How Ahrar al-Sham Has Come to Define the Kaleidoscope of the Syrian Civil War

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    • Sur les finasseries idéologiques d’Ahrar (qui font le miel des islmo-jihadologues), dont un des leaders, Ali al-Omar a présenté récemment l’idéologie comme la 5e école de l’islamisme, distincte des FM et du salafisme-jihadiste, tout en partageant les buts ultimes : un Etat islamique puis le rétablissement du califat) :
      http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-ahrar-al-sham-has-come-to-define-the-kaleidoscope-of-the-syrian-c
      et cet article récent dans The National mais qui a depuis disparu du site mais toujours accessible là :
      http://archive.is/GsFmr

      Ali Al Omar, the group’s deputy leader, answered some of these questions during an hour-long talk he gave on Friday, titled “The Place of Ahrar Al Sham among Islamist Currents". Three points stand out.
      First, Mr Al Omar begins the insightful talk by laying outmain Islamist movements that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He says all the four movements differ in their approach but agree on the objective, which is the restoration of the Islamic caliphate.
      Two of these movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tablighi Jamaat, seek to establish the caliphate without stating that as their goal, through political participation and proselytisation respectively. The failure of those movements, he says, led to the rise of a third one: jihadism.
      Ahar Al Sham belongs to a new movement that sees merits in each of the movements he mentioned. The group combines, rather than departs from, the approaches of all of its predecessors. Significantly, he points out that the difference between Ahrar Al Sham and jihadists is that the group does more than just jihad. The difference between the two is not that jihad is a temporary tactic for them, he says. That is a key clarification because some observers think that Ahrar Al Sham’s engagement in armed struggle is dictated by the reality in Syria, as the war against the regime rages.
      The group’s position on jihad is heavily shaped by Salafi-jihadism, which views jihad as a goal in and of itself. According to a recent 78-page study by Ahmad Abazeid, one of the group’s closest observers, the group “adopts the writings of Salafi-jihadism in its training camps and discourse".
      A second point that stands out from Mr Al Omar’s lecture is his group’s real stance on political participation. He explains that Ahrar Al Sham’s participation in political talks, conferences or pacts is designed as a form of “takhtheel" – disruption or subvers­ion.
      This is a telling statement, considering that it is such “flexibility" that led many to rethink the group’s ideology and to conclude that it broke away from Salafi-­jihadism – the “crucible from which it emerged", in the words of one of its media activists.
      Third, Mr Al Omar singles out the Taliban as a model worth following. This is the second time the group has officially praised the Taliban in this way. Last August, Ahrar Al Sham paid a tribute to the Taliban’s dead leader Mullah Omar, describing him as “the happy emir" and his group as “the blessed movement".

      Et du même auteur :
      http://timep.org/commentary/jihadist-legacy-still-shapes-ahrar-al-sham

      A mon humble avis ces finasseries traduisent plus les hésitations tactiques d’Ahrar dans un conflit dont les règles politiques (cessation hostilités et ses règles des cibles légitimes) ne sont pas claires et font l’enjeu de négociations entre acteurs extérieurs Le grand écart entre al-Qaïda et le fait d’être théoriquement partie prenante à genève ne sera peut-être pas éternellement possible...

    • Le genre de considérations qui arrivent au moment où les Russes insistent absolument pour que « les rebelles modérés » se séparent d’Al Nusra sur le terrain (deadline annoncée : hier dimanche), avant de reprendre des opérations d’envergure.