• Nos amis consultants : +1
    (via Mediapart)

    Accenture et McKinsey embauchés par l’Etat pour faire un milliard d’économies

    Par Romaric Godin et Antton Rouget

    Bercy vient de confier à Accenture et McKinsey l’élaboration d’un plan d’économies d’au moins un milliard d’euros d’ici 2022, d’après nos informations. Ces deux cabinets profitent déjà des carences de l’État dans la gestion de la crise sanitaire.

    J’ai l’impression que, outre remplir les poches des potes avec de l’argent public, l’objectif est surtout de rendre opaques les décisions en question.

    Ils achètent un service de boîte noire.

    Déléguer au privé, surtout celui là, réputé pour sa « discrétion », ça implique que l’administration ne sera pas au courant des plans et propositions ; ni les journalistes ; ni les députés. Ensuite, mise devant le fait accompli ; il reste un an et demi.

    #McKinsley #Accenture #Consulting

    #foutage_de_gueule

    • Le marché a été, dès le départ, alloti en deux parties par Bercy. Le premier lot, pour lequel Accenture a été retenu au mois de novembre 2020, se concentre sur les services de l’État, pour lesquels le besoin minimal en terme d’économies à réaliser a été fixé par Bercy à 800 millions d’euros. Le montant de ce lot est estimé à 25 millions d’euros.

      Le lot de McKinsey c’est 18 millions, selon les calculs de Mediapart.

      Dans les 45 millions, au total pour l’ensemble des deux lots.

    • en résumé, utiliser McKinsey présente plusieurs avantages :

      – McKinsey recommande ce qui convient au client (ici : Macron)
      – McKinsey garantit l’opacité du processus de réforme
      – les cibles - les fonctionnaires, les usagers - sont écartés des discussions et mis devant le fait accompli (stratégie du choc)
      – remplir les poches des amis avec de l’argent public permet de saigner un peu plus la cible.

  • Vaccination contre le Covid-19 : une faille béante dans le secret médical, Antton Rouget
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/270121/vaccination-contre-le-covid-19-une-faille-beante-dans-le-secret-medical

    Par manque d’anticipation, l’assurance-maladie n’a eu qu’un mois et demi pour développer le système informatique de suivi de la campagne de vaccination. Selon nos informations, celui-ci souffre de plusieurs failles : il permet à un médecin d’accéder à tous les dossiers des Français tandis que la procédure de signalement des effets indésirables a été mise en œuvre a minima.

    C’est un nouveau raté de taille dans la gestion de la crise sanitaire. Le système d’information (SI-Vaccin Covid) mis en place par la Caisse nationale d’assurance-maladie (Cnam) pour le suivi de la campagne de vaccination en France présente d’importantes brèches et insuffisances, selon les éléments réunis par Mediapart.

    Ces loupés sont la conséquence d’une mise en route tardive du système après plusieurs mois d’inertie des autorités, malgré les mises en garde de spécialistes de vaccination depuis le printemps dernier. À l’époque, alors que les labos s’engageaient à toute vitesse dans la course aux vaccins, les professionnels alertaient sur les enjeux liés à l’anticipation d’une campagne de vaccination d’envergure.

    Il a pourtant fallu attendre l’automne 2020 pour que le projet de SI soit mis en route au ministère de la santé. Et encore : il a continué à prendre du retard en étant ballotté pendant des semaines de décision en contre-décision. 

    Ces problèmes ont eu une incidence importante sur le déroulé des opérations. D’un point de vue de la sécurité des données, d’abord, puisque le SI-Vaccin Covid qui tourne depuis le 4 janvier s’apparente à une véritable passoire.

    Concrètement, le système permet le suivi de la campagne de vaccination en enregistrant toutes les consultations, les numéros de lots utilisés, les dates et lieux des injections, le nom du praticien, etc. Pour ce faire, les vaccinateurs doivent s’identifier sur le portail de la Cnam avec leur carte de professionnel de santé (CPS ou e-CPS) pour enregistrer chaque acte, pour lequel ils sont ensuite remboursés.

    Mais, une fois à l’intérieur du système, ils peuvent aussi accéder au dossier de n’importe quel patient sans autorisation particulière, ainsi que nous avons pu le vérifier. Pour cela, il leur suffit de renseigner le numéro de Sécurité sociale de la personne concernée, un numéro que l’on peut reconstituer facilement à partir des données d’état civil. Des applications accessibles à tous permettent même de générer ces numéros automatiquement.

    Dès lors, un professionnel de santé peut consulter la fiche d’un proche, d’un voisin ou même d’une personnalité publique, et accéder à ses données de vaccination sans être son médecin traitant ni recueillir son consentement.

    Interrogés sur cette situation, les services de la Cnam ont nié toute « faille » dans le système en estimant qu’« il appartient au médecin de procéder à une recherche ou à un enregistrement uniquement et exclusivement pour ses patients ». « Il s’agit là des règles courantes relatives à l’exercice professionnel de médecins qui sont soumis au secret médical et dont l’encadrement de la profession est très strict. Estimer que cela relève d’une faille de sécurité consisterait donc à considérer que, par nature, les médecins ne respectent pas leurs obligations, ni la déontologie à laquelle ils sont réglementairement soumis », ajoute la Cnam, qui rappelle que les accès sont tracés.

    Dans son avis du 10 décembre sur le SI-Vaccin Covid, alors en projet, la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (Cnil) avait estimé nécessaire de rappeler que les données traitées dans le cadre du système seraient protégées par le secret médical. À cet égard, la commission insistait sur le fait que « seules les personnes habilitées et soumises au secret professionnel doivent pouvoir accéder aux données du SI “Vaccin Covid”, dans les strictes limites de leur besoin d’en connaître pour l’exercice de leurs missions ». En clair, la Cnil réclamait un cloisonnement strict des données accessibles par les professionnels de santé.

    « Il appartient donc au responsable de traitement de définir pour chaque destinataire des profils fonctionnels strictement limités aux besoins d’en connaître pour l’exercice des missions des personnes habilitées », ajoutait d’ailleurs la Cnil, en réclamant que soient prises des mesures « dès que possible » afin que les personnes habilitées ne « puissent accéder aux différentes données relatives aux personnes concernées que lorsqu’elles en ont effectivement besoin ».

    Alors que ce cloisonnement technique au « besoin d’en connaître » n’est aujourd’hui pas assuré, la Cnil précise à Mediapart que ses contrôles « seront conduits dans les prochaines semaines » et qu’ils se « poursuivront tout au long de la période d’utilisation des fichiers, jusqu’à la fin de leur mise en œuvre et la suppression des données qu’ils contiennent ». « Dans ce cadre, prévient la commission, la sécurité des données, notamment les profils d’habilitation et permissions d’accès, fera l’objet d’une vigilance particulière. »

    De l’aveu de plusieurs sources, ce dysfonctionnement est la conséquence du calendrier extrêmement serré pour la mise en œuvre du système. Pour le déployer dans une version « dégradée » (a minima) en janvier, les équipes de la Cnam ont charbonné pendant tout le mois de décembre. Mais le retard était impossible à combler. « On ne peut pas sérieusement monter un système de cette importance, avec tous les audits nécessaires, en quelques semaines », gronde un expert.

    De fait, difficile de blâmer les équipes au cœur du projet. Le problème se situe bien en amont, tout en haut de la chaîne de décision, prenant sa source dans un défaut d’anticipation comparable à celui sur les commandes de masques ou sur la campagne de dépistage.

    La réunion de « lancement et d’organisation du projet » ne s’est tenue au ministère des solidarités et de la santé que le 17 novembre, moins d’un mois et demi avant le lancement de la campagne de vaccination, selon des documents internes consultés par Mediapart.

    À l’ordre du jour : une présentation globale du périmètre du système informatique, un macro-planning et l’organisation de la gouvernance d’un projet qui rassemble plusieurs acteurs. Sont en effet associées à l’initiative la Cnam, la délégation ministérielle du numérique en santé (DNS), mais aussi Santé publique France (SPF, pour les aspects logistiques), l’Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament (ANSM, pour le suivi des effets indésirables), l’Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (Anssi, pour la partie sécurité) ou encore la Haute Autorité de santé (HAS, pour les recommandations vaccinales). Autant d’acteurs que d’enjeux à maîtriser et coordonner.

    Les équipes du ministère de la santé n’ont pas caché, lors de cette réunion du 17 novembre, la réalité « des risques opérationnels principalement liés aux délais de mises en œuvre techniques et juridiques » du dispositif. À cette difficulté s’ajoute alors le « fort besoin d’intégration entre plusieurs SI », en particulier celui que développait au même moment Santé publique France (SPF) pour la distribution des doses de vaccin.

    Pour essayer de tenir les délais, plusieurs points quotidiens sont ensuite organisés, en fin de journée, pour le pilotage du projet et la coordination opérationnelle. Il faut faire vite, car l’État est déjà en retard sur tous ces objectifs, même les moins ambitieux.


    Exemple de fiche patient (anonymisée) consultable par n’importe quel praticien. © Document Mediapart

    En octobre, la DNS est déjà consciente que les délais seront difficiles à tenir alors qu’elle table à l’époque sur un lancement du système au 15 janvier seulement (le SI sera finalement ouvert le 4 janvier).

    Le ministère de la santé envisage à cette période de s’appuyer sur l’expertise de prestataires privés, sélectionnés sans publicité ni mise en concurrence, au motif de l’urgence impérieuse. Un directeur de projet est recruté en toute hâte. Problème : aussi bon soit-il sur les aspects numériques, il ne connaît rien à la vaccination et aux enjeux qui lui sont propres, puisqu’il vient d’un groupe hôtelier. L’homme travaille pendant quelques semaines, avec une adresse Gmail fournie par Google (et non une adresse officielle), avant de quitter ses fonctions.

    Au cours de ce même mois d’octobre, tout reste à faire : la DNS en est encore à préciser qu’il faut « prendre contact avec nos homologues européens pour benchmark, et étudier la possibilité d’une action conjointe ». Il convient d’« inscrire le sujet SI » à l’agenda du groupe de contacts mis en place par une inspectrice des finances au sein de la « Task Force Vaccination » que vient de créer le premier ministre Jean Castex, demande-t-on alors au ministère de la santé.

    L’entreprise américaine de conseil Accenture des deux côtés du marché

    Pour trouver un prestataire capable de porter le SI français, la DNS auditionne dans le même temps trois candidats, qui se sont volontairement manifestés auprès d’elle. S’affrontent sans le savoir le laboratoire américain Baxter, la multinationale du conseil informatique Accenture et une solution française MesVaccins, portée par la PME Syadem, basée à Bordeaux.

    La proposition de Baxter est rapidement écartée : sa solution paraît « peu adaptable » aux besoins français, sans compter les dégâts que provoquerait dans l’opinion le fait de confier la gestion de données médicales à une entreprise de l’industrie pharmaceutique…

    La candidature d’Accenture pose aussi question : la délégation ministérielle au numérique en santé (DNS) reconnaît que l’entreprise est bien implantée dans les SI, même s’il y a des « développements à effectuer pour adaptation aux besoins de la France ». Mais il y a surtout un « sujet » sur la protection des données personnelles. Accenture travaille par exemple en partenariat avec Microsoft, à qui le ministre de la santé Olivier Véran veut justement retirer l’hébergement des données du Health Data Hub pour les confier à une entreprise européenne.


    Atouts et inconvénients d’Accenture, selon le ministère de la santé. © Document Mediapart

    Reste l’offre MesVaccins qui présente des atouts, selon la DNS : il s’agit d’une « entreprise experte des SI de vaccination » qui est « proche des acteurs publics », avec une « équipe motivée et réactive », et des « données hébergées en France » et non commercialisées.

    Créé en 2009, MesVaccins est un carnet de vaccination électronique (CVE) permettant à chaque patient de gérer gratuitement ses vaccinations. Le dispositif intègre aussi un « système expert » d’aide à la décision vaccinale prenant en compte les caractéristiques individuelles et l’historique vaccinal de chaque personne pour l’aider à évaluer le bénéfice/risque.

    En août 2019, l’Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament (ANSM) a aussi recommandé son système de pharmacovigilance renforcée (détection proactive des effets indésirables) dans le cadre du déploiement du vaccin contre le virus Ebola. Des discussions pour intégrer MesVaccins au dossier médical partagé (DMP) mis à disposition du public par la Cnam sont également en cours depuis plusieurs années.

    Au mois d’octobre 2020, le ministère de la santé a malgré tout un doute concernant la taille de Syadem, l’entreprise qui développe cette solution : la PME est une « petite structure » ; sa « capacité de montée en charge » sur un projet aussi stratégique que le SI-Vac reste donc « à investiguer », estime la DNS.

    Pour s’assurer que la PME a bien les reins suffisamment solides, le ministère décide, le 3 novembre, d’auditer l’entreprise. Elle confie curieusement cette tâche à… Accenture, qui passe ainsi subitement de candidat au marché à assistant à maîtrise d’ouvrage (AMO) du même marché.

    Interrogée sur le périmètre exact de son contrat avec le ministère de la santé, la firme américaine n’a pas souhaité répondre « pour des raisons de confidentialité ». Le 21 janvier, le ministère de la santé avait simplement signifié, sans plus de détails, à France Info qu’il « a été fait appel au cabinet Accenture pour le lancement, l’enrichissement et l’accompagnement de la mise en œuvre du SI vaccination ».

    Sollicitée par Mediapart depuis le 12 janvier, la direction générale de la santé (DGS) nous a finalement répondu, juste après la publication de cet article pour nous préciser sa relation contractuelle avec Accenture. Dans le cadre d’un contrat cadre de 2018 à 2022 (permet à chaque ministère, de ne pas avoir à remettre en concurrence les titulaires sélectionnés initialement), le ministère a commandé une première mission d’« étude stratégique autour du lancement du SI Vaccination », dont l’assistance « aux choix structurants » et à la « mise en œuvre de la phase initiale » pour un montant de 388 500 euros TTC.

    Ce contrat a été notifié le 20 novembre 2020, pour une date de fin au 8 janvier 2021 La date de signature de la mission est étonnante, puisqu’elle est postérieure au début de l’audit mené par Accenture auprès de MesVaccins, ce qui signifie donc que le cabinet a travaillé pendant plusieurs semaines pour le ministère sans contrat...

    Pendant deux semaines, le géant américain a passé au peigne fin les capacités de la PME bordelaise. Tous les voyants sont au vert. Et le 17 novembre, Accenture présente deux options au ministère de la santé.

    Un premier scénario dans lequel MesVaccins vient en renfort de l’État et apporte des « services spécifiques » à la campagne de vaccination (questionnaire pré-vaccinal, détermination de l’éligibilité vaccinale et des contre-indications vaccinales, aide à la décision vaccinale, gestion d’éventuelles interférences entre différents vaccins, etc.). La partie « pharmacovigilance renforcée » et l’analyse des données restent du domaine exclusif de l’État. Dans le second scénario, MesVaccins devient un acteur central de la chaîne de vaccination, même si les dossiers patients, le suivi vaccinal et les certificats de vaccination sont encore gérés par l’État.

    Les équipes du ministère n’ont pas le temps de se prononcer sur ces deux options qu’au même moment, à un échelon supérieur, tout le travail préparatoire est balayé d’un revers de main. La « Task Force Vaccination » qui fonctionne sous l’autorité du premier ministre vient de changer brutalement de cap : plus question de faire appel à un prestataire spécialisé, il faut maintenant que le SI soit développé par les développeurs de la Cnam en interne.

    Quels sont les motifs de ce revirement, et pourquoi n’a-t-il pas été anticipé ? Matignon ne nous a pas répondu.

    La Cnam invoque pour sa part des raisons techniques en indiquant qu’au terme d’un « sourcing » qui aurait été réalisé à « l’été 2020 », aucune « solution n’était en mesure d’apporter les garanties suffisantes ». Dans ce cas-là, pourquoi le ministère de la santé a-t-il organisé des consultations avec plusieurs candidats en octobre, puis demandé à Accenture d’auditer MesVaccins, et qu’a-t-il été fait des conclusions favorables du rapport d’audit ? Relancée sur ce point, la Cnam admet juste que les « échanges se sont poursuivis à l’automne » avec des prestataires, sans en dire plus.

    Le cabinet Accenture est pour sa part revenu dans la boucle avec une mission d’« enrichissement et accompagnement à la mise en œuvre du SI Vaccination », signée le 23 décembre 2020, et qui court jusqu’au 26 mars 2021, pour un montant de 594 540 euros, selon les chiffres communiqués par la DGS.

    « Quand il est sous pression, l’État craint toujours de faire appel à une PME. Il y a toujours quelqu’un qui dit : “Mais attendez, est-ce qu’ils sont vraiment fiables ?” Si ça ne marche pas, on nous tombera dessus en disant : “Pourquoi vous avez pris ces zozos ?” Par sécurité, l’État se tourne donc automatiquement vers de gros acteurs », interprète un entrepreneur du numérique, qui fut notamment mobilisé sur l’application StopCovid.

    Début 2020, les PME spécialisées dans l’import-export de masques depuis la Chine avaient vécu la même déconvenue. Malgré leur connaissance du marché et leur réactivité, elles avaient été ignorées par l’État, lequel avait préféré faire appel à des grandes entreprises, qui pour certaines ne connaissaient rien aux dispositifs médicaux.
    Les revirements entre le ministère de la santé et la Task Force ont en tout cas fait perdre de précieuses semaines, et suscité l’incompréhension de plusieurs parties prenantes. « Après avoir mobilisé 100 % de nos équipes pendant six semaines et répondu à toutes les attentes, on n’a plus eu de nouvelles du jour au lendemain », déplore Jean-Louis Koeck, le fondateur de MesVaccins.

    Des alertes depuis le printemps

    « Nous avions entre les mains une solution disponible, dont l’intégration au dossier médical partagé de l’assurance-maladie est en cours, mais on a préféré repartir de zéro », s’étonne un ancien responsable SI Santé, qui note que Nicolas Revel, le puissant directeur de cabinet Jean Castex, connaît d’autant mieux le sujet qu’il a dirigé la Cnam de 2014 à juillet 2020.

    Le gouvernement a-t-il simplement craint de confier une partie, même minime, de l’expertise à un acteur privé ? « Mais, dans ce cas-là, pourquoi l’État refuse-t-il un partenariat avec une PME comme MesVaccins alors qu’il ouvre grand les portes à Doctolib pour la prise de rendez-vous ? », interroge un autre spécialiste.

    Le médecin Marcel Garrigou-Grandchamp, de la cellule juridique de la Fédération des médecins de France (FMF), abonde : « L’argument de ne pas voir entrer le privé ne tient avec le contre-exemple Doctolib. » Lui « pense que d’autres acteurs privés plus gros que MesVaccins veulent lui barrer la route en attendant d’imposer leur solution, c’est bien dommage ».

    « On a la chance d’avoir en France un système très précurseur, toutes les associations de médecins qui l’utilisent en sont très contentes », précise l’épidémiologiste Yves Buisson. Le président du groupe Covid-19 à l’Académie de médecine insiste notamment sur les performances du « système expert » de MesVaccins, qui traduit les recommandations scientifiques pour le grand public, et est d’ailleurs utilisé par l’agence Santé publique France.

    Le professeur Buisson loue aussi son « système de pharmacovigilance très poussé » (avec des relances des patients pour retracer les effets indésirables). « Au lieu de cela, on a préféré bricoler un truc incomplet en quelques semaines. Je ne comprends pas. Comme si on n’avait rien d’autre de mieux à faire… », cingle Yves Buisson.

    Lors de la réunion de travail avec la Cnam le 17 novembre, les agents du ministère de la santé ont expliqué à quel point le calendrier pour la mise en place du nouveau SI était « extrêmement contraint ».

    La première version du système devait ainsi comporter « les fonctionnalités minimales nécessaires au démarrage avec deux vaccins simultanés et ciblant quelques millions de personnes », seulement. La version ne comprend par exemple qu’une redirection vers le site de signalement des effets indésirables (pour relais à l’ANSM, qui coordonne la pharmacovigilance) alors que ce sujet avait été identifié comme un enjeu important par la DNS dans l’architecture du système.

    La plateforme SI-Vac sera progressivement « enrichie » au fil des semaines en fonction des « enseignements tirés de la fonction minimale », a-t-il été convenu le 17 novembre. Le déploiement de la version « complète » du système, qui « devra pouvoir gérer des campagnes de vaccination à l’échelle de la population française et l’intégralité des vaccins mis sur le marché », étant alors programmé à « horizon printemps 2021 ».

    Du côté du Syndicat de la médecine générale (SMG), on déplore que la question des données ait été « totalement écartée » de la discussion par les autorités. « Cela ne m’étonne pas du tout qu’on en soit là », avec la possibilité pour un praticien de consulter tous les dossiers dans le SI-Vac, fait part l’une des représentantes du SMG, Mathilde Boursier, en déplorant « une grande opacité autour de tout ce qui entoure les données en santé ». La praticienne défend une approche de santé publique, une médecine préventive et l’innovation en santé, mais estime que cela « ne doit pas se faire au détriment de la sécurité des données personnelles ».

    Proche d’Emmanuel Macron, le directeur de cabinet de Jean Castex, Nicolas Revel a dirigé la CNAM de 2014 à 2020. © Assurance maladie
    Le 17 décembre, dans une tribune publiée dans Libération, l’ancien directeur général de la santé (DGS) William Dab, Alain-Michel Ceretti, président de l’association de patients « Le Lien », ou encore Didier Seyler, membre du Comité d’orientation et de dialogue avec la société de Santé publique France, ont tiré la sonnette d’alarme en indiquant qu’il « serait incompréhensible » à leurs yeux qu’un effort ne soit pas engagé par l’État « pour améliorer la pharmacovigilance portant sur ces nouveaux vaccins ».

    Co-signataire de cette tribune, Pierre-Jean Ternamian, président de l’Union régionale des professionnels de santé de la région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, ne décolère pas. « J’ai martelé à toutes les réunions depuis le printemps, à l’échelon régional comme au niveau national, l’impérieuse nécessité de se préparer à la vaccination. On n’avait pas de nouvelles, on se disait : “Ils vont nous faire n’importe quoi”, et d’un coup on a vu surgir “SI-Vac”… Là on s’est dit qu’ils étaient en train d’inventer l’eau chaude, en pensant reproduire en deux mois dix ans d’expertise », peste ce médecin radiologue, qui a promu MesVaccins dans sa région et a même contribué à son développement.

    Pierre-Jean Ternamian avait écrit sur le sujet à Jean Castex avant l’explosion de la seconde vague, le 17 août 2020. Le chef de cabinet du premier ministre lui a répondu un mois et demi plus tard, dans un courrier daté du 1er octobre 2020, en renvoyant vers le conseiller technique pour la santé du cabinet, qui « ne manquera pas de vous contacter prochainement par téléphone ». « Je n’ai jamais eu de nouvelles », constate M. Ternamian.

    D’autres professionnels avaient aussi prévenu les autorités, dès le printemps, sur la nécessité d’anticiper la question du système d’information liée à la campagne de vaccination. « Mi-avril, nous avons écrit à nos interlocuteurs de la DNS pour évoquer les enjeux de la mise en place d’une future campagne de vaccination contre le Covid-19 », explique Jean-Louis Koeck de MesVaccins. Début mai 2020, une réunion a été organisée avec plusieurs membres de la Délégation ministérielle du numérique en santé (DNS), sans suite jusqu’au mois d’octobre.

    Le 9 juillet 2020, au creux de l’été, les membres du Conseil scientifique, du Care et du Comité Vaccin Covid-19, les trois groupes formés par Emmanuel Macron pour le conseiller dans ses décisions, ont rendu un avis important sur la question. « De nombreuses inconnues persistent sur le plan scientifique, mais il est indispensable d’avancer vers l’élaboration d’une stratégie vaccinale afin d’anticiper des questions aussi fondamentales que “qui vacciner et comment ?” dès qu’un vaccin sera disponible », prévenaient-ils alors, en indiquant que « l’occasion de diffuser/généraliser la mise en place d’un carnet électronique de vaccination doit être envisagée ». Lancée en plein remaniement ministériel, cette recommandation est restée lettre morte.

    #vaccin #Accenture #secret_médical #dossier_médical (très partageable) #campagne_vaccinale #attardés

  • Pour la mise en œuvre, désastreuse, de sa politique vaccinale, l’exécutif a fait appel à quatre cabinets de #consultance : #McKinsey, #Accenture, #Citwell et #JLL ; une pratique devenue commune par indifférenciation graduelle des sphères privées et publiques.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/01/07/vaccination-anti-covid-le-gouvernement-a-fait-appel-a-quatre-cabinets-de-con

    Ces cabinets n’ont pas la moindre compétence scientifique et leurs compétences gestionnaires sont sensiblement celles de la #haute_fonction_publique : devenue très faibles avec le développement du #management.
    https://www.politico.eu/article/french-government-defends-mckinsey-coronavirus-vaccine-rollout

    Le nom du #marché_public de 20 millions € avec McKinsey porte un nom explicite, la "transformation de l’action publique" étant le nom de l’importation des méthodes désastreuses du nouveau management dans le champ de l’Etat.
    https://www.boamp.fr/avis/detail/18-85473/1
    voir aussi :
    https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:268753-2018:TEXT:FR:HTML

    D’après le Canard, c’est @MaeldeCalan qui représentait @McKinsey_France à la réunion du 23 décembre dernier pour présenter le plan de #vaccination dont la médiocrité est apparue rapidement : 7000, hier, soit 45 fois moins qu’en Allemagne.

    #Maël_de_La_Lande (HEC, Science Po’) n’a rigoureusement aucune compétence scientifique. Il s’agit d’une figure de la droite conservatrice proche de l’#Institut_Montaigne, qui a apporté une large part des cadres macroniste — son directeur abritait "EM".
    https://www.consultor.fr/devenir-consultant/actualite-du-conseil/6307-elu-et-consultant-mckinsey-pour-le-vaccin-covid-un-stratege-ministeri

    Comment "#Baby-Juppé" (sic) a-t-il pu raté à ce point le « cadrage logistique », le « benchmarking » des « best practices » à l’étranger et la « coordination opérationnelle de la #task_force » ?

    Les étapes du #fiasco en quatre unes de la Pravda macroniste.

    Quel est le rôle de McKinsey dans le #lobbying en faveur de #Sanofi opéré dans les négociations européennes : contrat de 300 millions de doses de #vaccin en septembre, puis véto contre l’achat de 200+100 millions de doses de vaccins #Pfizer/#BioNTech ?

    https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-planning-disaster-germany-and-europe-could-fall-short-on-vaccine-supplie

    Quelle est la part du #retard dans la #campagne_de_vaccination due à une politique de recherche globalement désastreuse, qui a conduit à miser envers et contre tout sur #Sanofi ? Et quelle part vient de l’incapacité de l’exécutif à mettre en œuvre et gérer ?


    https://twitter.com/VidalFrederique/status/1345344588588969984

    McKinsey avait récemment été mandaté obtenir la création d’une agence de désinformation scientifique (un "#Science_Media_Center") au service du lobbying agro-industriel.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2020/09/22/l-information-scientifique-sous-tutelle-d-une-agence-de-communication_605309

    Les aller-retours entre McKinsey et l’Etat, caractéristiques de la mutation en cours de la haute fonction publique, ont été dans les deux sens. Ainsi, #Labaye, passé du comité de direction mondial du groupe à la présidence de Polytechnique.
    https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/societe/un-associe-de-mckinsey-a-la-tete-de-polytechnique-136118

    Ainsi, dans l’autre sens, #Mathieu_Maucort (Science Po’, HEC) — les "yeux et les oreilles de Macron à Marseille" — passé de McKinsey au poste de responsable du marketing politique d’En Marche.

    https://twitter.com/Pr_Logos/status/1347255977297506304

    #consulting #privatisation #Maël_de_Calan #macronisme #LREM

    ping @simplicissimus

  • Belgium - Automating Society Report 2020
    https://automatingsociety.algorithmwatch.org/report2020/belgium

    Contextualization As a result of the different governments, and the different levels of government, in Belgium (Federal and Regional), several different strategies dealing with digitization emerged in 2018. In Flanders, this strategy is called Vlaanderen Radicaal Digitaal, while in the Walloon region, it is known as Plan Numerique. In 2015, the federal government launched a strategy called Digital Belgium, but this covered more than just ADM. In 2018, the Flemish government launched an (...)

    #Accenture #Briefcam #algorithme #biométrie #éthique #facial #prédiction #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #comportement (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##discrimination ##enseignement ##pauvreté ##santé ##sport ##surveillance ##_ ##APD-Belgique ##AlgorithmWatch

  • Facebook moderators at Accenture are being forced back to the office, and many are scared for their safety
    https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/1/21497789/facebook-content-moderators-accenture-return-office-coronavirus

    Employees are concerned about COVID-19 now that they’re being told to return starting October 12th Facebook moderators employed by third-party contracting firm Accenture and based in Austin, Texas are being forced to return to the office on October 12th, The Verge has learned. Employees, almost all of whom are contractors, were instructed of the new policy at a company-wide town hall meeting today, say multiple people familiar with Accenture’s plans. Accenture, which has allowed its (...)

    #Accenture #Facebook #YouTube #algorithme #modération #COVID-19 #GigEconomy #santé #travail

    ##santé

  • Facebook Moderators Told to Return to Office Amid Pandemic
    https://theintercept.com/2020/10/13/facebook-moderators-covid-accenture

    Facebook content moderators must return to the office, and a call with their managers at Accenture did little to calm their fears. Facebook contractors tasked with sifting through some of the most heinous and traumatizing content on the internet faced a new hurdle this week when they were told to return to company offices to do their work in person as a pandemic runs rampant around them. Audio obtained by The Intercept suggests that their employer, Accenture, is downplaying the risk of (...)

    #Accenture #Facebook #algorithme #CCTV #température #modération #vidéo-surveillance #COVID-19 #GigEconomy #santé #surveillance (...)

    ##santé ##travail

  • La stratégie du choc pandémique : comment les entreprises du numérique conquièrent de nouveaux marchés
    https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/la-strategie-du-choc-pandemique-comment-les-entreprises-du-numeriq

    Si, malgré la récession qui s’amorce, le secteur du numérique se prépare à la croissance et recrute à tout-va, c’est au prix d’une lutte pour la survie, les entreprises les plus grandes et agressives s’accaparant la majorité des marchés et absorbant les plus petites, dans une nouvelle phase de sélection et de compétitivité redoublée. Article co-écrit par Maud Barret Bertelloni, membre du Mouton Numérique, et Augustin Langlade, journaliste à La Relève et La Peste. La crise sanitaire se révèle un marché (...)

    #Accenture #ANSSI #Apple #Atos #CapGemini #Dassault #Orange #Thalès #Withings #Doctolib #algorithme #montre #Bluetooth #CCTV #domotique #drone #iWatch #smartphone #contactTracing #géolocalisation #technologisme #métadonnées #vidéo-surveillance #BigData (...)

    ##COVID-19 ##enseignement ##lobbying ##santé ##surveillance ##_

  • Coronavirus : en Europe, la ruée en ordre dispersé sur les applications de « traçage »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/04/18/coronavirus-en-europe-la-ruee-en-ordre-disperse-sur-les-applications-de-trac

    Plusieurs pays, comme la France et l’Allemagne, ont choisi le projet PEPP-PT qui étudie la possibilité d’une application permettant de lutter contre la pandémie de Covid-19. D’autres Etats font cavalier seul. Au bout des pistes de l’aéroport Tegel de Berlin, la caserne Julius-Leber est, en ce début avril, le théâtre d’un étrange ballet. Des soldats allemands, treillis enserrés dans du ruban adhésif bariolé, arpentent un sol marqué de repères d’apparence ésotérique, téléphone en main et masques sur le (...)

    #StopCovid #GPS #Google #surveillance #Bluetooth #algorithme #géolocalisation #Apple #smartphone #PEPP-PT #travail #Accenture #technologisme #consentement #CapGemini #BigData #métadonnées #santé #COVID-19 (...)

    ##santé ##bracelet

  • Coronavirus : la tech française veut apporter sa pierre à l’appli StopCovid | Les Echos
    https://www.lesechos.fr/tech-medias/hightech/coronavirus-la-tech-francaise-veut-apporter-sa-pierre-a-lappli-stopcovid-11

    Parallèlement au projet officiel porté par l’Inria, six grands groupes français dont Orange, Dassault et Capgemini sont prêts à offrir leurs briques technologiques. De Londres à San Francisco, des start-up françaises ne sont pas en reste. Rien ne dit encore qu’elle verra le jour mais l’application StopCovid fait déjà l’objet d’une mobilisation générale. Pendant qu’un vif débat politique sur le respect des libertés publiques s’est ouvert, le gouvernement continue d’étudier ce dispositif qui permettra, dans la (...)

    #smartphone #santé #BigData #vidéo-surveillance #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #géolocalisation #Dassault #Accenture #Orange #Bluetooth #métadonnées (...)

    ##santé ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##StopCovid ##surveillance ##algorithme

  • The Rise of the Video Surveillance Industrial Complex
    https://theintercept.com/2020/01/27/surveillance-cctv-smart-camera-networks

    There’s widespread concern that video cameras will use facial recognition software to track our every public move. Far less remarked upon — but every bit as alarming — is the exponential expansion of “smart” video surveillance networks. Private businesses and homes are starting to plug their cameras into police networks, and rapid advances in artificial intelligence are investing closed-circuit television, or CCTV, networks with the power for total public surveillance. In the not-so-distant (...)

    #Western_Digital #Axis #Accenture #Briefcam #Canon #Cisco #Comcast #Google #Microsoft #Milestone #Motorola_Mobility #Verizon #Amazon #algorithme #CCTV #smartphone #biométrie #criminalité #police #racisme #automobilistes #émotions #facial #législation (...)

    ##criminalité ##prédiction ##reconnaissance ##vidéo-surveillance ##bénéfices ##BigData ##MinorityReport ##comportement ##BlackLivesMatter ##data ##discrimination ##Islam ##profiling

  • YouTube moderators are being forced to sign a statement acknowledging the job can give them PTSD - The Verge
    https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/24/21075830/youtube-moderators-ptsd-accenture-statement-lawsuits-mental-health

    Content moderators for YouTube are being ordered to sign a document acknowledging that performing the job can cause post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), according to interviews with employees and documents obtained by The Verge. Accenture, which operates a moderation site for YouTube in Austin, Texas, distributed the document to workers on December 20th — four days after The Verge published an investigation into PTSD among workers at the facility. “I understand the content I will be (...)

    #Accenture #Cognizant #Facebook #YouTube #modération #santé

    ##santé

  • Comment les géants de la tech manipulent la recherche sur l’éthique des IA | korii.
    https://korii.slate.fr/tech/intelligence-artificille-ethique-gafam-recherche-lobbying-conflit-intere

    Après le greenwashing, l’ethicalwashing ? Un ancien chercheur du MIT Media Lab témoigne. Dès 2018, il est devenu difficile de suivre les nombreux scandales liés à l’IA sur fond de contrats controversés : entre Facebook et Cambridge Analytica ; entre Google et le Pentagone sur les drones ; entre Amazon, IBM et la police sur la reconnaissance faciale ; entre Microsoft et les services de l’immigration sur le contrôle des frontières... Derrière plusieurs hashtags (#TechWontBuildIt, #NoTechForICE, (...)

    #Accenture #Altran #Bouygues #CambridgeAnalytica #DeepMind #Google #Microsoft #Orange #SNCF #Air_France #USDepartmentofDefense-DoD #IBM #MIT #Amazon #Facebook #algorithme #drone #activisme #biométrie #éthique #migration #police #racisme #facial (...)

    ##législation ##reconnaissance ##discrimination ##vidéo-surveillance ##frontières ##lobbying ##surveillance ##greenwashing ##bug

  • The Terror Queue
    https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/16/21021005/google-youtube-moderators-ptsd-accenture-violent-disturbing-content-interv

    These moderators help keep Google and YouTube free of violent extremism — and now some of them have PTSD GoogleGoogle and YouTube approach content moderation the same way all of the other tech giants do : paying a handful of other companies to do most of the work. One of those companies, Accenture, operates Google’s largest content moderation site in the United States : an office in Austin, Texas, where content moderators work around the clock cleaning up YouTube. Peter is one of hundreds (...)

    #Accenture #Google #YouTube #modération #conditions #travail

  • Avec Accenture (et de l’IA), le fisc veut détecter les piscines et autres vérandas non déclarées
    https://www.usine-digitale.fr/article/avec-accenture-et-de-l-ia-le-fisc-veut-detecter-les-piscines-et-autre

    Pour lutter contre la fraude, le fisc a signé un partenariat avec la société américaine de conseil informatique Accenture. Les Alpes-Maritimes, la Charente-Maritime et la Drôme ont expérimenté ce logiciel qui repère les anomalies fiscales en croisant les déclarations des contribuables, les vues aériennes et les plans de cadastre. La France ne serait pas au niveau dans la lutte contre la fraude fiscale, d’après un rapport de la Cour des comptes publié le 2 décembre 2019. La juridiction financière (...)

    #Accenture #algorithme #drone #aérien #fiscalité #fraude #contribuables #erreur #vidéo-surveillance (...)

    ##fiscalité ##surveillance

  • Accenture consacre 1 milliard de dollars par an à la reconversion de ses salariés
    https://www.lemonde.fr/emploi/article/2019/11/27/accenture-consacre-1-milliard-de-dollars-par-an-a-la-reconversion-de-ses-sal

    Pour anticiper l’automatisation des tâches et les suppressions de postes, le cabinet de conseil américain a fait le choix de former massivement. Tout commence par un bilan. Dorian Twiggs, 36 ans, venait tout juste de déménager de Detroit à Charlotte, en Caroline du Nord. Son nouvel employeur, le cabinet de conseil Accenture, l’avait placée dans une banque, afin de vérifier si tous les documents nécessaires pour décrocher des prêts immobiliers étaient réunis. Cela faisait onze ans qu’elle travaillait (...)

    #Accenture #algorithme #conditions #InternetOfThings #travail #travailleurs

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

  • #CBP terminates controversial $297 million #Accenture contract amid continued staffing struggles

    #Customs_and_Border_Protection on Thursday ended its controversial $297 million hiring contract with Accenture, according to two senior DHS officials and an Accenture representative.
    As of December, when CBP terminated part of its contract, the company had only completed processing 58 applicants and only 22 had made it onto the payroll about a year after the company was hired.
    At the time, the 3,500 applicants that remained in the Accenture hiring pipeline were transferred to CBP’s own hiring center to complete the process.

    CBP cut ties with Accenture on processing applicants a few months ago, it retained some services, including marketing, advertising and applicant support.
    This week, the entire contract was terminated for “convenience,” government speak for agreeing to part ways without placing blame on Accenture.
    While government hiring is “slow and onerous, it’s also part of being in the government” and that’s “something we have to accept and deal with as we go forward,” said one of the officials.
    For its efforts, CBP paid Accenture around $19 million in start-up costs, and around $2 million for 58 people who got job offers, according to the officials.
    Over the last couple of months, CBP explored how to modify the contract, but ultimately decided to completely stop work and return any remaining funds to taxpayers.
    But it’s unclear how much money, if any, that will be.

    In addition, to the funds already paid to Accenture, CBP has around $39 million left to “settle and close the books” with the company, an amount which has yet to be determined.
    In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture the contract to help meet the hiring demands of an executive order on border security that President Donald Trump signed during his first week in office. The administration directed CBP to hire an additional 7,500 agents and officers on top of its current hiring goals.
    “We were in a situation where we needed to try something new” and “break the cycle of going backwards,” said a DHS official about why the agency started the contract.

    Meanwhile, hiring remains difficult for the agency amid a surge of migrants at the southern border that is stretching CBP resources thin.
    It “continues to be a very challenging environment,” said one official about hiring efforts this year.

    In fact, one of the reasons that CBP didn’t need Accenture to process applicants, is because the agency didn’t receive as many applications as it initially planned for.
    The agency has been focused on beating attrition and has been able to recently “beat it by a modest amount,” said the official. “Ultimately we would like to beat it by a heck of a lot, but we’re not there yet.”

    https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/05/politics/cbp-terminate-hiring-contract-accenture/index.html
    #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #USA #Ests-Unis #complexe_militaro-industriel #business

    • Border Profiteers

      On a recent sunny spring afternoon in Texas, a couple hundred Border Patrol agents, Homeland Security officials, and salespeople from a wide array of defense and security contractors gathered at the Bandera Gun Club about an hour northwest of San Antonio to eat barbecue and shoot each other’s guns. The techies wore flip-flops; the veterans wore combat boots. Everyone had a good time. They were letting loose, having spent the last forty-eight hours cooped up in suits and ties back at San Antonio’s Henry B. Gonzalez convention center, mingling and schmoozing, hawking their wares, and listening to immigration officials rail about how those serving in enforcement agencies are not, under any circumstances, Nazis.

      These profiteers and bureaucrats of the immigration-industrial complex were fresh from the 2019 #Border_Security_Expo —essentially a trade show for state violence, where law enforcement officers and weapons manufacturers gather, per the Expo’s marketing materials, to “identify and address new and emerging border challenges and opportunities through technology, partnership, and innovation.” The previous two days of panels, speeches, and presentations had been informative, a major in the Argentine Special Forces told me at the gun range, but boring. He was glad to be outside, where handguns popped and automatic rifles spat around us. I emptied a pistol into a target while a man in a Three Percenter militia baseball hat told me that I was a “natural-born killer.” A drone buzzed overhead until, in a demonstration of a company’s new anti-drone technology, a device that looked like a rocket launcher and fired a sort of exploding net took it down. “This is music to me,” the Argentine major said.

      Perhaps it’s not surprising the Border Security Expo attendees were so eager to blow off steam. This year’s event found many of them in a defensive posture, given the waves of bad press they’d endured since President Trump’s inauguration, and especially since the disastrous implementation of his family separation policy, officially announced by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions in April of 2018, before being rescinded by Trump two-and-a-half months later. Throughout the Expo, in public events and in background roundtable conversations with reporters, officials from the various component parts of the Department of Homeland Security rolled out a series of carefully rehearsed talking points: Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) need more money, personnel, and technology; taking migrants to hospitals distracts CBP officers from their real mission; and the 1997 Flores court settlement, which prohibits immigration enforcement agencies from detaining migrant families with children for more than twenty days, is undermining the very sovereignty of the United States. “We want a secure border, we want an immigration system that has integrity,” Ronald Vitiello, then–acting head of ICE, said in a keynote address to the hundreds of people gathered in San Antonio. “We have a generous immigration system in this country, but it has to have integrity in order for us to continue to be so generous.”

      More of a technocrat than his thuggish predecessor Thomas Homan, Vitiello also spoke at length about using the “dark web” to take down smugglers and the importance of having the most up-to-date data-management technology. But he spoke most adamantly about needing “a fix” for the Flores settlement. “If you prosecute crimes and you give people consequences, you get less of it,” he said. “With Flores, there’s no consequence, and everybody knows that,” a senior ICE official echoed to reporters during a background conversation immediately following Vitiello’s keynote remarks. “That’s why you’re seeing so many family units. We cannot apply a consequence to a family unit, because we have to release them.”

      Meanwhile, around 550 miles to the west, in El Paso, hundreds of migrants, including children and families, were being held by CBP under a bridge, reportedly forced to sleep on the ground, with inadequate medical attention. “They treated us like we are animals,” one Honduran man told Texas Monthly. “I felt what they were trying to do was to hurt us psychologically, so we would understand that this is a lesson we were being taught, that we shouldn’t have crossed.” Less than a week after the holding pen beneath the bridge closed, Vitiello’s nomination to run ICE would be pulled amid a spate of firings across DHS; President Trump wanted to go “in a tougher direction.”

      Family Values

      On the second day of the Border Security Expo, in a speech over catered lunch, Scott Luck, deputy chief of Customs and Border Protection and a career Border Patrol agent, lamented that the influx of children and families at the border meant that resources were being diverted from traditional enforcement practices. “Every day, about 150 agents spend their shifts at hospitals and medical facilities with illegal aliens receiving treatment,” he said. “The annual salary cost for agents on hospital watch is more than $11.5 million. Budget analysts estimate that 13 percent of our operational budget—the budget that we use to buy equipment, to buy vehicles for our men and women—is now used for transportation, medical expenses, diapers, food, and other necessities to care for illegal aliens in Border Patrol custody.”

      As far as Luck was concerned, every dollar spent on food and diapers is one not spent on drones and weapons, and every hour an agent spends guarding a migrant in a hospital is an hour they don’t spend on the border. “It’s not what they signed up for. The mission they signed up for is to protect the United States border, to protect the communities in which they live and serve,” he told reporters after his speech. “The influx, the volume, the clutter that this creates is frustrating.” Vitiello applied an Orwellian inversion: “We’re not helping them as fast as we want to,” he said of migrant families apprehended at the border.

      Even when discussing the intimate needs of detained migrant families, the language border officials used to describe their remit throughout the Expo was explicitly militaristic: achieving “operational control,” Luck said, requires “impedance and denial” and “situational awareness.” He referred to technology as a “vital force multiplier.” He at least stopped short of endorsing the president’s framing that what is happening on the border constitutes an invasion, instead describing it as a “deluge.”

      According to the Migration Policy Institute, a non-partisan think tank, the U.S. immigrant population has continued to grow—although at a slower rate than it did before the 2007 recession, and undocumented people appear to make up a smaller proportion of the overall population. Regardless, in fiscal year 2018, both ICE and CBP stepped up their enforcement activities, arresting, apprehending, and deporting people at significantly higher rates than the previous year. More than three times as many family members were apprehended at the border last year than in 2017, the Pew Research Center reports, and in the first six months of FY 2019 alone there were 189,584 apprehensions of “family units”: more than half of all apprehensions at the border during that time, and more than the full-year total of apprehended families for any other year on record. While the overall numbers have not yet begun to approach those of the 1980s and 1990s, when apprehensions regularly exceeded one million per year, the demographics of who is arriving at the United States southern border are changing: fewer single men from Mexico and more children and families from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—in other words, an ever-wider range of desperate victims of drug gangs and American policies that have long supported corrupt regimes.

      This change has presented people like Luck with problems they insist are merely logistical: aging Border Patrol stations, he told us at the Expo, “are not luxurious in any way, and they were never intended to handle families and children.” The solution, according to Vitiello, is “continued capital investment” in those facilities, as well as the cars and trucks necessary to patrol the border region and transport those apprehended from CBP custody to ICE detention centers, the IT necessary to sift through vast amounts of data accumulated through untold surveillance methods, and all of “the systems by which we do our work.”

      Neither Vitiello nor Luck would consider whether those systems—wherein thousands of children, ostensibly under the federal government’s care, have been sexually abused and five, from December through May of this year, have died—ought to be questioned. Both laughed off calls from migrant justice organizers, activists, and politicians to abolish ICE. “The concept of the Department of Homeland Security—and ICE as an agency within it—was designed for us to learn the lessons from 9/11,” Vitiello said. “Those needs still exist in this society. We’re gonna do our part.” DHS officials have even considered holding migrant children at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, according to the New York Times, where a new $23 million “contingency mass migration complex” is being built. The complex, which is to be completed by the end of the year, will have a capacity of thirteen thousand.

      Violence is the Point

      The existence of ICE may be a consequence of 9/11, but the first sections of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border—originally to contain livestock—went up in 1909 through 1911. In 1945, in response to a shift in border crossings from Texas to California, the U.S. Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization Service recycled fencing wire and posts from internment camps in Crystal City, Texas, where more than a hundred thousand Japanese Americans had been imprisoned during World War II. “Although the INS could not erect a continuous line of fence along the border, they hoped that strategic placement of the fence would ‘compel persons seeking to enter the United States illegally to attempt to go around the ends of the fence,’” historian Kelly Lytle Hernández, quoting from government documents, writes in Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol. “What lay at the end of the fences and canals were desert lands and mountains extremely dangerous to cross without guidance or sufficient water. The fences, therefore, discouraged illegal immigration by exposing undocumented border crossers to the dangers of daytime dehydration and nighttime hypothermia.”

      Apprehension and deportation tactics continued to escalate in the years following World War II—including Operation Wetback, the infamous (and heavily propagandized) mass-deportation campaign of 1954—but the modern, militarized border era was greatly boosted by Bill Clinton. It was during Clinton’s first administration that Border Patrol released its “Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond,” which introduced the idea of “prevention through deterrence,” a theory of border policing that built on the logic of the original wall and hinges upon increasing the “cost” of migration “to the point that many will consider it futile to continue to attempt illegal entry.” With the Strategic Plan, the agency was requesting more money, officers, and equipment in order to “enhance national security and safeguard our immigration heritage.”

      The plan also noted that “a strong interior enforcement posture works well for border control,” and in 1996, amid a flurry of legislation targeting people of color and the poor, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which empowered the federal government to deport more people more quickly and made it nearly impossible for undocumented immigrants to obtain legal status. “Before 1996, internal enforcement activities had not played a very significant role in immigration enforcement,” the sociologists Douglas Massey and Karen A. Pren wrote in 2012. “Afterward these activities rose to levels not seen since the deportation campaigns of the Great Depression.” With the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2002, immigration was further securitized and criminalized, paving the way for an explosion in border policing technology that has further aligned the state with the defense and security industry. And at least one of Border Patrol’s “key assumptions,” explicitly stated in the 1994 strategy document, has borne out: “Violence will increase as effects of strategy are felt.”

      What this phrasing obscures, however, is that violence is the border strategy. In practice, what “prevention through deterrence” has meant is forcing migrants to cross the U.S.-Mexico border in the desert, putting already vulnerable people at even greater risk. Closing urban points of entry, for example, or making asylum-seekers wait indefinitely in Mexico while their claims are processed, pushes migrants into remote areas where there is a higher likelihood they will suffer injury and death, as in the case of seven-year-old Jakil Caal Maquin, who died of dehydration and shock after being taken into CBP custody in December. (A spokesperson for CBP, in an email response, deflected questions about whether the agency considers children dying in its custody a deterrent.) Maquin is one of many thousands who have died attempting to cross into the United States: the most conservative estimate comes from CBP itself, which has recovered the remains of 7,505 people from its southwest border sectors between 1998 and 2018. This figure accounts for neither those who die on the Mexican side of the border, nor those whose bodies remain lost to the desert.

      Draconian immigration policing causes migrants to resort to smugglers and traffickers, creating the conditions for their exploitation by cartels and other violent actors and increasing the likelihood that they will be kidnapped, coerced, or extorted. As a result, some migrants have sought the safety of collective action in the form of the “caravan” or “exodus,” which has then led the U.S. media and immigration enforcement agencies to justify further militarization of the border. Indeed, in his keynote address at the Expo, Luck described “the emerging prevalence of large groups of one hundred people or more” as “troubling and especially dangerous.” Later, a sales representative for the gun manufacturer Glock very confidently explained to me that this was because agents of al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, were embedded with the caravans.

      Branding the Border

      Unsurprisingly, caravans came up frequently at the Border Security Expo. (An ICE spokesperson would later decline to explain what specific threat they pose to national security, instead citing general statistics about the terrorist watchlist, “special interest aliens,” and “suspicious travel patterns.”) During his own keynote speech, Vitiello described how ICE, and specifically its subcomponent Homeland Security Investigations, had deployed surveillance and intelligence-gathering techniques to monitor the progress of caravans toward the border. “When these caravans have come, we’ve had trained, vetted individuals on the ground in those countries reporting in real time what they were seeing: who the organizers were, how they were being funded,” he said, before going on an astonishing tangent:

      That’s the kind of capability that also does amazing things to protecting brands, property rights, economic security. Think about it. If you start a company, introduce a product that’s innovative, there are people in the world who can take that, deconstruct it, and create their own version of it and sell it as yours. All the sweat that went into whatever that product was, to build your brand, they’ll take it away and slap it on some substandard product. It’s not good for consumers, it’s not good for public safety, and it’s certainly an economic drain on the country. That’s part of the mission.

      That the then–acting director of ICE, the germ-cell of fascism in the bourgeois American state, would admit that an important part of his agency’s mission is the protection of private property is a testament to the Trump administration’s commitment to saying the quiet part out loud.

      In fact, brands and private industry had pride of place at the Border Security Expo. A memorial ceremony for men and women of Border Patrol who have been killed in the line of duty was sponsored by Sava Solutions, an IT firm that has been awarded at least $482 million in federal contracts since 2008. Sava, whose president spent twenty-four years with the DEA and whose director of business development spent twenty with the FBI, was just one of the scores of firms in attendance at the Expo, each hoping to persuade the bureaucrats in charge of acquiring new gear for border security agencies that their drones, their facial recognition technology, their “smart” fences were the best of the bunch. Corporate sponsors included familiar names like Verizon and Motorola, and other less well-known ones, like Elbit Systems of America, a subsidiary of Israel’s largest private defense contractor, as well as a handful of IT firms with aggressive slogans like “Ever Vigilant” (CACI), “Securing the Future” (ManTech), and “Securing Your Tomorrow” (Unisys).

      The presence of these firms—and indeed the very existence of the Expo—underscores an important truth that anyone attempting to understand immigration politics must reckon with: border security is big business. The “homeland security and emergency management market,” driven by “increasing terrorist threats and biohazard attacks and occurrence of unpredictable natural disasters,” is projected to grow to more than $742 billion by 2023 from $557 billion in 2018, one financial analysis has found. In the coming decades, as more people are displaced by climate catastrophe and economic crises—estimates vary between 150 million and 1 billion by 2050—the industry dedicated to policing the vulnerable stands to profit enormously. By 2013, the United States was already spending more on federal immigration enforcement than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined, including the FBI and DEA; ICE’s budget has doubled since its inception in 2003, while CBP’s has nearly tripled. Between 1993 and 2018, the number of Border Patrol agents grew from 4,139 to 19,555. And year after year, Democrats and Republicans alike have been happy to fuel an ever more high-tech deportation machine. “Congress has given us a lot of money in technology,” Luck told reporters after his keynote speech. “They’ve given us over what we’ve asked for in technology!”

      “As all of this rhetoric around security has increased, so has the impetus to give them more weapons and more tools and more gadgets,” Jacinta Gonzalez, a senior campaign organizer with Mijente, a national network of migrant justice activists, told me. “That’s also where the profiteering comes in.” She continued: “Industries understand what’s good for business and adapt themselves to what they see is happening. If they see an administration coming into power that is pro-militarization, anti-immigrant, pro-police, anti-communities of color, then that’s going to shape where they put their money.”

      By way of example, Gonzalez pointed to Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel, who spent $1.25 million supporting Trump’s 2016 election campaign and followed that up last year by donating $1 million to the Club for Growth—a far-right libertarian organization founded by Heritage Foundation fellow and one-time Federal Reserve Board prospect Stephen Moore—as well as about $350,000 to the Republican National Committee and other GOP groups. ICE has awarded Palantir, the $20 billion surveillance firm founded by Thiel, several contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to manage its data streams—a partnership the agency considers “mission critical,” according to documents reviewed by The Intercept. Palantir, in turn, runs on Amazon Web Services, the cloud computing service provided by the world’s most valuable public company, which is itself a key contractor in managing the Department of Homeland Security’s $6.8 billion IT portfolio.

      Meanwhile, former DHS secretary John Kelly, who was Trump’s chief of staff when the administration enacted its “zero-tolerance” border policy, has joined the board of Caliburn International—parent organization of the only for-profit company operating shelters for migrant children. “Border enforcement and immigration policy,” Caliburn reported in an SEC filing last year, “is driving significant growth.” As Harsha Walia writes in Undoing Border Imperialism, “the state and capitalism are again in mutual alliance.”

      Triumph of the Techno-Nativists

      At one point during the Expo, between speeches, I stopped by a booth for Network Integrity Systems, a security firm that had set up a demonstration of its Sentinel™ Perimeter Intrusion Detection System. A sales representative stuck out his hand and introduced himself, eager to explain how his employer’s fiber optic motion sensors could be used at the border, or—he paused to correct himself—“any kind of perimeter.” He invited me to step inside the space that his coworkers had built, starting to say “cage” but then correcting himself, again, to say “small enclosure.” (It was literally a cage.) If I could get out, climbing over the fencing, without triggering the alarm, I would win a $500 Amazon gift card. I did not succeed.

      Overwhelmingly, the vendors in attendance at the Expo were there to promote this kind of technology: not concrete and steel, but motion sensors, high-powered cameras, and drones. Customs and Border Patrol’s chief operating officer John Sanders—whose biography on the CBP website describes him as a “seasoned entrepreneur and innovator” who has “served on the Board of Directors for several leading providers of contraband detection, geospatial intelligence, and data analytics solutions”—concluded his address by bestowing on CBP the highest compliment he could muster: declaring the agency comparable “to any start-up.” Rhetoric like Sanders’s, ubiquitous at the Expo, renders the border both bureaucratic and boring: a problem to be solved with some algorithmic mixture of brutality and Big Data. The future of border security, as shaped by the material interests that benefit from border securitization, is not a wall of the sort imagined by President Trump, but a “smart” wall.

      High-ranking Democrats—leaders in the second party of capital—and Republicans from the border region have championed this compromise. During the 2018-2019 government shutdown, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson told reporters that Democrats would appropriate $5.7 billion for “border security,” so long as that did not include a wall of Trump’s description. “Walls are primitive. What we need to do is have border security,” House Majority Whip Jim Clyburn said in January. He later expanded to CNN: “I’ve said that we ought to have a smart wall. I defined that as a wall using drones to make it too high to get over, using x-ray equipment to make it too wide to get around, and using scanners to go deep enough not to be able to tunnel under it. To me, that would be a smart thing to do.”

      Even the social democratic vision of Senator Bernie Sanders stops short at the border. “If you open the borders, my God, there’s a lot of poverty in this world, and you’re going to have people from all over the world,” he told Iowa voters in early April, “and I don’t think that’s something that we can do at this point.” Over a week later, during a Fox News town hall with Pennsylvania voters, he recommitted: “We need border security. Of course we do. Who argues with that? That goes without saying.”

      To the extent that Trump’s rhetoric, his administration’s immigration policies, and the enforcement agencies’ practices have made the “border crisis” more visible than ever before, they’ve done so on terms that most Democrats and liberals fundamentally agree with: immigration must be controlled and policed; the border must be enforced. One need look no further than the high priest of sensible centrism, Thomas Friedman, whose major complaint about Trump’s immigration politics is that he is “wasting” the crisis—an allusion to Rahm Emanuel’s now-clichéd remark that “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” (Frequently stripped of context, it is worth remembering that Emanuel made this comment in the throes of the 2008 financial meltdown, at the Wall Street Journal’s CEO Council, shortly following President Obama’s election.) “Regarding the border, the right place for Democrats to be is for a high wall with a big gate,” Friedman wrote in November of 2018. A few months later, a tour led by Border Patrol agents of the San Ysidro port of entry in San Diego left Friedman “more certain than ever that we have a real immigration crisis and that the solution is a high wall with a big gate—but a smart gate.”

      As reasonable as this might sound to anxious New York Times readers looking for what passes as humanitarian thinking in James Bennet’s opinion pages, the horror of Friedman’s logic eventually reveals itself when he considers who might pass through the big, smart gate in the high, high wall: “those who deserve asylum” and “a steady flow of legal, high-energy, and high-I.Q. immigrants.” Friedman’s tortured hypothetical shows us who he considers to be acceptable subjects of deportation and deprivation: the poor, the lazy, and the stupid. This is corporate-sponsored, state-sanctioned eugenics: the nativism of technocrats.

      The vision of a hermetically sealed border being sold, in different ways, by Trump and his allies, by Democrats, and by the Border Security Expo is in reality a selectively permeable one that strictly regulates the movement of migrant labor while allowing for the unimpeded flow of capital. Immigrants in the United States, regardless of their legal status, are caught between two factions of the capitalist class, each of which seek their immiseration: the citrus farmers, construction firms, and meat packing plants that benefit from an underclass of unorganized and impoverished workers, and the defense and security firms that keep them in a state of constant criminality and deportability.

      You could even argue that nobody in a position of power really wants a literal wall. Even before taking office, Trump himself knew he could only go so far. “We’re going to do a wall,” he said on the campaign trail in 2015. However: “We’re going to have a big, fat beautiful door on the wall.” In January 2019, speaking to the American Farm Bureau Association, Trump acknowledged the necessity of a mechanism allowing seasonal farmworkers from Mexico to cross the border, actually promising to loosen regulations on employers who rely on temporary migrant labor. “It’s going to be easier for them to get in than what they have to go through now,” he said, “I know a lot about the farming world.”

      At bottom, there is little material difference between this and what Friedman imagines to be the smarter, more humane approach. While establishment liberals would no doubt prefer that immigration enforcement be undertaken quietly, quickly, and efficiently, they have no categorical objection to the idea that noncitizens should enjoy fewer rights than citizens or be subject to different standards of due process (standards that are already applied in deeply inequitable fashion).

      As the smorgasbord of technologies and services so garishly on display at the Border Security Expo attests, maintaining the contradiction between citizens and noncitizens (or between the imperial core and the colonized periphery) requires an ever-expanding security apparatus, which itself becomes a source of ever-expanding profit. The border, shaped by centuries of bourgeois interests and the genocidal machinations of the settler-colonial nation-state, constantly generates fresh crises on which the immigration-industrial complex feeds. In other words, there is not a crisis at the border; the border is the crisis.

      CBP has recently allowed Anduril, a start-up founded by one of Peter Thiel’s mentees, Palmer Luckey, to begin testing its artificial intelligence-powered surveillance towers and drones in Texas and California. Sam Ecker, an Anduril engineer, expounded on the benefits of such technology at the Expo. “A tower doesn’t get tired. It doesn’t care about being in the middle of the desert or a river around the clock,” he told me. “We just let the computers do what they do best.”

      https://thebaffler.com/outbursts/border-profiteers-oconnor

  • The #iot Technology Focuses of #ey, GOFAR, #accenture, Receipt Bank, and #amazon
    https://hackernoon.com/the-iot-technology-focuses-of-ey-gofar-accenture-receipt-bank-and-amazon

    You’ve likely seen the acronym around, particularly if you work in the tech sphere. But it, like blockchain and any number of other tech trends, has for many people remained as meaningless today as it was when they first heard it.IoT. The internet of things.The internet. Things. Two particularly broad concepts that thankfully don’t combine to form something twice as meaningless, but rather one of the most exciting and revolutionary technological developments of the last few decades.So what is IoT? And what exactly does IoT in Australia look like? Let’s hear from five companies who are leading the charge in this cutting-edge field of tech, to find out what the IoT world of the future might look like.How 5 top companies are preparing for IoTWhat is IoT?Before we learn about the how and the (...)

    #internet-of-things

  • Government paying private firm $297 million to help hire 5,000 Border Patrol agents

    The contract with a division of #Accenture, an international professional services corporation with $35 billion in revenues in 2017, comes at a time when the Border Patrol is struggling to meet minimum staffing levels mandated by Congress and is losing more agents per year than it hires.

    http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-patrol-hiring-20171217-story.html
    #privatisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-frontière #garde-frontière #frontières #USA #Etats-Unis #Border_patrol_agents #business #argent #industrie_militaro-sécuritaire

    • Top Democrat seeks answers on $297 million recruiting contract for Trump’s immigration crackdown

      If the contract runs its full five-year course, Accenture would be paid $297 million to assist CBP to hire 7,500 new employees, including 5,000 Border Patrol agents, 2,000 customs officers and 500 Air and Marine officers. The company will be paid $42.6 million in the first year, according to federal contracting records.

      http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/sd-me-border-hires-20180103-story.html

    • Customs and Border Protection Paid $14 Million to Recruit Two Agents, Government Report Finds

      US Customs and Border Protection paid a consulting company nearly $14 million to recruit new agents as the agency struggled to boost staffing levels amid an immigration crackdown. For that fee, the company processed just two successful job offers. The startling figure, along with plans to use a questionable Blade Runner-like lie detection system, is among the findings of a scathing new investigation by the Department of Homeland Security’s internal watchdog.

      After receiving multiple complaints, DHS’s Office of Inspector General began investigating a five-year contract worth up to $297 million that CBP, a division of DHS, awarded last year to Accenture Federal Services, a subsidiary of global consulting company Accenture. The contract gives Accenture nearly $40,000 for each of the 7,500 CBP officials—including 5,000 Border Patrol agents—it is supposed to help recruit and hire. The OIG report, released Monday, shows that Accenture’s services have been even more costly than previously known and could put CBP at risk of being sued.

      The watchdog found that Accenture is “nowhere near” meeting its goal of hiring 7,500 people over five years, even though CBP has used many of its own resources to do the job for which it is paying Accenture. “As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided,” the report states. “Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars.”

      CBP has struggled for years to hire Border Patrol agents. Congress has set a minimum staffing level of about 21,370 agents, but there were just 19,555 agents in 2018. The Accenture contract came in response to President Donald Trump’s January 2017 request for 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents. It is still not clear whether CBP will be able to hire those agents, because Congress has refused to provide the funding for hiring them.

      When CBP awarded Accenture the hiring contract in November 2017, Mother Jones reported in June, it was essentially paying the company for extremely expensive hand-holding throughout the application process for new agents. Accenture was supposed to give applicants “one-on-one” encouragement so they didn’t get “stuck,” according to federal contracting documents. That included reminding them to take their entrance exam and providing “helpful information” about the test. It was also supposed to help applicants schedule their physical fitness test and medical exams.

      Accenture was to assist with all steps of CBP’s hiring process within 90 days of getting the contract. But CBP did not establish metrics to determine whether Accenture was doing that, the report states. OIG’s assessment of Accenture’s effectiveness was particularly damning. “[A]s of October 1, 2018—10 months into the contract—CBP has paid Accenture approximately $13.6 million for startup costs, security requirements, recruiting, and applicant support,” the report found. “In return, Accenture has processed two accepted job offers.”

      CBP disagreed with that characterization in a response included in OIG’s report. “Accenture has created a hiring structure…and conducted many of the hiring steps for several thousand applicants,” Henry Moak, a CBP official wrote. OIG replied that the contracting documents it reviewed show that Accenture and CBP are unable to track applicants recruited by Accenture. “As such,” the report states, “we question the veracity of CBP management’s assertion.”

      Instead of providing a team of hiring experts, OIG found, Accenture “relied heavily” on CBP during the hiring process. A key part of the contract required Accenture to develop a system to track applicants. That did not happen, and the company used CBP’s system instead, according to OIG. Accenture also planned to use a computer program to speed up background investigations and processing of security clearances, but the program didn’t work. The company responded by reviewing security clearance forms manually, which created a backlog.

      OIG is also concerned about Accenture’s decision to use a lie detection system called EyeDetect to screen applicants. The system works by having a computer analyze respondents’ eyes as they answer questions. As Wired reported last week, the National Security Agency found that EyeDetect, a product of technology company Converus, worked no better than random chance at identifying false statements when it tested an early version of the system in 2013. Converus’ own scientists have conducted the only peer-reviewed study of EyeDetect. Yet in August, Accenture deployed EyeDetect at a hiring expo without getting approval from DHS’s science and technology compliance office. Accenture plans to use EyeDetect results to decide whether to keep applicants in its own pool of potential CBP hires or give them to CBP to process. That could put CBP at risk of being sued by applicants if they are held to different standards by Accenture and CBP, according to OIG.

      The lack of funding raises additional questions about why CBP quickly awarded the lucrative contract to Accenture. DHS’s Inspector General found last year that CBP had failed to justify the need for more Border Patrol agents. Congress stated in a March budget document that hiring additional Border Patrol agents was “not supported by any analysis of workload and capability gaps across CBP.”

      CBP has been strangely sympathetic to Accenture’s shortcomings. At one point, Accenture did not know which applicants it was recruiting, so “CBP agreed to give credit and temporarily pay Accenture for a percentage of all applicants regardless of whether CBP or Accenture processed the applicants,” OIG found. CBP also went out of its way to take blame, telling OIG in its responses to the report that it has sometimes failed to clear Accenture staff on time.

      “We disagree,” OIG responded. “Based on our review of contract documentation…CBP has been accommodating Accenture, rather than Accenture accommodating CBP.”

      https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/customs-and-border-protection-paid-14-million-to-recruit-two-agents-gov

  • PartyBot, l’IA qui vous identifie pour diffuser vos morceaux favoris en soirée
    http://www.numerama.com/tech/249793-partybot-lia-qui-vous-identifie-pour-diffuser-vos-morceaux-favoris-

    Le champ des possibles concernant l’utilisation des intelligences artificielles est quasi-infini, mais qui aurait penser à en utiliser une en soirée ? C’est le cas d’Accenture Interactive, qui a imaginé un mélange d’IA et de reconnaissance faciale pour vous aider à passer une bonne soirée en s’assurant que la playlist incite le maximum de monde à gagner le dancefloor. Et si vous alliez en boîte de nuit avec votre Google Home ou Amazon Alexa, pour qu’ils s’assurent que vous passez une bonne soirée ? Les (...)

    #Accenture #algorithme #comportement #facial

  • Le Monde (pages « #Économie ») a publié le 26 septembre un article intitulé « Après un "cyber-casse", la technologie blockchain se cherche un avenir ». Je ne cherche pas à faire de la publicité pour cet article, très mauvais, mais 1) à signaler les princpales erreurs, suite à une demande sur un rézosocio, 2) à en profiter pour illustrer comment fonctionne la presse, la plupart du temps.

    Ah, au fait, l’article : http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/09/26/apres-un-cyber-casse-la-technologie-blockchain-se-cherche-un-avenir_5003434_

    L’erreur la moins grave mais la plus spectaculaire, et la plus révélatrice des conditions de production des articles de presse, est celle sur le nom de la monnaie utilisée par #Ethereum. L’article la nomme « ethereum » alors que c’est « ether » (Ethereum est la technologie, la monnaie se nomme ether). Cela montre qu’aucune relecture de l’article n’a été faite, n’importe quel participant au projet, même le plus ignorant et/ou débutant, aurait pu déceler cette erreur. Le journaliste ne peut pas tout connaitre, mais le problème est que rares sont les articles dans les médias qui sont relus par quelqu’un qui connait le sujet.

    L’erreur la plus grave est celle concernant les décisions prises pour faire face au vol. L’auteur écrit « Une large partie de la communauté a finalement accepté de revenir au niveau du bloc précédant le vol ». C’est tout à fait faux mais, en effet, des tas de médias officiels ont repris cette légende, qui marque une incompréhension de la #chaîne_de_blocs. Revenir en arrière est théoriquement possible mais annulerait toutes les transactions ayant eu lieu depuis le vol, y compris celles sans aucun rapport avec les coupables ou avec les victimes. Une telle mesure ne peut pas sérieusement être envisagée pour une chaîne aussi active d’Ethereum, et surtout pas des semaines après, quand des tas de transactions ont eu lieu. Ce qui a été fait le 20 juillet https://seenthis.net/messages/510691 était de changer les règles de la chaîne, pour permettre de vider le compte du voleur et de rembourser les volés. C’est donc le futur qui a été changé, pas le passé.

    Sinon, la traduction de « fork » par « fourche » est amusante et nouvelle (on dit putôt en général « scission » ou « division » ou « bifurcation »). Parmi les autres erreurs (trop pour être toutes citées), la soi-disant adresse d’un compte « un compte en banque au cœur d’une immense bataille technologique. Numéroté 0x5e8f0e63 » n’a pas la syntaxe d’une adresse Ethereum.

    Autre problème, le sensationnalisme de l’article (« un coin obscur du cyberespace », « un tour à la Arsène Lupin version XXIe siècle »), qui irait bien sur BFM TV mais qui colle peu avec ce que le Monde essaie de faire croire de lui-même.

    Enfin, il faut aussi se demander pourquoi cet article, maintenant, alors que le vol a eu lieu en juin et la scission en juillet. Le seul élément nouveau dans cet article est le publi-reportage pour la solution d’#Accenture « un nouveau concept permettant de modifier la blockchain », présentée comme la solution aux problèmes. Il est donc facile de voir l’origine de l’article : Accenture a envoyé un dossier de presse aux médias, avec les éléments de langage adaptés, et ce dossier de presse a été repris sans travail d’enquête sérieux. (Sur l’idée de modification de la chaîne de blocs, voir https://seenthis.net/messages/523881 )

    À noter que, comme très souvent, l’article de Wikipédia sur le sujet ne contient pas les erreurs qu’on trouve dans les médias institutionnels https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum#The_DAO_and_the_blockchain_fork

    • Selon Greenwich Associates, le secteur financier y a investi 1 milliard de dollars cette année [dans la technologie blockchain].

    • Bonjour
      Merci de votre critique, certes très négative, mais constructive.
      Bon, je vais tenter un exercice de transparence, avec cette réponse.

      1) Sur le factuel
      C’est une évidence, je ne suis pas un expert de l’Ether/Ethereum/Blockchain. En tant que correspondant à Londres, je suis amené à couvrir une très large palette de sujets, certains que je connais très bien, d’autres moins. Je n’ai pas fait ce sujet dans le vide : j’ai interviewé pour l’occasion les gens d’Accenture, le chercheur Giuseppe Ateniese et (uniquement par email, pour des raisons de délai et de décalage horaire) Bok Khoo, un expert indépendant. Mais je me dois d’accepter mes erreurs factuelles.

      a) Donc, ma confusion entre Ether et Ethereum : mea culpa.

      b) Sur l’adresse du compte du hackeur, que vous me dites fausse, je ne l’ai pas inventée : ça vient d’ici (https://gastracker.io/addr/0x5e8f0e63e7614c47079a41ad4c37be7def06df5a) , lien qui m’a été donné par Bok Khoo. Mais peut-être n’est-ce pas le bon lien ? Ou la bonne adresse ?

      c) Sur le changement a posteriori des blocs, « erreur la plus grave » que j’ai commise, d’après vous. Vous me dites que le passé n’a pas été changé, mais que l’avenir l’a été, en modifiant les règles régissant les Ethers. C’est techniquement correct. Je veux bien accepter qu’il s’agisse de ma part d’une excessive simplification. Mais le fait est que ces changements de règles reviennent à largement vider le compte du hackeur. Cela revient à annuler des événements passés.
      Et mettez-vous deux minutes à ma place : j’ai 4500 signes pour écrire un article sur la question de l’immuabilité de la blockchain, donc un maximum des deux ou trois phrases pour expliquer la façon dont le problème du cyber-casse a été résolu. Il faut simplifier. D’ailleurs, les journaux un peu partout à travers la planète, y compris les plus sérieux, ont expliqué le phénomène de la même façon.
      Sur la traduction : « fourche », c’est plutôt pas mal comme traduction de « fork », non ?

      2) Sur le fond
      Vos reproches ne répondent pas à la question fondamentale soulevée par cet article : l’immuabilité de la blockchain, présentée comme sa grande force, est-elle aussi une grande fragilité ? Faut-il concevoir de possibles modifications, comme le suggère Accenture ? C’est le cœur du sujet de l’article, auquel vous ne répondez pas. J’ai fait des erreurs factuelles, dont acte, mais le cœur du sujet reste valable.

      3) Sur la façon dont fonctionnent les médias
      Pour comprendre d’où vient cet article, je vais vous raconter sa genèse. Un jour, Acccenture m’a contacté, me parlant de leur nouveau brevet pour rendre possible la modification de la blockchain. Je ne suis pas là pour faire leur publicité. Je reçois des tas de communiqués de presse dont je ne parle jamais. Mais il se trouve que j’ai trouvé le sujet intéressant : la question de l’immuabilité de la blockchain m’a semblé pertinente. Et dans la presse quotidienne, il faut une « accroche d’actualité » pour parler d’un sujet, ce que me donnait le nouveau brevet déposé par Accenture.

      Ensuite, il y a une question de forme journalistique. Comment est-ce que j’explique ce débat technique en 4500 signes à une communauté de lecteurs qui n’a dans sa grande majorité jamais entendu parler de blockchain ? C’est en recherchant le sujet que je suis tombé sur le cyber-casse de juin, dont j’ignorais l’existence. Ca m’a semblé une bonne façon d’expliquer le sujet et de le rendre vivant.
      Vous me reprochez mon ton sensationnaliste. C’est un mauvais procès. Pour vous donner une idée du problème, sachez que j’ai aussi reçu un courrier de lecteur après cet article qui me dit en substance que c’est trop compliqué : « il semble difficile de faire passer ce type d’article auprès de lecteurs qui ne sont pas formés en la matière. Peut-être que les titulaires d’un master en sciences de l’informatique y trouveront matière à réflexion ? Moi pas. »

      Fondamentalement, deux logiques s’opposent ici. De mon côté, j’ai peu de place pour expliquer ce qu’est une blockchain, raconter le cyber-casse et rendre tout ça digeste pour les lecteurs. Cela signifie d’inévitables simplifications. De votre côté, mes simplifications vont forcément vous hérisser.

      J’ajoute un dernier point, fondamental. Quand j’ai préparé cet article, j’ai envoyé un message de demande d’informations au DAO Hub. Je n’ai jamais eu de réponse. Mes erreurs factuelles auraient sans doute pu être évitées si j’avais eu un interlocuteur.

      Ca pose une question qui revient régulièrement dans le monde de la presse : les journalistes peinent énormément à avoir des interlocuteurs qui expliquent des points techniques, puis on leur reproche leurs simplifications quand ils écrivent. En ce sens, je suis content qu’un dialogue soit désormais établi.

    • Merci de votre réponse, c’est rare que les médias acceptent de « descendre dans l’arène » https://seenthis.net/messages/526571

      Alors, point par point, avec les mêmes numéros.

      1) a) Je ne reproche pas à un journaliste généraliste de ne pas être expert du sujet, mais de n’avoir pas fait relire par un expert.

      1) b) L’adresse du compte est correcte mais ce n’est pas celle qu’il y avait dans l’article du Monde. Plus amusant, le lien que vous donnez est vers un explorateur d’Ethereum Classic, c’est-à-dire ceux qui ont refusé le changement (et où ce compte a donc toujours de l’argent). Si vous regardez sur un explorateur d’Ethereum tout court (« canal habituel » et pas « canal historique ») comme https://etherscan.io/address/0x5e8f0e63e7614c47079a41ad4c37be7def06df5a vous verrez un compte vide

      1) c) L’argument « les autres médias ont fait pareil » est un argument dangereux. Il reflète davantage le moutonnisme et l’entre-soi qu’une réalité objective sous-jacente.

      2) Sur l’immuabilité de la chaîne, j’ai au contraire répondu, dans cet article que je citais https://www.ethereum-france.com/la-chaine-de-blocs-nest-pas-immuable

      3) L’argument « c’est pour du grand public, pas pour des spécialistes » me semble tout aussi grave. C’est justement quand on écrit pour un vaste public qu’il faut être très rigoureux car, dans ce cas, les lecteurs ne peuvent pas corriger par eux-même. Que la vulgarisation soit un art difficile, je le conçois. Mais cela ne doit pas être une excuse pour les erreurs qu’on commet (car il s’agit bien d’erreurs et pas de « simplifications »). Et, malgré le discours élitiste de votre lecteur, j’ai entendu des tas de gens qui n’avaient pas de « master en sciences de l’informatique » dire des choses tout à fait intelligentes et sensées sur la chaîne de blocs.

      Quant au « DAO Hub », j’avoue ne pas connaitre et ne pas savoir ce que c’est. Mais dire qu’il est difficile de trouver des interlocuteurs est franchement excessif. Par exemple, vous pouvez demander dans votre propre journal, aux gens qui écrivent les articles sur le numérique et qui savent bien qui appeler.

    • Bonjour M Albert,

      Je rejoins Stéphane dans les mercis qu’il vous adresse : c’est rare que vos collègues corrigent, que reste-il de vraiment répondre aux critiques qu’on leur adresse.

      Pour reprendre cette discussion là où elle s’est arrêté, je souhaite souligner que la critique ici est en direction de l’ignorance crasse dont fait preuve une partie non négligeable de la profession et — apparemment — de votre rédaction. Vous semblez prendre ces critiques comme une attaque personnelle, or il n’en est rien. Vous comprendrez aisément que, pour toute personne avec une culture générale des enjeux du numérique, sortir des énormités telles qu’on les a lues dans votre article ou dans un article des Echos hier par ex. est tout bonnement risible.

      En ce sens, c’est assez ahurissant de lire des choses du genre "beh puisque tout le monde dans les médias raconte des bêtises, pourquoi on m’embête moi spécialement pour l’avoir fait" (je parle de votre argument : "D’ailleurs, les journaux un peu partout à travers la planète, y compris les plus sérieux, ont expliqué le phénomène de la même façon."). D’une part, c’est faux, d’autre part vous discrédite parce que vous faites là appel à un argument rhétologique fallacieux (logical fallacy en anglais) que l’on appelle argument d’autorité anonyme.

      Ensuite, excusez-moi, mais votre job est d’informer et clarifier sur différents enjeux. Et quand je dis ça, je pense bien à "clarify, don’t dumb down". J’ai écrit suffisamment de contenus de vulgarisation, Stéphane le fait également et très bien : oui, c’est difficile, mais ce n’est pas pour autant qu’il faut se cacher derrière la médiocrité et dire "Je veux bien accepter qu’il s’agisse de ma part d’une excessive simplification" ou encore "j’ai 4500 signes pour écrire un article sur la question de l’immuabilité de la blockchain, donc un maximum des deux ou trois phrases pour expliquer la façon dont le problème du cyber-casse a été résolu. Il faut simplifier." Une "excessive simplification" s’apparente à de la désinformation. Si vous ne savez pas défendre votre pitch et qualifier la faisabilité du travail à faire, alors changez d’angle. La qualité de l’information ne doit pas en souffir !

      Passons maintenant au contenu et les messages qu’il passe :

      – vous répondez ci-dessus : "Mais le fait est que ces changements de règles reviennent à largement vider le compte du hackeur. Cela revient à annuler des événements passés." Eh bien, non. Ce n’est pas ainsi que le contrat autonome initial a été écrit, ce n’est pas ce qui s’est passé. Du coup, c’est quoi votre argument au juste ?

      – vous écrivez : "Sur la traduction : « fourche », c’est plutôt pas mal comme traduction de « fork », non ?" Si, c’est bien si vous rédigez un article sur les dernières nouveautés culinaires. Vous vous plaignez de ne pas trouver des experts (j’y reviens plus bas) mais quand un expert vous explique comment utiliser le terme anglais correctement en français, vous n’acceptez pas le conseil. Alors faudrait savoir...

      Dans votre point 2), vous faites quelque chose de très dangereux et de fort décevant : vous utilisez (de nouveau) un argument rhétologique fallacieux. Il s’agit de charge de la preuve. C’est très facile de s’y prendre les pieds : donc, vous n’avez pas prouvé ce que vous avancez, donc vous demandez à Stéphane de vous prouver que vous avez tort. Je parle de ce passage : "Vos reproches ne répondent pas à la question fondamentale soulevée par cet article [...] C’est le cœur du sujet de l’article, auquel vous ne répondez pas. J’ai fait des erreurs factuelles, dont acte, mais le cœur du sujet reste valable." Dont acte, on vous a indiqué où aller chercher les infos... mais prudence parce que votre recours à ces outils rhétoriques est vraiment rapide.

      3) Vous écrivez : "Et dans la presse quotidienne, il faut une « accroche d’actualité » pour parler d’un sujet, ce que me donnait le nouveau brevet déposé par Accenture." Avez-vous suivi la réception de cette annonce ? Avez-vous constaté la risée et l’hilarité délirante que cette annonce a provoqué ? Le brevet d’Accenture est équivalent à une annonce du genre "on comprend rien et on veut que ça se sache". Alors, oui, il y aurait beaucoup de choses à dire sur cette demande de brevet. Mais fallait-il lier le hack de The DAO avec une telle ineptie corporate ? Parce que pour les lecteurs non-avertis, c’est rapide de voir un lien de causalité — ou un soupçon d’un tel lien — vu la manière dont est ficellé votre histoire. Et ça, c’est purement et simplement de l’intox.

      "Comment est-ce que j’explique ce débat technique en 4500 signes à une communauté de lecteurs qui n’a dans sa grande majorité jamais entendu parler de blockchain ?" En travaillant le sujet d’une manière faisable et en faisant un contenu correct. C’est difficile, mais pas impossible et — je répète — il faut savoir, quand on écrit sous telles contraintes, que certains sujets ne peuvent juste pas être traités dans les formats imposés. Pour votre information, des forks il y en a eu ailleurs.

      "Vous me reprochez mon ton sensationnaliste. C’est un mauvais procès. Pour vous donner une idée du problème, sachez que j’ai aussi reçu un courrier de lecteur après cet article qui me dit en substance que c’est trop compliqué" Eh oui, désolée, mais là, le souci vient de vous, très cher Monsieur. Quand on ne comprend pas quelque chose et on essaie d’en faire une réflexion complète, on fait du gloubiboulga comme c’est le cas là. J’ai suivi l’attaque de The DAO de très près (un peu de l’intérieur) et en lisant votre article, je n’étais pas sûre d’avoir vécu la chose que vous décrivez. Alors, peut-on éviter les rhétoriques fallacieuses (vous venez de faire votre 3e argument fallacieux, je ne vous en félicite pas) et revenir à une approche rationnelle et méthodologique de l’écriture ?

      "Fondamentalement, deux logiques s’opposent ici." Eh non, encore perdu. On ne vous demande pas d’être plus expert que les experts, mais de vous attaquer à ce que vous pourrez aborder sans casse. Là, les yeux ont été plus gros que le ventre. Vous n’êtes pas le seul, rassurez-vous, vos confrères et consoeurs font pareil et c’est surtout ce qui nous hérisse.

      "Ca pose une question qui revient régulièrement dans le monde de la presse : les journalistes peinent énormément à avoir des interlocuteurs qui expliquent des points techniques, puis on leur reproche leurs simplifications quand ils écrivent. En ce sens, je suis content qu’un dialogue soit désormais établi." Alors, là, je vous avoué, plein de gens qui ont lu ces quelques phrases ont rigolé. Sérieusement. Il y a une communauté très forte à Paris et en France de gens qui comprennent la partie technique de la chose. Il y a également des gens qui ont suivi cette histoire de (très) près. Vous cacher derrière ce genre d’excuses à deux balles ne vous fait pas honneur, désolée.

      Et pour vous prouver ce que je viens juste de dire, je vous invite à la prochaine conférence sur la blockchain et bitcoin (cherchez #MCONF sur twitter ou cliquer sur ce lien : http://bit.ly/2deM5o6

      Contactez-moi sur Twitter (@MaliciaRogue) pour que je vous réserve votre place. Et là, vous aurez des experts (dont Stéphane) à ne plus savoir qu’en faire et qui vous éviteront des embarassements futurs ;)

    • Bon, je sens que je ne suis pas en train de faire l’unanimité (ou alors, contre moi)...
      J’ai lu vos critiques. Je les trouve excessivement outrées mais j’en prends compte, croyez-moi. Merci de l’invitation à la prochaine conférence : c’est à Paris, je suis basé à Londres, et je ne pourrai pas y être. Je sais désormais qui contacter la prochaine fois que je parle du sujet.