The Nation

  • The Israel-Affiliated Organization Leading the Backlash Against Student Protests
    [The Israeli-American Council has worked in tandem with Israeli intelligence agencies for years. Last month, its leaders vowed to shut down the encampment at UCLA.]

    Key to their US operations was a highly sophisticated intelligence unit that targeted innocent Americans around the country. It was described to the IAC members in 2016 by Sagi Balasha, a former senior Israeli official who was the CEO of the IAC from 2011 to 2015. He then moved back to Israel and took over Concert, a secretive front organization operated by the Ministry of Strategic Affairs where he calls Vaknin-Gill, “my partner.” And among its projects was Israel Cyber Shield. “We started to establish a project called Israel Cyber Shield,” he said. “This is actually a civil intelligence unit that collects, analyzes and acts upon the activists in the BDS movement, of its people, organizations, or events. And we give it everything we collect. We are using the most sophisticated data system, intelligence system in the Israeli market.”

    And everything they collect, according to Vaknin-Gil, includes surveillance on students, churchgoers, and laborers around the country—any group that might support or be sympathetic to the Palestinian and boycott causes. Describing the various elements of the covert operations, she said, “The first one is intel, intelligence.… What we’ve done is mapped and analyzed the whole [pro-Palestinian] phenomena globally. Not just the United States, not just campuses, but campuses and intersectionality, labor unions and churches.” And secrecy was critical. “We are a different government working on a foreign soil, and we have to be very, very cautious,” she said.

    There was good reason for Israel’s secrecy. Among the key targets was Linda Sarsour, a leader in both the Palestinian movement and Black Lives Matter, which endorsed the boycott in 2016. She was also one of the primary organizers of the Women’s March following President Donald Trump’s inauguration. According to an investigation by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, among the material the Cyber Shield unit was able to secretly obtain from Sarsour was a password-protected file “containing information on her parents, and another file with more than 10 pages all marked ‘Confidential.’… The dossier concluded with an executive summary that highlighted her apparent weak points.” Once collected, the data was then turned over for use by another secretive Israeli unit targeting Americans, one known as Act.IL, that could then exploit Sarsour’s “weak points.” Act.IL had an unusual birth.

  • It’s Time to Stop Ignoring the Sexual Violence Happening in Gaza

    Since Israel launched its war on Gaza, Gazan men and women have provided extensive testimony as to the nature of sexual assault perpetrated by the Israeli military. And although gendered violence pervaded everyday life for Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza prior to the current ongoing assault, feminists who rally around the reports of rape of Israeli women, like Sheryl Sandberg and Hillary Clinton, have not lent Palestinian women the same level of concern.

  • Eric Adams Is the Lying Face of the Campus Crackdown | The Nation

    Après avoir expliqué combien Adams, en bon sioniste, est un menteur,

    The violence at UCLA is instructive. The pro-Israel counterprotesters were organized by a group funded by billionaire Bill Ackman and friends, including Jessica Seinfeld (wife of the comedian Jerry Seinfeld). Many of the hired protesters seem to have been Iranian monarchists—a group that tends to be pro-Israel because of the old alliance between the deposed shah of Iran and Israel.

  • Israel’s War on American Student Activists | The Nation

    […] Netanyahu secretly turned his attention to American students, faculty, and campus groups in the US fighting for Palestinian rights. Fearing the growing support for the Palestinian cause on college campuses, he established a covert front to spy on, harass, intimidate, and disrupt these groups. Critical to this effort is the little-known Washington-based Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC). For years the organization, with links to both Israeli intelligence and AIPAC, has used student informants belonging to Jewish and pro-Israel campus organization in the US to gather intelligence on pro-Palestinian students and groups.

    “The ICC pools resources from all of the campus organizations. So that they’re tapped in on all angles,” Lila Greenberg, the senior national field organizer for AIPAC at the time, told Tony Kleinfeld in 2016. At the time, Kleinfeld, who is Jewish, was posing as a pro-Israel activist while working as an undercover reporter for an Al Jazeera documentary. He also met with Jacob Baime, currently the ICC’s chief executive officer and the former national field director for AIPAC. In his Washington headquarters, Baime boasted to Kleinfeld about the power of his organization to secretly attack American students who support Palestinian rights. “We built up this massive national political campaign to crush them,” he said.

    To Kleinfeld’s hidden camera, Baime described ICC as basically a clandestine Israeli military command.

  • Letters From the Apocalypse | The Nation

    In September 2023, poet George Abraham and journalist Sarah Aziza began writing letters to each other about their experience as Palestinians, writers, artists, and intellectuals. A month into their correspondence, everything changed.

    • I fear, and expect, that our slow genocide will be replaced by a rapid one. Every rhetorical and tactical piece has been arranged for this. The world has long prepared for our death—they have practiced it every day for years. We are the ungrievable, the barbarians, the terrorist “animals.” Our suffering is expected, and excused. Welcomed, even. I fear no number of our dead that will satisfy a regime which has always intended our annihilation, and now anoints itself with the blood of its slain. And I dread watching our slaughter while my grief is rendered illegible by a consensus which has always sentenced us to death.

  • What Does It Mean to Be Palestinian Now?
    January 25, 2024 | The Nation

    For generations, the voices of Palestinians have been routinely overlooked. When we do turn to them, it is usually to ask them to justify their despair or prove their worthiness as humans—and to teach us the very basics of a generations-long crisis of forced exile and violent displacement.

    Instead of making Palestinians play out that endless cycle one more time, we wanted to get to the heart of a question that feels more vital, more essential, in our moment.

    The contributors to this section are Palestinians living in the US, where the war reverberates with terrifying intimacy even though the bloodshed is thousands of miles away. It is also where the need to hear from Palestinians—and to listen to what they have to say—has never been as critical, or as fraught.

    So what does it mean to be Palestinian now? It’s a question whose answer we know will keep changing in the months and years ahead. But we have to keep asking it. (...)

    • It may sound daft to suggest that a group of armed irregulars, numbering in the low tens of thousands, besieged and with little access to advanced weaponry, is a match for one of the world’s most powerful militaries, backed and armed by the United States. And yet, an increasing number of establishment strategic analysts warn that Israel could lose this war on Palestinians despite the cataclysmic violence it unleashed since the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7. And in provoking the Israeli assault, Hamas may be realizing many of its own political objectives.

      Both #Israel and #Hamas appear to be resetting the terms of their political contest not to the pre–October 7 status quo, but to the 1948 one. It’s not clear what comes next, but there will be no going back to the previous state of affairs.

      The surprise attack neutralized Israeli military installations, breaking open the gates of the world’s largest open-air prison and leading a gruesome rampage in which some 1,200 Israelis, at least 845 of them civilians, were killed. The shocking ease with which Hamas breached Israeli lines around the Gaza Strip reminded many of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Not literally—there are vast differences between a US expeditionary war in a distant land and Israel’s war to defend an occupation at home, waged by a citizen army motivated by a sense of existential peril. Instead, the usefulness of the analogy lies in the political logic shaping an insurgent offensive.

      In 1968, the Vietnamese revolutionaries lost the battle and sacrificed much of the underground political and military infrastructure they had patiently built over years. Yet the Tet Offensive was a key moment in their defeat of the United States—albeit at a massive cost in Vietnamese lives. By simultaneously staging dramatic, high-profile attacks on more than 100 targets across the country on a single day, lightly armed Vietnamese guerrillas shattered the illusion of success that was being peddled to the US public by the Johnson administration. It signaled to Americans that the war for which they were being asked to sacrifice tens of thousands of their sons was unwinnable.

      The Vietnamese leadership measured the impact of its military actions by their political effects rather than by conventional military measures such as men and materiel lost or territory gained. Thus Henry Kissinger’s 1969 lament: “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”

      That logic has Jon Alterman of the not-exactly-dovish Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., to see Israel as being at considerable risk of losing to Hamas:

      Hamas’s concept of military victory…is all about driving long-term political outcomes. Hamas sees victory not in one year or five, but from engaging with decades of struggle that increase Palestinian solidarity and increase Israel’s isolation. In this scenario, Hamas rallies a besieged population in Gaza around it in anger and helps collapse the Palestinian Authority government by ensuring Palestinians see it even more as a feckless adjunct to Israeli military authority. Meanwhile, Arab states move strongly away from normalization, the Global South aligns strongly with the Palestinian cause, Europe recoils at the Israeli army’s excesses, and an American debate erupts over Israel, destroying the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed here since the early 1970s.

      Hamas, Alterman writes, seeks “to use Israel’s far greater strength to defeat Israel. Israel’s strength allows the country to kill Palestinian civilians, destroy Palestinian infrastructure, and defy global calls for restraint. All those things advance Hamas’s war aims.”

      Such warnings have been ignored by the Biden administration and Western leaders, whose unconditional embrace of Israel’s war is rooted in the delusion that Israel was just another Western nation peacefully going about its business before it suffered an unprovoked attack on October 7—it’s a comforting fantasy to those who prefer to avoid recognizing a reality they’ve been complicit in creating.

      Forget “intelligence failures”; Israel’s failure to anticipate October 7 was a political failure to understand the consequences of a violent system of oppression that leading international and Israeli human rights organizations have branded as apartheid.

      Twenty years ago, former Knesset Speaker Avrum Burg warned of the inevitability of violent backlash. “It turns out that the 2,000-year struggle for Jewish survival comes down to a state of settlements, run by an amoral clique of corrupt lawbreakers who are deaf both to their citizens and to their enemies. A state lacking justice cannot survive,” he wrote in The International Herald Tribune.

      Even if the Arabs lower their heads and swallow their shame and anger forever, it won’t work. A structure built on human callousness will inevitably collapse in on itself.… Israel, having ceased to care about the children of the Palestinians, should not be surprised when they come washed in hatred and blow themselves up in the centers of Israeli escapism.

      Israel could kill 1,000 Hamas men a day and solve nothing, Burg warned, because Israel’s own violent actions would be the source of a replenishing of their ranks. His warnings have been ignored, even as they’ve been vindicated many times over. That same logic is now playing out on steroids in the destruction being visited on Gaza. The grinding structural violence Israel expected Palestinians to suffer in silence meant that Israeli security was always illusory.

      The weeks since October 7 have affirmed that there can be no return to the status quo ante. This was likely Hamas’s goal in staging its deadly attacks. And even prior to this, many in Israel’s leadership were openly calling for the completion of the Nakba, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine; now those voices have been amplified.

      Late November’s mutually agreed humanitarian pause saw Hamas release some hostages in exchange for Palestinians held in Israeli jails and an increase in humanitarian supplies entering #Gaza. When Israel resumed its military onslaught and Hamas returned to launching rockets, it was clear that Hamas has not been militarily defeated. The mass slaughter and destruction Israel has wrought in Gaza suggests an intention to make the territory uninhabitable for the 2.2 million Palestinians who live there—and to push for expulsion via a militarily engineered humanitarian catastrophe. Indeed, the IDF’s own estimate is that it has so far eliminated less than 15 percent of Hamas’s fighting force. This in a campaign that has killed more than 21,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, 8,600 of them children.

      October 7 and Palestinian politics

      Israel’s military will almost certainly oust Hamas from governing Gaza. But analysts such as Tareq Baconi, who has studied the movement and its thinking over the past two decades, argue that it has sought for quite some time to break out of the shackles of governing a territory sectioned off from the rest of Palestine, on terms set by the occupying power.

      Hamas has long shown a desire to break out of its Gaza governance role, from the mass unarmed March of Return protests in 2018 violently suppressed by Israeli sniper fire to efforts thwarted by the United States and Israel to transfer governance of Gaza to either a reformed Palestinian Authority, agreed-upon technocrats, or an elected government, while it focused on refocusing Palestinian politics in both Gaza and the West Bank on resistance to, rather than custodianship of, the occupation status quo. If a consequence of its attack were losing the responsibility for governing Gaza, Hamas might see that as advantageous.

      Hamas has tried to nudge Fatah onto a similar path, urging the ruling party in the West Bank to end Palestinian Authority (PA) security collaboration with Israel and more directly confront the occupation. Losing municipal control of Gaza is therefore far from a decisive defeat for Hamas’s war effort: For a movement dedicated to liberating Palestinian lands, governing Gaza had begun to look like a dead end, much as permanent limited self-governance in discontiguous islands of the West Bank has been for Fatah.

      Hamas, Baconi says, likely felt compelled to take a high-stakes gamble to shatter a status quo it deemed a slow death for Palestine. “All this still does not mean that Hamas’s strategic shift will be deemed successful in the long run,” he wrote in Foreign Policy.

      Hamas’s violent disruption of the status quo might well have provided Israel with an opportunity to carry out another Nakba. This might result in a regional conflagration or deal Palestinians a blow that could take a generation to recover from. What is certain, however, is that there is no return to what existed before.

      Hamas’s gambit, then, may have been to sacrifice municipal governance of a besieged Gaza to cement its status as a national resistance organization. Hamas is not trying to bury Fatah: The various unity agreements between Hamas and Fatah, particularly those led by prisoners of both factions, demonstrate that Hamas seeks a united front. The PA is unable to protect West Bank Palestinians from the increasing violence of Israeli settlements and entrenched control, let alone to meaningfully respond to the bloodshed in Gaza. Under the cover of Western backing on Gaza, Israel has killed hundreds of Palestinians, arrested thousands, and displaced entire villages on the West Bank, all the while escalating its state-sponsored settler attacks. In so doing, Israel has further undermined Fatah among the population and pushed it in the direction of Hamas.

      For years, settlers protected by the IDF have attacked Palestinian villages with the aim of forcing their residents to leave and tightening Israel’s illegal grip on the occupied territory—but the expansion of this since October 7 is causing even Israel’s US accomplices to blanche. Biden’s threat of visa bans against settlers involved in violence against West Bank Palestinians is an evasion: Those settlers are far from individual rogue actors; they are armed by the state and aggressively protected by the IDF and the Israeli legal system, because they are implementing a state policy. But even Biden’s miscast threat makes clear that Israel is at odds with his administration.

      Hamas has a pan-Palestinian perspective, not a Gaza-specific one, and so it intended October 7 to have transformative effects across Palestine. During the 2021 “Unity Intifada” that sought to connect the struggles of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza with those inside Israel, Hamas took actions in support of that goal. Now, the Israeli state is accelerating that connection with a paranoid campaign of repression against any expression of dissent from among its Palestinian citizens. Hundreds of Palestinians in the West Bank have been detained, including activists and teens posting on Facebook. Israel is all too aware of the potential for escalation in the West Bank. In that sense, the Israeli response has only brought the people of the West Bank and Gaza closer.

      It’s clear Israel never intended to accept a sovereign Palestinian state anywhere west of the Jordan River. Instead, Israel is intensifying long-standing plans for securing its control of the territory. That and growing Israeli encroachment into the Al Aqsa Mosque are a reminder that Israel is actively fueling whatever uprising follows in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and even within the ’67 lines.

      Ironically, then, the US insistence on the Palestinian Authority’s being put in control of Gaza after Israel’s war of devastation—and its belated, feeble warnings over settler violence—reinforces the idea of the West Bank and Gaza being a single entity. Israel’s 17-year policy of cleaving a pliant West Bank run by a co-opted PA from a “terrorist-run Gaza” has failed.

      Israel after October 7

      The Hamas-led raid punctured myths of Israeli invincibility and its citizens’ expectation of tranquility even as the state chokes the life out of Palestinians. Just weeks earlier, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was boasting that Israel had successfully “managed” the conflict to the point that Palestine no longer featured on his map of a “new Middle East.” With the Abraham Accords and other alliances, some Arab leaders were embracing Israel. The US was promoting the plan, with Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden both focused on “normalization” with Arab regimes that were willing to leave the Palestinians subject to ever-tightening Israeli apartheid. October 7 served up a brutal reminder that this was untenable, and that Palestinians’ resistance constitutes a form of veto power over the efforts of others to determine their fate.

      It’s too soon to measure the impact of October 7 on Israeli domestic politics. It has made Israelis more hawkish, but at the same time more distrustful of their national leadership after the colossal failure of intelligence and response. It took significant mass mobilization against the government by the families of Israelis held captive in Gaza to achieve a pause in military action and secure a hostage-release deal. Dramatic, high-profile internal dissent over the hostages and what’s required of Israel to secure their return could raise pressure for further release deals and even a full-blown cease-fire, despite a determination to continue the war among much of the political and military leadership. Israeli public opinion remains confused, angry, and unpredictable.

      Then there’s the war’s impact on Israel’s economy, whose growth model is based on attracting high levels of foreign direct investment to its tech sector and other export industries. Last year’s social protest and uncertainty over the constitutional fracas was already being cited as a reason for the 68 percent year-on-year drop in FDI reported over the summer. Israel’s war, for which 360,000 reservists have been mobilized, adds a new level of shock. Economist Adam Tooze wrote in his Substack:

      The tech lobby in Israel estimates that a tenth of its workforce has been mobilized. Construction is paralyzed by the quarantining of the Palestinian workforce in the West Bank. Consumption of services has collapsed as people stay away from restaurants and public gatherings are limited. Credit card records suggest that private consumption in Israel fell by nearly a third in the days after the war broke out. Spending on leisure and entertainment crashed by 70%. Tourism, a mainstay of the Israeli economy, has come to an abrupt halt. Flights are canceled and shipping cargo diverted. Offshore the Israeli government ordered Chevron to halt production at the Tamar natural gas field, costing Israel $200 million a month in lost revenue.

      Israel is a wealthy country with the resources to weather some of this storm, but with its wealth comes fragility—and it has much to lose.

      Israeli forces have poured into Gaza with a battle plan, but no clear war plan for Gaza after their invasion. Some Israeli military leaders aim to maintain “security control” of the sort they enjoy in the PA’s West Bank domain. In Gaza, this would pit it against a better-drilled insurgency supported by most of the population. Many in Israeli government circles advocate forcibly displacing much of Gaza’s civilian population into Egypt, by engineering a humanitarian crisis that makes Gaza unlivable. The US has said it has ruled that out, but no smart gambler would discount the possibility of the Israelis’ seeking forgiveness rather than permission for more mass-scale ethnic cleansing in line with Israel’s long-term demographic goals of reducing the Palestinian population between the river and the sea.

      US officials have reached for the prayer books of yore, speaking hopefully of putting 88-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, the head of PA, back in charge of Gaza, with the promise of some renewed pursuit of the chimeric “two-state solution.” But the PA has no credibility even in the West Bank because of its acquiescence to Israel’s ever-expanding occupation. Then, there’s the reality that preventing genuine Palestinian sovereignty in any part of historic Palestine has long been a point of consensus in the Israeli leadership across most of the Zionist political spectrum. And Israel’s leaders have no need to abide by the expectations of a US administration that may well be voted out next year. And they have a proven ability to wag the dog even if Biden were reelected. The US has chosen to ride shotgun in Israel’s war machine, whose destination may not be clear, but it’s certainly not any kind of Palestinian state.

      The global impact of October 7

      Israel and the United States may have convinced themselves that the world has “moved on” from the Palestinian plight, but the energies unleashed by the events since October 7 suggest that the opposite is true. Calls for solidarity with Palestine have echoed along the streets of the Arab world, serving in some countries as a coded language of dissent against decrepit authoritarianism. Across the Global South and in the cities of the West, Palestine now occupies a symbolic place as an avatar of rebellion against Western hypocrisy and an unjust postcolonial order. Not since the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq have so many millions around the world taken to the streets to protest. Organized labor has flexed its internationalist muscles to challenge arms deliveries to Israel and reminded itself of its power to change history, and legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and even US and European courts are being used to challenge government policies that enable Israel’s war crimes.

      Panicked by a world aghast at its actions in Gaza, Israel and its advocates have reverted to charges of antisemitism against those who would challenge Israel’s brutality—but everything from the mass marches to the vocal Jewish opposition to the opinion surveys on Biden’s handling of the crisis indicate that equating solidarity with antisemitism is not only factually wrong; it is unconvincing.

      Several countries in Latin America and Africa have symbolically cut ties, and the deliberate bombing of a civilian population and preventing access to shelter, food, water, and medical care has left even many of Israel’s allies aghast. The extent of violence the West is willing to countenance against a captive people in Gaza offers the Global South a stark reminder of accounts unsettled with the imperial West. And when French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly implore Israel to stop “bombing babies,” Israel is in danger of losing even parts of the West. It has become difficult in the short term for Arab and Muslim countries to maintain, much less expand public ties.

      Yoking itself to Israel’s response to October 7 has also burst the bubble on US fantasies of reclaiming hegemony in the Global South under a “we’re the good guys” rubric. The contrast between its response to Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestinian crises respectively has produced a consensus that there is hypocrisy at the very heart of US foreign policy, producing such extraordinary spectacles as Biden being castigated, face-to-face at an APEC Summit, by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim for his failure to stand up against Israel’s atrocities

      Ibrahim specifically warned that Biden’s response to Gaza had raised a serious trust deficit with those the United States hopes to court as allies in its competition with Russia and China. Having demonstrated to Arab allies that their Washington patron will side with Israel, even when it is bombing Arab civilians, will likely reinforce the trend of Global South states diversifying their geopolitical portfolios.

      The political question

      By shattering a status quo that Palestinians find intolerable, Hamas has put politics back on the agenda. Israel has significant military power, but it is politically weak. Much of the US establishment supporting Israel’s war assumes that violence emanating from an oppressed community can be stamped out by applying overwhelming military force against that community. But even Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin signaled skepticism over that premise, warning that Israel’s attacks killing thousands of civilians risked driving “them into the arms of the enemy [and replacing] a tactical victory with a strategic defeat.”

      Western politicians and media like to fantasize that Hamas is an ISIS-style nihilistic cadre holding Palestinian society hostage; Hamas is, in fact, a multifaceted political movement rooted in the fabric and national aspirations of Palestinian society. It embodies a belief, grimly affirmed by decades of Palestinian experience, that armed resistance is central to the Palestinian liberation project because of the failures of the Oslo process and the intractable hostility of its adversary. And its influence and popularity have grown as Israel and its allies keep thwarting a peace process and other nonviolent strategies for pursuing Palestinian liberation.

      Israel’s campaign will leave Hamas’s military capacity diminished. But even if it were to kill the organization’s top leaders (as it has done previously), Israel’s response to October 7 is affirming Hamas’s message and its standing among Palestinians across the region and beyond. Large protests in Jordan with pro-Hamas chants, for instance, are unprecedented. It requires no approval or support of the Hamas actions of October 7 to acknowledge the enduring appeal of a movement that seems capable of making Israel pay some kind of a price for the violence it visits upon Palestinians every day, every year, generation after generation.

      History also suggests a pattern in which representatives of movements dismissed as “terrorist” by their adversaries—in South Africa, say, or Ireland—nonetheless appear at the negotiating table when the time comes to seek political solutions. It would be ahistorical to bet against Hamas, or at least some version of the political-ideological current it represents, doing the same if and when a political solution between Israel and the Palestinians is revisited with seriousness.

      What comes after the horrific violence is far from clear, but Hamas’s October 7 attack has forced a reset of a political contest to which Israel appears unwilling to respond beyond devastating military force against Palestinian civilians. And as things stand eight weeks into the vengeance, Israel can’t be said to be winning.


    • Tony Karon
      Tony Karon is the editorial lead of Al Jazeera’s AJ+, a former senior editor at Time magazine, and was an activist in the anti-apartheid liberation movement in his native South Africa.

      Daniel Levy
      Daniel Levy is the president of the U.S./Middle East Project and a former Israeli negotiator with the Palestinians at Taba under prime minister Ehud Barak and at Oslo B under prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

  • The “Hunt for Hamas” Narrative Is Obscuring Israel’s Real Plans for Gaza | The Nation

    America’s media and political class is analyzing, debating, and shaping a narrative in Gaza that’s entirely different from the one being discussed in Israeli media and among Israeli political leaders. This gap, born from casual racism, deliberate credulity, and reflexive alignment with the US government’s party line, is creating a media failure the likes of which we haven’t seen since the run-up to the Iraq War.

    Israel is engaging in massive population transfers and attempting to depopulate Gaza, and everything it does must be understood through this lens. The Israeli government has explicitly said this from the beginning, starting with an evacuation order for North Gaza on October 13. No exceptions.

    Everything Israel has done since then is pursuant to carrying out this evacuation order to remove over 1 million people form North Gaza into refugee camps in South Gaza. This is what they said they would do, and it’s what they are doing.

    • « depopulate Gaza » : superbe et très juste - sans chercher à relativiser. En particulier, ça "évite" les braquages autour du terme génocide.

      Le plan serait donc une saisie de 100% de la surface de Gaza et une éjection de 90% de la population vers un ailleurs à définir ?

    • The government is doing forcible population transfers, and this means everyone. It’s the simplest way to explain Israel’s actions, yet American media—tied to “counterterror” narratives—can’t, or won’t, get their minds around the obvious fact that Israel is attempting to depopulate Gaza in stages.

      (ma graisse)

    • Les médias américains ont de gros moyens et ne sont pas peuplés que de crétins.

      Il y a probablement, comme en France, un pourcentage significatif de juifs parmi les journalistes et parmi les propriétaires de ces médias.
      Et un considérable pourcentage de sionistes parmi eux.

      Plus les moyens financiers importants du Lobby sioniste pour les pressions et la corruption.

      On a compris pourquoi les civils et les enfants palestiniens sont réduits en bouillie.

      Je pense qu’en France c’est pareil.

      Lutter en occident contre ce Lobby sioniste et tous ces relais, c’est touchy (sensible et risqué) car « antisémitisme accusation Joker qui autorise les carnages ».

      Mais ne pas le faire, c’est laisser nos compatriotes musulmans se faire insulter sur toutes les chaines.

  • The “Harvard Law Review” Refused to Run This Piece About Genocide in Gaza | The Nation

    Je poste cela ici, ne l’ayant pas déjà trouvée sur @seenthis
    Le texte est accessible à la suite de cette mise en contexte sur le site de The Nation

    On Saturday, the board of the Harvard Law Review voted not to publish “The Ongoing Nakba: Towards a Legal Framework for Palestine,” a piece by Rabea Eghbariah, a human rights attorney completing his doctoral studies at Harvard Law School. The vote followed what an editor at the law review described in an e-mail to Eghbariah as “an unprecedented decision” by the leadership of the Harvard Law Review to prevent the piece’s publication.

    Eghbariah told The Nation that the piece, which was intended for the HLR Blog, had been solicited by two of the journal’s online editors. It would have been the first piece written by a Palestinian scholar for the law review. The piece went through several rounds of edits, but before it was set to be published, the president stepped in. “The discussion did not involve any substantive or technical aspects of your piece,” online editor Tascha Shahriari-Parsa, wrote Eghbariah in an e-mail shared with The Nation. “Rather, the discussion revolved around concerns about editors who might oppose or be offended by the piece, as well as concerns that the piece might provoke a reaction from members of the public who might in turn harass, dox, or otherwise attempt to intimidate our editors, staff, and HLR leadership.”

    On Saturday, following several days of debate and a nearly six-hour meeting, the Harvard Law Review’s full editorial body came together to vote on whether to publish the article. Sixty-three percent voted against publication. In an e-mail to Egbariah, HLR President Apsara Iyer wrote, “While this decision may reflect several factors specific to individual editors, it was not based on your identity or viewpoint.”

    In a statement that was shared with The Nation, a group of 25 HLR editors expressed their concerns about the decision. “At a time when the Law Review was facing a public intimidation and harassment campaign, the journal’s leadership intervened to stop publication,” they wrote. “The body of editors—none of whom are Palestinian—voted to sustain that decision. We are unaware of any other solicited piece that has been revoked by the Law Review in this way. “

    When asked for comment, the leadership of the Harvard Law Review referred The Nation to a message posted on the journal’s website. “Like every academic journal, the Harvard Law Review has rigorous editorial processes governing how it solicits, evaluates, and determines when and whether to publish a piece…” the note began. ”Last week, the full body met and deliberated over whether to publish a particular Blog piece that had been solicited by two editors. A substantial majority voted not to proceed with publication.”

    #censure #génocide #palestine #gaza

    • To keep the lights on in Gaza City’s largest hospital, Wissam AbuJarad, an anesthetist, said staff were collecting gas from dwindling stocks in the area to maintain a steady supply to their generators.

      “If we run out of fuel, then we will lose all of the patients in the ICU, the babies in the incubators, and the patients who need surgery,” AbuJarad said.

      He said that some staff had been reduced to drinking from IV solution bags because Israel had cut off water supplies to the enclave.

    • The shutoff of clean water is of particularly grave concern. When people no longer have access to clean, treated water, they will drink water from whatever source there is, including seawater. These sources may be contaminated with sewage, chemicals, and other contaminants, which can lead to water-borne illnesses like cholera and dysentery; outbreaks of such diseases would strain the medical system in Gaza. These diseases also require rapid rehydration, and without a source of water, they can quickly become deadly. Clean water is also necessary for providing proper medical care to people—for one thing, you can’t wash your hands without it. Water is a key component in many medical procedures, such as dialysis for kidney patients. When clean water is no longer available, medical practitioners have to spend crucial moments looking for water in a time when time can barely be spared. Meanwhile, the blockade prevents medical supplies from entering Gaza, and Médecins Sans Frontières has reported that hospitals have run out of painkillers. As people are gravely injured and arrive at the hospital with open wounds, if hospitals are lacking proper medical equipment to stabilize them and prevent infection, many people will die preventable deaths.
      #eau #water

  • The Coronavirus Still Doesn’t Care About Your Feelings | The Nation

    But at a deeper level, this emphasis on public sentiment has contributed to confusion about the meaning of the term “pandemic.” A pandemic is an epidemiological term, and the meaning is quite specific—pandemics are global and unpredictable in their trajectory; endemic diseases are local and predictable. Despite the end of the Public Health Emergency in May, Covid-19 remains a pandemic, by definition. Yet some experts and public figures have uncritically advanced the idea that if the public appears to be tired, bored, or noncompliant with public health measures, then the pandemic must be over.

    But pandemics are impervious to ratings; they cannot be canceled or publicly shamed. History is replete with examples of pandemics that blazed for decades, sometimes smoldering for years before flaring up again into catastrophe. The Black Death (1346–1353 AD), the Antonine Plague (165–180 AD), and the Plague of Justinian (541–549 AD), pandemics all, lacked the quick resolution of the 1918 influenza pandemic. A pandemic cannot tell when the news cycle has moved on.


  • The Western Media Is Whitewashing the Azov Battalion | The Nation

    Then came Russia’s invasion. Within months, Azov fighters were being feted in Congress and at Stanford University. MSNBC swooned over a Ukrainian soldier whose Twitter account overflowed with neo-Nazi images. Facebook made the stunning decision to allow posts praising the Azov Battalion, even though the company admitted that it was a hate group.

    This overnight normalization of white supremacy was possible because Western institutions, driven by a zeal to ignore anything negative about our Ukrainian allies, decided that a neo-Nazi military formation in a war-torn nation had suddenly and miraculously stopped being neo-Nazi.


  • À Marseille, le RAID tire à vue - POLITIS

    La cité phocéenne, secouée par des affrontements après la mort de Nahel, a vu le RAID déployé dans ses rues. Plusieurs vidéos montrent cette unité d’élite réaliser des tirs à des distances potentiellement létales. Un homme y est mort après un « probable » tir « de type flash-ball ».

    Des coups de feu, parfois très proches. Dans une rue marseillaise, peu après minuit, dans la nuit du 30 juin au 1er juillet, des gens courent, visés par des tirs à moins de quatre mètres. Certains s’effondrent avant de se relever et de fuir. Les munitions sont en réalité des « bean bags », des petits sacs de toiles remplis de billes de plomb. En face d’eux, des hommes en noir, casqués et armés de #fusils de #calibre_12, le même pour les fusils de chasse. Il s’agit du #RAID, une unité d’élite de la #police qui intervient en cas d’attaques terroristes, de prises d’otages et dans la lutte contre le grand banditisme. Ce soir-là, pas de terroristes ni de criminels de grandes envergures, mais de simples jeunes révoltés.

    Le lendemain de cette scène de traque, dans la nuit du 1er au 2 juillet, Mohammed décède d’un arrêt cardiaque dans le même quartier. Le parquet estime que le décès de ce livreur Uber Eats et jeune père de famille de 27 ans a probablement été causé « par un choc violent au niveau du thorax provoqué par le tir d’un projectile de type flash-ball ». Présent lors des affrontements, il n’était là que pour prendre des photos, d’après sa femme contactée par RTL. Le parquet de Marseille a annoncé ouvrir une enquête pour « coups mortels avec usage ou menace d’une arme ».

    Flash-Ball, #LBD ou #bean_bag, le type de blessure engendrée par ces armes est relativement équivalent, la munition étant sphérique et relativement molle. Mais, comme le montre la scène du 1er juillet au soir, des tirs à moins de trois mètres sont effectués par le RAID. Encadré, le LBD est prévu pour un usage optimal entre 25 et 30 mètres. « En deçà des intervalles de distances opérationnels, propres à chaque munition, cette arme de force intermédiaire peut générer des risques lésionnels plus importants », rappelle une circulaire de 2017 de la police nationale.

    Pourtant, des vidéos des dernières émeutes montrent des policiers tirer à moins d’un mètre, comme à Montfermeil le 30 juin. Pour l’utilisation des bean bags, alors qu’une autre victime est dans le coma à Mont-Saint-Martin après un tir du RAID (article de La Voix du Nord), les consignes de tirs sont inconnues. Contacté pour obtenir plus d’informations sur les règles d’emploi, le ministère de l’Intérieur n’a pas répondu à nos sollicitations.

    #militarisation #maintien_de_l'ordre

    • After the Riots, the Police Terrorize Marseille

      Marseille, France—Many of the faces in the crowd were young and brown. It was June 29 in #Marseille. Two days prior in Nanterre, a cop fatally shot Nahel Merzouk, 17, in the head during a routine traffic stop. The police had claimed self-defense, but a video released by a witness showed an officer pointing and firing a gun directly into the youth’s car.

      That first night, there were arrests and fires in cities around Nanterre, but the anger quickly spread across France. Police responded by sending helicopters, armored vehicles, tactical units, and the French equivalent of SWAT teams. Over six days, police arrested between 3,600 and 4,000 people. About a third of them were minors—some as young as 11. Many of the detained protesters were men and boys of color like Nahel, who was of Algerian and Moroccan descent. While the government promises “swift, tough, and systematic” sanctions for those arrested, the confrontations have left French cities reeling. Marseille, in particular, has become a flashpoint in the media coverage of riots and looting.

      The scale and swiftness of police repression that descended upon French cities has been shocking. French media and politicians across the spectrum have turned police officers and a mayor and his family who escaped “attempted assassination”—an event that may not be connected to the riots—into the main victims of the unrest. But several people have died, including a 27-year-old in Marseille whose death is seen as “probably” due to the impact of a “Flash-Ball type projectile” (a rubber or foam pellet), a 50-year-old shot by a stray bullet in French Guyana, and a young man who fell from the roof of a grocery store during a looting near Rouen.

    • Pour le RAID, les consignes de tirs sont inconnues. Contacté pour obtenir plus d’informations sur les règles d’emploi, le ministère de l’Intérieur n’a pas répondu à nos sollicitations.

      Politis compte attaquer le RAID au tribunal administratif pour non respect de la procédure de tir ? #LOL #MDR (et accessoirement d’un arrêt cardiaque dû au tir du RAID à l’insu de son plein gré #le_coup_est_parti_tout_seul)

      Le mieux est d’attendre la dissolution de l’ONU. Et superbe article de The Nation.

  • The Protests in #France Are About to Collide With the 2024 Paris Olympics | The Nation

    The question facing France is going to be who benefits politically from this collision of an anti-Olympics movement with working-class anger. The left needs to be a home for French discontent. If it does not become one, the right, as it did in Brazil, can swoop in, fasten itself on the issue of Olympic corruption—linked, of course, to racist scapegoating—and find a path to power. Polls show support for left-wing initiatives like protecting pensions, but it’s Le Pen who is leading in the polls. The mere thought of Le Pen in power should be enough to make sure that anti-Olympics rage is used to organize movements for hope—and not divisive despair.

  • The Long #Covid Revolution | The Nation

    #MillionsMissing demonstrations like this one began in 2016 to raise awareness about myalgic encephalomyelitis, an infection-associated complex chronic illness (often abbreviated as ME/CFS). The hashtag alludes to the millions of dollars missing from research into ME/CFS and the millions of patients who are so marginalized from society that they sometimes seem to have disappeared. In the past three years, there has been an explosion of ME/CFS cases. According to #MEAction, the group that organizes #MillionsMissing, nearly half the current cases of long Covid meet the criteria for ME/CFS, and the majority of people with ME/CFS today are Covid-19 long-haulers.

    Long Covid symptoms, which commonly include persistent headaches, cognitive-functioning issues, fatigue, neuropathies, dizziness and fainting, significant sleep disturbances, gastrointestinal issues, and post-exertional symptom exacerbation (the worsening of symptoms after physical, mental, or emotional exertion), can affect every system of the body and, like those of ME/CFS, can range from mild to very severe. It’s common for Covid-19 long-haulers to receive additional diagnoses for related chronic illnesses. Because scientists also believe Covid may reactivate dormant viruses such as Epstein-Barr, some people with long Covid have been diagnosed with Lyme disease, shingles, and herpes, among other viruses. Many Covid long-haulers share symptom clusters and illness experiences, but “long Covid” also serves as a political term: It is a way for Covid patients who never fully recovered to advocate for research, public education, and economic support, no matter where they fall on the severity spectrum.

  • We Still Don’t Know Why Russia Invaded Ukraine
    Pourquoi la Russie a-t-elle décidé de mener une guerre contre l’#Ukraine en février 2022 précisément ? #Rajan_Menon critique les 2 explications monocausales dominantes.
    1/ C’est l’OTAN.

    Between then [2008] and the invasion moment, NATO never followed through on its pledge to take the next step and provide Kyiv with a “membership action plan.” By February 2022, it had, in fact, kept Ukraine waiting for 14 years without the slightest sign that its candidacy might be advancing (though Ukraine’s security ties and military training with some NATO states—the United States, Britain, and Canada, in particular—had increased).

    So, the NATO-was-responsible theory, suggesting that Putin invaded in 2022 in the face of an “existential threat,” isn’t convincing (even if one believes, as I do, that NATO’s enlargement was a bad idea and Russian apprehensions reasonable).

    2/ C’est la démocratie (qui de l’Ukraine pourrait s’insinuer en Russie).

    None of this explains why the war broke out when it did. Russia wasn’t then being roiled by protests; Putin’s position was rock-solid; and his party, United Russia, had no true rivals. Indeed, the only others with significant followings, relatively speaking, the Communist Party and the Liberal Democracy Party (neither liberal nor democratic), were aligned with the state.

    2’/ C’est une ambition impérialiste.

    But why then did a Russian ruler seized by imperial dreams and a neo-fascist ideology wait more than two decades to attack Ukraine? And remember, though now commonly portrayed as a wild-eyed expansionist, Putin, though hardly a peacemaker, had never previously committed Russian forces to anything like that invasion.

    Alors quoi ?

    Do I have a better explanation? No, but that’s my point. To this day, perhaps the most important question of all about this war, the biggest surprise—why did it happen when it did?—remains deeply mysterious, as do Putin’s motives (or perhaps impulses).

    • L’auteur s’amuse des noms qu’on donne aux guerres, en particulier quand il contient la raison de son déclenchement, et nomme son préféré :
      La guerre de l’oreille de Jenkins

      Jenkins raconte son histoire, demande justice et montre le bocal contenant son oreille. Les parlementaires unanimes poussent un cri d’indignation, invoquent le casus belli, rappellent que l’armada espagnole avait été défaite par la Royal Navy en 1718 au Cap Passaro, exigent que l’honneur britannique soit lavé de l’insupportable affront. Le premier ministre Walpole, qui est partisan de la paix, est forcé de déclarer la guerre à l’Espagne, le 30 octobre 1739

      Perso j’aime assez La guerre des petits gâteaux.

  • The Trump Campaign’s Collusion With Israel | The Nation

    Conclusion d’un très très long article publié dans The Nation « hebdomadaire classé à gauche et progressiste » (Wikipedia)

    The evidence, however, suggests that throughout the summer and into the fall of 2016, Israel illegally interfered in the US presidential election. A top agent of Netanyahu was secretly offering intelligence and other covert assistance to Trump to get him elected—all with virtually no oversight or scrutiny by the FBI or the US media, though both had numerous personnel in Israel at the time. Now Netanyahu is back in office as prime minister, and Trump is once again running for president. All the ingredients are there for history to repeat itself, unless the Justice Department and Congress conduct long-overdue investigations into the real source of secret foreign collaboration and interference in the 2016 election, and both the FBI and the media remove their self-imposed blinders when it comes to Israel.

    James BamfordJames Bam