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    Le directeur de rapunzel, militant anti vaccin et avortement, voit dans la COVID comme un élément naturel qui va faire son boulot....

  • Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to #Tibet

    Introduction and Summary

    In 2019 and 2020, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) introduced new policies to promote the systematic, centralized, and large-scale training and transfer of “rural surplus laborers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the first 7 months of 2020, the region had trained over half a million rural surplus laborers through this policy. This scheme encompasses Tibetans of all ages, covers the entire region, and is distinct from the coercive vocational training of secondary students and young adults reported by exile Tibetans (RFA, October 29, 2019).

    The labor transfer policy mandates that pastoralists and farmers are to be subjected to centralized “military-style” (军旅式, junlüshi) vocational training, which aims to reform “backward thinking” and includes training in “work discipline,” law, and the Chinese language. Examples from the TAR’s Chamdo region indicate that the militarized training regimen is supervised by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants, and training photos published by state media show Tibetan trainees dressed in military fatigues (see accompanying images).

    Poverty alleviation reports bluntly say that the state must “stop raising up lazy people.” Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process “strengthens [the Tibetans’] weak work discipline” and reforms their “backward thinking.” Tibetans are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion.” This is aided by a worrisome new scheme that “encourages” Tibetans to hand over their land and herds to government-run cooperatives, turning them into wage laborers.

    An order-oriented, batch-style matching and training mechanism trains laborers based on company needs. Training, matching and delivery of workers to their work destination takes place in a centralized fashion. Recruitments rely, among other things, on village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered in the TAR by Chen Quanguo (陈全国), and later used in Xinjiang to identify Uyghurs who should be sent to internment camps (China Brief, September 21, 2017). Key policy documents state that cadres who fail to achieve the mandated quotas are subject to “strict rewards and punishments” (严格奖惩措施, yange jiangcheng cuoshi). The goal of the scheme is to achieve Xi Jinping’s signature goal of eradicating absolute poverty by increasing rural disposable incomes. This means that Tibetan nomads and farmers must change their livelihoods so that they earn a measurable cash income, and can therefore be declared “poverty-free.”

    This draconian scheme shows a disturbing number of close similarities to the system of coercive vocational training and labor transfer established in Xinjiang. The fact that Tibet and Xinjiang share many of the same social control and securitization mechanisms—in each case introduced under administrations directed by Chen Quanguo—renders the adaptation of one region’s scheme to the other particularly straightforward.

    Historical Context

    As early as 2005, the TAR had a small-scale rural surplus labor training and employment initiative for pastoralists and farmers in Lhasa (Sina, May 13, 2005). The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) then specified that this type of training and labor transfer was to be conducted throughout the TAR (PRC Government, February 8, 2006). From 2012, the Chamdo region initiated a “military-style training for surplus labor force transfer for pastoral and agricultural regions” (农牧区富余劳动力转移就业军旅式培训, nongmuqu fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye junlüshi peixun) (Tibet’s Chamdo, October 8, 2014). Chamdo’s scheme was formally established in the region’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), with the goal of training 65,000 laborers (including urban unemployed persons) during that time (Chamdo Government, December 29, 2015).

    By 2016, Chamdo had established 45 related vocational training bases (TAR Government, November 17, 2016). Starting in 2016, the TAR’s Shannan region likewise implemented vocational training with “semi-military-style management” (半军事化管理, ban junshihua guanli) (Tibet Shannan Net, April 5, 2017). Several different sources indicate that Chamdo’s military-style training management was conducted by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants.[1]

    Policies of the 2019-2020 Militarized Vocational Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan

    In March 2019, the TAR issued the 2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan (西藏自治区2019-2020年农牧民培训和转移就业行动方案, Xizang Zizhiqu 2019-2020 Nian Nongmumin Peixun he Zhuanyi Jiuye Xingdong Fang’an) which mandates the “vigorous promotion of military-style…[vocational] training,” adopting the model pioneered in Chamdo and mandating it throughout the region. [2] The vocational training process must include “work discipline, Chinese language and work ethics,” aiming to “enhance laborers’ sense of discipline to comply with national laws and regulations and work unit rules and regulations.”

    Surplus labor training is to follow the “order-oriented” (订单定向式, dingdan dingxiangshi) or “need-driven” (以需定培, yi xu dingpei) method, [3] whereby the job is arranged first, and the training is based on the pre-arranged job placement. In 2020, at least 40 percent of job placements were to follow this method, with this share mandated to exceed 60 percent by the year 2024 (see [2], also below). Companies that employ a minimum number of laborers can obtain financial rewards of up to 500,000 renminbi ($73,900 U.S. dollars). Local labor brokers receive 300 ($44) or 500 ($74) renminbi per arranged labor transfer, depending whether it is within the TAR or without. [4] Detailed quotas not only mandate how many surplus laborers each county must train, but also how many are to be trained in each vocational specialty (Ngari Government, July 31, 2019).

    The similarities to Xinjiang’s coercive training scheme are abundant: both schemes have the same target group (“rural surplus laborers”—农牧区富余劳动者, nongmuqu fuyu laodongzhe); a high-powered focus on mobilizing a “reticent” minority group to change their traditional livelihood mode; employ military drill and military-style training management to produce discipline and obedience; emphasize the need to “transform” laborers’ thinking and identity, and to reform their “backwardness;” teach law and Chinese; aim to weaken the perceived negative influence of religion; prescribe detailed quotas; and put great pressure on officials to achieve program goals. [5]

    Labor Transfers to Other Provinces in 2020

    In 2020, the TAR introduced a related region-wide labor transfer policy that established mechanisms and target quotas for the transfer of trained rural surplus laborers both within (55,000) and without (5,000) the TAR (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). The terminology is akin to that used in relation to Xinjiang’s labor transfers, employing phrases such as: “supra-regional employment transfer” (跨区域转移就业, kuaquyu zhuanyi jiuye) and “labor export” (劳务输出, laowu shuchu). Both the 2019-2020 Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan and the TAR’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) only mention transfers outside the TAR in passing, without outlining a detailed related policy or the use of terminology akin to that found in related documents from Xinjiang. [6]

    In the first 7 months of 2020, the TAR trained 543,000 rural surplus laborers, accomplishing 90.5% of its annual goal by July. Of these, 49,900 were transferred to other parts of the TAR, and 3,109 to other parts of China (TAR Government, August 12). Each region is assigned a transfer quota. By the end of 2020, this transfer scheme must cover the entire TAR.

    Specific examples of such labor transfers identified by the author to other regions within the TAR include job placements in road construction, cleaning, mining, cooking and driving. [7] Transfers to labor placements outside the TAR include employment at the COFCO Group, China’s largest state-owned food-processing company (Hebei News, September 18, 2020).

    The central terminology employed for the labor transfer process is identical with language used in Xinjiang: “unified matching, unified organizing, unified management, unified sending off” (统一对接、统一组织、统一管理、统一输送 / tongyi duijie, tongyi zuzhi, tongyi guanli, tongyi shusong). [8] Workers are transferred to their destination in a centralized, “group-style” (组团式, zutuanshi), “point-to-point” (点对点, dianduidian) fashion. The policy document sets group sizes at 30 persons, divided into subgroups of 10, both to be headed by (sub-)group leaders (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). In one instance, this transport method was described as “nanny-style point-to-point service” (“点对点”“保姆式”服务 / “dianduidian” “baomu shi” fuwu) (Chinatibet.net, June 21). As in Xinjiang, these labor transfers to other provinces are arranged and supported through the Mutual Pairing Assistance [or “assist Tibet” (援藏, Yuan Zang)] mechanism, albeit not exclusively. [9] The transferred laborers’ “left-behind” children, wives and elderly family members are to receive the state’s “loving care.” [10]

    Again, the similarities to Xinjiang’s inter-provincial transfer scheme are significant: unified processing, batch-style transfers, strong government involvement, financial incentives for middlemen and for participating companies, and state-mandated quotas. However, for the TAR’s labor transfer scheme, there is so far no evidence of accompanying cadres or security personnel, of cadres stationed in factories, or of workers being kept in closed, securitized environments at their final work destination. It is possible that the transfer of Tibetan laborers is not as securitized as that of Uyghur workers. There is also currently no evidence of TAR labor training and transfer schemes being linked to extrajudicial internment. The full range of TAR vocational training and job assignment mechanisms can take various forms and has a range of focus groups; not all of them involve centralized transfers or the military-style training and transfer of nomads and farmers.

    The Coercive Nature of the Labor Training and Transfer System

    Even so, there are clear elements of coercion during recruitment, training and job matching, as well as a centralized and strongly state-administered and supervised transfer process. While some documents assert that the scheme is predicated on voluntary participation, the overall evidence indicates the systemic presence of numerous coercive elements.

    As in Xinjiang, TAR government documents make it clear that poverty alleviation is a “battlefield,” with such work to be organized under a military-like “command” structure (脱贫攻坚指挥部, tuopin gongjian zhihuibu) (TAR Government, October 29, 2019; Xinhua, October 7, 2018). In mid-2019, the battle against poverty in the TAR was said to have “entered the decisive phase,” given the goal to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of 2020 (Tibet.cn, June 11, 2019). Since poverty is measured by income levels, and labor transfer is the primary means to increase incomes—and hence to “lift” people out of poverty—the pressure for local governments to round up poor populations and feed them into the scheme is extremely high.

    The Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan cited above establishes strict administrative procedures, and mandates the establishment of dedicated work groups as well as the involvement of top leadership cadres, to “ensure that the target tasks are completed on schedule” (see [2]). Each administrative level is to pass on the “pressure [to achieve the targets] to the next [lower] level.” Local government units are to “establish a task progress list [and] those who lag behind their work schedule… are to be reported and to be held accountable according to regulations.” The version adopted by the region governed under Shannan City is even more draconian: training and labor transfer achievements are directly weighed in cadres’ annual assessment scores, complemented by a system of “strict rewards and punishments.” [11] Specific threats of “strict rewards and punishments” in relation to achieving labor training and transfer targets are also found elsewhere, such as in official reports from the region governed under Ngari City, which mandate “weekly, monthly and quarterly” reporting mechanisms (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    As with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, overcoming Tibetans’ resistance to labor transfer is an integral part of the entire mechanism. Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process causes the “masses to comply with discipline,” “continuously strengthens their patriotic awareness,” and reforms their “backward thinking.” [12] This may also involve the presence of local cadres to “make the training discipline stricter.” [13]

    Because the military-style vocational training process produces discipline and transforms “backward employment views,” it is said to “promote labor transfer.” [14] Rural laborers are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion,” which is said to induce passivity (TAR Commerce Department, June 10). The poverty alleviation and training process is therefore coupled with an all-out propaganda effort that aims to use “thought education” to “educate and guide the unemployed to change their closed, conservative and traditional employment mindset” (Tibet’s Chamdo, July 8, 2016). [15] One document notes that the poverty alleviation and labor transfer process is part of an effort to “stop raising up lazy people” (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    A 2018 account from Chamdo of post-training follow-up shows the tight procedures employed by the authorities:

    Strictly follow up and ask for effectiveness. Before the end of each training course, trainees are required to fill in the “Employment Willingness Questionnaire.” Establish a database…to grasp the employment…status of trainees after the training. For those who cannot be employed in time after training, follow up and visit regularly, and actively recommend employment…. [16]

    These “strict” follow-up procedures are increasingly unnecessary, because the mandated “order-oriented” process means that locals are matched with future jobs prior to the training.

    “Grid Management” and the “Double-Linked Household” System

    Coercive elements play an important role during the recruitment process. Village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered by Chen Quanguo, go from door to door to “help transform the thinking and views of poor households.” [17] The descriptions of these processes, and the extensive government resources invested to ensure their operation, overlap to a high degree with those that are commonly practiced in Xinjiang (The China Quarterly, July 12, 2019). As is the case in Xinjiang, poverty-alleviation work in the TAR is tightly linked to social control mechanisms and key aspects of the security apparatus. To quote one government document, “By combining grid management and the ‘double-linked household’ management model, [we must] organize, educate, and guide the people to participate and to support the fine-grained poverty alleviation … work.” [18]

    Grid management (网格化管理, wanggehua guanli) is a highly intrusive social control mechanism, through which neighborhoods and communities are subdivided into smaller units of surveillance and control. Besides dedicated administrative and security staff, this turns substantial numbers of locals into “volunteers,” enhancing the surveillance powers of the state. [19] Grid management later became the backbone of social control and surveillance in Xinjiang. For poverty alleviation, it involves detailed databases that list every single person “in poverty,” along with indicators and countermeasures, and may include a “combat visualization” (图表化作战, tubiaohua zuozhan) feature whereby progress in the “war on poverty” is visualized through maps and charts (TAR Government, November 10, 2016). Purang County in Ngari spent 1.58 million renminbi ($233,588 dollars) on a “Smart Poverty Alleviation Big Data Management Platform,” which can display poverty alleviation progress on a large screen in real time (TAR Government, February 20, 2019).

    Similarly, the “double-linked household” (双联户, shuang lian hu) system corrals regular citizens into the state’s extensive surveillance apparatus by making sets of 10 “double-linked” households report on each other. Between 2012 and 2016, the TAR established 81,140 double-linked household entities, covering over three million residents, and therefore virtually the region’s entire population (South China Morning Post, December 12, 2016). An August 2020 article on poverty alleviation in Ngari notes that it was the head of a “double-linked” household unit who led his “entire village” to hand over their grassland and herds to a local husbandry cooperative (Hunan Government, August 20).

    Converting Property to Shares Through Government Cooperatives

    A particularly troubling aspect of the Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan is the directive to promote a “poverty alleviation industry” (扶贫产业, fupin chanye) scheme by which local nomads and farmers are asked to hand over their land and herds to large-scale, state-run cooperatives (农牧民专业合作社, nongmumin zhuanye hezuoshe). [20] In that way, “nomads become shareholders” as they convert their usage rights into shares. This scheme, which harks back to the forced collectivization era of the 1950s, increases the disposable incomes of nomads and farmers through share dividends and by turning them into wage laborers. They are then either employed by these cooperatives or are now “free” to participate in the wider labor transfer scheme. [21] In Nagqu, this is referred to as the “one township one cooperative, one village one cooperative ” (“一乡一社”“一村一合” / “yixiang yishe” “yicun yihe”) scheme, indicating its universal coverage. [22] One account describes the land transfer as prodding Tibetans to “put down the whip, walk out of the pasture, and enter the [labor] market” (People.cn, July 27, 2020).

    Clearly, such a radical transformation of traditional livelihoods is not achieved without overcoming local resistance. A government report from Shuanghu County (Nagqu) in July 2020 notes that:

    In the early stages, … most herders were not enthusiastic about participating. [Then], the county government…organized…county-level cadres to deeply penetrate township and village households, convening village meetings to mobilize people, insisted on transforming the [prevailing attitude of] “I am wanted to get rid of poverty” to “I want to get rid of poverty” as the starting point for the formation of a cooperative… [and] comprehensively promoted the policy… Presently… the participation rate of registered poor herders is at 100 percent, [that] of other herders at 97 percent. [23]

    Importantly, the phrase “transforming [attitudes of] ‘I am wanted to get rid of poverty’ to ‘I want to get rid of poverty’” is found in this exact form in accounts of poverty alleviation through labor transfer in Xinjiang. [24]

    Given that this scheme severs the long-standing connection between Tibetans and their traditional livelihood bases, its explicit inclusion in the militarized vocational training and labor transfer policy context is of great concern.

    Militarized Vocational Training: Examining a Training Base in Chamdo

    The Chamdo Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School (昌都市金色阳光职业培训学校, Changdushi Jinse Yangguang Zhiye Peixun Xuexiao) operates a vocational training base within Chamdo’s Vocational and Technical School, located in Eluo Town, Karuo District. The facility conducts “military-style training” (军旅式培训, junlüshi peixun) of rural surplus laborers for the purpose of achieving labor transfer; photos of the complex show a rudimentary facility with rural Tibetan trainees of various ages, mostly dressed in military fatigues. [25]

    Satellite imagery (see accompanying images) shows that after a smaller initial setup in 2016, [26] the facility was expanded in the year 2018 to its current state. [27] The compound is fully enclosed, surrounded by a tall perimeter wall and fence, and bisected by a tall internal wire mesh fence that separates the three main northern buildings from the three main southern ones (building numbers 4 and 5 and parts of the surrounding wall are shown in the accompanying Figure 4). The internal fence might be used to separate dormitories from teaching and administrative buildings. Independent experts in satellite analysis contacted by the author estimated the height of the internal fence at approximately 3 meters. The neighboring vocational school does not feature any such security measures.


    In both Xinjiang and Tibet, state-mandated poverty alleviation consists of a top-down scheme that extends the government’s social control deep into family units. The state’s preferred method to increase the disposable incomes of rural surplus laborers in these restive minority regions is through vocational training and labor transfer. Both regions have by now implemented a comprehensive scheme that relies heavily on centralized administrative mechanisms; quota fulfilment; job matching prior to training; and a militarized training process that involves thought transformation, patriotic and legal education, and Chinese language teaching.

    Important differences remain between Beijing’s approaches in Xinjiang and Tibet. Presently, there is no evidence that the TAR’s scheme is linked to extrajudicial internment, and aspects of its labor transfer mechanisms are potentially less coercive. However, in a system where the transition between securitization and poverty alleviation is seamless, there is no telling where coercion stops and where genuinely voluntary local agency begins. While some Tibetans may voluntarily participate in some or all aspects of the scheme, and while their incomes may indeed increase as a result, the systemic presence of clear indicators of coercion and indoctrination, coupled with profound and potentially permanent change in modes of livelihood, is highly problematic. In the context of Beijing’s increasingly assimilatory ethnic minority policy, it is likely that these policies will promote a long-term loss of linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.

    Adrian Zenz is a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), and supervises PhD students at the European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal, Germany. His research focus is on China’s ethnic policy, public recruitment in Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing’s internment campaign in Xinjiang, and China’s domestic security budgets. Dr. Zenz is the author of Tibetanness under Threat and co-editor of Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change. He has played a leading role in the analysis of leaked Chinese government documents, to include the “China Cables” and the “Karakax List.” Dr. Zenz is an advisor to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and a frequent contributor to the international media.


    [1] See for example https://archive.is/wip/4ItV6 or http://archive.is/RVJRK. State media articles from September 2020 indicate that this type of training is ongoing https://archive.is/e1XqL.

    [2] Chinese: 大力推广军旅式…培训 (dali tuiguang junlüshi…peixun). See https://bit.ly/3mmiQk7 (pp.12-17). See local implementation documents of this directive from Shannan City (https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, pp.15-24), Xigatse (https://archive.is/7oJ7p) and Ngari (https://archive.is/wip/R3Mpw).

    [3] See also https://archive.is/wip/eQMGa.

    [4] Provided that the person was employed for at least 6 months in a given year. Source: https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [5] See the author’s main work on this in section 6 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [6] See https://archive.is/wip/Dyapm.

    [7] See https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx, https://archive.is/wip/NehA6, https://archive.is/wip/KMaUo, https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx.

    [8] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [9] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [10] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [11] See https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, p.24.

    [12] See https://archive.is/wip/fN9hz and https://archive.is/NYMwi, compare https://archive.is/wip/iiF7h and http://archive.is/Nh7tT.

    [13] See https://archive.is/wip/kQVnX. A state media account of Tibetan waiters at a tourism-oriented restaurant in Xiexong Township (Chamdo) notes that these are all from “poverty-alleviation households,” and have all gone through “centralized, military-style training.” Consequently, per this account, they have developed a “service attitude of being willing to suffer [or: work hard]”, as is evident from their “vigorous pace and their [constant] shuttling back and forth” as they serve their customers. https://archive.is/wip/Nfxnx (account from 2016); compare https://archive.is/wip/dTLku.

    [14] See https://archive.is/wip/faIeL and https://archive.is/wip/18CXh.

    [15] See https://archive.is/iiF7h.

    [16] See https://archive.is/wip/ETmNe

    [17] See https://archive.is/wip/iEV7P, see also e.g. https://archive.is/wip/1p6lV.

    [18] See https://archive.is/e45fJ.

    [19] See https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/securitizing-xinjiang-police-recruitment-informal-policing-and-ethnic-minority-cooptation/FEEC613414AA33A0353949F9B791E733 and https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet.

    [20] E.g. https://archive.is/R3Mpw. This scheme was also mentioned in the TAR’s 13th 5-Year-Plan (2016-2020) (https://archive.is/wip/S3buo). See also similar accounts, e.g. https://archive.is/IJUyl.

    [21] Note e.g. the sequence of the description of these cooperatives followed by an account of labor transfer (https://archive.is/gIw3f).

    [22] See https://archive.is/wip/gIw3f or https://archive.is/wip/z5Tor or https://archive.is/wip/PR7lh.

    [23] See https://archive.is/wip/85zXB.

    [24] See the author’s related work on this in section 2.2 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [25] Located as part of the 昌都市卡若区俄洛镇昌都市职业技术学校 campus. See https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc; compare https://archive.is/wip/uUTCp and https://archive.is/wip/lKnbe.

    [26] See https://archive.is/wip/WZsvQ.

    [27] Coordinates: 31.187035, 97.091817. Website: https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc. The timeframe for construction is indicated by historical satellite imagery and by the year 2018 featured on a red banner on the bottom-most photo of the website.


    #Chine #transfert_de_population #déplacement #rural_surplus_laborers #formaation_professionnelle #armée #travail #agriculture #discipline #discipline_de_travail #Chamdo #préjugés #terres #salariés #travailleurs_salariés #Chen_Quanguo #Xinjiang #Oïghours #camps #pauvreté #contrôle_social #pastoralisme #Farmer_and_Pastoralist_Training_and_Labor_Transfer_Action_Plan #minorités #obédience #discipline #identité #langue #religion #COFCO_Group #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire #Mutual_Pairing_Assistance #pauvreté #Shannan_City #Ngari_City #surveillance #poverty_alleviation #coopératives #salaire #Nagqu #Chamdo_Golden_Sunshine_Vocational_Training_School #Eluo_Town

  • mai 2018, Infokiosque sur la #ZaD #NDDL : « Premiers secours émotionnels dans nos luttes »


    « Premiers secours émotionnels dans nos luttes »
    –> texte complet : https://nantes.indymedia.org/articles/41154
    [archive : http://archive.is/G0Tkc ]

    Lire aussi les témoignages ultérieurs sur les traumatismes post-manif :

    « Des blessures qu’on ne saurait nommer »
    [archive : http://archive.is/9jgan ]

    « Blessures invisibles, les impensées de la répression »
    [archive : http://archive.is/4eqUx ]

    ValK. a posté une photo : « > » />

    Zone a Defendre de Notre-Dame-des-Landes, le 28 mai 2018.
    + plus d’infos : https://zad.nadir.org
    + plus de photos : https://www.flickr.com/photos/valkphotos/collections/72157632092797423
    #Photo : ValK.
    En voir +> https://frama.link/valk
    Soutenir +> https://liberapay.com/ValK

    #traumatismes #soins #syndromes_post-traumatiques #violences_policieres #maintien_de_l'ordre

  • #Portfolio | Maintien de l’ordre, le délire autoritaire de Macron
    Avec une #photo de Ricardo Parreira hallucinante de la personnalisation de son holster par un membre de la BAC : en plus d’être « non-réglementaire », l’utilisation de la figure du croisé en dit très très très long sur la vision que se fait de son rôle ce policier...
    https://www.lamuledupape.com/2019/09/06/maintien-de-lordre-le-delire-autoritaire-de-macron |+ http://archive.is/EsK3F

    Le reste des illustrations, du même photographe-auteur, rappelle où en est non-pas le #maintien_de_l'ordre mais bien la #guerre menée contre la contestation politique...

    Ce petit portfolio a pour but de montrer que les violences d’État ou les mécanismes de répression psychologique que nous condamnons en Ukraine, en Israël ou en Russie, sont dans les faits pratiqués en France, masqués derrière les exigences de la République et du maintien de l’ordre public.

    #violences_policières #armes

  • A propos de la flic infiltrée débusquée au contre-sommet du #G7

    source instable :
    sauvegardes :

    Sur le camp du contre-sommet, lors d’une assemblée assez sensible portant notamment sur l’organisation du départ de la manif de Bayonne, cette femme a été remarquée (par des personnes la connaissant du mouvement GJ à Toulouse) en train de prendre discrètement, avec son téléphone portable, des photos des gens participant à l’AG. Ces personnes ont décidé d’intervenir et de se confronter à elle, à l’écart de l’AG.

    Nous sommes donc loin d’avoir affaire à une simple indic de la police, comme il y en a bien sûr ici et là. Cette personne organisait, impulsait et poussait à des actions ; elle mettait en relation des gens afin que la police puisse procéder à des arrestations. C’est l’État qui organisait ses coups de filet...

    J’imagine qu’il va y avoir des enquêtes, en attendant y’a un appel à rassembler toutes les infos à l’adresse deratisation1312@riseup.net

    Ça rappelle l’affaire de flic infiltré qui avait été révélée en 2011 : Mark Kennedy / #Mark_Kennedy, espion dans les milieux politiques britanniques et européens... jusqu’à #Tarnac !
    L’occasion de ré-écouter la super émission de France Culture signalée par @davduf ici https://seenthis.net/messages/672015 . Y’avait aussi eut un article de @camillepolloni chez les inrock : https://www.lesinrocks.com/2012/03/13/actualite/actualite/mark-kennedy-la-taupe-de-tarnac
    et pour les passionné-e-s, un travail de titan sur lui est disponible sur la base anti-infiltration montée en angleterre suite au scandale : https://powerbase.info/index.php/Mark_Kennedy

    #NoG7 #G7EZ #g7welcometoparadise #infotraflicsG7 #police #infiltration #manipulation

  • How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen » Counterpunch: Tells the Facts, Names the Names

    January 15, 1998

    by Alexander Cockburn And Jeffrey St. Clair

    Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs ["From the Shadows"], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?

    Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.

    Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?

    Brzezinski: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.

    Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against a secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, people didn’t believe them. However, there was a basis of truth. You don’t regret anything today?

    Brzezinski: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.

    Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic [integrisme], having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

    Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

    Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.

    Brzezinski: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries.

    * There are at least two editions of this magazine; with the perhaps sole exception of the Library of Congress, the version sent to the United States is shorter than the French version, and the Brzezinski interview was not included in the shorter version.
    The above has been translated from the French by Bill Blum author of the indispensible, “Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II” and “Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower”

    #Afghanistan #USA #URSS #histoire

  • Denkmalschutz für die Nachkriegsmoderne am Alexanderplatz / 13.07.15 / Land Berlin

    Berlin ist die einzige Metropole weltweit, die in ihrem Stadtbild Zeugnisse der beiden politischen Blöcke des Kalten Krieges vereinigt. Die beiden deutschen Staaten arbeiteten mit großem Ehrgeiz an ihrem repräsentativen Erscheinungsbild als „Hauptstadt der DDR“ bzw. als „Schaufenster des Westens“.

    Ost-Berlin sollte eine sozialistische Vorzeigestadt werden. Dem Alexanderplatz kam dabei eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Er ist gleichzeitig großstädtischer Verkehrsknoten, an dem wichtige Institutionen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, der Wirtschaft und des Handels der DDR angesiedelt waren, und eine beruhigte Fußgängerzone um Brunnen und Weltzeituhr. Vergleichbare denkmalgeschützte Plätze in West-Berlin sind der Breitscheidplatz und der Ernst-Reuter-Platz.

    Das Landesdenkmalamt Berlin hat jetzt drei prominente Bauwerke am Alexanderplatz aus der Zeit um 1970 unter Denkmalschutz gestellt:

    – das Haus des Berliner Verlages, 1970-73, von den Architekten Karl-Ernst Swora, Rainer Hanslik, Günter Derdau, Waldemar Seifert und Gerhard Voss, mit Pressecafé und dem Fries „Sozialistische Presse“ von Willi Neubert (z.Z. überdeckt)
    – das Haus des Reisens, 1969-72, von den Architekten Roland Korn, Johannes Brieske, Roland Steiger mit dem Kupferrelief „Der Mensch überwindet den Raum“ von Walter Womacka
    – die Weltzeituhr, 1969-70, von Erich John

    DDR-Baukultur in Berlin: DDR-Häuser und Weltzeituhr am Alex unter Denkmalschutz | Berliner Zeitung

    Regina Weiss | Die Presse als Organisator

    Die Installation “Die Presse als Organisator” besteht aus einem Fassaden-Banner, installiert im Straßenraum unterhalb des Gebäudes des ehemaligen "Pressecafés" am "Haus des Verlages" (Berlin, Alexanderplatz). Das lichtdurchlässige, schwarz-weiß bedruckte Fassaden-Banner zeigt den Ausschnitt eines ursprünglich zum Gebäude gehörigen Wandbildes von Willy Neubert mit dem Titel "sozialistische Presse".

    Neuberts Wandfries wurde 1969-1973 als Kunst am Bau für das Dach des Pressecafés am Haus des Verlages geschaffen, und war bis in die 1990er Jahre vor Ort sichtbar installiert. Wie die anderen Wandbilder im ehemaligen Hauptstadtzentrum der DDR hatte auch das Fries am Haus des Verlages die Aufgabe grundlegende Strukturen der sozialistischen Gesellschaft zu verbildlichen, und in den Straßenraum zu übertragen. So illustrierte das dynamische Figurenfries ein von der Sowjetunion geprägtes Bild der Einheit von Presse und Staat, dass auf das Verständnis der Presse in der DDR übertragen wurde. Wie im Wandbild durch zwei männliche Figuren, denen das Portrait von Karl Marx über die Schultern blickt, dargestellt, erfüllte die Presse in der DDR mittels ihrer engen Verbindung zur regierenden Sozialistischen Einheitspartei eine gesellschaftsbildende Funktion. In diesem Sinne zeigte Neuberts Bild den Aufbau der Presse als Struktur kollektiver Arbeit, als funktionierendes Abbild einer organisierten, sozialistischen Gesellschaft.

    Heute ist die inzwischen mit Platten verdeckte Fläche des Wandbildes mit großflächiger Leuchtreklame versehen. Im Pressecafé befindet sich das Restaurant eines privaten Betreibers. Nur der in den Hintergrund getretene Schriftzug Pressecafé am Dach des Gebäudes gibt Aufschluss über die Geschichte des Ortes. Die Installation bringt das Wandbild in fragmentarischer Form wieder zum Vorschein. Als grafische schwarz- weiß Umsetzung der ursprünglich farbigen Bildvorlage umspannt das Fassaden-Banner eine Ecke des Gebäudes im Straßenbereich. Im Sichtbar werden der symbolischen Bildsprache zeichnet sich die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des ehemaligen Pressezentrums ab. Im Gegensatz zur „erhöhten Darstellung“ sozialistischer Pressearbeit treten die Figuren des Wandfrieses in der erneuten Installation dem Passanten direkt gegenüber. Diese Begegnung mit dem historischen Wandbild erinnert zunächst an die Geschichte der umgebenden Architektur. Gleichzeitig eröffnet die Konfrontation mit dem utopischen Bild einer vergangenen Gesellschaftsform jedoch auch einen sichtbaren Raum der Reflektion, der die Fragestellung nach dem Umgang mit dem sozialistischen Erbe der DDR als eine Reflektion gegenwärtiger Gesellschaft ermöglicht.

    #Berlin -Mitte #Alexanderplatz #Karl-Liebknecht-Straße #Otto_Braun_Straße #Münzstraße #DDR #Kunst #Architektur

  • Ladreit de Lacharrière, le mécène riche et puissant


    Le milliardaire qui a fait embaucher l’épouse de François Fillon à La Revue des Deux Mondes en 2012 et 2013 est un patron qui sait se montrer généreux. L’homme à la tête de la puissante agence de notation Fitch, et qui a ses entrées à l’Élysée, a toujours su aider ses amis dans le besoin.

    Qu’a cela ne tienne, Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière dont l’empire Fimalac contient, outre la puissante agence de notation Fitch, quelques titres de presse impose la femme du futur ex-premier ministre comme « conseillère littéraire » à la Revue des Deux Mondes pour 5 000 brut par mois. Une rémunération confortable pour un emploi extra-light puisque, selon l’enquête de l’hebdomadaire, elle ne rédigera que deux ou trois notes en vingt mois.

    Le milliardaire ne refuse rien à son ami Fillon à qui il prête régulièrement son avion privé comme ce 21 mars 2013, lorsque le député de Paris part rencontrer Vladimir Poutine.

    « Quand j’entends dire que c’est un entrepreneur, je bondis », s’emporte un patron qui estime qu’« il n’a jamais rien "entrepris" de sa vie puisque l’essentiel de sa fortune s’est faite par des coups et des montages financiers ». De Suez à L’Oréal dont il deviendra le vice-président, Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière multiplie les montages alambiqués mais lucratifs. Par rachats successifs, il impose l’agence de notation Fitch dans la cour des grands et échappe miraculeusement au scandale qui entoure ces agences après la crise financière de 2008.

    Alors que Nicolas Sarkozy s’emporte sur France 2 en 2008 contre ces agences qui « n’ont pas fait leur travail », il ne s’oppose pas à ce que le patron d’une des principales agences soit fait grand-croix de la Légion d’honneur en 2011. « Pourquoi croyez-vous que François Hollande accède à tous ses désirs ? » interroge un ancien ministre : « Mais tout simplement parce que son pouvoir de nuisance à la tête de Fitch est énorme. »

    • Sur les finasseries idéologiques d’Ahrar (qui font le miel des islmo-jihadologues), dont un des leaders, Ali al-Omar a présenté récemment l’idéologie comme la 5e école de l’islamisme, distincte des FM et du salafisme-jihadiste, tout en partageant les buts ultimes : un Etat islamique puis le rétablissement du califat) :
      et cet article récent dans The National mais qui a depuis disparu du site mais toujours accessible là :

      Ali Al Omar, the group’s deputy leader, answered some of these questions during an hour-long talk he gave on Friday, titled “The Place of Ahrar Al Sham among Islamist Currents". Three points stand out.
      First, Mr Al Omar begins the insightful talk by laying outmain Islamist movements that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He says all the four movements differ in their approach but agree on the objective, which is the restoration of the Islamic caliphate.
      Two of these movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tablighi Jamaat, seek to establish the caliphate without stating that as their goal, through political participation and proselytisation respectively. The failure of those movements, he says, led to the rise of a third one: jihadism.
      Ahar Al Sham belongs to a new movement that sees merits in each of the movements he mentioned. The group combines, rather than departs from, the approaches of all of its predecessors. Significantly, he points out that the difference between Ahrar Al Sham and jihadists is that the group does more than just jihad. The difference between the two is not that jihad is a temporary tactic for them, he says. That is a key clarification because some observers think that Ahrar Al Sham’s engagement in armed struggle is dictated by the reality in Syria, as the war against the regime rages.
      The group’s position on jihad is heavily shaped by Salafi-jihadism, which views jihad as a goal in and of itself. According to a recent 78-page study by Ahmad Abazeid, one of the group’s closest observers, the group “adopts the writings of Salafi-jihadism in its training camps and discourse".
      A second point that stands out from Mr Al Omar’s lecture is his group’s real stance on political participation. He explains that Ahrar Al Sham’s participation in political talks, conferences or pacts is designed as a form of “takhtheel" – disruption or subvers­ion.
      This is a telling statement, considering that it is such “flexibility" that led many to rethink the group’s ideology and to conclude that it broke away from Salafi-­jihadism – the “crucible from which it emerged", in the words of one of its media activists.
      Third, Mr Al Omar singles out the Taliban as a model worth following. This is the second time the group has officially praised the Taliban in this way. Last August, Ahrar Al Sham paid a tribute to the Taliban’s dead leader Mullah Omar, describing him as “the happy emir" and his group as “the blessed movement".

      Et du même auteur :

      A mon humble avis ces finasseries traduisent plus les hésitations tactiques d’Ahrar dans un conflit dont les règles politiques (cessation hostilités et ses règles des cibles légitimes) ne sont pas claires et font l’enjeu de négociations entre acteurs extérieurs Le grand écart entre al-Qaïda et le fait d’être théoriquement partie prenante à genève ne sera peut-être pas éternellement possible...

    • Le genre de considérations qui arrivent au moment où les Russes insistent absolument pour que « les rebelles modérés » se séparent d’Al Nusra sur le terrain (deadline annoncée : hier dimanche), avant de reprendre des opérations d’envergure.

  • Recensement des joies (ou pas) de l’état d’urgence en France

    La quadrature du net a mis en place une page Wiki spécifique visant à recenser les articles de presse qui parlent de possibles abus / dérapages liés à l’état d’urgence. Il sera utile notamment lorsqu’on aura à traiter la modification constitutionnelle annoncée par le gouvernement pour une extension / (...) — A lire sur d’autres sites, Répression - prisons, Informatique - Sécurité, https://archive.is