• #Angers : manif contre l’expulsion de la Grande Ourse
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/10/21/angers-manif-contre-lexpulsion-de-la-grande-ourse

    Le tribunal a rendu son verdict : la Grande Ourse ne bénéficiera d’aucun des délais généralement alloués aux squats avant leur #expulsion. La Grande Ourse, c’est une quarantaine de personnes hébergées, un lieu de repos pour les nécessiteux-ses, une épicerie à prix libre, un bar associatif et surtout l’un des symboles angevins de la résistance […]

    #6_quai_Robert_Fèvre #manifestation #Mineurs_Non_Accompagnés #procès #sans-papiers

  • Covid-19 : les circonstances de #contamination chez les Français restent mystérieuses, voici pourquoi | Le HuffPost
    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/covid-19-les-circonstance-de-contamination-chez-les-francais-sont-enc

    (...) les lieux des #clusters identifiés suite à ce #traçage “ne peuvent en aucun cas être considérés comme représentatifs des lieux de contamination en général” , alerte Daniel Lévy-Bruhl, épidémiologiste à Santé Publique France. SPF le rappelle, les clusters ne servent qu’à analyser le niveau de “criticité des différents secteurs ”. En clair, de voir que dans un Ehpad, le risque de transmission et le risque de forme grave de Covid-19 sont plus élevés que dans les crèches. 

    “Il n’est pas surprenant de retrouver un nombre brut de clusters plus élevé dans les entreprises ou milieux scolaires, mais si vous le rapportez au nombre d’entreprises et d’établissements scolaires, la proportion par milieu sera beaucoup plus faible” , estime Patrick Rolland, coordonnateur interrégional chez Santé publique France, à l’origine du système de traçage des clusters développé par SPF.

    Enquête sur les contaminations

    De plus, le traçage de contact en général est à bout de souffle et débordé face à l’explosion des contaminations. Surtout, il n’est lui non plus pas très représentatif. On voit par exemple que seules 2,8 personnes-contacts sont identifiées par cas confirmé de Covid-19. En parallèle, 73% des personnes diagnostiquées positives par PCR n’étaient pas référencées comme cas contact. En clair, le traçage de contact passe à côté de 7 personnes sur 10.

    Pourquoi ? Les cas confirmés cachent-ils les personnes qu’elles ont pu voir dans le cadre privé ? Les contaminations sont elles majoritairement intraçables, car elles proviennent d’inconnus (transports en commun, lieux publics, bars et restaurants, etc.) ? Le système est-il simplement débordé ? Ici, impossible de le savoir, parce qu’encore une fois, nous ne savons pas comment les Français se contaminent. 

    “Les plateformes de traçage de contact ont pour vocation de contacter les personnes identifiées et ne peuvent pas enquêter sur les circonstances fines de contamination” , explique Daniel Lévy-Bruhl. Mais justement, SPF s’est associé à l’Institut Pasteur pour essayer d’en savoir plus.

    Une étude épidémiologique va bientôt démarrer sur un échantillon important de cas où on va investiguer les circonstances de contaminations ”, précise l’épidémiologiste. Si tout se passe bien, les résultats devraient être connus “dans les mois qui viennent”. À défaut de permettre de mieux gérer la deuxième vague, cela permettra peut-être de prévenir la troisième.

    #épidémiologie #enquête_épidémiologique #covid-19 #sansvergogne #terrifiant

    • Clusters et chaînes de contamination, extrait de Corona virus update - Une traduction du podcast de Christian Drosten (NDR Info)
      https://inf-covid.blogspot.com/2020/10/allemagne-barrington-cluster-source.html
      Allemagne, Barrington, cluster-source, immunité, étude indienne, mutation D614G. Podcast #60 du 13 octobre 2020
      L’Allemagne va connaître la même évolution que le reste de l’Europe

      [...]
      La chose décisive est, et il faudrait vraiment le répéter encore et encore, car tout le monde ne l’a pas encore intégré, nous avons besoin de deux mesures combinées. Donc les règles AHA, c’est bien, mais je trouve cette formule presque un peu trop simple. Donc les règles AHA - distanciation, hygiène, masques grand public - c’est certainement une mesure généralement efficace et dont tout le monde se souvient. Et c’est bien. Mais nous avons besoin de quelque chose de plus, à savoir une mesure contre les clusters. C’est la règle de base pour ces maladies qui se propagent avec une sur-dispersion. Nous avons besoin de deux mesures à l’échelle de la société. La première est une mesure que tout le monde suit et qui n’a pas besoin d’être très intrusive, ni à être très efficace pour la propagation du virus. Elle doit être efficace à 20%. C’est certainement la combinaison de la distance, de l’hygiène et des masques. Quelque chose qui s’applique à tout le monde, qui s’applique dans toute la société, qui n’est pas drastique. Et puis, nous avons également besoin d’une mesure spécifique, qui prenne effet partout où des clusters apparaissent.

      Et c’est encore une faiblesse en Allemagne pour le moment, et aussi dans le système de reporting, et pas seulement en Allemagne. L’orientation spécifique de l’enregistrement des cas, l’enregistrement de l’activité infectieuse sur le cluster source, c’est-à-dire la question : Où avez-vous été infecté ? Nous sommes toujours très axés sur la poursuite des cas. En d’autres termes, nous demandons : ce patient qui a été infecté ici, qui aurait-il pu infecter, à la fois ces derniers jours, avec qui il était en contact, et aussi à l’avenir, il doit rester chez lui pour qu’il n’infecte plus personne.

      Mais le moment où nous remarquons cette infection est en fait un moment où la contagiosité est pratiquement terminée. Et les quelques personnes qu’il aurait pu infecter au cours des derniers jours ne sont pas à l’origine du processus d’infection, mais ce qui est vraiment à l’origine du processus d’infection, c’est le cluster source où il a contracté son infection. Car cette infection se propage par grappes. Même si les autorités sanitaires disent qu’il y a un processus d’infection de plus en plus diffus, on ne peut plus reconstituer les chaînes de contamination, alors ce n’est pas une description de la réalité de la propagation du virus, mais une description de l’impression qu’on a dans les services de santé car les gens ne peuvent pas dire où ils ont probablement été infectés il y a sept à dix jours.

      Nous avons cela avec d’autres rhumes également. Nous n’avons tout simplement pas cette mémoire. Nous ne pouvons pas nous souvenir dans quelles situations particulières, dangereuses, nous étions il y a sept à dix jours. Le problème, cependant, est que cette situation dangereuse dans laquelle nous avons été infectés il y a sept à dix jours est toujours là. Ce cluster couve toujours. Et sans que personne ne le sache, sans que les cas aient été signalés jusqu’à présent, nous avons ici un cluster source qui frémit. Nous sommes maintenant à ce moment où les remontées de chaînes deviennent de plus en plus difficiles, où les autorités sanitaires disent les unes après les autres : "Nous n’y arrivons plus, Bundeswehr, venez nous aider !" Nous voyons cela dans les médias maintenant. C’est maintenant le moment où cette méthode de travail sur les clusters source doit être mise en œuvre. Parce qu’en ce moment, d’après les statistiques, nous avons l’impression que cela vient des fêtes de famille, des ménages. Cela ne vient pas des situations de travail, des transports en commun, etc.

      Martini : D’aller au restaurant.

      Drosten : Exactement. Tous ces éléments ne figurent pas dans les statistiques des rapports pour le moment. Les autorités sanitaires disent que ce sont avant tout les situations privées, les fêtes de famille, la maison. Mais regardons maintenant de près ces statistiques de reporting. Et ce que nous constatons, c’est que plus de la moitié de toutes les nouvelles infection ne peuvent pas être résolues. [...] les chaînes de contamination reconstructibles sont minoritaires. [...] Les gens ne peuvent pas dire où ils se sont infectés. D’où cette proposition, que je fais depuis des semaines, que chaque citoyen tienne un journal des situations de cluster. Chaque soir, par exemple, vous pouvez écrire sur votre smartphone, dans votre bloc-notes ou sur n’importe quel morceau de papier, là où vous ne vous êtes pas sentis très à l’aise. Alors aujourd’hui, j’étais dans une situation où j’avais le sentiment qu’il y avait trop de monde, dans une pièce fermée, trop près les uns des autres, même si la plupart portaient des masques. En faisant cela, deux choses se produisent. Premièrement, [...] les gens pourraient se souvenir davantage et dire où ils ont été infectés. Les autorités sanitaires pourraient alors être en mesure d’identifier encore mieux les clusters source. Le suivi des cas serait amélioré. Le deuxième effet est que [chacun] réaliserait plus clairement qu’il se trouve régulièrement dans de telles situations et [qu’en y étant plus sensibilisé, il les évite à l’avenir].
      [Si je vais au restaurant] Est-ce que je m’en souviendrai dans dix jours ?

      Martini : Probablement pas.

      Drosten : Sérieusement. Donc si j’ai soudainement de la fièvre, [...] je dirais : « Je ne peux pas dire. » Ou je dirais aussi : « Eh bien, probablement à la maison, parce que mon conjoint a aussi de la fièvre. Donc, je me suis contaminé à la maison. » Mais je suis aussi allé manger avec mon conjoint, mais comme je ne l’ai pas noté, je ne m’en souviens pas. Je ne veux pas seulement me concentrer sur les restaurants. Il s’agit aussi d’autres situations, de situations quotidiennes, nombreuses dans le secteur du sport, dans le secteur des loisirs, mais aussi la vie professionnelle. Ces lacunes dans les listes seraient ainsi comblées. Par exemple dans la vie professionnelle, il y avait telle réunion [exceptionnelle], et il y avait 30 personnes dans la salle. Tous étaient assis à distance et portaient des masques. […] C’est quelque chose que nous pouvons tous faire. On ne peut pas simplement rester passifs et se dire que le département de la santé clarifiera tout ça si je tombe malade à un moment donné. [...]

      Martini : Cela voudrait dire que si nous notions ces contacts, nous serions un peu plus loin.

      Drosten : Alors nous serions certainement tous un peu plus impliqués. [...] Nous serions alors plus loin dans le processus de connaissance et d’évitement. Je pense que l’accent est mis ici sur l’évitement. Parce que les politiciens ne peuvent pas régler chaque petite situation de la vie quotidienne - de préférence séparément pour chaque Land- mais à un moment donné, la société doit passer à un mode de participation active.

      [...]
      Etude indienne sur les chaînes de contamination

      Martini : Si nous regardons de plus près une autre histoire qui nous intéresse encore et encore. En ce moment, il y a les vacances d’automne dans certains Länder, mais ensuite l’école reprend. Les chaînes de contamination. Nous en avons beaucoup parlé : les enfants sont-ils dangereux pour les générations plus âgées ? Oui ou non ? [...] Il y a maintenant des études qui examinent de plus près les modes de transmission. Une étude qui a évalué très précisément un ensemble de données en Inde. Qu’est-ce qui en est ressorti exactement ?

      Drosten : Oui, c’est aussi une étude [publiée] dans « Science ». C’est une étude intéressante car elle a été réalisée en Inde. Dans un pays où il n’est pas si facile de parvenir à un lockdown. [...] Il est donc probable que durant la période d’évaluation, qui était la première vague là-bas, nous aurons un aperçu de la propagation naturelle de ce virus […] L’étude a été menée dans l’Andhra Pradesh et le Tamil Nadu, deux États de l’Inde qui ont des systèmes de santé relativement bons, où la recherche des contacts a été effectuée avec beaucoup de personnel. Ici, bien sûr, à nouveau en fonction des symptômes. Autrement dit, si un cas survient dans un ménage, il s’agit du premier cas symptomatique. Ce qui s’est passé auparavant ne peut être dit. Mais lorsqu’un cas symptomatique survient, on a généralement tenté de tester tous les membres du ménage en laboratoire dans les 5 à 14 jours suivant le contact avec le cas index. De nombreux cas ont été examinés, du moins dans les statistiques. Il y a eu 263.000 cas index au Tamil Nadu et 172.000 dans l’Andhra Pradesh avec des infections principalement identifiées au Sras-2. Et ils avaient un total de plus de trois millions de contacts, dont chacun était inscrit sur des listes. Vous devez imaginer cela. Il s’agit d’un système de notification massif dans ces pays avec un grand nombre d’employés.

      L’étude s’est maintenant concentrée sur 575.000 contacts sur un total de près de 85.000 cas index, avec une documentation épidémiologique complète et des résultats de laboratoire. Un véritable chef-d’œuvre de l’épidémiologie de terrain [...] C’est juste intéressant ce qui en ressort. Par exemple, on peut souligner que le nombre de contacts par cas index (la première personne infectée) est de 7,3 en moyenne. C’est vraiment beaucoup, vous pouvez voir comment la société et les ménages y sont structurés différemment. Il s’agit d’une taille de ménage complètement différente de la nôtre. 0,2 % de tous les cas index avaient plus de 80 contacts. Ce sont de très grands cercles de contact qui ont été suivis ici. Il est également intéressant de souligner que dans le même temps, un peu plus de 70% de tous les cas index n’avaient aucun cas de contact positif dans la région. En d’autres termes, avec ces grands réseaux de contacts, chez 70% d’entre eux on n’a trouvé aucune infection dans les contacts. Cela souligne encore plus à quel point nous avons un effet de sur-dispersion avec cette maladie. À quel point, en Inde, cette maladie se propage en clusters, dans des événements de grande diffusion. Cela continuera d’être le cas en Allemagne. Cette maladie se propage par grappes, ce qui peut également être vu en Inde.

      Martini : Cela signifie que ce que nous pouvons apprendre ou voir pour nous de cette étude indienne est l’histoire du cluster. Faut-il vraiment accorder plus d’attention aux clusters ?

      Drosten : C’est certainement un message très important. Avec cette observation d’un processus d’infection peut-être plus naturel, incontrôlé, nous obtenons cette impression écrasante de la propagation par grappes. Et il y a aussi un contrôle interne intéressant dans les données. Dans cette situation, nous voyons un taux d’attaque secondaire de 11 %, c’est-à-dire combien sont infectés à partir d’un cas index confirmé. C’est la valeur que nous observons également dans nos contacts à haut risque, 15 minutes de contact en face à face. Et nous voyons 5 % pour des contacts à faible risque. Tout cela est très similaire aux nôtres. C’est pourquoi nous devons continuer à espérer que nous verrons également un comportement de propagation par clusters. C’est certainement l’un des messages les plus importants de cette étude. Et l’autre message très important est, tout simplement, que nous pouvons dire que la prévalence de cette maladie se situe principalement dans la même tranche d’âge. Donc, si vous regardez qui a infecté qui ici, [...] les groupes d’âge s’infectent les uns avec les autres parce qu’ils ont beaucoup de contacts sociaux les uns avec les autres.

      #épidémiologie_de_terrain

  • #Dijon : #procès et rassemblement de soutien à l’Engrenage
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/10/15/dijon-proces-et-rassemblement-de-soutien-a-lengrenage

    Mercredi 7 octobre, les jardins de l’Engrenage passaient en procès. Une centaine de personne étaient réunies devant la cité judiciaire. Le rendu aura lieu le 4 novembre. La ville de Dijon demande l’expulsion des occupant·es et jardinièr·es, pour pouvoir y contruire un énième « éco-quartier ». Interrogé par les journalistes de France Bleu Bourgogne, l’avocat […]

    #63_avenue_de_Langres #Jardin_l'Engrenage #potager

  • Open-source #satellite data to investigate #Xinjiang concentration camps

    The second part of this series discusses techniques on how to analyse a dire human rights situation in and around Xinjiang’s re-education and detention facilities.

    A pressing need to investigate characteristics of Xinjiang’s detention camps

    The story has been widely covered. Calls by human rights advocates to define China’s practices as ‘genocide’ grow louder. Hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims detained in internment camps. Many still are.

    “Inmates undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them into secular and loyal supporters of the party”, the New York Times wrote and published documents that unmistakably prove a dire human rights situation in the west of China.

    First China denied the camps ever existed. Then the Chinese consulate doesn’t bother anymore to play a smoke and mirror game and admits: “Xinjiang has set up vocational education and training centres in order to root out extreme thoughts…”. Their purpose: ‘compulsory programs for terrorist criminals’.

    Now, the language changed again. China’s President said the ‘strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct.’

    Unacceptable (and unwise) of some to deny it. Social media commentators, some who are frequently quoted by large media organisations, keep casting doubt on the tragic story. Margaret_Kimberley tweeted — after an ITV news report emerged — “These are lies. There is no evidence of Uighur concentration camps. More hybrid war against China” (it received 2,000 likes).

    While there is no room left to doubt that these camps do exist, there remains vast uncertainty whether investigative journalists and human rights advocates located all facilities spread out across the province.

    Researchers/journalists who made it their beat to find them, like Nathan Ruser at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), says “we don’t believe that we have found them all”, after posting 380 facilities online.

    Germany’s chancellor last week said China’s President Xi offered delegates to send envoys to visit Xinjiang province [and camps] to see for themselves. Chances increase to see more of the so-called ‘show camps’ for a short period of time or as long as the visits take (the BBC encountered it when it visited last time). Xi also ensured that there will be an ‘ongoing human-rights dialogue’. But Ursula von der Leyen tweeted “a lot remains to be done .. in other chapters of our relations”.

    Satelite investigations exposing more and more evidence. OSINT journalists rely on them. It’s one reason why some open-source intelligence journalism colleagues keep hearing rumours that some of the camps may have moved underground (e.g. detention in under-surface facilities) to hide from the spying eyes and scrutiny of satellite data analysts (we don’t have proof for this thesis but I encourage you to reach out if you have evidence).
    Mounting number of facilities

    The number of confirmed facilities steadily grew. A 2018 BBC investigation looked at 101 campsites, which got pinpointed via various media reports and academic research, the author says.

    Most recently, Buzzfeed investigated 268 compounds, many from previous lists I worked on too. In February, the list of ‘confirmed re-education camps’, so lower-security sites, mainly for indoctrination purposes, was limited to mere 50 facilities. ‘Confirmed’ in this context means they have been validated by eye-witness reports. Back then, there were another 170 that had yet to be confirmed.

    It is of vital importance to keep this investigation rolling. This means to forensically document the changes in these camps and to spend more time on characterizing each detail. ASPI just dropped a new list and we are going to work with that one instead of the original 50 we received (the list can be downloaded here and geodata that can be simply dragged and dropped into QGIS and Google Earth Pro, it is available here).

    Finally, news broke via Reuters (and research by Adrian Zenz) that evidence of forced labour is mounting also in Tibet (we will look into this later, too).
    List of ‘expanded camps’ extended

    Earlier in the year US-based Uighure group ETNAM shared a list with around 50 confirmed sites. We and others scrutinised this list on increased activity on the ground via aggregated satellite remote sensing data (link). The list was shared as klm. file. It helped enormously with going through them one by one. All the coordinates as well as the Chinese names of the places are accessible via Google Earth Pro. Now that ASPI dropped a new list with coordinates and updated 2020 records, some of the work we have started can be extended and match.

    Because we are most interested in the camps that got expanded (so buildings or features were added), we will concentrate on the list of facilities that were developed. It includes a list of 61 sites.

    Why is the onus on expanded camps? In addition to the characteristics ASPI added as classifiers, the extended camps might tell us where the local administration invests and where forced labour in the firm of Uighur prisoners went. We added a few more details for each facility that we thought was worth looking at (see sheet above).
    We will go through various ways to characterise/investigate facilities and their surroundings

    First significant markers includes the size of the camps. That includes quantitative details such as the number of buildings on the premise and adjacent to it. We will go through how to compare them. There are the walls of camps that are usually quite straight-lined. Their height, which we will define and validate, and the walls’ thickness may tell us something about recent developments (e.g. how secure the sites are, or were meant to be).

    Guard towners are also a quantifiable element. ASPI and others counted them. Because they can be seen from outside they may act as a signal to local residents. That is also likely the reason why those facilities that have some or all of their towers removed recently tend to locate closer to residential buildings (see my stats below).

    These changes are further revealing as they may tell us something about how the local government in various parts of the region varied in their response to international pressure (or not, by keeping them in place). ‘A lot [camps] had their security features removed in the second half of 2019’, Zenz explained. Some remained in place (important to add here, it remains doubtful that conditions improved inside of the camps, even if towers or security features were removed).

    Zenz has an explanation for some of the changes: “On the same time they invited all these delegations and visitors, they released a lot of people. If you release a lot of people, you can afford to run with fewer security features. That can still be run like an internment camp, I’m sure”. We will look closer at what has changed ourselves.

    Including those features above, there are a number of other aspects to take into account. We put them into the list below — each will be discussed separately:

    What blue factory buildings in and around camps can tell us
    What typical ‘prison features’ tell us
    What cars in parking lots tell us about personnel working at the facilities during Covid-19
    What walls can tell us
    What guard towers can tell us
    What sports facilities can tell us
    What the shapes/types of buildings and location can tell us
    What agricultural space (e.g. fields) around the camps can tell us
    What potential crematory sites reveal
    What Xinjiang’s export tell us
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment and surveillance
    What Baidu maps can tell us

    Blue-roofed factory buildings

    In satellite images, they are very pronounced with their blue coating. They may also heat up in the summer.

    Most of them are factory buildings, has been reported. You can see them added in and around camp facilities, whether they are low or high security premises.

    We can quantify them by counting them or via quantifying the space they take up. ASPIT decided to count them, though some buildings are smaller and other are massive. Google Earth has a polygon area measuring tool. A third option is to write a statistical model to calculate square meters factory floor space. If you are lazy you can consult a service that helps you with that via a visual detection algorithm — it calculates the area and records the number of blue roof buildings for a given satellite image.

    One of the camps that expanded in the past two years is the tier 1 low-security re-education facility in Bugur in Bayingolu (41.808855284.3005783). It has a dense network of factory buildings nearby (around 23) and within its own walls there are eight. We used ASPI’s data to confirm this that noted: ‘considerable room for expansion’.

    Let’s run the classification system over it and classify how much blue-roofed buildings that scatter around the camp can we count (importantly not all are factory spaces but many will be).

    On the AI model: I downloaded the images with their highest resolution from Google Earth. To make the image a bit clearer for the model, I adjusted the brightness, upped the contrast and tinkered with the exposure. We can see the blue buildings, roughly in a radius of 1.5 to 2 miles (see image), account for about 1,464.9 m² (0.15ha). The number of little blue buildings expanded considerably since 2014 where they accounted for 1,022m2 (0.10 ha) — sadly we only have an image for 2014 and one for 2019.

    Short intersection on the availability of images available in Google Earth:

    Some of the important images to document the progression of these camps are missing. Some camps have a mere handful of publically available images (as in the case above). This is appalling and private satellite image companies need to be nudged to make more images public. Especially for the latest developments, this is urgently needed. Researchers noted down the latest dates for which images are available at the time of writing. Below we see them grouped by months, and then by facility category (tier 1 to 4).

    What about bias to provide fewer updates on higher-security facilities? We don’t have much to go in here (there is no direct evidence that western satellite companies are being pressured into not publishing their images for camps on Google). Despite only a few camps that didn’t get updated at all over the past two years, we can see at the time of writing that Google and others hold more images for lower tier facilities (1 and 2) than for higher-security facilities (tier 3 and 4):

    Continuing on the factories, another example is the facility in Maralbeshi County (39°49’7.84"N, 78°31’4.37"E). It was erected around 2017/2018. In Google Earth, you can see how the blue-roofed buildings surround the internment complex. Note, how the larger blue factory complexes to the left and right were there before the camp was erected.

    In other words, the camp was planned and embedded into existing factory operation. It further corroborates a thesis that factory work by prisoners (in the form of forced labour), was part of a grander plan all along (though, to be certain, looking at satellite images alone does not suffice).

    Adrain Zenz thinks blue roof factories is something that warrants looking into in more detail. A bunch of these blue roof factory building were erected in 2018, especially in the second half. Zenz explains it’s important timing because the policy documents on forced labour, as explained in his post from last December, shows that a lot of this kind of policy was released in the first half or mid of 2018.

    A recent Buzzfeed investigation did mention blue roofs but surprisingly didn’t pay more attention to the matter. The factories grow in importance as the forced labour of imprisoned groups is being increasingly ‘commercialised’.

    ASPI’s data recorded the distance (measured in km I assume) between the 380 facilitates and the local/nearest industrial parks — where some of the forced labour could have moved to put to work. The data categorizes facilities in four areas of security (ranging from Tier 1= re-education camp to Tier 4= prison facility). Tear two and tier three camps tend to be located more closely to the industrial centre of the towns, the data suggests (see chart below):

    Zenz adds: “what’s significant is the sudden increase of blue roof, single story, flat type factory buildings. It’s consistent with policy, and also release, the Karakax list also talks about people being released into forced labour. A lot of that took place in 2019.”

    The blue metal barracks found in Dabancheng shining light yellow in the sentinel IR images as they are being reflected. Low res Sentinel 2 data also suggests that these metal-like structures in the south of the Payzawat camp (Payzawat County, 39.538372, 76.713606) may also heat up in the summer. SWIR (short-wave infrared imagery) and NIR can be used for heat monitoring.

    Prisons features: camps that imprisoned people become more ‘secure’ not less:

    Among the around 60 camps that have expanded recently, half of it are tier 3 or tier 4 facilities —detention centers and prisons with high security features.

    While it is true that some camps removed some of the towers and other security features (labelled ‘desecuritisation’ by ASPI’s records), others increased theirs. Those happened to be facilities that are detention centres and prison. In the context that Chinese authorities moved prisoners to these more secure facilities with less transparency and harsher treatments, this is cause for concern.

    Let’s look at an example. From the list of expanded camps, there is the camps Yarkant Facility in the Kashgar prefecture (38.351531177.3055467). Since 2018, we saw a nearly 10,000 m2 large factory compound built (compare images from 5/8/2018 with 1/21/2018). Then, a year later, watch downers got added. There are now 8 towners. For such a small facility that’s quite conspicuous. The reason it’s a high-security prison facility.

    Newly built detention/prison facilities created between 2018 and 2020 are of special interest. Camps like the tier 3 (detention) camp of Sanji Facility (#3, 44.102764,86.9960751), a with several watchtowers and an external wall is important as we can follow the progression of each step of the building process with high-resolution images.

    The location was probably chosen because of a lower-security area nearby, north of the facility (3/7/2018). Building must have started in the summer. A couple of months after the last shot (8/11/2018) the blue-roofed factory gets built-in the north-west of the camp (a reason to assume a direct relationship there) and within two weeks in August the main building takes shape. At the same time, the walls get erected and we can make out the layout of the facility with its heavy concrete structures.

    We can see, those are fundamentally different from building built in other lower-security camps. Then two months later it’s almost completed.

    The speed of building is noteworthy (better trackable if we had access to a more continuous stream of images). From the few images we have above and those from Sentinel 2, below, we can assume that it took the developers between three to four months in pure building time to pull it up — an astonishing pace. China is renowned for its fast building pace. For many other areas, such as coal plants and artificial island-building its cookie-cutter approach — where blueprints are being re-used over and over again - it permits building more quickly.

    Other who looked at the situation in Xinjiang reported that many Uighurs held in lower-tier facilities could have been moved/transferred to higher-tier prisons. In other words, despite some re-education camps have experienced ‘de-securitisation’, half of the camps that expanded are higher security facilities, so tier 3 (detention) or tier 4 (prison) camp facilities.

    What parking lots tell us about the camps during Covid-19

    I believe this topic has largely remained unexplored. Busy parking lots are one way to tell how many staff members are on site. Especially interesting it this for the recent month that were affected by coronavirus. We dont know much about the conditions inside of the facilities.

    But with fewer staff members around (and fewer visitors allowed — previous reporting has revealed that detention centres have ‘small visitor centres’), the lives of inmates may have worsened. There was some reporting that Covid-19 cases spiralled in the province of Xinjiang and some expressed concern that cases could spread within camps. It’s possible, no doubt. With only a few cases in the whole region, though, the risk is lower.

    Pandemic related fears may have affected the material and food supply. Sick imprisoned detainees may go without healthcare treatment for weeks or months. All these are assumptions for which we have little evidence. But the possibility alone raises concerns. If it is true that prisoners remained in the facilities during Covid, they could have suffered from the absence of staff and proper care.

    From satellite images, it is hard to know — though there is some evidence from an eyewitness account shared by a historian, a Georgetown professor on his Medium page.

    We might be able to tell how many temporary people were on sites (those that use their car to leave for the night). Counting vehicles at nearby car parks is one way.

    At some facilities, we can clearly see the parking lot. An example is Ghulja City (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). It’s a fairly large car park. We can use Picterra system (there is a 10 day free trial version) to check the satellite images for May 23 — thought there isn’t much to count, the car park is empty.

    Seven months earlier, on October 24th of 2019, we count around 120 cars (with some false positives, but that’s good enough for us). The algo gives you a count so you don’t have to count the red boxes one by one. Once trained, we can run it on subsequent images.

    Let’s walk you through how to train and count the cars. I simplify here (a more complete tutorial can be found here and in their platform). First, we use one of the images to train the algorithm on the cars in the car park. Then we run it on the other pictures. It’s neat and simple (and quick if you don’t have time to run your own statistical model in python).

    The number of vehicles dropped during the heights of Covid-19.

    We could do this for other confirmed location such as the facility in Chochek City (Tǎchéng Shì, 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E) where car numbers dropped in April. We see this in many other facilities (for those that expanded).

    Hotan City Facility #1 (37.1117019, 79.9711546) with 81 cars in the parking lot at the end of 2019 dropped to 10 during the height of the pandemic. Similar developments have been perceived at Hotan County Facility 1 (37.2420734 79.8595074), Ghulja Facility 1 (43.9756437 81.5009539) and a number of others.
    Calculating rooms and capacity

    How many people fit in a facility. If we take the example of the re-education camp in Chochek City ( 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E), we have high res Google images for the end of March and end of April of 2020. We can see the thin middle part is three stories high and in earlier images (Jul 18, 19) we can see the southern part is four stories high. In 2018, we got an image of the foundation when it was built. This provides enough detail to calculate that the facility has around 367 rooms — for the total t-shaped building with the arms.

    –—

    –—

    In the example above, we shouldn’t be too sure that alls detainees were kept in the facility during Covid. Some reports claim that some of the other lower security re-education centres kept people ‘only during the day for indoctrination classes’ (it’s certainly different for the high-security prison facility that is also on the premise of the Payzawat facility, see in the south, with their towers).

    Comparing camp sizes

    The total size of the camps matters, especially when they get extended. Most of the camps have clear wall frames build around them. It’s one of the most important and simple characteristics. The wall frames makes it relatively easy to draw shapes in your geolocation system of choice (the sheer size of the walls, might be less ideal to gauge the number of prisoners).

    Some have vast empty space in between might suggest that other faculty sections or factory buildings are due to be added. Some are cramped with building.

    Tracing and calculating the area of wall frames in Google Earth for some of the largest camps, we get what we already knew:

    To emulate the work ASPI’s data was posted here. A number of track and trace tutorials for Google Earth (one here on measuring property space) are available on YouTube.
    Staking out camp size:

    The Qariqash County/قاراقاش ناھىيىسى‎ /墨玉县(Mòyù Xiàn, 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E) sits in the South of the large stretch of desert.

    We use the polygon tool in Google Earth to stake out the clearly marked walls. You usually end up with a rectangle. Under measurements (right-click on the item) you can see the perimeter is around 1.65 km and the area is roughly 16.7 hectares (0.17 square km).

    Now we can compare it with another one on the list, the camp in Aqsu City (41°11’27.12"N, 80°16’25.08"E). It’s markedly smaller, with a perimeter of 1.1km and only an area of 5.65 hectares. There are other ways to do this in QGIS, a geoinformation system more efficiently.
    What can walls and towers tell us?

    How tall are walls at some of the camps? The answer varies across the vast variety of facilities. Height may tell us something about who built the camp and the level of security. It’s unsurprising to find different heights at different camps built by different planners.

    Where we don’t have shades available, we can check the two images above and reference them with the people in the image and define the height this way. Another standard way to calculate height is using the shades by the walls and towers and calculate the height via Google Earth and SunCalc.

    The shade of the southern wall in the satellite image from 03/19/2020 for the Dabancheng camp is around 7.62 meters long. The towers on the southern wall for those dates result in a height of around ~8meters.

    But the images in the Reuters shots look different. That’s why they were taken a year or two earlier. Satellite images from 4/22/2018 show clearly the octagonal shapes of the tower shades. If we calculate again, the shade of the tower is around 9 meters long, translating into around 14 meters in height.

    We do this for the wall as well. What we find is that, although the towers disappeared (though, some are still there, just not protruding so visibly), the only thing that really changed is the height of the walls — now around 13.5m tall, compared with 9.5m in 2018. The same towners, removed from one Dabancheng camp, then re-emerged half a kilometre south-east at the other newly built one (2019).

    Why are we even bothering measuring height? On one hand we want to answer how security changed across the camps. Are walls getting higher? Do they change in their layout. It helps to classify the type of camps. The higher the walls, the more secure they probably were meant to be. Higher wall might mean higher chance that prisoners are held at facilities over night. It also may help to disprove claims by XJ denialists.

    We can verify the Suncalc analysis with images. Cherchen County, for which we reviewed images for 12/14/19 shows roughly the same height. Explainer how to measure the height of an object from satellite image available here and here.

    The number of press images of the camps is limited. Most are by Reuters or AFP/Badung Police. It is this one here (37°14’29.78"N, 79°51’35.00"E). More local street footage, though not of camps, might be obtainable via Mapillary.

    Buildings shapes/outlines and location of camps

    Let’s start with the location of the facilities first. ASPI recorded the type of security for its 380 odd facilities, and for many the distance to populated areas such as residential buildings. When local administration planned on where to place the facilities they might have taken into account how the neighbouring public should (or shouldn’t) perceived them. More secluded camps are more hidden from public scrutiny. Those near people’s homes or schools may be placed there to have the opposite effect.

    What’s immediately apparent when running a few inferential statistics on the records is that the more secure detention centres tend to be kept further away from buzzing residential areas — meaning, further away than for instance Tier 1 re-education camps, which are often nestled between residential parts of cities, or occupying old schools.

    Agriculture/fields around the camps — investigating forced labour by detainees

    Identifying agricultural fields near or around facilities may reveal some potential aspects of how forced labour in the camps were used in close vicinity.

    Especially for secluded faculties, with not much else urban life going on (so reducing the possibility that other local farmers were involved in working the them), the chance increases that Uighurs detained were used.

    One example is the facility near Yingye’ercun, in Gulja, with a 0.16km2 large campground (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). The farming area that was developed since 2018 (shortly after the multistorey buildings was built in the core of the facility) spans 1.7km2 and is clearly marked (which includes the facility itself, see in red below).

    In other words, once the camp was built the fields surrounding it got worked and developed— unlikely to be only a convenient coincident. The nearby factory complex was also extended.

    Often it warrant also checking with Sentinel 2 images on EO browser. In this case, it’s useful because it allows us to visualise agricultural development via its invisible light remote sensing capabilities. Additional bands (which Google images lack) give access to the invisible spectrum and shows the agricultural expansion (here shown in red via the false colour composite, commonly used to assess plant density and health, “since plants reflect near-infrared and green light, while they absorb red”. Exposed ground are grey or tan, vegetation is red).
    Image for post

    Another camp in this regard is the Maralbeshi Facility (#6) in Kashgar (39.7406222 78.0115086) with lots of fields surrounding it.

    Why is the forced labour aspect in Xinjiang’s agriculture so important in this debate? For one, it’s part of the human rights abuse that more and more governments and industry leaders recognise (such as Swedish company H&M, who profited from cotton supplies and other kinds within their supply chain). Some decided to cut ties with suppliers in the region. It may the answer for the short term. In the long run, western businesses much apply pressure to get suppliers on their own to dissuade local forced labour practices (see example on ads that emerged to sell Uighur forced labour online).

    According to the ILO Forced Labour Convention from 1930, forced or compulsory labour is defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily’.
    Sports grounds: (basketball and other sports courts)

    Some found value in observing their development. BBC’s John Sudworth found that just before a press tour organised for his press teams two years ago the appearance of recreational areas altered. In some of the places they were taken to, satellite images and the internal security fencing — and what looked like watchtowers- where taken down shortly before the tours for journalists began. Specifically on sports grounds, they noticed that empty exercise yards have been transformed into sports facilities.

    The reporters asked: if the journalists have been presented with mere ‘show camps’, what may this say about the places they were not taken to. Sport facilities are quite easy to spot from satellite. The BBC travelled to Kaxgar in the very east of the region, about 100km south of Kazakhstan’s border. Their footages shows how the camp put up courts shortly before the press trip. But they didn’t last long. We found evidence that these very courts disappeared again in early 2020 (see below).

    In one of the camps in Qariqash (37°15’32.54"N, 79°44’52.08"E) the sports facilities were made unavailable as recently as July. Now big brown sheets, what looks like blankets with knobs on them, cover them. Those have never appeared on satellite images before and extend to the soccer field in the north and the big parking lot next to the sports courts.

    I have mixed feelings about recreational activities. We must strongly doubt that they benefit people held for indoctrination. So are they only a smoke and mirror game to show the friendliness of re-educational camps? Or are they actually benefiting the imprisoned? It is hard to say. In recent time, they are more likely to be added than removed. In around 37 facilities on the ASPI list basketball courts, running tracks or other sports fields were noted to have been added or extended.

    When we compare the average distance of residential building for these places (1.2km) with the average distance of all the places where we have a record on the distance to buildings (1.8km), we find the recreational activities might be used as an element to signal the locals that the facilities have those recreational features.

    Dabancheng has one court in the western block and a number of other ones in the centre part. In the eastern wing, there is nothing. We haven’t got any further high res satellite images on Dabancheng (other than those until March 2020, that leaves only checking Sentinel 2 images or commercial images).

    I am going to stop here. The analysis of recreational areas yielded rather little, for me and the folks at ASPI. “I don’t think the sports grounds mean much in the detention regime”, Nathan Ruser says. If you have more info do reach out or leave a comment.
    Crematories

    The New York Times followed the lead of findings (that emerged last year, also mentioned in the state.gov report) and check the extent of description of religious sites and burial grounds. In September, the team reported that ‘thousands of religious sites’, such as mosques, shrines and other sites were bulldozed or replaced.

    As many burial grounds disappeared and people within camps families have never heard from again, the question of how Uighurs’ life proceeded became more pressing. Crematories may be one aspect. Some anecdotal evidence by a source spoke of a nascent growth of crematory sites in the areas near camps. This appears important in the context of how prisoners are treated in facilities and what happens if they die and at what rates.

    High prevalence of tuberculosis in facilities worries insiders. TB is spread via droplets through the air by someone who is infected. It’s especially deadly when the immune system of those who caught it, can’t cope with it. With the conditions reported by some of the eyewitnesses, it is feasible that the hard conditions prisoners are being subjected to, could enhance the deadliness of TB.

    The think tank which produced a previous list of facilities searched and found a handful of crematories (I don’t think they concluded the research and it continues, perhaps with your help of OSINT research).

    The reason why crematories are of interest is that Uighur are Muslim, Muslims don’t burn the bodies of their dead. They bury them (creation is strictly forbidden). Seeing more crematories pop up might be a first clue on whether dead bodies from detention facilities are being burned. We have to stress here, we have to be extremely careful with drawing quick conclusions, the base of evidence is thin. One would need to check local statistics and cross-examine them with other data source.

    We will concentrate only on the sites itself. The ‘unconfirmed sample of crematory’ consists of ten sites. These are listed below. Just a word of warning. Feel free to investigate them further — either via additional satellite footage or on-site visits. Nonetheless, these get us started. The first three are confirmed by eyewitness accounts or local records (as far as I was told, this is sadly only secondary research).

    Cr_Gholja_01 (Existed, 44° 0’17.86"N, 81°13’40.43"E); Cr_Artush_01(Existed, 39°44’35.47"N, 76°12’7.49"E); Urumchi 2 Funeral Parlor (Existed, 43°54’55.20"N; 87°36’9.01"E)

    Cri_Hotan01_(Suspected)
    Cr_Artush_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Hotan_02(Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01(Suspected)
    CrArtush_02 (Suspected)

    Now let’s take a look at the characteristics of the confirmed crematories. They have some distinctive shapes, including a rectangular architecture, walls or a treeline that fence the premises (framed in black). Where marked ‘burial grounds’, I was unable to confirm this but checked with a few other sites mentioned in the coverage that was exposed in 2019 and it looked similar (in short, more time needs to be spent on this).

    What helped the researchers identify the confirmed ones? According to the source, the Chinese called them ‘burial management facilities’. It’s apparently a euphuism for ‘crematories’. The Chinese government bulldozed some burial grounds with the justification that they would take up too much space which was covered in the 2019 reporting.

    The other aspect is whether relatives receive the body of loved ones that die in the camps. Salih Hudayar (now Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile) says he had a relative who died in a facility (he don’t know whether in the camps or the prison) and his family was not able to have his body returned. He thinks that many other Uighurs have not had the body of a deceased family members returned to them. He assumes they are being cremated as no record exists of a burial site.

    More crematories are only possible if you have employees who staff and run them. The Chinese government tried to find those employees online. “We assume they are being cremated because the government ran job ads and offering high salaries to work on these [crematory] sites”, he added.

    The suspected crematory facilities were then modelled upon the layout of the existing/confirmed ones — e.g. compared with buildings in and around the area. “We found a couple, but we are not 100% sure”, the source admits. Here OSINT journalists could become useful (let me know if you have intel on this matter to follow up with).

    On the description in 2019: evidence surfaced that 45 Uighur cemeteries have been destroyed since 2014, including 30 in just the past two years (research was carried out by AFP and satellite imagery by Earthrise Alliance, here reported by the SCMP).
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment

    Salih Hudayar explained that what worries him is that population statistics don’t square. An often-cited figure of 7 million Uighurs in the province is much lower than the official estimates of the Uighur people.

    The number often used is 12 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs. The number could be higher. Especially in the villages — Uighurs are allowed to have only three kids — some families have more than that and don’t register their offspring, as a result, many kids lack birth certificates. Other figures on the number of Uighur population is much taller (larger than twice of the 12 million figure, but remains hard to confirm that. The closes figure the Chinese government will have internally after the government’s extensive and invasive security and surveillance campaigns, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices).

    The rising number of orphanages and kindergartens is also of interest. A satellite and local administrative data analysis should track them. The premise here: the more aggressive the detention of families are in XJ (moving Uighurs from low to higher security facilities), demand for places that house children increases. More orphanages and child-caring facilities could be revealed.
    What can exports tell us about forced labour?

    The type of exports of a region can help to figures out what to look for when it comes to forced labour. Increasingly, the international textile and fashion industry wakes up to reputational damage if supply chains incorporate Xinjiang forced labour. EU leaders held a meeting with China’s president Xi last week where Xi ‘rejected’ foreign [political] meddling in his nation’s affairs. But businesses have more leverage. Xinjiang is busy trading with foreign powers. The Chinese province accounted for a large part of the world’s supply in cotton. Exports amounted to $19.3bn according to export documents (export data for the west of China can be found in China’s official data stats, Stats.gov.cn, customs.gov.cn, or mofcom — this might be useful. Comparing what the government reports and what’s happening on the ground might reveal discrepancies, as it did before).

    Exports (to Europe, across the silk road to the west) is directly connected at A busy train station connecting to the neighbouring country of Kazakstan in the northeast (the export route is called Ala Pass. A short promotional video here). Given the rebound of the Chinese economy, the shipments/trainloads must have increased in May after the effects of the pandemic subsided. What’s unclear is to what extent and whether that matches what the government said.

    Satellite images might reveal discrepancies when train containers at the Dzungarian Gate (the Dzungarian Alatau mountain range along the border between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) are analysed. It’s the main connection between China and the west.

    The main railway station in Xinjiang for the Alataw pass is the Alashankou railway station (situated here: 45°10′13″N 82°34′13″E). It’s the last resort for export containers before entering Kazakhstan.

    OSINT journalists may be able to gauge Xinjiang export traffic by counting the number of containers on rail tracks. It might be laborious effort, not sure if it yields anything.

    More useful would it be to monitor the use of agriculture and factories in the nearby vicinity of camps, as shown before. Or perhaps they can be linked up.
    Baidu maps: Checking what the Chinese tech companies are ‘hiding’:

    The Chinese government may have little interest to showcase their human-rights violations which they deem as justified (Xi’s statement). Satellite images on Baidu Maps show maps that hide most of the facility. What to make of it? Google Earth lets you upload so-called ‘overlays’. If you stretch them to the right size you can compare the uploaded screenshot (we took from Baidu) with those present in Google Earth. For Tumshuq City/تۇمشۇق شەھىرى/图木舒克市(Túmùshūkè Shì) (39°54’40.02"N, 79° 1’26.09"E), see below.

    Why is Baidu’s involvement increasing relevant? On one hand, it is important to see the connection between private sector companies and the government. Chinese satellites are able to update and provide high-resolution images to the maps on Baidu. But they don’t. We had a similar debate on Twitter, that some government used to press companies to blur our images. But because images are available on other platforms ‘unblurred’, the practice was largely discontinued (there are still examples but they are getting fewer). One reason is that if a blurred area appears, it signals others to be extra vigilant and look out for other images. Instead, what increasing happens is that companies with private satellite are ordered not to release them (read more about the debate here).

    Baidu map’s decision to not show images on certain facilities have backfired. It can be reverse-engineered. Areas where images are unavailable became extra interesting. In this way Buzzfeed used Baidu Maps to their advantage. They located/confirmed some of the camps because of it. This way, they turned shortcoming into an opportunity. You may want to be quick in replicating this principle for other parts of the country where forced labour/detention camps are expected (e.g. Tibet). Such loopholes will usually be fixed swiftly.

    Bit more on the tech. According to a 2019 report by Human Rights Watch, Baidu’s map function used in the IJOP app, a controversial system used by the police and the state that generates “a massive dataset of personal information, and of police behaviour and movements in Xinjiang (it is not known how the authorities plan to use such data): The IJOP app logs the police officer’s GPS locations and other identifying information when they submit information to the IJOP app. The IJOP app uses a map functionality by Baidu, a major Chinese technology company, for purposes including planning the shortest route for police vehicle and officers on foot, according to the app’s source code.
    https://miro.medium.com/max/653/1*umOMbKghZDqPPiy0TpGZ7w.png

    What can the camps in Tibet tell us about the camps in Xinjiang?

    Reuters reported just last week that forced labour expanded to Tibet (south of XJ). Reuter’s own reporting corroborated the findings obtained by Adrian Zenz. It would take another post to go into how to investigate the state of transferred Tibetan labourers. The quick and dirty check on the situation shows the merit of using satellite images to investigate grows as foreign journalists are being barred from areas, such as entering the Tibet region (foreign citizens are only permitted on government-approved tours). OSINT lessons from investigating XJ should be applied to Tibet too.

    How does Xinjiang link to Tibet? The former Tibet Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was chosen for the same job in Xinjiang in 2016 and headed the development of Xinjiang’s camp system, Reuters reported.

    Mass incarceration started before Quanguo came onto the scene: A fanghuiju work team was dispatched to a village in Guma wherein 38 individuals were allegedly detained in a government campaign, in early 2016 — it’s true however that Party Secretary Quanguo, appointed in August 2016, who waged a ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ against violent activities and terrorism increased repression.

    In an article last year, The Print used satellite images to prove that at least three Tibetan “re-education camps” are currently under construction. The author of the survey was Vinayak Bha, an ex-colonel retired from the Indian military intelligence unit.

    Col Vinayak Bhat (@rajfortyseven on Twitter) found three camps in 2018/2019 and share them. One of them is the one in Botuocun (see below). Bha writes about Chinese military deployment dynamics. The temple of Tibetan Buddhism is a ‘concentration camp’ that is surrounded by high walls and guard towers and has the same structural design as a prison. It is feasible that China’s mass detention to spread to Tibetans. Methods will likely base on the model executed in XJ.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*ln7TsCnetV75EKNcv4LBJg.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*DtJKKnYJUH1K7p1_Pyyicw.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*4dU7K9DK9agNbitNmLBT4g.png

    The reports of the three camps emerged in 2019. “Small-scale versions of similar military-style training initiatives have existed in the region for over a decade, but construction of new facilities increased sharply in 2016, and recent policy documents call for more investment in such sites”, one report stated. Looking at the three sites, some of them are quite old but the one below is less than three years old.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*xFr73HSkbxVqDGNgicuVCQ.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*Ylxp6Hk1Nj8AAkvvxXI21Q.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/278/1*a4UgMAeLCBp9LvRfOuf6Tw.png
    The allegation is that these facilities are now be used as detention centres for political indoctrination. “The detainees are allegedly used as forced labour in government factories and projects during the day time or as per shift timings”. It is something that rings true under the light of camps in Xinjiang but we lack evidence from the satellite images.

    There is some evidence that additional factory buildings were added. For the facility above, buildings in the upper east wing, with red roofing was added recently. Their layout reminds us of the blue-roofed buildings in and scattered around Xinjiang facilities, which we also have present: “This architecture is bang on a XJ prison, [though] with a different style roof”, Ruser said.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/512/1*GL1DwZmaqVdgUtaWsZHWdA.png

    https://miro.medium.com/max/303/1*Jr03h6ADK4_iNNfYP5YLkA.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/328/1*RyzDtEa9SjE0WsBSwUaMfA.png

    The prison layout from the older prison facility above — with its long and vertically arranged wings and the rippled features — is similar to prisons seen in Xinjian, such as the two portrayed below (one at Qariqash County at 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E and the other facility in 39°25’54.60”N, 76° 3’20.59"E).
    https://miro.medium.com/max/389/1*w01GGfJZZlcNCWm5MR4csQ.png

    Closing remarks:

    There is a mountain of stuff not included here. This is a training post and not an investigation with full-rested conclusion. This post should encourage other open-source investigative journalists to look into the facilities, follow their own reporting and help monitor developments/details that others may have missed.

    At present there are only a handful of OSINT journalists looking into it. Even fewer have the time to continuously keep this rolling, e.g. analysing the camps as other stories press them to move on.

    We need more eyes on this. The alleged human right abuse must receive all the international scrutiny it can get. People like Shawn Zhang and others with Nathan Ruser and APSI) started the journey. Other journalists must continue and expand on it.

    Also, the more open we are about sources and the analysis (hopefully) the fewer people might try to cast doubt on the existence of the camps (good thread here)

    OSINT techniques used must master the skill to help others to replicate the findings, step by step. That’s the reason this post resulted more in a hands-on tutorial than an explanatory post. I encourage anyone to start looking into the human rights abuse (though, I must stress, be careful to draw quick conclusions. Instead, share what you see on satellite images with the community of serious journalists and OSINT investigators).

    One last thought on commercial satellite imagery companies. It is crucial to get their support on this. For more than 100 camps mentioned in the latest update of the ASPI list (nearly 80 of them high-security detention facilities — classified as tier 3 or 4), we have no updated record of satellite images. This leaves researchers and journalists only to low-resolution devices, by Sentinel 2 images, or beg for images from Maxar or Planet Labs. That’s not good enough. Transparency requires companies inc to make those high-resolution images available, to anyone. Intelligence services should also consider making their high-resolution images available to the public for scrutiny, though, that unlikely to happen.

    https://medium.com/@techjournalism/open-source-satellite-data-to-investigate-xinjiang-concentration-camps-2713c
    #camps_de_concentration #architecture_forensique #images_satellitaires #rééducation #ré-éducation #camps_de_rééducation #Chine #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #Tibet

    ping @reka @isskein @visionscarto

  • #Dijon : le #procès des jardins de l’Engrenage reporté
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/09/21/dijon-le-proces-des-jardins-de-lengrenage-reporte

    Nous venons d’apprendre que l’audience au tribunal qui décidera du sort de L’Engrenage n’aura pas lieu mercredi 23 septembre comme il était prévu. Le rassemblement de ce mercredi matin est donc annulé. Le procès est reporté – comme ça arrive très souvent avec les instances de justice – et une nouvelle date sera annoncée d’ici […]

    #63_avenue_de_Langres #Jardin_l'Engrenage #potager

  • #Angers : retour sur la #manifestation de soutien à la Grande Ourse et son #procès
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/09/03/angers-retour-sur-la-manifestation-de-soutien-a-la-grande-ourse-et-son-pro

    Mardi 1er septembre, la Grande Ourse et ses habitant·es étaient convoqué·es au tribunal judiciaire par le propriétaire qui réclame leur expulsion immédiate. Le collectif ayant appelé à un #rassemblement à 13h devant le bâtiment et à une marche de soutien, l’après midi fut chargée et animée. Retour rapide sur la mobilisation et l’audience elle-même. Une […]

    #6_quai_Robert_Fèvre #sans-papiers

  • #Angers : #procès de la Grande Ourse, #rassemblement de soutien le 1er septembre
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/08/30/angers-proces-de-la-grande-ourse

    Appel à mobilisation contre les expulsions et pour le droit au logement. Rendez-vous à 13h devant la Grande Ourse pour une déambulation, puis à 16h devant le tribunal d’instance au bvd Pierre de Coubertin pour un rassemblement-goûter. Alors que la crise de l’accès au logement se dégrade encore sur Angers, qui frappe encore plus fort […]

    #6_quai_Robert_Fèvre #expulsion #manifestation #sans-papiers

  • Je ne savais même pas que #htop était « à l’abandon », en tout cas le commentaire de la personne qui maintenait le projet seule et à bout de bras depuis des années fait plaisir à lire :)

    Is this project maintained ? · Issue #992 · hishamhm/htop
    https://github.com/hishamhm/htop/issues/992

    Hi everyone!

    First of all, I want to say I am really happy with this development! This is truly #FOSS working as intended.

    Second, with that out of the way, I want to apologize for being unresponsive. After almost 15 years maintaining a piece of software by myself (with an amazing number of community contributions, of course! but carrying the #maintainer burden on my own (and this is the not only project I’ve been maintaining mostly single-handedly for over 10 years)), one which started as a hobby and a learning experience, I gradually drifted away from it — the project felt pretty much “done” for my own use, and expanding it towards other horizons (such as the next branch in this repo) would be another mini-project in itself, that I kept meaning to get to it “one day”.

    At one point I realized that I had spent several months without looking at the “htop” folder in my mail client, and it felt like taking a sabbatical. At that point I thought, “well, that was refreshing”: in the meantime I was able to branch out to new projects and new ideas (which I really want to be able to carve out time to explore!). I quickly looked at the state of htop repo, saw the mounting PRs... thought myself, at least there are no critical bugfixes like the macOS craziness I’ve had to deal with in #682 (wow, 2018! I guess that was one of the last things I did here). That macOS bug which was very symbolic of the type of maintenance work I had to deal with in htop at that point in time: bugs for other platforms, new features for machine configurations I can’t test... you know, maintainer chores. Then I looked at the beta branch with unfinished work, sighed, and I thought “yeah, I’ll get back to this some time”. And then months flew by again.

    During that period, the thought of handing over maintainership crossed my mind many times (as recently as last week, incredibly!), and I always thought “ok, but to whom? how do I go about this?”. And then today I wake up to the news of htop 3.0.0, which I got via Twitter! And I must say, my immediate reaction was of relief.

    I guess here it’s a good point to make a note that might be useful for others: yes, burnout is a very real thing and for FOSS maintainers it can be hard to identify. I’ve experienced burnout at work before, and it’s easier to spot — because of the performance pressures — and to deal with — because ideally you have a supportive organization around you. For FOSS maintainers, the best-effort nature of the endeavor in most cases may make it hard for you to measure that effort, to balance your sense of duty to a community (that at times you built yourself!) to that of the effect it has on you (as in “why did I start doing this in the first place”). If you find yourself looking at your own FOSS projects and sighing, I guess that’s a sign!

    Yes, it was reckless of me to have filtered all mail mentioning “htop” email to a folder (I realized that for LuaRocks I have different filtering rules where Github/mailing list/etc go to a folder but direct messages go to my inbox — that would have been a better idea!), and not looking at it for so long. I apologize to @natoscott and @fasterit who tried to contact me; I understand that forking the project must not have been an easy decision to make, and any response of mine might have made it a little easier.

    I want to thank you all of you for taking on this initiative, starting from @afontenot for opening up this topic. I am extremely grateful for all the amazing feedback I’ve received for htop over the years. This has been by far my most successful project, it has brought me many many great things, and I think it’s indeed flattering to see it forked — I remember now saying once in a discussion about FOSS that “if something is unmaintained and important enough, it will be forked”. I guess this means htop is in a sense important enough to someone, and I’m honored for that. As I said above, that’s FOSS working as designed. I’m certain I could have handled things better from my side, but I guess all’s well that ends well!

    I’m excited to see the project move forward, and I’m making myself available for any administrivia you folks would like me to do in the transition process (such as getting this repo transferred, so this one auto-redirects and the issue and PR history gets preserved, making the original website redirect to the new one (love the domain!), etc).

    Thank you all once again, and here’s to htop’s future! Cheers!

    #htop

  • [Radio PANdemIK] Recette de cuisine du chef Wu Han #6 : « Comment bien préparer l’Antipastis de lama haché fâché » (Arthur) - Radio PANdemIK #43
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-pandemik/pandemik-43/#9005

    Recette de cuisine du chef Wu Han #6 : « Comment bien préparer l’Antipastis de lama haché fâché » (Arthur)

    Jingle Pandémik mixé avec « Limoges Ave Nobilis » Guillaume de Machaut suivi de « French radio » des Swirlies [01:06 ] Interview de Claé, schaerbeekoise de 6 ans, sur sa vision de la pandémie, ses rêves et ses oracles. Musique de GregoMondo "Le temps des boîtes". (Chloé et Cabiria) [08:20] Intro de « and i’m singing » de Jim O’Rourke album "I’m happy i’m singing" [08:27] Athènes le 1er mai par Léa B. [16:48] transition avec « Redcaps » de Alejandra & Aeron [16:51] « La Logique du Pourrissement » de Joby Bernabé (Madinina 1985) Compilation « Par les damné-es de la terre » voix de luttes 1969-1988 [22:56] Par la fenêtre intérieure (épisode 4) Un podcast du confinement réalisé par Philippe, (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-pandemik/pandemik-43_09005__0.mp3

  • [Radio PANdemIK] RADIO PANDEMIK #32
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-32

    Dans ce numéro 32, On va casser les murs !!! Parce que c’est inacceptable ce qu’il se passe dans les prisons et les centres fermés ! Tendons l’oreille et écoutons les prisonnières/prisonniers de Belgique et d’ailleurs, leurs proches, les acteurs/actrices du milieu carcérale. Tousse ensemble avec eux !!!!

    Jingle Extrait de le RTBF https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_prisons-les-detenus-et-leurs-proches-sont-en-colere-et-se-sentent-oublie Taulard - Dans la plaine - Les hauts plateaux ITW de Renaud-Selim de Genepi, déjà intervenu dans Pandémik #6 ITW de Grégory Wallez de la CGSP Reportage d’une action radio sur le toit d’un squat pour relayer les voix des prisons, réseau Anti-Covid19 Athènes 2 capsules proposées par Emma de l’Acentrale, 7Bis soins FF et le mix L’araignée de (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-pandemik/radio-pandemik-32_08831__1.mp3

  • [Radio Maritime] Confinés #6
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/radio-maritime/confines-6

    Aujourd’hui on donne la parole à plusieurs initiatives solidaires nées pendant le confinement. Récolter et distribuer des biens alimentaire, faire quelques courses pour ses voisins, devenir relais de quartier, ou même réparer des vélos gratuitement,... chacun tente à sa manière d’apporter sa pierre à l’édifice.

    On prend aussi des nouvelles de Christophe, à Uccle et de quelques habitants du Merlo, à Uccle.

    Patrick revient pour sa chronique et on termine avec la bonne humeur de Malika.

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/radio-maritime/confines-6_08793__1.mp3

  • Le projet totalitaire de la Smart City...
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/high-teck/17146-le-projet-totalitaire-de-la-smart-city

    De la data encore plus de data, et toujours plus de data, je veux dire au bout d’un moment, l’information tue l’information, mais le souci ici c’est qu’on voie très rapidement ce que ça peut donner, par exemple avec la série West World que je vous recommande chaudement, pour le reste si vous êtes chrétien, et si vous nous suivez, vous ne serez pas trop surpris, après la question c’est plutôt combien de temps pourrons-nous rester en ville, et après rapidement, combien de temps pourrons-nous rester en vie sans prêter allégeance à l’antéchrist, oui ça fait un peut brut de fonderie dit comme ça, mais c’est la réalité.

    Nb. Je ne peut pas systématiquement remettre toutes les informations complémentaires sous les articles, alors à vous de creuser, ce sont des petits bonus, (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_High-Tech #High_Tech

  • Voix Juives Indépendantes Canada recueille en ce moment des témoignages de Palestinien.nes qui vivent la pandémie de coronavirus, et l’Agence Média Palestine a décidé de les traduire en français... Voici les 5ème et 6ème :

    Témoignage #5 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Weeam Hammoudeh, Birzeit, Palestine
    IJV Canada, le 2 avril 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/04/17/temoignage-5-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-len

    Dispatch #5 From Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews and Mutual Aid : Weeam Hammoudeh, Birzeit, Palestine
    IJV Canada, le 2 avril 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatch-5-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-and-mutual-aid

    –--------------------

    Témoignage #6 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Mohammad Samara, Naplouse, Palestine
    IJV Canada, le 14 avril 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/04/16/temoignage-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-lentr

    Dispatch #6 From Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews & Mutual Aid : Mohammad Samara, Naplouse, Palestine
    IJV Canada, le 14 avril 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatch-6-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-mutual-aid

    ===========================

    Rappel des 4 premiers :

    Témoignage #1 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Ashraf Ashkar, St-Paul, Minnesota
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 19 mars 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/03/29/depeches-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-lentrai

    Dispatch #1 from Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews and Mutual Aid : Ashraf Ashkar, St-Paul, Minnesota
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 25 mars 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatches-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-and-mutual-aid

    Témoignage #2 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Abdelkarim Dalbah, Tulkarem, Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 23 mars 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/03/26/temoignage-2-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-lai

    Dispatch #2 from Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews and Mutual Aid : Abdelkarim Dalbah, Tulkarem, Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 25 mars 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatch-2-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-and-mutual-aid

    Témoignage #3 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Asmaa Tayeh, Jabalia (Gaza), Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 25 mars 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/04/03/temoignage-3-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-len

    Dispatch #3 from Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews and Mutual Aid : Asmaa Tayeh, Jabalia (Gaza), Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 25 mars 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatch-3-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-and-mutual-aid

    Témoignage #4 de Palestine sur le COVID-19, le confinement et l’entraide : Khalil Abou Yahia, Gaza, Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 27 mars 2020
    https://agencemediapalestine.fr/blog/2020/04/02/depeche-4-de-palestine-sur-le-covid-19-le-confinement-et-lentra

    Dispatch #4 from Palestine on COVID-19, Curfews and Mutual Aid : Khalil Abou Yahia, Gaza, Palestine
    IJV (Voix Juives Indépendantes) Canada, le 27 mars 2020
    https://www.ijvcanada.org/dispatch-4-from-palestine-on-covid-19-curfews-and-mutual-aid

    #coronavirus #Palestine #IJV #Canada #France #témoignage

    Voir compile des effets délétères indirects de la pandémie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/832147

  • Un thread tout à fait édifiant d’un certain Ulyss (@achabus) sur Twitter :
    https://twitter.com/achabus/status/1247657764505235458

    Je reproduis ici, en réintégrant les vidéos, en ajoutant les dates et les liens vers les sources, parce que c’est tout à fait sidérant sur le niveau d’impréparation et d’incompétence de notre équipe de vedettes…

    [6 mars - ASKPPG #6] en fait ils font pitié #confinementjour23
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247657356617547784/pu/vid/426x360/JlOHxGVXLM6LhxiI.mp4


    https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=194002125208821

    [8 mars - BFMTV] ouf on va rester dans le nouveau monde meilleur j’ai eu trop peur
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247660516555870213/pu/vid/1280x720/Z7ANySQYOngAyQ6O.mp4


    https://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/coronavirus-900-entreprises-nous-ont-demande-le-dispositif-du-chomage-partiel

    [5 mars - BFMTV] « nous pensons que »

    plus je les écoute plus ils me rassurent ils veillent sur nous pauvres ignorants que nous sommes faisons leur confiance
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247661993810632716/pu/vid/1280x720/PoSseaZ6r__9NS0i.mp4?tag=10


    https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/coronavirus-il-n-est-pas-du-tout-prevu-de-fermer-les-ecoles-a-cause-de-l-epid

    [8 mars - BFMTV] quel soulagement je me faisais déjà des films, des millions de gens confinés
    https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/coronavirus-pour-marlene-schiappa-la-france-ne-va-pas-vers-ce-que-fait-l-ital

    « Il faut être très clair, le stade 3 ce n’est pas d’avantage de confinement, au contraire, on prend acte que le virus est là, et on cesse de confiner ou de mettre en quarantaine », a-t-elle conclu.

    [3 mars - France 2] « j’ai préparé en tant que ministre l’arrivée de ce virus bien avant qu’il n’arrive en France »"nous avons travaillé à avoir des stocks de masques"

    alors ça va

    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247668699869347841/pu/vid/640x360/REiXGfeXULkBbcHx.mp4


    https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=505604923685086

    [5 mars - BFM TV] « le stade 3 ne signifie pas qu’on fermera l’ensemble des établissement scolaires »"il n’y aura pas de fermeture de l’ensemble des établissements scolaires"
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247669754233532416/pu/vid/640x360/wdeKq1LL2KHTtEB_.mp4


    https://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/story-8-toutes-les-ecoles-fermees-et-pourquoi-pas-nous-0503-1227873.html

    [10 mars - France Info] Coronavirus : « Il ne va pas y avoir, à un moment donné ou une heure donnée dans notre pays, une grande bascule où tout va changer », indique le président de la République à propos d’un passage au stade 3
    https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/1237347219315056640/vid/1280x720/AkVHinan6_Z8FAbr.mp4


    https://www.francetvinfo.fr/sante/maladie/coronavirus/video-coronavirus-macron-reconnait-que-dans-certains-departements-nous-

    11 mars « sur une base scientifique » nous naviguons a vue
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247674586860261376/pu/vid/640x360/WBg99kpoRfU7jyrJ.mp4

    « Pour les mesures à prendre en stade 3, elles sont encore en cours de réflexion, compte tenu de l’état d’avancée des réflexions scientifiques », avait indiqué Sibeth Ndiaye, en précisant qu’elles ne seront pas « standards » sur l’ensemble du territoire, « visant par exemple à une fermeture systématique. »

    « Ce n’est pas ce que nous envisageons, en tout cas à ce stade. Notre objectif n’est pas de mettre le pays à l’arrêt », avait-elle insisté.

    https://www.ouest-france.fr/sante/virus/coronavirus/coronavirus-emmanuel-macron-consulte-avant-son-allocution-de-20-h-67768

    [3 mars - BFMTV] heureusement que dans cette période troublée on a les media pour nous informer et démonter les fantasmes diffusés par les réseaux sociaux et bien nous expliquer la pensée complexe du gouvernement
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247677396716789760/pu/vid/640x360/V-u31Sv9nNf_IVbL.mp4


    https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7sglhh

    [10 mars - RFI] le journalisme de diffusion de communication gouvernementale ça avait déjà cet effet là en temps ordinaire
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247681145426280452/pu/vid/320x320/ZmZyagQGc7b1TBCm.mp4?tag=10


    https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2259141491059534

    [5 mars - LCI] au lieu de se cacher derrière l’avis d’experts dont le rôle n’est pas de prendre les décisions il aurait peut être fallu assumer ses responsabilités politiques sans prendre les citoyens pour des imbéciles
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247695422379962368/pu/vid/640x360/ynGQhUVnjocyPO_x.mp4


    https://www.lci.fr/politique/sibeth-ndiaye-la-france-ne-va-pas-s-arreter-avec-le-stade-3-de-l-epidemie-de-cor

    Mais quelles conséquences sur la vie quotidienne ? Contrairement aux idées reçues, le stade 3 sera moins contraignant pour les Français que le stade 2, qui implique de multiples « contraintes collectives » pour éviter la propagation du virus. « Une fois que l’épidémie est installée sur tout le territoire national, ça ne sert plus à rien d’empêcher les enfants d’aller à l’école ou autres », assure Sibeth Ndiaye. « Notre objectif ce sera de diminuer les effets de l’épidémie sur les individus infectés », ajoute-t-elle, soit de se concentrer sur le soin et la prise en charge des malades. 

    Pas d’école ou d’institution fermées donc, et le maintien des événements publics se fera au cas par cas en fonction des risques. « Mais dans un stade 3, on ne va pas arrêter la France, notre pays est solide, la vie ne s’arrêtera pas », a assuré Sibeth Ndiaye. « Je ne minimise pas le coronavirus car c’est une maladie nouvelle, inconnue et pour laquelle on a pas encore de traitement (...) mais il faut avoir conscience que dans 80% des cas les personnes atteintes ont simplement un gros rhume, seuls 20% sont des cas compliqués » a expliqué la porte-parole, précisant que le gouvernement ne fait que suivre des préconisations scientifiques et sanitaires. « Je préfère qu’il y ait une continuité de l’activité et notamment des transports pour que le personnel médical indispensable puisse se déplacer pour soigner les gens ».

    [6 mars - LCP] mais les presse-boutons comme @MarieLebec78 nous avaient prévenu aussi, au stade 3 il y aura « moins de mesures de confinement »
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1247807297885069313/pu/vid/640x360/bjnp4WWV0p55MrCz.mp4


    https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/coronavirus-il-y-aura-tres-probablement-un-stade-epidemique-analyse-mari

  • [Ze Glaz and Prez Show] #66
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/ze-glaz-and-prez-show/-66

    Un nouveau mix de confinement contenant un max de nouveautés picorées çà et là par les deux « klachkop » et assorties par le moins vieux des deux. Avec : Jasmine Guffond - An Utterly Dark Spot Electric Indigo - ferrum 8 Pak Yan Lau & Darin Gray - Lost Lucy Liyou - Unnie Leya - Wave Fean - Swellen Alabaster DePlume - If You’re Sure You Want To Pharoah Sanders - Love Is Here Part 2 Hilary Woods - There is No Moon The Fear Ratio - BY3 Vin Gordon & The Real Rock Band - Outta Jungle Babylon Timewarp - Durban Poison Neinzer - Deff Lyra Pramuk - Gossip Primitive World - Skins Plastered With White Lead Juana Molina - Cara de Espejo (home session) Nihiloxica - Tewali Sukali Anunaku - Stargate Shabaka & the Ancestors - ’til the Freedom Comes Home dumama + kechou - for (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/ze-glaz-and-prez-show/-66_08596__1.mp3

  • [PICKLS XP] studio volant depuis la cave
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/pickls-xp/1er-avril

    ((((((pourrais-on se pencher un peu sur l’origine de l’explication du alors mais pourquoi donc est-ce la question que l’on se pose ce jour là ? et si l’on va plus loin ce pourrait être ce jour-ci ? Que reste-il.x.e des nos réalités ? D’où l’idée est elle venu de se coller des poissons mort dans le dos en ce début de printemps ? ... Nous avons le temps de nous poser moulte. moulte et même des dures et difficiles questions en ces temps obscure où nos cerveau se confie. Où est la fin du combien de temps avant ?))))))

    #666
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/pickls-xp/1er-avril_08586__1.mp3

  • [Fade to Pleasure ] #69.2 Feat Flart und Kuss
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/ftp/-69-2-feat-flart-und-kuss

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/cache/50/ac/50ac744cc4ff92607d050b3f68499cde.jpg

    As might also be expected of his mixtape, polyrhythms feature throughout, always providing a precise percussive grounding for melodies to weave in and out of. The effects of this are at times disorienting, at others psychedelic, but always intriguing, owing to the influences of #avant_garde, #techno, experimental, and IDM, letfield folklorism & futurism

    Flart und Kuss Fb page :

    https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Band/FLart-Und-Kuss-447628782262086

    Broadcasted & hosted by Snooba on Panik (Brussels-Be) Grenouille (Marseille) Canal B (Rennes-Fr) C’rock (Vienne-Fr) Diversité FM (Dijon-Fr) Louiz Radio (Belgique-Louvain la neuve) You FM (Mons-Be) Woot (Marseille) Campus FM (...)

    #flart_une_kuss #avant_garde,techno,flart_une_kuss
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/ftp/-69-2-feat-flart-und-kuss_08470__1.mp3

  • [Fade to Pleasure ] #68.2 feat #snooba
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/ftp/-68-2-feat-snooba

    So obsessed with getting the right vibration straightaway, which hindered the flow

    #house #data #piano #beat #deep #eclectic #groove #random #letfield #drums #honey #kant #world_beat #flowers #second_hand #house,snooba,data,piano,beat,deep,eclectic,groove,random,letfield,drums,honey,kant,world_beat,flowers,second_hand
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/ftp/-68-2-feat-snooba_08463__1.mp3

  • [Ze Glaz and Prez Show] #65
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/ze-glaz-and-prez-show/-65

    De la radio en temps de pandémie... Ze Glaz & Prez Show #65 prend, confinement oblige, la forme d’un mix fabriqué par le Glaz sur base d’une sélection conjointe du Prez et du Glaz. 1heure 59 minutes et 13 secondes contenant un max de nouveautés et d’inédits : The Alvaret Ensemble - Blau Gers / Edu Comelles - Still Life (feat. Sara Galan) / Sary Moussa - In Praise of Shadows / Stian Westerhus - Chase the New Morning / Lina & Raul Refree - Maldição / Lee Ranaldo & Raul Refree - Humps (Espriu Mix) / Christian Wallumrod Ensemble - Dialect / Laurine Frost - Scouting The Innocence During Snowfall / Loup Uberto - Il Pecoraro I & II / Rhythm for Reasons - The Smokers Rhythm / Mhysa - bbygurl / Scratcha DVA - Do Ur Best / Tara Clerkin Trio - I Know He Will / Jeremy Cunningham - Sleep (...)

    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/ze-glaz-and-prez-show/-65_08453__1.mp3