• Stop Netanyahu Before He Gets Us All Killed

    via https://diasp.eu/p/17700907

    We could soon see several nuclear powers pitted against each other and dragging the world closer to nuclear annihilation.

    https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/netanyahu-war-on-iran

    Jeffrey D. Sachs & Sybil Fares
    Jun 16, 2025, Common Dreams

    For nearly 30 years, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has driven the #Middle_East into war and destruction. The man is a powder keg of violence. Throughout all the wars that he has championed, Netanyahu has always dreamed of the big one: to defeat and overthrow the Iranian Government. His long-sought war, just launched, might just get us all killed in a nuclear Armageddon, unless Netanyahu is stopped.

    #Netanyahu’s fixation on war goes back to his extremist mentors, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Yitzhak (...)

    • (... #Netanyahu’s fixation on war goes back to his extremist mentors, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Yitzhak) Shamir, and Menachem Begin. The older generation believed that Zionists should use whatever violence–wars, #assassinations, terror–is needed to achieve their aims of eliminating any Palestinian claim to a #homeland.

      The founders of Netanyahu’s political movement, the Likud, called for exclusive Zionist control over all of what had been British Mandatory Palestine. At the start of the British Mandate in the early 1920s, the #Muslim and #Christian Arabs constituted roughly 87% of the #population and owned ten times more land than the Jewish population. As of 1948, the Arabs still outnumbered the Jews roughly two to one. Nonetheless, the founding charter of #Likud (1977) declared that “between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.” The now infamous chant, “from the River to the Sea,” which is characterized as anti-Semitic, turns out to be the anti-Palestinian rallying call of the Likud.

      Israel’s war on Iran is the final move in a decades-old strategy. We are witnessing the culmination of decades of extremist #Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy.

      The challenge for Likud was how to pursue its maximalist aims despite their blatant illegality under international law and morality, both of which call for a two-state solution.

      In 1996, Netanyahu and his American advisors devised a “Clean Break” strategy . They advocated that Israel would not withdraw from the Palestinian lands captured in the 1967 war in exchange for regional peace. Instead, Israel would reshape the Middle East to its liking. Crucially, the strategy envisioned the US as the main force to achieve these aims—waging wars in the region to dismantle governments opposed to Israel’s dominance over Palestine. The US was called upon to fight wars on Israel’s behalf.

      The Clean Break strategy was effectively carried out by the US and Israel after 9/11. As NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark revealed, soon after 9/11, the US planned to “attack and destroy the governments in seven countries in five years—starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.”

      The first of the wars, in early 2003, was to topple the Iraqi government. Plans for further wars were delayed as the US became mired in Iraq. Still, the US supported Sudan’s split in 2005, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia that same year. In 2011, the Obama administration launched CIA operation Timber Sycamore against Syria and, with the UK and France, overthrew Libya’s government through a 2011 bombing campaign. Today, these countries lie in ruins, and many are now embroiled in civil wars.

      Netanyahu was a cheerleader of these wars of choice–either in public or behind the scenes–together with his neocon allies in the U.S. Government including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Victoria Nuland, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, and others.

      Testifying in the U.S. Congress in 2002, Netanyahu pitched for the disastrous war in Iraq, declaring “If you take out Saddam, Saddam’s regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region.” He continued, “And I think that people sitting right next door in Iran, young people, and many others, will say the time of such regimes, of such despots is gone.” He also falsely told Congress, “There is no question whatsoever that Saddam is seeking, is working, is advancing towards to the development of nuclear weapons.”

      The slogan to remake a “New Middle East” provides the slogan for these wars. Initially stated in 1996 through “Clean Break,” it was popularized by Secretary Condoleezza Rice in 2006. As Israel was brutally bombarding Lebanon, Rice stated:

      “What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one.”

      In September 2023, Netanyahu presented at UN General Assembly a map of the “New Middle East” completely erasing a Palestinian state. In September 2024, he elaborated on this plan by showing two maps: one part of the Middle East a “blessing,” and the other–including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran–a curse, as he advocated regime change in the latter countries.

      Israel’s war on Iran is the final move in a decades-old strategy. We are witnessing the culmination of decades of extremist Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy.

      The premise of Israel’s attack on Iran is the claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a claim is fatuous since Iran has repeatedly called for negotiations precisely to remove the nuclear option in return for an end to the decades of US sanctions.

      Since 1992, Netanyahu and his supporters have claimed that Iran will become a nuclear power “in a few years." In 1995, Israeli officials and their US backers declared a 5-year timeline. In 2003, Israel’s Director of Military Intelligence said that Iran will be a nuclear power “by the summer of 2004.” In 2005, the head of Mossad said that Iran could build the bomb in less than 3 years. In 2012, Netanyahu claimed at the United Nations that “it’s only a few months, possibly a few weeks before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.” And on and on.

      This 30-year-plus pattern of shifting deadlines has marked a deliberate strategy, not a failure in prophecy. The claims are propaganda; there is always an “existential threat.” More importantly, there is Netanyahu’s phony claim that #negotiations with Iran are useless.

      #Iran has repeatedly said that it does not want a nuclear weapon and that it has long been prepared to negotiate. In October 2003, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production and use of nuclear arms—a ruling later officially cited by Iran at an IAEA meeting in Vienna in August 2005 and referenced since as a religious and legal barrier to pursuing nuclear weapons.

      Even for those skeptical of Iran’s intentions, Iran has consistently advocated for a negotiated agreement supported by independent international verification. In contrast, the Zionist lobby has opposed any such settlements, urging the US to maintain sanctions and reject deals that would allow strict #IAEA monitoring in exchange for lifting sanctions.

      In 2016, the Obama Administration, together with the UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia, reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran—a landmark agreement to strictly monitor Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Yet, under relentless pressure from Netanyahu and the Zionist lobby, President Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018. Predictably, when Iran responded by expanding its uranium enrichment, it was blamed for violating an agreement that the US itself had abandoned. The double-standard and propaganda is hard to miss.

      On April 11, 2021, Israel’s Mossad attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz. Following the attack, on April 16, Iran announced that it would increase its uranium enrichment further, as bargaining leverage, while repeatedly appealing for renewed negotiations on a deal like the JCPOA. The Biden Administration rejected all such negotiations.

      At the start of his second term, Trump agreed to open a new negotiation with Iran. Iran pledged to renounce nuclear arms and to be subject to IAEA inspections but reserved the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. The Trump Administration appeared to agree to this point but then reversed itself. Since then, there have been five rounds of negotiations, with both sides reporting progress on each occasion.

      The sixth round was ostensibly to take place on Sunday, June 15. Instead, Israel launched a preemptive war on Iran on June 12. Trump confirmed that the US knew of the attack in advance, even as the administration was speaking publicly of the upcoming negotiations.

      Israel’s attack was made not only in the midst of negotiations that were making progress, but days before a scheduled UN Conference on Palestine that would have advanced the cause of the two-state solution. That conference has now been postponed.

      Israel’s attack on Iran now threatens to escalate to a full-fledged war that draws in the US and Europe on the side of Israel and Russia and perhaps Pakistan on the side of Iran. We could soon see several nuclear powers pitted against each other and dragging the world closer to nuclear annihilation. The Doomsday Clock is at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest to nuclear Armageddon since the clock was launched in 1947.

      Over the past 30 years, Netanyahu and his US backers have destroyed or destabilized a 4,000-km swath of countries stretching across North Africa, the Horn of #Africa, the Eastern #Mediterranean, and Western #Asia. Their aim has been to block a Palestinian State by overthrowing governments supporting the Palestinian cause. The world deserves better than this extremism. More than 170 countries in the UN have called for the two-state solution and regional stability. That makes more sense than Israel bringing the world to the brink of nuclear #Armageddon in pursuit of its illegal and extremist aims.

      #Sionisme #Israel #États-Unis #Palestine

  • Néstor Siurana / X : « 🔁 DIFUSIÓN para más mapas como este y seguir publicando contenido. https://t.co/hW8JU8zCGr » / X
    https://x.com/nestorsiurana/status/1924081121630798100

    👉🏽💥 Mapa DEFINITIVO para entender cómo funciona la ECONOMÍA de #África. ‼️
    Aparecen TODAS las uniones económicas, asociaciones y divisiones que nos ayudan a entender los FLUJOS ECONÓMICOS 💰 del continente.

    la source est là, mais sous #paywall et dans une version un peu plus ancienne
    https://www.africa-energy.com/map/economic-africa-macro-data-and-markets-1

    le site regorge de cartes (plus de 500…) mais réservées aux abonnés. Seules 22 sont accessibles gratuitement, moyennant inscription.
    News archive | African Energy – Maps
    https://www.africa-energy.com/news-centre/maps

  • African Lion 2025 : l’Algérie décline l’invitation des États-Unis
    Par La Rédaction - mardi 22 avril 2025 - Le Matin d’Algérie
    https://lematindalgerie.com/african-lion-2025-lalgerie-decline-linvitation-des-etats-unis

    L’Algérie a choisi de ne pas participer, même en tant qu’observateur, à l’exercice militaire multinational African Lion 2025, organisé par le Commandement des États-Unis pour l’Afrique (AFRICOM). L’information a été confirmée par des responsables américains lors d’une conférence de presse virtuelle animée par l’ambassade des États-Unis à Alger.
    (...)
    Le refus d’Alger intervient dans un contexte délicat : la participation de l’armée israélienne à cette édition d’African Lion est vue comme un point de friction majeur. Conformément à sa position historique de soutien à la cause palestinienne et de rejet de toute forme de normalisation avec Israël, l’Algérie marque une nouvelle fois sa distance vis-à-vis de toute initiative militaire où l’État hébreu est impliqué.

    Un exercice à grande échelle sur quatre pays africains

    Démarré officiellement le 14 avril en Tunisie, African Lion 25 se poursuivra en mai au Maroc, au Ghana et au Sénégal. Il réunit plus de 10 000 soldats issus de plus de 40 pays, dont sept alliés de l’OTAN. Il s’agit de l’édition la plus importante depuis la création de cet exercice en 2004.

    Les manœuvres incluent des exercices terrestres, aériens, navals, spatiaux et cybernétiques. Parmi les temps forts : opérations spéciales, insertion rapide de systèmes HIMARS, assistance médicale, et entraînement à la cyberdéfense. De nouveaux équipements, comme le système d’arme d’escouade de nouvelle génération, seront testés.
    Parmi les pays participants figurent :

    Au Maroc : France, Royaume-Uni, Israël, Cameroun, Pays-Bas, etc. (...)

    #African_Lion_2025 #AFRICOM

  • “Sur les traces de l’Histoire coloniale italienne” un texte de doctrine pour l’action odonymique décoloniale
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/10471

    Néotoponymie publie ici un texte traduit par Cristina Del Biaggio. L’article original, de Alessio Giordano, a été publié le 3 avril 2025 dans le quotidien en ligne SALTO, journal bilingue du Haut-Adige (Italie), sous...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #ExploreNeotopo #Neotopo_vous_signale #odonymie

  • Sommet IA : les travailleurs de l’ombre demandent aux Big Tech d’« arrêter de fuir »
    https://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/informatique/sommet-ia-les-travailleurs-de-l-ombre-demandent-aux-big-tech-d-arreter-de-

    TÉMOIGNAGES. Les modèles d’IA sont alimentés par des millions de modérateurs et préparateurs de données qui examinent, annotent et filtrent des contenus, souvent d’une violence inouïe, pour nettoyer les plateformes et permettre aux IA de s’entraîner. Le syndicat UNI Global Union, présent au Sommet de l’IA à Paris, veut profiter de l’événement pour trouver un accord mondial.

    La couleur rouge vif du stand détonne avec le vert pâle choisi pour habiller le Grand Palais à l’occasion du sommet de l’action pour l’IA. « J’espère croiser des représentants des Big Tech, pour le moment, je n’en ai pas rencontré », regrette Sonia Kgomo. Derrière elle, défilent sur un écran des témoignages de modérateurs de contenu.
    Sonia est venue de Nairobi (Kenya) pour défendre les droits de ces salariés invisibles de l’IA. Cette ancienne modératrice de Meta puis de son sous-traitant Sama (qui travaille aussi pour OpenAI) milite aujourd’hui pour #African_Tech_Workers_Rising, un collectif soutenu par UNI Global Union, un syndicat qui réunit des salariés des services à travers le monde. Pour elle, ce sommet est l’occasion de mettre les plateformes « face à leurs responsabilités ».

    #paywall

  • A Niamey, on baptise, rebaptise ou débaptise ! Quelle portée nationale et internationale ?
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/8799

    Le 15 octobre 2024, la junte militaire au pouvoir au Niger, issue du coup d’État de juillet 2023, réalise de spectaculaires dénominations de places, voies et monuments dans la capitale Niamey. Le terme officiel...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #ExploreNeotopo #Notes_de_recherche

  • « Places Tchad », lieux stratégiques et emblématiques de la « toponymie migrante »
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/8198

    De Cristina Del Biaggio, Université Grenoble Alpes et Laboratoire Pacte Ce qu’on pourrait appeler la « toponymie migrante » peut être appréhendée d’au moins deux manières : par la façon dont les personnes en #migration nomment les...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #Toponomo-Litterature

    • « Places Tchad », lieux stratégiques et emblématiques de la « toponymie migrante »

      Ce qu’on pourrait appeler la « toponymie migrante » peut être appréhendée d’au moins deux manières : par la façon dont les personnes en migration nomment les lieux qu’iels quittent, traversent ou ceux dont iels s’installent à l’issue de leur « aventure »[1] ; par la dénomination de rues (officielle ou portée par des collectifs militant·es) pour rendre hommage à des personnes qui ont connu l’exil, et souvent la violence que cela comporte.

      En ce qui concerne la deuxième catégorie, on peut notamment rappeler l’« Initiative for the Madina Hussiny Square »[2], qui a porté la lutte pour renommer la place de la République de la Croatie à Zagreb en Place Madine Hussiny, du nom d’une enfant de cinq ou six ans décédée en 2017 suite à un refoulement[3] à la frontière serbo-croate dont elle et sa famille ont été victimes (Hameršak 2022).

      Une action toponymique a été réalisée par le collectif en 2018 pour commémorer l’anniversaire de la mort de la petite réfugiée afghane, et une plaque a été inaugurée sur la place de la République de Croatie le 21 novembre 2018 (Figure 1).

      L’autre manière d’appréhender la « toponymie migrante » consiste à rendre compte de la manière dont les personnes en migration (dé-) (re-)nomment les lieux qu’iels fréquentent.

      Un très bel exemple de ce procédé est décrit dans le livre autobiographique d’Emmanuel Mbolela, Réfugié. Une odyssée africaine (2017), et dont je vous propose quelques extraits ci-dessous.

      Emmanuel Mbolela, originaire de la République démocratique du Congo qu’il a fui, arrive à Tamanrasset, au Niger, après avoir déjà traversé le Cameroun, le Nigeria et le Mali. Il raconte :

      « Comme les autres avant nous qui avaient été dévalisé·es dans le désert, nous nous retrouvions chaque matin place Tchad » (p.84).

      Dans une note du livre, Mbolela cite Mahmoud Traoré, qui explique la généalogie de la dénomination dans son propre livre :

      « Les clandestins en mal d’argent se rassemblent tôt le matin sur un large carrefour qu’on a baptisé ‘Place Tchad’, car les tout premiers immigrés arrivés ici étaient tchadiens. Après Sehba, je connaîtrai des ‘places Tchad’ dans toutes les villes que je traverserai. C’est toujours une rotonde, un carrefour, une place où s’accumule la main-d’œuvre irrégulière. Les patrons, les contremaîtres ou même des particuliers viennent y pêcher l’ouvrier idéal, invisible et craintif […]. L’appellation ‘place Tchad’ s’est […] répandue dans tout le Maghreb et même en Andalousie ! » (Traoré and Le Dantec 2012) (pp.84-85).

      Les places Tchad que Mbolela fréquente lors de son périple remplissent toutes cette fonction de « marché de la main-d’œuvre » décrit par Traoré :

      « C’est l’endroit où les Algériens venaient nous embaucher sur un chantier de bâtiment ou dans les plantations » (p.85).

      Mais la place Tchad remplit aussi une fonction de socialisation :

      « La place Tchad était le lieu de rencontre des migrant·es. Chaque jour nous nous rassemblions là en attendant l’embauche éventuelle et le débat commençait. Chacun racontait son chemin et son calvaire. […] Sur la place Tchad, nous abordions ainsi presque tous les domaines, la politique, l’économie, la culture, la religion. Nous avancions parfois des propositions sur la manière dont les pays auraient dû être gouvernés, selon nous, afin que les richesses profitent à tous » (pp.86-87).

      Les « places Tchad » ne sont, géographiquement, pas choisies au hasard. Si elles se trouvent dans des endroits où il est facile pour de potentiels patrons de trouver la main-d’œuvre qu’ils recherchent, elles sont aussi localisées pour que les migrant·es puissent s’enfuir rapidement en cas de danger, comme le rappelle quelques pages plus loin l’auteur,

      « la place Tchad n’était pas seulement un lieu de conférences. C’était aussi un champ de courses. Les policiers pouvaient débouler à tout moment – les courses-poursuites commençaient alors et celles et ceux que l’on attrapait étaient refoulé·es à Ti-n-Zaouâtene [à la frontière algéro-malienne, en plein désert]. Mais le choix de cette place par les migrant·es ne s’était pas fait au hasard : la configuration des lieux obligeait les Jeep de la police à effectuer des manœuvres compliquées avant d’y pénétrer, ce qui nous donnait le temps de nous enfuir ».

      En France, une seule place est officiellement nommée d’après le Tchad, à La Mée-sur-Seine, en région Île-de-France (Figure 2), mais combien de « places Tchad » existent-elles dans la cartographie informelle migrante ?

      https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/8198

      #place_tchad #toponymie #toponymie_politique #toponymie_migrante #Madina_Hussiny_Square #migrations #Madina_Hussiny

  • « Marcher le passé pour réécrire l’avenir ». Les balades décoloniales à #Berlin
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/8079

    Altreconomia, le « cousin transalpin » de Alternatives économiques, a publié en avril 2024 (nr. 269) un article dédié aux balades décoloniales organisées à Berlin par la petite entreprise Desta – Dekoloniale Stadtführung. Nous en proposons...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #Neotopo_vous_signale #Toponobservations #Allemagne

  • An #African_Feminist_Manifesto

    Decolonial African feminist thought is equal parts rage and radical care. It is a collaborative and unbiased call to action that insists on justice, self-determination, and autonomy, building on the legacies of foremothers to create our lifelines for our future and the ones that come after us.

    In the past year, the concept of ‘decolonization’ has faced strong pushback from the intersection of Big Tech, political interests, and conservative ideologies, reaching such proportions that Elon Musk, X’s CEO, described decolonization as ‘unacceptable to any reasonable person’, equating it with extreme violence and a violation of X’s terms of service. This reductionist rhetoric, particularly orchestrated to undermine campaigns against Israel’s occupation of Palestine and the designation of Palestinians as killable, disposable bodies, portrays decolonization as genocidal hate speech. In this essay, I reflect on the critical significance of the de-colonial from my concrete experiences as an African woman of Yorùbá descent who did a brief stint of grassroots activism towards political education, women’s research and documentation, and anti-sexual violence before moving to the US to pursue graduate education at the intersection of gender and sexuality studies and digital humanities. Here, my encounter with canonical American studies texts like John Locke’s theories of social contract came with a realization that Global North modernity was built on this basis: an agreement between rational individuals, transitioning from a state of nature into a collective body, where the right to punish is ceded to the state.

    Here, I must add that these thoughts I share here are collaborative speaking to/with foremothers, living and passed, and whose labour established the possibilities for counter-hegemonic feminisms and pockets of resistance to advance the stakes of an African feminist decolonial thought. My approach and thought specifically draw on the core areas that have driven my work and the directions of my political thought since I discovered the possibilities of a decolonial world sense. The very basic conception of decolonial feminism is built on a radical care approach to self-production and self-exploration—how we make sense of ourselves, and our relationship to our ancestors, land, and people. Nigerian gender scholar, Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí’s work on Yorùbá knowledge systems insists that the modernity we have inherited is a product of history and culture, where the collision of time and space determined whose knowledge was imposed and whose knowledge was erased. The implication of this is that our modernity is hinged on coloniality that persists even after the physical signifiers of colonialism are long gone. Exploring the historical processes behind colonization and white universalizing epistemologies, Jamaican writer and cultural theorist, Sylvia Wynter, reveals the central imperatives behind the invention of man, that determine which bodies are acknowledged as human with boundless possibilities for social, creative and epistemic exchanges. On the one hand, the basis of a God-given right to occupy and punish irrational godless individuals was the charge driving the logic of settler colonialism across indigenous lands from Abya Yala to continental Africa. However, when the incoherence of a rational/irrational binary became obvious, especially in the face of indigenous resistance, a state-led ‘degodding’ emerged that split the church and the state into two entities, even though religion remained a significant instrument for the institution of colonialism.

    The final invention of man, Wynter contends, was motivated by a colonial difference big bang event that produced a system of signification that essentially meant the further down the brown spectrum you are, the less human you were. And so, to be human was to be white, to be brown was to be subhuman, and to be Black was to be animal—the very basis of the ideologies that drove the transatlantic slave trade and persist in the Global North framing of continental Africa till date. What emerged from this construction was the erasure and epistemic disregard of existing truths of African as well as other Black and Brown bodies and mythology of dread at anything remotely African. Therefore, the outcome of over 500 years of trans-Atlantic slavery, colonization, and ongoing coloniality is that we have been compelled and socialized into privileging Euro-American truths, and what we have as a result is a climate-deficient, hyper-individualistic world without empathy.

    When putting these in context, it underscores that the very attack on the word ‘decolonization’ is reinforcing subhuman imaginaries and binding our bodies into ideological containment that is eerily similar to slave ships. Yet I am not lost on the irony that a white South African is one of the most intentionally algorithmically prominent voices in the battle against decolonization. My discussion in this article begins by exploring what a decolonial approach to gender and sexuality can look like in a world prioritizing singular truths, and finally, I explore a decolonial feminist approach to the digital and the very real effects of what Cognitive scientist and AI accountability activist, Abeba Birhane, amongst others have referred to as practices of today’s tech giants that mirror historical colonial exploitation of territories and resources.

    Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí offers a central argument in response to contemporary gender revolutions—Africans do not need to invent anything. Centring her deductions on the evidence within Oyo-Yorùbá that point to an inherent deference to seniority rather than gender and matrifocal namings of self and others ( ọmọ-ìyá), Oyěwùmí argues for a need to turn to African cultural epistemologies as extant truths that break Euro-American feminist epistemologies. Essentially, Western feminist thought deeply centres on a rigid, universal idea of gender as the dominant system of classification based on sexual differences, and the meanings and roles assigned to one and the other. With Oyo-Yorùbá culture, Oyěwùmí draws on the evidence in the language and the structure of social organizing to make the overarching statement: ‘Yorùbá don’t do gender.’ In primary school, we were often taught that the nuclear family is the smallest and most basic unit of the family. The nuclear family is that enclosed structure from which our understanding of political and moral agency is distilled: The man (the leader), the woman/wife/mother (the subjugated embodiment of reproductive and domestic labour, whom Oyěwùmí argues cannot be read independently of these mutually constituted labels), the children (boy and girl who grow up into a structure of gender sameness where the boy becomes the man and the girl becomes either the reproduced woman/wife/mother or becomes dissatisfied and agitated with this structure).

    Oyěwùmí’s central argument is that the feminist figure that emerges from the dissatisfaction cannot see beyond the family as the ‘everything’ of her oppression, and because of that, she cannot see race or class as these exist beyond the realms of this structure. Therefore, the hyper-nuclear Eurocentric foundations of Western feminist thought alongside white colonizer logic disregard structures of many African societies, including what she describes as fluid, situationally-contingent relations that have little to do with human bodies or sexual differences; where a biological woman can be ọkọ to an in-marrying biological woman or a biological man can be ìyàwó to his deity, and where everyone’s pronouns are inherently non-binary: ‘òun’, ‘wọn’, ‘iwọ’ etc. I find Oyěwùmí’s arguments very subversive, especially for the alternative imagining that they offer us to dismantle the deeply rooted Eurocentric points of view and the NGO-developmental narratives claiming to transform Africa’s gender regression.

    Yet I would argue that while some geographies of genderlessness or more appropriately gender fluidity are evident in the very convincing instances that Oyěwùmí centres, in conversation with Nigerian anthropologist, Ifi Amadiume and Ghanaian academic, Kwesi Yankah, there was nonetheless an overarching phallus signification, in the Jacques Lacanian sense. The concept of a body with a phallus was a privileged signifier that stabilized discourse within a Yorùbá context where the body without the phallus was perceived as not whole—the only marginally stabilizing factors for women being class and seniority. In the specific context of my paternal family in Esa-Oke, in-marrying wives were called ‘eru‘, meaning slaves, lending insights into traditions of rigid patriarchal dominance After years of silencing and within the tensions and limits of wifehood, oral traditions passed through generations of wives reveal that a kitchen performance called eré obìnrin-ilé began that gradually refuted the subject-object relations of the Faniyi men and their wives, beginning a hundred years ago and continuing till date. Using music and performance as channels of economic empowerment, radical care, and joy, they refused to negotiate their presence but insisted on it and dictated how they were remembered. To be part of that legacy of women refusing ‘subhumaness’ makes me proud beyond measure, and makes me recall the quote, ‘If they tell you, you are too feminist, show them who your mothers were.’ Othering at the level of language inevitably leads to othering at a deeper emotional level, and while Yorùbás might not do gender insofar as situationally contingent references and non-gendered pronouns, Yorùbá did gender in its positioning ọkọ as superior to ìyàwó, where even female ọkọ is superior to female ìyàwó, and reinforced the idea of woman as lacking or incomplete compared to man. What made Yorùbá the hyper-gendered culture and language it is today is expressed in Oyěwùmí’s arguments: coloniality. The imposition of Victorian patriarchy in a system where women nonetheless found visible spaces to create alternative conceptions of self despite the privilege and authority assigned to men, meant that these alternative geographies were catastrophically disrupted. Men were assigned apical privilege even though they were read as animals, thus effectively removing African women from the political category of humanness and womanhood. It is at this intersection that African feminist and literary scholar, Molara Ogundipe, would theorize the mountains inhibiting women in Africa as colonial oppression, traditional/cultural oppression, backwardness, men, colour/race, and herself. On the notion of sexuality, she tacitly wrote: ‘Africa does not know its sexuality.’

    I have always deeply connected to the conceptualization of queerness in the Cathy Cohenian way of one’s relation to the state and by extension colonial power. Therefore, I question what is rendered discreet, in the contemporary NGO brokerage that portrays Africa as a feminized and queer hell as opposed to the West as its heaven. I find in this the persistence of colonial language and tactics, reminiscent of colonial voyage writers like Gordon Sinclair, who caricatured a Sàngó priest as a ‘self-styled imp’ saying ‘mumbo jumbo’ to keep thunderstorms away, while dressed like a woman. These narratives have evolved to paint Africa as inherently backward and rigid, while positioning the West as the arbiter of gender fluidity and linguistic diversity which we now must audition to fit into, effectively erasing these expressions that existed long before colonial encounters. Therefore, if we submit that to be Yorùbá (and a Yorùbá woman) is to already be queer, if we were to submit Amadiume’s evidence of female husbands and male daughters and the institution of woman marriage in Igboland, it might not be farfetched to claim that to be African is to already be queer, especially considering not just our cultural epistemologies but the historical processes that have removed us from Eurocentric political classification, rendering us to the wild, which in the Taussig sense is the place where signification fails to exist.

    However, in crafting our identities out of this void, we were confronted by multiple tools of epistemic violence: ethnography and anthropology, Christian colonization, laws, prisons, and guns. While there were nonetheless pockets of direct resistance against the totalizing force of coloniality, the modernity that we have inherited is colonial mastery in our relationship to our land, bodies, hair, language, history, and culture. The overarching question thus becomes: if the entirety of our modernity is deeply entangled not just in the political and economic but also in social, ontological, and cosmological coloniality, then for whom is this modernity?

    We can argue that the same gender saviourism in NGO and developmental narratives finds its parallel in the language of bridging the digital divide and tech saviourism ventures of the Global North. Big Tech giants are materially and ideologically transforming us into quantified beings—economic objects bound to territories across colour and geographic lines, reinforced by practices that exploit people’s data for corporate profit just like historical (and ongoing) colonial exploitation of territories and resources. The overarching logic is that data has become the new oil, coffee, cocoa, and other exploited resources, and our lives online have become their highly valued product. Abeba Birhane and her collaborators’ work in progress has in particular argued that the major undersea cables in Africa owned by Google and Meta physically follow the trans-Atlantic slave trade route!

    French feminist, Francoise Verges, had asked a pivotal question: who cleans the world? In the context of data, we see the real-time effects of how labour exploitation disguised as tech saviourism affects African workers who are paid less than $2 per day to perform unseen and thankless tasks of data labelling, cleaning the filth off the datasets used to train chat programmes like ChatGPT. As Birhane argues, these companies profit off poverty and the rhetoric of lifting Africa out of poverty—one real-time evidence of the disposability of African workers was recently seen with the sudden layoffs at the onset of Twitter’s leadership change. In February 2024, OpenAI launched its Sora text-to-video model, and a very disturbing, flattened, and soulless Lagos, an output of Sora, was shared virally. As we are continually pushed into adopting the misnomer of artificial intelligence and the binary of AI vs human, we must remember that many of those who ‘cleaned it’, for poor pay and little to no emotional support, were Africans! Even after the illusion of the physical removal of colonizers, the parallels of colonialism and contemporary data extraction and exploitation continue to perpetuate global inequalities, just as the racist, sexist, colonial results of AI generative models that render invisible our truths are akin to the oil spills and environmental degradation currently plaguing the Niger Delta—another ongoing legacy of coloniality.

    DECOLONIZING OURSELVES

    As coloniality contains and regulates our lives, binding us to its walls and rendering discreet our potentially liberating alternatives, a decolonial thinking understands that even as colonial logic writes us as disposable, we are integral for its sustenance. Our (internalized) sub-humanness sustains the hierarchies because you need the concept of sub-humanness for there to be humanness, therefore the very premise of totalizing coloniality/modernity is shaky. It does not exist, and it ‘exists’ in relation to the absence of African, Indigenous, Caribbean and Asian truths. Therefore, a radical awakening or what Afro-Dominican decolonial feminist theorist, Yuderkys Espinosa-Muñosa, describes eloquently as epistemic disobedience, creates problems for this totalizing logic, as it emphasizes that the premise of coloniality/modernity is erasure and silencing.

    There is a matter-of-factness to the modernity of post-colonial peoples from our cyber-selves to architectural designs, food taste, beauty, literature, Afrobeats, Nollywood, FinTech and more. Yet our lives and language are almost irreversibly tainted by Euro-Americanness in our modern global-facing Nigerianness. We have multiple generations of Nigerians who are raised with English as their first language. We have adhered to colonial ways of classifying and interpreting our ontological system. We are also desperately chasing the models of a singular modernity that has been prescribed by the Global North, in terms of democracy, infrastructure, education, agriculture, land extraction, and security, and failing exceptionally at it. Decolonization, however, is not a word to be taken lightly; it is the radical possibility to imagine alternative ways of world-making, that allow our very deeply hidden truths to leak into our present and future. A radical possibility that allows us to stop writing our ability to be a thriving nation into the colonial past.

    A decolonial feminist approach is hope and strategies for resistance all in one: a theory for everything, that insists on interpreting the world not through an adapted white gaze but with our cultural knowledge and epistemologies at the centre while acknowledging the flaws embedded within our pre-colonial past. However, despite this impureness, we must find pockets of resistance and cling to them. We would find them, as Oyěwùmí found in Ifá and in several of our systems of knowledge that have persisted due to unknowability, untranslatability, and the inability of coloniality to transform them. Decolonial feminism is further premised on collective thinking, even when devoid of material bodies in contact with each other, as this very article is centred on thinking with Black, Indigenous, and African feminist counter-hegemonic scholarship. Yet we must refuse an approach where the South is constantly speaking to the North, while the North exists in its bubble. I recall a story famous among Nigerian gender academics where foremothers like Bolanle Awe and Molara Ogundipe walked out of a conference in the US that epistemically sidelined African feminist scholarship and set up a press conference that called out the organizers explicitly. That, too, is the driving force of African feminist decolonial thought: walking out on spaces that say we do not have anything of value to contribute. It is calling out the impasse of an androcentric feminist gaze that is ‘barbiefied’, airbrushed, and sung over a catchy chorus. It is inherently being what Sara Ahmed describes as a Feminist Killjoy, those who refuse the aesthetics of colonial modernity, and who refuse the basis upon which postcolonial democracy is built and call out the incoherence of democracy with the carceral imaginaries for queer bodies. It is listening and amplifying the voices of the African women who put themselves on the line, doing the arduous labour of AI auditing; women such as Deb Raji, Abeba Birhane and Joy Buolamwini. It is also acknowledging the possibilities that come from responsible AI and African model of technology, such the machine-learning model that diagnoses early stages of cassava plant disease directly on farmers’ phones, developed by Kenyan researcher, Charity Wuyan and her team.

    Ultimately, our major imperative must be centring our own interpretation of our world. Who truly finds AI input-process-output and prompt engineering new? Additionally, as Caribbean scholar and professor, Aisha Finch, asked, for whom is queerness or transness new? Certainly not for Ifá priests, whose divination mathematically calculates the right odù to address a client’s inquiry, drawing from a wealth of generative odù-ifá that is not reliant on data exploitation. In the same way, queerness is not new for the Yorùbá or the Igbo, nor for Black diasporic peoples whose experiences of the middle passage, and their forceful removal from categories of humanness led to alternative imaginings of relation to the body and normativity. Decolonial African feminist thinking thus prompts us to question supposed prescriptive statements when the production of its knowledge is stripped from certain bodies and centres only on a specific type of white body. It connects us to a critical legacy that binds contemporary Black women to their ancestors who not only resisted slavery but created breaches of resistance within alien spaces of domination, and whose legacies continues to sustain the spiritual and material connections between Afro-diasporic people today. A decolonial feminist thought is equal parts rage and radical care. It is a collaborative and unbiased call to action that insists on justice, self-determination, and autonomy, building on the legacies of foremothers to create our lifelines for our future and the ones that come after us. Ultimately, decolonial feminist thought is understanding that our future will not be a utopian world, but one where our interpretations are our own, and our tools of worldmaking are even more rooted across diasporic lands and seas and more sophisticated and cohesive, in refusing coloniality and its systems of domination.

    https://republic.com.ng/february-march-2024/an-african-feminist-manifesto
    #féminisme #féminisme_africain #féminismes #manifeste #manifesto #décolonial #féminisme_décolonial

    ping @_kg_ @cede

  • #Kenya: il presidente Ruto annuncia il ritiro della riforma finanziaria ma la protesta continua.
    https://radioblackout.org/2024/06/kenya-il-presidente-ruto-annuncia-il-ritiro-della-riforma-finanziaria

    In Kenya da più di una settimana proseguono le #proteste contro la nuova legge finanziaria, chiamata Finance Bill 2024, che prevede tra le altre cose un’imposta sul valore aggiunto del pane. Le proteste non sono scoppiate dal nulla, infatti, si aggiungono a un processo di peggioramento delle condizioni di vita dovute all’inflazione galoppante, ai disastri […]

    #L'informazione_di_Blackout #Africa #inflazione
    https://cdn.radioblackout.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Kenya-2024_06_27_2024.06.27-10.00.00-escopost.mp3

  • Comment préparer son « guerrilla kit » de performance odonymique décoloniale, un tutoriel en 9 points
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/7165

    De : Cristina Del Biaggio, Université Grenoble Alpes et Laboratoire Pacte, avril 2024 En Italie, les « guerrilleros » et « guerrilleras » odonymiques qui proposent des interventions contre la toponymieofficielle dans l’espace public semblent être de plus en...

    #A_votre_vote_ !A_vos_noms ! #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #Billets #Neotopo_vous_signale

  • Eight #AFIC risk analysis cells set a benchmark in Africa

    This week, Frontex together with the European Commission and representatives from eight African countries forming part of the #Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community (AFIC) met in Dakar, Senegal, to wrap up the European Union-funded project on “Strengthening of AFIC as an instrument to fight serious cross-border crimes affecting Africa and the EU”.

    Launched in 2017 and funded by the European Commission, the project aimed to enhance the capacity and capability of AFIC countries to work jointly on identifying key threats impacting border management in Africa.

    After years of hard work and despite the challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Frontex has completed its latest project and is proud to announce the handover of equipment to trained border police analysts who are carrying out their tasks in the risk analysis cells of eight AFIC countries: Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

    The role of the cells, which are run by local analysts trained by Frontex, is to collect and analyse data on cross-border crime and support authorities involved in border management.

    Frontex delivered a comprehensive risk analysis solution that meets the needs of the eight African border management authorities and enhances the safety and security of borders.

    The handover of the equipment marks the end of the project and the beginning of an intensive cooperation between the AFIC countries. Frontex stays committed and ready to continue to support the RACs by organising joint activities - such as workshops, trainings, plenary meetings – together with the AFIC partner countries, aiming at further developing AFIC risk analysis capacities.

    The AFIC project in numbers:

    – Establishment of eight risk analysis cells in Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and Mauritania;
    - 14 training sessions for analysts from African countries;
    - 10 regional workshops in Gambia, Ghana, Italy, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Poland and Ivory Coast;
    - 17 joint analytical field visits in the EU and Africa.

    About AFIC

    The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was launched in 2010 to promote regular exchanges on migrant smuggling and other border security threats affecting African countries and the EU. It brings together Frontex analysts with those of partner African border authorities. A central element of the network are risk analysis cells, run by local analysts trained by Frontex. There are currently eight cells operating in Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

    https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eight-afic-risk-analysis-cells-set-a-benchmark-in-africa-uwxHJU

    #Frontex #Afrique #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #coopération #équipement #risk_analysis #Côte_d'Ivoire #Gambie #Ghana #Mauritanie #Niger #Nigeria #Sénégal #Togo #données #border_management #contrôles_frontaliers #RACs #training #risk_analysis_cells #formation #gardes-côtes

  • Binta: la giovane rifugiata africana nel CETI di #Ceuta che sogna di diventare giornalista sportiva
    https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/10/binta-la-giovane-rifugiata-africana-nel-ceti-di-ceuta-che-sogna-di-diven

    La storia di Binta, una ragazza guineana di 21 anni, il cui viaggio alla ricerca di una vita migliore l’ha portata ad attraversare le frontiere e ad affrontare realtà che sfidano la percezione del coraggio umano. In #Africa, giovani ragazze come Binta lottano contro queste disuguaglianze e dimostrano che possono realizzare i loro sogni. Il suo sogno è quello di diventare una giornalista sportiva. Nel nord della Guinea Conakry, vicino al confine con il Senegal, si trova il villaggio di Marie de Yembering. È in questo angolo poco conosciuto dell’Africa che nasce la storia di Binta, una ventunenne il (...)

    #Notizie #Antonio_Sempere #Ceuta_e_Melilla #Donne_e_migrazioni #Racconti_di_vita #Spagna

  • Nouveau Cours en ligne (Mooc) “Dénommer le Monde, la politique des Toponymes”
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/6269

    Lancement du cours en ligne (MOOC) « Dénommer le Monde : la politique des toponymes ». Coordonné par Frédéric Giraut, le cours mobilise les expert.es suivant.es et bénéficie de leurs contributions : Ekaterina Mikhailova ; Maria Isabel...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #ExploreNeotopo #Neotopo_vous_signale #TheorizeNeotopo #Toponobservations #ToponoGender #Toponomo-Litterature

  • Vague de répression contre les migrants en Turquie : « J’envisage de retourner au Sénégal »

    Des vidéos amateurs envoyées à notre rédaction montrent des migrants africains arrêtés par la police turque dans le cadre d’une campagne de répression de l’immigration clandestine. Sur ces images, envoyées par des migrants du Sénégal, du Cameroun, de Guinée et d’Angola, des officiers hurlent sur les migrants et, dans certains cas, les violentent physiquement. Nos Observateurs, dont l’une des victimes visible dans une #vidéo, racontent.

    Les autorités turques ont lancé la répression au début du mois de juillet. Dans une interview publiée le 9 juillet, le ministre de l’intérieur, #Ali_Yerlikaya, a déclaré que la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine était l’une de ses priorités et que la #police d’Istanbul et des 81 provinces de Turquie intensifiait ses efforts pour arrêter et détenir les personnes se trouvant illégalement dans le pays.

    À Istanbul, la police a ainsi entamé le 4 juillet une série d’opérations de #ratissage de soir et de nuit, en se concentrant sur les lieux de sorties et les #espaces_publics. Elle affirme avoir arrêté 3 535 personnes au cours de la première semaine, soupçonnées d’être entrées illégalement en Turquie, d’avoir travaillé sans autorisation ou d’avoir dépassé la durée de validité de leur visa.

    Les vidéos envoyées à la rédaction des Observateurs par des migrants africains vivant en Turquie suggèrent un comportement violent de la part de la police.

    Une vidéo envoyée par des migrants du Sénégal et de Guinée montre la police plaquant au sol un homme africain au milieu d’une foule. Les policiers ne portaient pas d’uniforme, mais des menottes. La victime a demandé son téléphone à plusieurs reprises, ce qui a mis en colère le policier qui le maintenait au sol. Le policier lui a crié dessus et l’a ensuite giflé.

    Dans cette vidéo, envoyée par des migrants africains aux Observateurs de France 24 via WhatsApp et également postée sur Twitter, on voit le propriétaire d’un salon de coiffure sénégalais se faire gifler par un policier turc après avoir été arrêté pour un contrôle d’immigration. L’homme sénégalais a déclaré aux observateurs de France 24 que son permis de séjour était en cours de renouvellement.

    L’incident a eu lieu à Istanbul le mercredi 19 juillet. En utilisant les images disponibles sur Google Maps, notre rédaction a pu déterminer que l’incident s’est produit à l’entrée du centre commercial souterrain. Plusieurs migrants subsahariens vivant à Istanbul ont confirmé l’endroit.

    Le quartier environnant, Aksaray, regorge de magasins de vêtements et d’alimentaire tenus par des Africains.

    "Chaque fois que des policiers me voient, ils me demandent mes papiers"

    La rédaction des Observateurs a réussi à identifier et à contacter l’homme que l’on voit dans la vidéo : il s’agit de Mohamed Preira, un Sénégalais qui s’est installé en Turquie en 2019 et qui possède un salon de coiffure à Aksaray. Il déclare qu’il se rendait à son salon lorsqu’il a été arrêté par la police et avoir assuré aux agents ne pas avoir de permis de séjour sur lui parce qu’il était en cours de renouvellement.

    Ils ont pris mon téléphone et mon argent. Ils m’ont mis dans une voiture et m’ont conduit à un endroit où ils m’ont laissé partir. Eux-mêmes savent qu’ils n’ont pas le droit de m’arrêter. Mais je ne peux même pas porter plainte contre eux.

    J’ai déposé mes documents [pour renouveler mon statut de résident] et on m’a donné un reçu. Je suis en train d’obtenir les documents pour avoir le droit de vivre ici.

    Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’on m’arrête. Chaque fois que des policiers me voient, ils me demandent mes papiers. Mais ces policiers étaient tout simplement racistes. Maintenant, tout mon corps me fait mal.

    J’ai mon propre salon de coiffure à Istanbul. Je paie mon loyer. Mais la situation s’est aggravée, les contrôles sont de plus en plus nombreux. Maintenant, j’envisage de retourner au Sénégal. Vivre dans un autre pays, sans argent, c’est trop dur.

    #Turkey is one of the countries where #refugees are most often subjected to violence, both by society and the authorities.
    This video showing police violence was shared on social media yesterday.
    In #Istanbul, a migrant-refugee from #Africa was beaten and detained by the police.… pic.twitter.com/l4S1UAh2Ld
    — Vedat Yeler (@vedatyeler_) July 14, 2023

    Notre rédaction a reçu de très nombreuses vidéos montrant l’usage de la force par la police. L’une de ces vidéos, également publiée sur Twitter, montre deux policiers en uniforme tenant un migrant africain tandis qu’un troisième policier peut être vu en train de lui pousser la tête vers le sol. Alors qu’ils l’éloignent, le troisième policier se moque apparemment de la victime en lui tapant dans la main.

    Plusieurs migrants africains nous ont déclaré que l’incident avait eu lieu dans le quartier d’Esenyurt à Istanbul. L’imagerie satellite semble confirmer l’endroit, mais nous n’avons pas pu contacter l’homme qui a été arrêté.

    "Nous avons été traités comme des criminels parce que nous n’avons pas les papiers qu’ils refusent de nous donner”

    En novembre 2022, un rapport de Human Rights Watch estimait que les migrants détenus en Turquie sans papiers étaient souvent incarcérés dans des centres de détention surpeuplés, sans accès suffisant à une assistance juridique et à leurs familles.

    "Cédric" (pseudonyme) un Camerounais qui a parlé à notre rédaction de France 24 sous couvert d’anonymat, a été arrêté à Istanbul en décembre 2022 alors qu’il attendait une mise à jour de son statut de résident :

    Nous étions 12 à être détenus dans des chambres prévues pour six personnes. Nous étions censés avoir le droit de parler à nos familles, mais ils ont pris nos téléphones. Les conditions étaient horribles. J’ai vu beaucoup de suicides. Nous avons été traités comme des criminels parce que nous n’avions pas les papiers qu’ils refusaient de nous donner. Ils ne nous permettent pas d’avoir nos propres avocats. Ils ne vous laissent voir que leurs avocats.

    “Cédric” raconte qu’il a été autorisé à quitter le centre au bout de deux mois et qu’on lui a remis un document qui l’autorisait uniquement à vivre à Bartin, une petite ville située à 400 km d’Istanbul. Mais il n’est pas resté : "Il n’y avait pas d’opportunités là-bas et les gens étaient racistes, alors je suis retourné à Istanbul” dit-il.

    "Les migrants de toutes nationalités sont confrontés à de nombreuses violations des droits de l’Homme"

    Contacté, Mahmut Kaçan, un avocat turc spécialisé dans les droits des migrants, affirme que le système d’immigration du pays est devenu plus restrictif au cours des deux dernières années.

    Au cours des deux dernières années, les demandes d’asile n’ont pas été acceptées, que l’on soit un migrant régulier ou irrégulier. Ces dernières années, et pendant les élections [de mai 2023], il y a eu un débat. Le gouvernement actuel et l’opposition affirment qu’ils expulseront tous les réfugiés.

    Les migrants de toutes nationalités sont confrontés à de nombreuses violations des droits de l’Homme. Je reçois des plaintes, mais comme ces migrants ne sont pas correctement enregistrés, ils ne sont pas en mesure de déposer des plaintes et de contacter des ONG.

    https://observers.france24.com/fr/moyen-orient/20230721-turquie-migrants-violence-arrestations

    #migrations #Turquie #répression #asile #réfugiés #racisme_anti-noirs #sans-papiers #rafles

  • Sur la route de Thiès, un exemple de préemption toponymique par le bas
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/6059

    Michel Ben Arrous, Chaire Unesco “Dénommer le Monde” Université de Genève ; Université de Saint-Louis, Sénégal Un bord de route ordinaire au Sénégal, avec ses vendeuses de mangues, de papayes et de pastèques. Sur...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #ExploreNeotopo #Toponobservations

  • Nessuno vuole mettere limiti all’attività dell’Agenzia Frontex

    Le istituzioni dell’Ue, ossessionate dal controllo delle frontiere, sembrano ignorare i problemi strutturali denunciati anche dall’Ufficio europeo antifrode. E lavorano per dispiegare le “divise blu” pure nei Paesi “chiave” oltre confine

    “Questa causa fa parte di un mosaico di una più ampia campagna contro Frontex: ogni attacco verso di noi è un attacco all’Unione europea”. Con questi toni gli avvocati dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere europee si sono difesi di fronte alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. Il 9 marzo, per la prima volta in oltre 19 anni di attività (ci sono altri due casi pendenti, presentati dalla Ong Front-Lex), le “divise blu” si sono trovate di fronte a un giudice grazie alla tenacia dell’avvocata olandese Lisa-Marie Komp.

    Non è successo, invece, per le scioccanti rivelazioni del rapporto dell’Ufficio europeo antifrode (Olaf) che ha ricostruito nel dettaglio come l’Agenzia abbia insabbiato centinaia di respingimenti violenti: quell’indagine è “semplicemente” costata la leadership all’allora direttore Fabrice Leggeri, nell’aprile 2022, ma niente di più. “Tutto è rimasto nel campo delle opinioni e nessuno è andato a fondo sui problemi strutturali -spiega Laura Salzano, dottoranda in Diritto europeo dell’immigrazione presso l’Università di Barcellona-. C’erano tutti gli estremi per portare l’Agenzia di fronte alla Corte di giustizia e invece nulla è stato fatto nonostante sia un’istituzione pubblica con un budget esplosivo che lavora con i più vulnerabili”. Non solo l’impunità ma anche la cieca fiducia ribadita più volte da diverse istituzioni europee. Il 28 giugno 2022 il Consiglio europeo, a soli due mesi dalle dimissioni di Leggeri, dà il via libera all’apertura dei negoziati per portare gli agenti di Frontex in Senegal con la proposta di garantire un’immunità totale nel Paese per le loro azioni.

    A ottobre, invece, a pochi giorni dalla divulgazione del rapporto Olaf -tenuto segreto per oltre quattro mesi- la Commissione europea chiarisce che l’Agenzia “si è già assunta piena responsabilità di quanto successo”. Ancora, a febbraio 2023 il Consiglio europeo le assicura nuovamente “pieno supporto”. Un dato preoccupante soprattutto con riferimento all’espansione di Frontex che mira a diventare un attore sempre più presente nei Paesi chiave per la gestione del fenomeno migratorio, a migliaia di chilometri di distanza dal suo quartier generale di Varsavia.

    “I suoi problemi sono strutturali ma le istituzioni europee fanno finta di niente: se già è difficile controllare gli agenti sui ‘nostri’ confini, figuriamoci in Paesi al di fuori dell’Ue”, spiega Yasha Maccanico, membro del centro di ricerca indipendente Statewatch.

    A fine febbraio 2023 l’Agenzia ha festeggiato la conclusione di un progetto che prevede la consegna di attrezzature ai membri dell’Africa-Frontex intelligence community (Afic), finanziata dalla Commissione, che ha permesso dal 2010 in avanti l’apertura di “Cellule di analisi del rischio” (Rac) gestite da analisti locali formati dall’Agenzia con l’obiettivo di “raccogliere e analizzare informazioni strategiche su crimini transfrontalieri” oltre che a “sostenere le autorità nella gestione dei confini”. A partire dal 2021 una potenziata infrastruttura garantisce “comunicazioni sicure e istantanee” tra le Rac e gli agenti nella sede di Varsavia. Questo è il “primo livello” di collaborazione tra Frontex e le autorità di Paesi terzi che oggi vede, come detto, “cellule” attive in Nigeria, Gambia, Niger, Ghana, Senegal, Costa d’Avorio, Togo e Mauritania oltre a una ventina di Stati coinvolti nelle attività di formazione degli analisti, pronti ad attivare le Rac in futuro. “Lo scambio di dati sui flussi è pericoloso perché l’obiettivo delle politiche europee non è proteggere i diritti delle persone, ma fermarle nei Paesi più poveri”, continua Maccanico.

    Un gradino al di sopra delle collaborazioni più informali, come nell’Afic, ci sono i cosiddetti working arrangement (accordi di cooperazione) che permettono di collaborare con le autorità di un Paese in modo ufficiale. “Non serve il via libera del Parlamento europeo e di fatto non c’è nessun controllo né prima della sottoscrizione né ex post -riprende Salzano-. Se ci fosse uno scambio di dati e informazioni dovrebbe esserci il via libera del Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, ma a oggi, questo parere, è stato richiesto solo nel caso del Niger”. A marzo 2023 sono invece 18 i Paesi che hanno siglato accordi simili: da Stati Uniti e Canada, passando per Capo Verde fino alla Federazione Russa. “Sappiamo che i contatti con Mosca dovrebbero essere quotidiani. Dall’inizio del conflitto ho chiesto più volte all’Agenzia se queste comunicazioni sono state interrotte: nessuno mi ha mai risposto”, sottolinea Salzano.

    Obiettivo ultimo dell’Agenzia è riuscire a dispiegare agenti e mezzi anche nei Paesi terzi: una delle novità del regolamento del 2019 rispetto al precedente (2016) è proprio la possibilità di lanciare operazioni non solo nei “Paesi vicini” ma in tutto il mondo. Per farlo sono necessari gli status agreement, accordi internazionali che impegnano formalmente anche le istituzioni europee. Sono cinque quelli attivi (Serbia, Albania, Montenegro e Macedonia del Nord, Moldova) ma sono in via di sottoscrizione quelli con Senegal e Mauritania per limitare le partenze (poco più di 15mila nel 2022) verso le isole Canarie, mille chilometri più a Nord: accordi per ora “fermi”, secondo quanto ricostruito dalla parlamentare europea olandese Tineke Strik che a fine febbraio ha visitato i due Stati, ma che danno conto della linea che si vuole seguire. Un quadro noto, i cui dettagli però spesso restano nascosti.

    È quanto emerge dal report “Accesso negato”, pubblicato da Statewatch a metà marzo 2023, che ricostruisce altri due casi di scarsa trasparenza negli accordi, Niger e Marocco, due Paesi chiave nella strategia europea di esternalizzazione delle frontiere. “Con la ‘scusa’ della tutela della riservatezza nelle relazioni internazionali e mettendo la questione migratoria sotto il cappello dell’antiterrorismo l’accesso ai dettagli degli accordi non è consentito”, spiega Maccanico, uno dei curatori dello studio. Non si conoscono, per esempio, i compiti specifici degli agenti, per cui si propone addirittura l’immunità totale. “In alcuni accordi, come in Macedonia del Nord, si è poi ‘ripiegato’ su un’immunità connessa solo ai compiti che rientrano nel mandato dell’Agenzia -osserva Salzano-. Ma il problema non cambia: dove finisce la sua responsabilità e dove inizia quella del Paese membro?”. Una zona grigia funzionale a Frontex, anche quando opera sul territorio europeo.

    Lo sa bene l’avvocata tedesca Lisa-Marie Komp che, come detto, ha portato l’Agenzia di fronte alla Corte di giustizia dell’Ue. Il caso, su cui il giudice si pronuncerà nei prossimi mesi, riguarda il rimpatrio nel 2016 di una famiglia siriana con quattro bambini piccoli che, pochi giorni dopo aver presentato richiesta d’asilo in Grecia, è stata caricata su un aereo e riportata in Turchia: quel volo è stato gestito da Frontex, in collaborazione con le autorità greche. “L’Agenzia cerca di scaricare le responsabilità su di loro ma il suo mandato stabilisce chiaramente che è tenuta a monitorare il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali durante queste operazioni -spiega-. Serve chiarire che tutti devono rispettare la legge, compresa l’Agenzia le cui azioni hanno un grande impatto sulla vita di molte persone”.

    Le illegittimità nell’attività dei rimpatri sono note da tempo e il caso della famiglia siriana non è isolato. “Quando c’è una forte discrepanza nelle decisioni sulle domande d’asilo tra i diversi Paesi europei, l’attività di semplice ‘coordinamento’ e preparazione delle attività di rimpatrio può tradursi nella violazione del principio di non respingimento”, spiega Mariana Gkliati, docente di Migrazione e Asilo all’università olandese di Tilburg. Nonostante questi problemi e un sistema d’asilo sempre più fragile, negli ultimi anni i poteri e le risorse a disposizione per l’Agenzia sui rimpatri sono esplosi: nel 2022 questa specifica voce di bilancio prevedeva quasi 79 milioni di euro (+690% rispetto ai dieci milioni del 2012).

    E la crescita sembra destinata a non fermarsi. Frontex nel 2023 stima di poter rimpatriare 800 persone in Iraq, 316 in Pakistan, 200 in Gambia, 75 in Afghanistan, 57 in Siria, 60 in Russia e 36 in Ucraina come si legge in un bando pubblicato a inizio febbraio 2023 che ha come obiettivo la ricerca di partner in questi Paesi (e in altri, in totale 43) per garantire assistenza di breve e medio periodo (12 mesi) alle persone rimpatriate. Un’altra gara pubblica dà conto della centralità dell’Agenzia nella “strategia dei rimpatri” europea: 120 milioni di euro nel novembre 2022 per l’acquisto di “servizi di viaggio relativi ai rimpatri mediante voli di linea”. Migliaia di biglietti e un nuovo sistema informatico per gestire al meglio le prenotazioni, con un’enorme mole di dati personali delle persone “irregolari” che arriveranno nelle “mani” di Frontex. Mani affidabili, secondo la Commissione europea.

    Ma il 7 ottobre 2022 il Parlamento, nel “bocciare” nuovamente Frontex rispetto al via libera sul bilancio 2020, dava conto del “rammarico per l’assenza di procedimenti disciplinari” nei confronti di Leggeri e della “preoccupazione” per la mancata attivazione dell’articolo 46 (che prevede il ritiro degli agenti quando siano sistematiche le violazioni dei diritti umani) con riferimento alla Grecia, in cui l’Agenzia opera con 518 agenti, 11 navi e 30 mezzi. “I respingimenti e la violenza sui confini continuano sia alle frontiere terrestri sia a quelle marittime così come non si è interrotto il sostegno alle autorità greche”, spiega la ricercatrice indipendente Lena Karamanidou. La “scusa” ufficiale è che la presenza di agenti migliori la situazione ma non è così. “Al confine terrestre di Evros, la violenza è stata documentata per tutto il tempo in cui Frontex è stata presente, fin dal 2010. È difficile immaginare come possa farlo in futuro vista la sistematicità delle violenze su questo confine”. Su quella frontiera si giocherà anche la presunta nuova reputazione dell’Agenzia guidata dal primo marzo dall’olandese Hans Leijtens: un tentativo di “ripulire” l’immagine che è già in corso.

    Frontex nei confronti delle persone in fuga dal conflitto in Ucraina ha tenuto fin dall’inizio un altro registro: i “migranti irregolari” sono diventati “persone che scappano da zone di conflitto”; l’obiettivo di “combattere l’immigrazione irregolare” si è trasformato nella gestione “efficace dell’attraversamento dei confini”. “Gli ultimi mesi hanno mostrato il potenziale di Frontex di evolversi in un attore affidabile della gestione delle frontiere che opera con efficienza, trasparenza e pieno rispetto dei diritti umani”, sottolinea Gkliati nello studio “Frontex assisting in the ukrainian displacement. A welcoming committee at racialised passage?”, pubblicato nel marzo 2023. Una conferma ulteriore, per Salzano, dei limiti strutturali dell’Agenzia: “La legge va rispettata indipendentemente dalla cornice in cui operi: la tutela dei diritti umani prescinde dagli umori della politica”.

    https://altreconomia.it/nessuno-vuole-mettere-limiti-allattivita-dellagenzia-frontex

    #Frontex #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #justice #Lisa-Marie_Komp #OLAF #Sénégal #externalisation #Africa-Frontex_intelligence_community (#Afic) #Rac #Nigeria #Gambie #Niger #Ghana #Côte_d'Ivoire #Togo #Mauritanie #status_agreement #échange_de_données #working_arrangement #Serbie #Monténégro #Albanie #Moldavie #Macédoine_du_Nord #CJUE #cours_de_justice #renvois #expulsions

    • I rischi della presenza di Frontex in Africa: tanto potere, poca responsabilità

      L’eurodeputata #Tineke_Strik è stata in Senegal e Mauritania a fine febbraio 2023: in un’intervista ad Altreconomia ricostruisce lo stato dell’arte degli accordi che l’Ue vorrebbe concludere con i due Paesi ritenuti “chiave” nel contrasto ai flussi migratori. Denunciando la necessità di una riforma strutturale dell’Agenzia.

      A un anno di distanza dalle dimissioni del suo ex direttore Fabrice Leggeri, le istituzioni europee non vogliono mettere limiti all’attività di Frontex. Come abbiamo ricostruito sul numero di aprile di Altreconomia, infatti, l’Agenzia -che dal primo marzo 2023 è guidata da Hans Leijtens- continua a svolgere un ruolo centrale nelle politiche migratorie dell’Unione europea nonostante le pesanti rivelazioni dell’Ufficio europeo antifrode (Olaf), che ha ricostruito nel dettaglio il malfunzionamento nelle operazioni delle divise blu lungo i confini europei.

      Ma non solo. Un aspetto particolarmente preoccupante sono le operazioni al di fuori dei Paesi dell’Unione, che rientrano sempre di più tra le priorità di Frontex in un’ottica di esternalizzazione delle frontiere per “fermare” preventivamente i flussi di persone dirette verso l’Europa. Non a caso, a luglio 2022, nonostante i contenuti del rapporto Olaf chiuso solo pochi mesi prima, la Commissione europea ha dato il via libera ai negoziati con Senegal e Mauritania per stringere un cosiddetto working arrangement e permettere così agli “agenti europei” di operare nei due Paesi africani (segnaliamo anche la recente ricerca pubblicata dall’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione sul tema).

      Per monitorare lo stato dell’arte di questi accordi l’eurodeputata Tineke Strik, tra le poche a opporsi e a denunciare senza sconti gli effetti delle politiche migratorie europee e il ruolo di Frontex, a fine febbraio 2023 ha svolto una missione di monitoraggio nei due Paesi. Già professoressa di Diritto della cittadinanza e delle migrazioni dell’Università di Radboud di Nimega, in Olanda, è stata eletta al Parlamento europeo nel 2019 nelle fila di GroenLinks (Sinistra verde). L’abbiamo intervistata.

      Onorevole Strik, secondo quanto ricostruito dalla vostra visita (ha partecipato alla missione anche Cornelia Erns, di LeftEu, ndr), a che punto sono i negoziati con il Senegal?
      TS La nostra impressione è che le autorità senegalesi non siano così desiderose di concludere un accordo di status con l’Unione europea sulla presenza di Frontex nel Paese. L’approccio di Bruxelles nei confronti della migrazione come sappiamo è molto incentrato su sicurezza e gestione delle frontiere; i senegalesi, invece, sono più interessati a un intervento sostenibile e incentrato sullo sviluppo, che offra soluzioni e affronti le cause profonde che spingono le persone a partire. Sono molti i cittadini del Senegal emigrano verso l’Europa: idealmente, il governo vuole che rimangano nel Paese, ma capisce meglio di quanto non lo facciano le istituzioni Ue che si può intervenire sulla migrazione solo affrontando le cause alla radice e migliorando la situazione nel contesto di partenza. Allo stesso tempo, le navi europee continuano a pescare lungo le coste del Paese (minacciando la pesca artigianale, ndr), le aziende europee evadono le tasse e il latte sovvenzionato dall’Ue viene scaricato sul mercato senegalese, causando disoccupazione e impedendo lo sviluppo dell’economia locale. Sono soprattutto gli accordi di pesca ad aver alimentato le partenze dal Senegal, dal momento che le comunità di pescatori sono state private della loro principale fonte di reddito. Serve domandarsi se l’Unione sia veramente interessata allo sviluppo e ad affrontare le cause profonde della migrazione. E lo stesso discorso può essere fatto su molti dei Paesi d’origine delle persone che cercano poi protezione in Europa.

      Dakar vede di buon occhio l’intervento dell’Unione europea? Quale tipo di operazioni andrebbero a svolgere gli agenti di Frontex nel Paese?
      TS Abbiamo avuto la sensazione che l’Ue non ascoltasse le richieste delle autorità senegalesi -ad esempio in materia di rilascio di visti d’ingresso- e ci hanno espresso preoccupazioni relative ai diritti fondamentali in merito a qualsiasi potenziale cooperazione con Frontex, data la reputazione dell’Agenzia. È difficile dire che tipo di supporto sia previsto, ma nei negoziati l’Unione sta puntando sia alle frontiere terrestri sia a quelle marittime.

      Che cosa sta avvenendo in Mauritania?
      TS Sebbene questo Paese sembri disposto a concludere un accordo sullo status di Frontex -soprattutto nell’ottica di ottenere un maggiore riconoscimento da parte dell’Europa-, preferisce comunque mantenere l’autonomia nella gestione delle proprie frontiere e quindi non prevede una presenza permanente dei funzionari dell’Agenzia nel Paese. Considerano l’accordo sullo status più come un quadro giuridico, per consentire la presenza di Frontex in caso di aumento della pressione migratoria. Inoltre, come il Senegal, ritengono che l’Europa debba ascoltare e accogliere le loro richieste, che riguardano principalmente i visti e altre aree di cooperazione. Anche in questo caso, Bruxelles chiede il mandato più ampio possibile per gli agenti in divisa blu durante i negoziati per “mantenere aperte le opzioni [più ampie]”, come dicono loro stessi. Ma credo sia chiaro che il loro obiettivo è quello di operare sia alle frontiere marittime sia a quelle terrestri.
      Questo a livello “istituzionale”. Qual è invece la posizione della società civile?
      TS In entrambi i Paesi è molto critica. In parte a causa della cattiva reputazione di Frontex in relazione ai diritti umani, ma anche a causa dell’esperienza che i cittadini senegalesi e mauritani hanno già sperimentato con la Guardia civil spagnola, presente nei due Stati, che ritengono stia intaccando la sovranità per quanto riguarda la gestione delle frontiere. È previsto che il mandato di Frontex sia addirittura esecutivo, a differenza di quello della Guardia civil, che può impegnarsi solo in pattugliamenti congiunti in cui le autorità nazionali sono al comando. Quindi la sovranità di entrambi i Paesi sarebbe ulteriormente minata.

      Perché a suo avviso sarebbe problematica la presenza di agenti di Frontex nei due Paesi?
      TS L’immunità che l’Unione europea vorrebbe per i propri operativi dispiegati in Africa non è solo connessa allo svolgimento delle loro funzioni ma si estende al di fuori di esse, a questo si aggiunge la possibilità di essere armati. Penso sia problematico il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali dei naufraghi intercettati in mare, poiché è difficile ottenere l’accesso all’asilo sia in Senegal sia in Mauritania. In questo Paese, ad esempio, l’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (Unhcr) impiega molto tempo per determinare il loro bisogno di protezione: fanno eccezione i maliani, che riescono a ottenerla in “appena” due anni. E durante l’attesa queste persone non hanno quasi diritti.

      Ma se ottengono la protezione è comunque molto difficile registrarsi presso l’amministrazione, cosa necessaria per avere accesso al mercato del lavoro, alle scuole o all’assistenza sanitaria. E le conseguenze che ne derivano sono le continue retate, i fermi e le deportazioni alla frontiera, per impedire alle persone di partire. A causa delle attuali intercettazioni in mare, le rotte migratorie si stanno spostando sulla terra ferma e puntano verso l’Algeria: l’attraversamento del deserto può essere mortale. Il problema principale è che Frontex deve rispettare il diritto dell’Unione europea anche se opera in un Paese terzo in cui si applicano norme giuridiche diverse, ma l’Agenzia andrà a operare sotto il comando delle guardie di frontiera di un Paese che non è vincolato dalle “regole” europee. Come può Frontex garantire di non essere coinvolta in operazioni che violano le norme fondamentali del diritto comunitario, se determinate azioni non sono illegali in quel Paese? Sulla carta è possibile presentare un reclamo a Frontex, ma poi nella pratica questo strumento in quali termini sarebbe accessibile ed efficace?

      Un anno dopo le dimissioni dell’ex direttore Leggeri ritiene che Frontex si sia pienamente assunta la responsabilità di quanto accaduto? Può davvero, secondo lei, diventare un attore affidabile per l’Ue?
      TS Prima devono accadere molte cose. Non abbiamo ancora visto una riforma fondamentale: c’è ancora un forte bisogno di maggiore trasparenza, di un atteggiamento più fermo nei confronti degli Stati membri ospitanti e di un uso conseguente dell’articolo 46 che prevede la sospensione delle operazioni in caso di violazioni dei diritti umani (abbiamo già raccontato il ruolo dell’Agenzia nei respingimenti tra Grecia e Turchia, ndr). Questi problemi saranno ovviamente esacerbati nella cooperazione con i Paesi terzi, perché la responsabilità sarà ancora più difficile da raggiungere.

      https://altreconomia.it/i-rischi-della-presenza-di-frontex-in-africa-tanto-potere-poca-responsa

    • «Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare». La missione di ASGI in Senegal e Mauritania

      Lo scorso 29 marzo è stato pubblicato il rapporto «Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare» (https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania), frutto del sopralluogo giuridico effettuato tra il 7 e il 13 maggio 2022 da una delegazione di ASGI composta da Alice Fill, Lorenzo Figoni, Matteo Astuti, Diletta Agresta, Adelaide Massimi (avvocate e avvocati, operatori e operatrici legali, ricercatori e ricercatrici).

      Il sopralluogo aveva l’obiettivo di analizzare lo sviluppo delle politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo della mobilità e di blocco delle frontiere implementate dall’Unione Europea in Mauritania e in Senegal – due paesi a cui, come la Turchia o gli stati balcanici più orientali, gli stati membri hanno delegato la gestione dei flussi migratori concordando politiche sempre più ostacolanti per lo spostamento delle persone.

      Nel corso del sopralluogo sono stati intervistati, tra Mauritania e Senegal, più di 40 interlocutori afferenti a istituzioni, società civile, popolazione migrante e organizzazioni, tra cui OIM, UNHCR, delegazioni dell’UE. Intercettare questi soggetti ha consentito ad ASGI di andare oltre le informazioni vincolate all’ufficialità delle dichiarazioni pubbliche e di approfondire le pratiche illegittime portate avanti su questi territori.

      Il report parte dalle già assodate intenzioni di collaborazione tra l’Unione Europea e le autorità senegalesi e mauritane – una collaborazione che in entrambi i paesi sembra connotata nel senso del controllo e della sorveglianza; per quanto riguarda il Senegal, si fa menzione del ben noto status agreement, proposto nel febbraio 2022 a Dakar dalla Commissaria europea agli affari interni Ylva Johansson, con il quale si intende estendere il controllo di Frontex in Senegal.

      L’obiettivo di tale accordo era il controllo della cosiddetta rotta delle Canarie, che tra il 2018 e il 2022 è stata sempre più battuta. Sebbene la proposta abbia generato accese discussioni nella società civile senegalese, preoccupata all’idea di cedere parte della sovranità del paese sul controllo delle frontiere esterne, con tale accordo, elaborato con un disegno molto simile a quello che regola le modalità di intervento di Frontex nei Balcani, si legittimerebbe ufficialmente l’attività di controllo dell’agenzia UE in paesi terzi, e in particolare fuori dal continente europeo.

      Per quanto riguarda la Mauritania, si menziona l’Action Plan pubblicato da Frontex il 7 giugno 2022, con il quale si prospetta una possibilità di collaborare operativamente sul territorio mauritano, in particolare per lo sviluppo di governance in materia migratoria.

      Senegal

      Sin dai primi anni Duemila, il dialogo tra istituzioni europee e senegalesi è stato focalizzato sulle politiche di riammissione dei cittadini senegalesi presenti in UE in maniera irregolare e dei cosiddetti ritorni volontari, le politiche di gestione delle frontiere senegalesi e il controllo della costa, la promozione di una legislazione anti-trafficking e anti-smuggling. Tutto questo si è intensificato quando, a partire dal 2018, la rotta delle Canarie è tornata a essere una rotta molto percorsa. L’operatività delle agenzie europee in Senegal per la gestione delle migrazioni si declina principalmente nei seguenti obiettivi:

      1. Monitoraggio delle frontiere terrestri e marittime. Il memorandum firmato nel 2006 da Senegal e Spagna ha sancito la collaborazione ufficiale tra le forze di polizia europee e quelle senegalesi in operazioni congiunte di pattugliamento; a questo si aggiunge, sempre nello stesso anno, una presenza sempre più intensiva di Frontex al largo delle coste senegalesi.

      2. Lotta alla tratta e al traffico. Su questo fronte dell’operatività congiunta tra forze senegalesi ed europee, la normativa di riferimento è la legge n. 06 del 10 maggio 2005, che offre delle direttive per il contrasto della tratta di persone e del traffico. Tale documento, non distinguendo mai fra “tratta” e “traffico”, di fatto criminalizza la migrazione irregolare tout court, dal momento che viene utilizzato in maniera estensiva (e arbitraria) come strumento di controllo e di repressione della mobilità – fu utilizzato, ad esempio, per accusare di traffico di esseri umani un padre che aveva imbarcato suo figlio su un mezzo che poi naufragato.

      Il sistema di asilo in Senegal

      Il Senegal aderisce alla Convenzione del 1951 sullo status de rifugiati e del relativo Protocollo del 1967; la valutazione delle domande di asilo fa capo alla Commissione Nazionale di Eleggibilità (CNE), che al deposito della richiesta di asilo emette un permesso di soggiorno della durata di 3 mesi, rinnovabile fino all’esito dell’audizione di fronte alla CNE; l’esito della CNE è ricorribile in primo grado presso la Commissione stessa e, nel caso di ulteriore rifiuto, presso il Presidente della Repubblica. Quando il richiedente asilo depone la propria domanda, subentra l’UNHCR, che nel paese è molto presente e finanzia ONG locali per fornire assistenza.

      Il 5 aprile 2022 l’Assemblea Nazionale senegalese ha approvato una nuova legge sullo status dei rifugiati e degli apolidi, una legge che, stando a diverse associazioni locali, sulla carta estenderebbe i diritti cui i rifugiati hanno accesso; tuttavia, le stesse associazioni temono che a tale miglioramento possa non seguire un’applicazione effettiva della normativa.
      Mauritania

      Data la collocazione geografica del paese, a ridosso dell’Atlantico e delle isole Canarie, in prossimità di paesi ad alto indice di emigrazione (Senegal, Mali, Marocco), la Mauritania rappresenta un territorio strategico per il monitoraggio dei flussi migratori diretti in Europa. Pertanto, analogamente a quanto avvenuto in Senegal, anche in Mauritania la Spagna ha proceduto a rafforzare la cooperazione in tema di politiche migratorie e di gestione del controllo delle frontiere e a incrementare la presenta e l’impegno di attori esterni – in primis di agenzie quali Frontex – per interventi di contenimento dei flussi e di riammissione di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania.

      Relativamente alla Mauritania, l’obiettivo principale delle istituzioni europee sembra essere la prevenzione dell’immigrazione lungo la rotta delle Canarie. La normativa di riferimento è l’Accordo di riammissione bilaterale firmato con la Spagna nel luglio 2003. Con tale accordo, la Spagna può chiedere alla Mauritania di riammettere sul proprio territorio cittadini mauritani e non solo, anche altri cittadini provenienti da paesi terzi che “si presume” siano transitati per la Mauritania prima di entrare irregolarmente in Spagna. Oltre a tali interventi, il report di ASGI menziona l’Operazione Hera di Frontex e vari interventi di cooperazione allo sviluppo promossi dalla Spagna “con finalità tutt’altro che umanitarie”, bensì di gestione della mobilità.

      In tale regione, nella fase degli sbarchi risulta molto dubbio il ruolo giocato da organizzazioni come OIM e UNHCR, poiché non è codificato; interlocutori diversi hanno fornito informazioni contrastanti sulla disponibilità di UNHCR a intervenire in supporto e su segnalazione delle ONG presenti al momento dello sbarco. In ogni caso, se effettivamente UNHCR fosse assente agli sbarchi, ciò determinerebbe una sostanziale impossibilità di accesso alle procedure di protezione internazionale da parte di qualsiasi potenziale richiedente asilo che venga intercettato in mare.

      Anche in questo territorio la costruzione della figura del “trafficante” diventa un dispositivo di criminalizzazione e repressione della mobilità sulla rotta atlantica, strumentale alla soddisfazione di richieste europee.
      La detenzione dei cittadini stranieri

      Tra Nouakchott e Nouadhibou vi sono tre centri di detenzione per persone migranti; uno di questi (il Centro di Detenzione di Nouadhibou 2 (anche detto “El Guantanamito”), venne realizzato grazie a dei fondi di un’agenzia di cooperazione spagnola. Sovraffollamento, precarietà igienico-sanitaria e impossibilità di accesso a cure e assistenza legale hanno caratterizzato tali centri. Quando El Guantanamito fu chiuso, i commissariati di polizia sono diventati i principali luoghi deputati alla detenzione dei cittadini stranieri; in tali centri, vengono detenute non solo le persone intercettate in prossimità delle coste mauritane, ma anche i cittadini stranieri riammessi dalla Spagna, e anche le persone presenti irregolarmente su territorio mauritano. Risulta delicato il tema dell’accesso a tali commissariati, dal momento che il sopralluogo ha rilevato che le ONG non hanno il permesso di entrarvi, mentre le organizzazioni internazionali sì – ciò nonostante, nessuna delle persone precedentemente sottoposte a detenzione con cui la delegazione ASGI ha avuto modo di interloquire ha dichiarato di aver riscontrato la presenza di organizzazioni all’interno di questi centri.

      La detenzione amministrativa risulta essere “un tassello essenziale della politica di contenimento dei flussi di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania”. Il passaggio successivo alla detenzione delle persone migranti è l’allontanamento, che si svolge in forma di veri e propri respingimenti sommari e informali, senza che i migranti siano messi nelle condizioni né di dichiarare la propria nazionalità né di conoscere la procedura di ritorno volontario.
      Il ruolo delle organizzazioni internazionali in Mauritania

      OIM riveste un ruolo centrale nel panorama delle politiche di esternalizzazione e di blocco dei cittadini stranieri in Mauritania, tramite il supporto delle autorità di pubblica sicurezza mauritane nello sviluppo di politiche di contenimento della libertà di movimento – strategie e interventi che suggeriscono una connotazione securitaria della presenza dell’associazione nel paese, a scapito di una umanitaria.

      Nonostante anche la Mauritania sia firmataria della Convenzione di Ginevra, non esiste a oggi una legge nazionale sul diritto di asilo nel paese. UNHCR testimonia come dal 2015 esiste un progetto di legge sull’asilo, ma che questo sia tuttora “in attesa di adozione”.

      Pertanto, le procedure di asilo in Mauritania sono gestite interamente da UNHCR. Tali procedure si differenziano a seconda della pericolosità delle regioni di provenienza delle persone migranti; in particolare, i migranti maliani provenienti dalle regioni considerate più pericolose vengono registrati come rifugiati prima facie, quanto non accade invece per i richiedenti asilo provenienti dalle aree urbane, per loro, l’iter dell’asilo è ben più lungo, e prevede una sorta di “pre-pre-registrazione” presso un ente partner di UNHCR, cui segue una pre-registrazione accordata da UNHCR previo appuntamento, e solo in seguito alla registrazione viene riconosciuto un certificato di richiesta di asilo, valido per sei mesi, in attesa di audizione per la determinazione dello status di rifugiato.

      Le tempistiche per il riconoscimento di protezione, poi, sono differenti a seconda del grado di vulnerabilità del richiedente e in taluni casi potevano condurre ad anni e anni di attesa. Alla complessità della procedura si aggiunge che non tutti i potenziali richiedenti asilo possono accedervi – ad esempio, chi proviene da alcuni stati, come la Sierra Leone, considerati “paesi sicuri” secondo una categorizzazione fornita dall’Unione Africana.
      Conclusioni

      In fase conclusiva, il report si sofferma sul ruolo fondamentale giocato dall’Unione Europea nel forzare le politiche senegalesi e mauritane nel senso della sicurezza e del contenimento, a scapito della tutela delle persone migranti nei loro diritti fondamentali. Le principali preoccupazioni evidenziate sono rappresentate dalla prospettiva della conclusione dello status agreement tra Frontex e i due paesi, perché tale ratifica ufficializzerebbe non solo la presenza, ma un ruolo legittimo e attivo di un’agenzia europea nel controllo di frontiere che si dispiegano ben oltre i confini territoriali comunitari, ben oltre le acque territoriali, spingendo le maglie del controllo dei flussi fin dentro le terre di quegli stati da cui le persone fuggono puntando all’Unione Europea. La delegazione, tuttavia, sottolinea che vi sono aree in cui la società civile senegalese e mauritana risulta particolarmente politicizzata, dunque in grado di esprimere insofferenza o aperta contrarietà nei confronti delle ingerenze europee nei loro paesi. Infine, da interviste, colloqui e incontri con diretti interessati e testimoni, il ruolo di organizzazioni internazionali come le citate OIM e UNHCR appare nella maggior parte dei casi “fluido o sfuggevole”; una prospettiva, questa, che sembra confermare l’ambivalenza delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali, soggetti messi innanzitutto al servizio degli interessi delle istituzioni europee.

      Il report si conclude auspicando una prosecuzione di studio e analisi al fine di continuare a monitorare gli sviluppi politici e legislativi che legano l’Unione Europea e questi territori nella gestione operativa delle migrazioni.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/05/un-laboratorio-di-esternalizzazione-tra-frontiere-di-terra-e-di-mare

    • Pubblicato il rapporto #ASGI della missione in Senegal e Mauritania

      Il Senegal e la Mauritania sono paesi fondamentali lungo la rotta che conduce dall’Africa occidentale alle isole Canarie. Nel 2020, dopo alcuni anni in cui la rotta era stata meno utilizzata, vi è stato un incremento del 900% degli arrivi rispetto all’anno precedente. Il dato ha portato la Spagna e le istituzioni europee a concentrarsi nuovamente sui due paesi. La cosiddetta Rotta Atlantica, che a partire dal 2006 era stata teatro di sperimentazioni di pratiche di contenimento e selezione della mobilità e di delega dei controlli alle frontiere e del diritto di asilo, è tornata all’attenzione internazionale: da febbraio 2022 sono in corso negoziazioni per la firma di un accordo di status con Frontex per permettere il dispiegamento dei suoi agenti in Senegal e Mauritania.

      Al fine di indagare l’attuazione delle politiche di esternalizzazione e i loro effetti, dal 7 al 13 maggio 2022 un gruppo di socз ASGI – avvocatз, operatorз legali e ricercatorз – ha effettuato un sopralluogo giuridico a Nouakchott, Mauritania e a Dakar, Senegal.

      Il report restituisce il quadro ricostruito nel corso del sopralluogo, durante il quale è stato possibile intervistare oltre 45 interlocutori tra istituzioni, organizzazioni internazionali, ONG e persone migranti.

      https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania
      #rapport

    • Au Sénégal, les desseins de Frontex se heurtent aux résistances locales

      Tout semblait devoir aller très vite : début 2022, l’Union européenne propose de déployer sa force anti-migration Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises, et le président Macky Sall y semble favorable. Mais c’était compter sans l’opposition de la société civile, qui refuse de voir le Sénégal ériger des murs à la place de l’Europe.

      Agents armés, navires, drones et systèmes de sécurité sophistiqués : Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes créée en 2004, a sorti le grand jeu pour dissuader les Africains de prendre la direction des îles Canaries – et donc de l’Europe –, l’une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Cet arsenal, auquel s’ajoutent des programmes de formation de la police aux frontières, est la pierre angulaire de la proposition faite début 2022 par le Conseil de l’Europe au Sénégal. Finalement, Dakar a refusé de la signer sous la pression de la société civile, même si les négociations ne sont pas closes. Dans un climat politique incandescent à l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2024, le président sénégalais, Macky Sall, soupçonné de vouloir briguer un troisième mandat, a préféré prendre son temps et a fini par revenir sur sa position initiale, qui semblait ouverte à cette collaboration. Dans le même temps, la Mauritanie voisine, elle, a entamé des négociations avec Bruxelles.

      L’histoire débute le 11 février 2022 : lors d’une conférence de presse à Dakar, la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures du Conseil de l’Europe, Ylva Johansson, officialise la proposition européenne de déployer Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises. « C’est mon offre et j’espère que le gouvernement sénégalais sera intéressé par cette opportunité unique », indique-t-elle. En cas d’accord, elle annonce que l’agence européenne sera déployée dans le pays au plus tard au cours de l’été 2022. Dans les jours qui ont suivi l’annonce de Mme Johansson, plusieurs associations de la société civile sénégalaise ont organisé des manifestations et des sit-in à Dakar contre la signature de cet accord, jugé contraire aux intérêts nationaux et régionaux.

      Une frontière déplacée vers la côte sénégalaise

      « Il s’agit d’un #dispositif_policier très coûteux qui ne permet pas de résoudre les problèmes d’immigration tant en Afrique qu’en Europe. C’est pourquoi il est impopulaire en Afrique. Frontex participe, avec des moyens militaires, à l’édification de murs chez nous, en déplaçant la frontière européenne vers la côte sénégalaise. C’est inacceptable, dénonce Seydi Gassama, le directeur exécutif d’Amnesty International au Sénégal. L’UE exerce une forte pression sur les États africains. Une grande partie de l’aide européenne au développement est désormais conditionnée à la lutte contre la migration irrégulière. Les États africains doivent pouvoir jouer un rôle actif dans ce jeu, ils ne doivent pas accepter ce qu’on leur impose, c’est-à-dire des politiques contraires aux intérêts de leurs propres communautés. » Le défenseur des droits humains rappelle que les transferts de fonds des migrants pèsent très lourd dans l’économie du pays : selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, ils ont atteint 2,66 milliards de dollars (2,47 milliards d’euros) au Sénégal en 2021, soit 9,6 % du PIB (presque le double du total de l’aide internationale au développement allouée au pays, de l’ordre de 1,38 milliard de dollars en 2021). « Aujourd’hui, en visitant la plupart des villages sénégalais, que ce soit dans la région de Fouta, au Sénégal oriental ou en Haute-Casamance, il est clair que tout ce qui fonctionne – hôpitaux, dispensaires, routes, écoles – a été construit grâce aux envois de fonds des émigrés », souligne M. Gassama.

      « Quitter son lieu de naissance pour aller vivre dans un autre pays est un droit humain fondamental, consacré par l’article 13 de la Convention de Genève de 1951, poursuit-il. Les sociétés capitalistes comme celles de l’Union européenne ne peuvent pas dire aux pays africains : “Vous devez accepter la libre circulation des capitaux et des services, alors que nous n’acceptons pas la libre circulation des travailleurs”. » Selon lui, « l’Europe devrait garantir des routes migratoires régulières, quasi inexistantes aujourd’hui, et s’attaquer simultanément aux racines profondes de l’exclusion, de la pauvreté, de la crise démocratique et de l’instabilité dans les pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest afin d’offrir aux jeunes des perspectives alternatives à l’émigration et au recrutement dans les rangs des groupes djihadistes ».

      Depuis le siège du Forum social sénégalais (FSS), à Dakar, Mamadou Mignane Diouf abonde : « L’UE a un comportement inhumain, intellectuellement et diplomatiquement malhonnête. » Le coordinateur du FSS cite le cas récent de l’accueil réservé aux réfugiés ukrainiens ayant fui la guerre, qui contraste avec les naufrages incessants en Méditerranée et dans l’océan Atlantique, et avec la fermeture des ports italiens aux bateaux des ONG internationales engagées dans des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage des migrants. « Quel est ce monde dans lequel les droits de l’homme ne sont accordés qu’à certaines personnes en fonction de leur origine ?, se désole-t-il. À chaque réunion internationale sur la migration, nous répétons aux dirigeants européens que s’ils investissaient un tiers de ce qu’ils allouent à Frontex dans des politiques de développement local transparentes, les jeunes Africains ne seraient plus contraints de partir. » Le budget total alloué à Frontex, en constante augmentation depuis 2016, a dépassé les 754 millions d’euros en 2022, contre 535 millions l’année précédente.
      Une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières

      Boubacar Seye, directeur de l’ONG Horizon sans Frontières, parle de son côté d’une « gestion catastrophique et inhumaine des frontières et des phénomènes migratoires ». Selon les estimations de l’ONG espagnole Caminando Fronteras, engagée dans la surveillance quotidienne de ce qu’elle appelle la « nécro-frontière ouest-euro-africaine », entre 2018 et 2022, 7 865 personnes originaires de 31 pays différents, dont 1 273 femmes et 383 enfants, auraient trouvé la mort en tentant de rejoindre les côtes espagnoles des Canaries à bord de pirogues en bois et de canots pneumatiques cabossés – soit une moyenne de 6 victimes chaque jour. Il s’agit de l’une des routes migratoires les plus dangereuses et les plus meurtrières au monde, avec le triste record, ces cinq dernières années, d’au moins 250 bateaux qui auraient coulé avec leurs passagers à bord. Le dernier naufrage connu a eu lieu le 2 octobre 2022. Selon le récit d’un jeune Ivoirien de 27 ans, seul survivant, le bateau a coulé après neuf jours de mer, emportant avec lui 33 vies.

      Selon les chiffres fournis par le ministère espagnol de l’Intérieur, environ 15 000 personnes sont arrivées aux îles Canaries en 2022 – un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2021 (21 000) et 2020 (23 000). Et pour cause : la Guardia Civil espagnole a déployé des navires et des hélicoptères sur les côtes du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie, dans le cadre de l’opération « Hera » mise en place dès 2006 (l’année de la « crise des pirogues ») grâce à des accords de coopération militaire avec les deux pays africains, et en coordination avec Frontex.

      « Les frontières de l’Europe sont devenues des lieux de souffrance, des cimetières, au lieu d’être des entrelacs de communication et de partage, dénonce Boubacar Seye, qui a obtenu la nationalité espagnole. L’Europe se barricade derrière des frontières juridiques, politiques et physiques. Aujourd’hui, les frontières sont équipées de moyens de surveillance très avancés. Mais, malgré tout, les naufrages et les massacres d’innocents continuent. Il y a manifestement un problème. » Une question surtout le hante : « Combien d’argent a-t-on injecté dans la lutte contre la migration irrégulière en Afrique au fil des ans ? Il n’y a jamais eu d’évaluation. Demander publiquement un audit transparent, en tant que citoyen européen et chercheur, m’a coûté la prison. » L’activiste a été détenu pendant une vingtaine de jours en janvier 2021 au Sénégal pour avoir osé demander des comptes sur l’utilisation des fonds européens. De la fenêtre de son bureau, à Dakar, il regarde l’océan et s’alarme : « L’ère post-Covid et post-guerre en Ukraine va générer encore plus de tensions géopolitiques liées aux migrations. »
      Un outil policier contesté à gauche

      Bruxelles, novembre 2022. Nous rencontrons des professeurs, des experts des questions migratoires et des militants belges qui dénoncent l’approche néocoloniale des politiques migratoires de l’Union européenne (UE). Il est en revanche plus difficile d’échanger quelques mots avec les députés européens, occupés à courir d’une aile à l’autre du Parlement européen, où l’on n’entre que sur invitation. Quelques heures avant la fin de notre mission, nous parvenons toutefois à rencontrer Amandine Bach, conseillère politique sur les questions migratoires pour le groupe parlementaire de gauche The Left. « Nous sommes le seul parti qui s’oppose systématiquement à Frontex en tant qu’outil policier pour gérer et contenir les flux migratoires vers l’UE », affirme-t-elle.

      Mme Bach souligne la différence entre « statut agreement » (accord sur le statut) et « working arrangement » (arrangement de travail) : « Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple question juridique. Le premier, c’est-à-dire celui initialement proposé au Sénégal, est un accord formel qui permet à Frontex un déploiement pleinement opérationnel. Il est négocié par le Conseil de l’Europe, puis soumis au vote du Parlement européen, qui ne peut que le ratifier ou non, sans possibilité de proposer des amendements. Le second, en revanche, est plus symbolique qu’opérationnel et offre un cadre juridique plus simple. Il n’est pas discuté par le Parlement et n’implique pas le déploiement d’agents et de moyens, mais il réglemente la coopération et l’échange d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les États tiers. » Autre différence substantielle : seul l’accord sur le statut peut donner – en fonction de ce qui a été négocié entre les parties – une immunité partielle ou totale aux agents de Frontex sur le sol non européen. L’agence dispose actuellement de tels accords dans les Balkans, avec des déploiements en Serbie et en Albanie (d’autres accords seront bientôt opérationnels en Macédoine du Nord et peut-être en Bosnie, pays avec lequel des négociations sont en cours).

      Cornelia Ernst (du groupe parlementaire The Left), la rapporteuse de l’accord entre Frontex et le Sénégal nommée en décembre 2022, va droit au but : « Je suis sceptique, j’ai beaucoup de doutes sur ce type d’accord. La Commission européenne ne discute pas seulement avec le Sénégal, mais aussi avec la Mauritanie et d’autres pays africains. Le Sénégal est un pays de transit pour les réfugiés de toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest, et l’UE lui offre donc de l’argent dans l’espoir qu’il accepte d’arrêter les réfugiés. Nous pensons que cela met en danger la liberté de circulation et d’autres droits sociaux fondamentaux des personnes, ainsi que le développement des pays concernés, comme cela s’est déjà produit au Soudan. » Et d’ajouter : « J’ai entendu dire que le Sénégal n’est pas intéressé pour le moment par un “statut agreement”, mais n’est pas fermé à un “working arrangement” avec Frontex, contrairement à la Mauritanie, qui négocie un accord substantiel qui devrait prévoir un déploiement de Frontex. »

      Selon Mme Ernst, la stratégie de Frontex consiste à envoyer des agents, des armes, des véhicules, des drones, des bateaux et des équipements de surveillance sophistiqués, tels que des caméras thermiques, et à fournir une formation aux gardes-frontières locaux. C’est ainsi qu’ils entendent « protéger » l’Europe en empêchant les réfugiés de poursuivre leur voyage. La question est de savoir ce qu’il adviendra de ces réfugiés bloqués au Sénégal ou en Mauritanie en cas d’accord.
      Des rapports accablants

      Principal outil de dissuasion développé par l’UE en réponse à la « crise migratoire » de 2015-2016, Frontex a bénéficié en 2019 d’un renforcement substantiel de son mandat, avec le déploiement de 10 000 gardes-frontières prévu d’ici à 2027 (ils sont environ 1 500 aujourd’hui) et des pouvoirs accrus en matière de coopération avec les pays non européens, y compris ceux qui ne sont pas limitrophes de l’UE. Mais les résultats son maigres. Un rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne d’août 2021 souligne « l’inefficacité de Frontex dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière et la criminalité transfrontalière ». Un autre rapport de l’Office européen de lutte antifraude (Olaf), publié en mars 2022, a quant à lui révélé des responsabilités directes et indirectes dans des « actes de mauvaise conduite » à l’encontre des exilés, allant du harcèlement aux violations des droits fondamentaux en Grèce, en passant par le refoulement illégal de migrants dans le cadre d’opérations de rapatriement en Hongrie.

      Ces rapports pointent du doigt les plus hautes sphères de Frontex, tout comme le Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG), une commission d’enquête créée en février 2021 par le Parlement européen dans le but de « contrôler en permanence tous les aspects du fonctionnement de Frontex, y compris le renforcement de son rôle et de ses ressources pour la gestion intégrée des frontières et l’application correcte du droit communautaire ». Ces révélations ont conduit, en mars 2021, à la décision du Parlement européen de suspendre temporairement l’extension du budget de Frontex et, en mai 2022, à la démission de Fabrice Leggeri, qui était à la tête de l’agence depuis 2015.
      Un tabou à Dakar

      « Actuellement aucun cadre juridique n’a été défini avec un État africain », affirme Frontex. Si dans un premier temps l’agence nous a indiqué que les discussions avec le Sénégal étaient en cours – « tant que les négociations sur l’accord de statut sont en cours, nous ne pouvons pas les commenter » (19 janvier 2023) –, elle a rétropédalé quelques jours plus tard en précisant que « si les négociations de la Commission européenne avec le Sénégal sur un accord de statut n’ont pas encore commencé, Frontex est au courant des négociations en cours entre la Commission européenne et la Mauritanie » (1er février 2023).

      Interrogé sur les négociations avec le Sénégal, la chargée de communication de Frontex, Paulina Bakula, nous a envoyé par courriel la réponse suivant : « Nous entretenons une relation de coopération étroite avec les autorités sénégalaises chargées de la gestion des frontières et de la lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière, en particulier avec la Direction générale de la police nationale, mais aussi avec la gendarmerie, l’armée de l’air et la marine. » En effet, la coopération avec le Sénégal a été renforcée avec la mise en place d’un officier de liaison Frontex à Dakar en janvier 2020. « Compte tenu de la pression continue sur la route Canaries-océan Atlantique, poursuit Paulina Bakula, le Sénégal reste l’un des pays prioritaires pour la coopération opérationnelle de Frontex en Afrique de l’Ouest. Cependant, en l’absence d’un cadre juridique pour la coopération avec le Sénégal, l’agence a actuellement des possibilités très limitées de fournir un soutien opérationnel. »

      Interpellée sur la question des droits de l’homme en cas de déploiement opérationnel en Afrique de l’Ouest, Paulina Bakula écrit : « Si l’UE conclut de tels accords avec des partenaires africains à l’avenir, il incombera à Frontex de veiller à ce qu’ils soient mis en œuvre dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux et que des garanties efficaces soient mises en place pendant les activités opérationnelles. »

      Malgré des demandes d’entretien répétées durant huit mois, formalisées à la fois par courriel et par courrier, aucune autorité sénégalaise n’a accepté de répondre à nos questions. « Le gouvernement est conscient de la sensibilité du sujet pour l’opinion publique nationale et régionale, c’est pourquoi il ne veut pas en parler. Et il ne le fera probablement pas avant les élections présidentielles de 2024 », confie, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, un homme politique sénégalais. Il constate que la question migratoire est devenue, ces dernières années, autant un ciment pour la société civile qu’un tabou pour la classe politique ouest-africaine.

      https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Senegal-les-desseins-de-Frontex-se-heurtent-aux-resistances-locales
      #conditionnalité #conditionnalité_de_l'aide_au_développement #remittances #résistance

    • What is Frontex doing in Senegal? Secret services also participate in their network of “#Risk_Analysis_Cells

      Frontex has been allowed to conclude stationing agreements with third countries since 2016. However, the government in Dakar does not currently want to allow EU border police into the country. Nevertheless, Frontex has been active there since 2006.

      When Frontex was founded in 2004, the EU states wrote into its border agency’s charter that it could only be deployed within the Union. With developments often described as the “refugee crisis,” that changed in the new 2016 regulation, which since then has allowed the EU Commission to negotiate agreements with third countries to send Frontex there. So far, four Balkan states have decided to let the EU migration defense agency into the country – Bosnia and Herzegovina could become the fifth candidate.

      Frontex also wanted to conclude a status agreement with Senegal based on this model (https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t). In February 2022, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, announced that such a treaty would be ready for signing by the summer (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220211-eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal). However, this did not happen: Despite high-level visits from the EU (https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t), the government in Dakar is apparently not even prepared to sign a so-called working agreement. It would allow authorities in the country to exchange personal data with Frontex.

      Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometers of external border; like neighboring Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Senegal is considered a safe country of origin by Germany and other EU member states like Luxembourg.

      Even without new agreements, Frontex has been active on migration from Senegal practically since its founding: the border agency’s first (and, with its end in 2019, longest) mission started in 2006 under the name “#Hera” between West Africa and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf). Border authorities from Mauritania were also involved. The background to this was the sharp increase in crossings from the countries at the time, which were said to have declined successfully under “Hera.” For this purpose, Frontex received permission from Dakar to enter territorial waters of Senegal with vessels dispatched from member states.

      Senegal has already been a member of the “#Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community” (#AFIC) since 2015. This “community”, which has been in existence since 2010, aims to improve Frontex’s risk analysis and involves various security agencies to this end. The aim is to combat cross-border crimes, which include smuggling as well as terrorism. Today, 30 African countries are members of AFIC. Frontex has opened an AFIC office in five of these countries, including Senegal since 2019 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-opens-risk-analysis-cell-in-senegal-6nkN3B). The tasks of the Frontex liaison officer stationed there include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states.

      The personnel of the national “Risk Analysis Cells” are trained by Frontex. Their staff are to collect strategic data on crime and analyze their modus operandi, EU satellite surveillance is also used for this purpose (https://twitter.com/matthimon/status/855425552148295680). Personal data is not processed in the process. From the information gathered, Frontex produces, in addition to various dossiers, an annual situation report, which the agency calls an “#Pre-frontier_information_picture.”

      Officially, only national law enforcement agencies participate in the AFIC network, provided they have received a “mandate for border management” from their governments. In Senegal, these are the National Police and the Air and Border Police, in addition to the “Department for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Similar Practices.” According to the German government, the EU civil-military missions in Niger and Libya are also involved in AFIC’s work.

      Information is not exchanged with intelligence services “within the framework of AFIC activities by definition,” explains the EU Commission in its answer to a parliamentary question. However, the word “by definition” does not exclude the possibility that they are nevertheless involved and also contribute strategic information. In addition, in many countries, police authorities also take on intelligence activities – quite differently from how this is regulated in Germany, for example, in the separation requirement for these authorities. However, according to Frontex’s response to a FOIA request, intelligence agencies are also directly involved in AFIC: Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire send their domestic secret services to AFIC meetings, and a “#Center_for_Monitoring_and_Profiling” from Senegal also participates.

      Cooperation with Senegal is paying off for the EU: Since 2021, the total number of arrivals of refugees and migrants from Senegal via the so-called Atlantic route as well as the Western Mediterranean route has decreased significantly. The recognition rate for asylum seekers from the country is currently around ten percent in the EU.

      https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/27/what-is-frontex-doing-in-senegal-secret-services-also-participate-in-t
      #services_de_renseignement #données #services_secrets

  • En #Centrafrique, la #bière #Castel au cœur de la #guerre d’#influence entre #Paris et #Moscou
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/03/16/en-centrafrique-la-biere-castel-au-c-ur-de-la-guerre-d-influence-entre-paris

    Intimidations
    Puis le 9 mars, des policiers raflent huit étrangers, dont quatre Français, au Relais des Chasses, célèbre hôtel-restaurant français de Bangui, « dans le cadre de l’enquête sur l’incendie de la Mocaf ». A la recherche, selon eux, d’un liquide incendiaire utilisé pour les cocktails Molotov. Ils seront tous relâchés quelques heures après, sans mise en cause.

    Une nouvelle manière d’intimider les opérateurs économiques occidentaux, lâche un diplomate, qui redoute une escalade. D’autant que l’enquête sur l’incendie n’a toujours rien livré. « Nous exploitons tous les documents avant de procéder à des arrestations », expliquait à l’AFP, mardi 14 mars, le procureur de Bangui, Benoît Narcisse Foukpio, huit jours après l’incendie.

    L’ONU, l’Union européenne, des ONG et des capitales occidentales, Paris au premier chef, accusent régulièrement les Wagner – mais aussi les rebelles – de crimes contre les civils. Et la France reproche à M. Touadéra d’avoir, en échange de leur soutien militaire contre la rébellion, troqué les richesses de son pays, or et diamants notamment, à toute une galaxie de sociétés liées, selon l’ONU et Paris, à Wagner.

    Or, diamants, bois… mais pas seulement. Guerre de la bière aussi. Début janvier, coïncidant avec la campagne anti-Castel, une nouvelle bière, #Africa Ti L’Or, a inondé les bars de la capitale. Ces bouteilles sont commercialisées par la First Industrial Company, laquelle est dirigée par Dmitri Syty, selon une enquête de l’hebdomadaire Jeune Afrique. Et il n’est pas rare de voir des #paramilitaires_russes en livrer des caisses en ville… « Les #Russes cherchent à évincer toutes les compagnies étrangères de Centrafrique », accuse la source européenne.

  • Le combat des #éleveurs du #Ndiaël pour récupérer « leurs terres »

    Dans le nord-ouest du Sénégal, une coalition de 37 villages proteste depuis dix ans contre l’attribution de 20 000 hectares à une entreprise agroalimentaire. Ce conflit foncier illustre un phénomène généralisé sur le continent africain : l’#accaparement_de_terres par des #multinationales.

    Tout a dû paraître parfait au ministre de l’élevage du Niger lorsqu’il a visité, le 1er juin 2022, les installations des Fermes de la Teranga, une entreprise implantée dans le nord-ouest du Sénégal, à une cinquantaine de kilomètres de Saint-Louis : immenses étendues de cultures verdoyantes, systèmes d’irrigation fonctionnels, grosses machines agricoles...

    Devant les caméras, Tidjani Idrissa Abdoulkadri s’est dit « très impressionné » par le travail de cette société, qui dit cultiver de la luzerne sur 300 hectares depuis 2021. Il a émis le souhait qu’un jour le fourrage qu’elle produit puisse nourrir le bétail nigérien.

    Mais le tableau qu’a vu le ministre est incomplet. Car à une quinzaine de kilomètres de là, au bout de pistes tracées dans la terre sableuse, Gorgui Sow fulmine. Installé sur une natte dans le salon de sa petite maison, ce septuagénaire pas du genre à se laisser faire raconte comment, depuis dix ans, il s’oppose à ce projet agro-industriel. Son combat, explique-t-il en pulaar, lui a valu de multiples intimidations et convocations à la gendarmerie. Mais pas question de renoncer : la survie de sa famille et du cheptel qui assure ses moyens d’existence en dépend.

    Tout est parti d’un décret signé en 2012 par le président Abdoulaye Wade, cinq jours avant le second tour d’une élection présidentielle à laquelle il était candidat, et confirmé après des tergiversations par son successeur, Macky Sall. Ce texte attribue pour cinquante ans renouvelables 20 000 hectares à Senhuile, une entreprise inconnue, créée par des investisseurs sénégalais et italiens au profil flou.

    La superficie en question couvre trois communes, Ronkh, Diama et Ngnith, mais la majeure partie se trouve à Ngnith, où elle englobe plusieurs dizaines de villages, dont celui de Gorgui Sow. Le décret prévoit aussi l’affectation de 6 500 hectares aux populations qui seraient déplacées par les plans de l’entreprise consistant à produire des graines de tournesol pour l’export.

    Toutes ces terres, proches du lac de Guiers, le plus grand lac du Sénégal, faisaient jusque-là partie de la réserve naturelle du Ndiaël, créée en 1965 et représentant 46 550 hectares. Les populations qui y vivaient pouvaient continuer à y faire pâturer leurs bêtes, soit des milliers de chèvres, ânes, chevaux, moutons, vaches. Elles pouvaient aussi y ramasser du bois mort, récolter des fruits sauvages, des plantes médicinales, de la gomme arabique, etc. Elles avaient en revanche l’interdiction d’y pratiquer l’agriculture.

    Gorgui Sow et ses voisins, tous éleveurs comme lui, ont donc été outrés d’apprendre en 2012 que non seulement leurs lieux de vie avaient été attribués à une entreprise, mais que cette dernière allait y développer à grande échelle une activité longtemps proscrite, le tout pour alimenter des marchés étrangers.

    À l’époque, ce type de transaction foncière était déjà devenu courant au Sénégal. Depuis, le mouvement s’est poursuivi et concerne toute l’Afrique, qui représente 60 % des terres arables de la planète : elle est le continent le plus ciblé par les accaparements fonciers à grande échelle et à des fins agricoles, selon la Land Matrix, une initiative internationale indépendante de suivi foncier.

    Comme les communautés locales ne disposent, en général, que d’un droit d’usage sur les terres qu’elles occupent et que le propriétaire, à savoir l’État, peut les récupérer à tout moment pour les attribuer à un projet déclaré « d’utilité publique », les effets sont similaires partout : elles perdent l’accès à leurs champs, sources d’eau, lieux de pâturage, etc. C’est ce qui est arrivé avec Senhuile.

    À ses débuts, l’entreprise, qui promettait de créer des milliers d’emplois, a défriché plusieurs milliers d’hectares (entre 5 000 et 7 000, selon l’ONG ActionAid), creusant des canaux d’irrigation depuis le lac de Guiers, installant des barbelés. Ce qui était une forêt est devenu une étendue sableuse dégarnie, un « vrai désert », disent les riverains. Mais Senhuile a dû s’arrêter : une partie de la population s’est soulevée, affrontant les gendarmes venus protéger ses installations. Elle n’a au bout du compte pratiquement rien cultivé.

    « Senhuile a détruit les ressources naturelles qui nous permettaient de vivre, explique aujourd’hui Gorgui Sow. Des enfants se sont noyés dans les canaux. Les barbelés qu’elle a installés ont tué nos vaches, la zone de pâturage a été considérablement réduite. » Lui et d’autres habitants ont constitué le Collectif de défense des terres du Ndiaël (Coden) pour demander la restitution de cet espace qu’ils considèrent comme le leur. Il rassemble 37 villages de la commune de Ngnith, ce qui représente environ 10 000 personnes. Tous sont des éleveurs semi-nomades.
    De Senhuile aux Fermes de la Teranga

    Au fil des ans, le Coden que préside Gorgui Sow a noué des alliances au Sénégal et à l’étranger et a bénéficié d’une large couverture médiatique. Il a rencontré diverses autorités à Dakar et dans la région, manifesté, envoyé des lettres de protestation, obtenu des promesses de partage plus équitable des terres. Mais rien ne s’est concrétisé.

    En 2018, il y a eu un changement : Frank Timis, un homme d’affaires roumain, a pris le contrôle de Senhuile, à travers une autre entreprise, African Agriculture Inc. (AAGR), enregistrée en 2018 aux îles Caïmans. C’est à cette occasion que Senhuile a été rebaptisée Fermes de la Teranga, un mot wolof signifiant « hospitalité ». Le nom de Frank Timis est bien connu au Sénégal : il a été notamment cité, avec celui d’un frère de Macky Sall, dans un scandale concernant un contrat pétrolier.

    À la stupeur des éleveurs de Ngnith, AAGR a déposé en mars 2022 une demande d’introduction en Bourse auprès de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), à Washington, afin de lever des fonds. Disant avoir des intérêts au Sénégal et au Niger, elle annonce vouloir intégrer le marché international de vente de crédits carbone, de biocarburants et surtout de luzerne qu’elle a l’intention de proposer aux éleveurs locaux et de la région « ainsi qu’à l’Arabie saoudite, aux Émirats arabes unis et à l’Europe », selon le document remis à la SEC.

    « Qui chez nous aura les moyens d’acheter ce fourrage ? Celui que l’entreprise vend actuellement est hors de prix ! », s’agace Bayal Sow, adjoint au maire de Ngnith et membre du Coden. Il craint l’existence d’objectifs inavoués dans cette affaire, comme de la spéculation foncière. À ses côtés, dans son bureau de la mairie de Ngnith, écrasée par la chaleur de cette fin de saison sèche, un autre adjoint au maire, Maguèye Thiam, acquiesce, écœuré.

    Puisque la zone de pâturage a diminué, troupeaux et bergers sont contraints de partir loin, hors du Ndiaël, pour chercher du fourrage et des espaces où paître, précise-t-il. Dans ces conditions, l’idée que les territoires où les cheptels avaient l’habitude de se nourrir soient transformés en champs de luzerne pour produire du fourrage qui sera très certainement vendu à l’étranger paraît inconcevable.

    Être employé par les Fermes de la Teranga est également impensable : « Nous sommes une population d’éleveurs à 90 %, sans formation, sans diplôme. Nous ne pourrions être que de simples ouvriers. Cela n’a aucun intérêt », observe Hassane Abdourahmane Sow, membre du Coden. « Comment peut-on justifier l’attribution d’autant de terres à une entreprise alors que les populations locales en manquent pour pratiquer elles-mêmes l’agriculture et que l’État parle d’autosuffisance alimentaire ? », demande un autre ressortissant de la région.

    De son côté, AAGR assure que tout se passe bien sur le terrain. Sur le plan social, détaille-t-elle dans un courriel, le processus de concertation avec toutes les parties impliquées a été respecté. Elle dit avoir embauché sur place 73 personnes « qui n’avaient auparavant aucun emploi ni moyen de subsistance ».
    Dissensions

    Comme preuves de ses bonnes relations avec les populations locales, AAGR fournit des copies de lettres émanant de deux collectifs, l’un « des villages impactés de la commune de Ngnith », l’autre « des villages impactés de la commune de Ronkh », lesquels remercient notamment les Fermes de la Teranga de leur avoir donné du sucre lors du ramadan 2021. Ces deux collectifs « qui ont des sièges sociaux et des représentants légaux » sont les « seuls qui peuvent parler au nom des populations de la zone », insiste AAGR. « Toute autre personne qui parlera au nom de ces populations est motivée par autre chose que l’intérêt de la population impactée par le projet », avertit-elle.

    La société, qui a parmi ses administrateurs un ancien ambassadeur américain au Niger, communique aussi deux missives datées du 15 et 16 juillet 2022, signées pour la première par le député-maire de Ngnith et pour la seconde par le coordonnateur du Collectif de villages impactés de Ngnith. Dans des termes similaires, chacun dit regretter les « sorties médiatiques » de « soi-disant individus de la localité pour réclamer le retour de leurs terres ». « Nous sommes derrière vous pour la réussite du projet », écrivent-ils.

    Les Fermes de la Teranga se prévalent en outre d’avoir mis à disposition des communautés locales 500 hectares de terres. « Mais ces hectares profitent essentiellement à des populations de Ronkh qui ne sont pas affectées par le projet », fait remarquer un ressortissant de Ngnith qui demande : « Est-ce à l’entreprise “d’offrir” 500 hectares aux communautés sur leurs terres ? »

    Non seulement ce projet agro-industriel a « un impact sur nos conditions de vie mais il nous a divisés », s’attriste Hassane Abdourahmane Sow : « Des membres de notre collectif l’ont quitté parce qu’ils ont eu peur ou ont été corrompus. Certains villages, moins affectés par la présence de l’entreprise, ont pris parti pour elle, tout comme des chefs religieux, ce qui a là aussi généré des tensions entre leurs fidèles et eux. »

    « Il faut s’asseoir autour d’une table et discuter, suggère Maguèye Thiam. Nous ne sommes pas opposés à l’idée que cette société puisse bénéficier d’une superficie dans la région. Mais il faut que sa taille soit raisonnable, car les populations n’ont que la terre pour vivre », observe-t-il, donnant l’exemple d’une autre firme étrangère implantée sur 400 hectares et avec laquelle la cohabitation est satisfaisante.

    Interrogé par messagerie privée à propos de ce conflit foncier, le porte-parole du gouvernement sénégalais n’a pas réagi. Les membres du Coden répètent, eux, qu’ils continueront leur lutte « jusqu’au retour de (leurs) terres » et projettent de nouvelles actions.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/260822/le-combat-des-eleveurs-du-ndiael-pour-recuperer-leurs-terres

    #élevage #terre #terres #résistance #Sénégal #industrie_agro-alimentaire #Fermes_de_la_Teranga #agriculture #décret #Senhuile #Ronkh #Diama #Ngnith #tournesol #graines_de_tournesol #exportation #réserve_naturelle #foncier #lac_de_Guiers #eau #irrigation #barbelés #déforestation #pâturage #Collectif_de_défense_des_terres_du_Ndiaël (#Coden) #Frank_Timis #African_Agriculture_Inc. (#AAGR) #luzerne #fourrage #spéculation #conflits

  • #Colonialism - the Origin of #Capitalism
    https://diasp.eu/p/14334324

    #Colonialism - the Origin of #Capitalism

    The colonial mode of #production

    Source: https://yewtu.be/watch?v=jG1Dl97TmjQ Source: https://redirect.invidious.io/watch?v=jG1Dl97TmjQ

    A really interesting #video to show the connection between colonianism and today’s western #world. A colonianism that still exists despite today’s so popular welcome greetings for #refugees. Here African people come up to describe the #history from an African point of view.

    The first half hour is a short introduction to the topic. The next few minutes are more detailed explanations.

    #Uhuru #Movement : https://apspuhuru.org

    #International #African #Revolution #NATO (...)

  • Hungary welcomes those fleeing Ukraine but not ’illegal migrants’

    Hungary has taken in the second-largest number of people fleeing Ukraine behind Poland. But the government, notorious for its strict anti-immigration laws, has made it clear that hospitality would only be extended to those “legally staying on the territory of Ukraine”.

    After the Russian invasion of Ukraine began a week ago (February 24), Hungary opened its borders to those fleeing the raging conflict and has reportedly already taken in more than 130,000 refugees from Ukraine.

    “We’re letting everyone in,” Prime Minister Viktor Orban said last week near the Hungarian-Ukrainian border, addressing people fleeing Ukraine.

    “All border crossing points of ours are open, fully operational 24 hours a day,” Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on Wednesday (March 2). “We let everybody come in, including the Ukrainian citizens, and those who have been legally staying on the territory of Ukraine, and we do take good care of them.”

    Hungary, otherwise known for its staunch anti-immigration policies, has even passed a regulation allowing citizens of third countries who had been studying or working in Ukraine “to enter the territory of Hungary without reason,” Szijjarto said. “We organize for them the transfers to the nearest airports to enable them to return home.”

    ’We do not allow any illegal migrants to enter Hungary’

    However, the government has also made clear that these words of welcome are not meant for everyone fleeing Ukraine and that it has not changed its stance on barring all those it calls “illegal migrants”.

    The minister slammed “politicians in Hungary and abroad” suggesting his government had also opened the flood gates to “illegal migrants”. It was “fake news”, he said, that “illegal migrants would be allowed to enter the territory of Hungary, taking advantage of the flock of refugees,” Szijjarto told the UN Human Rights Council.

    “The truth is that we do not allow any illegal migrants to enter the territory of Hungary, and we will always protect Hungary from these people,” he said.

    He reiterated there was no comparison between refugees from Ukraine and the people Budapest has labelled “illegal migrants”, who have often arrived at its borders after fleeing war and conflict in places like Syria.

    Szijjarto claimed that Hungary had “a very, very clear experience” of how “illegal migrants tend to behave aggressively, ... they ruin the infrastructure and they attack police.” The minister said that refugees from Ukraine on the other hand cooperate with authorities and they “line up (at border crossing points) in a very disciplined very patient.”

    Different refugee groups, different treatment?

    Orban isn’t the only European far-right, anti-migration leader who has changed their tone towards refugees considerably since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

    “These are not the refugees we are used to,” Bulgarian President Rumen Radev said last week about Ukrainian refugees, quoted by the Associated Press. “These people are Europeans. These people are intelligent, they are educated people.”

    Such remarks illustrate a discrepancy between the treatment of Ukrainian migrants and the thousands of African, Arab, Indian and other migrant groups, including many students, trying to flee Ukraine, too.

    UN agencies, activists and refugee aid groups have been calling for equal treatment of members of any nationality trying to escape. On Thursday (March 3), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said in an online statement it had received “verified credible reports of discrimination, violence and xenophobia against third country nationals attempting to flee the conflict in Ukraine,” which resulted in “heightened risk and suffering”.

    “Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality or migration status is unacceptable,” IOM Director-General Antonio Vitorino said on Twitter.

    More than 28,000 third-country nationals have arrived in Moldova, Slovakia and Poland from Ukraine so far, UN migration agency IOM spokesperson Joe Lowry said on Twitter on Wednesday.

    Violating human rights, flouting EU law

    Over the past few years, the United Nations and rights groups like the Hungarian Helsinki Committee have repeatedly criticized the Prime Minister Victor Orban’s far-right government for its harsh migration policies.

    Among other things, Hungary enacted a law in 2018 that threatens jail time for people who support asylum seekers. It also proposed immigration bans and committed thousands of well-documented, illegal pushbacks of asylum seekers.

    One of the victims of these pushbacks is Moroccan migrant Jalal, who was traveling the Balkan route in early 2021 and made it over the border to Hungary before he was hit by a vehicle and suffered “terrible” injuries.

    Orban has also often made highly provocative statements in the past, including calling migrants “Muslim invaders” and claiming that “all terrorists are basically migrants.”

    In December, moreover, Orban said his country would not alter its strict immigration laws in the wake of a ruling from the EU’s top court, which had said that Hungary’s laws contravene EU law.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/38928/hungary-welcomes-those-fleeing-ukraine-but-not-illegal-migrants

    #Hongrie

    #racisme #réfugiés #guerre #Ukraine #Africains #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #catégorisation #tri #réfugiés_ukrainiens

    –-

    ajouté à ce fil de discussion :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/951230

    et plus particulièrement ici (Hongrie) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/951230#message951672

    • ’Good asylum-seekers’ vs. ’bad migrants’ – Hungary’s varying treatment of war refugees

      The warm welcome extended to Ukrainian refugees by EU countries that otherwise take a strict anti-immigrant stance has highlighted the stark differences in the treatment of people from Ukraine and those from non-European war zones. In Hungary the contrast is especially apparent, as the example of an Afghan student shows.

      Three years after he came to Hungary to study, Hasib Qarizada found himself left alone without help in a field in neighboring Serbia. How did he end up there?

      It all started last summer when the radical Islamic Taliban seized power in Hasib’s native Afghanistan. As his home country was descending into chaos, Hasib lodged an asylum application in the EU member state. But last September, Hungarian authorities, rather than offering refuge to Hasib, brought him over the border into non-EU country Serbia, a place he knew nothing about.

      "Police just came over and handcuffed me,’’ Hasib told The Associated Press (AP) in Belgrade, the Serbian capital. "They told me ’Don’t try to run away, don’t try to fight with us, don’t do anything stupid.’’’

      Stranded in a field in the middle of nowhere, the 25-year-old had no idea where he was, where to go or what to do.

      "I was a student, and they just gave my life a totally different twist,’’ he told AP. "They didn’t give me a chance to grab my clothes, my [phone] charger or my laptop or anything important that I would need to travel.’’

      He told the AP he "had no idea where Serbia was, what language they speak, what kind of culture they have.’’
      ’Sinister practice’

      EU countries like Hungary have been notorious for their strict anti-immigration laws, and this isn’t the first time rights activists have registered such a case in the region. In 2017, a 16-year-old Kurd from Iraq was deported into Serbia from Hungary — despite having initially arrived in Hungary from Romania and having managed to reach Austria before he was sent back to Hungary.

      Last December, a Cameroonian woman who entered Hungary from Romania was expelled to Serbia. Another African woman who arrived a year ago by plane from Dubai, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, reportedly also wound up in a field in Serbia.

      "This is something that unfortunately has become normal, regular and something which cannot be considered unusual,’’ Serbian rights lawyer Nikola Kovacevic told the AP. Still, this illegal practice of sending people into a third country they hadn’t come from was “particularly sinister,” according to the AP.
      Double standard

      With the current exodus of Ukrainians fleeing war, Hungary’s policies seem to have changed. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Orban announced “we’re letting everyone in.”

      There are other EU countries that face accusations of violence against migrants which now welcome people fleeing Ukraine with open arms. They include Croatia and Greece.

      While activists, UN agencies and other entities have applauded the shift from harsh anti-migration policies, they have also been warning of discrimination against refugees and migrants from Africa and the Middle East — groups of people who have been facing pushbacks at Europe’s external borders for years.

      "For those of us following these issues, it is hard to miss the stark contrast of the last few weeks with Europe’s harsh response to people fleeing other wars and crises,’’ Judith Sunderland of Human Rights Watch told AP. "A staggering number of people from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East die every year attempting to reach Europe.’’

      Zsolt Szekeres from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee noted that “the [Hungarian] government is trying their best to explain now why Ukrainians are good asylum-seekers and others are bad migrants.”

      Last week, less than ten days before Hungary holds its next national election (April 3), a government spokesperson called media reports that authorities were discriminating among the refugees arriving from Ukraine "fake news’’.

      Yet earlier this month, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said that refugees from Ukraine and the people Budapest has labeled “illegal migrants” could not be compared. He said: “The truth is that we do not allow any illegal migrants to enter the territory of Hungary, and we will always protect Hungary from these people.”

      Hungary’s harsh migration policies have manifested in, among other things, a 2018 law that threatens jail time for people who support asylum seekers, proposed immigration bans as well as thousands of illegal pushbacks.

      Orban has also often made highly provocative statements in the past, including calling migrants “Muslim invaders” and claiming that “all terrorists are basically migrants.” In December, moreover, Orban said his country would not alter its strict immigration laws in the wake of a ruling from the EU’s top court, which had said that Hungary’s laws contravene EU law.
      Next-level pushbacks

      The illegal practice of pushing asylum seekers like Afghan Hasib Qarizada back over the border
      , which many activists and journalists say are used systematically at the EU’s southeastern and eastern borders, has been observed for a number of years now. According to one human rights group, many cases involve torture.

      But when asylum seekers are expelled to a country they hadn’t come from, like Hasib, "the severity of the violation is higher,’’ Kovacevic, the Serbian lawyer, told AP.

      Hasib’s deportation is considered particularly striking given that the Afghan hadn’t arrived in Hungary irregularly. He was a self-financed student, shared an apartment and had established a life in Budapest. The reason for his decision to seek asylum was simple: His family could no longer pay his university fees due to the turmoil in Afghanistan, which meant he couldn’t renew his residence permit, according to AP.

      His family was in danger as they had connections with Afghanistan’s pre-Taliban government, Hasib told the AP. "They hardly go outside,’’ he said. Yet when Hungarian authorities rejected his request for refuge, activists say, they disregarded the fact that Afghanistan couldn’t be considered safe following the Taliban’s return to power.

      Lawyers with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) have since taken Hasib’s case both to courts in Hungary and the European Court of Human Rights. They argue that his unlawful expulsion violates the European Convention of Human Rights.

      Although a Hungarian court has ruled in his favor, AP reported, the lawyers are now trying to use legal measures to force Hungarian authorities to implement the decision so that Hasib is allowed to return to Hungary.

      "He applied for asylum, he was staying here, and he was in need of protection, and he was pushed out in a summary manner,’’ the HHC’s Zsolt Szekeres said. "He was never given the possibility or option to explain his situation.’’
      Worst days of his life

      In Serbia, Hasib was forced to sleep outside for four nights after being sent there. The days after he was abandoned on the field were the worst of his life, Hasib said. He recalls to AP wandering around for hours and asking a woman at a gas station to let him charge his phone.

      "I felt very horrible ... because I was a normal student. I was studying, I was going to classes. I had my own friends. I had my own life,’’ he said. "I wasn’t doing anything bad.’’

      According to Szekeres, governments should treat all people escaping war zones the same. "There is no difference between Ukrainian parents fleeing with their children and Afghan parents fleeing with their children,’’ he told AP. "This is a good reminder for everyone that asylum-seekers, no matter where they come from, need protection.’’

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/39483/good-asylumseekers-vs-bad-migrants--hungarys-varying-treatment-of-war-