortissants de pays tiers vers les frontières extérieures de l’UE afin de déstabiliser l’UE ou un État membre.
Rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières intérieures

Le texte approuvé clarifie et renforce le cadre du rétablissement et de la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures. Les États membres peuvent rétablir des contrôles à titre exceptionnel en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure. Ils devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ce rétablissement et estimer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent pas être atteints par d’autres moyens, notamment par des mesures alternatives.

Selon les nouvelles règles, si des menaces pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité ont un caractère imprévisible, des contrôles peuvent être mis en place immédiatement en en informant simultanément la Commission, les autres États membres et le Parlement européen. Ces contrôles sont limités à une période d’un mois maximum et ne peuvent être prolongés que pour une durée maximale de trois mois.

Dans le cas de menaces prévisibles, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures, notifiés à la Commission, aux États membres et au Parlement européen avant d’être rétablis, peuvent rester en place pendant une période de six mois maximum. Ils peuvent être prolongés par périodes renouvelables de six mois maximum, pour une durée n’excédant pas deux ans. Dans des situations exceptionnelles majeures liées à une menace persistante, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures peuvent être prolongés au-delà de deux ans, pour une période maximale de 6 mois supplémentaires, renouvelable une fois, la durée totale n’excédant pas un an.
Promotion de mesures alternatives

Une autre mise à jour du code frontières Schengen sur laquelle la présidence et le Parlement européen ont marqué leur accord concerne le recours à des mesures alternatives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

Le recours à ces mesures alternatives permettra aux États membres de limiter considérablement le rétablissement éventuel des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, en garantissant la sécurité tout en préservant l’espace de libre circulation sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

Le nouveau code introduit également des mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen. Une nouvelle procédure permettra à un État membre de transférer des ressortissants de pays tiers arrêtés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont arrivés directement. L’arrestation devrait s’effectuer dans le cadre d’une coopération bilatérale.
Mesures aux frontières extérieures en cas de crise sanitaire

En vertu du nouveau code frontières Schengen, le Conseil peut adopter une décision autorisant des restrictions temporaires de déplacement aux frontières extérieures en cas d’urgence de santé publique de grande ampleur. Pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, l’UE n’a pu émettre que des recommandations non contraignantes à l’intention des États membres.

La décision peut également prévoir des restrictions de déplacement liées à la santé, telles que des tests, une quarantaine et l’isolement à domicile.

Certaines catégories de personnes seront exemptées des restrictions à l’entrée : les personnes jouissant du droit à la libre circulation, les résidents de longue durée et les bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale.
Prochaines étapes

L’accord provisoire intervenu aujourd’hui sera soumis aux représentants des États membres au sein du Conseil (Coreper) pour confirmation. Il devra également être formellement adopté par les deux institutions.
Contexte

L’espace Schengen s’étend sur plus de 4 millions de kilomètres carrés, se compose de 27 pays européens et permet à plus de 400 millions de personnes de voyager librement entre les pays membres sans passer par des contrôles aux frontières.

La coopération entre les forces de police, les autorités douanières et les autorités chargées du contrôle des frontières extérieures des pays de l’espace Schengen contribue à la sécurité de la zone.

Le code frontières Schengen, qui va être mis à jour par cet accord entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen, constitue le cadre réglementaire qui prévoit l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures et fixe des règles pour le contrôle des personnes aux frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen.

Le code permet aux États membres de rétablir des contrôles aux frontières intérieures dans des circonstances exceptionnelles mettant en péril le fonctionnement global de l’espace Schengen.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/schengen-council-and-european-parliament-agree-to-update-eu-s-borde

Réforme Schengen : le nouveau code rend possible les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

Un accord a été trouvé, mardi, par les négociateurs du Parlement et du Conseil européens quant à la révision du code Schengen des frontières. Cet accord introduit de nouvelles mesures qui, rendent notamment légal le transfert de migrants depuis une zone frontalière vers le pays dont il arrive. Infomigrants fait le point.

L’accord a été annoncé mardi soir. Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil européen viennent d’aboutir à une version finale de révision du code Schengen des frontières. Ce code régit les pratiques aux frontières intérieures et extérieures de l’espace Schengen, territoire composé par 27 États au sein duquel, en théorie, chacun peut circuler sans contrôle.

L’accord doit encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement et le Conseil. Si un communiqué de presse en donne les grandes lignes, le texte détaillé n’a pas encore été rendu public. « La libre circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (...) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », soutient la ministre belge de l’Intérieur, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence du Conseil de l’UE.

Depuis 2015, de nombreux États, dont la France, ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières intérieures. En raison de la menace terroriste, mais aussi des restrictions sanitaires dues au Covid-19. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié des États membres de l’espace Schengen à le faire, rappelle l’AFP. Et ce, alors que ces contrôles internes sont contraires au principe de libre circulation dans l’espace Schengen.
Un an de prolongation supplémentaire pour les contrôles aux frontières intérieures

Ce type de contrôle est autorisé par le code Schengen « en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un État ». La réintroduction d’un contrôle aux frontières intérieures est d’une période de six mois maximum. Ces périodes sont ensuite renouvelables, sur une durée maximale de deux ans.

La nouvelle réforme du code Schengen réaffirme le caractère exceptionnel de ces contrôles. La « nécessité et la proportionnalité » de ces derniers devra être argumentée.

Mais elle ajoute la possibilité de les prolonger encore d’une année supplémentaire. Le nouveau code encadre donc mieux la pratique… Tout en allongeant sa possibilité à trois années maximum.
Une nouvelle mesure qui légitime les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

À partir de cette base, les négociateurs ont introduit une nouvelle mesure pour contrôler les mouvements migratoires au sein de l’espace Schengen qui inquiète fortement les ONG et avocats en droit des étrangers. Le nouveau code permettra en effet à un État membre de « transférer les ressortissants de pays tiers appréhendés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont directement arrivés. L’arrestation devra avoir lieu dans le cadre d’un cadre de coopération bilatérale », détaille le communiqué.

Par exemple : à la frontière franco-italienne, avec cette nouvelle mesure, « toute personne qui se trouve dans la zone frontalière pourra être arrêtée si les autorités françaises soupçonnent que cette personne est en situation irrégulière et venue d’Italie », décrit Ulrich Stege, avocat en droit des étrangers membre du réseau juridique italien ASGI, et enseignant à l’International University de Turin. Il sera possible de la refouler via « une procédure simplifiée, par exemple un unique document indiquant l’identité de la personne. On le lui fait signer, puis on la repousse ». Des pushbacks qui deviendraient légaux, en somme.

Cette pratique a pourtant été épinglée, pas plus tard qu’en septembre 2023, par la Cour de Justice de l’UE. « La volonté est clairement de codifier et généraliser, dans la législation européenne, une pratique qui est en ce moment même en place notamment entre la France et l’Italie », confirme Ulrich Stege.
Risques accrus de contrôles au faciès

Edwige*, une exilée ivoirienne rencontrée à Vintimille en octobre, avait raconté à Infomigrants le déroulement des contrôles de police menant à des refoulements, dans les trains entre l’Italie et la France. « Les policiers nous ont dit de sortir. Directement, sans regarder nos documents. Moi, j’étais aux toilettes à ce moment-là : ils sont rentrés, ils m’ont tirée dehors. Je ne comprenais pas ce qu’il se passait », témoignait-elle. « C’est là que je me suis rendue compte qu’ils avaient fait sortir tous les Noirs du train. »

« Rappelons que, dès que l’on parle de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, on ne peut pas imaginer autre chose que ce que l’on voit depuis 2015 : c’est-à-dire des contrôles avec un profilage racial des personnes. Cela ne peut pas se faire autrement », met en garde Ulrich Stege.

Avec cette nouvelle mesure, « on s’oriente vers une systématisation de ces contrôles basées sur du profilage racial », soutient l’avocat et professeur d’université italien. Pour rappel, ces contrôles au faciès sont bien entendus illégaux... Car discriminatoires. "Il est clair que les contrôles « aléatoires » de documents dépendront des décisions de la police quant à savoir qui « ressemble » à une personne sans-papiers", abonde l’ASGI dans son analyse de la réforme, parue mi 2022.

« Jusqu’ici, on avait des pratiques basées sur des accords bilatéraux. Cette fois, il y aurait une loi européenne qui régularise et légitime ces pratiques. Or, ce sont des pratiques violentes, de refoulements et de discriminations raciales », tranche Silvia Carta, chargée de plaidoyer politique migratoire pour le réseau PICUM (Plateforme pour la coopération internationale sur les migrants sans papiers), également interrogée par Infomigrants.
Pas d’exception pour les mineurs, les demandeurs d’asile ou les familles ?

Plusieurs questions restent en suspens. Existera-t-il un droit au recours, pour les personnes soumises à cette nouvelle mesure ? Mais aussi : combien de temps les personnes pourront-elles être placées dans des locaux de rétention, en attendant leur refoulement ? Par-dessus tout : y aura-t-il des exceptions pour les catégories protégées, à savoir les mineurs non-accompagnés, les familles avec enfants, ou encore les demandeurs d’asile - qui ont le droit imprescriptible de déposer une demande d’asile partout dans l’UE ?

« Notre crainte, c’est que cette mesure favorise, entre autres, la rétention illégale des personnes », pointe Silvia Carta. « Le Parlement avait envisagé des garde-fous. Mais nous ne savons pas exactement ce qui a été retenu dans le texte, d’autant que le Conseil était, à l’inverse, réticent à les intégrer dans l’accord... »

Or, « sans précision, sans règle claire, chacun fait un peu comme il le veut. On le voit bien à la frontière franco-italienne, où des demandeurs d’asile sont refoulés », insiste Ulrich Stege.

De manière globale, le nouveau code Schengen vise à promouvoir et créer d’autres « mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les mouvements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen », assume le communiqué européen.

Sans publication du texte, difficile de savoir pour le moment ce que recouvre ce champ des « mesures alternatives ». Les ONG craignent une intensification du recours aux technologies de surveillance. Avec l’idée de « faciliter les détections et les interceptions des gens de façon de plus en plus systématique. Via des drones, des caméras, l’intelligence artificielle... », souligne Silvia Carta.
Des mesures face aux tentatives « d’instrumentalisation » de migrants

La révision du code Schengen concerne aussi les frontières extérieures. Il est prévu une harmonisation des règles d’entrée dans l’UE « en cas d’urgence sanitaire », avec des « éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests », laisse entrevoir le communiqué.

Surtout, l’accord prévoit des mesures face aux tentatives d’Etats tiers d’"instrumentaliser" les migrants « dans un but politique » de déstabilisation - comme le Bélarus ou encore la Russie ont été accusés par l’UE de le faire, en 2023. Il s’agira de « limiter le nombre de points de passage, ou de réduire leurs horaires d’ouverture », annonce le communiqué.

"Ce concept d’"instrumentalisation" est problématique et inquiétant", réagit Silvia Carta. "Il associe la migration à une menace sécuritaire. Et puis, qui rentrera dans cette définition de l’"instrumentalisation" ? Est-ce qu’à terme, cela pourrait viser aussi les missions de sauvetage des personnes exilées menées par des ONG ?"

Le rôle de l’agence de garde-frontières Frontex s’en verra renforcé, souligne dans son analyse détaillée le réseau Border Violence Monitoring. Dans les moments de tension aux frontières extérieures, comme entre la Finlande et la Russie fin 2023, des agents sont envoyés sur place, en mission.

« C’est un constat que l’on fait pour tous les textes sur les migrations, y compris le nouveau Pacte migratoire européen : l’UE produit des nouvelles règles qui se basent sur une approche sécuritaire, avec la criminalisation de la figure du migrant », conclut Ulrich Stege. « Et cela nuit aux droits fondamentaux qui devraient s’appliquer ».

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/55028/reforme-schengen--le-nouveau-code-rend-possible-les-refoulements-aux-f

Racial profiling and “internal pushbacks” in new Schengen borders legislation

Statewatch is publishing the final compromise text of the revised Schengen Borders Code, which is due for adoption soon by the Council and the Parliament. The text has been heavily criticised for encouraging racial profiling through the increased use of police patrols and checks at internal borders in the Schengen area, as well as legitimating “internal pushbacks”, with the aim of avoiding the full-blown reintroduction of internal border controls.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4177/eu-sbc-text.jpg

The proposed Regulation, which comes hot on the heels of other new legislation as part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, has a number of goals, as explained in the compromise text document (pdf):

a) establish a new mechanism which should allow for a timely adoption by the Council of a binding instrument setting out temporary travel restrictions at the external borders in case of a pandemic,

b) address the instrumentalisation of migrants, where a third country actor is using human beings to destabilise the Union or its Member States,

c) create a new mechanism allowing for a European response to problems affecting a majority of Member States at the same time and thus putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk,

d) clarify and expand the list of elements that must be assessed by a Member State when taking the decision on temporary reintroduction of border controls,

e) provide that safeguards should always be applied, to limit the negative impact of the temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders, should this reintroduction be inevitable.

The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migration has said that the text will increase the use of police checks at internal borders that will be based on “racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics,” whilst warning that it also legalises “the violent practice of ‘internal pushbacks’, which consists in apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the member state the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.”

The document includes an explanation from the Presidency of “the key elements of the compromise text”:

– Travel restrictions – The definition and concept of “large-scale public health emergency” were agreed and the Parliament accepted that Member States can apply stricter measures than those agreed at EU level. A supplementary list of categories of travellers that could be exempted from travel restrictions was included from which categories of essential travellers could be added to Annex XI by means of an implementing act.

– Alternative police measures – These measures are intended to enable Member States to avoid having to resort to the reintroduction of internal border controls. These provisions were largely maintained in the final agreement. This is an important element since it will expand the toolbox available to Member States to deal with threats before reintroducing internal border controls.

– Transfer procedure – The procedure will take place in the context of a bilateral cooperation framework. Minors will not be exempted from the procedure, but procedural safeguards will be included.

– Instrumentalisation – A cross-reference was made to the definition of instrumentalisation as contained in the Crisis Regulation

– Attempt to cross the external border en masse and using force – The wording of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was maintained.

– Reintroduction/prolongation of internal border controls – On the issue of a maximum duration for which Member States can reintroduce internal border controls, an agreement was reached for a total period of two years, with possibility of two additional prolongations of 6 months each. In the case of a situation putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border controls that affects several Member States, the application of the provision will be restricted to large scale public health emergencies.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/february/racial-profiling-and-internal-pushbacks-in-new-schengen-borders-legislat

Asylum and migration reform: EU member states’ representatives green light deal with European Parliament

Today, EU member states’ representatives (Coreper) approved the provisional deal that was reached between the Council presidency and the European Parliament on 20 December 2023, constituting a pact of five key laws which will reform the EU’s asylum and migration system.

“The member states today confirmed their commitment to improve the European asylum and migration system. These new rules will make the European asylum system more effective and increase solidarity between member states. This agreement will fundamentally change the way in which we deal with migration and asylum on the ground, at the borders and within our territories. The agreement will not change the situation on the ground from day one after its adoption, but now we have to be fully committed to implement what we have decided.” (Nicole de Moor, Belgian State Secretary for Asylum and Migration)

Pact on asylum and migration

The five EU laws of the pact touch upon all stages of asylum and migration management.

The update of the Eurodac regulation (the EU fingerprint database) will make it possible to better tackle irregular movements and monitor the paths of asylum seekers and persons in an irregular situation throughout the EU.

The screening regulation’s aim is to strengthen controls of persons at external borders. It also ensures fast identification of the correct procedure – such as return to their country of origin or start of an asylum procedure – when a person enters the EU without fulfilling the right entry conditions.

The asylum procedure regulation (APR) establishes a common procedure that member states need to follow when people seek international protection. It streamlines the procedural arrangements and sets standards for the rights of the asylum seeker. It introduces a mandatory border procedure, with the aim of quickly assessing at the EU’s external borders whether applications for asylum are unfounded or inadmissible.

The asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) will replace the current Dublin regulation. It sets out rules determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. To balance the current system whereby a few member states are responsible for the vast majority of asylum applications, a new solidarity mechanism will be established. The new rules combine mandatory solidarity to support member states who cannot cope with the number of irregular arrivals into their territory with flexibility for member states as regards the choice of their contributions

The fifth leg of the Pact is a new law that establishes a framework allowing member states to address situations of crisis in the field of asylum and migration. They would be authorised to adjust certain rules, for instance concerning the registration of asylum applications or the asylum border procedure. On the other hand these countries would be able to request solidarity and support measures from the EU and its member states.
Reception conditions, qualification and resettlement

The permanent representatives committee also gave the thumbs up to three asylum and migration laws on which Council and Parliament had already reached agreement in 2022. These three laws comprise a revision of the reception conditions directive, an update of the qualification regulation and a regulation establishing an EU resettlement framework.

A return border regulation was also approved which allows the pact to apply to those European countries with differing Schengen rules.
Next steps

The laws approved today will have to be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.

Background

The asylum procedure regulation, asylum and migration management regulation, Eurodac regulation, screening regulation and crisis regulation are components of the new pact on migration and asylum, which the Commission proposed on 23 September 2020.

The reception conditions directive, qualification regulation and EU resettlement framework were proposed in 2016.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/08/asylum-and-migration-reform-eu-member-states-representatives-green-

L’effondrement moral est total.

En espérant que c’est 1 déclaration genre « arrêt du financement des Palestiniens » faite de son propre chef par je ne sais plus quel extrémiste de droite de l’UE

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on humanitarian pauses in Gaza
►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/12/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-unio
#Borrell

Extraordinairement lamentable

The EU condemns the use of hospitals and civilians as human shields by Hamas. Civilians must be allowed to leave the combat zone. These hostilities are severely impacting hospitals and taking a horrific toll on civilians and medical staff. The EU emphasizes that international humanitarian law stipulates that hospitals, medical supplies and civilians inside hospitals must be protected. Hospitals must also be supplied immediately with the most urgent medical supplies and patients that require urgent medical care need to be evacuated safely. In this context, we urge Israel to exercise maximum restraint to ensure the protection of civilians

Une telle complicité est inqualifiable

Rendez vous compte qu’à ce rythme, si le Hezbollah et les iraniens rentraient ds le conflit avec les américains et les israéliens, nos armées européennes se retrouveraient à bombarder le Liban et la Syrie, et l’Iran ?

▻https://www.bfmtv.com/international/moyen-orient/palestine/gaza-l-ue-condamne-l-utilisation-par-le-hamas-d-hopitaux-et-de-civils-comme-b

““““““““““““““““““““““““
Conseil de l’UE Communiqué de presse 12 novembre 2023 19:08

Déclaration de la Haute Représentante au nom de l’Union européenne sur les pauses humanitaires à Gaza

►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/12/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-unio
#IsraelUE

Je suspecte qu’un aspect de cette communication aujourd’hui était de faire rapidement contrefeu à la déclaration de Macron et de rappeler ce qu’on est autorisé à dire en Europe.

Macron relativise sa déclaration à la BBC
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1026262

#Israël #France #cesser-le-feu #civils

La notion d’écoterrorisme existe-t-elle ?

Il existe deux manières de qualifier cette notion. Je suis juriste de formation, et la première consiste à regarder le droit et à en rester à ce que dit le code pénal : le terrorisme est le fait d’user de l’intimidation et de la terreur pour troubler gravement l’ordre public. Ces dernières années, c’est un fait, aucune action de cette nature n’a été commise au nom de la cause environnementale.

Néanmoins, face à des idéologies qui légitiment et théorisent le recours à l’action violente pour inviter nos gouvernements à agir encore plus contre le réchauffement climatique, lorsque des faits de dégradation par incendie commis en juin glorifient la personne du terroriste américain « Unabomber », récemment décédé, au travers de l’inscription « Nous prenons la relève », lorsque des organisations comme Les Soulèvements de la Terre, même si elles s’en défendent, diffusent des modes opératoires fondés sur la violence, qui sont ensuite suivis d’effets, ou font le tour de la mouvance radicale d’ultragauche française et européenne pour les mobiliser, il y a de quoi rester vigilant.

La crise des retraites a-t-elle constitué une forme de catalyseur pour une nouvelle génération de militants ?

La crise des retraites a connu un avant et un après l’utilisation du 49.3. C’est très net dans la physionomie des rassemblements. Dès la première manifestation qui suit le 49.3, le 23 mars, les différents services de renseignement documentent clairement que l’entrée en lice des collectifs d’ultragauche, qu’ils soient anarcho-autonomes ou « antifas », a servi de catalyseur. Quant à la nouvelle génération de militants d’ultragauche, une partie a investi la sphère environnementale, contribuant à la radicalisation de ses modes d’action.

Les affrontements de Sainte-Soline, dans les Deux-Sèvres, autour de la question environnementale, marquent-ils un tournant ?

Il existe des marqueurs traditionnels sur lesquels se mobilise l’ultragauche : la lutte contre « l’Etat capitaliste », l’extrême droite, les forces de l’ordre ou encore le personnel pénitentiaire. Le phénomène nouveau de ces derniers mois, c’est la part croissante de ses militants qui a investi la question environnementale. Que mes propos ne soient pas mal interprétés : la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique est un combat légitime qui mérite d’être mené avec détermination. Mais avec les moyens admis en démocratie ! Or, ce qui a très nettement été documenté à Sainte-Soline, c’est que cette revendication constitue pour certains un prétexte pour s’en prendre aux symboles de l’Etat, aux forces de l’ordre, à ce qu’ils appellent le « système », au capital et à tous ceux qui le représentent. La manière dont l’#ultragauche investit la sphère environnementale, en y important ses modes d’action, est un sujet de préoccupation.

A Sainte-Soline, certains manifestants s’étaient manifestement préparés pour en découdre mais leur action s’est concentrée sur les forces de l’ordre, elle n’avait rien à voir avec une entreprise terroriste au sens premier du terme…

L’ultragauche constitue en effet, d’abord et avant tout, une menace pour l’ordre public. Mais cette menace ne doit pas être minimisée. D’abord parce que certaines manifestations des derniers mois ont franchi un cap, et il n’est pas possible de se résoudre à ces déferlements de violence. Deuxièmement, plusieurs individus de la mouvance ont été mis en cause, fin 2020, dans une association de malfaiteurs en vue de commettre des infractions terroristes [sept prévenus, dont un ex-combattant anti-Daech au Rojava, seront jugés à l’automne pour « association de malfaiteurs terroriste » pour des projets d’attentats]. Troisièmement, les mouvances d’ultragauche, ces dernières années, se sont signalées par des actions clandestines particulièrement violentes, à travers notamment des campagnes incendiaires, comme celle qui a visé la caserne de Meylan [le 26 octobre 2017, un incendie vise plusieurs véhicules de gendarmerie d’une brigade située dans cette localité de l’Isère et se propage en partie au bâtiment d’habitation des familles de militaires. L’action est revendiquée par un groupuscule d’ultragauche].

D’autres actions clandestines de type saccage, destruction de biens me semblent aussi présenter une gravité très significative. Enfin, ce n’est pas parce que l’ultragauche n’est pas passée à l’acte terroriste ces dernières années que le risque n’existe pas. Nous sommes ainsi extrêmement préoccupés par la manière dont des groupuscules français sont influencés par des structures étrangères. En juin, un forum français d’ultragauche a par exemple salué l’action de militants grecs qui avaient placé un colis piégé devant le logement personnel d’un policier à Athènes. Aux yeux de ces militants, s’en prendre au système nécessite désormais de s’en prendre à ceux qui l’incarnent, pas seulement à ceux qui le dirigent.

Supposer que parce que des groupes s’en prennent à des biens, ils s’en prendront aussi à des personnes, n’est-ce pas un raisonnement biaisé ?

L’histoire du #terrorisme est une histoire de cycles, cela vaut pour le terrorisme islamiste comme pour le terrorisme politique. Et notre responsabilité, c’est de garder la mémoire longue et d’essayer d’anticiper ces cycles. En France, en Italie ou en Allemagne, dans les années 1970-1980, l’ultragauche a tué en considérant que la légitimité de ses idées devait conduire à ce type d’action radicale. Ce qui nous préoccupe, c’est l’émergence du même discours chez certains : la conscience intime que nos démocraties sont soumises à des dangers imminents, que l’autorité politique ne les prend pas en compte et que des actions contre les biens ne sont plus suffisantes. Le risque d’une gradation vers des actes de violence physique n’est pas une vue de l’esprit.

Son analyse de Sainte-Soline va tellement en prendre plein la gueule demain que ce n’est pas la peine de la mentionner.

notre responsabilité, c’est de garder la mémoire longue et d’essayer d’anticiper

#DGSI

Projets d’attaques : [cela fait 10 ans qu’]Europol et [bien plus tardivement] la DGSI alertent sur le terrorisme d’extrême droite en France
▻https://www.liberation.fr/politique/projets-dattaques-europol-et-la-dgsi-alertent-sur-le-terrorisme-dextreme-

D’un point de vue chiffré, la police européenne a recensé deux projets d’attaques terroristes d’extrême droite déjoués en France au cours de l’année écoulée, sur un total de quatre (dont un a conduit à la commission d’un attentat ayant fait deux morts le 12 octobre 2022 en Slovaquie) au sein de l’Union européenne. Mais aussi 16 arrestations pour ce motif, toujours dans l’Hexagone, sur un total de 45 à l’échelle de l’UE. Avec les chiffres les plus élevés sur ces deux critères, comme l’année dernière, la France ressort bien comme le pays où la menace d’« ultradroite » (un terme policier) est la plus manifeste. Devant l’Allemagne (une attaque déjouée et onze interpellations) et l’Italie (pas de projet concret d’attaque mais six arrestations).

Armes à feu, cryptomonnaies et messageries chiffrées

Ces projets déjoués en France ont notamment en commun la jeunesse des aspirants terroristes présumés. Le premier, qui a été appréhendé le 3 juin 2022 à Bourg-Saint-Andéol (Ardèche), était âgé de 20 ans. Il se revendiquait de l’idéologie nationale-socialiste et cherchait à s’en prendre « aux juifs, aux noirs, aux femmes, à la communauté LGBT ». Il cherchait à se procurer des armes pour perpétrer une tuerie de masse, selon les enquêteurs. Le second, âgé lui de 19 ans, a été interpellé à Bouzonville (Moselle) et est suspecté d’avoir voulu s’en prendre à des policiers ou des synagogues. Lui se réclamait de l’accélérationnisme, ce courant qui incite ses partisans à tout faire pour déstabiliser le « système » et précipiter le déclenchement de la « guerre civile raciale ». Ce jeune homme possédait une arme à feu et tentait de s’en procurer d’autres, ainsi que des explosifs.

Dans son rapport annuel, Europol met une nouvelle fois en avant des schémas de radicalisation où Internet joue un rôle important. Notamment car c’est le lieu d’échange des cryptomonnaies, pour lesquelles la mouvance affiche un grand intérêt, les voyant comme une alternative d’un système bancaire qui serait « tenu par les juifs ». Mais le Web sert surtout pour la diffusion de la propagande et des échanges entre éléments potentiellement violents, via des applications de messagerie chiffrées et des réseaux sociaux plus confidentiels que les géants du genre. Europol note ainsi la publication de deux nouveaux « manuels terroristes » sur Telegram en 2022. De tendance accélérationniste, ceux-ci expliquent comment des « attaques par des acteurs isolés sur des cibles faciles et des attaques à grande échelle contre des infrastructures vitales, telles que le réseau électrique, télécommunications et transport pétrolier » peuvent « contribuer au déclenchement d’une “guerre raciale” ».

Infographie - Terrorisme dans l’UE : faits et chiffres

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/terrorism-eu-facts-figures

Tracking the Pact: EU seeks to seal off Balkan Route with expanded Frontex deployments

The European Commission wants to launch negotiations with Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania so that EU border agency Frontex can extend its zone of operations. Currently, Frontex operations in those states can only take place at the borders they share with EU member states, in accordance with the 2016 Frontex Regulation. Upgrading the EU’s agreements with the Balkan states to take into account the powers granted to Frontex by the 2019 Regulation will make it possible to deploy EU border guards at non-EU borders - for example, between Bosnia and Serbia, or between Serbia and Montenegro. An agreement with North Macedonia has already been signed. The aim is to halt the irregular movement of people through the Balkans towards “core” EU member states.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/3546/eu-frontex-balkans.jpg

In order to launch negotiations the Commission needs the approval of the Council of the EU, and has thus sent to the Council four recommendations that, once they are signed off, will allow it to enter into negotiations with each of the four states:

- Albania (COM(2022) 690 final, in Council doc. 14060/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Bosnia and Herzegovina (COM(2022) 691 final, in Council doc. 14061/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Montenegro (COM(2022) 692 final, in Council doc. 14062/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Serbia (COM(2022) 693 final, in Council doc. 14063/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)

An upgraded agreement with North Macedonia based on the 2019 Frontex Regulation has already been approved.

Each of the documents contains an explanatory memorandum before coming to the draft text of the proposed Council Recommendations.

For example, the proposal on Albania notes:

“Albania lies on the Western Balkans migration route, which sees significant irregular migration towards the core of the European Union, both via land and across the Adriatic Sea...

Given that Albania is a neighbouring third country that remains an important country of transit for irregular migration to the European Union, the value of cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the relevant authorities of Albania remains high. Albania has been a model for the successful deployment of Frontex joint operations to third countries, and it therefore represents an ideal candidate for the expansion of such cooperation.”

Amongst other things, the memoranda note bilateral agreements signed by each of the states - for example, Bosnia has signed “readmission agreements with all the Western Balkan countries, Türkiye, Russia, Moldova and Pakistan whose practical implementation started in August 2022.” The intention is that Balkan states will not just prevent people from arriving in “core” EU territory - they will also deport them.

There is no mention in any of the documents of the controversy the agency is mired in for its failure to uphold fundamental rights standards within the EU, in particular at the Greek-Turkish border, as confirmed by the recently-published report of the European Anti-Fraud Office.

An annex to each of the above documents contains the negotiating directives for the Commission to follow, subject to possible amendment and then approval by the Council.

- Albania (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Montenegro (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Serbia (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)

Although marked ’SENSITIVE’ (as are the proposals for recommendations), the annexes merely state that the agreement with each country should meet the standards set out in the model status agreement adopted by the European Commission in December last year.

The final terms of the agreements are of course subject to negotiations with each state, with the texts then sent to the Council and Parliament for approval (or not).

This is likely to lead to certain discrepancies. For example, the current status agreements with Balkan states contain differences on the privileges and immunities of officials deployed on Frontex operations:

“While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision [on whether to waive criminal immunity or not] will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.”

Negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex operations in Senegal and Mauritania are also ongoing. When approved, Frontex operations in those two countries will be the first ones outside the European continent.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/october/tracking-the-pact-eu-seeks-to-seal-off-balkan-route-with-expanded-fronte

Communiqué de presse du Conseil de l’UE du 24 février 2023 au sujet du nouvel accord conclu entre Frontex et la Macédoine du Nord (signé en octobre 2022, déploiement opérationnel à partir du 1er avril 2023: ►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr).

Le communiqué refait le point sur les accords entre Frontex et les Etats non UE :

- Border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules.
- In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.
- An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.
- The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

–---

Border management: EU concludes agreement with North Macedonia on Frontex cooperation

The Council gave today its final green light to an agreement with North Macedonia on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement will allow joint operations to be organised and Frontex border management teams to be deployed in North Macedonia, subject to the country’s agreement.

As of 1st April, Frontex will be able to assist North Macedonia in its efforts to manage migratory flows, counter illegal immigration, and tackle cross-border crime. Reinforcing controls along North Macedonia’s borders will contribute to further enhancing security at the EU’s external borders.

In line with the European border and coast guard regulation, the agreement also includes provisions for compliance monitoring and for the protection of fundamental rights.

Background

In 2019 a new Frontex regulation was adopted, broadening the agency’s mandate on several areas, including cooperation with third countries. The new mandate allows the agency to assist those countries with a status agreement throughout their territory and not only in the regions bordering the EU, as was the case with the previous mandate. It also allows Frontex staff to exercise executive powers, such as border checks and registration of persons. Status agreements allowing for joint operations can now be concluded with a wider range of countries and are no longer limited to neighbouring countries.

Frontex had border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules. In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.

An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.

The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr

Joint Civil Society statement on the Schengen Borders Code

The undersigned civil society organisations would like to express their concerns with regard to several aspects of the Commission’s proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code.

Overall, the proposal embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders irregularly are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing and curtailing safeguards. At the same time, the proposal fails to recognise the lack of regular pathways for asylum seekers, who are often forced to turn to irregular border crossings in order to seek international protection within the EU, and further complicates access to asylum. The measures put forward by the Commission would have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, access to asylum and the harmonisation of procedures under EU law. Furthermore, the proposal would increase the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, without any adequate safeguards.

Freedom of movement within the EU and violation of the principle of non-discrimination

Several provisions of the proposed amended Schengen Borders Code would encroach the right to freedom of movement within the EU (art. 3(2) TEU, art. 21 and 77 TFEU) by expanding the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls and facilitating the application of so-called “alternative measures” which in practice amount to discriminatory border controls. The discretionary nature of these border checks is very likely to disproportionately target racialised communities, and practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling and expose people to institutional and police abuse.

While the amended Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also introduces the possibility to carry out police checks in the internal border areas with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration, when these are based on “general information and experience of the competent authorities” (rec. 18 and 21 and art. 23). In addition, the proposal clarifies the meaning of “serious threat” which justifies the temporary reintroduction of border controls (which was already possible under art. 25 of the 2016 SBC). Problematically, the proposed definition of “serious threat” also includes “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (art. 25).[1]

Such provisions, together with the new procedure set by article 23a and analysed below, will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics. This practice is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law and a breach to migrants’ fundamental rights.

Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2021 shows that people from an ‘ethnic minority, Muslim, or not heterosexual’ are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them.

The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling and put migrant communities at risk of institutional violence, which undermines the right to non-discrimination and stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

Lack of individual assessment and increased detention

The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders”. According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national without a residence permit or right to remain crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g., from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France) and if they are apprehended “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from, without undergoing an individual assessment (art. 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if they are apprehended as part of cross-border police cooperation (e.g. joint police patrols) and if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

The person will be then transferred within 24 hours.[2] During these 24 hours, Annex XII sets that the authorities might “take appropriate measures” to prevent the person from entering on the territory – which constitutes, in practice, a blanket detention provision, without any safeguards nor judicial overview. While the transfer decision could be subject to appeal, this would not have a suspensive effect. The Return Directive would also be amended, by introducing an obligation for the receiving member state to issue a return decision without the exceptions currently listed in article 6 (e.g., the possibility to issue a residence permit for humanitarian or compassionate reasons). As a consequence, transferred people would be automatically caught up in arbitrary and lengthy detention and return procedures.[3]

Courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria have recently ruled against readmissions taking place under informal or formal agreements, recognising them as systematic human rights violations with the potential to trigger so-called chain pushbacks. The courts found the plaintiffs were routinely returned from Italy or Austria through Slovenia to Croatia, from where they had been illegally pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In practice, this provision would legalise the extremely violent practice of “internal pushbacks” which have been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and condemned by higher courts. The new procedure, including the possibility to detain people for up to 24 hours, would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts and despite international consensus that child detention constitutes a human rights violation.

Access to asylum

The new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in cases of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (art. 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of border crossing points and their opening hours, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (art. 5(4) and 13(5)). The definition of instrumentalisation of migrants should also be read in conjunction with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, which provides member states with numerous derogations to the asylum acquis.

These measures unjustifiably penalise asylum seekers by limiting access to the territory and de facto undermining art. 31 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their entry or presence in their territory without authorization, and are therefore in violation of international law.

Harmonisation of procedures under EU law and asylum acquis

The proposal lifts the standstill clause introduced by the 2008 Return Directive (art. 6(3)) which prohibits member states from negotiating new bilateral readmission agreements. When negotiating the 2008 Return Directive, both the Commission and the European Parliament had clarified that bilateral readmission agreements should remain an exception, as they undermine the objective of harmonising procedures under EU law.

By incentivising states to adopt new bilateral agreements, and proposing a new internal transfer procedure, the Commission’s proposal promotes the proliferation of exceptional procedures, which are outside the framework set by the Return Directive and the asylum acquis, and circumvents the procedural safeguards included in the Dublin Regulation.

The proposed provisions undermine the substantive and procedural guarantees for third country nationals, such as the right to request asylum, the respect of the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.

As mentioned above, several national-level courts have ruled on the unlawfulness of readmissions carried out under formal and informal agreements, which often led to instances of chain-refoulement. There is a serious risk that readmission agreements, if they remain a part of the current legislative proposal, could be further abused to perpetrate chain refoulement and collective expulsions, which are in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Use of monitoring and surveillance technologies

Lastly, the proposal also facilitates a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, by clarifying that these are part of member states’ responsibility to patrol borders (art. 2). In addition, article 23, analysed above, clarifies that internal checks, including to prevent irregular migration, can be carried out “where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory”.

By removing obstacles for a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, these provisions would create a loophole to introduce technologies which would otherwise be discouraged by pre-existing EU legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation.[4]

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other automated decision-making systems, including profiling, are increasingly used in border control and management for generalised and indiscriminate surveillance. Insofar as such systems are used to ‘detect human presence’ for the purpose of ‘combating irregular migration’, there is serious concern that such systems can facilitate illegal interdiction, violence at border crossings, and further limit access to asylum and other forms of protection.

Furthermore, these technologies disproportionately target racialised people, thus further exacerbating the risks of increased racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, monitoring and surveillance technologies which make use of artificial intelligence by nature violate the right to non-discrimination insofar as they are trained on past data and decision-making, and therefore codify assumptions on the basis of nationality and other personal characteristics, which is prohibited by international racial discrimination law.[5]

Recommendations

In light of the concerns discussed above, the undersigned civil society organisations:

– Express their concerns on the harmful impact of narratives which consider people crossing borders irregularly as a threat, and recommend the European Parliament and the Council to delete such references from recital 29, article 23 and article 25(1)(c);
– Call on the EU institutions to uphold the right to freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination, including by prohibiting the use of technologies which make use of artificial intelligence and other automated decision-making systems. In this regard, we recommend the European Parliament and the Council to amend article 23, paragraph (a) by deleting the reference to “combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration” in point (ii) and deleting point (iv) on monitoring and surveillance technologies;
– Urge the EU institutions to uphold the right to apply for asylum, and recommend deleting the definition of ‘instrumentalisation of migration’ in article 2, paragraph 27 and all the ensuing provisions which would apply in this circumstance;
– Condemn the proliferation of exceptional procedures which undermine the right to an individual assessment, and recommend deleting article 23a, annex XII, and the proposed amendment to art. 6(3) of the Return Directive;
– Express their concerns at the glaring inconsistency between some of the proposed provisions and the European Commission’s commitments under the EU Action Plan against Racism, i.e. with respect to ending racial profiling, and call on the EU institutions to uphold their commitment to address and to combat structural and institutional discrimination and include explicit references to the Action Plan against Racism in the text of the Schengen Borders Code.

▻https://picum.org/joint-civil-society-statement-schengen-borders-code

#discrimination #non-discrimination #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #réadmission

L’UE précise son futur système de contrôle des voyageurs exemptés de visas

Les modalités du futur système de #contrôle_préalable, auquel devront se soumettre d’ici fin 2022 les ressortissants de pays tiers pouvant se rendre dans l’Union #sans_visa, a fait l’objet d’un #accord annoncé vendredi par l’exécutif européen.

Ce dispositif, baptisé ETIAS et inspiré du système utilisé par les Etats-Unis, concernera les ressortissants de plus de 60 pays qui sont exemptés de visas pour leurs courts séjours dans l’Union, comme les ressortissants des Etats-Unis, du Brésil, ou encore de l’Albanie et des Emirats arabes unis.

Ce système dit « d’information et d’autorisation », qui vise à repérer avant leur entrée dans l’#espace_Schengen des personnes jugées à #risques, doit permettre un contrôle de sécurité avant leur départ via une demande d’autorisation sur internet.

Dans le cadre de l’ETIAS, les demandes en ligne coûteront 7 euros et chaque autorisation sera valable trois ans pour des entrées multiples, a indiqué un porte-parole de la Commission.

Selon les prévisions, « probablement plus de 95% » des demandes « donneront lieu à une #autorisation_automatique », a-t-il ajouté.

Le Parlement européen avait adopté dès juillet 2018 une législation établissant le système ETIAS, mais dans les négociations pour finaliser ses modalités opérationnelles, les eurodéputés réclamaient des garde-fous, en le rendant interopérable avec les autres systèmes d’information de l’UE.

Eurodéputés et représentants des Etats, de concert avec la Commission, ont approuvé jeudi des modifications qui permettront la consultation de différentes #bases_de_données, dont celles d’#Europol et d’#Interpol, pour identifier les « menaces sécuritaires potentielles, dangers de migration illégale ou risques épidémiologiques élevés ».

Il contribuera ainsi à « la mise en oeuvre du nouveau Pacte (européen) sur la migration et l’asile », a estimé le porte-parole.

« Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos #frontières_extérieures. (ETIAS) fournira des #informations_préalables sur les voyageurs avant qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières de l’UE afin d’identifier les risques en matière de #sécurité ou de #santé », a souligné Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, citée dans un communiqué.

Hors restrictions dues à la pandémie, « au moins 30 millions de voyageurs se rendent chaque année dans l’UE sans visa, et on ne sait pas grand chose à leur sujet. L’ETIAS comblera cette lacune, car il exigera un "#background_check" », selon l’eurodéputé Jeroen Lenaers (PPE, droite pro-UE), rapporteur du texte.

L’accord doit recevoir un ultime feu vert du Parlement et des Vingt-Sept pour permettre au système d’entrer en vigueur.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/190321/l-ue-precise-son-futur-systeme-de-controle-des-voyageurs-exemptes-de-visas
#smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes

Eurodac, la “sorveglianza di massa” per fermare le persone ai confini Ue

Oggi il database conserva le impronte digitali di richiedenti asilo e stranieri “irregolari”. La proposta di riforma della Commissione Ue vuole inserire più dati biometrici, compresi quelli dei minori. Mettendo a rischio privacy e diritti

Da più di vent’anni i richiedenti asilo che presentano domanda di protezione in un Paese europeo, così come i cittadini stranieri che attraversano “irregolarmente” i confini dell’Unione, sono registrati con le impronte digitali all’interno del sistema “Eurodac”. L’acronimo sta per “European asylum dactyloscopy database” e al 31 dicembre 2019 contava oltre 5,69 milioni di set di impronte cui se ne sono aggiunti oltre 644mila nel corso del 2020. Le finalità di Eurodac sono strettamente legate al Regolamento Dublino: il database, infatti, era stato istituito nel 2000 per individuare il Paese europeo di primo ingresso dei richiedenti asilo, che avrebbe dovuto valutare la domanda di protezione, ed evitare che la stessa persona presentasse domanda di protezione in più Paesi europei (il cosiddetto asylum shopping). 

Nei prossimi anni, però, Eurodac potrebbe diventare uno strumento completamente diverso. Il 23 settembre 2020 la “nuova” Commissione europea guidata da Ursula von der Leyen, infatti, ha presentato una proposta di riforma che ricalca un testo presentato nel 2016 e si inserisce all’interno del Patto sull’immigrazione e l’asilo, ampliando gli obiettivi del database: “Eurodac, che era stato creato per stabilire quale sia il Paese europeo competente a esaminare la domanda di asilo, vede affiancarsi alla sua funzione originaria il controllo delle migrazioni irregolari e dei flussi secondari all’interno dell’Unione -commenta Valeria Ferraris, ricercatrice presso il dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Torino (unito.it)-. Viene messa in atto un’estensione del controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti irregolari e non come persone bisognose di protezione”.

“Oggi Eurodac registra solo le impronte digitali. La proposta di riforma prevede di aggiungere i dati biometrici del volto, che possono essere utilizzati per il riconoscimento facciale tramite apposite tecnologie -spiega ad Altreconomia Chloé Berthélémy, policy advisor dell’European digital rights-. Inoltre si prevede di raccogliere anche le generalità dei migranti, informazioni relative a data e luogo di nascita-nazionalità. Sia per gli adulti sia per i minori a partire dai sei anni di età, mentre oggi vengono registrati solo gli adolescenti dai 14 anni in su”. Per Bruxelles l’esigenza di aggiungere nuovi dati biometrici al database è motivata dalle difficoltà di alcuni Stati membri nel raccogliere le impronte digitali a causa del rifiuto da parte dei richiedenti asilo o perché questi si procurano tagli, lesioni o scottature per non essere identificati. La stima dei costi per l’espansione di Eurodac è di 29,8 milioni di euro, necessari per “l’aggiornamento tecnico, l’aumento dell’archiviazione e della capacità del sistema centrale” si legge nella proposta di legge. 

Le preoccupazioni per possibili violazioni dei diritti di migranti hanno spinto Edri, il principale network europeo di Ong impegnate nella tutela dei diritti e delle libertà digitali, e altre trenta associazioni (tra cui Amnesty International, Statewatch, Terre des Hommes) a scrivere lo scorso settembre una lettera aperta alla Commissione Libe del Parlamento europeo per chiedere di ritardare il processo legislativo di modifica di Eurodac e “concedere il tempo necessario a un’analisi significativa delle implicazioni sui diritti fondamentali della proposta di riforma”. 

“Lungi dall’essere meramente tecnico, il dossier Eurodac è di natura altamente politica e strategica”, scrivono le associazioni firmatarie nella lettera. Che avvertono: se le modifiche proposte verranno adottate potrebbe venire compromesso “il dovere dell’Unione europea di rispettare il diritto e gli standard internazionali in materia di asilo e migrazione”. Eurodac rischia così di trasformarsi in “un potente strumento per la sorveglianza di massa” dei cittadini stranieri. Inoltre “le modifiche proposte sulla banca dati, che implicano il trattamento di più categorie di dati per una serie più ampia di finalità, sono in palese contraddizione con il principio di limitazione delle finalità, un principio chiave Ue sulla protezione dei dati”.

“Si rischia di estendere il controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti ‘irregolari’ e non come persone bisognose di protezione” – Valeria Ferraris

Le critiche delle associazioni firmatarie si concentrano soprattutto sul possibile uso del riconoscimento facciale per l’identificazione biometrica che viene definito “sproporzionato e invasivo della privacy” si legge nella lettera. “Le leggi fondamentali sulla protezione dei dati personali in Europa stabiliscono che l’interferenza con il diritto alla privacy deve essere proporzionata e rispondere a un interesse generale -spiega Chloé Berthélémy-. Nel caso di Eurodac, l’utilizzo delle impronte digitali è sufficiente a garantire l’identificazione della persona garantendo così il principio di limitazione dello scopo, che è centrale per la protezione dei dati in Europa”. 

“Noi siamo contrari all’uso di tecnologie di riconoscimento facciale e siamo particolarmente radicali su questo -aggiungono Davide Del Monte e Laura Carrer dell’Hermes Center, una delle associazioni firmatarie della lettera-. Una tecnologia può anche avere un utilizzo corretto, ad esempio per combattere il terrorismo, ma la potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare. Inoltre è molto difficile fare un passo indietro una volta che le infrastrutture necessarie a implementare queste tecnologie vengono ‘posate’ e messe in funzione: non si torna mai indietro e il loro utilizzo viene sempre ampliato. Per noi sono equiparabili ad armi e per questo la loro circolazione deve essere limitata”. Anche in virtù di queste posizioni, Hermes Center è promotore in Italia della campagna “Reclaim your face” con cui si chiede alle istituzioni di vietare il riconoscimento facciale negli spazi pubblici.

“La potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare” – Laura Carrer

Ma non è finita. Se la riforma verrà adottata, all’interno del database europeo finiranno non solo i richiedenti asilo e le persone intercettate mentre attraversano “irregolarmente” le frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea ma anche tutti gli stranieri privi di titolo di soggiorno che venissero fermati all’interno di un Paese europeo e verrebbe anche creata una categoria ad hoc per i migranti soccorsi in mare durante un’operazione di search and rescue. Verranno inoltre raccolti i dati relativi ai bambini a partire dai sei anni di età: ufficialmente, questa (radicale) modifica al funzionamento del database europeo è stata introdotta con l’obiettivo di tutelare i minori stranieri. 

Ma le associazioni evidenziano come raccogliere e conservare i dati biometrici dei bambini per scopi non legati alla loro protezione rappresenti “una violazione gravemente invasiva e ingiustificata del diritto alla privacy, che lede i principi di proporzionalità e necessità”. Dati e informazioni che verranno conservati più a lungo di quanto non accade oggi: per i “migranti irregolari” si passa dai 18 mesi attuali a cinque anni.

A complicare ulteriormente la situazione c’è anche l’entrata in vigore nel 2018 del nuovo “Regolamento interoperatività”, che permette di mettere in connessione Eurodac con altri database come il Sistema informativo Schengen (Sis) e il sistema informativo Visti (Vis), il Sistema europeo di informazione e autorizzazione ai viaggi (Etias) e il Sistema di ingressi/uscite (Ees). 

“In precedenza, questi erano tutti sistemi autonomi, ora si sta andando verso un merging, garantendo una connessione che contraddice la base giuridica iniziale per cui ciascuno di questi sistemi aveva un suo obiettivo -spiega Ferraris-. Nel corso degli anni gli obiettivi attribuiti a ciascun sistema si sono moltiplicati, violando i principi in materia di protezione dei dati personali e diventando progressivamente sempre più focalizzati sul controllo della migrazione”. Inoltre le modifiche normative hanno esteso l’accesso a questi database sempre più integrati tra loro a un numero sempre maggiore di autorità.

“Quello che chiediamo al Parlamento europeo è di fare un passo indietro e di ripensare l’intero quadro normativo -conclude Berthélémy-. La nostra principale raccomandazione è quella di realizzare e pubblicare una valutazione di impatto sull’estensione dell’applicazione di Eurodac per delineare le conseguenze sui diritti fondamentali o su quelli dei minori causati dalle significative modifiche proposte. Si sta estendendo in maniera enorme l’ambito di applicazione di un database, e questo avrà conseguenze per decine di migliaia di persone”.

▻https://altreconomia.it/eurodac-la-sorveglianza-di-massa-per-fermare-le-persone-ai-confini-ue

Lex signing ceremony in presence of David SASSOLI, EP President and Tytti TUPPURAINEN, Finnish Minister for European Affairs, on the European Border and Coast Guard regulation, rapporteur Roberta METSOLA (EPP, MT)

#David_SASSOLI, EP President and #Tytti_TUPPURAINEN, Finnish Minister for European Affairs and President in office of the Council of the EU, sign various legislative acts such as the European Border and Coast Guard regulation, by rapporteur Roberta METSOLA (EPP, MT), in the European Parliament in Brussels.

https://i.imgur.com/rpIaNV2.png

Et un commentaire au message, toujours reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop :
En complément, un PDF très complet est disponible ici :
« Analyse juridique Le Régime d’Asile
Européen Commun - introduction à l’attention des juridictions »
▻https://www.easo.europa.eu/file/25988/ent.jsf

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

European Border and Coast Guard: Launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

Today, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, is launching the first ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country. As of 22 May, teams from the Agency will be deployed together with Albanian border guards at the Greek-Albanian border to strengthen border management and enhance security at the EU’s external borders, in full agreement with all concerned countries. This operation marks a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and its Western Balkan partners, and is yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

The launch event is taking place in Tirana, Albania, in the presence of Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister and Sandër Lleshaj, Albanian Interior Minister.

Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said: "With the first ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders.”

Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, said: “Today we mark a milestone for our agency and the wider cooperation between the European Union and Albania. We are launching the first fully fledged joint operation outside the European Union to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.”

While Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders, the European Border and Coast Guard is able to lend both technical and operational support and assistance. The European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to support the Albanian border guards in performing border checks at crossing points, for example, and preventing unauthorised entries. All operations and deployments at the Albanian border with Greece will be conducted in full agreement with both the Albanian and Greek authorities.

At the start of the operation, the Agency will be deploying 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and 1 thermo-vision van from 12 EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.

Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will contribute to the better management of irregular migration, further enhance security at the EU’s external borders and strengthen the Agency’s ability to act in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, while bringing that neighbourhood closer to the EU.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2591_en.htm
#externalisation

Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Albania at the official launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are here today to celebrate an important achievement and a milestone, both for Albania and for the EU.

Only six months ago, here in Tirana, the EU signed the status agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard. This agreement, that entered into force three weeks ago, was the first agreement ever of its kind with a neighbouring country.

Today, we will send off the joint European Border and Coast Guard Teams to be deployed as of tomorrow for the first time in a non-EU Member State. This does not only mark a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and Western Balkan partners, it is also yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

The only way to effectively address migration and security challenges we are facing today and those we may be confronted with in the years to come is by working closer together, as neighbours and as partners. What happens in Albania and the Western Balkans affects the European Union, and the other way around.

Joint approach to border management is a key part of our overall approach to managing migration. It allows us to show to our citizens that their security is at the top of our concerns. But effective partnership in ensuring orderly migration also enables us, as Europe, to remain a place where those in need of protection can find shelter.

Albania is the first country in the Western Balkans with whom the EU is moving forward with this new important chapter in our joint co-operation on border management.

This can be a source of pride for both Albania and the EU and an important step that brings us closer together.

While the overall situation along the Western Balkans route remains stable with continuously low levels of arrivals - it is in fact like night and day when compared to three years ago - we need to remain vigilant.

The Status Agreement will help us in this effort. It expands the scale of practical, operational cooperation between the EU and Albania and hopefully soon with the rest of the Western Balkan region.

These are important elements of our co-operation, also in view of the continued implementation of the requirements under the visa liberalisation agreement. Visa-free travel is a great achievement, which brings benefits to all sides and should be safeguarded.

Together with Albanian border guards, European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to perform border checks at crossing points and perform border surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings and counter cross-border criminality.

But, let me be clear, Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders. European Border and Coast Guard Teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers in the Albanian territory under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the Republic of Albania.

Dear Friends,

When it comes to protecting our borders, ensuring our security and managing migration, the challenges we face are common, and so must be our response.

The European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement and its implementation will allow us to better work together in all these areas. I hope that these agreements can be finalised also with other Western Balkans partners as soon as possible.

I wish to thank Prime Minister Edi Rama, the Albanian authorities, and the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Fabrice Leggeri and his team for their close cooperation in bringing this milestone achievement to life. I also want to thank all Member States who have contributed with staff and the personnel who will be part of this first deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams in a neighbouring country.

With just a few days to go before the European Elections, the need for a more united and stronger European family is more important than ever. We firmly believe that a key priority is to have strong relations with close neighbours, based on a clear balance of rights and obligations – but above all, on genuine partnership. This includes you, fellow Albanians.

Albania is part of the European family.Our challenges are common. They know no borders. The progress we are witnessing today is another concrete action and proof of our commitment to bring us closer together. To make us stronger.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-2668_en.htm

Externalisation: Frontex launches first formal operation outside of the EU and deploys to Albania

The EU has taken a significant, if geographically small, step in the externalisation of its borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has launched its first Joint Operation on the territory of a non-EU-Member State, as it begins cooperation with Albania on the border with Greece.

After the launch of the operation in Tirana on 21 May a deployment of 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and a thermo-vision van started yesterday, 22 May (European Commission, link). Twelve Member States (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) have contributed to the operation.

New agreements

The move follows the entry into force on 1 May this year of a Status Agreement between the EU and Albania on actions carried out by Frontex in that country (pdf). Those actions are made possible by the conclusion of operational plans, which must be agreed between Frontex and the Albanian authorities.

The Status Agreement with Albania was the first among several similar agreements to be signed between the Agency and Balkan States, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia.

The nascent operation in Albania will give Frontex team members certain powers, privileges and immunities on Albanian territory, including the use of force in circumstances authorised by Albanian border police and outlined in the operational plan.

Frontex does not publish operational plans whilst operations (which can be renewed indefinitely) are ongoing, and documents published after the conclusion of operations (usually in response to requests for access to documents) are often heavily-redacted (Ask the EU, link).

Relevant articles

Article 4 of the Status Agreement outlines the tasks and powers of members of Frontex teams operating in Albanian territory. This includes the use of force, if it is authorised by both the Frontex team member’s home Member State and the State of Albania, and takes place in the presence of Albanian border guards. However, Albania can authorise team members to use force in their absence.

Article 6 of the Status Agreement grants Frontex team members immunity from Albanian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction “in respect of the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the course of the actions carried out in accordance with the operational plan”.

Although a representative of Albania would be informed in the event of an allegation of criminal activity, it would be up to Frontex’s executive director to certify to the court whether the actions in question were performed as part of an official Agency function and in accordance with the Operational Plan. This certification will be binding on the jurisdiction of Albania. Proceedings may only continue against an individual team member if the executive director confirms that their actions were outside the scope of the exercise of official functions.

Given the closed nature of the operational plans, this grants the executive director wide discretion and ensures little oversight of the accountability of Agency team members. Notably, Article 6 also states that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. This immunity does not, however, extend to the jurisdiction of team members’ home Member States, and they may also waive the immunity of the individual under Albanian jurisdiction.

Right to redress

These measures of immunity alongside the lack of transparency surrounding documents outlining team members’ official functions and activities (the operational plan) raise concerns regarding access to redress for victims of human rights violations that may occur during operations.

Human rights organisations have denounced the use of force by Frontex team members, only to have those incidents classified by the Agency as par for the course in their operations. Cases include incidents of firearm use that resulted in serious injury (The Intercept, link), but that was considered to have taken place according to the standard rules of engagement. This opacity has implications for individuals’ right to good administration and to the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms.

If any damage results from actions that were carried out according to the operational plan, Albania will be held liable. This is the most binding liability outlined by the Status Agreement. Albania may only “request” that compensation be paid by the Member State of the team member responsible, or by the Agency, if acts were committed through gross negligence, wilful misconduct or outside the scope of the official functions of the Agency team or staff member.

Across the board

The provisions regarding tasks, powers and immunity in the Status Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia are all broadly similar, with the exception of Article 6 of the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This states:

“Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina… to provide evidence in accordance with the procedural law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

The Status Agreement with Serbia, an early draft of which did not grant immunity to team members, is now consistent with the Agreement with Albania and includes provisions stating that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses.

It includes a further provision that:

“...members of the team may use weapons only when it is absolutely necessary in self-defence to repel an immediate life-threatening attack against themselves or another person, in accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Serbia”.

▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/may/fx-albania-launch.htm

La police des frontières extérieures de l’UE s’introduit en Albanie

Frontex, l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, a lancé mardi en Albanie sa première opération hors du territoire d’un de ses États membres.

Cette annonce de la Commission européenne intervient quelques jours avant les élections européennes et au moment où la politique migratoire de l’UE est critiquée par les candidats souverainistes, comme le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini ou le chef de file de la liste française d’extrême droite, Jordan Bardella, qui a récemment qualifié Frontex d’« hôtesse d’accueil pour migrants ».

Cette opération conjointe en Albanie est « une véritable étape historique rapprochant » les Balkans de l’UE, et témoigne d’une « meilleure gestion de la migration et de la protection de nos frontières communes », a commenté à Tirana le commissaire chargé des migrations, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

L’Albanie espère convaincre les États membres d’ouvrir des négociations d’adhésion ce printemps, ce qui lui avait été refusé l’an passé. Son premier ministre Edi Rama a salué « un pas très important dans les relations entre l’Albanie et l’Union européenne » et a estimé qu’il « renforçait également la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité ».

À partir de 22 mai, Frontex déploiera des équipes conjointes à la frontière grecque avec des agents albanais.

La Commission européenne a passé des accords semblables avec la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui devraient également entrer en vigueur.

Tous ces pays sont sur une des « routes des Balkans », qui sont toujours empruntées clandestinement par des milliers de personnes en route vers l’Union européenne, même si le flux n’est en rien comparable avec les centaines de milliers de migrants qui ont transité par la région en quelques mois jusqu’à la fermeture des frontières par les pays de l’UE début 2016.

Ce type d’accord « contribuera à l’amélioration de la gestion de la migration clandestine, renforcera la sécurité aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et consolidera la capacité de l’agence à agir dans le voisinage immédiat de l’UE, tout en rapprochant de l’UE les pays voisins concernés », selon un communiqué de la Commission.

Pour éviter de revivre le chaos de 2015, l’Union a acté un renforcement considérable de Frontex. Elle disposera notamment d’ici 2027 d’un contingent de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes pour aider des pays débordés.

https://images.lpcdn.ca/641x427/201905/21/1641482-membres-frontex-policiers-albanais-conversent.jpg

European Border and Coast Guard Agency began to patrol alongside the Albanian-Greek border in late May (►https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118). Similar agreements have recently been concluded with Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina but Albania is the first country to start implementing programs aimed at blocking refugees entering the EU. Bilten states that Frontex employees can carry arms and fight “against any kind of crime, from” illegal migration “to theft of a car or drug trafficking”. Frontex’s mission is not time-bound, i.e. it depends on the EU’s need. The Albanian authorities see it as a step forward to their membership in the Union.

Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 10.06.2019

L’article original:
Što Frontex radi u Albaniji?

https://www.bilten.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/000_1FP47G.jpg

Nakon što je Europska unija službeno zatvorila “balkansku migrantsku rutu”, očajni ljudi počeli su tražiti nove puteve. Jedan od njih prolazi kroz Albaniju, a tamošnja se vlada odrekla kontrole nad vlastitom granicom u nadi da će time udobrovoljiti unijske dužnosnike.

Agencija za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu, Frontex, počela je krajem prošlog mjeseca patrolirati uz albansko-grčku granicu. Već prvog dana, raspoređeno je pedesetak policajaca iz različitih zemalja članica EU koji bi se u suradnji s albanskim graničarima trebali boriti protiv “ilegalne migracije”. Iako je slične dogovore Unija nedavno sklopila sa zemljama poput Srbije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Crne Gore te Bosne i Hercegovine – a sve s ciljem blokiranja mogućnosti izbjeglica da uđu na područje EU – Albanija je prva zemlja u kojoj je počela provedba tog programa. Zaposlenici Frontexa ne samo da smiju nositi oružje, već imaju i dozvolu da se bore protiv bilo koje vrste kriminala, od “ilegalnih migracija” do krađe automobila ili trgovine drogom. Također, njihova misija nije vremenski ograničena, što znači da će Frontexovi zaposlenici patrolirati s albanske strane granice dok god to Unija smatra potrebnim.

Unatoč nekim marginalnim glasovima koji su se žalili zbog kršenja nacionalne suverenosti prepuštanjem kontrole nad granicom stranim trupama, javnost je reagirala bilo potpunom nezainteresiranošću ili čak blagom potporom sporazumu koji bi tobože trebao pomoći Albaniji da uđe u Europsku uniju. S puno entuzijazma, lokalni su se mediji hvalili kako su u prva četiri dana Frontexovi zaposlenici već ulovili 92 “ilegalna migranta”. No to nije prvo, a ni najozbiljnije predavanje kontrole nad granicom koje je poduzela albanska vlada. Još od kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih jadranskim i jonskim teritorijalnim vodama Republike Albanije patrolira talijanska Guardia di Finanza. Tih se godina albanska obala često koristila kao most prema Italiji preko kojeg je prelazila većina migranata azijskog porijekla, ne samo zbog blizine južne Italije, već i zbog slabosti državnih aparata tijekom goleme krize 1997. i 1998. godine.

Helikopteri Guardije di Finanza također kontroliraju albansko nebo u potrazi za poljima kanabisa i to sve u suradnji s lokalnom državnom birokracijom koja je sama dijelom suradnica dilera, a dijelom nesposobna da im se suprotstavi. No posljednjih godina, zbog toga što su druge rute zatvorene, sve veći broj ljudi počeo se kretati iz Grčke preko Albanije, Crne Gore i BiH prema zemljama EU. Prema Međunarodnoj organizaciji za migracije, granicu je prešlo oko 18 tisuća ljudi, uglavnom iz Sirije, Pakistana i Iraka. To predstavlja povećanje od sedam puta u odnosu na godinu ranije. Tek manji dio tih ljudi je ulovljen zbog nedostatka kapaciteta granične kontrole ili pak potpune indiferencije prema ljudima kojima siromašna zemlja poput Albanije nikada neće biti destinacija.
Tranzitna zemlja

Oni koje ulove smješteni su u prihvatnom centru blizu Tirane, ali odatle im je relativno jednostavno pobjeći i nastaviti put dalje. Dio njih službeno je zatražio azil u Albaniji, ali to ne znači da će se dulje zadržati u zemlji. Ipak, očekuje se da će ubuduće albanske institucije biti znatno agresivnije u politici repatrijacije migranata. U tome će se susretati s brojnim pravnim i administrativnim problemima: kako objašnjavaju lokalni stručnjaci za migracije, Albanija sa zemljama iz kojih dolazi većina migranata – poput Sirije, Pakistana, Iraka i Afganistana – uopće nema diplomatske odnose niti pravne predstavnike u tim zemljama. Zbog toga je koordiniranje procesa repatrijacije gotovo nemoguće. Također, iako sporazum o repatrijaciji postoji s Grčkoj, njime je predviđeno da se u tu zemlju vraćaju samo oni za koje se može dokazati da su iz nje došli, a većina migranata koji dođu iz Grčke nastoji sakriti svaki trag svog boravka u toj zemlji.

U takvoj situaciji, čini se izvjesnim da će Albanija biti zemlja u kojoj će sve veći broj ljudi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme. Prije nekih godinu i pol dana, izbila je javna panika s dosta rasističkih tonova. Nakon jednog nespretnog intervjua vladinog dužnosnika njemačkom mediju proširile su se glasine da će se u Albaniju naseliti šesto tisuća Sirijaca. Brojka je već na prvi pogled astronomska s obzirom na to da je stanovništvo zemlje oko tri milijuna ljudi, ali teorije zavjere se obično šire kao požar. Neki od drugorazrednih političara čak su pozvali na oružanu borbu ako dođu Sirijci. No ta je panika zapravo brzo prošla, ali tek nakon što je vlada obećala da neće primiti više izbjeglica od onog broja koji bude određen raspodjelom prema dogovoru u Uniji. Otad zapravo nema nekog osobitog antimigrantskog raspoloženja u javnosti, unatoč tome što tisuće ljudi prolazi kroz zemlju.
Europski san

Odnos je uglavnom onaj indiferencije. Tome pridonosi nekoliko stvari: činjenica da je gotovo trećina stanovništva Albanije također odselila u zemlje Unije,1 zatim to što ne postoje neke vjerske i ultranacionalističke stranke, ali najviše to što nitko od migranata nema nikakvu namjeru ostati u zemlji. No zašto je albanska vlada tako nestrpljiva da preda kontrolu granice i suverenitet, odnosno zašto je premijer Edi Rama izgledao tako entuzijastično prilikom ceremonije s Dimitrisom Avramopulosom, europskim povjerenikom za migracije, unutrašnje poslove i državljanstvo? Vlada se nada da će to ubrzati njezin put prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji. Posljednjih pet godina provela je čekajući otvaranje pristupnih pregovora, a predavanje kontrole nad granicom vidi kao još jednu ilustraciju svoje pripadnosti Uniji.

S druge strane, stalna politička kriza koju su izazvali studentski protesti u prosincu 2018., te kasnije bojkot parlamenta i lokalnih izbora od strane opozicijskih stranaka, stavlja neprestani pritisak na vladu. Očajnički treba pozitivan znak iz EU jer vodi političku i ideološku borbu protiv opozicije oko toga tko je autentičniji kulturni i politički predstavnik europejstva. Vlada naziva opoziciju i njezine nasilne prosvjede antieuropskima, dok opozicija optužuje vladu da svojom korupcijom i povezanošću s organiziranim kriminalom radi protiv europskih želja stanovništva. Prije nekoliko dana, Komisija je predložila početak pristupnih pregovora s Albanijom, no Europsko vijeće je to koje ima zadnju riječ. Očekuje se kako će sve ovisiti o toj odluci. Ideja Europe jedno je od čvorišta vladajuće ideologije koja se desetljećima gradi kao antipod komunizmu i Orijentu te historijska destinacija kojoj Albanci stoljećima teže.

Neoliberalna rekonstrukcija ekonomije i društva gotovo je uvijek legitimirana tvrdnjama kako su to nužni – iako bolni – koraci prema integraciji u Europsku uniju. Uspješnost ove ideologije ilustrira činjenica da otprilike 90% ispitanih u različitim studijama podržava Albansku integraciju u EU. U toj situaciji ne čudi ni odnos prema Frontexu.

►https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118

v. la new Frontex Regulation (octobre 2019) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/806961

Frontex expands operations in EU neighbouring countries

https://digit.site36.net/files/2019/11/Frontex_Albania-1024x683.jpg

After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A first deployment of the EU border troops has meanwhile been increased.

The European Commission has now also signed an arrangement with Serbia on „cooperation on border management“. The so-called status agreement regulates the implementation of „Joint Operations“ with the EU border agency Frontex at the common borders with the European Union. It was already published by the Commission in January and has now been ratified by the Serbian Parliament. Kosovo’s territory is excluded.

The objectives of the agreement include the fight against irregular migration and cross-border crime in accordance with the Frontex Regulation. The EU also promises „increased technical and operational assistance“ to the Serbian border police.

Model status agreement for „priority third countries“

The negotiations with Serbia followed a model status agreement approved by the Commission under the „European Migration Agenda“ for operational cooperation with „priority third countries“. The Commission first concluded a status agreement with Albania a year ago, followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro on 7 October this year. Further status agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Macedonia have been negotiated but still need to be ratified by the national parliaments. The European Parliament must also give its assent.

Once all five status agreements have been signed, Frontex could be deployed throughout the whole Western Balkans with the exception of Kosovo. The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, describes the agreements as „yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU“. All countries concerned are considered candidates for EU membership and the agreement to the Frontex operations is intended to facilitate the negotiations.

However, this rapprochement is likely to be damaged by the decision of the French government to refuse negotiations on EU membership to Northern Macedonia and Albania despite fulfilling the necessary conditions. The North Macedonian parliament could therefore delay the planned Frontex agreement. The same applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which France’s President Macron described as a „ticking time bomb“ for returning jihadists.

Police powers and immunity

The border police officers sent by Frontex from the EU Member States receive a special identity card from the country of deployment and wear their own uniforms with a blue Frontex armband. They will also carry weapons, ammunition and equipment from their sending state and may use force.

The troops enjoy immunity during Frontex operations. If a criminal offence is found, it will be prosecuted by the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin. Frontex team members also enjoy full protection against civil and administrative prosecution in the State of operation. The latter will also be liable for any damage caused by a member of the team during „all acts performed in the exercise of the official functions“.

Deployment plan agreed with Greece

Following the conclusion of the status agreement with Albania, it took six months for Frontex to launch its by now „first-ever joint operation“ on the territory of a neighbouring third country. According to Frontex, the governments in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia have sent personnel to a total of 16 patrol vehicles and one thermovision car.

According to the operational plan, which Frontex says is agreed with the Greek government, the operation will take place along the entire „green“ border and, in addition to border surveillance in the sections Sopik, Çarçovë, Leskovik, Shtikë, Kapshticë and Livadhja, will include border control at the Albanian-Greek crossing points Kakavija, Tre Urat (Çarçovë), Kapshticë, Rips and Qafe Bote. Frontex has set up support offices in Gjirokaster, Kakavija and Kapshticë to coordinate operations.

In the meantime, the operation, which started with 50 EU officials, has grown to 66. One sixth comes from the German Federal Police, which also brought along six of the twelve patrol vehicles currently in use. In addition to operational border control, training measures are also planned in Albania. The operation will also facilitate the exchange of operational information and „best practices“.

No Albanian human rights groups involved

The new Frontex Regulation will apply from 4 December. The border agency will be then granted more powers and will set up a border troop of 10,000 border guards. The measures taken by Frontex should be observed by a Fundamental Rights Officer, among others. Frontex has also set up a Consultative Forum with non-governmental organisations to advise the Agency on how to prevent infringements.

For „Joint Operations“ in third countries, the Consultative Forum recommends involving human rights groups active there in the operational plan. However, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, which sends eleven officers to Albania, has „no knowledge“ of the involvement of Albanian non-governmental organisations. The German Government also does not know which Albanian organisations might be asked to participate.

►https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries

Infographic - Border management: agreements with non-EU countries

https://i.imgur.com/b2IxnFb.png

Commissioner calls for more rescue capacity in the Mediterranean

I take note of the decision taken by the EU’s Political and Security Committee with regards to Operation Sophia. I regret that this will lead to even fewer naval assets in the Mediterranean, which could assist the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Lives are continuing to be lost in the Mediterranean. This should remind states of the urgency to adopt a different approach, one that should ensure a sufficiently resourced and fully operational system for saving human lives at sea and to safeguard rescued migrants’ dignity.

Whilst coastal states have the responsibility to ensure effective coordination of search and rescue operations, protecting lives in the Mediterranean requires concerted efforts of other states as well, to begin with the provision of naval assets specifically dedicated to search and rescue activities, deployed in those areas where they can make an effective contribution to saving human lives. Furthermore, I reiterate my call to all states to refrain from hindering and criminalising the work of NGOs who are trying to fill the ever-increasing gap in rescue capacity. States should rather support and co-operate with them, including by ensuring that they can use ports for their life-saving activities.

Finally, the decision to continue only with aerial surveillance and training of the Libyan Coast Guard further increases the risks that EU member states, directly or indirectly, contribute to the return of migrants and asylum seekers to Libya, where it is well-documented, in particular recently by the United Nations, that they face serious human rights violations. So far, calls to ensure more transparency and accountability in this area, including by publishing human rights risk assessments and setting up independent monitoring mechanisms, have not been heeded. The onus is now on EU member states to show urgently that the support to the Libyan Coast Guard is not contributing to human rights violations, and to suspend this support if they cannot do so.

▻https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-calls-for-more-rescue-capacity-in-the-mediterranean
#droits_humains #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye

NO migrant has been saved by Sophia after July 2018, perfectly in line with Italian requests

https://i.imgur.com/Jl8qyhJ.png

source, #Matteo_Villa via twitter:
▻https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1110910470783946753

#statistiques #sauvetage #chiffres

EU to end ship patrols in scaled down migrant rescue operation: diplomats

The European Union will cease the maritime patrols that have rescued thousands of migrants making the perilous Mediterranean Sea crossing from North Africa to Europe, but it will extend air missions, two diplomats said on Tuesday.
A new agreement on the EU’s Operation Sophia was hammered out after Italy, where anti-migrant sentiment is rising, said it would no longer receive those rescued at sea.

Operation Sophia’s mandate was due to expire on Sunday but should now continue for another six months with the same aim of detering people smugglers in the Mediterranean. But it will no longer deploy ships, instead relying on air patrols and closer coordination with Libya, the diplomats said.

“It is awkward, but this was the only way forward given Italy’s position, because nobody wanted the Sophia mission completely shut down,” one EU diplomat said.

A second diplomat confirmed a deal had been reached and said it must be endorsed by all EU governments on Wednesday.

The tentative deal, however, could weaken Operation Sophia’s role in saving lives in the sea where nearly 2,300 people perished last year, according to United Nations figures.

From the more than one million refugees and migrants who made it to the bloc during a 2015 crisis, sea arrivals dropped to 141,500 people in 2018, according to the United Nations.

Still, Italy’s deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini, has said his country would no longer be the main point of disembarkation for people trying to cross the Mediterranean by boat and rescued by Sophia’s patrol ships.

Rome called for other countries to open up their ports instead, but no other EU states came forward. Diplomats said countries including Spain, France and Germany signaled they were not willing to host more rescued people - most of whom are fleeing wars and poverty in Africa and the Middle East.

However, EU governments did want the mission to continue because they felt it had been effective in dissuading smugglers.

The compromise discussion in Brussels did not discuss military aspects of the role of air patrols. But the new arrangement will involve more training of the coast guard in Libya, where lawlessness has allowed smugglers to openly operate sending people to Europe by sea.

But it would be in line with the EU’s policy of turning increasingly restrictive on Mediterranean immigration since the surge in 2015 and discouraging people from risking their lives in the sea in trying to cross to Europe where governments do not want them.

The bloc has already curbed operations of EU aid groups in the part of the Mediterranean in question and moved its own ships further north where fewer rescues take place.

▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-sophia/eu-weighs-up-awkward-migration-compromise-on-mediterranean-mission-idUSKCN1

En Méditerranée, l’UE retire ses navires militaires qui ont sauvé 45.000 migrants

Les États membres de l’Union européenne ont décidé, mercredi 27 mars, de retirer leurs navires militaires engagés en Méditerranée dans le cadre de l’opération militaire dite « Sophia », au moins temporairement. Depuis 2015, ces bateaux ont pourtant permis de sauver 45 000 migrants environ.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280319/en-mediterranee-l-ue-retire-ses-navires-militaires-qui-ont-sauve-45000-mig

#EUNAVFOR_MED Operation Sophia : mandate extended until 30 September 2019

The Council today extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia until 30 September 2019.

The Operation Commander has been instructed to suspend temporarily the deployment of the Operation’s naval assets for the duration of this extension for operational reasons. EU member states will continue to work in the appropriate fora on a solution on disembarkation as part of the follow-up to the June 2018 European Council conclusions.

The Operation will continue to implement its mandate accordingly, strengthening surveillance by air assets as well as reinforcing support to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea through enhanced monitoring, including ashore, and continuation of training.

The operation’s core mandate is to contribute to the EU’s work to disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The operation has also supporting tasks. It trains the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and monitors the long-term efficiency of the training and it contributes to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. In addition, the operation also conducts surveillance activities and gathers information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. As such, the operation contributes to EU efforts for the return of stability and security in Libya and to maritime security in the Central Mediterranean region.

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia was launched on 22 June 2015. It is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration. The Operation Commander is Rear Admiral Credendino, from Italy. The headquarters of the operation are located in Rome.

Today’s decision was adopted by the Council by written procedure.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/29/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-mandate-extended-until-30-september-2

Border management: EU signs agreement with Montenegro on European Border and Coast Guard cooperation

Today, the European Union signed an agreement with Montenegro on border management cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement was signed on behalf of the EU by Maria Ohisalo, Minister of the Interior of Finland and President of the Council and Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, and on behalf of Montenegro by Minister of the Interior, Mevludin Nuhodžić.

The objective of this agreement is to allow Frontex to coordinate operational cooperation between EU Member states and Montenegro on the management of the borders that the European Union and Montenegro have in common. The signing of this agreement is yet another demonstration of the deepening and expanding cooperation with Montenegro. It will bring benefits for both parties, in particular in enhancing border management activities.
Maria Ohisalo, Minister of the Interior of Finland

Today, we are further strengthening our border cooperation with Montenegro, taking yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU. The migratory and security challenges we face are common and our response must be joint too.
Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship

This agreement allows Frontex to assist Montenegro in border management, carry out joint operations and deploy teams in the regions of Montenegro that border the EU, subject to Montenegro’s agreement.

These activities aim at tackling illegal immigration, in particular sudden changes in migratory flows, and cross-border crime, and can involve the provision of increased technical and operational assistance at the border.

Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and Frontex will contribute to tackling illegal immigration and further enhance security at the EU’s external borders.
Next steps

The draft decision on the conclusion of the agreement was sent to the European Parliament, which needs to give its consent for the agreement to be concluded.
Background

Today’s status agreement is the second such agreement to be concluded with a partner country, after a similar agreement was signed with Albania in October 2018. Negotiations with Montenegro were concluded on 5 July 2018 and the draft status agreement was initialled by Commissioner Avramopoulos and Montenegro Interior Minister Mevludin Nuhodžić in February 2019. The Council then authorised the signature of the agreement on 19 March 2019.

Similar status agreements have also been initialled with North Macedonia (July 2018), Serbia (September 2018) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (January 2019) and are pending finalisation.

Frontex launched the first-ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country in Albania on 22 May this year.

Frontex can carry out deployments and joint operations on the territory of neighbouring non-EU countries, subject to the prior conclusion of a status agreement between the European Union and the country concerned.

Earlier this year, following a proposal by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council agreed to reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard. This will allow for joint operations and deployments to take place in countries beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.

Cooperation with third countries is an important element of the European integrated border management concept. This concept is applied through a four-tier access model which includes: measures in third countries, measures with neighbouring third countries, border control measures and measures within the Schengen area.

▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2019/10/07/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-montenegro-on-european-bo

On October 7, the European Union signed an agreement (▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2019/10/07/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-montenegro-on-european-bo) with Montenegro on border management. The agreement was signed between Montenegro and Frontex (EU Border and Coast Guard Agency), allowing Frontex to support Montenegro in the border management process, conducting joint operations and recruiting teams in the region to monitor the border. The aim of the agreement is to curb illegal migration, as the EU itself states “in the wake of sudden changes in migrant flows”. The role of Frontex’s mission has never been completely clear, and it remains unclear what the specific role of Frontex officers will be in this case - what their responsibilities and the scope of their activities will be. The presence of Frontex is always justified by the EU’s argument for strengthening security, but the only security we see strengthened in this aspect is the security of Fortress Europe, but not the security of people - both those trying to cross the border and access the asylum system and those living in border areas. Let’s not forget about the cages (▻https://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/ovo-na-slici-su-migranti-koje-je-policija-u-bih-zatvorila-u-kaveze) in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, with migrants in them, awaiting deportation to Montenegro.

https://www.telegram.hr/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Screenshot_2019-04-23_12-41-45-1-840x530.png

Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodosli, le 14.10.2019