🛑 ✊ #Retraites #RéformedesRetraites #NonALaReformeDesRetraites #grèves #GrèveGénérale #GreveGeneraleIllimitee #Grève7mars...
#8mars #GrèveFéministe...
#9mars #GrèveEtudiante...
#10mars #GrèveClimat
> #Anticapitalisme #Féminisme #écologie
330234858_1356614735135298_5982244152255016051_n.jpg (895×895)
La Commune de Paris et ses enseignements pour aujourd’hui ►https://mensuel.lutte-ouvriere.org//2021/03/07/la-commune-de-paris-et-ses-enseignements-pour-aujourdhui_155 | #archiveLO (#archiveLO, 2 mars 2021)
#Commune_de_paris #1871 #éphéméride
– La Commune de Paris (18 mars-28 mai 1871)
– Commémorer la Commune… pour mieux en trahir les idéaux
– Des enseignements dévoyés
– Les travailleurs apprennent de leurs expériences
– #Démocratie_prolétarienne et #démocratie_bourgeoise
– « L’Internationale sera le genre humain »
– La nécessité d’un #parti_révolutionnaire
En septembre 1870, par l’intermédiaire des militants, très minoritaires, qui se réclamaient de ses idées, Marx avait avant tout conseillé aux travailleurs de la capitale de « procéder méthodiquement à leur propre organisation de classe ». Ils n’en eurent pas le temps et certains n’en comprirent pas la nécessité. Avec la Commune de Paris, le #prolétariat se retrouva donc au pouvoir sans avoir pu s’organiser en conséquence ni avoir eu la possibilité de trancher entre les différents courants politiques qui existaient en son sein : #communistes, #anarchistes, partisans de #Proudhon ou de #Blanqui notamment.
Les tâtonnements, voire les fautes des dirigeants de la Commune en matière financière comme dans le domaine militaire, la difficulté de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre une politique en direction de la #paysannerie pauvre, ne purent être surmontés en raison de l’absence d’un véritable parti. Il manqua une #organisation et des dirigeants concentrant l’expérience du #mouvement_ouvrier et qui auraient pu se lier aux masses dans la période précédente. Ils ne purent pas davantage écarter certains patriotes se réclamant du socialisme qui, comme l’écrit #Trotsky, « n’avaient en fait aucune confiance » en la classe ouvrière et, pire, qui « ébranlaient la foi du prolétariat en lui-même ».
C’était déjà la conclusion tirée par les plus conscients des militants révolutionnaires de cette époque. #Marx, #Engels, bien sûr, mais aussi le Hongrois #Léo_Frankel, militant de l’#Association_internationale_des_travailleurs et qui avait été un des dirigeants de la Commune. Il écrivit peu après son écrasement : « Afin de réaliser cet objectif [la prise du pouvoir], les ouvriers se doivent de créer un parti autonome s’opposant à tous les autres partis, “unique moyen” pour liquider le règne des autres classes. » Frankel sera l’un des fondateurs du Parti général des ouvriers de Hongrie en 1880.
Ce sont les deux révolutions russes de 1905 et de 1917 qui tranchèrent définitivement cette question. Pour que la formidable pression révolutionnaire s’exerce pleinement, et contrairement à ce qu’affirmait le courant anarchiste, il fallait une organisation centralisée, soudée, dont les militants étaient en contact permanent avec les entreprises et avec les soldats du front et de l’arrière. Un parti à même d’adapter sa politique aux flux et aux reflux de la révolution et d’impulser ainsi une politique jetant les bases d’une société communiste : ce fut la tâche du #Parti_bolchevique.
18 mars 1871, le prolétariat parisien au pouvoir
►https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2021/03/17/18-mars-1871-le-proletariat-parisien-au-pouvoir_155783.html | LO du 17 mars 2021
La semaine du 18 mars au 26 mars 1871
– Les maires & les députés de Paris
– Le Comité Central & la légalité
– Premières entrevues entre maires & CC
– Les députés de Paris à l’assemblée
L’hebd’Eau #109 du 20 février 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-109-du-20-fevrier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Compte-rendu de l’Assemblée Générale du Réseau L’Assemblée générale de l’association s’est tenue le vendredi 3 février 2023 à 19h, en présentiel et … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #108 du 13 février 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-108-du-13-fevrier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx La troisième séance du séminaire prévue le 19 janvier a été reportée … Lire la suite
L’Apprentissage | L’Architecture Sort du Bois #10
▻https://topophile.net/rendez-vous/lapprentissage-larchitecture-sort-du-bois-10
#APPRENTISSAGES 👉 Passer de la technique de coulage et d’encollage, à la #culture de l’#assemblage. Le mercredi 15 mars prochain après midi et soirée : L’après midi de 14H à 17H : FORUM #Forum de la #formation bois dans la chapelle du couvent des Récollets Maison de l’architecture Ile-de-France avec les stands de : Lycées professionnels régionaux, LYCEE... Voir l’article
L’hebd’Eau #107 du 6 février 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-107-du-6-fevrier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx Suite à la grève du jeudi 19 janvier, la troisième séance du … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #106 du 30 janvier 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-106-du-30-janvier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx En raison de la grève contre la réforme des retraites prévue le … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #105 du 23 janvier 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-105-du-23-janvier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx En raison de la grève contre la réforme des retraites prévue le … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #104 du 16 janvier 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-104-du-16-janvier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx En raison de la grève contre la réforme des retraites prévue le … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #103 du 3 janvier 2023
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-103-du-3-janvier-2023
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le Rés-EAUx vous souhaite une bonne et heureuse année 2023 ! Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx Le … Lire la suite
L’hebd’Eau #101 du 05 décembre 2022
▻https://reseaux.parisnanterre.fr/lhebdeau-101-du-05-decembre-2022
La lettre de diffusion de l’association Réseau d’études en sciences sociales sur l’eau (Rés-EAUx) _ La vie du Rés-EAUx Le séminaire Ecologie Politique de l’Eau (EPE) du Rés-EAUx Le premier volet (2022-2023) du séminaire « Ecologie politique de l’eau » du Rés-EAUx … Lire la suite
Immigration : la #justice française prête à faire la lumière sur le « #bateau_cercueil » au large de la Libye
Après dix ans de péripéties judiciaires, la cour d’appel de Paris a décidé, jeudi 22 septembre, de rouvrir l’enquête sur le drame du « bateau cercueil » et la possible responsabilité de la France dans la mort de 63 des personnes à bord, en avril 2011, au large de la Libye.
Qui a laissé mourir d’une mort lente 63 personnes lors de leur terrible dérive de deux semaines sur leur zodiac au large de la Libye au printemps 2011 ? Deux des neuf survivants, épaulés par un collectif d’associations, bataillent depuis plus de dix ans pour faire la lumière sur le drame de ce « bateau cercueil », objet d’invraisemblables péripéties judiciaires.
La cour d’appel de Paris a décidé, ce jeudi 22 septembre, de rouvrir l’#enquête après notamment deux non-lieux en 2013 et 2018, confirmés en appel en 2020 avant que la Cour de cassation n’ordonne en 2021 de réexaminer l’affaire. Elle a également demandé la jonction des procédures étrangères, des plaintes ayant été déposées en Belgique, en Espagne et en Italie.
Une armada présente sur les lieux
Car à l’époque des faits, en pleine révolte contre le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, des avions militaires et des navires de guerre, agissant dans le cadre d’une coalition internationale de 18 États et de l’Otan contre le régime libyen, patrouillaient dans la zone.
Parti de Tripoli dans la nuit du 26 au 27 mars, le bateau, censé gagner l’île italienne de Lampedusa et tombé à cours de carburant, entama une mortelle dérive qui finira par le faire échouer, le 10 avril, sur la côte libyenne. Entre-temps 61 passagers, majoritairement éthiopiens, avaient péri et deux autres moururent à terre.
Or le centre de surveillance et de sauvetage en mer italien avait alerté son homologue maltais, le centre de commandement de l’Otan et les bateaux évoluant dans la zone que le zodiac avait émis un signal de détresse. Celui-ci avait même été repéré par un avion français peu après avoir quitté la Libye, comme l’affirment les survivants et comme a pu le reconstituer l’ONG Forensic architecture dont le rapport a été versé à l’enquête. Un hélicoptère portant la mention « army » avait aussi survolé l’embarcation et lui avait même lancé bouteilles d’eau et biscuits. Enfin, un bâtiment de guerre avait croisé à proximité des passagers en perdition après cinq ou six jours de dérive.
L’obstruction judiciaire
« C’était la dernière chance que l’enquête soit rouverte, c’est une immense satisfaction, même si elle est fortement teintée d’amertume, car il a fallu attendre dix ans, l’instruction ne fait que commencer », commente Patrick Henriot, magistrat honoraire membre du Gisti, le Groupement d’information et de soutien aux immigrés. « Dès le départ, la juge d’instruction a considéré qu’il n’y avait pas lieu de rechercher la responsabilité de l’armée, elle a prononcé un non-lieu avant même d’ouvrir le dossier, toutes les étapes de la procédure ont ensuite été marquées du sceau de cette mauvaise volonté », poursuit-il.
Ainsi parmi les éléments invraisemblables, le ministère français de la défense qui avait nié la présence d’un de ses avions dans la zone finira par le reconnaître, après déclassification d’un document en 2017. Lequel mentionnait également la présence de navires de guerre espagnols et italiens. « La justice italienne interrogée avait, elle aussi, reconnu qu’un avion français avait survolé l’embarcation, la juge n’a rien fait de ces informations », s’indigne Patrick Henriot. Et un non-lieu fut à nouveau prononcé en 2018. L’enquête ne fait que démarrer, et promet d’être longue.
▻https://www.la-croix.com/France/Immigration-justice-francaise-prete-faire-lumiere-bateau-cercueil-large-Li
#left-to-die_boat #migrations #mourir_en_mer #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #asile #réfugiés #10_avril_2011
–—
L’enquête de #forensic_architecture sur ce cas :
In March 2011, 72 passengers left the Libyan coast heading in the direction of Italy on board a small rubber boat at the time of NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Despite several distress signals relaying their location, as well as repeated interactions with at least one military helicopter and a military ship, they were left to drift for 14 days. As a result of the inaction of all state actors involved, only nine of the passengers survived. By combining their testimonies with wind and sea-current data as well as satellite imagery, Forensic Oceanography reconstructed the liquid traces of this event, producing a report that served as the basis of several legal complaints.
►https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-left-to-die-boat
–—
voir aussi :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/469156
Législatives - Français à l’étranger - 1er tour
#circo - LREM vs Nupes / participation
#1 - 35 vs 33 / 21%
#2 - 34 vs 28 / 15%
#3 - 38 vs 31 / 28%
#4 - 38 vs 32 / 29%
#5 * 24 vs 27 / 24%
#6 - 36 vs 20 / 22%
#7 - 34 vs 26 / 29% (LREM est Modem)
#8 - 28 vs 27 / 12% (UDI/LR vs LREM)
#9 * 27 vs 39 / 14%
#10 - 32 vs 22 / 19%
#11 - 38 vs 24 / 28%les sortant.e.s sont tous des LREM
(ou le contraire) ; sauf 8e (UDI) et 9e (candidate LREM pas sortante).
les écarts au 1er tour sont tous >5%, sauf 1ere, 5e et 8e.
participation 20-30%, sauf 2e, 8e et 9e à 12-15%
Nupes en tête : 2/11 (5e et 9e)
LREM en tête : 8/11
Valls était dans la 5e, fait 15% et appelle à voter pour le sortant, dissident LREM.
source : ►https://lepetitjournal.com/expat-politique/actualites/resultats-premier-tour-legislatives-francais-etranger-339557
12% des Français de l’étranger privés de vote par un problème « d’incompatibilité » avec les boites mails hébergées par Yahoo.
▻https://www.bfmtv.com/tech/legislatives-un-bug-prive-certains-francais-de-l-etranger-de-vote-par-interne
a priori, problème résolu 24h avant la clôture du vote ; la méthode Rache est aussi utilisée pour les outils de vote :-)
▻https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/legislatives/vote-en-ligne-aux-legislatives-bug-resolu-pour-les-francais-de-letranger-
Identité numérique : prouve que tu existes
▻https://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?article1685
La Commission européenne prépare son « portefeuille européen d’identité numérique ». Rome et Bologne adoptent le « crédit social numérique » à la chinoise. La digitalisation de l’État et son corollaire, l’identification numérique, progressent dans l’indifférence des Smartiens, à la faveur des phases aigües de la Crise (épidémie, guerre, effondrement écologique). Il aura fallu moins de vingt ans pour que se réalisent nos pires anticipations sur la société de contrainte. Pour les nouveaux venus et les nostalgiques, on a ressorti quelques archives. Te souviens-tu de Libertys ? (Pour lire le texte, ouvrir le document ci-dessous.)
Lire aussi : – Libertys – Carte d’identité électronique : ce n’est pas du canular – Aujourd’hui le nanomonde #10 – Après l’occupation de la CNIL – Au doigt et à l’œil (...)
#Nécrotechnologies
▻https://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/IMG/pdf/prouve_que_tu_existes.pdf
#social_ranking, #crédit_social, #Digital_Identity_Wallet, #Ukraine, etc.
La gauche s’en fout, mais l’extrême droite s’est déjà emparé du sujet, semble-t’il...
Lego Star Wars: The Skywalker Saga has led to extensive crunch at development studio TT Games - Polygon
►https://www.polygon.com/features/22891555/lego-star-wars-the-skywalker-saga-has-led-to-extensive-crunch-at-tt-games
late 2017, development studio TT Games began work on Lego Star Wars: The Skywalker Saga at a time when dozens inside the company were at odds with management. Citing frustration over tight development schedules, the company’s crunch culture, and outdated development tools, more than 20 current and former TT Games employees tell Polygon that calls for change over the years had largely been ignored.
More TT Games Employees Speak Out After Skywalker Saga Report
▻https://www.fanbyte.com/?p=124963
In late January, roughly 30 current and former TT Games employees spoke anonymously to Polygon (and myself) about the culture of crunch and mismanagement at both its Knutsford and Wilmslow offices. The final report highlighted instances of premeditated crunch, mishandled projects, and allegations of sexual harassment that occurred under the company’s former management, in addition to complaints of micro-management under the new leadership that had arrived from Sony. Former employees claimed these factors were responsible for a large turnover of staff over the last few years, with at least forty people leaving the two studios since the beginning of 2021, though that number has since grown considerably.
#jeu_vidéo #jeux_vidéo #tt_games #ressources_humaines #crunch #harcèlement_sexuel #environnement_toxique #culture_toxique #sony #trouble_de_stress_post_traumatique #santé #jeu_vidéo_LEGO skywalker_saga #jeu_vidéo_lego_star_wars_the_video_game #giant_interactive #jon_burton #warner_bros #ea #electronic_arts #traveller_s_tales #david_dootson #paul_flanagan #rémunération #jeu_vidéo_lego_jurassic_world #jeu_vidéo_lego_city_undercover #jeu_vidéo_lego_the_incredibles #lego #assurance_qualité #tt_fusion #console_wii_u #unreal_engine #unreal #ntt #tom_stone #jeu_vdidéo_lego_marvel_superheroes #jeu_vidéo_god_of_war #michael_denny #martin_palmer #paul_flanagan #10_10_games #eric_matthews #mark_green #arthur_parsons #light_brick_studio #jeu_vidéo_lego_builder_s_journey #red_games #jeu_vidéo_lego_brawls #gameloft #jeu_vidéo_lego_legacy_heroes_unboxed #jeu_vidéo_lego_star_wars_castaways #leon_warren, #james_lay #robert_nicholds #népotisme #jeu_vidéo_gotham_knights #funko
Sur les traces de Rosa Luxemburg
Textes et images : Falk Weiß
Traduction et voix : Nepthys Zwer
#1 Une approche
#2 Tiergarten/ Rue de Cuxhaven
#3 - Kreuzberg / rue de Lützow
#4 Neukölln / rue Hermann
#5 Friedenau / rue Wieland / rue Cranach
#6 Quartier Südende / chemin de Biberach
#7 Centre / rue Barnim – prison des femmes
#8 Neukölln / rue Weise
#9 Wilmersdorf / rue de Mannheim
#10 Charlottenburg / hôtel Eden
#Berlin #Mitte #Friedrichshain #Friedenau #Tiergarten #Wilmersdorf
#histoire #communisme #révolution #1919
Schön, lieber Klaus !
Un ami de France m’écrit ce que lui inspire cette quête :
"Je connais trop peu son œuvre par ailleurs, elle a pour moi le même statut un peu iconique de martyr de la lutte sociale que Jean Jaurès en France, morts pour avoir tenté de faire passer cette lutte avant les passions nationalistes et identitaires. Tout comme Jean Jaurès est surtout connu ici pour avoir été assassiné à la veille de la guerre en tentant de l’empêcher, Rosa Luxemburg et Karl Liebknecht le sont comme leaders d’une Révolution Spartakiste écrasée dans le sang par les Freikorps, les pendants et quelque part les précurseurs des anciens combattants fascistes qui porteront Mussolini au pouvoir en Italie quelques années plus tard et inspireront les milices nazies ensuite, et se présentaient comme les garants d’un ordre social et d’un idéal nationaliste contre des rouges niveleurs et internationalistes. Ce combat se poursuit aujourd’hui sous d’autres formes, en apparence moins violentes, et avec d’autres acteurs, mais le retour de l’extrême-droite pour le contrôle de masses populaires laissées en déshérence est patent des deux côtés de l’Atlantique."
Quelques textes de R.L. disponibles sur la toile (source: Wikipedia):
R.L. bei project gutenberg
▻https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/author/32368
English : The Accumulation of Capital, les autres textes étan en allemand
▻https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/autoren/namen/luxembur.html
Schriften von R.R. bei archive.org
▻https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%22Luxemburg%2C+Rosa%2C+1871-1919%22&and%5B%5D=l
Gesammelte Werke, 1923, 515 Seiten
▻https://archive.org/details/gesammeltewerke00luxeuoft
Die Akkumulation des Kapitals, Ein Beitrag
zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus, Berlin 1913.
▻http://mlwerke.de/lu/lu05/lu05_005.htm
Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie, 1916
▻https://archive.org/details/DieKriseDerSozialdemokratie
Die russische Revolution : eine kritische Würdigung, Berlin 1922
▻https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_zBfUAAAAMAAJ/page/n1/mode/2up
Marxists’ Internet Archive, Rosa Luxemburg
▻https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/index.htm
Nov/Dez 1893 - Der englische Bergarbeiterstreik 1893
Feb 1894 - Wie entstand die Maifeier?
Jan 1895 - Der erste Kongreß der deutschen Bergarbeiter
Okt 1897 - Der Sozialismus in Polen
30. Sep 1898 - Possibilismus und Opportunismus
3./8. Okt 1898 - Reden auf dem Stuttgarter Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands
1899 - Sozialreform oder Revolution?
20./26. Feb 1899 - Miliz und Militarismus
6. Jul 1899 - Eine taktische Frage
22. Jul 1899 - Hohle Nüsse
Sep 1899 - Kautskys Buch wider Bernstein
22. Sep 1899 - Unser leitendes Parteiorgan
9./14. Okt 1899 - Reden auf dem Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zu Hannover
1900 - Zur Verteidigung der Nationalität
29. Mär 1900 - Um die Beute
12./19. Sep 1900 - Die „deutsche Wissenschaft“ hinter den Arbeitern
1901 - Die sozialistische Krise in Frankreich
1901 - Der Parteitag und der Hamburger Gewerkschaftsstreit
Apr 1902 - Das belgische Experiment
13. Jul 1902 - Vor Ludwigshafen
Aug 1902 - Zur Frage des Terrorismus in Rußland
19. Sep 1902 - Der Achtstundentag auf dem Parteitag -
14. März 1903 - Karl Marx
Herbst 1903 - Im Rate der Gelehrten
Herbst 1903 - Geknickte Hoffnungen
1904 - Organisationsfragen der russischen Sozialdemokratie
Feb 1904 - Krieg
5./6. Dez 1904 - Sozialdemokratie und Parlamentarismus
1905 - Kirche und Sozialismus
8. Jan 1905 - Aus dem literarischen Nachlaß von Karl Marx
1. Feb 1905 - Nach dem ersten Akt
8. Feb 1905 - Das Problem der „hundert Völker“
8. Feb 1905 - Die Revolution in Russland
8. Feb 1905 - Terror
29. April 1905 - Im Feuerscheine der Revolution
30. Mai 1905 - Die Debatten in Köln
17./23. Sep 1905 - Reden auf dem Jenaer Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands im Jahre 1905
16. Nov 1905. - Die Russische Revolution 1905
19. Nov 1905. - Eine maßlose Provokation
29. Nov 1905. - Die Lösung der Frage
15. Sep 1906 - Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften
23./29. Sep 1906 - Reden auf dem Mannheimer Parteitag
der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands im Jahre 1906
24. Okt 1906 - Die zwei Methoden der Gewerkschaftspolitik
1909–10 - Einführung in die Nationalökonomie
14. März 1910 - Wie weiter? -
1910 - Ermattung oder Kampf? -
Juni 1910 - Die Theorie und die Praxis
1. Okt 1910 - Der politische Massenstreik und die Gewerkschaften (Rede)
6./8. Mai 1911 - Friedensutopien
Aug 1911 - Marokko
19. Aug 1911 - Kleinbürgerliche oder proletarische Weltpolitik?
12. Mai 1912 - Frauenwahlrecht und Klassenkampf
1913 - Die Akkumulation des Kapitals
14. März 1913 - Karl Marx
27. Mai 1913 - Die weltpolitische Lage
Anfang Juni 1913 - Lassalles Erbschaft
Sep 1913 - Das Offiziösentum der Theorie
Okt 1913 - Nach dem Jenaer Parteitag
6. Jan 1914 - Die Bilanz von Zabern
27. Jan 1914 - Die alte Programmforderung
3. Feb 1914 - Noch eine Lehre von Zabern
20. Feb 1914 - Verteidigungsrede vor der Frankfurter Strafkammer
7. März 1914 - Diskussionsbeitrag am 7. März 1914 in der Protestversammlung gegen die Verurteilung Rosa Luxemburgs in Freiburg im Breisgau
2. Apr 1914 - Die andere Seite der Medaille
5. Mai 1914 - „Nicht zuständig“
29. Sep 1914 - Zweierlei Maß
27. Nov 1914 - Keine Überraschung
Dez 1914 - Für die internationale Solidarität!
4. Dez 1914 - Parteidisziplin
15. Apr 1915 - Der Wiederaufbau der Internationale
Mitte 1915 - Perspektiven und Projekte
Ende 1915 - Entwurf zu den „Junius“-Thesen1916 - Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie („Junius“-Broschüre)
Frühjahr 1916 - Die Politik der sozialdemokratischen Minderheit
März 1916 - Resolution über die Aufgaben sozialdemokratischer Abgeordneter für die Beendigung des Krieges
Apr 1916 - Die Lehre des 24. März
Mai 1916 - Hundepolitik
Jun 1916 - Was ist mit Liebknecht?
7. Jul 1916 - Postkarte an Sonja Liebknecht
20. Sep 1916 - Liebknecht
Okt 1916 - Wofür kämpfte Liebknecht, und weshalb wurde er zu Zuchthaus verurteilt?
Dez 1916 - Friede und Schiedsverträge
6. Jan 1917 - Offene Briefe an Gesinnungsfreunde
Apr 1917 - Die Revolution in Rußland
Apr 1917 - Wilsons Sozialismus
25. Mai 1917 - Rückblick auf die Gothaer Konferenz
Aug 1917 - Brennende ZeitfragenDez 1917 - Brief aus dem Gefängnis
1918 - Zur russischen Revolution
20. Nov 1918 - Die Nationalversammlung
29. Nov 1918 - Parteitag der Unabhängigen SP
14. Dez 1918 - Was will der Spartakusbund?
15. Dez 1918 - Außerordentliche Verbandsgeneralversammlung der USPD von Groß-Berlin
17. Dez 1918 - Nationalversammlung oder Räteregierung?
31. Dez 1918 - Unser Programm und die politische Situation
7. Jan 1919 - Was machen die Führer?
8. Jan 1919 - Versäumte Pflichten
11. Jan 1919 - Das Versagen der Führer
13. Jan 1919 - Kartenhäuser
14. Jan 1919 - Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin
Rosa Luxemburg: Kirche und Sozialismus (1905)
▻https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/1905/xx/kirche.htm
Wie die Kapitalisten den Körper des Volkes in das Gefängnis der Not und Unfreiheit sperrten, so sperrte der Klerus den Kapitalisten zu Hilfe und um der eigenen Herrschaft willen den Geist des Volkes ein, weil er fürchtete, ein aufgeklärtes, vernünftiges Volk, das Welt und Natur mit durch die Wissenschaft geöffneten Augen betrachtet, würde die Herrschaft der Priester abwerten und sie nicht mehr als höchste Macht und Quelle aller Gnade auf Erden ansehen. Indem er also die ursprünglichen Lehren des Christentums, die gerade das irdische Glück der Geringsten erstrebten, abändert und verfälscht, redet der heutige Klerus dem Volk ein, es leide Not und Erniedrigung nicht auf Grund der schändlichen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, sondern auf Befehl des Himmels, durch Fügung der Vorsehung. Und dadurch eben tötet die Kirche im arbeitenden Menschen den Geist, tötet in ihm die Hoffnung und den Willen nach besserer Zukunft, tötet in ihm den Glauben an sich selbst und seine Kraft, die Achtung vor der eigenen menschlichen Würde. Die heutigen Priester halten sich mit ihren falschen und den Geist vergiftenden Lehren dank der Dumpfheit und Erniedrigung des Volkes und wollen diese Dumpfheit und Erniedrigung für ewige Zeiten bewahren.
Es gibt dafür unschlagbare Beweise. In den Ländern, wo der katholische Klerus allmächtig über das Denken des Volkes herrscht wie in Spanien und Italien, dort herrschen auch größte Dumpfheit und – größtes Verbrechen. Nehmen wir beispielsweise zwei Länder in Deutschland zum Vergleich: Bayern und Sachsen. Bayern ist hauptsächlich ein Bauernland, wo der katholische Klerus noch großen Einfluß auf das Volk hat. Sachsen ist dagegen ein hochindustrialisiertes Land, wo die Sozialdemokratie schon seit langen Jahren Einfluß auf die arbeitende Bevölkerung hat. In Sachsen sind zum Beispiel in fast allen Wahlkreisen Sozialdemokraten in den Reichstag gewählt worden, wodurch dieses Land bei der Bourgeoisie verhaßt und als „rot“, sozialdemokratisch, verschrien ist. Und was ergibt sich? Amtliche Berechnungen zeigen, daß, wenn man die Zahl der im Laufe eines Jahres im klerikalen Bayern und im „roten“ Sachsen begangenen Verbrechen vergleicht (im Jahre 1898), auf 100.000 Personen bei schwerem Diebstahl in Bayern 204, in Sachsen 185 Fälle kommen, bei Körperverletzungen in Bayern 296, in Sachsen 72, bei Meineid in Bayern 4, in Sachsen 1. Ebenso, wenn man die Zahl der Verbrechen im Posenschen betrachtet, so gab es im selben Jahr auf 100.000 Menschen 232 Körperverletzungen, in Berlin 172. Und in Rom, dem Sitz des Papstes, wurden im vorletzten Jahr des Bestehens des Kirchenstaates, d.h. der weltlichen Macht des Papstes im Jahre 1869, in einem Monat 279 Menschen wegen Mordes, 728 wegen Körperverletzung, 297 wegen Raubes und 21 wegen Brandstiftung verurteilt! Das waren die Früchte einer ausschließlichen Herrschaft der Geistlichkeit über das Denken der armen Bevölkerung.
Das heißt natürlich nicht, daß die Geistlichkeit zum Verbrechen ermuntert, im Gegenteil, mit den Lippen reden die Priester viel gegen Diebstahl, Raub und Trunksucht. Aber bekanntlich stehlen, schlagen und trinken die Menschen nicht aus Eigensinn oder Neigung, sondern aus zwei Gründen: aus Not und Dumpfheit. Wer also das Volk in Not und Dumpfheit hält, wie es die Geistlichkeit tut, wer im Volk den Willen und die Energie zu einem Ausweg aus Not und Dumpfheit tötet, wer auf jede Weise diejenigen behindert, die das Volk bilden und aus der Not emporheben wollen, der ist ebenso verantwortlich für die Verbreitung von Verbrechen und Trunksucht, als ob er dazu ermuntern würde.
#LeMotLeJeu
Un nouveau jeu auquel s’adonne @monolecte, je l’ai bien vu sur l’oiseau bleu !
Alors voilà, mon premier jeu, c’est pas mal, hein !
(bêta) LeMOT 10 3/6
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟦🟦⬜🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
▻https://dev.to/michelc/lemot-pour-jouer-a-wordle-en-francais-o67
(bêta) LeMOT 10 5/6
🟦⬜⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟦⬜⬜🟦
🟦⬜⬜⬜⬜
🟦🟦⬜⬜🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #9 4/6
⬛⬛⬛🟩🟨
🟩⬛⬛🟩⬛
🟩⬛⬛🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
SUTOM #11 5/6
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Bande de saleté⋅es, vous croyiez que je travaillais trop ?!
SUTOM 11 4/6
🟥🟡🟡🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟦🟥🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 9 4/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟨
🟩⬛🟨⬛⬛
🟩⬛🟩🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Celui là il m’a bien fait chier je trouvais rien du tout
(bêta) LeMOT 10 4/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜🟦
⬜🟧🟦🟧⬜
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
Wesh kesskia en anglais : Wordle 213 4/6
►https://powerlanguage.co.uk/wordle
⬛🟨🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
C’est l’heure des nouveaux mots, mais je les garde pour le thé du matin…
Pff, c’est le premier, pas terrible :
(bêta) LeMOT 11 X/6
🟦⬜⬜⬜⬜
⬜⬜⬜⬜🟦
⬜🟧⬜⬜🟦
⬜🟧⬜🟧⬜
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧⬜🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
Je vous maudis, c’est gravement addictif ce truc.
oui, j’ai joué sur deux ordis différents :o)
(bêta) LeMOT 11 3/6
⬜🟧⬜🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧⬜⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
Tricheur…
J’en ai chié avec le sutom.
SUTOM #12 4/6
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM #12 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
C’était très très mal parti pourtant !
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #10 4/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟨⬛⬛
🟨🟩⬛🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Quand tu élimines des lettres, parfois, ça aide beaucoup.
(bêta) LeMOT 11 4/6
🟧⬜🟦🟦⬜
🟧🟧⬜⬜⬜
🟧🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
J’ai un peu triché pour celui là ça venait pas
SUTOM 12 5/6
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟥🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Alors là tout seul mais c’était au hasard à la fin, je connaissais même pas
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 10 6/6
⬛⬛🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟨⬛
🟨🟩⬛⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 11 4/6
⬜⬜🟦🟦⬜
🟦🟧🟦⬜⬜
🟧🟧🟧⬜⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
Et l’anglais toujours
Wordle 214 5/6
🟨⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛🟨⬛⬛
🟨🟩⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟨🟨⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #10 5/6
🟨⬛⬛⬛⬛
🟨🟩⬛⬛🟨
🟨🟩🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛⬛🟨
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 11 4/6
⬜⬜⬜🟧⬜
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟦
🟧🟧⬜🟧⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
(bêta) LeMOT 11 2/6
⬜⬜🟧🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #10 4/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟨
🟨🟩⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
in english
Wordle 214 4/6
⬜⬜🟨⬜⬜
🟨🟩⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟩🟨🟨⬜
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(Quand on en fait plusieurs, on peut toujours éditer ses messages précédents pour regrouper ceux du même jour dans le même commentaire, par exemple)
En fait @rastapopoulos je ne vais plus poster les résultats des prochains jours, c’était juste pour marquer le coup :))
#MOKET jour 20
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM #13 3/6
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟡🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #11 5/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨⬛
🟩🟨⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟨
🟩🟨⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 12 6/6
⬜🟦🟧⬜⬜
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟦⬜⬜⬜🟦
🟦🟦🟧⬜🟦
⬜🟦🟧🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
SUTOM #13 3/6
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟡🟦🟡
🟥🟡🟡🟡🟦🟥🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #11 4/6
🟨⬛🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟩⬛
🟩🟩⬛🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 12 4/6
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟦🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 20
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM 15 3/6
🟥🟡🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟡🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 13 3/6
⬛🟩⬛⬛⬛
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 14 5/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜🟦
🟦⬜⬜🟧⬜
⬜🟧🟦🟧⬜
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 22
🟥🟡🟡🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Wordle 217 6/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨⬛
⬛⬛🟨🟨⬛
⬛🟩🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛🟩
⬛🟩🟩⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
SUTOM 16 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟡🟥🟡🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 14 💀/6
FUCK yavait mille mots possibles avec juste cette lettre du milieu qui change donc totalement du hasard…
🟩⬛🟨⬛🟨
🟩🟩⬛🟩⬛
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 15 3/6
🟦⬜🟧⬜⬜
⬜🟧🟧🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 23
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Wordle 218 5/6
⬛⬛🟨⬛⬛
🟨⬛⬛🟩⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟩⬛
🟨🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
SUTOM #16 3/6
🟥🟦🟡🟥🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟡🟦🟥🟦🟥🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #14 4/6
⬛🟨🟨⬛⬛
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟨
🟨⬛🟨🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 15 6/6
⬜⬜🟧⬜⬜
⬜⬜🟧⬜⬜
⬜⬜🟧⬜⬜
⬜⬜🟧🟧⬜
🟦🟧🟧🟧⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 23
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #14 4/6
🟨🟩⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #16 2/6
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟡🟥🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 15 3/6
⬜🟦⬜⬜🟦
🟦⬜🟧🟧⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 23
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
#MOKET jour 23
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟡🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #14 6/6
⬛⬛🟨⬛🟨
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
►https://wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #16 3/6
🟥🟡🟦🟡🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟡🟥🟡🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://sutom.nocle.fr
(bêta) LeMOT 15 5/6
🟦🟦⬜⬜⬜
🟦🟦🟦⬜🟦
🟦🟧🟧🟧⬜
⬜🟧🟧🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
Wordle 218 4/6
⬜⬜⬜🟨⬜
🟨🟨⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟩🟩⬜⬜
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
►https://powerlanguage.co.uk/wordle
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #15 4/6
🟩🟨⬛⬛⬛
🟩⬛⬛🟨⬛
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #17 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟡🟡🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 16 2/6
⬜⬜🟧🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 24
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM #17 4/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #15 3/6
⬛⬛🟨⬛🟨
⬛🟨🟩🟨🟨
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 16 4/6
⬜⬜⬜🟦⬜
⬜🟦🟦⬜⬜
⬜🟧🟦🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 24
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟡🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM 17 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 15 3/6
🟨🟨⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟨⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 16 3/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜⬜
🟧🟦🟦🟦🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 24
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
failli faire pareil que @monolecte là avec plusieurs mots ayant juste cette lettre qui change
Wordle 219 5/6
en trichant
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟨
🟩🟩🟩⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #16 4/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨⬛
🟨⬛⬛🟨⬛
⬛⬛🟨⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #18 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟡🟡🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 17 4/6
⬜🟦⬜⬜🟦
🟦⬜⬜🟦⬜
⬜🟦🟧🟧⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
#MOKET jour 25
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM 18 4/6
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟡🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 16 6/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛⬛
⬛⬛🟩⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟩⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 17 5/6
⬜⬜🟦⬜🟦
🟦🟦🟦⬜⬜
⬜🟦🟦🟦⬜
⬜🟦⬜🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 25
on voit qu’y en a qui connaissent bien ce mot
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
J’ai décidé de ne publier que sur Mastodon. Ils ont l’option spoiler qui permet de cacher les captures d’écran. ▻https://framapiaf.org/@Monolecte/107685585627833330
SUTOM #19 3/6
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟡🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 18 6/6
⬜⬜⬜🟦🟦
⬜🟦⬜🟦🟦
⬜🟦⬜🟦🟦
⬜🟦⬜🟦🟦
🟦🟦🟧🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
Rah, sur celui là j’ai confondu les codes couleur, heureusement je me suis rattrapé à la dernière ligne ! (c’est à l’avant-dernière que j’ai compris que j’avais fait n’imp !)
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #17 5/6
🟨🟨⬛⬛⬛
⬛⬛🟨🟩⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟩⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟩🟨
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
#MOKET jour 26
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟡🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Les doigts dans le nez ce soir !
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #17 4/6
⬛⬛⬛🟩⬛
⬛🟩⬛🟩🟨
⬛🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #19 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟡🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 18 3/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜🟦
🟦🟦🟦⬜⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 26
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟥🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
et voilà, j’ai été regarder de quoi il s’agissait...#perdition #procrastination
SUTOM #20 4/6
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟡🟥🟦
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Pfff....
SUTOM #20 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟡🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #18 4/6
🟨⬛🟨⬛🟨
🟨⬛🟨🟨⬛
🟨🟩🟨🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 19 3/6
⬜⬜🟦⬜🟦
⬜🟦🟧🟦🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
J’étais en jambes, ce matin
▻https://framapiaf.org/@Monolecte/107693622765834031
Et bienvenue dans le club de la perdition, @supergeante.
Ma fille : « tiens, t’as trouvé des jeux de vieux ! »
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #18 3/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
🟩🟨⬛🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
(bêta) LeMOT 19 3/6
🟧⬜🟦⬜🟦
🟧🟧⬜🟧⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 27
🟥🟡🟡🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
j’ai eu du mal avec celui-là
Et sinon j’avais vu par mégarde la réponse pour sutom donc pas fait
En effet, il était bien compliqué !
#MOKET jour 27
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
Wordle 222 5/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟨⬜🟩⬜
⬜🟩🟩🟩⬜
⬜🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
►https://powerlanguage.co.uk/wordle
Difficile de trouver les mots en anglais... Mais rassuré à la fin, parce que ce sont à chaque fois des mots, pour le moment, que je connais...
SUTOM 20 2/6
🟥🟦🟦🟥🟥🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 18 3/6
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟨
🟩🟩🟩⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 19 4/6
Je suis déçu que ce ne fut pas « bebop », ça rentrait parfaitement avec les 3 que j’avais dès le début.
⬜⬜⬜🟦🟦
🟧🟧⬜🟧⬜
🟦🟦⬜⬜⬜
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 27
pourquoi j’ai mis tant de temps à celui là aussi ? (alors que j’avais mis « inuits » juste avant en plus…)
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟦🟥🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #19 2/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨🟨
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #21 2/6
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
ah c’était bien parti mais pour le troisième j’ai galéré
(bêta) LeMOT 20 5/6
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟦⬜🟦⬜⬜
🟦🟦🟦⬜⬜
🟧🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
retour au calme :)
#MOKET jour 28
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 20 4/6
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
⬜🟦⬜🟦⬜
🟧🟦🟦⬜🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 28
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟥🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
SUTOM #21 2/6
🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟡🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #19 3/6
🟨⬛🟨⬛🟩
⬛🟩🟨⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Wordle 223 5/6
⬜🟨⬜⬜🟨
⬜⬜🟩🟩⬜
⬜⬜🟩🟩🟩
⬜🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Aujourd’hui, un tunnel et un coup de bol…
▻https://framapiaf.org/@Monolecte/107705041302137709
J’ai mon premier succès en NL, je suis joie :)
Woordle 224 4/6
▻https://woordle.nl
🟩⬛⬛⬛⬛
🟩⬛🟨⬛⬛
🟩⬛⬛🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Pour commencer la série je me suis plantée dans le code couleur, m’en suis aperçue à la quatrième ligne, réussi de justesse
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #20 6/6
⬛⬛🟨⬛⬛
⬛⬛🟨🟨⬛
⬛🟨🟨🟨⬛
⬛🟨🟨⬛🟩
🟨🟨🟨🟨🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
Ça allait mieux après
SUTOM #22 3/6
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
sauf là où j’ai fait une ultime proposition au pif (je ne connaissais pas le mot) et c’était bon :)
(bêta) LeMOT 21 6/6
⬜🟦⬜⬜🟧
⬜⬜🟧⬜🟧
⬜⬜🟧⬜🟧
🟦🟦🟧⬜🟧
⬜🟧🟧🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
et je termine en beauté
#MOKET jour 29
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Pareil, ce mot n’existe pas au scrabble par exemple...
(bêta) LeMOT 21 6/6
⬜🟦⬜⬜⬜
🟦🟦⬜⬜🟦
⬜🟦🟦⬜🟧
🟦⬜🟦🟧🟧
⬜🟧🟧🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 29
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟡🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #20 4/6
⬛⬛⬛🟩🟩
⬛⬛🟨🟩🟩
🟩🟩⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Wordle 224 4/6
🟨⬜⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟩⬜🟨⬜
⬜🟩⬜⬜🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
►https://powerlanguage.co.uk/wordle
SUTOM #22 4/6
🟥🟡🟡🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟥🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟡🟥🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM 22 5/6
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟥🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 20 💀/6
RAAAAH yavait mille mots avec ce début et cette fin, tunnel perdant
⬛⬛⬛⬛🟩
⬛⬛🟨🟨🟩
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
🟩🟩⬛⬛🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 21 3/6
WESH la chance
⬜⬜🟧⬜🟧
🟧⬜🟧🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 29
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟥🟥🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Wordle 224 4/6
⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟨⬛⬛⬛
🟩🟨🟨🟨🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
SUTOM #23 2/6
🟥🟦🟥🟦🟥🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
#MOKET jour 30
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
(bêta) LeMOT 22 4/6
⬜⬜🟦⬜⬜
⬜🟧🟦⬜⬜
🟦🟧🟧🟧🟦
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #21 4/6
⬛🟩⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩🟨🟨⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Wordle 225 4/6
⬜🟩⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟩🟩🟩⬜
⬜🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #21 4/6
⬛⬛⬛🟩⬛
⬛🟨🟨🟩⬛
⬛🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #23 2/6
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟥🟥🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 22 4/6
⬜⬜🟦⬜⬜
🟦🟧🟦⬜⬜
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 30
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟦🟡🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
SUTOM 24 3/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡🟥
🟥🟡🟦🟡🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 22 3/6
⬛🟩🟩🟨🟩
🟩🟩🟩⬛🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 23 4/6
🟧🟦⬜⬜🟧
🟧⬜⬜🟦🟧
🟧🟧🟧⬜🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 31
🟥🟦🟥🟡🟦🟥🟦🟥
🟥🟡🟡🟥🟦🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Wordle 226 X/6
fuck…
⬛🟨⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟨⬛⬛🟨
⬛⬛⬛🟩🟨
⬛🟩🟨🟨🟨
⬛🟩🟩🟩🟩
⬛🟩🟩🟩🟩
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #22 4/6
⬛⬛🟨🟨🟨
🟨🟨⬛🟨🟨
⬛🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #24 2/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 23 4/6
⬜🟧⬜🟦⬜
🟧🟧🟧⬜🟧
🟧🟧🟧⬜🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 31
🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟡🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟦🟥🟦🟡🟡🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Encore une soirée tunnels.
Mais en même temps, je commence à avoir l’impression d’être plus agile.
Pfouu celui là...
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #24 6/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨⬛
⬛🟨⬛⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛⬛🟩
⬛🟩⬛🟩🟩
⬛🟩🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #26 4/6
🟥🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Et loupé :
(bêta) LeMOT 25 X/6
⬜⬜🟦⬜⬜
⬜🟧⬜⬜⬜
🟦🟧⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟧⬜⬜🟧
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
⬜🟧⬜🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 2
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Sur la moquette, j’ai fait tapis ! ▻https://framapiaf.org/@Monolecte/107741027670250493
SUTOM 28 5/6
🟥🟦🟦🟦🟡🟡
🟥🟦🟡🟡🟦🟡
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟥
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟥🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Le Mot (@WordleFR) 26 4/6
⬛🟨⬛⬛🟩
🟨⬛🟨⬛🟩
🟨⬛⬛🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
(bêta) LeMOT 27 6/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜🟧
⬜🟧⬜🟦🟧
🟦🟧⬜⬜🟧
⬜🟧🟧⬜🟧
🟦🟧🟧⬜🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
MOKET jour 4
Comment MOI j’ai pu mettre aussi longtemps à trouver celui là…
🟥🟡🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟡🟡🟡🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦
🟥🟥🟦🟦🟡🟦🟡🟥🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
Wordle 230 5/6
⬛⬛⬛🟨⬛
🟨⬛🟨⬛⬛
⬛🟩⬛⬛⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩⬛
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
Le Mot (@WordleFR) #26 5/6
⬛🟨⬛⬛🟨
⬛⬛🟩🟩🟩
⬛⬛🟩🟩🟩
⬛🟨🟩🟩🟩
🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩
wordle.louan.me
SUTOM #28 3/6
🟥🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦
🟥🟥🟥🟦🟦🟡
🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥🟥
(bêta) LeMOT 27 4/6
⬜⬜⬜⬜⬜
⬜🟦⬜⬜🟦
🟧🟦🟦⬜🟧
🟧🟧🟧🟧🟧
#LeMotLeJeu
►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
#MOKET jour 4
🟥🟦🟡🟦🟦🟦🟡🟦🟦
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#MOKET jour 5
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►https://jesuislibre.net/moket
(bêta) LeMOT 28 4/6
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►https://www.solitaire-play.com/lemot
SUTOM #29 5/6
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Le Mot (@WordleFR) #27 4/6
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wordle.louan.me
Pour toi, c’était purement descriptif !
The #EU #crop #map - a first continental #high-resolution map of the #European_Union | EU #Science Hub
▻https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/science-update/eu-crop-map
#resolution #10m
Révolution française #10 : Les Girondins se perdent – par Henri Guillemin
▻https://www.les-crises.fr/revolution-francaise-10-les-girondins-se-perdent-par-henri-guillemin
Début mars 1793, la situation est tragique pour la France. Source : RTS, Henri Guillemin Henri Guillemin poursuit son évocation de la Révolution française avec Les Girondins se perdent. Au début de 1793, la situation est assez tragique en France. Les armées françaises ont envahi la Belgique, mais la Convention ne s’en tient pas […]
Corriger le problème de hauteur 100% (100vh) sur mobile - Alsacreations
▻https://www.alsacreations.com/astuce/lire/1831-corriger-le-probleme-de-hauteur-100vh-sur-mobile.html
2 contournements (CSS ou JS) du bogue de Safari sur le calcul du 100vh
(comme Microsoft avec IE6 il y a quelques années, Apple se sent suffisamment en position de force sur les navigateurs mobiles pour faire n’importe quoi et si possible non compatible avec les standards...)
Le hack de cette solution, c’est le @support pour détecter uniquement Safari (et en théorie, ce genre de chose c’est mal…). Sans cela, dans mon expérience, la valeur -webkit-fill-available est détectée par Chrome (au lieu d’être ignorée), mais qui la met à zéro, ce qui casse totalement la maquette.
/* Avoid Chrome to see Safari hack */
@supports (-webkit-touch-callout: none) {
body {
/* The hack for Safari */
min-height: -webkit-fill-available;
}
}
Comprendre la Commune de Paris #10 : A l’attaque de Paris – par Henri Guillemin
▻https://www.les-crises.fr/comprendre-la-commune-de-paris-10-a-l-attaque-de-paris-par-henri-guillemi
Source :RTS, Henri Guillemin En 1971, cent ans après « la semaine sanglante » qui vit l’écrasement de la Commune de Paris, l’historien et écrivain français Henri Guillemin présente en treize conférences télévisées cette page sombre de l’histoire de France. Découvrez ou redécouvrez cette passionnante série en version haute définition restaurée. Voir l’épisode précédent. Les Parisiens vivent encore dans l’illusion d’une concorde avec les Versaillais et d’une extension de la Commune. Ils vont tomber de haut au moment de l’attaque de la capitale. Source :RTS, Henri Guillemin, 18-09-1971Lire la suite
The invention of whiteness: the long history of a dangerous idea
Before the 17th century, people did not think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race. But once the idea was invented, it quickly began to reshape the modern world.
In 2008, a satirical blog called Stuff White People Like became a brief but boisterous sensation. The conceit was straightforward, coupling a list, eventually 136 items long, of stuff that white people liked to do or own, with faux-ethnographic descriptions that explained each item’s purported racial appeal. While some of the items were a little too obvious – indie music appeared at #41, Wes Anderson movies at #10 – others, including “awareness” (#18) and “children’s games as adults” (#102), were inspired. It was an instant hit. In its first two months alone, Stuff White People Like drew 4 million visitors, and it wasn’t long before a book based on the blog became a New York Times bestseller.
The founder of the blog was an aspiring comedian and PhD dropout named Christian Lander, who’d been working as an advertising copywriter in Los Angeles when he launched the site on a whim. In interviews, Lander always acknowledged that his satire had at least as much to do with class as it did with race. His targets, he said, were affluent overeducated urbanites like himself. Yet there’s little doubt that the popularity of the blog, which depended for its humour on the assumption that whiteness was a contentless default identity, had much to do with its frank invocation of race. “As a white person, you’re just desperate to find something else to grab on to,” Lander said in 2009. “Pretty much every white person I grew up with wished they’d grown up in, you know, an ethnic home that gave them a second language.”
Looking back at Stuff White People Like today, what marks the site’s age is neither the particularities of its irony nor the broad generalities of its targets. There are still plenty of white people with too much time and too much disposable income on their hands, and plenty of them still like yoga (#15), Vespa scooters (#126), and “black music that black people don’t listen to any more” (#116).
What has changed, however – changed in ways that date Stuff White People Like unmistakably – is the cultural backdrop. Ten years ago, whiteness suffused mainstream culture like a fog: though pervasive to the point of omnipresence, it was almost nowhere distinct. When the sorts of white people for and about whom Lander was writing talked about being white, their conversations tended to span the narrow range between defensiveness and awkwardness. If they weren’t exactly clamouring to dispense with their racial identity, and the privileges that came with it, they were also not eager to embrace, or even discuss it, in public.
In the years since, especially among the sort of people who might have once counted themselves fans of Lander’s blog, the public significance of whiteness has undergone an almost wholesale re-evaluation. Far from being a punchline for an anxious, cathartic joke, whiteness is now earnestly invoked, like neoliberalism or populism, as a central driver of cultural and political affairs. Whereas Lander could score a bestseller in 2008 with a book mocking whiteness as a bland cultural melange whose greatest sin was to be uninteresting, just nine years later Ta-Nehisi Coates would have his own bestseller that described whiteness as “an existential danger to the country and the world”.
Much of the change, of course, had to do with Donald Trump, for whom, as Coates put it, “whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic, but is the very core of his power”. But it was not only Trump. Whiteness has been implicated in events on both sides of the Atlantic, including Brexit; mass shootings in Norway, New Zealand and the US; the George Floyd and Breonna Taylor killings; and the 6 January insurrection at the US Capitol. Alongside these real-world incidents, a bumper crop of scholarship, journalism, art and literature – by Coates, Nell Irvin Painter, Jordan Peele, Eric Foner, Ava DuVernay, Adam Serwer, Barbara and Karen Fields, Kevin Young, David Olusoga, Nikole Hannah-Jones, Colson Whitehead and Claudia Rankine, among many others – has spurred the most significant reconsideration of racial whiteness in 50 years.
This reckoning, as it is sometimes called, has had measurable effects. In a Pew poll last October, nearly a third of white Americans said that the recent attention to racial issues signified a “major change” in American attitudes about race – another 45% said it was a “minor change” – and nearly half believed that those changes would lead to policies that would ameliorate racial inequality. In the UK, a YouGov poll from December suggested that more than a third of Britons reported that they were having more discussions about racism than they had previously.
At the same time, this new focus on whiteness has prompted much confusion and consternation, especially among white people not used to thinking of themselves in racial terms. The Pew poll found that half of white Americans thought there was “too much” discussion of racial issues, and a similar proportion suggested that seeing racism where it didn’t exist was a bigger problem than not seeing racism where it did.
What these recent debates have demonstrated more than anything, perhaps, is how little agreement still exists about what whiteness is and what it ought to be. Nearly everywhere in contemporary society “white” is presumed to be a meaningful index of identity that, like age and gender, is important enough to get mentioned in news accounts, tallied in political polls, and recorded in government databases. Yet what that identity is supposed to tell us is still substantially in dispute. In many ways, whiteness resembles time as seen by Saint Augustine: we presume we understand it as long as we’re not asked to explain it, but it becomes inexplicable as soon as we’re put to the test.
A little more than a century ago, in his essay The Souls of White Folk, the sociologist and social critic WEB Du Bois proposed what still ranks as one of the most penetrating and durable insights about the racial identity we call white: “The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed.”
Though radical in its time, Du Bois’s characterisation of what he called the “new religion of whiteness” – a religion founded on the dogma that “of all the hues of God, whiteness alone is inherently and obviously better than brownness and tan” – would have a profound effect on the way historians and other scholars would come to understand racial identity. In part this had to do with his insistence that a racial category like whiteness was more akin to a religious belief than a biological fact. Du Bois rejected the idea, still common in his day, that the races reflected natural divisions within the human species – as well as the nearly inevitable corollary that the physical, mental and behavioural traits associated with the white race just happened to be the ones most prized by modern societies.
That had been the view, for instance, of Thomas Jefferson, who had attempted to delineate “the real distinctions which nature has made” between the races, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, first published in 1781. It was also the view that would appear, at least in attenuated form, two centuries later in Charles Murray and Richard J Herrnstein’s Bell Curve, which was published in 1994. Murray and Herrnstein argued that “the most plausible” explanation for the differences between Black and white populations recorded on IQ tests was “some form of mixed gene and environmental source” – in other words, that at least some of the discrepancy owes to natural differences.
By the time The Bell Curve appeared, Du Bois’s assertion that racial categories were not biologically grounded was widely accepted. In the years since, the scientific evidence for that understanding has only become more overwhelming. A 2017 study examined the DNA of nearly 6,000 people from around the world and found that while some genetic differences among humans can be traced to various ancestral lineages – for example, eastern African, southern European or circumpolar – none of those lineages correspond to traditional ideas about race.
If it’s easy enough for many people today to accept that whiteness is a purely sociological phenomenon – in some quarters, the idea that “race is a social construct” has become a cliche – the same cannot be said for Du Bois’s suggestion that whiteness is a relatively new thing in human history. And yet just as in the case of genetic science, during the second half of the 20th century a number of historians demonstrated that while Du Bois was off by a few hundred years, he was correct that it was only in the modern period that people started to think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race.
Of course, it’s important not to overstate the case: the evolution of the idea of whiteness was messy and often indistinct. As the historian Nell Irvin Painter has cautioned, “white identity didn’t just spring to life full-blown and unchanging”. It had important antecedents that included a growing sense of a pan-European identity; longstanding cultural associations that saw white as a symbol of purity and virtue; and bog-standard ethnocentrism.
Still, with only slightly exaggerated precision, we can say that one of the most crucial developments in “the discovery of personal whiteness” took place during the second half of the 17th century, on the peripheries of the still-young British empire. What’s more, historians such as Oscar and Mary Handlin, Edmund Morgan and Edward Rugemer have largely confirmed Du Bois’s suspicion that while xenophobia appears to be fairly universal among human groupings, the invention of a white racial identity was motivated from the start by a need to justify the enslavement of Africans. In the words of Eric Williams, a historian who later became the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, “slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery”.
If you asked an Englishman in the early part of the 17th century what colour skin he had, he might very well have called it white. But the whiteness of his skin would have suggested no more suitable basis for a collective identity than the roundness of his nose or the baldness of his head. If you asked him to situate himself within the rapidly expanding borders of the known world, he would probably identify himself, first and most naturally, as an Englishman. If that category proved too narrow – if, say, he needed to describe what it was he had in common with the French and the Dutch that he did not share with Ottomans or Africans – he would almost certainly call himself a Christian instead.
That religious identity was crucial for the development of the English slave trade – and eventually for the development of racial whiteness. In the early 17th century, plantation owners in the West Indies and in the American colonies largely depended on the labour of European indentured servants. These servants were considered chattel and were often treated brutally – the conditions on Barbados, England’s wealthiest colony, were notorious – but they were fortunate in at least one respect: because they were Christian, by law they could not be held in lifetime captivity unless they were criminals or prisoners of war.
Africans enjoyed no such privilege. They were understood to be infidels, and thus the “perpetual enemies” of Christian nations, which made it legal to hold them as slaves. By 1640 or so, the rough treatment of indentured servants had started to diminish the supply of Europeans willing to work on the sugar and tobacco plantations, and so the colonists looked increasingly to slavery, and the Atlantic-sized loophole that enabled it, to keep their fantastically profitable operations supplied with labour.
The plantation owners understood very well that their cruel treatment of indentured Europeans, and their even crueller treatment of enslaved Africans, might lead to thoughts – or worse – of vengeance. Significantly outnumbered, they lived in constant fear of uprisings. They were particularly afraid of incidents such as Bacon’s Rebellion, in 1676, which saw indentured Europeans fighting side-by-side with free and enslaved Africans against Virginia’s colonial government.
To ward off such events, the plantation owners initially sought to protect themselves by giving their “Christian” servants legal privileges not available to their enslaved “Negroes”. The idea was to buy off the allegiance of indentured Europeans with a set of entitlements that, however meagre, set them above enslaved Africans. Toward the end of the 17th century, this scheme witnessed a significant shift: many of the laws that regulated slave and servant behaviour – the 1681 Servant Act in Jamaica, for example, which was later copied for use in South Carolina – began to describe the privileged class as “whites” and not as “Christians”.
One of the more plausible explanations for this change, made by Rugemer and the historian Katharine Gerbner, among others, is that the establishment of whiteness as a legal category solved a religious dilemma. By the 1670s, Christian missionaries, including the Quaker George Fox, were insisting that enslaved Africans should be inducted into the Christian faith. The problem this posed for the planters was obvious: if their African labourers became Christians, and no longer “perpetual enemies” of Christendom, then on what legal grounds could they be enslaved? And what about the colonial laws that gave special privileges to Christians, laws whose authors apparently never contemplated the possibility that Africans might someday join the faith?
The planters tried to resolve the former dilemma by blocking the conversion of enslaved Africans, on the grounds, as the Barbados Assembly put it in 1680, that such conversion would “endanger the island, inasmuch as converted negroes grow more perverse and intractable than others”. When that didn’t work (the Bishop of London objected) they instead passed laws guaranteeing that baptism could not be invoked as grounds for seeking freedom.
But the latter question, about privileges for Christians, required the colonialists to think in a new way. No longer could their religious identity separate them and their servants from enslaved Africans. Henceforth they would need what Morgan called “a screen of racial contempt”. Henceforth, they would need to start thinking of themselves as white.
As late as 1694, a slave-ship captain could still question the racial logic newly employed to justify his trade. (“I can’t think there is any intrinsick value in one colour more than another, nor that white is better than black, only we think it so because we are so,” Thomas Phillips wrote in his diary.) But whiteness quickly proved itself a powerful weapon that allowed transatlantic capitalism to secure the labour – “white” and African – it needed. As the historian Theodore Allen put it, “The plantation bourgeoisie deliberately extended a privileged status to the white poor of all categories as a means of turning to African slavery as the basis of its system of production.”
The economic utility of the idea of whiteness helped spread it rapidly around the world. Du Bois was not wrong to call it a religion, for like a religion, it operated at every psychological, sociological and political scale, from the most intimate to the most public. Like a religion, too, it adapted to local conditions. What it meant to be white in British Virginia was not identical to what it would mean in New York before the American civil war, in India during the Raj, in Georgia during Jim Crow, in Australia after Federation, or in Germany during the Third Reich. But what united all these expressions was a singular idea: that some group of people called white was naturally superior to all others. As Benjamin Disraeli, the Victorian prime minister and one of the most committed race ideologists of his time, put it, “race implies difference, difference implies superiority, and superiority leads to predominance”.
The idea of whiteness, in other words, was identical to the idea of white supremacy. For the three centuries that preceded the civil rights movement, this presumption was accepted at the most refined levels of culture, by people who, in other contexts, were among the most vocal advocates of human liberty and equality. It is well known that Immanuel Kant argued we should treat every other person “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. Less well known is his proposal, in his Lectures on Physical Geography, published in 1802, that “humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites”, or his claim, in his notes for his Lectures on Anthropology, that native “Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus, serve only as slaves”. Even Gandhi, during the early part of his life, accepted the basic lie of whiteness, arguing that “the English and the Indians spring from a common stock, called the Indo-Aryan” and that “the white race in South Africa should be the predominating race”.
As though aware of their own guilty conscience, the evangelists of the religion of whiteness were always desperate to prove that it was something other than mere prejudice. Where the Bible still held sway, they bent the story of Noah’s son Ham into a divine apologia for white supremacy. When anatomy and anthropology gained prestige in the 18th and 19th centuries, they cited pseudo-scientific markers of racial difference like the cephalic index and the norma verticalis. When psychology took over in the 20th, they told themselves flattering stories about divergences in IQ.
For all their evident success, the devotees of the religion of whiteness were never able to achieve the total vision they longed for. In part, this was because there were always dissenters, including among those who stood to gain from it, who rejected the creed of racial superiority. Alongside those remembered by history – Elizabeth Freeman, Toussaint Louverture, Harriet Tubman, Sitting Bull, Franz Boas, Haviva Reik, Martin Luther King Jr, Nelson Mandela – there were millions of now-forgotten people who used whatever means they possessed to resist it. In part, too, the nonsense logic that regulated the boundaries of whiteness – the one-drop rule in the US, which said that anyone with Black ancestry could not be white; the endless arguments over what “caucasian” was supposed to mean; the “honorary Aryan” status that Hitler extended to the Japanese – was no match for the robust complexities of human society.
Yet if the religion of whiteness was never able to gain acceptance as an unchallengeable scientific fact, it was still hugely successful at shaping social reality. Some of this success had to do with its flexibility. Thanks to its role in facilitating slavery, whiteness in the US was often defined in opposition to blackness, but between those two extremes was room for tactical accommodations. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin could claim that only the English and Saxons “make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth”, and nearly 80 years later, Ralph Waldo Emerson would insist that the Irish, like the Chinese and the Native American, were not caucasian. Over time, however, the definition of who counted as culturally white expanded to include Catholics from southern Europe, the Irish and even Jews, who for centuries had been seen as quintessential outsiders.
The religion of whiteness also found success by persuading its adherents that they, and not the people they oppressed, were the real victims. In 1692, colonial legislators in British Barbados complained that “sundry of the Negroes and Slaves of this island, have been long preparing, contriving, conspiring and designing a most horrid, bloody, damnable and detestable rebellion, massacre, assassination and destruction”. From there, it was a more or less straight line to Woodrow Wilson’s claim, in 1903, that the southerners who started the Ku Klux Klan were “aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation”, and to Donald Trump’s warning, when he launched his presidential campaign in 2015, that Mexican immigrants to the US were “bringing drugs. And they’re bringing crime. And they’re rapists.”
Where the religion of whiteness was not able to win converts with persuasion or fear, it deployed cruder measures to secure its power, conscripting laws, institutions, customs and churches to enforce its prerogatives. Above all, it depended on force. By the middle of the 20th century, the presumption that a race of people called white were superior to all others had supplied the central justification not just for the transatlantic slave trade but also for the near-total extinction of Indians in North America; for Belgian atrocities in Congo; for the bloody colonisation of India, east Africa and Australia by Britain; for the equally bloody colonisation of north and west Africa and south-east Asia by France; for the deployment of the Final Solution in Nazi Germany; and for the apartheid state in South Africa. And those are merely the most extreme examples. Alongside those murdered, raped and enslaved in the name of whiteness, the total number of whom runs at least to nine figures, are an almost unthinkable number of people whose lives were shortened, constrained, antagonised and insulted on a daily basis.
It was not until the aftermath of the second world war that frank endorsements of white supremacy were broadly rejected in Anglo-American public discourse. That this happened at all was thanks largely to the efforts of civil rights and anti-colonial activists, but the war itself also played a role. Though the horrors of the Nazi regime had been more acute in their intensity than anything happening at the time in the US or the UK, they supplied an unflattering mirror that made it impossible to ignore the racism that was still prevalent in both countries. (A New York Times editorial in 1946 made the connection explicit, arguing that “this is a particularly good year to campaign against the evils of bigotry, prejudice and race hatred because we have recently witnessed the defeat of enemies who tried to found a mastery of the world upon such a cruel and fallacious policy”.)
Political appeals to white solidarity diminished slowly but certainly. In 1955, for example, Winston Churchill could still imagine that “Keep England White” was a winning general-election theme, and even as late as 1964, Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate for parliament, would score a surprise victory after endorsing a nakedly racist slogan. By 1968, however, when Enoch Powell delivered his “Rivers of Blood” speech – in which he approvingly quoted a constituent who lamented that “in 15 or 20 years’ time, the black man will have the whip hand over the white man” – he would be greeted by outrage in the Times, which called it an “evil speech”, and expelled from the Conservative shadow cabinet. In the US, too, where a century of racial apartheid had followed a century of slavery, open expressions of racism met with increasing public censure. Throughout the 60s and into the 70s, Congress passed a series of statutes that rendered explicit racial discrimination illegal in many areas of public life.
This gradual rejection of explicit, government-enforced white supremacy was hugely consequential in terms of public policy. Yet it did not mean that whiteness, as a political force, had lost its appeal: in the weeks after Powell’s speech, to take just one example, a Gallup poll found that 74% of Britons supported his suggestion that brown-skinned immigrants ought to be repatriated. It also left unresolved the more difficult question of whether whiteness was truly separable from its long history of domination.
Instead of looking too hard at the sordid history of whiteness, many white people found it easier to decide that the civil rights movement had accomplished all the anti-racism work that needed doing. The result was a strange détente. On the one hand, whiteness retreated as a subject of public attention, giving way to a new rhetoric of racial colour-blindness. On the other hand, vast embedded economic and cultural discrepancies allowed white people continue to exercise the institutional and structural power that had accumulated on their behalf across the previous three centuries.
Similarly, while blatant assertions of white power – such as the 1991 gubernatorial campaign of David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard, in Louisiana – met with significant elite resistance, what counted as racist (and therefore subject to the taboo) was limited to only the most flagrant instances of racial animus. Among liberals and conservatives, racism was widely understood as a species of hatred, which meant that any white person who could look into his heart and find an absence of open hostility could absolve himself of racism.
Even the phrase “white supremacy”, which predates the word “racism” in English by 80 years and once described a system of interlocking racial privileges that touched every aspect of life, was redefined to mean something rare and extreme. In 1923, for example, under the headline White Supremacy Menaced, the New York Times would print an article which took at face value a Harvard professor’s warning that “one of the gravest and most acute problems before the world today” was “the problem of saving the white race from submergence in the darker races”. In 1967, the US supreme court invalidated a law that prevented whites from marrying people who were not white, on the grounds that it was “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”, and two years later, the critic Albert Murray would use the phrase to describe everything from anti-Black prejudice in police departments to bigoted media representations of Black life to influential academic studies such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s The Negro Family.
By the 80s and 90s, however, at least in white-dominated media, “white supremacy” was reserved only for the most shocking and retrograde examples of racism. For many people who grew up at that time, as I did, the phrase evoked cross burnings and racist hooligans, rather than an intricate web of laws and norms that maintained disparities of wealth, education, housing, incarceration and access to political power.
Perhaps most perverse of all was the charge of “reverse racism”, which emboldened critics of affirmative action and other “race-conscious” policies to claim that they, and not the policies’ proponents, were the true heralds of racial equality. In 1986, Ronald Reagan went so far as to defend his opposition to minority-hiring quotas by invoking Martin Luther King Jr: “We want a colour-blind society,” Reagan declared. “A society, that in the words of Dr King, judges people not by the colour of their skin, but by the content of their character.”
Of course not everyone accepted this new dispensation, which scholars have variously described as “structural racism”, “symbolic racism” or “racism without racists”. In the decades following the civil rights movement, intellectuals and activists of colour continued to develop the Du Boisian intellectual tradition that understood whiteness as an implement of social domination. In the 80s and 90s, a group of legal scholars that included Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris and Richard Delgado produced a body of research that became known as critical race theory, which was, in Bell’s words, “ideologically committed to the struggle against racism, particularly as institutionalised in and by law”.
Alongside critical race theory, and in many ways derived from it, a new academic trend, known as whiteness studies, took shape. Historians working in this subfield demonstrated the myriad ways in which the pursuit of white supremacy – like the pursuit of wealth and the subjection of women – had been one of the central forces that gave shape to Anglo-American history. For many of them, the bill of indictment against whiteness was total: as the historian David Roediger put it, “it is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.”
In the fall of 1992, a new journal co-founded by Noel Ignatiev, one of the major figures in whiteness studies, appeared in bookstores around Cambridge, Massachusetts. Called Race Traitor, the magazine wore its motto and guiding ethos on its cover: Treason to Whiteness is Loyalty to Humanity. The issue opened with an editorial whose headline was equally provocative: “Abolish the white race – by any means necessary.” This demand, with its echoes of Sartre by way of Malcolm X, was not, as it turned out, a call for violence, much less for genocide. As Ignatiev and his co-editor, John Garvey, explained, they took as their foundational premise that “the white race is a historically constructed social formation”, a sort of club whose membership “consists of those who partake of the privileges of the white skin in this society”.
For Ignatiev and Garvey, whiteness had been identified with white supremacy for so long that it was folly to think it was salvageable. “So long as the white race exists,” they wrote, “all movements against racism are doomed to fail.” What was necessary, in their view, was for the people called “white” – people like them – to forcefully reject that identification and the racial privileges that came with it. Whiteness, they suggested, was a fragile, unstable thing, such that even a small number of determined attacks – objecting to racist educational programmes at a school board meeting, say, or capturing racist police behaviour on video – ought to be able to unsettle the whole edifice.
But while whiteness studies produced much work that still makes for bracing, illuminating reading, it was soon mocked as one more instance of the very privilege it meant to oppose. “The whole enterprise gives whites a kind of standing in the multicultural paradigm they have never before enjoyed,” Margaret Talbot wrote in the New York Times in 1997. “And it involves them, inevitably, in a journey of self-discovery in which white people’s thoughts about their own whiteness acquire a portentous new legitimacy.” Even Ignatiev would later say he “wanted nothing to do with” it.
By the mid-2000s, the “colour-blind” ideological system had become so successful that it managed to shield even the more obvious operations of whiteness – the overwhelming numbers of white people in corporate boardrooms, for instance, or in the media and tech industries – from much censure. In the US, when racial disparities could not be ignored, it was often suggested that time was the only reliable remedy: as the numerical proportion of whites dwindled, so too would their political and economic power diminish. (Never mind that whiteness had managed to escape predictions of demographic doom before, by integrating groups it had previously kept on its margins.)
Meanwhile, younger white liberals, the sort of people who might have read Bell or Crenshaw or Ignatiev at university, tended to duck the subject of their own racial identity with a shuffling awkwardness. Growing up white in the decades after the civil rights movement was a little like having a rich but disreputable cousin: you never knew quite what to make of him, or the extravagant gifts he bought for your birthday, and so you found it easier, in general, just not to say anything.
The absence of talk about whiteness was so pervasive that it became possible to convince yourself that it constituted one of the central obstacles to racial progress. When I was in graduate school during the early 00s, toward the end of the whiteness-studies boomlet, I often heard – including from my own mouth – the argument that the real problem was that white people weren’t talking enough about their racial identity. If you could get people to acknowledge their whiteness, we told ourselves, then it might be possible to get them to acknowledge the unfair ways in which whiteness had helped them.
The trouble with this notion would become clear soon enough, when the presidency of Barack Obama offered the surest test to date of the proposition that whiteness had separated itself from its supremacist past. Though Obama’s election was initially hailed by some as proof that the US was entering a new post-racial phase, it took just a few months for the Tea party, a conservative movement ostensibly in favour of small government, to suggest that the opposite was closer to the truth.
In September 2009, Jimmy Carter caused a stir by suggesting that the Tea party’s opposition was something other than a principled reaction to government spending. “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on the fact that he is a black man,” Carter said. (Carter’s speculation was later backed up by research: the political scientist Ashley Jardina, for instance, found that “more racially resentful whites are far more likely to say they support the Tea party and rate it more positively.”)
The white backlash to Obama’s presidency continued throughout his two terms, helped along by Rupert Murdoch’s media empire and the Republican party, which won majorities in both houses of Congress by promising to obstruct anything Obama tried to accomplish. Neither project kept Obama from a second term, but this does not mean that they were without effect: though Obama lost white voters by 12% in 2008, four years later he would lose them by 20%, the worst showing among white voters for a successful candidate in US history.
At the same time, Obama’s victory suggested to some observers the vindication of the demographic argument: the changing racial composition of the US appeared to have successfully neutralised the preferences of the white electorate, at least as far as the presidency was concerned. (“There just are not enough middle-aged white guys that we can scrape together to win,” said one Republican after Obama’s victory.)
What’s more, the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests, which attracted international attention in the summer of 2014, prompted a torrent of demonstrative introspection among white people, especially online. As the critic Hua Hsu would write, half-teasingly, in 2015, “it feels as though we are living in the moment when white people, on a generational scale, have become self-aware”.
Not for the first time, however, what was visible on Twitter was a poor indicator of deeper social trends. As we now know, the ways in which whiteness was becoming most salient at mid-decade were largely not the ways that prompted recent university graduates to announce their support for Rhodes Must Fall on Instagram. Far more momentous was the version of white identity politics that appreciated the advantages of whiteness and worried about them slipping away; that saw in immigration an existential threat; and that wanted, more than anything, to “Take Back Control” and to “Make America Great Again”.
It was this version of whiteness that helped to power the twin shocks of 2016: first Brexit and then Trump. The latter, especially – not just the fact of Trump’s presidency but the tone of it, the unrestrained vengeance and vituperation that animated it – put paid to any lingering questions about whether whiteness had renounced its superiority complex. Ta-Nehisi Coates, who more than any other single person had been responsible for making the bumbling stereotype of whiteness offered up by Stuff White People Like seem hopelessly myopic, understood what was happening immediately. “Trump truly is something new – the first president whose entire political existence hinges on the fact of a black president,” Coates wrote in the autumn of 2017. “His ideology is white supremacy, in all its truculent and sanctimonious power.”
In 1860, a man who called himself “Ethiop” published an essay in The Anglo-African Magazine, which has been called the first Black literary journal in the US. The author behind the pseudonym was William J Wilson, a former bootmaker who later served as the principal of Brooklyn’s first public school for Black children. Wilson’s essay bore the headline, What Shall We Do with the White People?
The article was meant in part meant to mock the white authors and statesmen who had endlessly asked themselves a similar question about Black people in the US. But it was not only a spoof. In a tone that mimicked the smug paternalism of his targets, he laid out a comprehensive indictment of white rule in the country: the plunder and murder of the “Aborigines”; the theft and enslavement of Africans; the hypocrisy embodied by the American constitution, government and white churches. At the root of all this, he wrote, was “a long continued, extensive and almost complete system of wrongdoing” that made the men and women who enabled it into “restless, grasping” marauders. “In view of the existing state of things around us,” Wilson proposed at the end, “let our constant thought be, what for the best good of all shall we do with the White people?”
Much has changed since Wilson’s time, but a century and a half on, his question remains no less pertinent. For some people, such as the political scientist Eric Kaufmann, whiteness is what it has always pretended to be. Though he acknowledges that races are not genetically defined, Kaufmann nevertheless sees them as defensible divisions of humanity that have some natural basis: they emerge, he suggests, “through a blend of unconscious colour-processing and slowly evolved cultural conventions”. In his 2019 book Whiteshift, Kaufmann argues that the history of oppression by white people is “real, but moot”, and he advocates for something he calls “symmetrical multiculturalism”, in which “identifying as white, or with a white tradition of nationhood, is no more racist than identifying as black”. What shall we do with the white people? Kaufmann thinks we should encourage them to take pride in being white, lest they turn to more violent means: “Freezing out legitimate expressions of white identity allows the far right to own it, and acts as a recruiting sergeant for their wilder ideas.”
From another perspective – my own, most days – whiteness means something different from other racial and ethnic identities because it has had a different history than other racial and ethnic identities. Across three-and-a-half centuries, whiteness has been wielded as a weapon on a global scale; Blackness, by contrast, has often been used as a shield. (As Du Bois put it, what made whiteness new and different was “the imperial width of the thing – the heaven-defying audacity.”) Nor is there much reason to believe that whiteness will ever be content to seek “legitimate expressions”, whatever those might look like. The religion of whiteness had 50 years to reform itself along non-supremacist lines, to prove that it was fit for innocuous coexistence. Instead, it gave us Donald Trump.
Yet even this does not fully answer Wilson’s question. For if it’s easy enough to agree in theory that the only reasonable moral response to the long and very much non-moot history of white supremacy is the abolitionist stance advocated in the pages of Race Traitor – ie, to make whiteness meaningless as a group identity, to shove it into obsolescence alongside “Prussian” and “Etruscan” – it seems equally apparent that whiteness is not nearly so fragile as Ignatiev and Garvey had imagined. Late in his life, James Baldwin described whiteness as “a moral choice”, as a way of emphasising that it was not a natural fact. But whiteness is more than a moral choice: it is a dense network of moral choices, the vast majority of which have been made for us, often in times and places very distant from our own. In this way whiteness is a problem like climate change or economic inequality: it is so thoroughly imbricated in the structure of our everyday lives that it makes the idea of moral choices look quaint.
As with climate change, however, the only thing more difficult than such an effort would be trying to live with the alternative. Whiteness may seem inevitable and implacable, and Toni Morrison surely had it right when she said that the world “will not become unracialised by assertion”. (To wake up tomorrow and decide I am no longer white would help no one.) Even so, after 350 years, it remains the case, as Nell Irvin Painter argues, that whiteness “is an idea, not a fact”. Not alone, and not without much work to repair the damage done in its name, it still must be possible to change our minds.
▻https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/apr/20/the-invention-of-whiteness-long-history-dangerous-idea
#blanchité #races #invention #histoire #race_blanche #modernité
Au Poste #10, avec Alain Damasio
Par David Dufresne, 30 mars 2021
▻http://www.davduf.net/au-poste-10-alain-damasio
Alain Damasio #AuPoste - YouTube
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iEBNi1kVSVA
Lundi 29 mars 2021, 18h, un grand jour. On a reçu, à la bonne franquette, sur Twitch, l’écrivain. Pour parler de ses œuvres, de la techno police, du recul des libertés en France et ailleurs. Comment il se sent, au milieu du vacarme et de ses succès. Une parole libre, sincère, qui vagabonde de Foucault aux jeux vidéos, des Zones à Désir et des Oasis, des Zones à défendre et des Zones d’autonomie temporaires.
Il y a 150 ans, la Commune de Paris - #10
Le 18 mars 1871, les travailleurs prenaient le pouvoir
– La journée des canons
#archiveLO (16 mars 1971) #commune_de_paris
L’espace d’un instant #10
▻http://liminaire.fr/entre-les-lignes/article/l-espace-d-un-instant-10
« La grande révélation n’était jamais arrivée. En fait, la grande révélation n’arrivait peut-être jamais. C’était plutôt de petits miracles quotidiens, des illuminations, allumettes craquées à l’improviste dans le noir ; en voici une. » Vers le phare, Virginia Woolf Manille, Philippines : 17:21 Dans le silence des rues, nos pas frappent le sol à coups répétés, se propagent, faux-fuyants infinis, contre les murs rugueux et l’asphalte luisante du sol. Nos cris et nos souffles se prolongent dans le mouvement (...) #Entre_les_lignes