• Identité numérique : prouve que tu existes
    https://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?article1685

    La Commission européenne prépare son « portefeuille européen d’identité numérique ». Rome et Bologne adoptent le « crédit social numérique » à la chinoise. La digitalisation de l’État et son corollaire, l’identification numérique, progressent dans l’indifférence des Smartiens, à la faveur des phases aigües de la Crise (épidémie, guerre, effondrement écologique). Il aura fallu moins de vingt ans pour que se réalisent nos pires anticipations sur la société de contrainte. Pour les nouveaux venus et les nostalgiques, on a ressorti quelques archives. Te souviens-tu de Libertys ? (Pour lire le texte, ouvrir le document ci-dessous.)

    Lire aussi : – Libertys – Carte d’identité électronique : ce n’est pas du canular – Aujourd’hui le nanomonde #10 – Après l’occupation de la CNIL – Au doigt et à l’œil (...)

    #Nécrotechnologies
    https://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/IMG/pdf/prouve_que_tu_existes.pdf

  • Lego Star Wars: The Skywalker Saga has led to extensive crunch at development studio TT Games - Polygon
    https://www.polygon.com/features/22891555/lego-star-wars-the-skywalker-saga-has-led-to-extensive-crunch-at-tt-games

    late 2017, development studio TT Games began work on Lego Star Wars: The Skywalker Saga at a time when dozens inside the company were at odds with management. Citing frustration over tight development schedules, the company’s crunch culture, and outdated development tools, more than 20 current and former TT Games employees tell Polygon that calls for change over the years had largely been ignored.

    More TT Games Employees Speak Out After Skywalker Saga Report
    https://www.fanbyte.com/?p=124963

    In late January, roughly 30 current and former TT Games employees spoke anonymously to Polygon (and myself) about the culture of crunch and mismanagement at both its Knutsford and Wilmslow offices. The final report highlighted instances of premeditated crunch, mishandled projects, and allegations of sexual harassment that occurred under the company’s former management, in addition to complaints of micro-management under the new leadership that had arrived from Sony. Former employees claimed these factors were responsible for a large turnover of staff over the last few years, with at least forty people leaving the two studios since the beginning of 2021, though that number has since grown considerably.

    #jeu_vidéo #jeux_vidéo #tt_games #ressources_humaines #crunch #harcèlement_sexuel #environnement_toxique #culture_toxique #sony #trouble_de_stress_post_traumatique #santé #jeu_vidéo_LEGO skywalker_saga #jeu_vidéo_lego_star_wars_the_video_game #giant_interactive #jon_burton #warner_bros #ea #electronic_arts #traveller_s_tales #david_dootson #paul_flanagan #rémunération #jeu_vidéo_lego_jurassic_world #jeu_vidéo_lego_city_undercover #jeu_vidéo_lego_the_incredibles #lego #assurance_qualité #tt_fusion #console_wii_u #unreal_engine #unreal #ntt #tom_stone #jeu_vdidéo_lego_marvel_superheroes #jeu_vidéo_god_of_war #michael_denny #martin_palmer #paul_flanagan #10_10_games #eric_matthews #mark_green #arthur_parsons #light_brick_studio #jeu_vidéo_lego_builder_s_journey #red_games #jeu_vidéo_lego_brawls #gameloft #jeu_vidéo_lego_legacy_heroes_unboxed #jeu_vidéo_lego_star_wars_castaways #leon_warren, #james_lay #robert_nicholds #népotisme #jeu_vidéo_gotham_knights #funko

  • Sur les traces de Rosa Luxemburg

    Textes et images : Falk Weiß
    Traduction et voix : Nepthys Zwer

    #1 Une approche
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qrq93W7eeUs

    #2 Tiergarten/ Rue de Cuxhaven
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK8M8TmJjK4

    #3 - Kreuzberg / rue de Lützow
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fODc7o_hZFw

    #4 Neukölln / rue Hermann
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5FszWzoplo

    #5 Friedenau / rue Wieland / rue Cranach
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUHenFIOZ6Y

    #6 Quartier Südende / chemin de Biberach
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqO6w-tZ0KQ

    #7 Centre / rue Barnim – prison des femmes
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iN_BQaLbV8

    #8 Neukölln / rue Weise
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBdJNdyPVHw

    #9 Wilmersdorf / rue de Mannheim
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akbqWBtkCdI

    #10 Charlottenburg / hôtel Eden
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7skCXBjBx0E

    #Berlin #Mitte #Friedrichshain #Friedenau #Tiergarten #Wilmersdorf
    #histoire #communisme #révolution #1919

    @nepthys

    • Schön, lieber Klaus !

      Un ami de France m’écrit ce que lui inspire cette quête :
      "Je connais trop peu son œuvre par ailleurs, elle a pour moi le même statut un peu iconique de martyr de la lutte sociale que Jean Jaurès en France, morts pour avoir tenté de faire passer cette lutte avant les passions nationalistes et identitaires. Tout comme Jean Jaurès est surtout connu ici pour avoir été assassiné à la veille de la guerre en tentant de l’empêcher, Rosa Luxemburg et Karl Liebknecht le sont comme leaders d’une Révolution Spartakiste écrasée dans le sang par les Freikorps, les pendants et quelque part les précurseurs des anciens combattants fascistes qui porteront Mussolini au pouvoir en Italie quelques années plus tard et inspireront les milices nazies ensuite, et se présentaient comme les garants d’un ordre social et d’un idéal nationaliste contre des rouges niveleurs et internationalistes. Ce combat se poursuit aujourd’hui sous d’autres formes, en apparence moins violentes, et avec d’autres acteurs, mais le retour de l’extrême-droite pour le contrôle de masses populaires laissées en déshérence est patent des deux côtés de l’Atlantique."

    • Quelques textes de R.L. disponibles sur la toile (source: Wikipedia):

      R.L. bei project gutenberg
      https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/author/32368
      English : The Accumulation of Capital, les autres textes étan en allemand
      https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/autoren/namen/luxembur.html

      Schriften von R.R. bei archive.org
      https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%22Luxemburg%2C+Rosa%2C+1871-1919%22&and%5B%5D=l

      Gesammelte Werke, 1923, 515 Seiten
      https://archive.org/details/gesammeltewerke00luxeuoft

      Die Akkumulation des Kapitals, Ein Beitrag
      zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus, Berlin 1913.
      http://mlwerke.de/lu/lu05/lu05_005.htm

      Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie, 1916
      https://archive.org/details/DieKriseDerSozialdemokratie

      Die russische Revolution : eine kritische Würdigung, Berlin 1922
      https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_zBfUAAAAMAAJ/page/n1/mode/2up

      Marxists’ Internet Archive, Rosa Luxemburg
      https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/index.htm

      Nov/Dez 1893 - Der englische Bergarbeiterstreik 1893

      Feb 1894 - Wie entstand die Maifeier?

      Jan 1895 - Der erste Kongreß der deutschen Bergarbeiter

      Okt 1897 - Der Sozialismus in Polen

      30. Sep 1898 - Possibilismus und Opportunismus

      3./8. Okt 1898 - Reden auf dem Stuttgarter Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands

      1899 - Sozialreform oder Revolution?

      20./26. Feb 1899 - Miliz und Militarismus

      6. Jul 1899 - Eine taktische Frage

      22. Jul 1899 - Hohle Nüsse

      Sep 1899 - Kautskys Buch wider Bernstein

      22. Sep 1899 - Unser leitendes Parteiorgan

      9./14. Okt 1899 - Reden auf dem Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zu Hannover

      1900 - Zur Verteidigung der Nationalität

      29. Mär 1900 - Um die Beute

      12./19. Sep 1900 - Die „deutsche Wissenschaft“ hinter den Arbeitern

      1901 - Die sozialistische Krise in Frankreich

      1901 - Der Parteitag und der Hamburger Gewerkschaftsstreit

      Apr 1902 - Das belgische Experiment

      13. Jul 1902 - Vor Ludwigshafen

      Aug 1902 - Zur Frage des Terrorismus in Rußland

      19. Sep 1902 - Der Achtstundentag auf dem Parteitag -

      14. März 1903 - Karl Marx

      Herbst 1903 - Im Rate der Gelehrten

      Herbst 1903 - Geknickte Hoffnungen

      1904 - Organisationsfragen der russischen Sozialdemokratie

      Feb 1904 - Krieg

      5./6. Dez 1904 - Sozialdemokratie und Parlamentarismus

      1905 - Kirche und Sozialismus

      8. Jan 1905 - Aus dem literarischen Nachlaß von Karl Marx

      1. Feb 1905 - Nach dem ersten Akt

      8. Feb 1905 - Das Problem der „hundert Völker“

      8. Feb 1905 - Die Revolution in Russland

      8. Feb 1905 - Terror

      29. April 1905 - Im Feuerscheine der Revolution

      30. Mai 1905 - Die Debatten in Köln

      17./23. Sep 1905 - Reden auf dem Jenaer Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands im Jahre 1905

      16. Nov 1905. - Die Russische Revolution 1905

      19. Nov 1905. - Eine maßlose Provokation

      29. Nov 1905. - Die Lösung der Frage

      15. Sep 1906 - Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften

      23./29. Sep 1906 - Reden auf dem Mannheimer Parteitag
      der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands im Jahre 1906

      24. Okt 1906 - Die zwei Methoden der Gewerkschaftspolitik

      1909–10 - Einführung in die Nationalökonomie

      14. März 1910 - Wie weiter? -

      1910 - Ermattung oder Kampf? -

      Juni 1910 - Die Theorie und die Praxis

      1. Okt 1910 - Der politische Massenstreik und die Gewerkschaften (Rede)

      6./8. Mai 1911 - Friedensutopien

      Aug 1911 - Marokko

      19. Aug 1911 - Kleinbürgerliche oder proletarische Weltpolitik?

      12. Mai 1912 - Frauenwahlrecht und Klassenkampf

      1913 - Die Akkumulation des Kapitals

      14. März 1913 - Karl Marx

      27. Mai 1913 - Die weltpolitische Lage

      Anfang Juni 1913 - Lassalles Erbschaft

      Sep 1913 - Das Offiziösentum der Theorie

      Okt 1913 - Nach dem Jenaer Parteitag

      6. Jan 1914 - Die Bilanz von Zabern

      27. Jan 1914 - Die alte Programmforderung

      3. Feb 1914 - Noch eine Lehre von Zabern

      20. Feb 1914 - Verteidigungsrede vor der Frankfurter Strafkammer

      7. März 1914 - Diskussionsbeitrag am 7. März 1914 in der Protestversammlung gegen die Verurteilung Rosa Luxemburgs in Freiburg im Breisgau

      2. Apr 1914 - Die andere Seite der Medaille

      5. Mai 1914 - „Nicht zuständig“

      29. Sep 1914 - Zweierlei Maß

      27. Nov 1914 - Keine Überraschung

      Dez 1914 - Für die internationale Solidarität!

      4. Dez 1914 - Parteidisziplin

      15. Apr 1915 - Der Wiederaufbau der Internationale

      Mitte 1915 - Perspektiven und Projekte

      Ende 1915 - Entwurf zu den „Junius“-Thesen1916 - Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie („Junius“-Broschüre)

      Frühjahr 1916 - Die Politik der sozialdemokratischen Minderheit

      März 1916 - Resolution über die Aufgaben sozialdemokratischer Abgeordneter für die Beendigung des Krieges

      Apr 1916 - Die Lehre des 24. März

      Mai 1916 - Hundepolitik

      Jun 1916 - Was ist mit Liebknecht?

      7. Jul 1916 - Postkarte an Sonja Liebknecht

      20. Sep 1916 - Liebknecht

      Okt 1916 - Wofür kämpfte Liebknecht, und weshalb wurde er zu Zuchthaus verurteilt?

      Dez 1916 - Friede und Schiedsverträge

      6. Jan 1917 - Offene Briefe an Gesinnungsfreunde

      Apr 1917 - Die Revolution in Rußland

      Apr 1917 - Wilsons Sozialismus

      25. Mai 1917 - Rückblick auf die Gothaer Konferenz

      Aug 1917 - Brennende ZeitfragenDez 1917 - Brief aus dem Gefängnis

      1918 - Zur russischen Revolution

      20. Nov 1918 - Die Nationalversammlung

      29. Nov 1918 - Parteitag der Unabhängigen SP

      14. Dez 1918 - Was will der Spartakusbund?

      15. Dez 1918 - Außerordentliche Verbandsgeneralversammlung der USPD von Groß-Berlin

      17. Dez 1918 - Nationalversammlung oder Räteregierung?

      31. Dez 1918 - Unser Programm und die politische Situation

      7. Jan 1919 - Was machen die Führer?

      8. Jan 1919 - Versäumte Pflichten

      11. Jan 1919 - Das Versagen der Führer

      13. Jan 1919 - Kartenhäuser

      14. Jan 1919 - Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin

    • Rosa Luxemburg: Kirche und Sozialismus (1905)
      https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/1905/xx/kirche.htm

      Wie die Kapitalisten den Körper des Volkes in das Gefängnis der Not und Unfreiheit sperrten, so sperrte der Klerus den Kapitalisten zu Hilfe und um der eigenen Herrschaft willen den Geist des Volkes ein, weil er fürchtete, ein aufgeklärtes, vernünftiges Volk, das Welt und Natur mit durch die Wissenschaft geöffneten Augen betrachtet, würde die Herrschaft der Priester abwerten und sie nicht mehr als höchste Macht und Quelle aller Gnade auf Erden ansehen. Indem er also die ursprünglichen Lehren des Christentums, die gerade das irdische Glück der Geringsten erstrebten, abändert und verfälscht, redet der heutige Klerus dem Volk ein, es leide Not und Erniedrigung nicht auf Grund der schändlichen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, sondern auf Befehl des Himmels, durch Fügung der Vorsehung. Und dadurch eben tötet die Kirche im arbeitenden Menschen den Geist, tötet in ihm die Hoffnung und den Willen nach besserer Zukunft, tötet in ihm den Glauben an sich selbst und seine Kraft, die Achtung vor der eigenen menschlichen Würde. Die heutigen Priester halten sich mit ihren falschen und den Geist vergiftenden Lehren dank der Dumpfheit und Erniedrigung des Volkes und wollen diese Dumpfheit und Erniedrigung für ewige Zeiten bewahren.

      Es gibt dafür unschlagbare Beweise. In den Ländern, wo der katholische Klerus allmächtig über das Denken des Volkes herrscht wie in Spanien und Italien, dort herrschen auch größte Dumpfheit und – größtes Verbrechen. Nehmen wir beispielsweise zwei Länder in Deutschland zum Vergleich: Bayern und Sachsen. Bayern ist hauptsächlich ein Bauernland, wo der katholische Klerus noch großen Einfluß auf das Volk hat. Sachsen ist dagegen ein hochindustrialisiertes Land, wo die Sozialdemokratie schon seit langen Jahren Einfluß auf die arbeitende Bevölkerung hat. In Sachsen sind zum Beispiel in fast allen Wahlkreisen Sozialdemokraten in den Reichstag gewählt worden, wodurch dieses Land bei der Bourgeoisie verhaßt und als „rot“, sozialdemokratisch, verschrien ist. Und was ergibt sich? Amtliche Berechnungen zeigen, daß, wenn man die Zahl der im Laufe eines Jahres im klerikalen Bayern und im „roten“ Sachsen begangenen Verbrechen vergleicht (im Jahre 1898), auf 100.000 Personen bei schwerem Diebstahl in Bayern 204, in Sachsen 185 Fälle kommen, bei Körperverletzungen in Bayern 296, in Sachsen 72, bei Meineid in Bayern 4, in Sachsen 1. Ebenso, wenn man die Zahl der Verbrechen im Posenschen betrachtet, so gab es im selben Jahr auf 100.000 Menschen 232 Körperverletzungen, in Berlin 172. Und in Rom, dem Sitz des Papstes, wurden im vorletzten Jahr des Bestehens des Kirchenstaates, d.h. der weltlichen Macht des Papstes im Jahre 1869, in einem Monat 279 Menschen wegen Mordes, 728 wegen Körperverletzung, 297 wegen Raubes und 21 wegen Brandstiftung verurteilt! Das waren die Früchte einer ausschließlichen Herrschaft der Geistlichkeit über das Denken der armen Bevölkerung.

      Das heißt natürlich nicht, daß die Geistlichkeit zum Verbrechen ermuntert, im Gegenteil, mit den Lippen reden die Priester viel gegen Diebstahl, Raub und Trunksucht. Aber bekanntlich stehlen, schlagen und trinken die Menschen nicht aus Eigensinn oder Neigung, sondern aus zwei Gründen: aus Not und Dumpfheit. Wer also das Volk in Not und Dumpfheit hält, wie es die Geistlichkeit tut, wer im Volk den Willen und die Energie zu einem Ausweg aus Not und Dumpfheit tötet, wer auf jede Weise diejenigen behindert, die das Volk bilden und aus der Not emporheben wollen, der ist ebenso verantwortlich für die Verbreitung von Verbrechen und Trunksucht, als ob er dazu ermuntern würde.

  • Révolution française #10 : Les Girondins se perdent – par Henri Guillemin
    https://www.les-crises.fr/revolution-francaise-10-les-girondins-se-perdent-par-henri-guillemin

    Début mars 1793, la situation est tragique pour la France. Source : RTS, Henri Guillemin  Henri Guillemin poursuit son évocation de la Révolution française avec Les Girondins se perdent. Au début de 1793, la situation est assez tragique en France. Les armées françaises ont envahi la Belgique, mais la Convention ne s’en tient pas […]

  • Corriger le problème de hauteur 100% (100vh) sur mobile - Alsacreations
    https://www.alsacreations.com/astuce/lire/1831-corriger-le-probleme-de-hauteur-100vh-sur-mobile.html

    2 contournements (CSS ou JS) du bogue de Safari sur le calcul du 100vh
    (comme Microsoft avec IE6 il y a quelques années, Apple se sent suffisamment en position de force sur les navigateurs mobiles pour faire n’importe quoi et si possible non compatible avec les standards...)

    #safari #100vh #viewport

    • Le hack de cette solution, c’est le @support pour détecter uniquement Safari (et en théorie, ce genre de chose c’est mal…). Sans cela, dans mon expérience, la valeur -webkit-fill-available est détectée par Chrome (au lieu d’être ignorée), mais qui la met à zéro, ce qui casse totalement la maquette.

      /* Avoid Chrome to see Safari hack */
      @supports (-webkit-touch-callout: none) {
       body {
         /* The hack for Safari */
         min-height: -webkit-fill-available;
       }
      }
  • Comprendre la Commune de Paris #10 : A l’attaque de Paris – par Henri Guillemin
    https://www.les-crises.fr/comprendre-la-commune-de-paris-10-a-l-attaque-de-paris-par-henri-guillemi

    Source :RTS, Henri Guillemin En 1971, cent ans après « la semaine sanglante » qui vit l’écrasement de la Commune de Paris, l’historien et écrivain français Henri Guillemin présente en treize conférences télévisées cette page sombre de l’histoire de France. Découvrez ou redécouvrez cette passionnante série en version haute définition restaurée. Voir l’épisode précédent.  Les Parisiens vivent encore dans l’illusion d’une concorde avec les Versaillais et d’une extension de la Commune. Ils vont tomber de haut au moment de l’attaque de la capitale. Source :RTS, Henri Guillemin, 18-09-1971Lire la suite

  • The invention of whiteness: the long history of a dangerous idea

    Before the 17th century, people did not think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race. But once the idea was invented, it quickly began to reshape the modern world.

    In 2008, a satirical blog called Stuff White People Like became a brief but boisterous sensation. The conceit was straightforward, coupling a list, eventually 136 items long, of stuff that white people liked to do or own, with faux-ethnographic descriptions that explained each item’s purported racial appeal. While some of the items were a little too obvious – indie music appeared at #41, Wes Anderson movies at #10 – others, including “awareness” (#18) and “children’s games as adults” (#102), were inspired. It was an instant hit. In its first two months alone, Stuff White People Like drew 4 million visitors, and it wasn’t long before a book based on the blog became a New York Times bestseller.

    The founder of the blog was an aspiring comedian and PhD dropout named Christian Lander, who’d been working as an advertising copywriter in Los Angeles when he launched the site on a whim. In interviews, Lander always acknowledged that his satire had at least as much to do with class as it did with race. His targets, he said, were affluent overeducated urbanites like himself. Yet there’s little doubt that the popularity of the blog, which depended for its humour on the assumption that whiteness was a contentless default identity, had much to do with its frank invocation of race. “As a white person, you’re just desperate to find something else to grab on to,” Lander said in 2009. “Pretty much every white person I grew up with wished they’d grown up in, you know, an ethnic home that gave them a second language.”

    Looking back at Stuff White People Like today, what marks the site’s age is neither the particularities of its irony nor the broad generalities of its targets. There are still plenty of white people with too much time and too much disposable income on their hands, and plenty of them still like yoga (#15), Vespa scooters (#126), and “black music that black people don’t listen to any more” (#116).

    What has changed, however – changed in ways that date Stuff White People Like unmistakably – is the cultural backdrop. Ten years ago, whiteness suffused mainstream culture like a fog: though pervasive to the point of omnipresence, it was almost nowhere distinct. When the sorts of white people for and about whom Lander was writing talked about being white, their conversations tended to span the narrow range between defensiveness and awkwardness. If they weren’t exactly clamouring to dispense with their racial identity, and the privileges that came with it, they were also not eager to embrace, or even discuss it, in public.

    In the years since, especially among the sort of people who might have once counted themselves fans of Lander’s blog, the public significance of whiteness has undergone an almost wholesale re-evaluation. Far from being a punchline for an anxious, cathartic joke, whiteness is now earnestly invoked, like neoliberalism or populism, as a central driver of cultural and political affairs. Whereas Lander could score a bestseller in 2008 with a book mocking whiteness as a bland cultural melange whose greatest sin was to be uninteresting, just nine years later Ta-Nehisi Coates would have his own bestseller that described whiteness as “an existential danger to the country and the world”.

    Much of the change, of course, had to do with Donald Trump, for whom, as Coates put it, “whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic, but is the very core of his power”. But it was not only Trump. Whiteness has been implicated in events on both sides of the Atlantic, including Brexit; mass shootings in Norway, New Zealand and the US; the George Floyd and Breonna Taylor killings; and the 6 January insurrection at the US Capitol. Alongside these real-world incidents, a bumper crop of scholarship, journalism, art and literature – by Coates, Nell Irvin Painter, Jordan Peele, Eric Foner, Ava DuVernay, Adam Serwer, Barbara and Karen Fields, Kevin Young, David Olusoga, Nikole Hannah-Jones, Colson Whitehead and Claudia Rankine, among many others – has spurred the most significant reconsideration of racial whiteness in 50 years.

    This reckoning, as it is sometimes called, has had measurable effects. In a Pew poll last October, nearly a third of white Americans said that the recent attention to racial issues signified a “major change” in American attitudes about race – another 45% said it was a “minor change” – and nearly half believed that those changes would lead to policies that would ameliorate racial inequality. In the UK, a YouGov poll from December suggested that more than a third of Britons reported that they were having more discussions about racism than they had previously.

    At the same time, this new focus on whiteness has prompted much confusion and consternation, especially among white people not used to thinking of themselves in racial terms. The Pew poll found that half of white Americans thought there was “too much” discussion of racial issues, and a similar proportion suggested that seeing racism where it didn’t exist was a bigger problem than not seeing racism where it did.

    What these recent debates have demonstrated more than anything, perhaps, is how little agreement still exists about what whiteness is and what it ought to be. Nearly everywhere in contemporary society “white” is presumed to be a meaningful index of identity that, like age and gender, is important enough to get mentioned in news accounts, tallied in political polls, and recorded in government databases. Yet what that identity is supposed to tell us is still substantially in dispute. In many ways, whiteness resembles time as seen by Saint Augustine: we presume we understand it as long as we’re not asked to explain it, but it becomes inexplicable as soon as we’re put to the test.

    A little more than a century ago, in his essay The Souls of White Folk, the sociologist and social critic WEB Du Bois proposed what still ranks as one of the most penetrating and durable insights about the racial identity we call white: “The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed.”

    Though radical in its time, Du Bois’s characterisation of what he called the “new religion of whiteness” – a religion founded on the dogma that “of all the hues of God, whiteness alone is inherently and obviously better than brownness and tan” – would have a profound effect on the way historians and other scholars would come to understand racial identity. In part this had to do with his insistence that a racial category like whiteness was more akin to a religious belief than a biological fact. Du Bois rejected the idea, still common in his day, that the races reflected natural divisions within the human species – as well as the nearly inevitable corollary that the physical, mental and behavioural traits associated with the white race just happened to be the ones most prized by modern societies.

    That had been the view, for instance, of Thomas Jefferson, who had attempted to delineate “the real distinctions which nature has made” between the races, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, first published in 1781. It was also the view that would appear, at least in attenuated form, two centuries later in Charles Murray and Richard J Herrnstein’s Bell Curve, which was published in 1994. Murray and Herrnstein argued that “the most plausible” explanation for the differences between Black and white populations recorded on IQ tests was “some form of mixed gene and environmental source” – in other words, that at least some of the discrepancy owes to natural differences.

    By the time The Bell Curve appeared, Du Bois’s assertion that racial categories were not biologically grounded was widely accepted. In the years since, the scientific evidence for that understanding has only become more overwhelming. A 2017 study examined the DNA of nearly 6,000 people from around the world and found that while some genetic differences among humans can be traced to various ancestral lineages – for example, eastern African, southern European or circumpolar – none of those lineages correspond to traditional ideas about race.

    If it’s easy enough for many people today to accept that whiteness is a purely sociological phenomenon – in some quarters, the idea that “race is a social construct” has become a cliche – the same cannot be said for Du Bois’s suggestion that whiteness is a relatively new thing in human history. And yet just as in the case of genetic science, during the second half of the 20th century a number of historians demonstrated that while Du Bois was off by a few hundred years, he was correct that it was only in the modern period that people started to think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race.

    Of course, it’s important not to overstate the case: the evolution of the idea of whiteness was messy and often indistinct. As the historian Nell Irvin Painter has cautioned, “white identity didn’t just spring to life full-blown and unchanging”. It had important antecedents that included a growing sense of a pan-European identity; longstanding cultural associations that saw white as a symbol of purity and virtue; and bog-standard ethnocentrism.

    Still, with only slightly exaggerated precision, we can say that one of the most crucial developments in “the discovery of personal whiteness” took place during the second half of the 17th century, on the peripheries of the still-young British empire. What’s more, historians such as Oscar and Mary Handlin, Edmund Morgan and Edward Rugemer have largely confirmed Du Bois’s suspicion that while xenophobia appears to be fairly universal among human groupings, the invention of a white racial identity was motivated from the start by a need to justify the enslavement of Africans. In the words of Eric Williams, a historian who later became the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, “slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery”.

    If you asked an Englishman in the early part of the 17th century what colour skin he had, he might very well have called it white. But the whiteness of his skin would have suggested no more suitable basis for a collective identity than the roundness of his nose or the baldness of his head. If you asked him to situate himself within the rapidly expanding borders of the known world, he would probably identify himself, first and most naturally, as an Englishman. If that category proved too narrow – if, say, he needed to describe what it was he had in common with the French and the Dutch that he did not share with Ottomans or Africans – he would almost certainly call himself a Christian instead.

    That religious identity was crucial for the development of the English slave trade – and eventually for the development of racial whiteness. In the early 17th century, plantation owners in the West Indies and in the American colonies largely depended on the labour of European indentured servants. These servants were considered chattel and were often treated brutally – the conditions on Barbados, England’s wealthiest colony, were notorious – but they were fortunate in at least one respect: because they were Christian, by law they could not be held in lifetime captivity unless they were criminals or prisoners of war.

    Africans enjoyed no such privilege. They were understood to be infidels, and thus the “perpetual enemies” of Christian nations, which made it legal to hold them as slaves. By 1640 or so, the rough treatment of indentured servants had started to diminish the supply of Europeans willing to work on the sugar and tobacco plantations, and so the colonists looked increasingly to slavery, and the Atlantic-sized loophole that enabled it, to keep their fantastically profitable operations supplied with labour.

    The plantation owners understood very well that their cruel treatment of indentured Europeans, and their even crueller treatment of enslaved Africans, might lead to thoughts – or worse – of vengeance. Significantly outnumbered, they lived in constant fear of uprisings. They were particularly afraid of incidents such as Bacon’s Rebellion, in 1676, which saw indentured Europeans fighting side-by-side with free and enslaved Africans against Virginia’s colonial government.

    To ward off such events, the plantation owners initially sought to protect themselves by giving their “Christian” servants legal privileges not available to their enslaved “Negroes”. The idea was to buy off the allegiance of indentured Europeans with a set of entitlements that, however meagre, set them above enslaved Africans. Toward the end of the 17th century, this scheme witnessed a significant shift: many of the laws that regulated slave and servant behaviour – the 1681 Servant Act in Jamaica, for example, which was later copied for use in South Carolina – began to describe the privileged class as “whites” and not as “Christians”.

    One of the more plausible explanations for this change, made by Rugemer and the historian Katharine Gerbner, among others, is that the establishment of whiteness as a legal category solved a religious dilemma. By the 1670s, Christian missionaries, including the Quaker George Fox, were insisting that enslaved Africans should be inducted into the Christian faith. The problem this posed for the planters was obvious: if their African labourers became Christians, and no longer “perpetual enemies” of Christendom, then on what legal grounds could they be enslaved? And what about the colonial laws that gave special privileges to Christians, laws whose authors apparently never contemplated the possibility that Africans might someday join the faith?

    The planters tried to resolve the former dilemma by blocking the conversion of enslaved Africans, on the grounds, as the Barbados Assembly put it in 1680, that such conversion would “endanger the island, inasmuch as converted negroes grow more perverse and intractable than others”. When that didn’t work (the Bishop of London objected) they instead passed laws guaranteeing that baptism could not be invoked as grounds for seeking freedom.

    But the latter question, about privileges for Christians, required the colonialists to think in a new way. No longer could their religious identity separate them and their servants from enslaved Africans. Henceforth they would need what Morgan called “a screen of racial contempt”. Henceforth, they would need to start thinking of themselves as white.

    As late as 1694, a slave-ship captain could still question the racial logic newly employed to justify his trade. (“I can’t think there is any intrinsick value in one colour more than another, nor that white is better than black, only we think it so because we are so,” Thomas Phillips wrote in his diary.) But whiteness quickly proved itself a powerful weapon that allowed transatlantic capitalism to secure the labour – “white” and African – it needed. As the historian Theodore Allen put it, “The plantation bourgeoisie deliberately extended a privileged status to the white poor of all categories as a means of turning to African slavery as the basis of its system of production.”

    The economic utility of the idea of whiteness helped spread it rapidly around the world. Du Bois was not wrong to call it a religion, for like a religion, it operated at every psychological, sociological and political scale, from the most intimate to the most public. Like a religion, too, it adapted to local conditions. What it meant to be white in British Virginia was not identical to what it would mean in New York before the American civil war, in India during the Raj, in Georgia during Jim Crow, in Australia after Federation, or in Germany during the Third Reich. But what united all these expressions was a singular idea: that some group of people called white was naturally superior to all others. As Benjamin Disraeli, the Victorian prime minister and one of the most committed race ideologists of his time, put it, “race implies difference, difference implies superiority, and superiority leads to predominance”.

    The idea of whiteness, in other words, was identical to the idea of white supremacy. For the three centuries that preceded the civil rights movement, this presumption was accepted at the most refined levels of culture, by people who, in other contexts, were among the most vocal advocates of human liberty and equality. It is well known that Immanuel Kant argued we should treat every other person “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. Less well known is his proposal, in his Lectures on Physical Geography, published in 1802, that “humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites”, or his claim, in his notes for his Lectures on Anthropology, that native “Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus, serve only as slaves”. Even Gandhi, during the early part of his life, accepted the basic lie of whiteness, arguing that “the English and the Indians spring from a common stock, called the Indo-Aryan” and that “the white race in South Africa should be the predominating race”.

    As though aware of their own guilty conscience, the evangelists of the religion of whiteness were always desperate to prove that it was something other than mere prejudice. Where the Bible still held sway, they bent the story of Noah’s son Ham into a divine apologia for white supremacy. When anatomy and anthropology gained prestige in the 18th and 19th centuries, they cited pseudo-scientific markers of racial difference like the cephalic index and the norma verticalis. When psychology took over in the 20th, they told themselves flattering stories about divergences in IQ.

    For all their evident success, the devotees of the religion of whiteness were never able to achieve the total vision they longed for. In part, this was because there were always dissenters, including among those who stood to gain from it, who rejected the creed of racial superiority. Alongside those remembered by history – Elizabeth Freeman, Toussaint Louverture, Harriet Tubman, Sitting Bull, Franz Boas, Haviva Reik, Martin Luther King Jr, Nelson Mandela – there were millions of now-forgotten people who used whatever means they possessed to resist it. In part, too, the nonsense logic that regulated the boundaries of whiteness – the one-drop rule in the US, which said that anyone with Black ancestry could not be white; the endless arguments over what “caucasian” was supposed to mean; the “honorary Aryan” status that Hitler extended to the Japanese – was no match for the robust complexities of human society.

    Yet if the religion of whiteness was never able to gain acceptance as an unchallengeable scientific fact, it was still hugely successful at shaping social reality. Some of this success had to do with its flexibility. Thanks to its role in facilitating slavery, whiteness in the US was often defined in opposition to blackness, but between those two extremes was room for tactical accommodations. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin could claim that only the English and Saxons “make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth”, and nearly 80 years later, Ralph Waldo Emerson would insist that the Irish, like the Chinese and the Native American, were not caucasian. Over time, however, the definition of who counted as culturally white expanded to include Catholics from southern Europe, the Irish and even Jews, who for centuries had been seen as quintessential outsiders.

    The religion of whiteness also found success by persuading its adherents that they, and not the people they oppressed, were the real victims. In 1692, colonial legislators in British Barbados complained that “sundry of the Negroes and Slaves of this island, have been long preparing, contriving, conspiring and designing a most horrid, bloody, damnable and detestable rebellion, massacre, assassination and destruction”. From there, it was a more or less straight line to Woodrow Wilson’s claim, in 1903, that the southerners who started the Ku Klux Klan were “aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation”, and to Donald Trump’s warning, when he launched his presidential campaign in 2015, that Mexican immigrants to the US were “bringing drugs. And they’re bringing crime. And they’re rapists.”

    Where the religion of whiteness was not able to win converts with persuasion or fear, it deployed cruder measures to secure its power, conscripting laws, institutions, customs and churches to enforce its prerogatives. Above all, it depended on force. By the middle of the 20th century, the presumption that a race of people called white were superior to all others had supplied the central justification not just for the transatlantic slave trade but also for the near-total extinction of Indians in North America; for Belgian atrocities in Congo; for the bloody colonisation of India, east Africa and Australia by Britain; for the equally bloody colonisation of north and west Africa and south-east Asia by France; for the deployment of the Final Solution in Nazi Germany; and for the apartheid state in South Africa. And those are merely the most extreme examples. Alongside those murdered, raped and enslaved in the name of whiteness, the total number of whom runs at least to nine figures, are an almost unthinkable number of people whose lives were shortened, constrained, antagonised and insulted on a daily basis.

    It was not until the aftermath of the second world war that frank endorsements of white supremacy were broadly rejected in Anglo-American public discourse. That this happened at all was thanks largely to the efforts of civil rights and anti-colonial activists, but the war itself also played a role. Though the horrors of the Nazi regime had been more acute in their intensity than anything happening at the time in the US or the UK, they supplied an unflattering mirror that made it impossible to ignore the racism that was still prevalent in both countries. (A New York Times editorial in 1946 made the connection explicit, arguing that “this is a particularly good year to campaign against the evils of bigotry, prejudice and race hatred because we have recently witnessed the defeat of enemies who tried to found a mastery of the world upon such a cruel and fallacious policy”.)

    Political appeals to white solidarity diminished slowly but certainly. In 1955, for example, Winston Churchill could still imagine that “Keep England White” was a winning general-election theme, and even as late as 1964, Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate for parliament, would score a surprise victory after endorsing a nakedly racist slogan. By 1968, however, when Enoch Powell delivered his “Rivers of Blood” speech – in which he approvingly quoted a constituent who lamented that “in 15 or 20 years’ time, the black man will have the whip hand over the white man” – he would be greeted by outrage in the Times, which called it an “evil speech”, and expelled from the Conservative shadow cabinet. In the US, too, where a century of racial apartheid had followed a century of slavery, open expressions of racism met with increasing public censure. Throughout the 60s and into the 70s, Congress passed a series of statutes that rendered explicit racial discrimination illegal in many areas of public life.

    This gradual rejection of explicit, government-enforced white supremacy was hugely consequential in terms of public policy. Yet it did not mean that whiteness, as a political force, had lost its appeal: in the weeks after Powell’s speech, to take just one example, a Gallup poll found that 74% of Britons supported his suggestion that brown-skinned immigrants ought to be repatriated. It also left unresolved the more difficult question of whether whiteness was truly separable from its long history of domination.

    Instead of looking too hard at the sordid history of whiteness, many white people found it easier to decide that the civil rights movement had accomplished all the anti-racism work that needed doing. The result was a strange détente. On the one hand, whiteness retreated as a subject of public attention, giving way to a new rhetoric of racial colour-blindness. On the other hand, vast embedded economic and cultural discrepancies allowed white people continue to exercise the institutional and structural power that had accumulated on their behalf across the previous three centuries.

    Similarly, while blatant assertions of white power – such as the 1991 gubernatorial campaign of David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard, in Louisiana – met with significant elite resistance, what counted as racist (and therefore subject to the taboo) was limited to only the most flagrant instances of racial animus. Among liberals and conservatives, racism was widely understood as a species of hatred, which meant that any white person who could look into his heart and find an absence of open hostility could absolve himself of racism.

    Even the phrase “white supremacy”, which predates the word “racism” in English by 80 years and once described a system of interlocking racial privileges that touched every aspect of life, was redefined to mean something rare and extreme. In 1923, for example, under the headline White Supremacy Menaced, the New York Times would print an article which took at face value a Harvard professor’s warning that “one of the gravest and most acute problems before the world today” was “the problem of saving the white race from submergence in the darker races”. In 1967, the US supreme court invalidated a law that prevented whites from marrying people who were not white, on the grounds that it was “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”, and two years later, the critic Albert Murray would use the phrase to describe everything from anti-Black prejudice in police departments to bigoted media representations of Black life to influential academic studies such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s The Negro Family.

    By the 80s and 90s, however, at least in white-dominated media, “white supremacy” was reserved only for the most shocking and retrograde examples of racism. For many people who grew up at that time, as I did, the phrase evoked cross burnings and racist hooligans, rather than an intricate web of laws and norms that maintained disparities of wealth, education, housing, incarceration and access to political power.

    Perhaps most perverse of all was the charge of “reverse racism”, which emboldened critics of affirmative action and other “race-conscious” policies to claim that they, and not the policies’ proponents, were the true heralds of racial equality. In 1986, Ronald Reagan went so far as to defend his opposition to minority-hiring quotas by invoking Martin Luther King Jr: “We want a colour-blind society,” Reagan declared. “A society, that in the words of Dr King, judges people not by the colour of their skin, but by the content of their character.”

    Of course not everyone accepted this new dispensation, which scholars have variously described as “structural racism”, “symbolic racism” or “racism without racists”. In the decades following the civil rights movement, intellectuals and activists of colour continued to develop the Du Boisian intellectual tradition that understood whiteness as an implement of social domination. In the 80s and 90s, a group of legal scholars that included Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris and Richard Delgado produced a body of research that became known as critical race theory, which was, in Bell’s words, “ideologically committed to the struggle against racism, particularly as institutionalised in and by law”.

    Alongside critical race theory, and in many ways derived from it, a new academic trend, known as whiteness studies, took shape. Historians working in this subfield demonstrated the myriad ways in which the pursuit of white supremacy – like the pursuit of wealth and the subjection of women – had been one of the central forces that gave shape to Anglo-American history. For many of them, the bill of indictment against whiteness was total: as the historian David Roediger put it, “it is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.”

    In the fall of 1992, a new journal co-founded by Noel Ignatiev, one of the major figures in whiteness studies, appeared in bookstores around Cambridge, Massachusetts. Called Race Traitor, the magazine wore its motto and guiding ethos on its cover: Treason to Whiteness is Loyalty to Humanity. The issue opened with an editorial whose headline was equally provocative: “Abolish the white race – by any means necessary.” This demand, with its echoes of Sartre by way of Malcolm X, was not, as it turned out, a call for violence, much less for genocide. As Ignatiev and his co-editor, John Garvey, explained, they took as their foundational premise that “the white race is a historically constructed social formation”, a sort of club whose membership “consists of those who partake of the privileges of the white skin in this society”.

    For Ignatiev and Garvey, whiteness had been identified with white supremacy for so long that it was folly to think it was salvageable. “So long as the white race exists,” they wrote, “all movements against racism are doomed to fail.” What was necessary, in their view, was for the people called “white” – people like them – to forcefully reject that identification and the racial privileges that came with it. Whiteness, they suggested, was a fragile, unstable thing, such that even a small number of determined attacks – objecting to racist educational programmes at a school board meeting, say, or capturing racist police behaviour on video – ought to be able to unsettle the whole edifice.

    But while whiteness studies produced much work that still makes for bracing, illuminating reading, it was soon mocked as one more instance of the very privilege it meant to oppose. “The whole enterprise gives whites a kind of standing in the multicultural paradigm they have never before enjoyed,” Margaret Talbot wrote in the New York Times in 1997. “And it involves them, inevitably, in a journey of self-discovery in which white people’s thoughts about their own whiteness acquire a portentous new legitimacy.” Even Ignatiev would later say he “wanted nothing to do with” it.

    By the mid-2000s, the “colour-blind” ideological system had become so successful that it managed to shield even the more obvious operations of whiteness – the overwhelming numbers of white people in corporate boardrooms, for instance, or in the media and tech industries – from much censure. In the US, when racial disparities could not be ignored, it was often suggested that time was the only reliable remedy: as the numerical proportion of whites dwindled, so too would their political and economic power diminish. (Never mind that whiteness had managed to escape predictions of demographic doom before, by integrating groups it had previously kept on its margins.)

    Meanwhile, younger white liberals, the sort of people who might have read Bell or Crenshaw or Ignatiev at university, tended to duck the subject of their own racial identity with a shuffling awkwardness. Growing up white in the decades after the civil rights movement was a little like having a rich but disreputable cousin: you never knew quite what to make of him, or the extravagant gifts he bought for your birthday, and so you found it easier, in general, just not to say anything.

    The absence of talk about whiteness was so pervasive that it became possible to convince yourself that it constituted one of the central obstacles to racial progress. When I was in graduate school during the early 00s, toward the end of the whiteness-studies boomlet, I often heard – including from my own mouth – the argument that the real problem was that white people weren’t talking enough about their racial identity. If you could get people to acknowledge their whiteness, we told ourselves, then it might be possible to get them to acknowledge the unfair ways in which whiteness had helped them.

    The trouble with this notion would become clear soon enough, when the presidency of Barack Obama offered the surest test to date of the proposition that whiteness had separated itself from its supremacist past. Though Obama’s election was initially hailed by some as proof that the US was entering a new post-racial phase, it took just a few months for the Tea party, a conservative movement ostensibly in favour of small government, to suggest that the opposite was closer to the truth.

    In September 2009, Jimmy Carter caused a stir by suggesting that the Tea party’s opposition was something other than a principled reaction to government spending. “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on the fact that he is a black man,” Carter said. (Carter’s speculation was later backed up by research: the political scientist Ashley Jardina, for instance, found that “more racially resentful whites are far more likely to say they support the Tea party and rate it more positively.”)

    The white backlash to Obama’s presidency continued throughout his two terms, helped along by Rupert Murdoch’s media empire and the Republican party, which won majorities in both houses of Congress by promising to obstruct anything Obama tried to accomplish. Neither project kept Obama from a second term, but this does not mean that they were without effect: though Obama lost white voters by 12% in 2008, four years later he would lose them by 20%, the worst showing among white voters for a successful candidate in US history.

    At the same time, Obama’s victory suggested to some observers the vindication of the demographic argument: the changing racial composition of the US appeared to have successfully neutralised the preferences of the white electorate, at least as far as the presidency was concerned. (“There just are not enough middle-aged white guys that we can scrape together to win,” said one Republican after Obama’s victory.)

    What’s more, the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests, which attracted international attention in the summer of 2014, prompted a torrent of demonstrative introspection among white people, especially online. As the critic Hua Hsu would write, half-teasingly, in 2015, “it feels as though we are living in the moment when white people, on a generational scale, have become self-aware”.

    Not for the first time, however, what was visible on Twitter was a poor indicator of deeper social trends. As we now know, the ways in which whiteness was becoming most salient at mid-decade were largely not the ways that prompted recent university graduates to announce their support for Rhodes Must Fall on Instagram. Far more momentous was the version of white identity politics that appreciated the advantages of whiteness and worried about them slipping away; that saw in immigration an existential threat; and that wanted, more than anything, to “Take Back Control” and to “Make America Great Again”.

    It was this version of whiteness that helped to power the twin shocks of 2016: first Brexit and then Trump. The latter, especially – not just the fact of Trump’s presidency but the tone of it, the unrestrained vengeance and vituperation that animated it – put paid to any lingering questions about whether whiteness had renounced its superiority complex. Ta-Nehisi Coates, who more than any other single person had been responsible for making the bumbling stereotype of whiteness offered up by Stuff White People Like seem hopelessly myopic, understood what was happening immediately. “Trump truly is something new – the first president whose entire political existence hinges on the fact of a black president,” Coates wrote in the autumn of 2017. “His ideology is white supremacy, in all its truculent and sanctimonious power.”

    In 1860, a man who called himself “Ethiop” published an essay in The Anglo-African Magazine, which has been called the first Black literary journal in the US. The author behind the pseudonym was William J Wilson, a former bootmaker who later served as the principal of Brooklyn’s first public school for Black children. Wilson’s essay bore the headline, What Shall We Do with the White People?

    The article was meant in part meant to mock the white authors and statesmen who had endlessly asked themselves a similar question about Black people in the US. But it was not only a spoof. In a tone that mimicked the smug paternalism of his targets, he laid out a comprehensive indictment of white rule in the country: the plunder and murder of the “Aborigines”; the theft and enslavement of Africans; the hypocrisy embodied by the American constitution, government and white churches. At the root of all this, he wrote, was “a long continued, extensive and almost complete system of wrongdoing” that made the men and women who enabled it into “restless, grasping” marauders. “In view of the existing state of things around us,” Wilson proposed at the end, “let our constant thought be, what for the best good of all shall we do with the White people?”

    Much has changed since Wilson’s time, but a century and a half on, his question remains no less pertinent. For some people, such as the political scientist Eric Kaufmann, whiteness is what it has always pretended to be. Though he acknowledges that races are not genetically defined, Kaufmann nevertheless sees them as defensible divisions of humanity that have some natural basis: they emerge, he suggests, “through a blend of unconscious colour-processing and slowly evolved cultural conventions”. In his 2019 book Whiteshift, Kaufmann argues that the history of oppression by white people is “real, but moot”, and he advocates for something he calls “symmetrical multiculturalism”, in which “identifying as white, or with a white tradition of nationhood, is no more racist than identifying as black”. What shall we do with the white people? Kaufmann thinks we should encourage them to take pride in being white, lest they turn to more violent means: “Freezing out legitimate expressions of white identity allows the far right to own it, and acts as a recruiting sergeant for their wilder ideas.”

    From another perspective – my own, most days – whiteness means something different from other racial and ethnic identities because it has had a different history than other racial and ethnic identities. Across three-and-a-half centuries, whiteness has been wielded as a weapon on a global scale; Blackness, by contrast, has often been used as a shield. (As Du Bois put it, what made whiteness new and different was “the imperial width of the thing – the heaven-defying audacity.”) Nor is there much reason to believe that whiteness will ever be content to seek “legitimate expressions”, whatever those might look like. The religion of whiteness had 50 years to reform itself along non-supremacist lines, to prove that it was fit for innocuous coexistence. Instead, it gave us Donald Trump.

    Yet even this does not fully answer Wilson’s question. For if it’s easy enough to agree in theory that the only reasonable moral response to the long and very much non-moot history of white supremacy is the abolitionist stance advocated in the pages of Race Traitor – ie, to make whiteness meaningless as a group identity, to shove it into obsolescence alongside “Prussian” and “Etruscan” – it seems equally apparent that whiteness is not nearly so fragile as Ignatiev and Garvey had imagined. Late in his life, James Baldwin described whiteness as “a moral choice”, as a way of emphasising that it was not a natural fact. But whiteness is more than a moral choice: it is a dense network of moral choices, the vast majority of which have been made for us, often in times and places very distant from our own. In this way whiteness is a problem like climate change or economic inequality: it is so thoroughly imbricated in the structure of our everyday lives that it makes the idea of moral choices look quaint.

    As with climate change, however, the only thing more difficult than such an effort would be trying to live with the alternative. Whiteness may seem inevitable and implacable, and Toni Morrison surely had it right when she said that the world “will not become unracialised by assertion”. (To wake up tomorrow and decide I am no longer white would help no one.) Even so, after 350 years, it remains the case, as Nell Irvin Painter argues, that whiteness “is an idea, not a fact”. Not alone, and not without much work to repair the damage done in its name, it still must be possible to change our minds.

    https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/apr/20/the-invention-of-whiteness-long-history-dangerous-idea
    #blanchité #races #invention #histoire #race_blanche #modernité

    ping @cede @karine4

  • Au Poste #10, avec Alain Damasio
    Par David Dufresne, 30 mars 2021
    http://www.davduf.net/au-poste-10-alain-damasio

    Alain Damasio #AuPoste #10 - YouTube
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iEBNi1kVSVA

    Lundi 29 mars 2021, 18h, un grand jour. On a reçu, à la bonne franquette, sur Twitch, l’écrivain. Pour parler de ses œuvres, de la techno police, du recul des libertés en France et ailleurs. Comment il se sent, au milieu du vacarme et de ses succès. Une parole libre, sincère, qui vagabonde de Foucault aux jeux vidéos, des Zones à Désir et des Oasis, des Zones à défendre et des Zones d’autonomie temporaires.

  • L’espace d’un instant #10
    http://liminaire.fr/entre-les-lignes/article/l-espace-d-un-instant-10

    « La grande révélation n’était jamais arrivée. En fait, la grande révélation n’arrivait peut-être jamais. C’était plutôt de petits miracles quotidiens, des illuminations, allumettes craquées à l’improviste dans le noir ; en voici une. » Vers le phare, Virginia Woolf Manille, Philippines : 17:21 Dans le silence des rues, nos pas frappent le sol à coups répétés, se propagent, faux-fuyants infinis, contre les murs rugueux et l’asphalte luisante du sol. Nos cris et nos souffles se prolongent dans le mouvement (...) #Entre_les_lignes

  • La piscine commune de combustible usé de Fukushima Daiichi - Fukushima 福島第一
    http://www.fukushima-blog.com/article-la-piscine-commune-de-combustible-use-de-fukushima-daiichi-9

    Avant la catastrophe de #Fukushima, le Japon envisageait la construction d’un nouveau centre de #stockage, les piscines de nombreux sites nucléaires approchant le maximum de leurs capacités de stockage. Même si le programme #nucléaire nippon va être amoindri, voire abandonné, il n’est pas certain que ce projet ne voie pas le jour. En effet, sortir du nucléaire ne signifie pas abandonner toutes les installations. La production d’électricité nucléaire des 40 dernières années va devoir être assumée par les générations futures durant des milliers d’années.

    Un site sous surveillance

    Tepco reste très discret sur cette piscine, voire ne communique pas. Pourtant c’est bien le lieu le plus dangereux du site nucléaire car la somme des déchets rassemblés en ce seul endroit est énorme : plus de 1000 tonnes de #combustible_usé y sont actuellement entreposées, autrement dit 6375 assemblages rassemblant plus de 400 000 barres. Le site est étroitement surveillé : lors des études géologiques, c’est toujours cet endroit précis que l’on a choisi pour faire se croiser les coupes de terrain. La construction antisismique a donc dû être très soignée, car d’une part les barres ne doivent pas s’entrechoquer, et d’autre part l’étanchéité de la piscine doit demeurer parfaite.

    #10_ans_dans_3_mois

  • ITALY : UPTICK IN CHAIN-REMOVALS

    While the exact number of persons arriving via the Slovenian-Italian border is unknown, there has been a sharp rise since April (http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2020/11/09/friuli-venezia-giulia-immigrazione-fedriga-ripensare-politiche-di-controllo-) of people entering Italy from the Balkan route. Not only in Trieste, but also around the province of #Udine, arrivals have increased compared to last year. In Udine, around 100 people (https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/11/30/migranti-oltre-cento-persone-rintracciate-nelludinese_9fdae48d-8174-4ea1-b221-8) were identified in one day. This has been met with a huge rise in chain pushbacks, initiated by Italian authorities via readmissions to Slovenia. From January to October 2020, 1321 people (https://www.rainews.it/tgr/fvg/articoli/2020/11/fvg-massimiliano-fedriga-migranti-arrivi-emergenza-98da1880-455e-4c59-9dc9-6) have been returned via the informal readmissions agreement, representing a fivefold increase when compared with the statistics from 2019.

    In this context, civil society groups highlight that “the returns are being carried out so quickly there is no way Italian authorities are implementing a full legal process at the border to determine if someone is in need of international protection.” The pushbacks to Slovenia appear to be indiscriminate. According to Gianfranco Schiavone (https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/17/europe-italy-bosnia-slovenia-migration-pushbacks-expulsion), from ASGI (Associazione per gli studi giuridici sullʼim-migrazione), “[they] have involved everybody, regardless of nationality,” he said. “They pushed back Afghans, Syrians, people from Iraq, people in clear need of protection.” As stated by Anna Brambilla, lawyer at ASGI, the Italian Ministry of the Interior (https://altreconomia.it/richiedenti-asilo-respinti-al-confine-tra-italia-e-slovenia-la-storia-d):
    “confirmed that people who have expressed a desire to apply for international protection are readmitted to Slovenia and that readmissions are carried out without delivering any provision relating to the readmission itself.”

    Crucially, the well publicised nature of chain removals from Slovenia, and onwards through Croatia, mean the authorities are aware of the violent sequence they are enter-ing people into, and thus complicit within this #violence.

    But instead of dealing with this deficit in adherence to international asylum law, in recent months Italian authorities have only sought to adapt border controls to apprehend more people. Border checks are now focusing on trucks, cars and smaller border crossings (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu4es3xXVc8&feature=youtu.be

    ), rather than focusing solely on the military patrols of the forested area. This fits into a strategy of heightened control, pioneered by the Governor of the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region Massimiliano Fedriga who hopes to deploy more detection equipment at the border. The aim is to choke off any onward transit beyond the first 10km of Italian territory, and therefore apply the fast tracked process of readmission to the maximum number of new arrivals.

    https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/BVMN-November-Report.pdf

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #refoulements #push-backs #Italie #Slovénie #droit_d'asile #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #10_km #refoulements_en_chaîne

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la création de #zones_frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/795053

    • Schiavone: «#Lamorgese ammetta che l’Italia sta facendo respingimenti illegali»

      «Le riammissioni informali dei richiedenti asilo non hanno alcuna base giuridica», spiega Gianfranco Schiavone, del direttivo dell’Asgi, Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’immigrazione. Nel 2020 sono state riammesse in Slovenia 1301 persone. «Sostenere, come ha fatto la ministra dell’interno Lamorgese durante l’interrogazione del deputato di Leu, Erasmo Palazzotto, che la Slovenia e soprattutto la Croazia siano “Paesi sicuri” nonostante le prove schiaccianti della violenza esercitata dalla polizia croata sulle persone in transito, ha dell’incredibile, un’affermazione indecorosa»

      Quelle che il governo italiano chiama “riammissioni” in realtà altro non sono che respingimenti illegali dei profughi che arrivano dalla Rotta Balcanica a Trieste e Gorizia. Pakistani, iracheni, afghani, e talvolta anche siriani che avrebbero diritto di chiedere asilo nel nostro Paese ma neanche mettono piede sul suolo italiano che già sono in marcia per fare forzatamente la Rotta Balcanica al contrario: all’Italia alla Slovenia, dalla Slovenia alla Croazia, dalla Croazia alla Bosnia.

      Lo scorso 13 gennaio il deputato di Leu, Erasmo Palazzotto durante la sua interrogazione ha ricordato alla ministra dell’Interno Lamorgese quanto sia disumano quello che sta succedendo in Bosnia, alle porte dell’Europa e di come testimoni il fallimento dell’Unione nella gestione dei flussi migratori sottolinenando che "Il nostro Paese deve sospendere le riammissioni informali verso la Slovenia e porre la questione in sede di Consiglio Europeo per gestire in maniera umana questo fenomeno. Va messa la parola fine a questa barbarie”. Ma Lamorgese sembra ancora continuare a non curarsi di quello che avviene dentro i nostri confini. Nel 2020 sono state respinte illegalmente in Slovenia 1301 persone.

      «Quello che succede al confine italiano sono veri e propri respingimenti illegali», spiega Gianfranco Schiavone, del direttivo di Asgi, Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione. «Anche nel 2018 si erano registrati casi di respingimenti illegittimi ma in numero contenuto. Allora la risposta fu principalmente quella di negare i fatti. In ogni caso, oggi, il fenomeno dei respingimenti illegali è aumentato enormemente in termini di quantità ma soprattutto nella loro rivendicazione ideologica. Mentre in passato la giustificazione poggiava sulla tesi che non si trattasse di richiedenti asilo oggi si tende a giustificare (pur usando volutamente un linguaggio ambiguo) che si possono respingere anche i richiedenti perchè la domanda di asilo si può fare in Slovenia».

      Stando a quanto ha affermato la ministra le riammissioni sono possibili in virtù dell’accordo bilaterale firmato dai due Paesi, Italia e Slovenia, nel 1996. Si tratta di “riammissioni” effettuate non in ragione del ripristino dei controlli alle frontiere interne, mai formalmente avvenuto, ma in applicazione dell’Accordo bilaterale fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica di Slovenia sulla riammissione delle persone alla frontiera, firmato a Roma il 3 settembre 1996, che contiene previsioni finalizzate a favorire la riammissione sul territorio dei due Stati sia di cittadini di uno dei due Stati contraenti sia cittadini di Stati terzi.

      «In primis», spiega Schiavone, «occorre rilevare come tale accordo risulti illegittimo per contrarietà al sistema costituzionale interno italiano e per violazione di normative interne. È infatti dubbia la legittimità nell’ordinamento italiano dell’Accordo bilaterale fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica di Slovenia e di ogni altro analogo tipo di accordi intergovernativi per due ordini di ragioni: nonostante abbiano infatti una chiara natura politica, essi non sono stati ratificati con legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica ai sensi dell’art. 80 Cost.;in quanto accordi intergovernativi stipulati in forma semplificata, in ogni caso essi non possono prevedere modifiche alle leggi vigenti in Italia (altro caso in cui l’art. 80 Cost. prevede la preventiva legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica) e dunque essi neppure possono derogare alle norme di fonte primaria dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano. In ogni caso, anche volendo prescindere da ogni ulteriore valutazione sui profili di illegittimità dell’Accordo di riammissione è pacifico che ne è esclusa appunto l’applicazione ai rifugiati riconosciuti ai sensi della Convenzione di Ginevra (all’epoca la nozione di protezione sussidiaria ancora non esisteva) come chiaramente enunciato all’articolo 2 del medesimo Accordo. Del tutto priva di pregio sotto il profilo dell’analisi giuridica sarebbe l’obiezione in base alla quale l’accordo fa riferimento ai rifugiati e non ai richiedenti asilo giacché come è noto, il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato (e di protezione sussidiaria) è un procedimento di riconoscimento di un diritto soggettivo perfetto i cui presupposti che lo straniero chiede appunto di accertare. Non v’è pertanto alcuna possibilità di distinguere in modo arbitrario tra richiedenti protezione e rifugiati riconosciuti dovendosi comunque garantire in ogni caso l’accesso alla procedura di asilo allo straniero che appunto chiede il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato. A chiudere del tutto l’argomento sotto il profilo giuridico, è il noto Regolamento Dublino III che prevede che ogni domanda di asilo sia registrata alla frontiera o all’interno dello Stato nel quale il migrante si trova. Una successiva complessa procedura stabilita se il Paese competente ad esaminare la domanda è eventualmente diverso da quello nel quale il migrante ha chiesto asilo e in ogni caso il Regolamento esclude tassativamente che si possano effettuare riammissioni o respingimenti di alcun genere nel paese UE confinante solo perchè il richiedente proviene da lì. Anzi, il Regolamento è nato in primo luogo per evitare rimpalli di frontiera tra uno stato e l’altro. Violare, come sta avvenendo, questa fondamentale procedura, significa scardinare il Regolamento e in ultima analisi, il sistema europeo di asilo. È come se fossimo tornati indietro di trent’anni, a prima del 1990».

      Inoltre secondo la ministra "la Slovenia aderisce alla Convenzione di Ginevra e che la stessa Slovenia, come la Croazia sono considerati Paesi sicuri sul piano del rispetto dei diritti umani e delle convenzioni internazionali. Pertanto le riammissioni avvengono verso uno stato europeo, la Slovenia, dove vigono normative internazionali analoghe a quelle del nostro paese”.

      «Lamorgese», continua Schiavone, «ha fatto una figura veramente imbarazzante che ricade sul nostro Paese. Bisogna avere il coraggio di ammettere che abbiamo fatto una cosa illegale riammettendo i richiedenti asilo in Slovenia e da là, attraverso una collaudata catena, in Crozia e infine in Bosnia. E anche se nell’audizione dice tre parole, solo un piccolo inciso, sul fatto che non possono essere riamessi i migranti che hanno fatto richiesta d’asilo, nei fatti la sostanza non cambia. Infine sostenere che la Slovenia e soprattutto la Croazia siano “Paesi sicuri” nonostante le prove schiaccianti della violenza esercitata dalla polizia croata sulle persone in transito ha dell’incredibile. Un ministro non può permettersi di dire che quelli sono Paesi sicuri, perchè per i migranti della Rotta Balcanica non lo sono. E alla domanda “come finirà la questione?” La ministra non è stata in grado di formulare nessuna risposta chiara sul fatto che verrà posta fine alla pratica delle riammissioni dei richiedenti. Ed è forse questa la cosa più grave».

      http://www.vita.it/it/article/2021/01/18/schiavone-lamorgese-ammetta-che-litalia-sta-facendo-respingimenti-ille/158020

  • Somme : la ferme des 1 000 vaches, près d’Abbeville, cesse sa production de lait
    Publié le 04/12/2020
    https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/somme-ferme-mille-vaches-abbeville-cesse-son-activite-l
    https://bit.ly/3qxJvwO

    La ferme des mille vaches de Buigny-Saint-Maclou dans la Somme cessera sa production de lait au 1er janvier 2021, annonce ce 4 décembre la communication de l’établissement. Décriée depuis sa mise en place en 2011 par l’association Novissen, celle-ci est aujourd’hui satisfaite de la nouvelle. (...)

    #1000_vaches

  • #Toulouse : le cadeau de Jean-Luc Moudenc à Thierry Oldak
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/11/25/toulouse-le-cadeau-de-jean-luc-moudenc-a-thierry-oldak

    C’est une opération de longue haleine que Thierry Oldak, un des plus gros promoteurs toulousain, est sur le point de réussir, raflant au passage un joli pactole. Sur la revente de l’ancien bâtiment EDF du #10-12_Quai_Saint-Pierre, le Groupe Thiery Oldak s’apprête à se faire plus de 6 millions d’euros de bénef’ grâce à […]

    #Quai_Saint_Pierre #spéculation

  • #Toulouse : nouveau squat à #Blagnac, rue Vélasquez
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/10/15/toulouse-nouveau-squat-a-blagnac

    Après l’expulsion du #Squat_des_Amandiers hier à Blagnac, l’avenir du nouveau squat de Blagnac, situé au #10_rue_Vélasquez, va se jouer cet après-midi jeudi 15 octobre, car un huissier et la police sont passés ce matin, ce qui fait craindre une expulsion cet après-midi. Il faut un maximum de soutiens. Le nouveau bâtiment […]

    #14_rue_des_Amandiers #CEDIS #Collectif_d'Entraide_et_D'Innovation_Sociale #ouverture #sans-papiers

  • Covid #10 | La Nature, source et ressource de l’établissement humain
    https://topophile.net/savoir/covid-10-la-nature-source-et-ressource-de-letablissement-humain-questions

    Cloîtrés chacun chez soi à longueur de journée, à longueur de semaines et de mois, tout le monde a pu apprécier le (ré)confort d’un rayon de soleil ou d’un courant d’air vivifiant, ces manifestations élémentales de la Nature. Alors que les questions sanitaires et hygiéniques sont sur toutes les lèvres, nous interrogeons l’architecte (et membre... Voir l’article

  • [Strange Fruits] #065 #Strange_Fruits #100%_musique
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/strange-fruits/-065-strange-fruits-100-musique

    Playlist :

    #Alexander_Hawkins / #Dominic_Lash / #Paul_May / #Alex_Ward : Basenji ‎(Barkingside - Emanem - 2008)

    #Bill_Carrothers : Blue Evening (Swing Sing Songs - Warner Music France - 2001)

    #N∆BOU : Not That Bad (Hubert - W.E.R.F. - 2020)

    #Ivo_Perelman, #Dominic_Duval, #Brian_Willson : Grateful For Life ‎(Mind Games - Leo Records - 2009)

    #Anthony_Braxton : Hot House (Sextet (1993) - New Braxton House - 2018)

    #Lotte_Anker - #Sylvie_Courvoisier - #Ikue_Mori : Morning Dove (Alien Huddle - Intakt Records - 2008)

    #Frank_Gratkowski / #Jacob_Anderskov : Narrative ‎(Ardent Grass - Red Toucan Records - 2010)

    #Don_Cherry : Amejelo ‎ ("Mu" First Part - BYG Records - 1969)

    #Jozef_Dumoulin Trio : The Dragon Warrior (Rainbow Body - Bee Jazz - 2011)

    Dessin (c) Sara Yu (...)

    #Sylvie_Courvoisier,Jozef_Dumoulin,Anthony_Braxton,Strange_Fruits,Alex_Ward,Don_Cherry,Ivo_Perelman,Paul_May,Brian_Willson,N∆BOU,Frank_Gratkowski,Lotte_Anker,Alexander_Hawkins,Ikue_Mori,Jacob_Anderskov,Dominic_Duval,Bill_Carrothers,Dominic_Lash,100%_musique
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/strange-fruits/-065-strange-fruits-100-musique_09210__1.mp3

  • [Radio Maritime] Confinés #10
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-maritime/confines-10

    De retour en studio, on contacte Malika par téléphone, on se plonge dans une archive d’une balade au MoMuse, on écoute un épisode du podcast « A l’ouest » réalisé par des jeunes du quartier Beekkant, on reçoit Isabelle qui souhaite lancer une radio dans le quartier Nord à Bruxelles, on discute avec Gaspar de l’asbl La Rue qui vient de publier un appel à stopper la pression immobilière dans le quartier le long du canal et on termine avec Monsieur Patrick qui n’a pas préparé de Chronique mais a réouvert son école de devoir.

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-maritime/confines-10_09129__1.mp3

  • COVID-19, une leçon de géopolitique #10 - L’Irak face au virus -Le dessous des cartes VIDEO

    L’irruption du coronavirus dans le contexte de crise économique en Irak peut-il constituer une aubaine pour Daech ? Pierre-Jean Luizard, historien spécialiste de l’Irak, répond aux questions d’Émilie Aubry. Comme la plupart des pays du monde, l’Irak est touché par l’épidémie de Covid-19. Une propagation qui a pu être favorisée par sa proximité avec l’Iran où le virus s’est rapidement déclaré.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/096952-010-A/covid-19-une-lecon-de-geopolitique-10-l-irak-face-au-virus
    https://youtu.be/uCAvzKaWWWg

    #Covid-19#Moyen-Orient#Iran#Iraq#Frontière#Géopolitique#Relations_internationales#migrant#migration

  • [Radio PANdemIK] Recette de cuisine du Chef Wuhan - #2 - comment bien préparer la chauve-souris au lait (Arthur) - Radio PANdémIK #17
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-17/#8647

    Recette de cuisine du Chef Wuhan - #2 - comment bien préparer la chauve-souris au lait (Arthur)

    Panik se décuple et se propage en Pandémik infectieuse des oreilles les plus sourdes. Volatile, imprévisible, elle s’attrape à horaires variables, pour une durée brève ou indéterminée et jusqu’à amener des changements irréversibles. Jingle Radio Pandémik - Magda

    2 ème épisode de confinement intime par Islin-Lucrezia De Fraye - mars 2020 - 11min

    Pearly OG - rap freestyle - 6 avril 2020 - 1min

    « Ya l’covid-19 donc j’prefere qu’on s’appel au tel, c’est pas du bleuf c’est une maladie très très mortel »

    Chronique Nicolas Montagu pour l’Acentrale - témoignages de soignant.e.s - 14’36

    Bouli Lanners en colère - ’Tu dis la vérité maintenant’ - 4 avril 2020 - 1min

    ’Comment s’en sortir sans sortir #10 par (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-17_08647__0.mp3

  • [Radio PANdemIK] Radio PANdémIK #17
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-17

    Panik se décuple et se propage en Pandémik infectieuse des oreilles les plus sourdes. Volatile, imprévisible, elle s’attrape à horaires variables, pour une durée brève ou indéterminée et jusqu’à amener des changements irréversibles. Jingle Radio Pandémik - Magda

    2 ème épisode de confinement intime par Islin-Lucrezia De Fraye - mars 2020 - 11min

    Pearly OG - rap freestyle - 6 avril 2020 - 1min

    « Ya l’covid-19 donc j’prefere qu’on s’appel au tel, c’est pas du bleuf c’est une maladie très très mortel »

    Chronique Nicolas Montagu pour l’Acentrale - témoignages de soignant.e.s - 14’36

    Bouli Lanners en colère - ’Tu dis la vérité maintenant’ - 4 avril 2020 - 1min

    ’Comment s’en sortir sans sortir #10 par Emmanuel Moreira’ - 2’55

    https://soundcloud.com/laviemanifeste/sets/comment-sen-sortir-sans-sortir

     (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-17_08644__1.mp3