• Turkey’s Islamists, nationalists both silent on Israeli weapons flow to Azerbaijan
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-pragmatism-triumphs-over-anti-israeli-sentiments.html

    Overall, as Azeri-Israeli strategic cooperation deepens, we are once more reminded that radical groups in Turkish society are still taking their cues from the government and are in sync with the state. Hence, it would be too soon to interpret the results of Kadir Has University’s research as a significant change in anti-Israel sentiment in Turkey. A more sober analysis would be that even the hatred for Israel can be controlled if it is in the interest of these groups.

    #Turquie

  • What’s next for Hezbollah in Syria? - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/hezbollah-mustapha-baderedine-mughniyeh-syria-war-resistance.html

    “He’s a combination of several elements — experience, charisma, military vision and shrewdness — that are hard to find in one person. He had them all in him. But this doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s men are going to be affected on the ground,” he told Al-Monitor. “Resistance bloc fighters execute plans and tactics that are drawn by the joint military command, so there’s no fear in this regard on field operations. But, yes, the command will miss his capabilities and broad vision.”

    The source added, “Hezbollah’s military today isn’t the same as a decade ago. Today they are more institutionalized. Several great commanders have fallen in the past couple of years, but this didn’t change the course of the war. … The best farewell to [Badreddine] is to continue this war until the victory that he was looking for [is achieved].”

    But in fact, the killing of Badreddine is going to have a deep effect on Hezbollah’s military command. For the first time in many years, there will be a new commander from outside the legend of Badreddine and his brother-in-law, commander Imad Mughniyeh.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/hezbollah-mustapha-baderedine-mughniyeh-syria-war-resistance.html#ixzz49

  • Revealed: Saudi Arabia owns $117 billion of U.S. debt
    http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/16/investing/saudi-arabia-us-debt-ownership-revealed/index.html

    Unlike with most other major owners of U.S. debt, the Treasury Department kept Saudi Arabia’s precise holdings secret since the 1970s. Saudi’s holdings were lumped together with that of other oil exporting nations, including Venezuela and Iraq.

    But that policy ended on Monday as the Treasury Department disclosed precise holdings by specific countries that were previously grouped together. A Treasury official told CNNMoney the move was made following a review aimed at trying to provide more “comprehensive and transparent” data.

    • @nidal : oui j’avais fait le lien grâce à tes signalements (et ceux d’@kassem).

      Comme un vieux couple marié qui se déchire, la colère incite à révéler quelques secrets d’alcôve, à user du chantage, mais aussi à mentir effrontément, à mettre tous les torts sur l’autre, à se menacer et à se faire quelques vacheries. Scène de ménage géopolitique...
      En « conspirationniste prudent », j’espère que quelques bulles des noirs secrets que l’on peut soupçonner de cette entente viennent, à la faveur de cette dispute, éclater à la surface des eaux médiatiques.

      Une réflexion primesautière d’un ignorant en matière de droit : un truc me chiffonne quand même c’est que la possibilité pour les familles de victimes du 09.11 d’attaquer l’Etat saoudien devant les tribunaux américains pourrait renforcer une dynamique qui paraît faire du système judiciaire américain une justice internationale de fait, capable de sanctionner des Etats, ou de faire plier la législation d’autres pays, et ce sans accord politique et sans réciprocité. Ici comme sur d’autres questions : affaire du non-respect des sanctions unilatérales contre l’Iran, de l’évasion fiscale par HSBC, des fonds vautour en Argentine, voire dans les histoires de corruption de la FIFA...
      Avec l’avantage que cela fournit aux forces qui peuvent l’instrumentaliser.

    • @souriyam Il me semble qu’il y a quelques semaines, l’Iran a été condamné par un tribunal de New York à une somme totalement astronomique pour… sa responsabilité totalement farfelue dans les attentats du 11 Septembre. Alors du coup je ne sais pas bien quoi penser. (Peut-être une histoire de pénal/civil, mais je ne vois pas pourquoi les Séoudiens étaient protégés et par les Iraniens.)

    • Amusant, je viens juste de tomber sur un article d’al-Monitor qui traite du sujet, mais en insistant sur le fait que cette tendance constitue une menace pour la conduite de la politique étrangère américaine (ici l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien) et les investisseurs américains potentiels dans les pays ciblés, mais l’article fait aussi le lien avec d’autres affaires (non-respect des sanctions américaines par BNP ou les saoudiens et le 11 septembre) :
      How Supreme Court decision to freeze Iran assets undermines US foreign policy
      http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/us-supreme-court-iranian-asset-seizures-terror-victims.html#

      The concept that a nation is immune from lawsuits in the courts of another is accepted internationally, even in cases where the alleged harm is egregious. The United States enshrined state immunity as law through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976. Since its enactment, FSIA has gone through transformations resulting in exceptions to the law that include the right of victims of terrorism to sue states listed as “state sponsors of terrorism.” This list includes Iran, but not US allies such as Saudi Arabia. Recent actions under the FSIA exceptions include the US Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the seizing of $2 billion of Iranian assets to compensate victims of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, a lawsuit against Iran filed by former Marine and prisoner Amir Hekmati and a widely mocked decision by a federal court that found Iran liable for the Sept. 11 attacks. The United States seems to be moving forward with the aggressive use of FSIA exceptions to account for past Iranian actions, but the further weakening of state immunity will have unintended consequences that are likely to backfire.

    • L’article parle surtout de la peine prononcée conte l’Iran au sujet de morts de militaires américains du temps de la guerre au Liban, mais aussi de ce que tu écris plus haut sur les plaintes au sujet du 11.09 contre l’Iran et les Saoudiens :

      While plaintiffs seek redress for foreign states’ actions through judicial actions, their desires may not necessarily square with US foreign policy interests — especially when there are doubts as to the defendant’s culpability.
      A prominent example of such a conflict is the recent court order for Iran to pay $10 billion to families of victims who died in the Sept. 11 attacks. The same court cleared Saudi Arabia of any responsibility for the attacks. The decision left foreign policy experts dumbfounded and the White House struggling to explain the judgment. The damage to American credibility would be unimaginable if sanctions violators were used to fund such a farcical judgment.

      Il me semble qui plus est que quelqu’un a signalé ici cette condamnation assez invraisemblable de l’Iran pour le 11.09 dont tu parles.

  • Article très intéressant d’Elijah Magnier sur les divergences actuelles entre Damas, Téhéran et le Hezbollah d’un côté et la Russie de l’autre quant à la cessation des hostilités :
    Russia equivocates in Syria, Iran is confused and al-Qaeda takes the initiative
    https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2016/05/11/russia-equivocates-in-syria-iran-is-confused-and-al-qaeda-takes-
    Morceaux choisis :

    The Damascus and Moscow alliance faced with the cooperation of the Middle Eastern regional countries and the United States in Syria is failing at the moment. Al-Qaeda in al-Sham (Jabhat al-Nusra) although excluded from the Cease-fire, grabbed the initiative on the ground and counter attacked south of Aleppo with many allies: Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, Jaish al-Sunnah and the Turkestan forces (all not excluded from the Cease-fire) fighting within the ranks of Jaish al-Fateh, the “army of conquest,” which includes more jihadist organizations and others more moderate.[...]
    Now that over 97 cities and towns are engaged in the cessation of hostilities (COH), the Russian President Vladimir Putin needs a strong case to return to the Syrian arena in full force. Today, Moscow has placed itself alongside flexible American diplomacy, which in Syria changes according to developments and is unwilling to re-initiate a military campaign that could be considered aggressive to various countries in the Middle East. Such a flexible Russian attitude has angered Tehran and Damascus and their proxy allies, forcing them to alter plans of deployment.[...]
    Decision makers in Syria say “Moscow gave the time for rebels to regroup and reorganise their offensives. There is no point in fighting and dying in areas we don’t need to hold on to. Before the Russian intervention, we were defending the main cities and no force could have managed to break in. Now we are on several fronts without serious coordination between all forces. It is time to change tactics and reduce military deployment”.[...]
    “Countries in the region are prepared to wait seven more months for a new U.S. President who would interact with Assad more aggressively than President Barack Obama. These countries will continue supporting the rebels in the next 7 months, sending money and weapons so they are prepared for another confrontation. The allies of Damascus consider Russia has repeated what the late President of Egypt Anwar al-Sadat did in 1973 when he stopped the war suddenly and gave Israel the opportunity to regroup its forces, returning to regain the initiative and overcome the Egyptian third army, all of which resulted in the Camp David agreement”.[...]
    It is therefore expected that Hezbollah, a strong and effective ally of Damascus, will modify its deployment plans on the battlefield to mitigate the human losses as long as there is an unclear horizon and that Russian politics in Syria are unclear, say the sources. Six months ago, Damascus and its allies decided to retreat to the main cities and abandon distant and rural areas, difficult to supply logistically and considered less strategic. Today, Hezbollah refuses to engage in all on-going battles when military plans are drawn up but not implemented, even with limited officers. If Russia is willing to hit only ISIS in the East of Syria and refrain from hitting al-Nusra and other jihadists spread in vast area around Aleppo, Hezbollah is not willing to lose more men to keep a status quo. There will be no withdrawal from Syria but redeployment and reduce participation in many forthcoming battles, according to sources on the ground.
    A fuzzy future is overwhelming Syria. It seems that the appeasing Russian policy of appeasement with regard to Jahbat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and other jihadists will negatively affect the Syrian army provided that there are no other changes in the Syrian dynamic. The war in Syria is not expected to end soon.

    Article original en arabe dans le journal koweïtien al-Raï ici : http://www.alraimedia.com/ar/article/special-reports/2016/05/10/678502/nr/syria

    • Un article d’al-Monitor rapportait l’agacement des Iraniens quant à la cessation des hostilités qui privait Damas d’initiative tout en permettant à Jaysh al-Fatah (dont al-Nousra et le TIP exclus de la Cessation des hostilités) de faire des avancées importantes au sud d’Alep, dont récemment à Khan Touman :
      http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-syria-heavy-losses-khan-tuman.html

      The Khan Tuman attack took place one day after the United States and Russia announced a cease-fire in Aleppo province. Kowsari denounced the cease-fire as simply being another method for the United States to achieve its goals in Syria, and he accused the United States of working with opposition groups to violate the cease-fires.

      According to Entekhab website, quoting Lebanon’s As-Safir newspaper, during a May 7 meeting between Assad and Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian officials had reportedly conveyed their concern about Russia’s proposals for a political solution at a time when armed opposition groups are increasing their forces traveling through Turkey. The Iranians reportedly believe that the political solutions would limit Russia’s military involvement before having established dominance over the armed fighters and this would cause a change in the battles.

  • Erdogan suggests name change for Arab League - Al-Monitor : the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-erdogan-accuses-arab-league-of-splitting-islam.html

    Ce n’est pas un gag, Erdogan suggère, dans une conférence relativement mineure il est vrai, de changer la Ligue arabe en Ligue musulmane... (Il s’en verrait d’ailleurs assez bien le patron alors que pour la Ligue arabe, ce n’est pas gagné et la place est déjà prise de toute manière !)

    “We always talk about Turks and Arabs. I am saddened by this. They talk about the Arab League. So does this mean we should put a Turkish League in front of this?” Erdogan said. “You talk about Islamic cooperation on the one hand and about an Arab League on the other. What kind of business is this? Why don’t we just call it the ’Islamic League’ instead of the Arab League?”

    #arabisme

  • Four reasons Sisi won’t turn against Iran - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-saudi-egypt-sisi-rapprochment-salman-visit.html

    Avoiding confrontation: Does Egypt even want to confront Iran? There is no clear cut answer to this question, although its regional policy and strategic choices toward Middle Eastern hotspots — such as Syria and Yemen — show a tendency for rivalry with Riyadh and especially Ankara rather than any sort of inclination to confront Tehran. Although there is no such thing as regional cooperation between Egypt and Iran, confronting Iran is not on Sisi’s agenda. The Egyptians are reflecting Riyadh’s rhetoric toward Iran obviously for economic reasons, but the economic dimension has its limits in shaping politics, especially when it comes to strategic choices.
    Limited potential: What can Egypt add to Saudi’s regional effort against Iran? The answer is “not much.” In fact, Egypt’s strategic potential in the Middle East is so limited that it couldn’t stop Qatar from backing the Egyptian opposition. Although having Cairo within its anti-Iran camp would have some political ramifications, Riyadh is putting a lot of effort into getting more than just political backing from Sisi. Faced with a lack of a much-needed strategic — and effective — ally, Riyadh is struggling to create one out of Egypt. Yet on a cost-benefit analysis, Egypt is perhaps too much of a cost for Saudi Arabia to raise any concern in Tehran.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-saudi-egypt-sisi-rapprochment-salman-visit.html#ixzz47gNYqyef

  • Why Merkel’s criticism only strengthens Netanyahu - Al-Monitor | Mazal Mualem | Posted May 2, 2016
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/israel-netanyahu-germany-merkel-settlements-frustration.html#

    The diplomatic uproar over the Der Spiegel report about German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s despair over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and of the ongoing construction in the settlements is not damaging Netanyahu politically. On the contrary. However, anyone who has spoken with senior German officials over the past two years knows that the claims that Germany is less inclined to unconditionally support Israel, which has since been denied (at least partially) by sources close to the chancellor, is a reliable reflection of reality. Germany, Israel’s most important ally in Europe, feels Netanyahu is leading it by the nose and taking it for granted while he keeps boosting the settlement enterprise.