هجمات جاكرتا تؤكد حدوث تغيير في استراتيجية “الدولة الاسلامية”.. ولماذا تبنت “الدولة” هذه الهجمات…

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  • Dans un article du WINEP sur les motivations supposées de Da’ich dans l’attentat à Istanbul l’auteur soutient qu’il y aurait un plan américano-turc pour reprendre le contrôle de la frontière turco-syrienne d’Azaz à Jarabulus, plan que selon lui Da’ich aurait visé à contrecarrer en commettant cet attentat :
    http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/what-is-behind-the-istanbul-attack

    Second, by bringing the war to Turkey’s largest city, IS aims to undercut the planned U.S.-Turkish campaign against its forces in Syria, which is reportedly scheduled to begin in a matter of weeks following Vice President Joe Biden’s January 23 visit to Ankara. The apparent goal of the joint plan is to capture the sixty-mile-long Jarabulus-Azaz corridor along the Syrian border, most of which is currently held by IS. If successful, the campaign would effectively plug the group’s last overland conduit from Syria into Turkey and Europe. The IS leadership is well aware that such a development would hurt its finances, recruitment efforts, and prestige, so it appears to have acted preemptively in the hope that Turkey will stand down or at least not escalate its military efforts.

    L’article ne mentionne pas que, de fait, pour la partie tenue par Jaysh al-Fatah, le corridor d’Azaz est largement menacé de tomber sous les efforts distincts de l’Armée syrienne et des forces kurdes du YPG dans le canton d’Afrin, soutenus tous deux par l’aviation russe. La route Azaz-Alep étant d’ores et déjà coupée sur une petite partie par l’armée syrienne.
    D’autre part, à l’est d’Alep, dans la zone tenue par Da’ich, d’un côté les kurdes du YPG, adjoints de quelques groupes de l’ASL au sein des SDF et soutenus par l’aviation américaine, ont déjà passé la « ligne rouge » turque de l’Euphrate et pourrait se diriger vers Manbij, tandis que de l’autre côté l’armée syrienne progresse depuis sa reprise de l’aéroport militaire de Kuweires en direction de la ville d’al-Bab.

    Ce plan serait-il une manière de réagir à ces évolutions inquiétantes pour la Turquie tout en actant la fin de son soutien de fait à Da’ich et en s’intégrant à un éventuel plan américain pour en pas rester sur la touche ?
    Si quelqu’un à des lumières particulières ou d’autres sources évoquant cet hypothétique plan américano-turc...

    • Une carte - au code couleur étrange : violet pour le régime et mauve pour Da’ich ! - pour comprendre un peu la situation militaire au nord de la Syrie, tirée du dernier article de Balanche sur le site du WINEP (hum !) :


      La même en plus grand ici : http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Maps/Syria%20Conflict/IS_WindowOnTurkeyDec2015-2.pdf

    • A lire également, l’article approfondi de Balanche qu’accompagne la carte, qui présente de manière exhaustive la situation complexe au nord de la Syrie :
      https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-die-is-cast-the-kurds-cross-the-euphrates

      As the PYD and its allies seized Abu Qilqil, several sources indicated that IS might abandon Manbij, mainly because it faces major local hostility there and would be unable to defend the town against a Kurdish advance. On November 12, Manbij civilians protested the forced recruitment of young men to fight with IS on the Azaz front line. And on December 19, the group executed fourteen civilians out of fear that an uprising might be brewing.

      Meanwhile, the PYD offensive has been supported by coalition airstrikes, indicating that the move was at least partly coordinated with the United States and was not a unilateral PYD decision. From that perspective, the advance toward Manbij could be part of a strategy to win back Raqqa. If Manbij falls, the capital of the “caliphate” could eventually become isolated from the rest of IS territory in Syria. All of the Euphrates bridges from the Turkish border south to Assad Lake have been destroyed or are controlled by the Kurds. If the PYD moves further south and the Syrian army launches an offensive toward al-Bab or Assad Lake, many IS personnel would be trapped in east Aleppo province.
      WHO WOULD BENEFIT MOST?

      To the west, the rebel groups controlling the Azaz corridor are currently on the defensive against IS, which has seized several villages in the area since September and is slowly progressing toward Azaz. The priority of the Saudi/Turkish-backed Jaish al-Fatah is to defend the supply road to eastern Aleppo against the Kurds in the west and the Syrian army in the south. Yet Russian aircraft are multiplying their raids on the corridor and weakening the rebel defenses, especially near the border crossing of Bab al-Salam, and losing this road would leave rebel units in the eastern districts almost completely surrounded by regime forces. Some assistance would still flow from the western Bab al-Hawa border crossing, but the Syrian army’s progress around Aleppo threatens that route as well.