• Why the U.S. Military Can’t Fix Syria
    http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/opinion/why-the-us-military-cant-fix-syria.html

    The memo’s authors and other interventionists fail to recognize that the United States in fact has effectively weakened President Bashar al-Assad already. In 2015, the administration’s aggressive covert action program facilitated significant gains for the opposition in northern Syria, exposed Latakia — the regime’s heartland — to attack, and diminished the Syrian military position in the northwestern province of Idlib.

    But these losses were also key factors in Russia’s decision to enter the Syrian fray after years of sitting on the sidelines. This gives the lie to the interventionists’ belief that “judicious” airstrikes could somehow disempower the Assad government, sap Russian resolve and improve prospects for a negotiated solution.

    If Moscow saw fit to intervene on account of Washington’s covert support for the rebels, it is only logical that it would retaliate even more strongly in the event of overt support. Indeed, that prospect is probably Moscow’s main motivation for keeping an air contingent and thousands of troops in Syria, conducting regular operations there and continuing to assure the Syrian government of Russia’s unstinting support.

    Even in the unfathomable event that Russia were to abandon Syria, direct American military action would cause Iran and Hezbollah, the Assad government’s closest allies, to intensify their support. This would strengthen hawks in Iran and dim prospects for further improvement in United States-Iran relations.

    Perhaps the interventionists believe that American military action would force Mr. Assad to the peace table. That prospect is equally implausible. There is no conceivable bargain that the Syrian president could strike with his adversaries, many of whom are hard-line Islamists. He and his colleagues would rather go down fighting than hand Syria to Sunni jihadists. The same goes for Iran and Hezbollah.