• Hundreds of migrants stuck in #Niger amid coronavirus pandemic

    As countries close borders to curb spread of coronavirus, aid groups in Niger ’overwhelmed’ by requests of support.

    While countries across Africa have been closing their borders as part of efforts to contain the coronavirus pandemic, migrants and people on the move are paying a high price.

    Over the past two weeks, hundreds of women, men and children have been stuck in Niger, a country that represents a traditional corridor of transit for seasonal labourers from West Africa heading to Libya or Algeria, as well as people hoping to move further to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea.

    “We’re being overwhelmed by requests of support,” said Barbara Rijks, Niger director for the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

    Deportations from Algeria to Niger have been a continuing trend since late 2016, with figures decreasing last year only to begin growing again from February onwards. The migrants, who were arrested during police roundups in Algeria’s coastal cities and forced to travel for days in overloaded trucks, were usually offered assistance by the IOM to return to their countries of origin.

    But now amid the pandemic, they are forced to quarantine in tent facilities set up in the military border post of Assamaka, where temperatures touch 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), or in the southern city of Arlit.

    With borders closed all across West Africa, they risk being stuck in Niger much longer than they expected.

    “We’re extremely worried,” said Abderahmane Maouli, the mayor of Arlit, a city that hosts one of the six IOM transit centres in Niger and a new facility for those that end their quarantine in Assamaka.

    “Despite the border closure, we see that movements are continuing: People travel through minor routes to avoid border controls and reach Arlit without going through the quarantine, and this is a major public health issue for our community,” Maouli told Al Jazeera.

    The deportation of more than 8,000 people by Algeria since January this year, he says, had already put local welfare services under strain.

    ’First warning sign’

    An uncommon push-back operation happened also in late March at the border between Niger and Libya, where a convoy of travellers was intercepted and sent back in the middle of the desert, forcing the IOM to organise humanitarian assistance.

    The quarantine of these groups and other travellers - in a makeshift camp set up in record time - fosters worries from both migrants and local communities in a country already standing at the bottom of the United Nations human development index and facing deadly seasonal outbreaks of malaria and measles. Some 1,400 doctors are operational in Niger, according to the government, serving a population of about 22 million.

    “A first warning sign,” Rijks told Al Jazeera, “was the arrival of 767 people, half of which foreigners, at the border between Niger and Algeria, on March 19: From that moment on, we registered continuous arrivals and each one of these people needs to quarantine for 14 days.”

    Later in March, a convoy of pick-up cars carrying 256 people was pushed-back by Libyan militiamen close to Tummo, a military outpost marking the frontier between Niger and Libya, some 900 kilometres (559 miles) northeast of Agadez, where their perilous desert crossing started.

    Blocked in the garrison village of Madama, Nigeriens and migrants mostly from Nigeria, Ghana and Burkina Faso suffered the unmerciful Saharan heat for days before receiving humanitarian assistance by the IOM and Niger’s Civil Protection Department that organised their transfer to Agadez. Their drivers were arrested for breaching anti-smuggling rules.

    In Agadez, a once-coveted tourist destination for Europeans willing to explore Saharan dunes, they were lodged in a tent facility set up by the IOM alongside the main sports arena, where football games have been temporarily suspended due to the coronavirus pandemic.

    “It’s been a huge challenge, we had to boost our activities in less than one week, adopting hygienic measures in our six transit centres, that are already at full capacity, and opening up new structures to lodge people quarantining,” Rijks said.

    Another 44 people were found at Assamaka in the night between April 4-5 and welcomed at IOM’s quarantine site, where Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres, or MSF) and the International Federation of the Red Cross provide medical and psychosocial assistance.
    ’Humanitarian corridors’

    IOM operations in Niger scaled up after the government enforced anti-smuggling measures in 2015, to prevent migrants from taking dangerous Saharan trails to Libya or Algeria.

    In the span of a few years, the number of crossings reduced, from about 330,000 in 2016 to 100,000 in 2018, while hundreds of “passeurs” - the French word for smugglers and middlemen active in the transportation business - were jailed.

    As a consequence, more and more people ended up being blocked in the country and turned to the organisation’s voluntary return programmes. From 2017 to early 2020, some 32,000 migrants returned home from Niger with IOM assistance.

    “People were usually staying for a few weeks in transit centres, where we arranged travel documents with consulates, before going back to their country of origin, while now they’re stuck in our transit centres and this adds frustrations,” said Rijks.

    She hopes that - despite border closures - governments in West Africa will agree soon on organising “humanitarian corridors to return their citizens from Niger”.

    While Rijks noted that countries are willing to receive back their citizens, the closure of land and air transportation routes, coupled with the need to set up costly quarantine facilities for returnees on arrival, put more strain on an already fragile logistic organisation.

    Currently, 2,371 people - mostly Nigerians, Guineans, Cameroonians and Malians - are lodged in the IOM’s six transit centres, Rijks said, while the size and number of new facilities set up to quarantine migrants are increasing by the day.
    ’Perfect storm’

    Niger has confirmed 342 coronavirus cases and 11 deaths as of Thursday, with the vast majority of cases found in the capital, Niamey. The country has introduced a series of containment measures to slow the spread of COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, including the closure of international borders, a ban on gatherings and non-essential activities and a night curfew.

    In addition to migrants on the move, humanitarian organisations are particularly concerned about the fate of 420,000 refugees and internally displaced Nigeriens who escaped violence by armed groups along the country’s borders with Nigeria, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. These people often live in crowded settlements, where physical distancing is a luxury.

    “On top of displacement caused by jihadists, malnutrition risks and socio-economic vulnerability, COVID-19 represents the perfect storm for Niger,” said Alessandra Morelli, country director for the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR), pointing also at the interruption of evacuation flights for refugees from Libyan detention centres who are temporarily hosted in Niger while awaiting opportunities to resettle to Europe or North America.

    Morelli said the programme was launched in 2017 to offer “a vital lifeline” for the most vulnerable refugees detained in Libya.

    “We took them out of prisons, brought them here by plane and assisted them in their asylum and resettlement claim.”

    About 3,000 people have been evacuated to Niger so far and more than 2,300 resettled to Canada, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, France and other countries.

    All operations are currently suspended.

    While the number of coronavirus cases grow by the day, with deepening worries over the effect of a severe outbreak in already fragile countries in the region, some refugees hosted in the reception centre of Hamdallaye started producing soap for local communities.

    “It’s a sign of hope in the midst of this situation,” said Morelli, whose WhatsApp account blinks continuously with information on new displacements and violence along Niger’s sealed borders.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/hundreds-migrants-stuck-niger-coronavirus-pandemic-200409131745319.html
    #IOM #OIM #immobilité #confinement #fermeture_des_frontières #Assamaka #épidémie #Arlit #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #centre_de_transit #centres_de_transit #renvois #Algérie #refoulement #push-back #quarantaine #migrerrance #frontières #Tummo #Madama #Agadez #passeurs
    ping @ceped_migrinter_afrique @karine4 @isskein

  • Travail des enfants sur les plantations de cacao : deux décennies de perdues
    https://www.publiceye.ch/fr/thematiques/chocolat/travail-des-enfants-cacao-deux-decennies-de-perdues?pk_campaign=20200407_N

    L’industrie souligne volontiers que le #travail_des_enfants dans le secteur du #cacao #ouest-africain prend ses racines dans la #pauvreté de cette région, ce qu’on ne peut nier. Mais l’une des principales causes de cette pauvreté réside dans l’absence de revenu vital : la vaste majorité des quelque deux millions de cacaoculteurs en #Afrique_de_l’Ouest ne gagnent pas suffisamment pour vivre dans la dignité. C’est une réalité que plus personne ne conteste aujourd’hui, même dans les milieux politiques et économiques. Toutefois, l’industrie mentionne rarement le fait que les revenus des familles d’agriculteurs dépendent en premier lieu du prix d’achat que les négociants et les transformateurs de cacao leur paient pour les fèves.

    #exploitation #esclavage #chocolat

  • East Africa’s reefs being fished at unsustainable rates, study finds
    https://news.mongabay.com/2020/03/east-africas-reefs-being-fished-at-unsustainable-rates-study-finds

    Fish populations in coral reefs off Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique are being harvested at unsustainable rates, new research has found.

    In the study published in the journal Marine Ecology Progress Series, researchers calculate that 70% of the region’s coral reefs have fish stocks below levels needed to produce maximum yield, and 38% of sites have fish stocks below sustainable levels.

    #pêche #surpêche #Afrique_de_l'est

  • #Côte_d’Ivoire : World-Renowned Photojournalist Reza Trains #Returned_Migrants, Journalists in Photography

    “Photography is a universal language which can help express feelings and convey emotions without using words,” said #Reza_Deghati, the internationally acclaimed news photographer, who began his celebrated career 40 years ago, after he left his native Iran.

    This month, he is sharing his expertise, and his enthusiasm, with migrants returning to their African homeland after hard journeys abroad. “Photography allows returnees to gain self-confidence and rediscover themselves,” he explained. “Learning how to take a good picture of their daily lives helps them value their life and show us their side of their own story.”

    During the dates 6-8 December, Reza Deghati worked in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (#IOM) which organized a three-day photography training event in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Six young photographers participated in the training here in the Ivorian capital.

    After learning the technical aspects of photography, the participants trained their newly acquired skills on by visiting reintegration and recreational activities organized by IOM for returned migrants and community members. For instance, the participants attended a street art painting performed by returned migrants on the walls of a school rehabilitated by other returnees.

    The aim of this pilot project was to offer returned migrants an opportunity to become visual storytellers of their daily life back home and help local journalists change the narrative on migration in the country.

    “I couldn’t finish the first level of high school last year because I left for Algeria,” said 17-year-old Laciné who now is back at school as part of the reintegration assistance he received from IOM after returning to Côte d’Ivoire.

    “For me, this training is a new start as it can help me show others what I have experienced and what I am experiencing without using words,” Laciné explained.

    The training will be followed by a three-month coaching by IOM photographer Mohamed Diabaté, and the photographs taken by the participants will be exhibited in Spring 2020.

    “Learning photography means learning to look at the world in a different way,” Diabaté said. The IOM Côte d’Ivoire photographer and filmmaker added: “It also gives a new dimension to the returnees’ daily lives and it shows a reality that someone else cannot grasp. It enables us to see through their eyes.”

    This training is the first of a series that will be organized by IOM across West Africa in 2020. It was organized in the frame of an EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions.

    One participant, reporter Benjamin B., explained what he gained from the sessions with Reza Deghati this way: “As a journalist, I have a pen, and I can write. Words can explain reality. But the pictures will show it. If I have both skills, I can better write about migration.”

    https://www.iom.int/news/cote-divoire-world-renowned-photojournalist-reza-trains-returned-migrants-journ
    #photographie #photojournalisme #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #réfugiés_ivoiriens #réintégration #OIM #returnees #expulsion #art #Mohamed_Diabaté #cours_de_photo #Afrique_de_l'Ouest

    Il n’y a pas de limites à l’indécence de l’OIM :

    The aim of this pilot project was to offer returned migrants an opportunity to become visual storytellers of their daily life back home and help local journalists change the narrative on migration in the country.
    This training is the first of a series that will be organized by IOM across West Africa in 2020. It was organized in the frame of an #EU-IOM_Joint_Initiative_for_Migrant_Protection_and_Reintegration_in_the_Sahel_and_Lake_Chad_regions (https://migrationjointinitiative.org).

    ping @albertocampiphoto @philippe_de_jonckheere @_kg_ @isskein @karine4 @reka

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur les campagnes de #dissuasion à l’émigration (intégré à la métaliste plus générale sur l’externalisation des frontières) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765326

  • L’#or_vert ou la stupéfiante odyssée du #khat

    Le khat est consommé dans de nombreux pays d’#Afrique_de_l'Est. Vendue sous la forme de feuilles et de tiges, cette plante psychotrope provoque une sensation stimulante d’#euphorie impulsée par une accélération du rythme cardiaque. Mais le khat crée aussi des effets d’accoutumance et de manque, doublés de déprime, de léthargie, et chez certains, notamment les enfants, de troubles mentaux. Ancien dépendant au khat, #Abukar_Awalé, membre de la diaspora somalienne en Grande-Bretagne, a alerté les autorités britanniques et milité pour la fin de la tolérance. Ce film suit son combat courageux, remonte la filière du khat à travers le monde et en expose les ravages et les enjeux économiques.


    https://www.programme.tv/l-or-vert-ou-la-stupefiante-odyssee-du-khat-156617631
    #film #documentaire #film_documentaire
    #drogue #UK #interdiction #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Ethiopie #Awaday #Londres #café #traumatisme #guerre #conflit #santé_mentale #Somalie #Somaliland #argent #revenu #prix_du_café #accord_international_sur_le_café #Dadaab #Kenya #réfugiés #camps_de_réfugiés #toxicomanie #dépendance #femmes #hommes #oubli #alternative #Angleterre #genre #qat

  • #Libre_circulation des personnes et des biens dans l’espace #CEDEAO : analyse sur la longue fermeture des frontières du Nigeria

    Depuis le 20 août le puissant Nigéria, membre de la communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest a fermé ses frontières pénalisant ainsi les peuples voisins qui vivent des échanges.

    Comment comprendre une telle décision alors que depuis 1975 la CEDEAO a été créée, justement pour briser les barrières et réunir les peuples ?

    https://www.studiokalangou.org/index.php/magazines/11986-libre-circulation-personnes-biens-espace-cedeao-analyse-longue
    #Nigeria #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #Afrique_de_l'Ouest
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • The number of EU residence permits issued to Northern and Western African nationals for work purposes fell by 46% and 58% respectively during a period of increasing irregular arrivals on the Central Mediterranean Route

    –-> Evidemment... le lien entre les deux faits (baisse des permis de séjour et augmentation des #arrivées_irrégulières) que l’OIM souligne est très tenu... c’est en réalité le coeur du problème : les personnes passent par des #routes_illégalisées via la #Méditerranée parce qu’ils n’ont pas de possibilités de prendre l’#avion... car l’accès leur est interdit via le non-octroi de #visas...

    #illégalisation #routes_migratoires #routes_illégalisées #permis_de_travail #UE #EU #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #permis_de_séjour #statistiques #chiffres #contextualisation

    Le #rapport d’où l’OIM sort ces chiffres :
    AFRICAN MIGRATION TO THE EU : IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN CONTEXT

    Contrary to common perceptions, migration from Northern and Western Africa to the EU between 2011 and 2017 has been primarily regular. Numbers of African nationals settling legally in the EU – proxied by first residence permits issued for family reunification, education or work purposes – have exceeded irregular sea arrivals for most of the top ten countries of origin of irregular migrants arriving in Italy over the period considered.

    At the same time, both total regular and irregular entries of African nationals to the EU have fallen since 2016, based on available data. First EU residence permits to nationals of countries in Northern and Western Africa have mostly been issued for family reunification over the years. While these have remained stable on average, residence permits granted for work purposes have fallen sharply in the period considered.

    https://gmdac.iom.int/sites/default/files/03_-_residence_permits-bbb.pdf

    #préjugés #regroupement_familial

    ping @reka @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

  • #Histoire de l’#Afrique_de_l’Ouest en un clin d’œil

    De toutes les régions du continent africain, c’est l’Afrique de l’Ouest qui a eu la plus grande concentration d’anciens royaumes et empires dans son histoire précoloniale.

    Ce n’est pas une tâche facile que de tenter de prendre des clichés de l’Afrique de l’Ouest à divers moments de son évolution. Même les royaumes les plus importants de l’histoire de la région — les empires du Mali, Songhai, du Ghana, Ashanti, etc. —, avec leurs frontières toujours changeantes, ne donnent que des images troubles. Les petites communautés et les territoires tribaux, qui ont toujours parsemé le paysage, sont encore plus flous et, bien qu’ils aient eu, sans aucun doute, un impact sur l’histoire culturelle de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, ils ont dû être omis.


    ... et ainsi de suite...

    Pour voir les cartes en une animation vidéo (j’ai pas réussi à l’extraire de twitter pour le mettre ici) :
    https://twitter.com/i/status/1144289420071321602

    #Tékrour

    Établi par le peuple #toucouleur de la vallée du #fleuve_Sénégal, le royaume de Tékrour a été le premier État de la région à adopter l’#Islam. Bien que devenu un État islamique robuste, Tékrour n’a jamais pu se défaire pour très longtemps du contrôle de ses puissants voisins : d’abord sous l’emprise de l’empire du Ghana, il a ensuite été conquis par celui du Mali.

    Écrivant bien plus tard, en 1270, Ibn Saïd a dépeint les aristocrates de Tékrour et leur affinité avec les commerçants blancs du Maghreb, dont ils imitaient les tenues et la cuisine. Il a aussi décrit deux sections distinctes de la population de Tékrour : les sédentaires, ancêtres des actuels Toucouleurs, et les nomades, qui deviendront les Peuls.

    #Gao (ou #Kaw-Kaw)

    Les débuts de la ville de Gao sont obscurs. Elle a été fondée pendant le VIIe siècle, soit comme village pêcheur des #Songhaïs, soit pour servir d’étape aux commerçants d’or berbères. Quoiqu’il en soit, la ville a rapidement fleurit et elle est devenue un centre majeur de commerce en Afrique de l’Ouest. L’empire de Gao s’est étendu depuis la ville le long du Niger sous la direction des Songhaïs. Au IXe siècle, Gao était déjà une puissance régionale.

    La culture de #Nok

    Parmi les sociétés du Néolithique et de l’Âge de Fer en Afrique de l’Ouest, la culture de Nok est peut-être la toute première et la plus connue, datant de 1000 av. J.-C. Cette société très développée s’est épanouie sur le plateau de #Jos qui surplombe la confluence des fleuves Niger et Bénoué, et a exercé une influence considérable sur une vaste étendue. La terre des sites archéologiques de #Taruga et de Jos était parfaite pour préserver les anciennes poteries et statues en terre cuite du peuple de Nok ; leurs sculptures détaillées d’humains et d’animaux varient en échelle de grandeur nature à 2,5 cm.

    Grâce à la découverte d’outils et d’objets en fer à Nok, les chercheurs savent que l’Âge de Fer a commencé en Afrique de l’Ouest aux alentours de 500 av. J.-C., alors que même en Egypte et en Afrique du Nord, l’usage du fer n’était pas encore généralisé. Contrairement à la plupart des autres cultures qui sont passées du #Néolithique à l’#Âge_de_Fer, la culture de Nok a évolué directement de la #pierre au #fer, sans connaître les étapes des âges du bronze et du cuivre. Ceci a amené les chercheurs à se demander si la technologie de production de fer a été apportée d’une autre région, ou si les Nok l’ont découverte par eux-mêmes.

    #Djenné-Djenno

    L’ancienne ville de Djenné-Djenno comptait une population considérable, comme l’indiquent les cimetières bondés qui ont été déterrés. Les habitants faisaient probablement pousser leur propre nourriture : comparé aux conditions arides de la région aujourd’hui, les précipitations auraient été abondantes à leur époque. Les habitants de Djenné-Djenno étaient des forgerons habiles qui créaient des outils et des bijoux en fer.

    La ville faisait partie d’un réseau commercial bien développé, quoique son étendue fasse toujours débat. L’absence de toute source de fer dans les environs pour leur industrie métallurgique, ainsi que la présence de perles romaines et hellénistiques sur le site suggèrent à certains chercheurs que la ville avait des relations avec des terres distantes.

    Les émigrations

    Le peuple #bantou est originaire du centre de l’actuel #Nigeria, mais a commencé son émigration vers le centre, et plus tard, le sud de l’Afrique vers 1000 av. J.-C. À cette époque, il reste peu de #Bantous, voire aucun, dans la région, mais les échos de leurs culture et traditions résonnent encore à travers l’Afrique de l’Ouest.

    Vers 200 av. J.-C., des groupes #akan ont commencé à se déplacer vers l’ouest, depuis la région située autour du #Lac_Tchad. Au cours des siècles suivants, ils traversèrent des rivières et des forêts denses pour atteindre la côte de l’actuel #Ghana.
    https://www.culturesofwestafrica.com/fr/histoire-afrique-de-l-ouest
    #archéologie #chronologie #cartographie #visualisation

  • Les naufragés. L’odyssée des migrants africains

    Les naufragés réunit les #témoignages de plusieurs dizaines d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants originaires d’#Afrique_de_l’Ouest, arrivés en Europe après la chute de Mouammar Kadhafi en #Libye.


    http://www.karthala.com/terrains-du-siecle/3236-les-naufrages-l-odyssee-des-migrants-africains.html
    #livre #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Etienne_Dubuis

  • À Lunel (à l’est de #Montpellier), cette statue d’un héroïque bidasse français dont on ne saura pas sur qui il tire, ni pourquoi :

    Comme toujours en France, on a des statue remontant aux (glorieuses) heures du colonialisme, mais il y a des chances pour que tu n’en aies jamais entendu parler : Charles Ménard
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_M%C3%A9nard

    Fils d’un pharmacien de Lunel, il est le frère de Joseph Ménard, il entre à l’Ecole de Saint-Cyr, le 29 octobre 1880, nommé sous-lieutenant d’infanterie de marine le 1er octobre 1882. L’année suivante, il est envoyé avec Louis-Gustave Binger au Soudan avec la mission topographique de Parfait-Louis Monteil, puis muté à Madagascar. Une nouvelle mission lui est confiée en septembre 1890 par Eugène Étienne, sous-secrétaire d’Etat aux Colonies. Il devait faire le voyage de Louis-Gustave Binger en sens inverse, en partant de Grand-Bassam en novembre 1890 pour rejoindre le Niger. Il arrive à Kong en mars 1891, y reste deux mois, puis traverse le fleuve Bandama et se dirigea vers le village de Séguéla. Il est tué au combat le 4 février 1892, avec la plupart des membres de sa mission, au cours d’une opération dans le Soudan occidental contre le village de Séguéla, situé dans l’actuelle Côte d’Ivoire, tenu par les rebelles du chef dioula Samory, alors en lutte contre la conquête coloniale française.

    Et donc surtout, jamais à l’école de la République : Samory Touré
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samory_Touré

    Samory Touré fut sans doute l’adversaire le plus redoutable que les Français eurent à affronter en Afrique de l’Ouest. C’est pourquoi il apparaît, dans l’historiographie nationaliste post-coloniale, en figure de héros de la résistance africaine à l’expansion coloniale.

    Même ces fiches Kikipédia sont extrêmement édulcorées, utilisant systématiquement le bidasse-talk avec ses euphémismes et ses approximations (pas de morts, pas de massacres…). Ménard est mort « au cours d’une opération contre [un] village », Samory Touré a été capturé dans « une campagne française de représailles »…

  • #métaliste de #campagnes de #dissuasion à l’#émigration

    Une analyse de ces campagnes par #Antoine_Pécoud
    https://seenthis.net/messages/763546

    "Campagnes de dissuasion massive", article de Antoine Pécoud et #Julia_Van_Dessel :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/912835

    Un entretien avec des représentants de l’ODM (Suisse, maintenant SEM) et de l’OIM sur le lien entre cinéma et campagnes de dissuasion à la migration :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/763642

    –---------------------

    Le gouvernement chante contre l’immigration illégale (#USA/#Etats-Unis —> #Amérique_centrale) : (2014)

    L’organisme de contrôle des frontières se sert des #radios centraméricaines pour diffuser anonymement des chansons censées dissuader la population d’immigrer vers les Etats-Unis.

    https://seenthis.net/messages/276610

    En #Guinée , l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations contrôle des frontières et les âmes :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/757474
    #OIM #IOM #organisation_internationale_contre_les_migrations

    Toujours l’OIM, mais en #Tunisie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/732291

    Et au #Cameroun , OIM, as usual :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/763640

    Au #Sénégal, avec le soutien de l’ #Espagne (2007) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/763670

    Campagne #aware_migrants, financée par l’ #Italie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/520420

    Une campagne de l’ #Australie
    https://seenthis.net/messages/474986
    #Etats-Unis #film
    Il y a aussi la campagne #No_way :
    https://seenthis.net/tag/no_way

    Financée par l’#Allemagne, une campagne en #Afghanistan :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/464281#message588432
    https://seenthis.net/messages/464281#message592615
    https://seenthis.net/messages/432534

    Les campagnes de la #Suisse :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/385940
    notamment dans les #Balkans mais aussi en #Afrique_de_l'Ouest (#Cameroun, #Nigeria)

    Campagne des #Etats-Unis :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/269673#message274426
    https://seenthis.net/messages/269673#message274440
    #USA

    Une campagne du #Danemark :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/385940#message397757

    En #France :
    Traversées de la #Manche par des migrants : les associations “révoltées” par une publicité du gouvernement
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794698

    Les campagnes de dissuasion au #Nigeria , ça vaut 40 mio d’euro...


    https://seenthis.net/messages/815068

    Au #Mali :
    TAMADENW logbook of a theatre show in Mali
    https://seenthis.net/messages/857432
    #théâtre

    Cyprus to launch SMS campaign to stem migrant arrivals
    https://seenthis.net/messages/857683

    #campagne #migrations #vidéos

    ping @isskein @_kg_ @reka

  • Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017

    A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.

    The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.

    See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)

    It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:

    “guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”

    The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).

    The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.

    The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.

    The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):

    "For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."

    At the same time:

    “The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”

    Those return operations included Frontex’s:

    “first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
    #Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans

    • EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations

      The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.

      The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:

      “The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”

      The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.

      When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.

      Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.

      The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:

      “The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”

      European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):

      “- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
      - More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
      - Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries

      New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”

      See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)

      The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm

  • Grande Guerre : les batailles oubliées de l’Afrique - RFI
    http://webdoc.rfi.fr/grande-guerre-afrique-colonies-1914-1918

    Souvent méconnues, les batailles de la Première Guerre mondiale dans les colonies africaines allemandes ont pourtant fait de nombreuses victimes. Du Togo au Sud-Ouest africain allemand, en passant par le Cameroun, le Congo belge et l’Afrique orientale allemande, des Africains sont enrôlés pour se battre sur leur propre continent et servir une guerre qui n’est pas la leur, une guerre d’Européens. Si le nombre de soldats présents sur les fronts africains et le nombre de tranchées creusées paraissent dérisoire comparés à ceux des fronts européens, les affrontements sont d’une extrême violence et déciment aussi des civils, colons et colonisés. Enjeux stratégiques, riches de matières premières et de ressources minières, les colonies allemandes sont convoitées, dès le début du conflit, par les Alliés.

    #pgm #première_guerre_mondiale #1914-1918

  • L’unité somalienne ébranlée par la lassitude de ses Etats fédérés - RFI
    http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20181103-unite-somalie-secouee-lassitude-etats-federes-mohamed-farmajo

    La Somalie continue de s’enfoncer dans la crise politique. Les Etats fédérés reprochent à l’Etat central de mal redistribuer les ressources, de manquer de vision, de s’ingérer dans les affaires locales. Quatre d’entre eux ont même annoncé la création d’un parti politique et d’une force armée commune chargée de combattre les shebabs. Les observateurs s’inquiètent de plus en plus.

    #somalie #omaliland #puntland #afrique_de_l_est #corne_de_l_afique

  • #métaliste (qui va être un grand chantier, car il y a plein d’information sur seenthis, qu’il faudrait réorganiser) sur :
    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #migrations #réfugiés

    Des liens vers des articles généraux sur l’externalisation des frontières de la part de l’ #UE (#EU) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/569305
    https://seenthis.net/messages/390549
    https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

    Ici une tentative (très mal réussie, car évidement, la divergence entre pratiques et les discours à un moment donné, ça se voit !) de l’UE de faire une brochure pour déconstruire les mythes autour de la migration...
    La question de l’externalisation y est abordée dans différentes parties de la brochure :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765967

    Petit chapitre/encadré sur l’externalisation des frontières dans l’ouvrage "(Dé)passer la frontière" :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/769367

    Les origines de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers (maritimes) : accord #USA-#Haïti de #1981 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768694

    L’externalisation des politiques européennes en matière de migration
    https://seenthis.net/messages/787450

    "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/789048

    Partners in crime ? The impacts of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794636
    #paix #stabilité #droits #Libye #Niger #Turquie

    Proceedings of the conference “Externalisation of borders : detention practices and denial of the right to asylum”
    https://seenthis.net/messages/880193

    Brochure sur l’externalisation des frontières (passamontagna)
    https://seenthis.net/messages/952016

  • Le berceau de la domestication du riz africain identifié au Mali - Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD)
    https://www.ird.fr/ird.fr/toute-l-actualite/communiques-et-dossiers-de-presse/cp-2018/le-berceau-de-la-domestication-du-riz-africain-identifie-au-mali

    Une étude internationale, coordonnée par des chercheurs de l’IRD, et associant le CEA et le Centre du riz pour l’Afrique (AfricaRice), identifie l’origine géographique de la domestication du riz africain. Grâce au séquençage de plus de 246 génomes de riz africain – sauvages et cultivés – les chercheurs montrent que cette domestication est intervenue il y a 3 000 ans dans le delta intérieur du fleuve Niger, au nord du Mali. Ces résultats, publiés le 5 juillet 2018 dans la revue Current Biology , révèlent également comment les changements climatiques passés ont induit des transformations profondes des sociétés, notamment l’adoption de l’agriculture.

    Troisième #céréale la plus produite dans le monde après le blé et le maïs, le riz constitue la base de l’alimentation de près de la moitié de la population mondiale. De la famille des poacées, le riz se cultive pour sa graine, riche en amidon. On distingue deux espèces cultivées majeures : le #riz_africain (Oryza glaberrima ) et le #riz_asiatique (Oryza sativa ). Ces espèces ont divergé génétiquement il y a environ un million d’années, bien avant leur #domestication par l’Homme [et certainement LA Femme, tordu]. Ces domestications se sont produites indépendamment en Asie et en Afrique, dans les 10 000 dernières années. Jusqu’à présent, les hypothèses scientifiques localisaient l’origine géographique de la domestication du riz africain en #Afrique_de_l’Ouest1.


    #riz #cartographie #préhistoire

  • Nouvelle page internet sur le thème des #mixed_migrations
    About the Mixed Migration Centre

    The MMC is a leading source for independent and high quality data, information, research and analysis on mixed migration. Through the provision of credible evidence and expertise, the MMC aims to support agencies, policy makers and practitioners to make well-informed decisions, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to contribute to protection and assistance responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in the sector responding to mixed migration.

    http://www.mixedmigration.org

    Régions couvertes :
    #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Yémen #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Moyen-Orient #Asie

    cc @isskein @reka

    #mixed_migration #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • Après la Guinée Bissau, nouvelle extension d’APC dans le palmier à huile au Congo | Commodafrica
    http://www.commodafrica.com/09-05-2018-apres-la-guinee-bissau-nouvelle-extension-dapc-dans-le-palm

    L’américain African Palm Corp (APC) a ajouté 3 millions d’hectares supplémentaires de palmier à l’huile en Afrique de l’Ouest à son portefeuille avec la signature d’un accord avec la Société et les représentants de Ngalipomi, groupe local basé au Congo. Cet accord conférera à APC un accès à trois millions d’hectares supplémentaires de palmiers en Afrique de l’Ouest, en #Guinée_Bissau et au #Congo.

    « C’est le deuxième accord que nous concluons en seulement quelques mois, et nous sommes ravis d’inclure le Congo dans notre nouvelle phase d’exploitation. Ceci renforce notre vision consistant à créer un modèle d’affaires durable, capable d’autonomiser économiquement les communautés locales africaines via la culture de fruits de palmier », a expliqué Oscar A. Faria, président et PDG d’African Palm Corp. En avril dernier le groupe américain a annoncé le lancement de ses activités en Guinée Bissau sur 1,5 million d’hectares (cf. nos informations ).

    #industrie_palmiste

  • #Mauritanie : des #migrants_sénégalais renvoyés dans leur pays

    En Mauritanie, le gouvernement a ordonné l’expulsion de 53 migrants sénégalais arrêtés ces derniers jours à #Nouadhibou alors qu’ils tentaient de gagner l’archipel des Canaries, en Espagne en #pirogue.

    Les migrants avaient quitté la ville sénégalaise de Thiès, lundi 28 mai dernier, à bord d’une embarcation de fortune pour les îles Canaries avant de tomber en panne non loin des côtes mauritaniennes de Nouadhibou. Le capitaine a pris la fuite et les passagers ont été récupérés par la marine mauritanienne avant leur transfert à Nouadhibou d’où ils ont été acheminés vers Nouakchott.

    C’est là que la mesure d’expulsion a été exécutée. Un premier contingent vient de quitter le pays selon le président de l’association des ressortissants sénégalais en Mauritanie. « Lundi, un premier groupe de 21 migrants est parti pour le Sénégal, explique à RFI Assane Gueye. Les autres suivront bientôt. J’ai pu leur rendre visite, j’ai vu leurs conditions d’accueil. Elles sont acceptables ».

    Assane Gueye est le seul contact direct avec ses compatriotes. Il s’est dit étonné de voir le nombre élevé de Sénégalais à bord d’une seule embarcation. « Avant, vous trouviez à bord d’une pirogue diverses nationalités, gambienne, guinéenne et malienne. Mais cette fois, il y avait 53 Sénégalais, vraiment je suis étonné ». Les 32 autres Sénégalais du centre de rétention de Nouakchott seront rapatriés dans les prochains jours suivant la signature des arrêts d’expulsion les concernant.

    http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180606-mauritanie-migrants-senegalais-renvoyes-leur-pays
    #it_has_begun #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #migrations #Canaries #rétention #détention_administrative

    –-> vu que, selon ce qui est dit ici, il s’agirait de potentiels #candidats_à_l'émigration vers l’Europe... je me demande si il n’y a pas la petite main de l’UE derrière
    #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières

  • Surexploitation et changement climatique : au Sénégal, la pêche est en danger

    La sécurité alimentaire de la population sénégalaise dépend largement des ressources halieutiques : près de 70 % des protéines animales consommées sont puisées en mer et le plat national, le thiéboudienne, est préparé avec du riz et du poisson. Tout un pan de l’économie du pays s’est développé autour de ce vivier. Le Sénégal est le deuxième pays producteur de poisson en Afrique de l’Ouest et dépasse désormais les 500.000 tonnes extraites par an, derrière le Nigéria. La pêche est la première branche exportatrice du pays. Plus de 600.000 emplois en dépendraient, soit 17 % de la population active.

    Abondance de biens ne nuit pas, mais la ressource n’en est pas moins tarissable. À force de puiser dans les stocks de poissons sénégalais, la voracité des pêches industrielles et artisanales déséquilibre et épuise les écosystèmes qui faisaient le bonheur et la prospérité des pêcheurs artisanaux. La pêche s’est largement intensifiée depuis les années 1970. Plus de 20.000 pirogues et quelque 160 navires industriels se disputeraient, désormais, les 718 kilomètres de côtes du Sénégal, pour répondre à une demande mondialisée et soutenue. La cadence infernale des ballets incessants des navires ne permet pas aux stocks de poissons de se régénérer. Plus de 50 % des stocks suivis dans les eaux ouest-africaines seraient surexploités, ce qui constitue l’un des taux les plus élevés au monde. La rentabilité des pêcheries, insuffisamment compensée par la hausse des prix, diminue à mesure que l’effort de pêche et le nombre d’espèces ciblées augmente. À tel point que des pêcheurs, acculés, pensent à migrer vers l’Europe ou tentent des incursions en eaux étrangères, au péril de leur vie. En janvier 2018, un pêcheur saint-louisien a été abattu par des gardes-côtes mauritaniens [2].

    voir aussi dans le diplo de mai cette très belle carte.

    #pêche #surpêche #Sénégal #Afrique_de_l'ouest

  • No food, no water: African migrants recount terrifying Atlantic crossing

    Men rescued off Brazil after 35 days at sea tell of harrowing 3,000km journey on which some drank urine to survive.

    In the days after the food and water had run out, as the catamaran drifted helplessly in the Atlantic with a snapped mast and broken motor, there was nothing left to do but pray, said Muctarr Mansaray, 27.

    “I pray every day. I pray a lot at that particular moment. I don’t sleep at night,” he said.

    Mansaray and 24 other African migrants had set out from the African nation of Cape Verde in April, on what they were told by the two Brazilian crewmen would be a relatively quick and easy voyage to a new country where they hoped to find work.

    This weekend, they were rescued by fishermen 80 miles off the coast of Brazil, after an incredible 3,000km (1,864-mile) journey across the Atlantic.

    The men, from Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau had been at sea for 35 days – the last few days without food and water.

    Details have now begun to emerge of the men’s terrifying and chaotic voyage in a 12-metre catamaran barely big enough for them to squeeze on. When food and water ran out, some even drank sea water and urine.

    “After 35 days of journey in these conditions it is really lucky that nobody died,” said Luis Almeida, head of the federal police’s immigration department in São Luís, the capital of Maranhão state.

    “There was not a cabin for all of them, so they were exposed to a lot of sun and solar radiation during these 35 days,” he said. The rescued men were disorientated, dehydrated and some had problems seeing after so long exposed to the glare of sun reflected on the waves.

    Almeida said the case was unprecedented: African stowaways have been found on cargo ships in Maranhão ports before, but this was the first time a boatload of migrants had arrived in the state. The two Brazilians also on the boat were arrested for promoting illegal immigrations.

    The journey began in the island nation of Cape Verde, 400 miles west of Senegal.

    Mansaray, a Muslim from Freetown in Sierra Leone, had moved there five years ago to study science and technology with hopes of becoming a teacher. He studied for two years but was struggling to pay his university fees and working as a cellphone repairman.

    “They called me the cellphone doctor,” he told the Guardian by phone from São Luís.

    A friend who is a student in São Paulo told him he could study for free in Brazil’s biggest city and would be able to send money home to his elderly parents and sister in Freetown. “I said, cool, that’s why I got that boat,” he said.

    He said he had been introduced to a Brazilian on the street and then paid $700 (£521) for what he was told would be a 22-day passage.

    He became scared when he saw the size of the vessel he was about to cross the Atlantic on.

    “I am the last to arrive, when I enter on the boat, a lot of guys, oh my God, is this going to be safe all of us?” he said. “How can I do this journey? Because I am already in, I cannot discourage other people, so I find courage and go.”
    ‘The motor broke, and the sail broke’

    Others had paid more on the promise that they would be given food, but within 10 days the food had run out, so the men survived on two biscuits or a few spoonfuls of food each day. One day, one man caught a fish with a rope.

    “We boiled a fish, and everybody eat,” Mansaray said.

    But the mast snapped when one of the boat’s crew was trying to tie it to the other side of the boat, he said, and the motor would not work because the crew had mixed kerosene and diesel. A storm came as a relief because at least there was rainwater to drink.

    Elhadji Mountakha Beye, 36, was hit on the head when the mast broke and has been left with a scar. The mechanic from Dakar in Senegal had previously lived in Cape Verde, and paid €1,000 (£877) for his passage in the hope of finding work in Brazil where he hoped to meet up with a Senegalese friend in São Paulo. “There is better work there than in Senegal,” he said.

    He described a hellish journey.

    “It was tiring, there was no food, the food ran out, the water ran out,” he said. “Just on that sea. The motor broke, and the sail broke. Now just wait for someone to help us.”

    Just as the situation was becoming dire, the men aboard the drifting vessel spotted a fishing boat and signalled that they were in distress. The fishermen, from nearby Ceará state, towed the catamaran to the nearby port of São José de Ribamar.

    “The next day someone would have died,” Moisés dos Santos, one of the fishermen, told reporters when the men landed. “They said they ate two biscuits a day. They even drank urine, that’s what they say, they told us. We felt very honoured to save the lives of a lot of people.”

    The men were met by a medical team from the Maranhão state government’s secretariat of human rights, taken to a health post for checks and then housed in a local gymnasium.

    “All of them said life was precarious in their origin countries and they all have relatives or people they know living in Brazil. They were looking for a better life and to work in Brazil,” said Jonata Galvão, the state’s adjunct secretary for human rights.

    Federal police said they were now evaluating a “migratory solution” for the men to stay in Brazil.

    “We are not criminals. We are hard-working guys. So I believe that the government will help us to do that,” Mantsaray said. “It is my dream, and I believe my dream will come true with the help of God, and I can support my family back home.”

    This story was amended on 23 May 2018 to correct the length of the journey across the Atlantic. It is 3,000km, not 3,000 miles.


    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/african-migrant-brazil-boat-rescue-atlantic-crossing

    #parcours_migratoires #océan_atlantique #atlantique #Afrique #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Brésil
    via @isskein

  • ATTENTION :
    Les liens sur ce fil de discussion ne sont pas tous en ordre chronologique.
    Portez donc une attention particulière au date de publication de l’article original (et non pas de quand je l’ai posté sur seenthis, car j’ai fait dernièrement des copier-coller de post sur d’autres fils de discussion) !

    –---------------------------

    Niger : Europe’s Migration Laboratory

    “We share an interest in managing migration in the best possible way, for both Europe and Africa,” Mogherini said at the time.

    Since then, she has referred to Niger as the “model” for how other transit countries should manage migration and the best performer of the five African nations who signed up to the E.U. #Partnership_Framework_on_Migration – the plan that made development aid conditional on cooperation in migration control. Niger is “an initial success story that we now want to replicate at regional level,” she said in a recent speech.

    Angela Merkel became the first German chancellor to visit the country in October 2016. Her trip followed a wave of arrests under Law 36 in the Agadez region. Merkel promised money and “opportunities” for those who had previously made their living out of migration.

    One of the main recipients of E.U. funding is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which now occupies most of one street in Plateau. In a little over two years the IOM headcount has gone from 22 to more than 300 staff.

    Giuseppe Loprete, the head of mission, says the crackdown in northern Niger is about more than Europe closing the door on African migrants. The new law was needed as networks connecting drug smuggling and militant groups were threatening the country, and the conditions in which migrants were forced to travel were criminal.

    “Libya is hell and people who go there healthy lose their minds,” Loprete says.

    A side effect of the crackdown has been a sharp increase in business for IOM, whose main activity is a voluntary returns program. Some 7,000 African migrants were sent home from Niger last year, up from 1,400 in 2014. More than 2,000 returns in the first three months of 2018 suggest another record year.

    The European Development Fund awarded $731 million to Niger for the period 2014–20. A subsequent review boosted this by a further $108 million. Among the experiments this money bankrolls are the connection of remote border posts – where there was previously no electricity – to the internet under the German aid corporation, GIZ; a massive expansion of judges to hear smuggling and trafficking cases; and hundreds of flatbed trucks, off-road vehicles, motorcycles and satellite phones for Nigerien security forces.

    At least three E.U. states – #France, Italy and Germany – have troops on the ground in Niger. Their roles range from military advisers to medics and trainers. French forces and drone bases are present as part of the overlapping Barkhane and G5 Sahel counterinsurgency operations which includes forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Mauritania. The U.S., meanwhile, has both troops and drone bases for its own regional fight against Islamic militants, the latest of which is being built outside Agadez at a cost of more than $100 million.

    https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/05/22/niger-europes-migration-laboratory
    #Niger #asile #migrations #réfugiés #laboratoire #agadez #frontières #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières #modèle_nigérien #cartographie #visualisation
    #OIM #IOM #retours_volontaires #renvois #expulsions #Libye #développement #aide_au_développement #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #G5_sahel #Italie #Allemagne #IMF #FMI

    Intéressant de lire :

    ❝As one European ambassador said, “Niger is now the southern border of Europe.”
    #frontière_européenne #frontière_mobile

    Il y a quelques mois, la nouvelles frontière européenne était désignée comme étant la frontière de la #Libye, là, elle se déplace encore un peu plus au sud...
    –-> v. mon post sur seenthis :


    https://seenthis.net/messages/604039

    Voilà donc la nouvelle carte :

    • Europe Benefits by Bankrolling an Anti-Migrant Effort. Niger Pays a Price.

      Niger has been well paid for drastically reducing the number of African migrants using the country as a conduit to Europe. But the effort has hurt parts of the economy and raised security concerns.

      The heavily armed troops are positioned around oases in Niger’s vast northern desert, where temperatures routinely climb beyond 100 degrees.

      While both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have branches operating in the area, the mission of the government forces here is not to combat jihadism.

      Instead, these Nigerien soldiers are battling human smugglers, who transport migrants across the harsh landscape, where hundreds of miles of dunes separate solitary trees.

      The migrants are hoping to reach neighboring Libya, and from there, try a treacherous, often deadly crossing of the Mediterranean to reach Europe.

      The toll of the military engagement is high. Some smugglers are armed, militants are rife and the terrain is unforgiving: Each mission, lasting two weeks, requires 50 new truck tires to replace the ones shredded in the blistering, rocky sand.

      But the operation has had an impact: Niger has drastically reduced the number of people moving north to Libya through its territory over the past two years.

      The country is being paid handsomely for its efforts, by a Europe eager to reduce the migrant flow. The European Union announced at the end of last year it would provide Niger with one billion euros, or about $1.16 billion, in development aid through 2020, with hundreds of millions of that earmarked for anti-migration projects. Germany, France and Italy also provide aid on their own.

      It is part of a much broader European Union strategy to keep migrants from its shores, including paying billions of euros to Turkey and more than $100 million to aid agencies in Sudan.

      Italy has been accused of paying off militias in Libya to keep migrants at bay. And here in Niger, some military officials angrily contend that France financed a former rebel leader who remains a threat, prioritizing its desire to stop migration over Niger’s national security interests.

      Since passing a law against human trafficking in 2015, Niger has directed its military to arrest and jail migrant smugglers, confiscate their vehicles and bring the migrants they traffic to the police or the International Organization for Migration, or I.O.M. The migrants are then given a choice whether to continue on their journey — and risk being detained again, or worse — or given a free ride back to their home country.

      The law’s effect has been significant. At the peak in 2015, there were 5,000 to 7,000 migrants a week traveling through Niger to Libya. The criminalization of smuggling has reduced those numbers to about 1,000 people a week now, according to I.O.M. figures.

      At the same time, more migrants are leaving Libya, fleeing the rampant insecurity and racist violence targeting sub-Saharan Africans there.

      As a result, the overall flow of people has now gone into a notable reverse: For the last two years, more African migrants have been leaving Libya to return to their homelands than entering the country from Niger, according to the I.O.M.

      One of Niger’s biggest bus companies, Rimbo, used to send four migrant-filled buses each day from the country’s capital in the south, Niamey, to the northern city of Agadez, a jumping off point for the trip to the Libyan border.

      Now, the company has signed a two-year contract with the I.O.M. to carry migrants the other way, so they can be repatriated.

      On a recent breezy evening in Niamey, a convoy of four Rimbo buses rolled through the dusty streets after an arduous 20-hour drive from Agadez, carrying 400 migrants. They were headed back home to countries across West Africa, including Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

      For leaders in Europe, this change in migrant flows is welcome news, and a testament to Niger’s dedication to shared goals.

      “Niger really became one of our best allies in the region,” said Raul Mateus Paula, the bloc’s ambassador to Niger.

      But the country’s achievement has also come with considerable costs, including on those migrants still determined to make it to Libya, who take more risks than ever before. Drivers now take routes hundreds of miles away from water points and go through mined areas to avoid military patrols. When smugglers learn the military is in the area, they often abandon migrants in the desert to escape arrest.

      This has led to dozens of deaths by dehydration over the past two years, prompting Niger’s civil protection agency and the I.O.M. to launch weekly rescue patrols.

      The agency’s head, Adam Kamassi, said his team usually rescues between 20 to 50 people every time it goes out. On those trips, it nearly always finds three or four bodies.

      The crackdown on human smuggling has also been accompanied by economic decline and security concerns for Niger.

      The government’s closure of migrant routes has caused an increase in unemployment and an uptick in other criminal activity like drug smuggling and robbery, according to a Niger military intelligence document.

      “I know of about 20 people who have become bandits for lack of work,” said Mahamadou Issouf, who has been driving migrants from Agadez to southern Libya since 2005, but who no longer has work.

      Earlier this year, the army caught him driving 31 migrants near a spot in the desert called the Puit d’Espoir, or Well of Hope. While the army released him in this case, drivers who worked for him have been imprisoned and two of his trucks impounded.

      The military intelligence document also noted that since the crackdown, towns along the migrant route are having a hard time paying for essential services like schools and health clinics, which had relied on money from migration and the industries feeding it.

      For example, the health clinic in Dirkou, once a major migrant way station in northern Niger, now has fewer paying clients because the number of migrants seeking has dwindled. Store owners who relied on the steady flow of people traveling through have gone bankrupt.

      Hassan Mohammed is another former migrant smuggler who lost his livelihood in the crackdown.

      A native of Dirkou, Mr. Mohammed, 31, began driving migrants across the desert in 2002, earning enough in the process to buy two Toyota pickup trucks. The smuggling operation grew enough that he began employing his younger brothers to drive.

      Today, Mr. Mohammed’s brothers are in prison, serving the six-month sentences convicted smuggler drivers face. His two pickup trucks are gathering dust, along with a few dozen other confiscated vehicles, on a Niger army base. With no income, Mr. Mohammed now relies on the generosity of friends to survive.

      With Europe as a primary beneficiary of the smuggling crackdown, the European Union is eager to keep the effort in place, and some of the bloc’s aid finances a project to convert former smugglers into entrepreneurs. But the project is still in its pilot stage more than two years after the migrant crackdown began.

      Ibrahim Yacouba, the former foreign minister of Niger, who resigned earlier this year, said, “There are lots of announcements of millions of euros in funding, but in the lived reality of those who are in the industry, there has been no change.”

      The crackdown has also raised security concerns, as France has taken additional steps to stop migration along the Niger-Libya border that go beyond its asylum-processing center.

      From its military base in the northern Nigerien outpost of Madama, France funded last year an ethnic Toubou militia in southern Libya, with the goal of using the group to help stop smugglers, according to Nigerien security officials.

      This rankled the Nigerien military because the militia is headed by an ex-Nigerien rebel, Barka Sidimi, who is considered a major security risk by the country’s officials. To military leaders, this was an example of a European anti-migrant policy taking precedent over Niger’s own security.

      A French military spokesperson said, “We don’t have information about the collaboration you speak of.”

      Despite the country’s progress in reducing the flow of migrants, Nigerien officials know the problem of human smugglers using the country as a conduit is not going away.

      “The fight against clandestine migration is not winnable,’’ said Mohamed Bazoum, Niger’s interior minister.

      Even as Libya has experienced a net drop in migrants, new routes have opened up: More migrants are now entering Algeria and transiting to Morocco to attempt a Mediterranean crossing there, according to Giuseppe Loprete, who recently left his post after being the I.O.M.’s director in Niger for four years.

      But despite the drawbacks that come with it, the smuggling crackdown will continue, at least for now, according to Mr. Bazoum, the interior minister. Migrant smuggling and trafficking, he said, “creates a context of a criminal economy, and we are against all forms of economic crime to preserve the stability and security of our country.”

      For Mr. Mohammed, the former smuggler, the crackdown has left him idle and dejected, with no employment prospects.

      “There’s no project for any of us here,” he said. “There’s nothing going on. I only sleep and wake up.”


      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/world/africa/niger-migration-crisis.html#click=https://t.co/zSUbpbU3Kf

    • Le 25 Octobre 2018, le Chef de Mission de l’ OIM Niger, M. Martin Wyss, a remis à la Police Nationale-Niger ??️via son Directeur Général Adjoint, M. Oumarou Moussa, le premier prototype du poste frontière mobile, en présence du #Directeur_de_la_Surveillance_du_Territoire (#DST) des partenaires techniques et financiers.

      Ce camion aménagé avec deux bureaux et une salle d’attente, des climatiseurs et une connectivité satellitaire, est autonome en électricité grâce à des panneaux solaires amovibles et une turbine éolienne. Il aura pour fonction d’appuyer des postes de contrôle aux frontières, établir un poste frontalier temporaire ou venir en soutien de mouvements massifs de personnes à travers les frontières.

      Ce prototype unique au monde a été entièrement développé et conceptualisé par l’unité de #gestion_des_frontières de l’#OIM_Niger, pour l’adapter au mieux aux contraintes atmosphériques et topographiques du Niger.

      Il a été financé par le Canada’s International Development – Global Affairs Canada ??️

      Crédits photos : OIM Niger / Daniel Kouawo

      source : https://www.facebook.com/IBMNiger/posts/1230027903804111

      #OIM #IOM #frontière_mobile #Canada

    • Remise du système MIDAS et inauguration du parc de vaccination à Makalondi

      L’ OIM Niger a procédé à la remise du #système_MIDAS au niveau du poste de police de #Makalondi (Burkina Faso - Niger).

      MIDAS saisit automatiquement les informations biographiques et biométriques des voyageurs à partir de lecteurs de documents, d’#empreintes_digitales et de #webcams. Il est la propriété entière et souveraine du Gouvernement du Niger.

      Le sytème permet d’enregistrer pour mieux sécuriser et filtrer les individus mal intentionnés, mais aussi de mieux connaître les flux pour ensuite adapter les politiques de développement sur les axes d’échange.

      A la même occasion, le Gouverneur de Tillabéri et l’OIM ont inauguré un par de vaccination le long d’un couloir de transhumance de la CEDEAO.

      Ce projet a été réalisé grâce au don du peuple Japonais.

      https://www.facebook.com/IBMNiger/videos/483536085494618
      #surveillance #biométrie #MIDAS

    • Le mardi 28 aout 2018, s’est tenu la cérémonie de remise du système MIDAS au poste de police frontalier de Makalondi (frontière Burkina faso). Cette cérémonie organisée par l’OIM Niger dans le cadre du projet « #NICOLE – Renforcement de la coopération interservices pour la sécurité des frontières au Niger » sous financement du Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan a enregistré la remarquable participation du gouverneur de la région de Tillabéri, le directeur de la surveillance du Territoire (DST), les responsables régionaux, départementaux et communaux de la police Nationale et de l’élevage, les autorités locales et coutumières du département de #Torodi et de la commune rurale de #Makalondi ainsi que de l’#Eucap_Sahel_Niger. MIDAS (#Migration_Information_and_Data_Analysis_System) qui est un système d’information et de gestion des données migratoires développé par l’OIM en 2009 et opérationnel dans 19 pays est aujourd’hui également opérationnel au niveau du poste frontière de Makalondi. Cette cérémonie était aussi l’occasion d’inaugurer le parc de vaccination pour bétail réalisé dans le cadre du même projet par l’OIM afin de soutenir les capacités de résilience des communautés frontalières de la localité.
      toutes les autorités présentes à la cérémonie ont tenues à exprimer leur immense gratitute envers l’OIM pour son appui au gouvernement du Niger dans son combat pour la sécurisation des frontières.


      https://www.facebook.com/IBMNiger/posts/1197797207027181

    • Niger grapples with migration and its porous borders

      Europe has been grappling with the migration problem on its side of the Mediterranean for several years now with little sign of bringing the situation under control, but there is also an African frontline, on the edges of the Sahara, and the improverished nation of Niger is one of the hotspots. The situation here is similarly out of control, and EU funds have been made available to try and persude people smugglers to give up their business. However, much of the money has gone to waste, and the situation has in some ways evolved into something worse. Euronews’ Valerie Gauriat has just returned from Niger. This is her report.

      Scores of four-wheel drives have just arrived from Libya, at the checkpoint of the city of Agadez, in central Niger, Western Africa’s gateway to the Sahara.

      Every week, convoys like these travel both ways, crossing the thousand kilometers of desert that separate the two countries.

      Travelers are exhausted after a 5-day journey.

      Many are Nigerian workers, fleeing renewed violence in Libya, but many others are migrants from other western African countries.

      “When we get to Libya, they lock us up. And when we work we don’t get paid,” said one Senegalese man.

      “What happened, we can’t describe it. We can’t talk about everything that goes on, because it’s bad, it’s so bad !” said another, from Burkina Fasso.

      Many have already tried to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe.

      “We paid for it, but we never went. They caught us and locked us up. I want to go home to Senegal now, that’s my hope,” said another man.

      Mohamed Tchiba organised this convoy. This former Touareg rebel is a well-known figure in Agadez’s migration business, which is a long-standing, flourishing activity despite a law against irregular migration which made it illegal two years ago.

      EU-funded reconversion projects were launched to offset the losses, but Mohamed refuses to give up his livelihood.

      “I’m a smuggler, even now I’m a smuggler! Because I’ve heard that in town they are giving us something to give up this job. But they did not give me anything. And I do not know any other work than this one,” he told us.

      We head to Agadez, where we find dozens of vehicles in a car park. They were confiscated from the smugglers who were arrested by the police, and are a slowly-rusting symbol of the fight against irregular immigration.

      But that didn’t go down well with the local population. The law hit the local economy hard

      Travelers departing for Libya were once Ibrahim’s main source of revenue, but now customers for his water cans are scarce. The layoffs of workers after the closure of gold mines in the area did not help.

      “Before, we sold 400 to 500 water cans every week to migrants, and cans were also sent to the mine. But they closed the road to Libya, they closed the mines, everything is closed. And these young people stay here without working or doing anything, without food. If they get up in the morning, and they go to bed at night, without eating anything, what will prevent them one day from going to steal something?” wonders trader Oumarou Chehou.

      Friday prayers are one of the few occasions when the city comes to life.

      We go to meet with the President of the so-called Association for former migration workers.

      He takes us to meet one of the former smugglers. After stopping their activity they have benefited from an EU-funded reconversion programme.

      Abdouramane Ghali received a stock of chairs, pots, and loudspeakers, which he rents out for celebrations. We ask him how business is going.

      "It depends on God ... I used to make much more money before; I could get up to 800 euros a week; now it’s barely 30 euros a week,” he says.

      Abdouramane is still among the luckiest. Out of 7000 people involved in the migration business, less than 400 have so far benefited from the reconversion package: about 2000 euros per project. That’s not enough to get by, says the president of the Former Smugglers’ Association, Bachir Amma.

      “We respected the law, we are no longer working, we stopped, and now it’s the State of Niger and the European Union which abandoned us. People are here, they have families, they have children, and they have nothing. We eat with our savings. The money we made before, that’s what feeds us now, you see. It’s really difficult, it’s very hard for us,” he says.

      We catch up with Abdouramane the next morning. He has just delivered his equipment to one of his customers, Abba Seidou, also a former smuggler, who is now a taxi driver. Abba is celebrating the birth of his first child, a rare opportunity to forget his worries.

      “Since it’s a very wonderful day, it strengthened my heart, to go and get chairs, so that people, even if there is nothing, they can sit down if they come to your house. The times are hard for immigration, now; but with the small funds we get, people can get by. It’s going to be okay,” the proud father says. Lots of other children gather round.

      “These kids are called the” talibe “, or street kids,” reports euronews’ Valerie Gauriat. "And the celebration is a chance for them to get some food. Since the anti-smuggling law was implemented, there are more and more of them in the streets of Agadez.”

      The European Union has committed to spending more than one billion euros on development aid in a country classified as one of the poorest in the world. Niger is also one of the main beneficiaries of the European emergency fund created in 2015 to address migration issues in Africa. But for the vice-president of the region of Agadez, these funds were only a bargaining chip for the law against irregular immigration, which in his eyes, only serves the interests of Europe.

      Valerie Gauriat:

      “Niger has received significant funding from the European Union. Do you believe these funds are not used properly?”

      Vice-President of the Agadez Regional Council, Aklou Sidi Sidi:

      “First of all the funding is insufficient. When we look at it, Turkey has received huge amounts of money, a lot more than Niger. And even armed groups in Libya received much more money than Niger. Today, we are sitting here, we are the abyss of asylum seekers, refugees, migrants, displaced people. Agadez is an abyss,” he sighs.

      In the heart of the Sahel region, Niger is home to some 300,000 displaced people and refugees. They are a less and less transitory presence, which weighs on the region of Agadez. One center managed by the International Office for Migration hosts migrants who have agreed to return to their countries of origin. But the procedures sometimes take months, and the center is saturated.

      “80 percent of the migrants do not have any identification, they do not have any documents. That means that after registration we have to go through the procedure of the travel authorisation, and we have to coordinate this with the embassies and consulates of each country. That is the main issue and the challenge that we are facing every day. We have around 1000 people in this area, an area that’s supposed to receive 400 or 500 people. We have mattresses piled up because people sleep outside here because we’re over our capacity. Many people are waiting on the other side. So we need to move these people as quickly as possible so we can let others come,” says the IOM’s transit centre manager, Lincoln Gaingar.

      Returning to their country is not an option for many who transit through Niger. Among them are several hundred Sudanese, supervised by the UNHCR. Many fled the Darfur conflict, and endured hell in Libyan detention centres. Some have been waiting for months for an answer to their asylum request.

      Badererdeen Abdul Kareem dreams of completing his veterinary studies in the West.

      “Since I finished my university life I lost almost half of my life because of the wars, traveling from Sudan to Libya. I don’t want to lose my life again. So it’s time to start my life, it’s time to work, it’s time to educate. Staying in Niger for nothing or staying in Niger for a long time, for me it’s not good.”

      But the only short-term perspective for these men is to escape the promiscuity of the reception center. Faced with the influx of asylum seekers, the UNHCR has opened another site outside the city.

      We meet Ibrahim Abulaye, also Sudanese, who spent years in refugee camps in Chad, and then Libya. He is 20 years old.

      “It was really very difficult, but thank God I’m alive. What I can really say is that since we cannot go back home, we are looking for a place that is more favourable to us, where we can be safe, and have a better chance in life.”

      Hope for a better life is closer for those who have been evacuated from Libyan prisons as part of an emergency rescue plan launched last year by the UNHCR. Welcomed in Niamey, the capital of Niger, they must be resettled in third countries.

      After fleeing their country, Somalia, these women were tortured in Libyan detention centers. They are waiting for resettlement in France.

      “There are many problems in my country, and I had my own. I have severe stomach injuries. The only reason I left my country was to escape from these problems, and find a safe place where I could find hope. People like me need hope,” said one of them.

      A dozen countries, most of them European, have pledged to welcome some 2,600 refugees evacuated from Libya to Niger. But less than 400 have so far been resettled.

      “The solidarity is there. There has to be a sense of urgency also to reinstall them, to welcome them in the countries that have been offering these places. It is important to avoid a long stay in Niger, and that they continue their journey onwards,” says the UNHCR’s Alessandra Morelli in Niamey.

      The slowness of the countries offering asylum to respect their commitments has disappointed the Niger government. But what Niger’s Interior minister Mohamed Bazoum most regrets is a lack of foresight in Europe, when it comes to stemming irregular immigration.

      “I am rather in favor of more control, but I am especially in favor of seeing European countries working together to promote another relationship with African countries. A relationship based on issuing visas on the basis of the needs that can be expressed by companies. It is because this work is not done properly, that we have finally accepted that the only possible migration is illegal migration,” he complains.

      Estimated from 5 to 7,000 per week in 2015, the number of migrants leaving for Libya has fallen tenfold, according to the Niger authorities. But the traficking continues, on increasingly dangerous routes.

      The desert, it is said in Agadez, has become more deadly than the Mediterranean.

      We meet another one of the smugglers who for lack of alternatives says he has resumed his activities, even if he faces years in prison.

      “This law is as if we had been gathered together and had knives put under our throats, to slit our throats. Some of us were locked up, others fled the country, others lost everything,” he says.

      He takes us to one of the former transit areas where migrants were gathered before leaving for Libya, when it was allowed. The building has since been destroyed. Customers are rarer, and the price of crossings has tripled. In addition to the risk of being stopped by the police and army patrols, travelers have to dodge attacks by arms and drug traffickers who roam the desert.

      “Often the military are on a mission, they don’t want to waste time, so sometimes they will tell you,’we can find an arrangement, what do you offer?’ We give them money to leave. We must also avoid bandits. There are armed people everywhere in the bush. We have to take byways to get around them. We know that it’s dangerous. But for us, the most dangerous thing is not to be able to feed your family! That’s the biggest danger!”

      We entered one of the so-called ghettos outside Agadez, where candidates for the trip to Europe through Libya hide out, until smugglers pick them up. We are led to a house where a group of young people are waiting for their trip to be organized by their smuggler.

      They have all have already tried to cross the desert, but were abandoned by their drivers, fleeing army patrols, and were saved in the nick of time. Several of their fellow travelers died of thirst and exhaustion.

      Mohamed Balde is an asylum seeker from Guinea.

      “The desert is a huge risk. There are many who have died, but people are not discouraged. Why are they coming? One should just ask the question!” he says. “All the time, there are meetings between West African leaders and the leaders of the European Union, to give out money, so that the migrants don’t get through. We say that’s a crime. It is their interests that they serve, not the interests of our continent. To stop immigration, they should invest in Africa, in companies, so that young people can work.”

      Drogba Sumaru is an asylum seeker from the Ivory Coast.

      “It’s no use giving money to people, or putting soldiers in the desert, or removing all the boats on the Mediterranean, to stop immigration! It won’t help, I will keep going on. There are thousands of young people in Africa, ready to go, always. Because there is nothing. There is nothing to keep them in their countries. When they think of the suffering of their families, when they think that they have no future. They will always be ready, ready for anything. They will always be ready to risk their lives,” he concludes.

      https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/26/niger-grapples-with-migration-and-its-porous-borders

    • Europe’s « Migrant Hunters »

      The checkpoint on the way out of the Saharan town of Agadez in Niger is nothing more than a long metal chain that stretches across the road. On a Monday afternoon in March, a handful of pickup trucks and lorries loaded with migrants mostly from southern Niger waited quietly at the barrier to embark on the long journey up through the Ténéré desert. An overweight officer inspected the vehicles and then invited the drivers to show him their paperwork inside a somber-looking shack on the side of the road, where money most likely changed hands.

      Every Monday afternoon a convoy, protected by an escort of three military pickups, two mounted with machine guns, begins its arduous journey toward Dirkou, 435 miles away, on the road to the Libyan border. Protection has long been needed against highwaymen—or, as they’re called locally, coupeurs de route. These disgruntled Tuareg youths and former rebels roam the foothills of the Aïr Mountains just beyond Agadez. If a vehicle slips out of view of the escort for even a moment, the coupeurs seize the opportunity, chasing and shooting at the overloaded vehicles to relieve the passengers of their money and phones—or sometimes even to take the cars. A cautious driver sticks close behind the soldiers, even if they are pitifully slow, stopping frequently to sleep, eat, drink tea, or extract bribes from drivers trying to avoid the checkpoints.

      The first 60 miles out of Agadez—a journey of about two hours through the mountains—were the most hazardous. But then we reached the dusty Ténéré plain. As darkness fell, lighter vehicles picked up speed, making good headway during the night as the cold hardened the sand. Sleepy migrants, legs dangling over the side of the tailboard, held on to branches attached to the frame of the vehicle to keep from falling off.

      The following day, there was a stop at Puits Espoir (“Hope’s Well”), midway between Agadez and Dirkou. It was dug 15 years ago to keep those whose transport had broken down in the desert from dying of thirst. But the well’s Arabic name, Bir Tawil, which means “the Deep Well,” is perhaps more apt. The well drops nearly 200 feet, and without a long enough rope to reach the water below, migrants and drivers can perish at its edge. The escort soldiers told me that the bodies of 11 who died in this way are buried in the sand inside a nearby enclosure built from car scraps. Travelers took a nap under its shade or beside the walls around the well, which were graffitied by those who had passed through. There was “Dec 2016 from Tanzania to Libya” or “Flavio—Solo from Guinea.” After Espoir, most vehicles abandon the slow convoy and go off on their own, risking attacks by coupeurs for a quicker journey toward Libya.

      PROXY BORDER GUARDS

      Before mid-2016, there were between 100 and 200 vehicles, mostly pickups, each filled with around 30 migrants heading for Libya, that were making such a journey every week. Since mid-2016, however, under pressure from the European Union, and with promises of financial support, the Niger government began cracking down on the northward flow of sub-Saharans, arresting drivers and confiscating cars, sometimes at the Agadez checkpoint itself. Now there are only a few cars transporting passengers, most of them Nigeriens who have managed to convince soldiers at the checkpoint—often with the help of a bribe—that they do not intend to go all the way to Europe but will end their journey in Libya.

      “To close Libya’s southern border is to close Europe’s southern border,” Marco Minniti, Italy’s interior minister, said in April at a meeting in Rome with representatives of three cross-border Saharan tribes, the Tubu, Awlad Suleiman Arabs, and Tuareg. The leaders agreed to form a border force to stop migrants entering Libya from traveling to Europe, reportedly at the demand of, and under the prospect of money from, the Italian government. All three communities are interested in resolving the deadly conflicts that have beset the country since the fall of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 and hope Italy will compensate them monetarily for their casualties (in tribal conflicts, a payment is needed to end a fight) as well as fund reconstruction and development of neglected southern Libya. Italy, of course, is keen on halting the flow of migrants reaching its shores and sees these Saharan groups, which have the potential to intervene before migrants even get to Libya, as plausible proxies.

      Some tribal leaders in southern Libya—mostly Tubu and Tuareg—look favorably on Italy’s and Europe’s overtures and suggested that the EU should cooperate directly with local militias to secure the border. But their tribes largely benefit from smuggling migrants, and they also made clear this business will not stop unless development aid and compensation for the smugglers is provided. “The EU wants to use us against migrants and terrorism,” a Tubu militia leader told me, off-the-record, on the side of a meeting in the European Parliament last year. “But we have our own problems. What alternative can we propose to our youth, who live off trafficking?”

      With or without the EU, some of the newly armed groups in Libya are selling themselves as migrant hunters. “We arrested more than 18,000 migrants,” a militia chief told me, with a hauteur that reminded me of the anti-immigrant sentiment spreading across Europe. “We don’t want just to please the EU, we protect our youths and our territory!”

      It seems rather reckless, however, in a largely stateless stretch of the Sahara, for Europe to empower militias as proxy border guards, some of whom are the very smugglers whose operations the EU is trying to thwart. The precedent in Sudan is not encouraging. Last year, Khartoum received funding from the EU that was intended to help it restrict outward migration. The best the government could do was redeploy at the Sudanese-Libyan border the notorious Rapid Support Forces, recruited among Darfur’s Janjaweed militias, which have wreaked havoc in the province since 2003. In due course, their leader, Brigadier General Dagalo, also known as “Hemeti,” claimed to have arrested 20,000 migrants and then threatened to reopen the border if the EU did not pay an additional sum. The EU had already given Sudan and Niger 140 million euros each in 2016. And the Libyan rival factions are catching on, understanding well that the migrant crisis gives them a chance to blackmail European leaders worried about the success of far-right anti-immigrant groups in their elections. In February, with elections looming in the Netherlands and France, the EU made a deal to keep migrants in Libya, on the model of its March 2016 agreement with Turkey, with the Tripoli-based, internationally recognized Government of National Accord, despite the fact it has little control over the country. In August, the GNA’s main rival, eastern Libya’s strongman Khalifa Haftar, claimed that blocking migrants at Libya’s southern borders would cost one billion euros a year over 20 years and asked France, his closest ally in Europe, to provide him with military equipment such as helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, and night vision goggles. Needless to say, Haftar did not get the equipment.

      THE HUB

      Dirkou became a migrant hub about 25 years ago and remains a thriving market town whose residents make a living mostly off of road transport to and from Libya. Smuggling people across Libya’s southern borders became semiofficial practice in 1992, as Qaddafi sought to circumvent the UN’s air traffic embargo. This, in turn, opened up an opportunity for ambitious facilitators who could get their hands on a vehicle, a period that came to be known locally as “the Marlboro era.” Planes and trucks, contravening the embargo, delivered cigarettes to Dirkou, where there was already an airstrip long enough for cargo planes. They then sold their contraband to Libyan smugglers, who took them north with help from Nigerien authorities.

      Smuggling was possible at the time only if the government was involved, explained Bakri, one of the drivers I met in Dirkou (and who requested his name be changed). Gradually, cigarettes were replaced by Moroccan cannabis, which was driven down from around the Algerian border through Mali and Niger. Tuareg rebels, who had been involved in sporadic insurgencies against the governments of Mali and Niger, began to attack the convoys to steal their cargoes for reselling. The traffickers eventually enlisted them to serve as their protectors, guides, or drivers.

      That process began in the 1990s and 2000s when the Niger government and Tuareg rebels held regular peace talks and struck deals that allowed former insurgents to be integrated into the Niger armed forces. Hundreds of fighters who were left to fend for themselves, however, fell back on banditry or drug trafficking, and it wasn’t long before the authorities decided that they should be encouraged to transport migrants to Libya instead. Many now own vehicles that had been captured from the army in the course of the rebellion. These were cleared through customs at half the normal fee, and the Ministry of Transport awarded a great number of them licenses. It was decided that the new fleet of migrant facilitators would take passengers at the bus station in Agadez.

      In 2011, after the NATO-backed revolution in Libya had toppled Qaddafi, newly formed Tubu militias took control of most of the country’s arms stockpiles, as well as its southern borderlands. Many young Tubu men from Libya or Niger stole or, like Bakri, who dropped out of the university to become a smuggler, bought a good pickup truck for carrying passengers. The new wave of drivers who acquired their cars during the turmoil were known in Arabic as sawag NATO, or “NATO drivers.”

      “If the number of migrants increased,” Bakri told me, “it’s mostly because NATO overthrew Qaddafi.” Qaddafi was able to regulate the flow of migrants into Europe and used it as a bargaining chip. In 2008, he signed a friendship treaty with Italy, which was then led by Silvio Berlusconi. In exchange for Libya’s help to block the migrants, “Il Cavaliere” launched the construction of a $5 billion highway in Libya. Crucially, however, Qaddafi’s regime provided paid work for hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharans, who had no need to cross the Mediterranean. Since 2011, Libya has become a much more dangerous place, especially for migrants. They are held and often tortured by smugglers on the pretext that they owe money and used for slave labor and prostitution until their families can pay off the debt.

      In May 2015, under EU pressure, Niger adopted a law that made assistance to any foreigner illegal on the grounds that it constituted migrant trafficking. Critics noted that the legislation contradicts Niger’s membership in the visa-free ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), from which most migrants traveling between Niger and Libya hail (they numbered 400,000 in 2016). The law was not enforced until the middle of last year, when the police began arresting drivers and “coaxers”—the regional term for all intermediaries on the human-smuggling routes up through West Africa. They jailed about 100 of them and confiscated another 100 vehicles. Three months later, the EU congratulated itself for a spectacular drop in migrant flows from Niger to Libya. But the announcement was based on International Organization for Migration (IOM) data, which the UN agency has since acknowledged to be incorrect, owing to a “technical problem” with its database.

      Saddiq, whose name has also been changed, is a coaxer in Agadez. He told me that migrants were still arriving in the town in the hope of heading north. “The police are from southern Niger and they are not familiar with the desert,” he said. “For every car arrested, 20 get through.” The cars have gotten faster. One of Saddiq’s drivers traded his old one for a Toyota Tundra, which can reach 120 miles per hour on hard sand. Meanwhile, groups of migrants have gotten smaller and are thus lighter loads. New “roads” have already been pounded out through the desert. Drivers pick up migrants as far south as the Nigerien-Nigerian border, keeping clear of towns and checkpoints. “Tubu drivers have been going up with GPS to open new roads along the Niger-Algeria border,” said Saddiq. “They meet the drug traffickers and exchange food and advice.”

      On these new roads, risks are higher for drivers and passengers. Vehicles get lost, break down, and run out of fuel. Thirst is a constant danger, and, as drivers and the IOM warned, deaths increased during the 2017 dry season, which began in May. Drivers pursued by patrols are likely to aim for a high-speed getaway, which means abandoning their passengers in the desert. “Because we couldn’t take the main road, bandits attacked us,” Aji, a Gambian migrant, told me as he recounted his failed attempt to get to Libya last December. “Only 30 kilometers from Agadez, bandits shot at us, killed two drivers and injured 17 passengers, including myself.” They took everything he owned. He was brought back to the hospital in Agadez for treatment for his wounded leg. He was broke and his spirits were low. “I no longer want to go to Libya,” he said.

      New liabilities for the smugglers drive up their prices: the fare for a ride from Agadez to Libya before the Niger government decided to curtail the northward flow was around $250. Now it is $500 or more. People with enough money travel in small, elite groups of three to five for up to $1,700 per head. Migrants without enough cash can travel on credit, but they risk falling into debt bondage once in Libya. Even with the higher fees, smugglers’ revenues have not increased. Saddiq’s has fallen from $5,000 a month to around $2,000. Costs, including lavish bribes to Niger’s security forces, have risen sharply. Still, the pace of the trade remains brisk. “I have a brand-new vehicle ready for 22 passengers,” Saddiq told me. That evening, as he loaded up his passengers with their light luggage and jerry cans of water, a motorbike went ahead of it with its headlights off to make sure that the coast was clear.

      “Many won’t give up this work, but those who continue are stuntmen,” grumbled one of Saddiq’s colleagues, a Tuareg former rebel who has been driving migrants for more than 15 years. Feeling chased by the authorities, or forced to pay them bribes twice as much as before, Tuareg and Tubu drivers are increasingly angry with the Nigerien government and what they call “the diktat of Europe.” He thought there might be better money in other activities. “What should we do? Become terrorists?” he said, somewhat provocatively. “I should go up to Libya and enlist with Daesh [the Islamic State, or ISIS]. They’re the ones who offer the best pay.”

      https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/niger/2017-08-31/europes-migrant-hunters
      #Agadez #réfugiés #Niger #désert_du_Ténéré #passeurs #smugglers #smuggling #Dirkou #routes_migratoires #parcours_migratoires

    • Sfidare la morte per fuggire dal Niger

      In Niger i militari inseguono i migranti. Ordini dall’alto: quello che vuole l’Europa. Che per questo li paga. I profughi cercano così altri percorsi. Passano per il deserto, per piste più pericolose. Con il rischio di morire disidratati

      http://espresso.repubblica.it/polopoly_fs/1.308980!/httpImage/image.JPG_gen/derivatives/gallery_990/image.JPG
      http://espresso.repubblica.it/polopoly_fs/1.308979!/httpImage/image.JPG_gen/derivatives/gallery_990/image.JPG


      #photographie

    • A line in the sand

      In late 2016, Agadez made headlines when Niger became one of the European Union (EU)’s prime partners in the fight against irregular migration. The arrest of human smugglers and the confiscation of their 4x4 trucks resulted in a decrease in the number of migrants travelling through the region.

      Given Agadez’s economic dependence on the migration industry, Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit investigated the costs of these measures for the local population, their authorities and regional security. We invite you to work with our data and explore our findings.


      https://www.clingendael.org/sustainable_migration_management_Agadez
      #économie #économie_locale

    • Quel lunedì che ha cambiato la migrazione in Niger

      Nella prima storia della sua trilogia sul Niger per Open Migration, Giacomo Zandonini ci raccontava com’è cambiata la vita di un ex passeur di migranti dopo l’applicazione delle misure restrittive da parte del governo. In questa seconda storia, sfida i pericoli del Sahara insieme ai migranti e racconta come la chiusura della rotta di Agadez abbia spinto la locale economia al dettaglio verso le mani di un sistema mafioso.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/quel-lunedi-che-ha-cambiato-la-migrazione-in-niger
      #fermeture_des_frontières #mafia

      En anglais:
      http://openmigration.org/en/analyses/the-monday-that-changed-migration-in-niger

    • In Niger, Europe’s Empty Promises Hinder Efforts to Move Beyond Smuggling

      The story of one former desert driver and his struggle to escape the migration trade reveals the limits of an E.U. scheme to offer alternatives to the Sahara smugglers. Giacomo Zandonini reports from Agadez.


      https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/01/03/europes-empty-promises-hinder-efforts-to-move-beyond-smuggling
      #reconversion

    • Agadez, aux portes du Sahara

      Dans la foulée de la ’crise des migrants’ de 2015, l’Union Européenne a signé une série d’accords avec des pays tiers. Parmi ceux-ci, un deal avec le Niger qui provoque des morts anonymes par centaines dans le désert du Sahara. Médecins du Monde est présente à Agadez pour soigner les migrants. Récit.

      https://spark.adobe.com/page/47HkbWVoG4nif

    • « A Agadez, on est passé de 350 migrants par jour à 100 par semaine »

      Journée spéciale sur RFI ce 23 mai. La radio mondiale propose des reportages et des interviews sur Agadez, la grande ville-carrefour du Nord-Niger, qui tente de tourner le dos à l’émigration clandestine. Notre reporter, Bineta Diagne essaie notamment de savoir si les quelque 5 000 à 6 000 passeurs, transporteurs et rabatteurs, qui vivent du trafic des migrants, sont en mesure de se reconvertir. Au Niger, Mohamed Bazoum est ministre d’Etat, ministre de l’Intérieur et de la Sécurité publique. En ligne de Niamey, il répond aux questions de Christophe Boisbouvier.

      http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20180523-agadez-on-est-passe-350-migrants-jour-100-semaine

      Des contacts sur place ont confirmé à Karine Gatelier (Modus Operandi, association grenobloise) et moi-même que les arrivées à Agadez baissent.
      La question reste :

      Les itinéraires changent : vers où ?

    • Niger: la difficile #reconversion d’Agadez

      Le Niger est un pays de transit et de départ de l’émigration irrégulière vers l’Europe. Depuis fin 2016, les autorités tentent de lutter contre ce phénomène. Les efforts des autorités se concentrent autour de la ville d’Agadez, dans le centre du pays. Située aux portes du désert du Ténéré et classée patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco, Agadez a, pendant plusieurs années, attiré énormément de touristes amoureux du désert. Mais l’insécurité a changé la donne de cette région, qui s’est progressivement développée autour d’une économie parallèle reposant sur la migration. Aujourd’hui encore, les habitants cherchent de nouveaux débouchés.

      http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180523-niger-difficile-reconversion-agadez
      #tourisme

    • Au #Sahara, voyager devient un crime

      La France s’est émue lorsque Mamadou Gassama, un Malien de 22 ans, sans papiers, a sauvé un enfant de 4 ans d’une (probable) chute fatale à Paris. Une figure de « migrant extraordinaire » comme les médias savent régulièrement en créer, mais une figure qui ne devrait pas faire oublier tous les autres, « les statistiques, les sans-nom, les numéros. » Ni tous celles et ceux qui n’ont aucune intention de venir en Europe, mais qui sont néanmoins victimes des nouvelles politiques migratoires européennes et africaines mises en œuvre à l’abri des regards, à l’intérieur même du continent africain.

      Les migrations vers et à travers le Sahara ne constituent certes pas un phénomène nouveau. Mais à partir du début des années 2000, la focalisation des médias et des pouvoirs publics sur la seule minorité d’individus qui, après avoir traversé le Sahara, traversent également la Méditerranée, a favorisé l’assimilation de l’ensemble de ces circulations intra-africaines à des migrations économiques à destination de l’Europe.

      Ce point de vue, qui repose sur des représentations partielles et partiales des faits, éloignées des réalités de terrain observées par les chercheurs, sert depuis lors de base de légitimation à la mise en œuvre de politiques migratoires restrictives en Afrique.

      Le Sahara, zone de contrôle

      L’Europe (Union européenne et certains États), des organisations internationales (notamment l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM)) et des structures ad hoc (#Frontex, #EUCAP_Sahel_Niger), avec la coopération plus ou moins volontariste des autorités nationales des pays concernés, participent ainsi au durcissement législatif mis en place dans les pays du Maghreb au cours des années 2000, puis en Afrique de l’Ouest la décennie suivante, ainsi qu’au renforcement de la surveillance et du contrôle des espaces désertiques et des populations mobiles.

      Le Sahara est ainsi transformé en une vaste « #zone-frontière » où les migrants peuvent partout et en permanence être contrôlés, catégorisés, triés, incités à faire demi-tour voire être arrêtés.

      Cette nouvelle manière de « gérer » les #circulations_migratoires dans la région pose de nombreux problèmes, y compris juridiques. Ainsi, les ressortissants des États membres de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (#CEDEAO), qui ont officiellement le droit de circuler librement au sein de l’#espace_communautaire, se font régulièrement arrêter lorsqu’ils se dirigent vers les frontières septentrionales du #Mali ou du #Niger.

      Le Niger, nouveau garde-frontière de l’Europe

      Dans ce pays, les migrations internationales n’étaient jusqu’à récemment pas considérées comme un problème à résoudre et ne faisaient pas l’objet d’une politique spécifique.

      Ces dernières années, tandis que le directeur général de l’OIM affirmait – sans chiffre à l’appui – qu’il y a dorénavant autant de décès de migrants au Sahara qu’en Méditerranée, l’UE continuait de mettre le gouvernement nigérien sous pression pour en finir avec « le modèle économique des passeurs ».

      Si des projets et programmes sont, depuis des années, mis en œuvre dans le pays pour y parvenir, les moyens financiers et matériels dédiés ont récemment été décuplés, à l’instar de l’ensemble des moyens destinés à lutter contre les migrations irrégulières supposées être à destination de l’Europe.

      Ainsi, le budget annuel de l’OIM a été multiplié par 7,5 en 20 ans (passant de 240 millions d’euros en 1998 à 1,8 milliard d’euros en 2018), celui de Frontex par 45 en 12 ans (passant de 6 millions d’euros en 2005 à 281 millions d’euros en 2017), celui d’EUCAP Sahel Niger par 2,5 en 5 ans (passant de moins de 10 millions d’euros en 2012 à 26 millions d’euros en 2017), tandis que depuis 2015 le Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique a été lancé par l’UE avec un budget de 2,5 milliards d’euros destinés à lutter contre les « causes profondes de la migration irrégulière » sur le continent, et notamment au Sahel.

      Ceci est particulièrement visible dans la région d’Agadez, dans le nord du pays, qui est plus que jamais considérée par les experts européens comme « le lieu où passe la plupart des flux de [migrants irréguliers] qui vont en Libye puis en Europe par la route de la Méditerranée centrale ».

      La migration criminalisée

      La mission européenne EUCAP Sahel Niger, lancée en 2012 et qui a ouvert une antenne permanente à Agadez en 2017, apparaît comme un des outils clés de la politique migratoire et sécuritaire européenne dans ce pays. Cette mission vise à « assister les autorités nigériennes locales et nationales, ainsi que les forces de sécurité, dans le développement de politiques, de techniques et de procédures permettant d’améliorer le contrôle et la lutte contre les migrations irrégulières », et d’articuler cela avec la « lutte anti-terroriste » et contre « les activités criminelles associées ».

      Outre cette imbrication officialisée des préoccupations migratoires et sécuritaires, EUCAP Sahel Niger et le nouveau Cadre de partenariat pour les migrations, mis en place par l’UE en juin 2016 en collaboration avec le gouvernement nigérien, visent directement à mettre en application la loi nigérienne n°2015-36 de mai 2015 sur le trafic de migrants, elle-même faite sur mesure pour s’accorder aux attentes européennes en la matière.

      Cette loi, qui vise à « prévenir et combattre le trafic illicite de migrants » dans le pays, définit comme trafiquant de migrants « toute personne qui, intentionnellement et pour en tirer, directement ou indirectement, un avantage financier ou un autre avantage matériel, assure l’entrée ou la sortie illégale au Niger » d’un ressortissant étranger.
      Jusqu’à 45 000 euros d’amende et 30 ans de prison

      Dans la région d’#Agadez frontalière de la Libye et de l’Algérie, les gens qui organisent les transports des passagers, tels les chauffeurs-guides en possession de véhicules pick-up tout-terrain leur permettant de transporter une trentaine de voyageurs, sont dorénavant accusés de participer à un « trafic illicite de migrants », et peuvent être arrêtés et condamnés.

      Transporter ou même simplement loger, dans le nord du Niger, des ressortissants étrangers (en situation irrégulière ou non) fait ainsi encourir des amendes allant jusqu’à 30 millions de francs CFA (45 000 euros) et des peines pouvant s’élever à 30 ans de prison.

      Et, cerise sur le gâteau de la répression aveugle, il est précisé que « la tentative des infractions prévue par la présente loi est punie des mêmes peines. » Nul besoin donc de franchir irrégulièrement une frontière internationale pour être incriminé.

      Résultat, à plusieurs centaines de kilomètres des frontières, des transporteurs, « passeurs » avérés ou supposés, requalifiés en « trafiquants », jugés sur leurs intentions et non leurs actes, peuvent dorénavant être arrêtés. Pour les autorités nationales, comme pour leurs homologues européens, il s’agit ainsi d’organiser le plus efficacement possible une lutte préventive contre « l’émigration irrégulière » à destination de l’Europe.

      Cette aberration juridique permet d’arrêter et de condamner des individus dans leur propre pays sur la seule base d’intentions supposées : c’est-à-dire sans qu’aucune infraction n’ait été commise, sur la simple supposition de l’intention d’entrer illégalement dans un autre pays.

      Cette mesure a été prise au mépris de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (article 12.2) et de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (article 13.2), qui stipulent que « toute personne a le droit de quitter tout pays, y compris le sien ».

      Au mépris également du principe de présomption d’innocence, fondateur de tous les grands systèmes légaux. En somme, une suspension du droit et de la morale qui reflète toute la violence inique des logiques de lutte contre les migrations africaines supposées être à destination de l’Europe.
      Des « passeurs » sans « passages »

      La présomption de culpabilité a ainsi permis de nombreuses arrestations suivies de peines d’emprisonnement, particulièrement dans la région d’Agadez, perçue comme une région de transit pour celles et ceux qui souhaitent se rendre en Europe, tandis que les migrations vers le Sud ne font l’objet d’aucun contrôle de ce type.

      La loi de 2015 permet en effet aux forces de l’ordre et de sécurité du Niger d’arrêter des chauffeurs nigériens à l’intérieur même de leur pays, y compris lorsque leurs passagers sont en situation régulière au Niger. Cette loi a permis de créer juridiquement la catégorie de « passeur » sans qu’il y ait nécessairement passage de frontière.

      La question des migrations vers et à travers le Sahara semble ainsi dorénavant traitée par le gouvernement nigérien, et par ses partenaires internationaux, à travers des dispositifs dérivés du droit de la guerre, et particulièrement de la « guerre contre le terrorisme » et de l’institutionnalisation de lois d’exception qui va avec.

      Malgré cela, si le Niger est peu à peu devenu un pays cobaye des politiques antimigrations de l’Union européenne, nul doute pour autant qu’aucune police n’est en mesure d’empêcher totalement les gens de circuler, si ce n’est localement et temporairement – certainement pas dans la durée et à l’échelle du Sahara.

      Adapter le voyage

      Migrants et transporteurs s’adaptent et contournent désormais les principales villes et leurs #check-points, entraînant une hausse des tarifs de transport entre le Niger et l’Afrique du Nord. Ces #tarifs, qui ont toujours fortement varié selon les véhicules, les destinations et les périodes, sont passés d’environ 100 000 francs CFA (150 euros) en moyenne par personne vers 2010, à plusieurs centaines de milliers de francs CFA en 2017 (parfois plus de 500 euros). Les voyages à travers le Sahara sont ainsi plus onéreux et plus discrets, mais aussi plus difficiles et plus risqués qu’auparavant, car en prenant des routes inhabituelles, moins fréquentées, les transporteurs ne minimisent pas seulement les risques de se faire arrêter, mais aussi ceux de se faire secourir en cas de pannes ou d’attaques par des bandits.

      Comme le montre l’article Manufacturing Smugglers : From Irregular to Clandestine Mobility in the Sahara, cette « clandestinisation » (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002716217744529) généralisée du transport de migrants s’accompagne d’une diminution, voire d’une disparition, du contrôle social jusque-là exercé sur les différents acteurs, entre eux, mais aussi par leurs proches ou par les agents de l’État qui ponctionnaient illégalement leurs activités.

      Il était en effet aisé, jusqu’à récemment, de savoir qui était parti d’où, quel jour, avec combien de passagers, et de savoir si tous étaient arrivés à bon port. Ce qui incitait chacun à rester dans les limites morales de l’acceptable. Ces dernières années, entre les risques pris volontairement par les transporteurs et les migrants, et les abandons de passagers dans le désert, il ne serait pas étonnant que le nombre de morts sur les pistes sahariennes ait augmenté.
      Une vraie fausse réduction des flux

      Récemment, l’OIM a pu clamer une diminution des volumes des flux migratoires passant par le Niger, et des représentants de l’UE et de gouvernements sur les deux continents ont pu se féliciter de l’efficacité des mesures mises en œuvre, clamant unanimement la nécessité de poursuivre leur effort.

      Mais de l’accord même des agents de l’#OIM, seul organisme à produire des chiffres en la matière au Sahara, il ne s’agit en fait que d’une diminution du nombre de personnes passant par ses points de contrôle, ce qui ne nous dit finalement rien sur le volume global des flux à travers le pays. Or, malgré toutes les mesures sécuritaires mises en place, la toute petite partie de la population qui a décidé de voyager ainsi va sans doute continuer à le faire, quel qu’en soit le risque.

      https://theconversation.com/au-sahara-voyager-devient-un-crime-96825
      #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #mobilité #libre_circulation #frontières #externalisation #fermeture_des_frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #IOM #contrôles_frontaliers #déstructuration #passeurs #smugglers

    • Déclaration de fin de mission du Rapporteur Spécial des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme des migrants, Felipe González Morales, lors de sa visite au Niger (1-8 octobre, 2018)

      L’externalisation de la gestion de la migration du Niger par le biais de l’OIM

      En raison de ses capacités limitées, le gouvernement du Niger s’appuie depuis 2014 largement sur l’OIM pour répondre à la situation des personnes migrantes expulsées de l’Algérie ou forcées de revenir de pays voisins tels que la Libye et le Mali. À leur arrivée dans l’un des six centres de transit de l’OIM, et sous réserve qu’ils s’engagent à leur retour, l’OIM leur offre un abri, de la nourriture, une assistance médicale et psychosociale, des documents de voyage/d’identité et le transport vers leur pays d’origine. Depuis 2015, 11 936 migrants ont été rapatriés dans leur pays d’origine dans le cadre du programme d’AVR de l’OIM, la plupart en Guinée Conakry, au Mali et au Cameroun.

      Au cours de ma visite, j’ai eu l’occasion de m’entretenir avec de nombreux hommes, femmes et enfants vivant dans les centres de transit de l’OIM à Agadez et à Niamey, inscrits au programme d’AVR. Certains d’entre eux ont indiqué qu’ils ne pouvaient plus supporter les violations des droits de l’homme (ayant été victimes de discrimination raciale, d’arrestations arbitraires, de torture, d’expulsion collective, d’exploitation sexuelle et par le travail pendant leur migration) et de la situation difficile dans les centres de transit et souhaitaient retourner dans leur pays d’origine. D’autres ont indiqué qu’ils s’étaient inscrits au programme d’AVR parce que c’était la seule assistance qui leur était offerte, et beaucoup d’entre eux m’ont dit que dès leur retour dans leur pays d’origine, ils essaieraient de migrer à nouveau.

      En effet, quand le programme d’AVR est la seule option disponible pour ceux qui ont été expulsés ou forcés de rentrer, et qu’aucune autre alternative réelle n’est proposée à ceux qui ne veulent pas s’y inscrire, y compris ceux qui se trouvent dans une situation vulnérable et qui ont été victimes de multiples violations des droits de l’homme, des questions se posent quant à la véritable nature volontaire de ces retours si l’on considère l’ensemble du parcours qu’ils ont effectué. De plus, l’inscription à un programme d’AVR ne peut pas prévaloir sur le fait que la plupart de ces migrants sont à l’origine victimes d’expulsions illégales, en violation des principes fondamentaux du droit international.

      L’absence d’évaluations individuelles efficaces et fondées sur les droits de l’homme menées auprès des migrants rapatriés, faites dans le respect du principe fondamental de non-refoulement et des garanties d’une procédure régulière, est un autre sujet de préoccupation. Un grand nombre de personnes migrantes inscrites au programme d’AVR sont victimes de multiples violations des droits de l’homme (par exemple, subies au cours de leur migration et dans les pays de transit) et ont besoin d’une protection fondée sur le droit international. Cependant, très peu de personnes sont orientées vers une demande d’asile/procédure de détermination du statut de réfugié, et les autres sont traitées en vue de leur retour. L’objectif ultime des programmes d’AVR, à savoir le retour des migrants, ne peut pas prévaloir sur les considérations en lien avec les droits de l’homme pour chaque cas. Cela soulève également des préoccupations en termes de responsabilité, d’accès à la justice et de recours pour les migrants victimes de violations des droits de l’homme.

      Rôle des bailleurs de fonds internationaux et en particulier de l’UE

      Bien que les principaux responsables gouvernementaux ont souligné que l’objectif de réduction des migrations vers le nord était principalement une décision de politique nationale, il est nécessaire de souligner le rôle et la responsabilité de la communauté internationale et des bailleurs de fond à cet égard. En effet, plusieurs sources ont déclaré que la politique nigérienne en matière de migration est fortement influencée et principalement conduite selon les demandes de l’Union européenne et de ses États membres en matière de contrôle de la migration en échange d’un soutien financier. Par exemple, le fait que le Fonds fiduciaire de l’Union européenne apporte un soutien financier à l’OIM en grande partie pour sensibiliser et renvoyer les migrants dans leur pays d’origine, même lorsque le caractère volontaire est souvent discutable, compromet son approche fondée sur les droits dans la coopération pour le développement. De plus, d’après mes échanges avec l’Union européenne, aucun soutien n’est prévu pour les migrants qui ne sont ni des réfugiés ni pour ceux qui n’ont pas accepté d’être renvoyés volontairement dans leur pays d’origine. En outre, le rôle et le soutien de l’UE dans l’adoption et la mise en œuvre de la loi sur le trafic illicite de migrants remettent en question son principe de « ne pas nuire » compte tenu des préoccupations en matière de droits de l’homme liées à la mise en œuvre et exécution de la loi.

      https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23698&LangID=F
      #droits_humains #droits_de_l'homme_des_migrants #Niger #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    • African migration ’a trickle’ thanks to trafficking ban across the Sahara

      The number of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean for Europe has been dropping and that is partly because of tougher measures introduced on the migrant routes, as Mike Thomson reports from Niger.

      In a small dusty courtyard near the centre of Agadez, a town on the fringes of the Sahara desert, Bachir Amma, eats lunch with his family.

      A line of plastic chairs, clinging to the shadow of the mud walls, are the only visible furniture.

      Mr Amma, a former people smuggler, dressed in a faded blue denim shirt and jeans, has clearly known better days.

      "I stopped trafficking migrants to the Libyan border when the new law came in.

      "It’s very, very strict. If you’re caught you get a long time in jail and they confiscate your vehicle.

      “If the law was eased I would go back to people trafficking, that’s for sure. It earned me as much as $6,000 (£4,700) a week, far more money than anything I can do now.”
      Traffickers jailed

      The law Mr Amma mentioned, which banned the transport of migrants through northern Niger, was brought in by the government in 2015 following pressure from European countries.

      Before then such work was entirely legal, as Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) that permits the free movement of people.

      Police even provided armed escorts for the convoys involved. But since the law was passed many traffickers have been jailed and hundreds of their vehicles confiscated.

      Before 2015, the Agadez region was home to more than 6,000 people traffickers like Mr Amma, according to figures from the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) .

      Collectively they transported around 340,000 Europe-bound migrants through the Sahara desert to Libya.
      Migration in reverse

      Since the clampdown this torrent has become a relative trickle.

      In fact, more African migrants, who have ended up in Niger and experienced or heard of the terrible dangers and difficulties of getting to Europe, have decided to return home.

      This year alone 16,000 have decided to accept offers from the IOM to fly them back.

      A large and boisterous IOM-run transit centre in Agadez is home to hundreds of weary, homesick migrants.

      In one large hut around 20 young men, from a variety of West African countries, attend a class on how to set up a small business when they get home.

      Among them is 27-year-old Umar Sankoh from Sierra Leone, who was dumped in the Sahara by a trafficker when he was unable to pay him more money.

      “The struggle is so hard in the desert, so difficult to find your way. You don’t have food, you don’t have nothing, even water you can’t drink. It’s so terrible,” he said.

      Now, Mr Sankoh has given up his dreams of a better life in Europe and only has one thought in mind: "I want to go home.

      "My family will be happy because it’s been a long time so they must believe I am dead.

      “If they see me now they’ll think, ’Oh my God, God is working!’”
      Coast guards intercept vessels

      Many thousands of migrants who make it to Libya are sold on by their traffickers to kidnappers who try and get thousands of dollars from their families back home.

      Those who cannot pay are often tortured, sometimes while being forced to ask relatives for money over the phone, and held in atrocious conditions for months.

      With much of the country in the grip of civil war, such gangs can operate there with impunity.

      In an effort to curb the number of migrants making for southern Europe by boat, thousands of whom have drowned on the way, coast guards trained by the European Union (EU) try and stop or intercept often flimsy vessels.

      Those on board are then taken to detention centres, where they are exposed to squalid, hugely overcrowded conditions and sometimes beatings and forced hard labour.
      Legal resettlement offers

      In November 2017, the EU funded a special programme to evacuate the most vulnerable refugees in centres like these.

      Under this scheme, which is run by the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR), a little more than 2,200 people have since been flown to the comparative safety of neighbouring Niger.

      There, in a compound in the capital, Niamey, they wait for the chance to be resettled in a European country, including the UK, as well as Canada and the US.

      So far just under 1,000 have been resettled and 264 accepted for resettlement.

      The rest await news of their fate.

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46802548
      #cartographie

      Commentaire de Alizée Daouchy via la mailing-list Migreurop:

      Rien de très nouveau dans cet article, il traite des routes migratoires dans le Sahara mais ne s’intéresse qu’au cas d’Agadez.
      L’auteur qualifie les « flux » dans le Sahara de « migration in reverse ». Alors qu’avant l’adoption de la loi contre le trafic de migrants (2015), 340 000 personnes traversaient le désert du Sahara vers la Libye (sans préciser pour quelle(s) année(s)), en 2018, 16 000 personnes ont été ’retournées’ dans leur pays d’origine par l’#OIM.

      Pour autant, des ’trafiquants’ continuent leurs activités en empruntant des routes plus dangereuses pour éviter les forces de l’ordre. A ce sujet la représentante de l’UNHCR au Niger rappelle que : la communauté internationale ("we, the international Community, the UNHCR") considère que pour chaque mort en Méditerranée, il y en aurait au moins deux dans le désert". Mais toujours pas de sources concernant ces chiffres.

      #migrations_inversées #migrations_inverses

    • After crackdown, what do people employed in migration market do?

      Thousands in Niger were employed as middlemen until the government, aided by the EU, targeted undocumented migration.

      A group of women are squeezed into a modest room, ready to take their class in a popular district of Agadez, the largest city in central Niger.

      A blackboard hangs on the wall and Mahaman Alkassoum, chalk in hand, is ready to begin.

      A former people smuggler, he is an unusual professor.

      His round face and shy expression clash with the image of the ruthless trafficker.

      “We’re here to help you organise your savings, so that your activities will become profitable,” Alkassoum tells the women, before drawing a timeline to illustrate the different stages of starting a business.

      Until mid-2016, both he and the women in the room were employed in Agadez’s huge migration market, which offered economic opportunities for thousands of people in an immense desert region, bordering with Algeria, Libya and Chad.

      Alkassoum used to pack his pick-up truck with up to 25 migrants at once, driving them across the Sahara from Agadez to the southern Libyan city of Sebha, earning up to 1,500 euros ($1,706) a month - five times the salary of a local policeman.

      All of us suffered with the end of migration in Agadez. We’re toasting peanuts every day and thinking of new ways to earn something.

      Habi Amaloze, former cook for migrants

      The women, his current students, were employed as cooks in the ghettos and yards where migrants were hosted during their stay in town.

      At times, they fed 100 people a day and earned about 200 euros ($227) a month.

      For decades, the passage of western African migrants heading to Libya, and eventually to Italian shores, happened in daylight, in full view - and in most cases with the complicity of Niger security forces.

      According to a 2016 study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migrants in transit had injected about 100 million euros ($113.8m) into the local economy,

      But the “golden age” of migration through Agadez ended abruptly in the summer of 2016 when the government of Niger launched a crackdown on people smuggling.

      More than 300 drivers, middlemen and managers of ghettos, have been arrested since then, convincing other colleagues - like Alkassoum and his students - to abandon their activity.

      The driver’s new career as a community organiser began right after, when most locals involved in the smuggling business realised they had to somehow reinvent their lives.

      At first, a few hundred men, former drivers or managers of ghettos, decided to set up an informal association, with the idea of raising funds between members to launch small commercial activities.

      But the project didn’t really work, Alkassoum recounts. In early 2018, the leader of the group, a renowned smuggler, disappeared with some of the funds.

      Alkassoum, at the time the association’s secretary, got discouraged.

      That was the moment when their female colleagues showed up.

      Most of them were wives or sisters of smugglers, who were cooking for the migrants inside ghettos and, all of a sudden, had also seen their source of income disappear.

      Resorting to an old experience as a youth leader, Alkassoum decided to help them launch new businesses, through lessons on community participation and bookkeeping.

      As of mid-2018, more than 70 women had joined.

      “At first we met to share our common suffering after losing our jobs, but soon we realised we needed to do more,” says Fatoumata Adiguini at the end of the class.

      They decided to launch small businesses, dividing themselves into subgroups, each one developing a specific idea.

      Habi Amaloze, a thin Tuareg woman, heads one of the groups: 17 women that called themselves “banda badantchi” - meaning “no difference” in Hausa - to share their common situation.

      The banda badantchi started with the cheapest possible activity, shelling and toasting peanuts to sell on the streets.

      Other groups collected small sums to buy a sheep, chicks or a sewing machine.

      “We started with what we had, which was almost nothing, but we dream to be able one day to open up a restaurant or a small farming activity,” explains Amaloze.

      While most men left Agadez to find opportunities elsewhere, the women never stopped meeting and built relations of trust.

      Besides raising their children, they have another motivation: working with migrants has freed them from marital control, something they are not willing or ready to lose.

      According to Rhissa Feltou, the mayor of Agadez, the crackdown on northbound migration responded to European requests more than to local needs.

      Since 2015, the European Union earmarked 230 million euros ($261.7m) from its Emergency Trust Fund of Africa for projects in Niger, making it the main beneficiary of a fund created to “address the root causes of migration”.

      Among the projects, the creation of a police investigative unit, where French and Spanish policemen helped their Nigerien counterparts to track and arrest smugglers.

      Another project, known under its acronym Paiera, aimed at relieving the effect of the migration crackdown in Agadez, included a compensation scheme for smugglers who left their old job. The eight million-euro ($9.2m) fund was managed by the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a state office tasked with reducing conflicts in border areas.

      After endless negotiations between local authorities, EU representatives and a committee representing smugglers, a list of 6,550 smuggling actors operating in the region of Agadez, was finalised in 2017.

      But two years after the project’s launch, only 371 of them received small sums, about 2,300 euros ($2,616) per person, to start new activities.

      The High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace told Al Jazeera that an additional eight million-euro fund is available for a second phase of the project, to be launched in March 2019, allowing at least 600 more ex-smugglers to be funded.

      But Feltou, the city’s mayor, isn’t optimistic.

      “We waited too much and it’s still unclear when and how these new provisions will be delivered,” he explains.

      Finding viable job opportunities for thousands of drivers, managers of ghettos, middlemen, cooks or water can sellers, who lost their main source of income in a country the United Nations dubbed as the last in its human development index in 2018, is not an easy task.

      For the European Union, nonetheless, this cooperation has been a success. Northbound movements registered by the IOM along the main desert trail from Agadez to the Libyan border, dropped from 298,000 people a year in 2016 to about 50,000 in 2018.

      In a January 2019 report, the EU commission described such a cooperation with Niger as “constructive and fruitful”.

      Just like other women in her group, Habi Amaloze was disregarded by Brussels-funded programmes like Paiera.

      But the crackdown changed her life dramatically.

      Her brother, who helped her after her husband died years ago, was arrested in 2017, forcing the family to leave their rented house.

      With seven children, ranging from five to 13 years old, and a sick mother, they settled in a makeshift space used to store building material. Among piles of bricks, they built two shacks out of sticks, paperboard and plastic bags, to keep them safe from sand storms.

      “This is all we have now,” Amaloze says, pointing to a few burned pots and a mat.

      In seven years of work as a cook in her brother’s ghetto, she fed tens of thousands of migrants. Now she can hardly feed her family.

      “At that time I earned at least 35,000 [West African franc] a week [about $60], now it can be as low as 2,000 [$3.4], enough to cook macaroni once a day for the kids, but no sauce,” she says, her voice breaking.

      Only one of her children still attends school.

      Her experience is familiar among the women she meets weekly. “All of us suffered with the end of migration in Agadez,” she says.

      Through their groups, they found hope and solidarity. But their future is still uncertain.

      “We’re toasting peanuts every day and thinking of new ways to earn something,” Hamaloze says with a mix of bitterness and determination. “But, like all our former colleagues, we need real opportunities otherwise migration through Agadez and the Sahara will resume, in a more violent and painful way than before.”


      https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/crackdown-people-employed-migration-market-190303114806258.html

  • Climate-Fragility Profile : Lake Chad Basin | adelphi

    https://www.adelphi.de/en/publication/climate-fragility-profile-lake-chad-basin

    Nagarajan, Chitra; Benjamin Pohl, Lukas Rüttinger, Florence Sylvestre, Janani Vivekananda, Martin Wall and Susanne Wolfmaier 2018: Climate-Fragility Profile: Lake Chad Basin. Berlin: adelphi.

    Climate change is increasingly recognised as a ‘threat multiplier’ that interacts with and compounds existing risks and pressures. When climate change converges and interacts with other environmental, economic, social, and political shocks and pressures, it can increase the likelihood of instability or conflict. This threat is particularly virulent in fragile and conflict-affected situations where governments and societal institutions already struggle to achieve security and equitable development. At the same time, conflicts and fragility often contribute to environmental degradation and undermine the ability to adapt to climate change, thus creating a vicious circle of increasing vulnerability and fragility.

    #lac_tchad #climat #afrique_de_l_ouest #eau

  • #Expanding_the_fortress

    La politique d’#externalisation_des_frontières de l’UE, ses bénéficiaires et ses conséquences pour les #droits_humains.

    Résumé du rapport

    La situation désespérée des 66 millions de personnes déplacées dans le monde ne semble troubler la conscience européenne que lorsqu’un drame a lieu à ses frontières et se retrouve sous le feu des projecteurs médiatiques. Un seul État européen – l’Allemagne – se place dans les dix premiers pays au monde en termes d’accueil des réfugiés : la grande majorité des personnes contraintes de migrer est accueillie par des États se classant parmi les plus pauvres au monde. Les migrations ne deviennent visibles aux yeux de l’Union européenne (UE) que lorsque les médias s’intéressent aux communautés frontalières de Calais, Lampedusa ou Lesbos et exposent le sort de personnes désespérées, fuyant la violence et qui finissent par mourir, être mises en détention ou se retrouver bloquées.

    Ces tragédies ne sont pas seulement une conséquence malheureuse des conflits et des guerres en cours dans différents endroits du monde. Elles sont aussi le résultat des politiques migratoires européennes mises en œuvre depuis les accords de Schengen de 1985. Ces politiques se sont concentrées sur le renforcement des frontières, le développement de méthodes sophistiquées de surveillance et de traque des personnes, ainsi que l’augmentation des déportations, tout en réduisant les possibilités de résidence légale malgré des besoins accrus. Cette approche a conduit un grand nombre de personnes fuyant la violence et les conflits et incapables d’entrer en Europe de manière légale à emprunter des routes toujours plus dangereuses.

    Ce qui est moins connu, c’est que les tragédies causées par cette politique européenne se jouent également bien au-delà de nos frontières, dans des pays aussi éloignés que le Sénégal ou l’Azerbaïdjan. Il s’agit d’un autre pilier de la gestion européenne des flux migratoires : l’externalisation des frontières. Depuis 1992, et plus encore depuis 2005, l’UE a mis en œuvre des politiques visant à externaliser les frontières du continent et empêcher les populations déplacées de parvenir à ses portes. Cela implique la conclusion d’accords avec les pays voisins de l’UE afin qu’ils reprennent les réfugiés déportés et adoptent, comme l’Europe, des mesures de contrôle des frontières, de surveillance accrue des personnes et de renforcement de leurs frontières. En d’autres termes, ces accords ont fait des pays voisins de l’UE ses nouveaux garde-frontières. Et parce qu’ils sont loin des frontières européennes et de l’attention médiatique, les impacts de ces politiques restent relativement invisibles aux yeux des citoyens européens.

    Ce rapport cherche à mettre en lumière les politiques qui fondent l’externalisation des frontières européennes et les accords conclus, mais aussi les multinationales et sociétés privées qui en bénéficient, et les conséquences pour les personnes déplacées ainsi que pour les pays et les populations qui les accueillent. Il est le troisième de la série Border Wars, qui vise à examiner les politiques frontalières européennes et à montrer comment les industries des secteurs de l’armement et de la sécurité ont contribué à façonner les politiques de sécurisation des frontières de l’Europe, puis en ont tiré les bénéfices en obtenant un nombre croissant de contrats dans le secteur.

    Ce rapport étudie l’augmentation significative du nombre de mesures et d’accords d’externalisation des frontières depuis 2005, le phénomène s’accélérant massivement depuis le sommet Europe-Afrique de La Valette en novembre 2015. Via une série de nouveaux instruments, tels que le Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique (EUTF), le Cadre pour les partenariats avec les pays tiers en matière de gestion des migrations et la Facilité en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie, l’UE et les États membres injectent des millions d’euros dans un ensemble de projets visant à prévenir la migration de certaines populations vers le territoire européen.

    Cela implique la collaboration avec des pays tiers en matière d’accueil des personnes déportées, de formation des forces de police et des garde-frontières ou le développement de systèmes biométriques complets, ainsi que des donations d’équipements incluant hélicoptères, bateaux et véhicules, mais aussi des équipements de surveillance et de contrôle. Si de nombreux projets sont coordonnés par la Commission européenne, un certain nombre d’États membres, tels que l’Espagne, l’Italie et l’Allemagne, prennent également des initiatives individuelles plus poussées en finançant et en soutenant les efforts d’externalisation des frontières par le biais d’accords bilatéraux.

    Ce qui rend cette collaboration particulièrement problématique est le fait que de nombreux gouvernements qui en bénéficient sont profondément autoritaires, et que les financements sont souvent destinés aux organes de l’État les plus responsables des actes de répression et de violations des droits humains. L’UE fait valoir, à travers l’ensemble de ses politiques, une rhétorique consensuelle autour de l’importance des droits humains, de la démocratie et de l’état de droit ; il semble cependant qu’aucune limite ne soit posée lorsque l’Europe soutient des régimes dictatoriaux pour que ces derniers s’engagent à empêcher « l’immigration irrégulière » vers le sol européen. Le résultat concret se traduit par des accords et des financements conclus entre l’UE et des régimes aussi tristement célèbres que ceux du Tchad, du Niger, de Biélorussie, de Libye ou du Soudan.

    Les politiques européennes dans ce domaine ont des conséquences considérables pour les personnes déplacées, que le statut « illégal » rend déjà vulnérables et plus susceptibles de subir des violations de droits humains. Nombre d’entre elles finissent exploitées, avec des conditions de travail inacceptables, ou encore sont mises en détention ou directement déportées dans le pays qu’elles ont fui. Les femmes réfugiées sont particulièrement menacées par les violences basées sur le genre, les agressions et l’exploitation sexuelles.

    La violence et la répression que subissent les déplacés favorisent également l’immigration clandestine, reconfigurant les activités des passeurs et renforçant le pouvoir des réseaux criminels. De fait, les personnes déplacées sont souvent forcées de se lancer sur des routes alternatives, plus dangereuses, et de s’en remettre à des trafiquants de moins en moins scrupuleux. En conséquence, le nombre de morts sur les routes migratoires s’élève de jour en jour.

    En outre, le renforcement des organes de sécurité de l’Etat dans l’ensemble des pays du MENA (Moyen Orient Afrique du Nord), du Maghreb, du Sahel et de la Corne de l’Afrique constitue une menace directe contre les droits humains et la responsabilité démocratique dans ces zones, notamment en détournant des ressources essentielles qui pourraient suppress être destinées à des mesures économiques ou sociales. En effet, ce rapport montre que l’obsession européenne à prévenir les flux migratoires réduit non seulement les ressources disponibles, mais dénature également les échanges, l’aide et les relations internationales entre l’Europe et ces régions. Comme l’ont signalé de nombreux experts, ce phénomène crée un terreau favorable à toujours plus d’instabilité et d’insécurité, et a pour conséquence de pousser toujours plus de personnes à prendre la route de l’exil.

    Un secteur économique a cependant grandement tiré parti des programmes d’externalisation des frontières de l’UE. En effet, comme l’ont montré les premiers rapports Border Wars, les secteurs de l’industrie militaire et de sécurité ont été les principaux bénéficiaires des contrats de fourniture d’équipements et de services pour la sécurité frontalière. Les entreprises de ces secteurs travaillent en partenariat avec un certain nombre d’institutions intergouvernementales et (semi) publiques qui ont connu une croissance significative ces dernières années, à mesure qu’étaient mise en oeuvre des dizaines de projets portant sur la sécurité et le contrôle des frontières dans des pays tiers.
    Le rapport révèle que :

    La grande majorité des 35 pays considérés comme prioritaires par l’UE pour l’externalisation de ses frontières sont gouvernés par des régimes autoritaires, connus pour leurs violation des droits humains et avec des indicateurs de développement humain faibles.
    48% d’entre eux (17) ont un gouvernement autoritaire, et seulement quatre d’entre eux sont considérés comme démocratiques (mais toujours imparfaits)
    448% d’entre eux (17) sont listés comme « non-libres », et seulement trois sont listés comme « libres » ; 34% d’entre eux (12) présentent des risques extrêmes en matière de droits humains et les 23 autres présentent des risques élevés.
    51% d’entre eux (18) sont caractérisés par un « faible développement humain », seulement huit ont un haut niveau de développement humain.
    Plus de 70% d’entre eux (25) se situent dans le dernier tiers des pays du monde en termes de bien-être des femmes (inclusion, justice et sécurité)

    Les États européens continuent à vendre des armes à ces pays, et cela en dépit du fait que ces ventes alimentent les conflits, les actes de violence et de répression, et de ce fait contribuent à l’augmentation du nombre de réfugiés. La valeur totale des licences d’exportations d’armes délivrées par les États membres de l’UE à ces 35 pays sur la décennie 2007-2016 dépasse les 122 milliards d’euros. Parmi eux, 20% (7) sont sous le joug d’un embargo sur les ventes d’armes demandé par l’UE et/ou les Nations Unies, mais la plupart reçoivent toujours des armes de certains États membres, ainsi qu’un soutien à leurs forces armées et de sécurité dans le cadre des efforts liés aux politiques migratoires.

    Les dépenses de l’UE en matière de sécurité des frontières dans les pays tiers ont considérablement augmenté. Bien qu’il soit difficile de trouver des chiffres globaux, il existe de plus en plus d’instruments de financement pour les projets liés aux migrations, la sécurité et les migrations provient de plus en plus d’instruments, la sécurité et les migrations irrégulières étant les principales priorités. Ces fonds proviennent aussi de l’aide au développement. Plus de 80% du budget de l’EUTF vient du Fonds européen de développement et d’autres fonds d’aide au développement et d’aide humanitaire.

    L’augmentation des dépenses en matière de sécurité des frontières a bénéficié à un large éventail d’entreprises, en particulier des fabricants d’armes et des sociétés de sécurité biométrique. Le géant de l’armement français Thales, qui est également un exportateur incontournable d’armes dans la région, est par exemple un fournisseur reconnu de matériel militaire et de sécurité pour la sécurisation des frontières et de systèmes et équipements biométriques. D’autres fournisseurs importants de systèmes biométriques incluent Véridos, OT Morpho et Gemalto (qui sera bientôt racheté par Thales). L’Allemagne et l’Italie financent également leurs propres groupes d’armement – Hensoldt, Airbus et Rheinmetall pour l’Allemagne et Leonardo et Intermarine pour l’Italie – afin de soutenir des programmes de sécurisation des frontières dans un certain nombre de pays du MENA, en particulier l’Égypte, la Tunisie et la Libye. En Turquie, d’importants contrats de sécurisation des frontières ont été remportés par les groupes de défense turcs, notamment Aselsan et Otokar, qui utilisent les ressources pour subventionner leurs propres efforts de défense, également à l’origine des attaques controversées de la Turquie contre les communautés kurdes.

    Un certain nombre d’entreprises semi-publiques et d’organisations internationales ont également conclu des contrats de conseil, de formation et de gestion de projets en matière de sécurité des frontières. On y trouve la société para-gouvernementale française Civipol, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le Centre international pour le développement des politiques migratoires (ICMPD). Les groupes Thales, Airbus et Safran sont présents au capital de Civipol, qui a rédigé en 2003, à titre de consultant pour la Commission Européenne, un document très influent établissant les fondations pour les mesures actuelles d’externalisation des frontières, dont elle bénéficie aujourd’hui.

    Les financements et les dons en matière d’équipements militaires et de sécurité ainsi que la pression accrue sur les pays tiers pour qu’ils renforcent leurs capacités de sécurité aux frontières ont fait croître le marché de la sécurité en Afrique. Le groupe de lobbying Association européenne des industries aérospatiales et défense (ASD) a récemment concentré ses efforts sur l’externalisation des frontières de l’UE. De grands groupes d’armement tels qu’Airbus et Thales lorgnent également sur les marchés africains et du Moyen-Orient, en croissance.

    Les décisions et la mise en œuvre de l’externalisation des frontières au niveau de l’Union européenne ont été caractérisées par une rapidité d’exécution inhabituelle, hors du contrôle démocratique exercé par le Parlement européen. De nombreux accords importants avec des pays tiers, parmi lesquels les pactes « Migration Compact » signés dans le Cadre pour les partenariats et l’Accord UE- Turquie, ont été conclus sans ou à l’écart de tout contrôle parlementaire.

    Le renforcement et la militarisation de la sécurité des frontières ont conduit à une augmentation du nombre de morts parmi les personnes déplacées. En général, les mesures visant à bloquer une route particulière de migration poussent les personnes vers des routes plus dangereuses. En 2017, on a dénombré 1 mort pour 57 migrants traversant la Méditerranée ; en 2015, ce chiffre était de 1 pour 267. Cette statistique reflète le fait qu’en 2017, les personnes déplacées (pourtant moins nombreuses qu’en 2015), principalement originaires d’Afrique de l’Ouest et de pays subsahariens, ont préféré la route plus longue et plus dangereuse de la Méditerranée Centrale plutôt que la route entre la Turquie et la Grèce empruntée en 2015 par des migrants (principalement Syriens). On estime que le nombre de migrants morts dans le désert est au moins le double de ceux qui ont péri en Méditerranée, bien qu’aucun chiffre officiel ne soit conservé ou disponible.

    On assiste à une augmentation des forces militaires et de sécurité européennes dans les pays tiers pour la sécurité aux frontières. L’arrêt des flux migratoires est devenu une priorité des missions de Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) au Mali et au Niger, tandis que des États membres tels que la France ou l’Italie ont également décidé de déployer des troupes au Niger ou en Libye.

    Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et garde-côtes, collabore de plus en plus avec les pays tiers. Elle a entamé des négociations avec des pays voisins de l’UE pour mener des opérations conjointes sur leurs territoires. La coopération en matière de déportation est déjà largement implantée. De 2010 à 2016, Frontex a coordonné 400 vols de retours conjoints avec des pays tiers, dont 153 en 2016. Depuis 2014, certains de ces vols ont été appelés « opérations de retour conjoint », l’avion et les escortes navigantes provenant des pays de destination. Les États membres invitent de plus en plus fréquemment des délégations de pays tiers à identifier les personnes « déportables » sur la base de l’évaluation de nationalité. Dans plusieurs cas, ces identifications ont conduit à l’arrestation et à la torture des personnes déportées.

    Ce rapport examine ces impacts en cherchant à établir comment ces politiques ont été mises en œuvre en Turquie, en Libye, en Égypte, au Soudan, au Niger, en Mauritanie et au Mali. Dans tous ces pays, pour parvenir à la conclusion de ces accords, l’UE a dû fermer les yeux ou limiter ses critiques sur les violations des droits humains.

    En Turquie, l’UE a adopté un modèle proche de celui de l’Australie, externalisant l’ensemble du traitement des personnes déplacées en dehors de ses frontières, et manquant ainsi à des obligations fondamentales établies par le droit international, telles que le principe de non-refoulement, le principe de non-discrimination (l’accord concerne exclusivement les populations syriennes) et le principe d’accès à l’asile.

    En Libye, la guerre civile et l’instabilité du pays n’ont pas empêché l’UE ni certains de ses États membres, comme l’Italie, de verser des fonds destinés aux équipements et aux systèmes de gestion des frontières, à la formation des garde-côtes et au financement des centres de détention – et ce bien qu’il ait été rapporté que des garde-côtes avaient ouvert le feu sur des bateaux de migrants ou que des centres de détentions étaient gérés par des milices comme des camps de prisonniers.

    En Égypte, la coopération frontalière avec le gouvernement allemand s’est intensifiée malgré la croissante consolidation du pouvoir militaire dans le pays. L’Allemagne finance les équipements et la formation régulière de la police aux frontières égyptienne. Les personnes déplacées se trouvent régulièrement piégées dans le pays, dans l’impossibilité de se rendre en Libye du fait de l’insécurité qui y règne, et subissent les tirs des gardes-côtes égyptiens s’ils décident de prendre la route maritime.

    Au Soudan, le soutien à la gestion des frontières fourni par l’UE n’a pas seulement conduit à suppress sortir un régime dictatorial de son isolement sur la scène internationale, mais a également renforcé les Forces de soutien rapide, constituées de combattants de la milice Janjawid, considérée comme responsables de violations de droits humains au Darfour.

    La situation au Niger, un des pays les plus pauvres au monde, montre bien le coût de la politique de contrôle des migrations subi par les économies locales. La répression en cours à Agadez a considérablement affaibli l’économie locale et poussé la migration dans la clandestinité, rendant la route plus dangereuse pour les migrants et renforçant le pouvoir des gangs de passeurs armés. De même au Mali, l’imposition des mesures d’externalisation des frontières par l’UE dans un pays tout juste sorti d’une guerre civile menace de raviver les tensions et de réveiller le conflit.

    L’ensemble des cas étudiés met en lumière une politique de l’UE via-à-vis de ses voisins obsessionnellement focalisée sur les contrôles migratoires, quel que soit le coût pour les pays concernés ou les populations déplacées. C’est une vision étroite et finalement vouée à l’échec de la sécurité, car elle ne s’attaque pas aux causes profondes qui poussent les gens à migrer : les conflits, la violence, le sous-développement économique et l’incapacité des États à gérer correctement ces situations. Au lieu de cela, en renforçant les forces militaires et de sécurité dans la région, ces politiques prennent le risque d’exacerber la répression, de limiter la responsabilité démocratique et d’attiser des conflits qui pousseront plus de personnes à quitter leurs pays. Il est temps de changer de cap. Plutôt que d’externaliser les frontières et les murs, nous devrions externaliser la vraie solidarité et le respect des droits de l’homme.


    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #UE #EU #Europe #rapport #infographie #visualisation #invisibilité #politiques_migratoires #surveillance #traque #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Sénégal #Azerbaïdjan #accords_de_réadmission #privatisation #multinationales #sécurisation_des_frontières #business #La_Vallette #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_pour_l’Afrique #fonds_fiduciaire #Turquie #partenariats #Tchad #Niger #Biélorussie #Libye #Soudan #violence #répression #mourir_aux_frontières #morts #décès #Maghreb #Sahel #Corne_de_l'Afrique #industrie_militaro-sécuritaire #armes #commerce_d'armes #Fonds_européen_de_développement #développement #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #aide_humanitaire #Thales #Véridos #biométrie #OT_Morpho #Gemalto #Hensoldt #Airbus #Rheinmetall #Leonardo #Intermarine #Égypte #Tunisie #Aselsan #Otokar #Civipol #OIM #IOM #Centre_international_pour_le_développement_des_politiques_migratoires #ICMPD #Airbus #Safran #Association_européenne_des_industries_aérospatiales_et_défense #ASD #Migration_Compact #accord_UE-Turquie #Politique_de_sécurité_et_de_défense_commune #PSDC #Mali #Frontex #Mauritanie #militarisation_des_frontières

    pour télécharger le #rapport :
    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf

    cc @reka @albertocampiphoto @daphne @marty

    • Esternalizzare le frontiere europee significa militarizzare

      Come dimostra il recente rapporto del Transnational Institut, «Espandendo la Fortezza», la crescita della spesa per il controllo delle frontiere esterne avvantaggia produttori di armi e società di sicurezza biometrica. Molte delle loro proposte sono poi apparse nell’Agenda europea sotto forma di decisioni politiche. Sara Prestianni analizza le conseguenze militari dell’esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/esternalizzare-le-frontiere-europee-significa-militarizzare

    • 3 liens vers des articles/reportages de #Gabriele_Del_Grande, un des premiers journalistes à avoir visité les centres en Libye.

      C’était 2008-2009
      Libia: siamo entrati a #Misratah. Ecco la verità sui 600 detenuti eritrei

      Di notte, quando cessano il vociare dei prigionieri e gli strilli della polizia, dal cortile del carcere si sente il rumore del mare. Sono le onde del Mediterraneo, che schiumano sulla spiaggia, a un centinaio di metri dal muro di cinta del campo di detenzione. Siamo a Misratah, 210 km a est di Tripoli, in Libia. E i detenuti sono tutti richiedenti asilo politico eritrei, arrestati al largo di Lampedusa o nei quartieri degli immigrati a Tripoli. Vittime collaterali della cooperazione italo libica contro l’immigrazione. Sono più di 600 persone, tra cui 58 donne e diversi bambini e neonati. Sono in carcere da più di due anni, ma nessuno di loro è stato processato. Dormono in camere senza finestre di 4 metri per 5, fino a 20 persone, buttati per terra su stuoini e materassini di gommapiuma. Di giorno si riuniscono nel cortile di 20 metri per 20 su cui si affacciano le camere, sotto lo sguardo vigile della polizia. Sono ragazzi tra i 20 e i 30 anni. La loro colpa? Aver tentato di raggiungere l’Europa per chiedere asilo.

      Da anni la diaspora eritrea passa da Lampedusa. Dall’aprile del 2005 almeno 6.000 profughi della ex colonia italiana sono approdati sulle coste siciliane, in fuga dalla dittatura di Isaias Afewerki. La situazione a Asmara continua a essere critica. Amnesty International denuncia continui arresti e vessazioni di oppositori e giornalisti. E la tensione con l’Etiopia resta alta, cosicché almeno 320.000 ragazzi e ragazze sono costretti al servizio militare, a tempo indeterminato, in un paese che conta solo 4,7 milioni di abitanti. Molti disertano e scappano per rifarsi una vita. La maggior parte dei profughi si ferma in Sudan: oltre 130.000 persone. Tuttavia ogni anno migliaia di uomini e donne attraversano il deserto del Sahara per raggiungere la Libia e da lì imbarcarsi clandestinamente per l’Italia.

      La prima volta che sentii parlare di Misratah fu nella primavera del 2007, durante un incontro a Roma con il direttore dell’Alto commissariato dei rifugiati a Tripoli, Mohamed al Wash. Pochi mesi dopo, nel luglio del 2007, insieme alla associazione eritrea Agenzia Habeshia, riuscimmo a stabilire un contatto telefonico con un gruppo di prigionieri eritrei che erano riusciti a introdurre un telefono cellulare nel campo. Si lamentavano delle condizioni di sovraffollamento, della scarsa igiene dei bagni, e delle precarie condizioni di salute, specie di donne incinte e neonati. E accusavano gli agenti di polizia di avere molestato sessualmente alcune donne durante le prime settimane di detenzione. Amnesty International si espresse più volte per bloccare il loro rimpatrio. E il 18 settembre 2007 la diaspora eritrea organizzò manifestazioni nelle principali capitali europee.

      Il direttore del centro, colonnello ‘Ali Abu ‘Ud, conosce i report internazionali su Misratah, ma respinge le accuse al mittente: “Tutto quello che dicono è falso” dice sicuro di sé seduto alla scrivania, in giacca e cravatta, dietro un mazzo di fiori finti, nel suo ufficio al primo piano. Dalla finestra si vede il cortile dove sono radunati oltre 200 detenuti. Abu ‘Ud ha visitato nel luglio 2008 alcuni centri di prima accoglienza italiani, insieme a una delegazione libica. Parla di Misratah come di un albergo a cinque stelle comparato agli altri centri libici. E probabilmente ha ragione. Il che è tutto un dire. Dopo una lunga insistenza, insieme a un collega della radio tedesca, Roman Herzog, siamo autorizzati a parlare con i rifugiati eritrei. Scendiamo nel cortile. Ci dividiamo. Intervisto F., 28 anni, da 24 mesi chiuso qua dentro. Mentre lui parla mi accorgo che non lo sto ascoltando, in verità provo a mettermi nei suoi panni. Abbiamo grossomodo la stessa età, ma lui i migliori anni della vita li sta buttando via in un carcere, senza un motivo apparente.

      Dall’altro lato del cortile, Roman è riuscito a parlare per qualche minuto con un rifugiato sottraendosi al controllo degli agenti della sicurezza che vigilano sul nostro lavoro e riprendono con una telecamera le nostre attività. Si chiama S.. Parla liberamente: “Fratello, siamo in una pessima situazione, siamo torturati, mentalmente e fisicamente. Siamo qui da due anni e non conosciamo quale sarà il nostro futuro. Puoi vederlo da solo, guarda!” Intanto l’interprete li ha raggiunti e traduce tutto al direttore del campo, che interrompe l’intervista e chiede a S. se per caso non vuole ritornare in Eritrea. Lui risponde di no, intanto Roman lo invita ad allontanarsi a passo svelto e a dire tutto quello che può prima che il direttore li interrompa di nuovo. “Siamo qui da più di due anni, senza nessuna speranza. Siamo tutti eritrei. Io sono venuto in Libia nel 2005. Cerchiamo asilo politico, a causa della situazione nel nostro paese. Ma il mondo non si interessa a noi. Non è facile stare due anni in prigione, senza nessuna comodità. Siamo in prigione, non vediamo mai l’esterno. Tutti noi abbiamo bisogno della libertà, ecco di cosa abbiamo bisogno”.

      La polizia si avvicina nuovamente, Roman chiede a S. di mostrargli la sua stanza. Zigzagando tra la folla nel cortile entrano nel corridoio su cui danno la vista quattro stanze. All’interno, 18 ragazzi siedono su coperte e materassini di gommapiuma stesi sul pavimento. La stanza misura quattro metri per cinque. Al centro, una pentola gorgoglia sopra un fornellino da campeggio. Non ci sono finestre. “Siamo in troppi qui, è sovraffollato – dice S. – non vediamo la luce del sole e non c’è ricambio d’aria. Con il caldo d’estate la gente si ammala. E anche di inverno, fa molto freddo di notte, la gente si ammala”. Siamo a fine novembre, e i ragazzi indossano ciabatte da mare e leggeri pullover. La stanza accanto è più grande, ci sono solo donne e bambini, ma sono almeno il doppio.

      A quel punto gli uomini della sicurezza interrompono l’intervista e portano Roman fuori dal cortile, dove gli presentano un rifugiato scelto dal direttore... “Sono anche io un prigioniero” gli dice. Ma lui preferisce parlare con J.. Ha 34 anni e dice di essere stato in 13 prigioni diverse in Libia: “Alcuni di noi sono qui da quattro anni. Personalmente sono a Misratah da tre anni. Siamo nella peggiore delle situazioni. Non abbiamo commesso reati, stiamo solo chiedendo asilo politico. E non ci viene concesso. Diteci almeno perchè? Visto che nessuno ci informa. Che cosa sta succedendo là fuori? Diteci che cosa sarà di noi! Nemmeno l’Acnur. Non ci dicono mai niente. Non ho più speranza, quando ci vado a parlare nemmeno mi ascoltano. Pesavo 60 kg quando sono entrato, adesso ne peso 48, immagina perchè..”

      Il colonnello Abu ‘Ud segue la conversazione grazie alla traduzione in arabo dell’interprete, finché non riesce più a trattenersi. “Vuoi ritornare in Eritrea?” chiede a J. interrompendo bruscamente l’intervista. “Preferisco morire – gli risponde – tutti preferirebbero morire. “Se vuoi andare in Eritrea ti rimpatriamo in un solo giorno” minaccia il direttore. “Ci vietano di parlare con te” dice J. a Roman. Il direttore diventa furioso. Gli grida in faccia “Dite loro che li rimpatrieremo tutti!”. Poi si avvicina a Roman e con un urlo secco ordina: “Finito!”. Roman cerca di protestare, “abbiamo finito” gli ripette Abu ‘Ud mentre gli agenti lo tirano per le braccia verso l’uscita. Intanto il colonnello sale sui gradini e si rivolge a gran voce a tutti i rifugiati che nel frattempo si sono avvicinati per vedere cosa stia accadendo. “Se vi sentite maltrattati qui, organizzeremo il vostro rimpatrio immediatamente. Avete già rifiutato di ritornare nel vostro paese, ecco perchè siete in questo posto. Ma ognuno di voi è libero di ritornare in Eritrea! Chi vuole andare in Eritrea?” chiede alla folla. “Nessuno!” gli fanno eco i presenti. Scende e grida al mio collega “Hai visto! Adesso abbiamo veramente finito”.

      Saliamo di nuovo nell’ufficio del colonnello, che con toni molto nervosi cerca di convincerci del suo impegno. Per ben due volte l’ambasciata eritrea ha inviato dei funzionari per identificare i prigionieri. Ma i rifugiati hanno sempre rifiutato di incontrarli. Hanno addirittura organizzato uno sciopero della fame. Comprensibile, visto che rischiano di essere perseguitati in patria. La Libia dovrebbe averlo capito da un pezzo, visto che il 27 agosto 2004 uno dei voli di rimpatrio per l’Eritrea partiti da Tripoli venne addirittura dirottato in Sudan dagli stessi passeggeri. Ma il concetto di asilo politico sfugge alle autorità libiche. Eritrei o nigeriani, vogliono tutti andare in Europa. E visto che l’Europa chiede di controllare la frontiera, l’unica soluzione sono le deportazioni. E per chi non collabora con le ambasciate – come i rifugiati eritrei - la detenzione diventa a tempo indeterminato. Così per tornare in libertà non rimangono che due possibilità. Avere la fortuna di rientrare nei programmi di reinsediamento all’estero dell’Alto commissariato dei rifugiati (Acnur), oppure provare a scappare.

      Haron ha 36 anni. A casa ha lasciato una moglie e due bambini. Dall’Eritrea è scappato dopo 12 anni di servizio militare non retribuito. Dopo due anni di detenzione a Misratah, la Svezia ha accettato la sua richiesta di reinsediamento. E’ partito tre giorni dopo la nostra visita, il 27 novembre 2008, con un gruppo di altri 26 rifugiati eritrei del campo di Misratah, tra cui molte donne. I posti lasciati vuoti saranno presto riempiti con i nuovi arrestati. Già la settimana scorsa sono arrivate otto donne. I reinsediamenti sono le uniche carte che l’Acnur riesce a giocare, da un anno a questa parte, in Libia. Le prime 34 donne eritree lasciarono il campo di Misratah nel novembre del 2007 e furono accolte dall’Italia, a Cantalice, un piccolo comune nella campagna di Rieti. Per l’Italia fu il primo reinsediamento ufficiale di rifugiati dai tempi della crisi cilena del 1973. Ma l’operazione venne censurata dagli uffici stampa del Ministero dell’Interno, per non sollevare polemiche tra i leghisti. Insieme alle donne arrivarono 5 uomini e una bambina nata pochi giorni prima.

      Da allora, circa 200 rifugiati sono stati trasferiti da Misratah in vari paesi. Oltre all’Italia (70), anche in Romania (39), Svezia (27), Canada (17), Norvegia (9) e Svizzera (5). A snocciolarmi i dati è Osama Sadiq. E’ il coordinatore dei progetti della International organisation for peace care and relief (Iopcr). Una importante ong libica, che si dichiara non governativa, ma che tanto indipendente non deve essere, visto che ha al suo interno ex funzionari del ministero dell’interno e della sicurezza. E che è talmente influente, che l’Acnur riesce a entrare a Misratah soltanto sotto la sua copertura. Proprio così. In un paese dove transitano ogni anno migliaia di rifugiati eritrei, ma anche sudanesi, somali ed etiopi, l’Acnur conta meno di una ong. Non ha nemmeno un accordo di sede. E non riesce a spendere una parola a livello internazionale per la liberazione dei 600 prigionieri di Misratah. Probabilmente a dettare la linea politica dell’Acnur in Libia sono fragili equilibri diplomatici da non rompere per non rischiare di farsi cacciare da un Paese che non ha nemmeno mai firmato la Convenzione di Ginevra. Eppure la Libia sta conoscendo una importante fase di apertura. E il governo lavora a una nuova legge sull’immigrazione che però – secondo chi ha letto la bozza - non contiene nessun riferimento alla protezione dei rifugiati.

      Per quelli che non rientrano nei progetti di reinsediamento dell’Acnur, non rimane che l’ennesima fuga. Koubros è uno di loro. Lo incontriamo sulle scale della chiesa di San Francesco, nel quartiere Dhahra di Tripoli, dopo la messa del venerdì mattina. Un gruppo di eritrei è in fila per lo sportello sociale della Caritas, dove lavora l’infaticabile suor Sherly. A Misratah ha passato un anno. Era stato arrestato a Tripoli durante una retata nel quartiere di Abu Selim. E’ scappato durante un ricovero in ospedale. Poi però è stato di nuovo arrestato e portato al carcere di Tuaisha, vicino all’aeroporto di Tripoli. Dove è riuscito a corrompere un poliziotto facendosi inviare 300 dollari dagli amici eritrei in città. Siede vicino a Tadrous. Anche lui eritreo, anche lui disertore in fuga dal suo paese. E’ uscito due settimane fa dal carcere di Surman. Era stato condannato a cinque mesi di galera dopo essere stato trovato in mare con altri 90 passeggeri, a Zuwarah. In carcere si è preso la scabbia. Gli chiediamo di accompagnarci nel quartiere di Gurgi, dove vivono gli eritrei pronti a partire per l’Italia. Dice che è pericoloso. Gli eritrei vivono nascosti. La nostra presenza potrebbe allertare la polizia e provocare una retata. Y. però la pensa diversamente, vive in una zona diversa. Lo seguiamo.

      Scendiamo in una traversa sterrata di Shar‘a Ahad ‘Ashara, l’undicesima strada, a Gurgi. Qui vivono molti immigrati africani. L’appartamento è di proprietà di una famiglia chadiana, che ha affittato a sette eritrei le due piccole stanze sul terrazzo. Ci togliamo le scarpe per entrare. I pavimenti sono coperti di tappeti e coperte. Ci dormono in cinque ragazzi. La televisione, collegata alla grande parabola montata sul terrazzo, manda in onda videoclip in tigrigno di cantanti eritrei. E’ un posto sicuro, dicono, perchè l’ingresso della casa passa dall’appartamento della famiglia chadiana, che è a posto coi documenti. Si sono trasferiti qui da poco, dopo le ultime retate a Shar‘a ‘Ashara. Adesso quando sentono la sirena della polizia non ci fanno più caso. Prima si correvano a nascondere. Ci offrono cioccolata, una salsa di patate e pomodoro con del pane, 7-Up e succo di pera.

      Continuiamo a parlare delle loro esperienze nelle carceri libiche. Ognuno di loro è stato arrestato almeno una volta. E tutti sono usciti grazie alla corruzione. Basta pagare la polizia, da 200 a 500 dollari, per scappare o per non essere arrestati. I soldi arrivano con Western Union, grazie a una rete di solidarietà tra gli eritrei della diaspora, in Europa e in America.

      Anche Robel è stato a Misratah. C’ha passato un anno. Ci mostra il certificato di richiedente asilo rilasciato dall’Acnur. Scade l’11 maggio 2009. Ma con quello non si sente al sicuro. “Un mio amico è stato arrestato lo stesso, glielo hanno strappato sotto gli occhi”. Durante la detenzione, ha scritto un appello alla comunità internazionale, con un gruppo di sei studenti eritrei.

      Sul muro, accanto al poster di Gesù, c’è una foto in bianco e nero di una bambina di pochi anni, con su scritto il suo nome, Delina, con il pennarello. L’ho riconosciuta. E’ la stessa bambina che giocava sulle scale della chiesa con Tadrous. Anche lei dovrà rischiare la vita in mare. “L’importante è arrivare nelle acque internazionali”, dice Y.. Gli intermediari eritrei (dallala) che organizzano i viaggi, hanno diverse reputazioni. Ci sono intermediari spregiudicati e altri di cui ci si può fidare. Ma il rischio rimane. Non posso non pensarci, mentre sull’aereo di ritorno per Malta, comodamente seduto e un po’ annoiato, sfoglio la mia agenda con i numeri di telefono e le email dei ragazzi eritrei conosciuti a Tripoli. Prima della mia partenza per la Libia, un amico etiope mi aveva dato il numero di telefono di un suo compagno di viaggio, ancora a Tripoli, un certo Gibril. Ho provato a chiamarlo per tutto il tempo, ma il numero era spento. Nell’orecchio mi risuona ancora l’incomprensibile messaggio vocale in arabo. Speriamo che sia arrivato in Italia, o piuttosto a Misratah. E non in fondo al mare.


      https://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/01/libia-siamo-entrati-misratah-ecco-la.html

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      Frontiera Sahara. I campi di detenzione nel deserto libico
      SEBHA - “Con noi c’era un bambino di quattro anni con la madre, durante tutto il viaggio mi sono domandato: come si può mandare una madre con un bambino di quattro anni insieme ad altre cento persone stipate come animali in un camion come quelli per la frutta, dove non c’è aria e dove stavamo stretti stretti, senza spazio per muoversi, per 21 ore di viaggio, dove le persone urinavano e defecavano davanti a tutti perché non c’era altra possibilità? Abbiamo viaggiato dalle 16:00 alle 13:00 del giorno dopo. Durante il giorno ogni volta che l’autista faceva una sosta per mangiare noi rimanevamo chiusi dentro il rimorchio sotto il sole. Mancava l’aria e tutti si alzavano in preda al panico perché non si respirava e volevamo scendere. Guardare il bambino ci faceva coraggio. Quando il camion si fermava lo prendevamo e lo mettevamo vicino al finestrino. Si chiamava Adam. Il camion si è fermato almeno tre volte nel deserto per far mangiare gli autisti e per la preghiera... Verso l’una siamo arrivati a Kufrah… Quando sono sceso ho rubato il burro con il pane che tenevano appeso fuori dal container. Non avevamo mangiato per tutto il viaggio, eravamo 110 persone, compreso Adam di quattro anni e sua madre”. [1]

      Menghistu non è l’unico a essere stato chiuso dentro un container e deportato. In Libia è la prassi. I container servono a smistare nei vari campi di detenzione i migranti arrestati sulle rotte per Lampedusa. Ne esistono di tre tipi. Il più piccolo è un pick-up furgonato. Quello medio è l’equivalente di un camioncino. E quello più grande è un vero e proprio container, blu, con tre feritoie per lato, trainato da un auto rimorchio. Quando un rifugiato eritreo, nella primavera del 2006, me ne parlò per la prima volta, stentai a crederlo. L’immagine di centinaia di uomini, donne e bambini rinchiusi dentro una scatola di ferro per essere concentrati in dei campi di detenzione e da lì deportati, mi rievocava i fantasmi della seconda guerra mondiale. Mi sembrava troppo. Ma la figura del container ritornava, come un marchio di autenticità, in tutte le storie di rifugiati transitati dalla Libia che avevo intervistato dopo di lui. Finché quei camion ho avuto modo di vederli con i miei occhi.

      A Sebha ce n’è uno per ogni tipo. Siamo alle porte del grande deserto libico, nella capitale della storica regione del Fezzan. Da qui, fino al secolo scorso passavano le carovane che attraversavano il Sahara. Oggi alle carovane si sono sostituiti gli immigrati. Il colonnello Zarruq è il direttore del nuovo centro di detenzione della città. È stato inaugurato lo scorso 20 agosto. I tre capannoni si intravedono oltre il muro di cinta. Ognuno ha quattro camerate, in tutto il centro possono essere detenute fino a 1.000 persone. Nel parcheggio sterrato, è parcheggiato un camion con uno dei container utilizzati per lo smistamento degli immigrati detenuti. Con una pacca sulle spalle, il direttore mi invita a salire sulla motrice. Un Iveco Trakker 420, a sei ruote. Mi indica il tachimetro: 41.377 km. Nuovo di pacca. È rientrato ieri sera da Qatrun, a quattro ore di deserto da qui. A bordo c’erano 100 prigionieri, arrestati alla frontiera con il Niger. Entriamo nel container, dalle scale posteriori. L’ambiente è claustrofobico anche senza nessuno. Difficile immaginarsi cosa possa diventare con 100 o 200 persone ammassate una sull’altra in questa scatola di ferro. I raggi del sole filtrati dalla polvere illuminano le taniche di plastica vuote, a terra, sotto le panche di ferro. Su una c’è scritto Gambia.

      L’acqua è il bagaglio essenziale per i migranti che attraversano il deserto. Ognuno prima di partire si porta dietro una o due taniche. Le riveste di juta per proteggerle dal sole e ci scrive su il proprio nome per riconoscerle una volta appese ai lati dei camion. Nelle traversate del Sahara la vita è appesa a un filo. Se il motore va in panne, se il camion si insabbia, o l’autista decide di abbandonare i passeggeri, è finita. Nel raggio di centinaia di chilometri non c’è altro che sabbia. Muoiono a decine ogni mese, ma le notizie filtrano difficilmente. Sulla stampa internazionale abbiamo censito almeno 1.621 vittime in tutto il Sahara. Ma stando alle testimonianze dei sopravvissuti, ogni viaggio conta i suoi morti. E ogni viaggio conta i suoi attacchi da parte di bande armate in Niger e Algeria.

      Tra i cento migranti arrivati a Sebha nel container di ieri c’è anche una famiglia di Sikasso, in Mali. Padre, madre e bambino. Arrestati tre giorni prima, a Ghat, alla frontiera con l’Algeria. Li incontriamo nell’ufficio del direttore. Il piccolino ha otto anni, faceva la terza elementare. Il padre lo stringe affettuosamente tra le forti braccia, mentre racconta in arabo, al nostro interprete, che lui in Europa non ci voleva andare. Che era venuto a Sebha perché aveva già lavorato qui nel 2002, con una compagnia tedesca. Hanno con sé i passaporti, ma senza il visto libico. Nel campo sono chiusi in celle separate. Il bimbo sta con la madre. I loro nomi compaiono sulle liste dei prossimi aerei pronti a partire. Nei primi undici mesi dell’anno, soltanto da Sebha, hanno deportato più di 9.000 persone, soprattutto nigeriani, maliani, nigerini, ghanesi, senegalesi e burkinabé. Solo a novembre i rimpatri sono stati 1.120. Zarruq mi mostra l’elenco dei voli: 467 nigeriani deportati il 2 settembre, 420 maliani a metà novembre. Le ambasciate mandano qui i loro funzionari per identificare i propri cittadini, e poi si provvede al rimpatrio. Kabbiun e Ajouas hanno già incontrato l’ambasciata nigeriana. I piedi di Kabbiun sono scalzi. Lo hanno arrestato a Ghat, le scarpe le ha lasciate in mezzo al deserto. Ajouas invece viveva a Tripoli da sei anni. Nessuno di loro ha visto un giudice o un avvocato. Avviene tutto senza convalida e senza nessuna possibilità di presentare ricorso e tantomeno di chiedere asilo politico.

      È il caso di Patrick. Viene dalla Repubblica democratica del Congo, recentemente tornata alle cronache per la crisi nella regione del Kivu. È stato arrestato un mese fa a Tripoli, mentre cercava lavoro alla giornata sotto i cavalcavia di Suq Thalatha. Possiamo parlare liberamente in francese, perché l’interprete non lo conosce. Mi porge un foglio spiegazzato dalla tasca. È il suo certificato di richiedente asilo politico. Rilasciato dall’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati (Acnur) a Tripoli, il nove ottobre 2007. Qua dentro è carta straccia. Come gli altri detenuti, Patrick non ha diritto di telefonare a nessuno, nemmeno all’Acnur. Se non trova prima i soldi per corrompere qualche poliziotto, anche lui, prima o poi, sarà deportato. E come lui i suoi compagni di cella. Sono camerate di otto metri per otto. I detenuti sono buttati per terra su stuoini e cartoni. La luce entra dalle vetrate in cima alle alte pareti. Ogni camerata è riempita con 60-70 persone. Stanno chiusi tutto il giorno, escono solo per i pasti, in un locale adibito a mensa, accanto a un piccolo chiosco dove i detenuti possono comprare bibite, dolci o medicine, sempre all’interno del muro di cinta.

      Le compagnie aeree che si occupano delle deportazioni sono libiche: Ifriqiya e Buraq Air. I soldi pure, garantisce il direttore. Ma è difficile credergli. Dopotutto il rapporto della Commissione europea del dicembre 2004 parlava già allora di 47 voli di rimpatrio finanziati dall’Italia. Zarruq scuote il capo. Dice che da Roma hanno avuto soltanto due fuoristrada per il pattugliamento, con il progetto Across Sahara. E il nuovo centro di detenzione? Ha finanziato tutto la Libia, insiste. Ammette però che l’Italia si era impegnata a costruire un nuovo centro, e che la a sha‘abiyah, la municipalità, aveva anche predisposto un terreno. Ma poi non se ne è fatto niente. Intanto però il vecchio campo è stato restaurato e ampliato, grazie anche ai lavori forzati degli immigrati detenuti. Questo Zarruq non me lo può dire, ma sono voci che corrono tra i rimpatriati, dall’altro lato della frontiera, a Agadez, in Niger. Ad ogni modo, insiste, oggi tutti i rimpatri avvengono in aereo, anche quelli verso il Niger: Sono passati i tempi dei cosiddetti “rimpatri volontari”, quando, nel 2004, oltre 18.000 nigerini e non solo vennero caricati sui camion e abbandonati alla frontiera in pieno deserto, con le decine di vittime che ne seguirono a causa degli incidenti.

      Ma Zarruq non ha intenzione di parlare di questo. E nemmeno il luogo tenente Ghrera. È lui il responsabile delle pattuglie nel Sahara. L’Italia e l’Europa si sono impegnate a finanziare alla Libia un sistema di controllo elettronico delle frontiere terrestri, firmato FinMeccanica. Lui alla sola idea sorride. Lavora nel deserto da 35 anni. Conosce bene il terreno. Per darci un’idea ci accompagna a Zellaf, 20 km a sud di Sebha. Ancora non siamo nel grande Sahara. Eppure davanti a noi non si vede che sabbia. I due fuoristrada, dopo una corsa a cento km all’ora sulle dune, fermano i motori. Ghrera e l’altro autista, ‘Ali, si lavano le mani nella sabbia. E si inginocchiano verso est. Dopo la preghiera, si riavvicinano. Controllare le rotte nel Sahara è impossibile, dice. Sono 5.000 km di deserto. Un’area troppo vasta e un terreno troppo accidentato Gli 89 autisti – quasi tutti libici – arrestati nei primi undici mesi del 2008 sono un’inezia rispetto alle migliaia di persone che attraversano il Sahara ogni anno. Alle missioni di pattugliamento partecipano gruppi di 10 fuoristrada. Stanno fuori per cinque giorni, ci spiega. Poi sorride. Ha trovato una bottiglia vuota di Gin, per terra. L’alcol in Libia è illegale. E infatti sulla bottiglia c’è scritto fabriqué au Niger, prodotto in Niger. Ghrera lancia la bottiglia nella sabbia, poco lontano. Non dice niente. I traffici non riguardano solo gli immigrati. Ci sono l’alcol, le sigarette, la droga, le armi. Prima di riaccendere il motore ribadisce il concetto: anche con il doppio delle pattuglie, il deserto rimane una porta aperta.

      Il centro di detenzione di Sebha non è l’unico campo di detenzione al sud. Ce ne sono almeno altri cinque. Quelli di Shati, Qatrun, Ghat e Brak, nel sud ovest del paese, fanno capo a Sebha, nel senso che gli immigrati arrestati in queste località vengono poi smistati a Sebha dentro i container. L’altro campo si trova 800 km a sud est, a Kufrah, e lì vengono detenuti i rifugiati eritrei e etiopi in arrivo dal Sudan. È il carcere che gode della peggiore fama, tra gli stessi libici.

      Mohamed Tarnish è il presidente dell’Organizzazione per i diritti umani, una ong libica finanziata dalla Fondazione di Saif al Islam Gheddafi, il primogenito del colonnello. Ci incontriamo al Caffè Sarayah, a due passi dalla Piazza Verde, a Tripoli. La sua organizzazione, sotto la guida del suo predecessore, Jum‘a Atigha, ha ottenuto il rilascio di circa 1.000 prigionieri politici e si è battuta per il miglioramento delle condizioni delle carceri libiche. Da un paio d’anni hanno accesso anche ai centri di detenzione degli immigrati. Ne hanno visitati sette. Ha la bocca cucita, davanti a noi c’è un funzionario dell’agenzia per la stampa estera del governo libico. Ma riesce comunque a farci capire che il centro di Kufrah è il peggiore. Le condizioni del vecchio fabbricato, il sovraffollamento, la scadenza del cibo e l’assenza di assistenza sanitaria.

      Per capire il significato delle allusioni di Tarnish, rileggo le interviste fatte ai rifugiati eritrei ed etiopi nel 2007.“Dormivamo in 78 in una cella di sei metri per otto” - “Dormivamo per terra, la testa accanto ai piedi dei vicini” - “Ci tenevano alla fame. Un piatto di riso lo potevamo dividere anche in otto persone” - “Di notte mi portavano in cortile. Mi chiedevano di fare le flessioni. Quando non ce la facevo più mi riempivano di calci e maledivano me e la mia religione cristiana” – “Usavamo un solo bagno in 60, nella cella c’era un odore perenne di scarico. Era impossibile lavarsi” - “C’erano pidocchi e pulci dappertutto, nel materasso, nei vestiti, nei capelli” - “I poliziotti entravano nella stanza, prendevano una donna e la violentavano in gruppo davanti a tutti”. È il ritratto di un girone infernale. Ma anche di un luogo di affari. Sì perché da un paio d’anni la polizia è solita vendere i detenuti agli stessi intermediari che poi li porteranno sul Mediterraneo. Il prezzo di un uomo si aggira sui 30 dinari, circa 18 euro.

      Non sono stato autorizzato a visitare il centro di Kufrah e non ho potuto verificare di persona. Tuttavia il fatto che le versioni dei tanti rifugiati con cui ho parlato coincidano nel disegnare un luogo di abusi, violenze e torture, mi fa pensare che sia tutto vero. Nel 2004 la Commissione europea riferiva che l’Italia stava finanziando il centro di detenzione di Kufrah. Nel 2007 il governo Prodi smentiva la notizia, dicendo che si trattava di un centro di assistenza sanitaria. Poco importa. Dal 2003, Italia e Unione Europea finanziano operazioni di contrasto dell’immigrazione in Libia. La domanda è la seguente: perché fingono tutti di non sapere?

      Nel 2005, il prefetto Mario Mori, ex direttore del Sisde, informava il Copaco: “I clandestini [in Libia, ndr.] vengono accalappiati come cani... e liberati in centri... dove i sorveglianti per entrare devono mettere i fazzoletti intorno alla bocca per gli odori nauseabondi”. Ma i funzionari della polizia italiana sapevano già tutto. Già perché dal 2004 alcuni agenti fanno attività di formazione in Libia. E alcuni funzionari del ministero dell’Interno, hanno visitato in più occasioni i centri di detenzione libici, Kufrah compreso, limitandosi a non rilasciare dichiarazioni. E l’ipocrita Unione Europea? Il rapporto della Commissione europea del 2004, definisce le condizioni dei campi di detenzione libici “difficili” ma in fin dei conti “accettabili alla luce del contesto generale”. Tre anni dopo, nel maggio 2007, una delegazione di Frontex visitò il sud della Libia, compreso il carcere di Kufrah, per gettare le basi di una futura cooperazione. Indovinate cosa scrisse? “Abbiamo apprezzato tanto la diversità quanto la vastità del deserto”. Sulle condizioni del centro di detenzione però preferì sorvolare. Una dimenticanza?

      [1] Testimonianza raccolta dalla scuola di italiano Asinitas, Roma, 2007


      https://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/01/frontiera-sahara-i-campi-di-detenzione.html

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      Guantanamo Libia. Il nuovo gendarme delle frontiere italiane

      La porta di ferro è chiusa a doppia mandata. Dalla piccola feritoia si affacciano i volti di due ragazzi africani e un di egiziano. L’odore acre che esce dalla cella mi brucia le narici. Chiedo ai tre di spostarsi. La vista si apre su due stanze di tre metri per quattro. Incrocio gli sguardi di una trentina di persone. Ammassati uno sull’altro. A terra vedo degli stuoini e qualche lercio materassino in gommapiuma. Sui muri qualcuno ha scritto Guantanamo. Ma non siamo nella base americana. Siamo a Zlitan, in Libia. E i detenuti non sono presunti terroristi, ma immigrati arrestati a sud di Lampedusa e lasciati marcire in carceri fatiscenti finanziate in parte dall’Italia e dall’Unione europea.

      I prigionieri si accalcano contro la porta della cella. Non ricevono visite da mesi. Alcuni alzano la voce: “Aiutateci!”. Un ragazzo allunga la mano oltre quelli della prima fila e mi porge un pezzettino di cartone. C’è scritto sopra un numero di telefono, a penna. Il prefisso è quello del Gambia. Lo metto in tasca prima che la polizia se ne accorga. Il ragazzo si chiama Outhman. Mi chiede di dire a sua madre che è ancora vivo. È in carcere da cinque mesi. Fabrice invece non esce da questa cella da nove mesi. Entrambi sono stati arrestati durante le retate nei quartieri degli immigrati a Tripoli. Da anni la polizia libica è impegnata in simili operazioni. Da quando nel 2003 l’Italia siglò con Gheddafi un accordo di collaborazione per il contrasto dell’immigrazione, e spedì oltremare motovedette, fuoristrada e sacchi da morto, insieme ai soldi necessari a pagare voli di rimpatrio e tre campi di detenzione. Da allora decine di migliaia di immigrati e rifugiati ogni anno sono arrestati dalla polizia libica e detenuti nei circa 20 centri fatiscenti sparsi per il paese, in attesa del rimpatrio. Insieme a un collega tedesco, siamo i primi giornalisti autorizzati a visitare questi centri.

      “La gente soffre! Il cibo è pessimo, l’acqua è sporca. Ci sono donne malate e altre incinte”. Gift ha 29 anni. Viene dalla Nigeria. Indossa ancora il vestito che aveva quando l’arrestarono tre mesi fa, ormai ridotto a uno straccio sporco e consumato. Stava passeggiando con il marito. Non avevano documenti e furono arrestati. Non lo vede da allora, lui nel frattempo è stato rimpatriato. Dice di avere lasciato i due figli a Tripoli. Di loro non ha più notizie. Viveva in Libia da tre anni. Lavorava come parrucchiera e non aveva nessuna intenzione di attraversare il Canale di Sicilia. Come molti degli immigrati detenuti dai nuovi gendarmi della frontiera italiana.

      All’Europa invece aveva pensato Y.. C’aveva pensato e come. Disertore dell’esercito eritreo, per chiedere asilo politico, si era imbarcato due mesi fa per Lampedusa. Ma è stato fermato in mare. Dai libici. Da quel giorno è rinchiuso a Zlitan. Anche lui senza nessuna convalida dello stato d’arresto. Prima di farlo entrare nello studio del direttore, un poliziotto gli sussurra qualcosa all’orecchio. Lui fa cenno di sì col capo. Quando gli chiediamo delle condizioni del centro, risponde “Everything is good”. Va tutto bene. È spaventato a morte. Sa che ogni risposta sbagliata gli può costare un pestaggio. Il direttore del campo, Ahmed Salim, sorride compiaciuto delle risposte e ci assicura che non sarà deportato. Nel giro di qualche settimana sarà trasferito al centro di detenzione di Misratah, 210 km a est di Tripoli, dove sono concentrati i prigionieri di nazionalità eritrea.

      Nella provincia esistono altri tre centri di detenzione per stranieri, a Khums, Garabulli e Bin Ulid. Ma sono strutture più piccole e i detenuti vengono poi tradotti nel campo di Zlitan, che può rinchiudere fino a 325 persone, in attesa del loro rimpatrio. Ma quanti sono i centri di detenzione in tutta la Libia? Sulla base delle testimonianze raccolte in questi anni, ne abbiamo contati 28, perlopiù concentrati sulla costa. Ne esistono di tre tipi. Ci sono dei veri e propri centri di raccolta, come quelli di Sebha, Zlitan, Zawiyah, Kufrah e Misratah, dove vengono concentrati i migranti e i rifugiati arrestati durante le retate o alla frontiera. Poi ci sono strutture più piccole, come quelle di Qatrun, Brak, Shati, Ghat, Khums… dove gli stranieri sono detenuti per un breve periodo prima di essere inviati nei centri di raccolta. E poi ci sono le prigioni: Jadida, Fellah, Twaisha, Ain Zarah… Prigioni comuni, nelle quali intere sezioni sono dedicate alla detenzione degli stranieri senza documenti. Anche nelle prigioni, le condizioni di detenzione sono pessime. Scabbia, parassiti e infezioni sono il minimo che ci si possa prendere. Molte donne sono colpite da infezioni vaginali. E non mancano i decessi, dovuti perlopiù all’assenza di assistenza sanitaria o a ricoveri ospedalieri troppo tardivi. Il nome più ricorrente nei racconti dei migranti è quello del carcere di Fellah, a Tripoli, che però è stato recentemente demolito per far spazio a un grande cantiere edilizio, in linea con il restyling di tutta la città. La sua funzione è stata sostituita dal Twaisha, un’altra prigione vicino all’aeroporto.

      Koubros è riuscito a scappare da Twaisha poche settimane fa. È un rifugiato eritreo di 27 anni. Viveva in Sudan, ma dopo che un amico eritreo è stato rimpatriato da Khartoum, non si è più sentito al sicuro e ha pensato all’Europa. Da Twaisha è uscito sulle stampelle. Non poteva pagare la cifra che gli aveva chiesto un poliziotto ubriaco. Allora l’hanno portato fuori dalla cella e preso a manganellate. È uscito grazie a una colletta tra i prigionieri eritrei. Per corrompere una delle guardie carcerarie sono bastati 300 dollari. Lo incontro davanti alla chiesa di San Francesco, a Tripoli. Come ogni venerdì, una cinquantina di migranti africani aspetta l’apertura dello sportello sociale della Caritas. Tadrous è uno di loro. È stato rilasciato lo scorso sei ottobre dal carcere di Surman. È uno dei pochi ad essere stato giudicato da una corte. La sua storia mi interessa. Era il giugno del 2008. Si erano imbarcati da Zuwarah, in 90. Ma dopo poche ore decisero di invertire la rotta, perché il mare era in tempesta. E tornarono indietro. Appena toccata terra furono arrestati e portati nella prigione di Surman. Il giudice li condannò a 5 mesi di carcere per emigrazione illegale. Finiti i quali è stato rilasciato. Gli chiedo se gli fu dato un avvocato d’ufficio. Sorride scuotendo la testa. La risposta è negativa.

      Niente di strano, sostiene l’avvocato Abdussalam Edgaimish. La legge libica non prevede il gratuito patrocinio per reati passibili di pene inferiori a tre anni. Edgaimish è il direttore dell’ordine degli avvocati di Tripoli. Ci riceve nel suo studio in via primo settembre. Ci spiega che tutte le pratiche di arresto e detenzione sono svolte come procedure amministrative, senza nessuna convalida del giudice. Senza nessuna base legale dunque, ma solo sull’onda dell’emergenza. Anche in Libia una persona non potrebbe essere privata della libertà senza un mandato d’arresto. Ma questa è la teoria. La pratica invece è quella delle retate casa per casa nei sobborghi di Tripoli.

      “I migranti sono vittime di una cospirazione tra le due rive del Mediterraneo. L’Europa vede soltanto un problema di sicurezza, nessuno vuole parlare dei loro diritti”. Anche Jumaa Atigha è un avvocato di Tripoli. Nella parete del suo ufficio è appesa una Laurea in Diritto penale dell’Università La Sapienza, di Roma, conferita nel 1983. Dal 1999 ha presieduto l’Organizzazione per i diritti umani della Fondazione guidata dal primogenito di Gheddafi, Saif al Islam. Lo scorso anno si è dimesso. Dal 2003 ha condotto una campagna che ha portato alla liberazione di 1.000 prigionieri politici. Ci descrive un paese in rapido cambiamento, ma ancora lontano da una situazione ideale sul fronte delle libertà individuali e politiche. In Libia non c’è nessuna legge sull’asilo, ci conferma, ma in compenso una commissione si sta occupando di scrivere un nuova legge sull’immigrazione.

      Atigha conosce personalmente le condizioni di detenzione in Libia. Dal 1991 al 1998 è stato incarcerato, senza processo, come prigioniero politico. Ci dice che la tortura è comunemente praticata dalla polizia libica. “Dal 2003 abbiamo fatto una campagna contro la tortura nelle carceri. Abbiamo organizzato conferenze, visitato le prigioni, fatto dei corsi agli ufficiali di polizia. La mancanza di consapevolezza fa sì che la polizia pratichi la tortura pensando così di servire la giustizia”.

      Mustafa O. Attir la pensa allo stesso modo. Insegna sociologia all’Università El Fatah di Tripoli. “Non è un problema di razzismo. I libici sono gentili con gli stranieri. È un problema di polizia”. Attir sa quello che dice. È entrato nelle carceri libiche come ricercatore nel 1972, nel 1984 e nel 1986. Gli agenti di polizia non hanno istruzione - sostiene -, e sono educati al concetto di punizione.

      Le sue parole mi fanno ripensare ai parrucchieri ghanesi nella medina, ai sarti chadiani, ai negozianti sudanesi, ai camerieri egiziani, alle donne delle pulizie marocchine e agli spazzini africani che armati di scope di bambù ogni notte ripuliscono le vie dei mercati della capitale. Mentre gli eritrei si nascondono nei sobborghi di Gurji e Krimia, migliaia di immigrati africani vivono e lavorano, in condizioni di sfruttamento, ma con relativa tranquillità. Sicuramente per sudanesi e chadiani è tutto più facile. Parlano arabo e sono musulmani. La loro presenza in Libia è decennale e quindi tollerata. Lo stesso per egiziani e marocchini. Al contrario eritrei ed etiopi sono qui esclusivamente per il passaggio in Europa. Spesso non parlano arabo. Spesso sono cristiani. E i loro nonni combattevano contro i libici a fianco delle truppe coloniali italiane. E poi si sa che hanno spesso in tasca i soldi per la traversata. Per cui diventano facile mira di piccoli delinquenti e poliziotti corrotti. Per i nigeriani, e più in generale i sub-sahariani anglofoni, è ancora diverso. Che siano diretti in Europa oppure no, il loro destino in Libia si scontra sistematicamente contro il pregiudizio che si è venuto a creare contro i nigeriani, sulla scia di qualche fatto di cronaca nera. Sono accusati di portare droga, alcol e prostituzione, di essere autori di rapine e omicidi, e di diffondere il virus dell’Hiv.

      Il professor Attir, nel 2007, ha organizzato tre seminari sul tema dell’immigrazione nei paesi arabi. In Libia è uno dei massimi esperti. Ed è pronto a smentire la cifre che circolano in Europa. “Due milioni di immigrati in Libia pronti a partire per l’Italia? Non è vero”. In realtà non esistono statistiche di nessun tipo. Ma solo stime. Che però – secondo Attir – non sono attendibili. Basta dare un occhio in giro. La popolazione libica è di cinque milioni e mezzo di persone. Gli stranieri non possono ragionevolmente essere più di un milione, compresi gli immigrati arabi egiziani, tunisini, algerini e marocchini. La maggior parte di loro non ha mai pensato all’Europa. E la Libia ha bisogno di loro, perché è un paese sottopopolato e perché i libici non vogliono più fare lavori pesanti e mal retribuiti. Attir è consapevole delle pressioni che l’Europa sta facendo sulla Libia perché sigilli le sue frontiere. Ma sa che “non c’è modo per farlo”.

      La Libia ha circa 1.800 km di costa, in buona parte disabitati. Il colonnello Khaled Musa, capo delle pattuglie anti immigrazione a Zuwarah, non sa che farsene delle sei motovedette promesse dall’Italia. Potrebbero servire a pattugliare meglio il tratto di mare tra la frontiera tunisina, Ras Jdayr, e Sabratah, ammette. Ma sono solo 100 km. Il 6% della costa libica. E le partenze si sono già spostate sul litorale a est di Tripoli, tra Khums e Zlitan, a più di 200 km da Zuwarah. Il dipartimento anti immigrazione di Zuwarah è nato nel 2005. Il numero di migranti arrestati è sceso da 5.963 nel 2005 a soli 1.132 nel 2007. Per il capo del dipartimento investigazioni, Sala el Ahrali, i dati indicano il successo delle misure repressive. Molti degli organizzatori dei viaggi sono stati arrestati, questo sarebbe il motivo per cui le partenze si sono ridotte. E la costa è più controllata. Ogni dieci chilometri è installata una tenda, in mezzo alla spiaggia. Serve da appoggio ai fuoristrada della polizia, che da due anni pattugliano la litoranea, appoggiati da quattro motovedette della marina. Il tratto di costa attualmente pattugliato è di una cinquantina di chilometri. Parte da Farwah, a una decina di chilometri dalla frontiera tunisina, e finisce 15 km a est di Zuwarah, a Mellitah, nei pressi dell’imponente impianto di trattamento del gas di proprietà dell’Eni e della libica National Oil Company.

      E proprio da Mellitah parte il #Greenstream, il gasdotto sottomarino più lungo del Mediterraneo. Collega la Libia a Gela, in Sicilia. Ironia della sorte, corre lungo la stessa rotta che porta i migranti a Lampedusa. Come dire che mentre sulla superficie del mare l’Europa dispiega le sue forze militari per bloccare il transito degli esseri umani, otto miliardi di metri cubi di gas ogni anno scorrono silenziosi nei 520 km di condotta posata sui fondali di quello stesso mare, in mezzo alle ossa delle migliaia di uomini e donne morti nella traversata del Canale di Sicilia. Un’immagine che sintetizza perfettamente le relazioni degli ultimi cinque anni tra Roma e Tripoli, condotte all’insegna dello slogan “più petrolio e meno immigrati”.

      https://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/01/guantanamo-libia-il-nuovo-gendarme.html
      #gazoduc

      –---------------------------------

      Liens qu’il a mis aujourd’hui sur FB pour accompagner ce message:

      Non conosco nessuno dell’equipaggio di #Lifeline, la nave della ONG accusata dal ministro Salvini di aver agito fuorilegge soccorrendo 239 passeggeri in difficoltà in acque libiche. Purtroppo però conosco bene le carceri libiche. Fui il primo giornalista italiano a visitarle nel 2008 insieme al collega e amico Roman Herzog. Abusi, pestaggi, violenze sulle donne erano la norma già allora. Gli unici che si salvavano erano quelli che riuscivano a farsi mandare abbastanza soldi dai familiari in Europa con cui corrompevano facilmente le guardie colluse con le mafie del contrabbando per farsi rilasciare e tentare di nuovo la traversata. Gli altri, dopo mesi di prigione in condizioni inumane venivano rimpatriati sui voli dell’OIM oppure, molto più spesso, stipati come vuoti a rendere dentro i container dei camion che prendevano la via del deserto, per decine di ore, mentre sotto il sole le lamiere di ferro diventavano un forno, per essere infine abbandonati alla frontiera sud con il Niger e il Sudan, in una terra di nessuno. E quanti ne sono morti anche lì, in mezzo al Sahara. Con molti giornalisti e documentaristi abbiamo denunciato questa situazione fin dal 2007. Da quando Prodi e Amato negoziarono gli accordi di respingimento con Gheddafi a quando Berlusconi e Maroni li misero in pratica nel 2009. Da allora sembra non essere cambiato molto. E allora, pur non conoscendoli, mi azzardo a pensare che l’equipaggio della #Lifeline abbia disobbedito all’ordine di consegnare i passeggeri alla guardia costiera libica temendo per il destino di quegli uomini, di quelle donne e di quei bambini, immaginando il triste destino che li attendeva nelle prigioni oltremare.

      Dopodiché se il comportamento della #Lifeline costituisca un reato lo deciderà un giudice anche alla luce di queste considerazioni. Perché quello che il ministro Salvini si dimentica di ricordare è che la Libia non è Malta, non è la Spagna, non è la Francia. La Libia di oggi non è un paese sicuro.

      Ciononostante, attenzione, gli sbarchi devono cessare. Ma come si fa?

      Si aprono vie legali. Perché, ministro, da contribuenti italiani non vogliamo finanziare altre prigioni in Libia. Vogliamo finanziare asili nido, scuole, parchi, ospedali. Non vogliamo continuare a finanziare le milizie colluse con le stesse mafie del contrabbando che dite di voler combattere.

      Per sconfiggere quelle mafie, azzerare gli sbarchi e porre fine alle tragedie delle traversate c’è un unico modo: legalizzare l’emigrazione Africa-Europa. Perché fin quando quell’emigrazione sarà illegale, ci sarà qualche mafia pronta a lucrarci. Oggi i libici, domani gli egiziani o i tunisini. Il mare è grande e incontrollabile.

      La soluzione sarebbe così semplice che è incredibile credere che i vostri consiglieri non ve l’abbiano prospettata. Andate in Europa e chiedete a gran voce che le ambasciate UE in Africa riaprano i canali legali dei visti che hanno progressivamente chiuso in questi ultimi vent’anni, spingendo centinaia di migliaia di giovani nelle mani del contrabbando libico a cui abbiamo concesso il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord in questo mare.

      Calcolate quante persone ogni anno attraversano il mare per rimanere bloccati in Italia, senza documenti e senza lavoro. Calcolate quanti sono e rilasciate lo stesso numero di visti per ricerca di lavoro. Affinché quelle stesse persone possano comodamente imbarcarsi in aereo, con in tasca un passaporto e un visto europeo liberi di circolare in tutta Europa, ricongiungersi con i propri familiari e cercare lavoro là dove il lavoro c’è, in quel centro e nord Europa che in questi anni ha importato milioni di lavoratori dall’est mentre noi a sud predicavamo il blocco navale e continuavamo a contare i morti.

      In caso contrario, signor ministro, siate più chiari. Dite semplicemente che di negri in Europa non volete vederne. Né per le vie legali né per quelle illegali.

      https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2121309374549318&id=100000108285082

    • La zona SAR libica non esiste. Il grande inganno nel rimbalzo dei soccorsi

      "Una zona SAR libica ad oggi non esiste”, spiega Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, avvocato, esperto di immigrazione, membro del direttivo di Osservatorio Solidarietà. “E non esiste in quanto il governo di Tripoli non ha soddisfatto i requisiti imposti dall’IMO (Organizzazione marittima internazionale) per il riconoscimento delle zone SAR”, aggiunge l’avvocato.

      I requisiti consistono nell’accordo tra lo Stato che si pone come responsabile delle operazioni di salvataggio in una propria area di mare l’Organizzazione marittima internazionale (IMO). A quel punto i dati della zona SAR devono essere inseriti in un database ufficiale e pubblico, il GISIS. A marzo, in seguito al caso Open Arms, Famiglia Cristiana aveva fatto una verifica con l’IMO e la risposta ricevuta era stata: “La Libia non ha inviato le sue informazioni”.

      “Quasi tutte le operazioni di soccorso in acque internazionali nelle ultime settimane sono state coordinate dal Comando della Guardia costiera italiana proprio perché la Libia non esiste come paese unitario e non ha un Comando centrale unificato”, aggiunge Vassallo Paleologo.

      “Ma tutto è cambiato dal caso Aquarius”. Infatti da alcuni giorni anche sul sito dell’IMO compare il riferimento alla zona SAR libica “ma continua a non esistere uno stato unitario e anche le guardie costiere delle diverse città rispondono a milizie diverse“, avverte l’avvocato. “Alla fine il risultato è che il trasferimento di competenze ai libici e l’allontanamento delle Ong produce un ritardo nei soccorsi, un amento delle vittime e delle persone riportate nei centri di detenzione in Libia dove continuano gli abusi”.

      Esiste invece una zona SAR maltese. Ma Malta ha dichiarato unilateralmente la sua zona di ricerca e soccorso, un’area molto ampia che però non è riconosciuta dalle autorità marittime internazionali poiché il Governo de la Valletta non ha mai sottoscritto alcune modifiche della convenzione di Amburgo del 1979 e della convenzione #Solas introdotte nel 2004. Queste norme prevedono che lo sbarco avvenga nel paese che ha coordinato i soccorsi, e da sempre in quel tratto di mare i soccorsi sono stati coordinati dall’Italia. Quindi, in base al diritto internazionale e alla prassi i soccorsi coordinati dall’Italia hanno sempre indicato un porto di sbarco italiano.

      http://osservatoriosolidarieta.org/la-zona-sar-libica-non-esiste-il-grande-inganno-nel-rimbalz
      #Malte #SAR

    • Conséquences pour les droits de l’homme de la « dimension extérieure » de la politique d’asile et de migration de l’Union européenne : loin des yeux, loin des droits ?

      Les objectifs de la délégation des procédures de migration aux pays en dehors des frontières de l’Union européenne sont, entre autres, d’alléger la pression migratoire des États membres aux frontières de l’UE et de réduire le besoin des migrants d’entreprendre des voyages terrestres et maritimes potentiellement mortels. La réinstallation dans toute l’Europe devrait ensuite faciliter un afflux plus régulier sur le continent. Cependant, le transfert des responsabilités et l’engagement de pays tiers dans le renforcement de contrôles aux frontières de l’UE comportent de sérieux risques pour les droits de l’homme. Il augmente le risque que les migrants soient « bloqués » dans les pays de transit par la réadmission et le recours accru à des mesures punitives et restrictives telles que le refoulement, la rétention arbitraire et les mauvais traitements. C’est également un moyen pour de nombreux États membres de l’Union européenne de prendre leurs distances par rapport à la question de l’assistance et de l’intégration des réfugiés, qui est source de divisions politiques.

      Ce #rapport exhorte les États membres à œuvrer ensemble pour que le recours accru à des politiques de dissuasion ne porte pas atteinte au devoir des États européens de respecter et de défendre les droits de l’homme à l’échelle mondiale et à s’abstenir d’externaliser le contrôle des migrations vers les pays où la législation, les politiques et les pratiques ne respectent pas les normes de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Convention des Nations Unies relative au statut des réfugiés.

      http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-fr.asp?fileid=24808&lang=fr

    • Sahel, la France en guerre ?

      Au Mali, alors que la campagne pour les élections présidentielles du 29 juillet bat son plein, l’insécurité liée au terrorisme grandit. La France a-t-elle encore un rôle a jouer ? Elle a depuis 2013 une forte présence militaire entre le Sahel et le Sahara, mais quelle place tient-elle dans la guerre contre le terrorisme ?

      Sahel, la France en guerre ? Par David Dominé-Cohn ntoine de Saint-Exupéry dans Terre des hommes (1939) dresse le portrait des officiers français des compagnies méharistes au Sahara. Développées à partir de 1897 par le commandant Laperrine, ces unités d’infanterie, relevant pour partie de la Légion étrangère, apparentées aussi aux spahis, ont effectué un travail de police et de contrôle des populations des oasis. Chez l’écrivain, le capitaine Bonnafous exerce son autorité, fascinante pour l’observateur occidental, dans un mélange d’héroïsme, d’humanité et d’extrême violence : « À cause de Bonnafous chaque pas vers le sud devient un pas riche de gloire »… et d’insurrections des populations locales.

      Les grandes formes historiques semblent se reproduire dans le désert. Depuis 2013, la France entretient une présence militaire entre le Sahel et le Sahara : 4500 hommes au printemps 2018. Avec 500 opérations en trois ans et demi, l’objectif affiché est d’abord de maintenir la pression sur les groupes terroristes et d’apporter un soutien à la population locale. Les attaques terroristes sur place sont l’occasion de s’interroger sur l’espace du Sahara et du Sahel comme étant redevenu un espace majeur d’action militaire de la France. Témoignant dans le livre de David Revault d’Allones, Les guerres du président (2015), Sacha Mandel, plume de Jean-Yves Le Drian, revendique le terme de guerre pour ce qui a causé, pour la France 22 morts et des dizaines de blessés et des centaines morts et de blessés pour les adversaires. Or peut-on faire la guerre au terrorisme ?

      Faire la « guerre au #Mali » puis faire la guerre au #terrorisme

      L’intervention française au Mali avec l’opération Serval commence le 11 janvier 2013 pour soutenir l’État malien dans la reprise des villes du pays contrôlées par une alliance entre le MNLA (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad) touareg, qui réclame le développement et l’indépendance du Nord du pays, l’Azawad, et des mouvements islamistes comme Ansar Dine et le MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest) et d’autres issus de la guerre civile algérienne des années 1990 comme AQMI. Les opérations militaires françaises, appuyées par les forces des États voisins, visent d’abord à sécuriser Bamako, comme l’affirme le président Hollande le 15 janvier aux Émirats Arabes Unis. La boucle du fleuve Niger est reprise entre le 22 et le 28 janvier, la ville de Gao le 25. Le 27 janvier par une opération aéroportée de la Légion, Tombouctou est contrôlée, puis Kidal le 30. En février et mars les forces avancent vers le nord, vers Tesslit et Tigharghâr, pendant que Gao connaît un regain de violence et d’actes terroristes kamikazes comme dans la nuit du 9 au 10 février. Un effort important est fait pour séparer les mouvements de l’Azawad des islamistes. Ainsi, le général tchadien Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno déclare le 11 janvier à RFI que ses troupes, qui occupent la ville, entretiennent de bonnes relations avec le MNLA. Le 2 février, dans un discours à Bamako, François Hollande considère l’action française comme inachevée et se donne comme objectif l’éradication du terrorisme. Les opérations antiterroristes scandent toute la seconde moitié de l’année 2013 et le début de 2014. Le 1er août 2014, l’opération Serval et l’opération Épervier au Tchad sont regroupées dans l’opération Barkhane qui porte sur l’ensemble de la bande sahélo-saharienne. Michel Galy (La guerre au Mali. Comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara. Enjeux et zones d’ombre, 2013) rappelle que l’intervention française s’inscrit à la fois dans une forme de tradition française et dans un contexte général de transformation de la région. Au-delà de la remise en cause du mode de gouvernement du président Amadou Toumani Touré, les différents mouvements indépendantistes ou djihadistes s’inscrivent dans des enjeux régionaux où pèsent certains voisins du Maghreb, les puissances d’Afrique de l’Ouest et de toutes les grandes puissances mondiales occidentales ou orientales. Elles sont attentives au développement des mouvements terroristes se revendiquant de l’islam mais aussi à une région de plus en plus stratégique, jeune, au sous-sol très riche et qui sera un foyer de peuplement du XXI siècle.

      De la ligne de front à une ligne de postes

      Barkhane est devenue une opération de surveillance anti-terroriste d’un territoire immense à partir de postes avancés en liaison avec les forces locales. Le 18 avril 2018, Michel Cambon, président de la commission sénatoriale des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées souligne que dans ce cadre, la stratégie française est celle de « coups de poing » menées par des forces spéciales basées à Ouagadougou grâce au dispositif Sabre. Celui-ci est ancien, plus ancien que Barkhane et Serval. Dans le livre blanc de défense et de sécurité nationale en 2008, la désignation de l’arc de crises, allant de l’Océan atlantique à l’Océan indien entraîne la mise en place d’un plan Sahel qui comporte un large volet anti-terroriste. Comme le souligne Jean- Christophe Notin (La guerre de la France au Mali, 2014), la composante essentielle de ce volet est le prépositionnement d’unités dites Sabre de forces spéciales. Elles ont joué un rôle au début de Serval dans la protection des sites nucléaires du Niger et ont participé aux opérations Serval et Barkhane. Le soutien à la lutte anti-terroriste est un moyen majeur d’influence des grandes puissances en Afrique. Les États-Unis sont ainsi très présents depuis 2007 via leur commandement pour l’Afrique (Africom) ; la qualification de terroriste permet à chacun de se trouver un ennemi commun. Le passage d’une logique d’action militaire de reprise d’un territoire à une action de surveillance, de police et de contre-terrorisme se traduit par de nouveaux besoins en matériel, comme le souligne le sénateur Cambon : « les hélicoptères lourds, les véhicules de type quad/pickup pour la mobilité, les ISMI catcher pour l’écoute des GSM, la biométrie, la capacité « drones » ». Il conclue son rapport par « un message assez clair et assez pessimiste » : une opération militaire ne réglera pas un problème politique.

      Le terrorisme persiste largement dans la région. Le Groupement de Soutien à l’Islam et aux Musulmans, qui fédère plusieurs groupes djihadistes, dont Ansar Dine, des katibats d’al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique et d’al-Mourabitoune, lance régulièrement des attaques contre les forces dans la région. Le 2 mars 2018, deux attaques à Ouagadougou au Burkina Faso ont fait 8 morts et une soixantaine de blessés. Le 14 avril, le GSIM a lancé une attaque « complexe » avec une quinzaine d’attaquants à Tombouctou contre la force Barkhane et la Mission des Nations unies au Mali. Le groupe a revendiqué son action comme une réponse à des raids aériens. Le 5 juillet, Emmanuel Macron évoque un redéploiement du dispositif français. Le bureau pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Sahel de l’ONU soulignait dans un rapport du 29 juin la montée en capacité des mouvements terroristes autant que le possible resserrement des liens entre les différents mouvements djihadistes violents avec une extension de leurs zones d’activité. La réduction des adversaires à des mouvements avant tout terroristes mais mobiles et circulant dans un large territoire a conduit à un renouvellement des logiques d’action : le droit de poursuite au-delà de la frontière est nécessaire. Créé en février 2014, le G5 regroupe le Mali, le Niger, le Burkina Faso et le Tchad. Il vise le développement régional et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Cependant l’objectif d’une force commune actée en novembre 2015 peine à se réaliser et il a fallu attendre juin 2017 pour que l’ONU salue sa mise en place. Les financements sont aujourd’hui très insuffisants par rapport aux immenses besoins nés des contraintes du territoire. La France occupe donc de fait un rôle central dans la réalisation d’opérations de contreterrorisme par sa capacité très supérieure dans les domaines du renseignement, de la mobilité et de la frappe. Dans un milieu désertique, un espace que l’on traverse, l’action militaire est une action de contrôle de flux qui entraîne soit l’enlisement, soit des reconfigurations politiques, militaires et institutionnelles profondes. La criminalisation des personnes circulant dans de tels espaces est une stratégie classique de contrôle. Pour Hélène Claudot-Hawad (Galy, La guerre au Mali, 2013), la question Touareg a été construite tout au long de la colonisation : à partir des années 1910, l’administration française déploie un projet de tribalisation dans le but de contrôler des groupes et des circulations dans la bande sahélo-saharienne. La question des Touaregs est restée problématique pour les pouvoirs issus de la décolonisation. A l’aube de la décennie 2000 les tensions sont fortes d’autant plus que les organisations régionales de contrebande rejoignent une partie des mouvements islamistes.

      L’envers de la lutte contre les pirates du désert

      Le G5 Sahel se veut l’instrument d’une action régionale centrée sur la lutte anti-terroriste. Le terroriste y est celui qui circule impunément et qui devient ce que Daniel Heller-Roazen a vu dans la figure ancienne du pirate : l’ennemi de tous (L’ennemi de tous. Le pirate contre les nations, 2010, édition originale anglaise 2009). Le pirate brouille la limite entre criminalité et politique : « la piraterie entraine une transformation du concept de guerre. » C’est dans cette perspective qu’on peut lire le rapport du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l’Homme qui dénombre au Mali 1200 violations entre janvier 2016 et juin 2017 faisant 2700 victimes dont 441 morts. Si plus de 70% des violations sont le fait d’acteurs non étatiques on peut, par exemple, s’interroger sur le statut des 150 arrestations administratives faites par les forces de Barkhane. Les « neutralisations » des terroristes, leur mort pendant des combats ou suite à des frappes aériennes, posent également question. Le respect des Droits de l’Homme est en jeu, mais aussi le cadre juridique dans lequel interviennent les troupes françaises. En arrière plan, le rapport de l’ONU pointe que 20% des violations sont le fait des forces de sécurité maliennes. A l’horizon de ce rapport qui suit plusieurs autres avant lui, par exemple celui en mai 2017 de la FIDH « Mali : Terrorisme et impunité font chanceler un accord de paix fragile » souligne les impasses d’une approche centrée sur l’anti-terrorisme et qui ne vise pas un processus politique global dans la région. De ce fait, interroger l’action française au Sahel c’est aussi nous interroger sur le rapport au territoire des autres, particulièrement des pays en développement, le rapport aux flux dans un contexte d’urgence migratoire. Cela questionne les actions militaires futures. Ces engagements sont usants pour les hommes et les matériels et constituent un poids considérable sur notre appareil militaire. Les opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme sont légitimes dans la mesure où la terreur et les actes criminels ne sauraient être tolérés. Il faut mesurer le dilemme moral qui pèse sur tout gouvernant à la tête d’une puissance militaire capable d’une opération pour faire cesser ce qui constitue à un moment donné un scandale moral. Mais il faut admettre que ce qui constitue un scandale moral aujourd’hui s’inscrit dans des problématiques plus vastes et plus anciennes. Oublier que le terrorisme et les terroristes sont les manifestations de problèmes plus larges qu’eux-mêmes, c’est accepter de croire qu’il est possible aujourd’hui, en démocratie de faire la guerre à un mode d’action et à des idées et de gagner. L’aveuglement de certaines grandes puissances face à ces enjeux tient souvent du refoulement de problèmes qui leurs sont propres. Dans un coin du parc Montsouris à Paris, un obélisque commémore le colonel Flatters et ses compagnons tués par des Touaregs en 1881 à Bir el-Garama en tentant de rejoindre le Soudan français par le Sahara. Son expédition était l’aboutissement d’un projet porté depuis 1879 par la commission supérieure du Transsaharien visant à la création d’un chemin de fer allant de l’Algérie à Dakar via le Mali dans une double perspective de contrôle des circulations sahélo-sahariennes et donc des populations y vivant mais aussi des ressources présentes dans la région et pouvant présenter un intérêt colonial. L’échec de la mission Flatters n’a pas limité ces entreprises puisque le contrôle de ces espaces de désert a été un axe politique majeur des autorités coloniales de l’Algérie comme de l’Afrique occidentale française.

      https://aoc.media/analyse/2018/07/11/sahel-france-guerre

      signalé par @isskein via la mailing-list Migreurop

    • États africains, portiers de l’Europe

      À coups de milliards versés par l’Union européenne, les États africains deviennent les nouveaux gardes-frontières du Vieux Continent. Cette vaste enquête menée dans douze pays explore les rouages et les conséquences humaines de cette politique européenne controversée, dont les exilés paient le prix fort.

      L’Espagne a été la première à franchir le pas : face à l’afflux de migrants sur les côtes des #Canaries, le pays a décidé de subventionner plusieurs pays d’#Afrique_de_l’Ouest afin qu’ils se chargent d’arrêter à leurs frontières les candidats à l’exil. L’#Union_européenne a emboîté le pas à l’Espagne, en conditionnant l’#aide_au_développement à destination d’une vingtaine de pays africains à un renforcement de ces contrôles. Policiers et militaires européens sont parallèlement envoyés sur place pour aider à briser les routes migratoires. L’UE n’hésite d’ailleurs pas à faire de dictatures comme l’#Érythrée et le #Soudan ses « partenaires » dans la chasse aux migrants. Les véritables gagnants de ces interventions à grande échelle sont les entreprises d’armement et de sécurité européennes, dans lesquelles sont réinvesties les subventions versées. Au fil d’une vaste enquête dans douze pays, Jan M. Schäfer explore les rouages et les conséquences humaines de cette politique européenne controversée, dont les exilés paient le prix fort.

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/078195-000-A/etats-africains-portiers-de-l-europe
      #film #documentaire
      #business #armes #armement

      Le documentaire n’est plus disponible sur arte, mais peut être visionné sur Youtube, voici quelques liens actuellement valides :
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUSIi-qP2pY


      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0nf5c4FOPo

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hu7VvY5fs7Y

    • La relation dangereuse entre migration, développement et #sécurité pour externaliser les frontières en Afrique

      L’ARCI, dans le cadre du projet de monitorat de l’externalisation des politiques européennes et italiennes sur les migrations – parallèlement à son travail de communication constant sur l’évolution des accords multilatéraux et bilatéraux avec les pays d’origine et de transit, a produit ce document d’analyse pour alerter la société civile et les gouvernements sur les dérives possibles de ces stratégies qui conduisent à des violations systématiques des droits fondamentaux et des Conventions internationales


      https://www.arci.it/documento/la-relation-dangereuse-entre-migration-developpement-et-securite-pour-externali
      #rapport #Soudan #Niger #Tunisie

      In English :
      https://www.arci.it/documento/the-dangerous-link-between-migration-development-and-security-for-the-externali

    • Giochi pericolosi: delocalizzare in Africa le frontiere Ue

      Più di 25mila persone riportate nell’inferno e 600 morti nel solo mese di maggio 2018. L’esternalizzazione delle frontiere – ovvero la collaborazione con i Paesi di origine e transito per espellere facilmente i migranti o bloccarli prima dell’arrivo – nuoce gravemente alle vite dei migranti ma anche ai diritti dei cittadini dei Paesi in cui sono state delocalizzate le frontiere della Fortezza Europa e non fa certo bene alle “democrazie” che vogliono rendere invisibili i profughi messi in fuga dalle loro stesse politiche commerciali. «Esternalizzare significa spingere le responsabilità giuridiche e politiche dei nostri Paesi più a sud nella cartina del mondo, alla ricerca di una totale impunità o nel tentativo di farla ricadere su altri Paesi». A tre anni dal vertice della Valletta dove furono sancite le linee guida dell’esternalizzazione, l’Arci fa un bilancio dell’impressionante subappalto europeo a regimi come quelli nigerino, sudanese, tunisino (sono più famosi gli accordi con Libia, Egitto e Turchia) per richiamare l’attenzione di società civile e governi sugli effetti negativi di queste strategie e le loro implicazioni in merito alle violazioni sistematiche dei diritti fondamentali di migranti e popolazioni interessate. Si tratta di “La pericolosa relazione tra migrazione, sviluppo e sicurezza per esternalizzare le frontiere in Africa“, un documento d’analisi curato da Sara Prestianni dell’ufficio Immigrazione dell’Arci nell’ambito del progetto di monitoraggio Externalisation Policies Watch che ha previsto missioni sul campo tra il dicembre 2016 e luglio 2018.

      Tanto è devastante per i diritti umani, quanto fa bene ai bilanci dell’industria militare del Nord del mondo e al destino politico dei governi populisti e xenofobi che, «con la guerra ai migranti, alimentano l’immaginario di un nemico da combattere alle nostre porte, e che con la loro presenza nel continente africano si giocano la partita dell’influenza territoriale». “Aiutarli a casa loro” significa fornire carri armati ed elicotteri, sistemi biometrici e satellitari, eserciti e truppe: il rapporto segnala come il processo di esternalizzazione del controllo della frontiera europea in Africa sembra evolversi verso una predominanza della dimensione militare e della sicurezza. EucapSahel, missione “civile” per “modernizzare” le forze dell’ordine di Niger e Mali, da forza antiterrorismo è diventata centrale nella politica di gestione delle frontiere – poi ci sono le missioni militari italiane in Libia e Niger, quindi la forza congiunta G5 Sahel che – oltre ad un contributo di 100 milioni di euro – si è vista attribuire ulteriori 500 milioni di euro nel summit del marzo 2018. Si tratta di cifre ingenti che potrebbero essere usate per una reale politica di cooperazione allo sviluppo o di integrazione, come ha detto proprio a Left Selly Kane, responsabile Immigrazione della Cgil nazionale.

      La militarizzazione dell’esternalizzazione, però, non solo serve a bloccare gli arrivi in Europa ma coincide con gli interessi dell’industria italiana della sicurezza e con la concorrenza interna all’Ue per una presenza geostrategica in quelle aree. La trasformazione di Frontex nell’European Border and Coastguard Agency è solo una delle tante proposte “suggerite” dalle lobby militar-industriali alla Commissione europea. Avverte il rapporto Arci (dal quale attingiamo con ampi stralci): «L’attuazione del processo di esternalizzazione deve essere osservato anche come esempio di riduzione dello spazio democratico all’interno dell’Europa stessa e degli Stati membri. Per molte delle attività e dei fondi attribuiti per l’attuazione di tali politiche è stato aggirato il controllo democratico del Parlamento europeo cosi come, a livello italiano, si è evitata la ratificazione degli Accordi Bilaterali da parte delle Camere, in flagrante violazione dell’Art 80 della Costituzione».

      Che poi «le procedure di selezione e monitoraggio dei progetti finanziati dal Trust Fund risultino «non trasparenti e i processi di valutazione privi di coerenza» (come denunciato nel rapporto Concord) non sembra scuotere la coscienza dei governi europei avvezzi a scandali di vario tipo. Per questo il rapporto sottolinea «il compito fondamentale delle associazioni della società civile di analizzare queste politiche, riportando le responsabilità giuridiche e politiche ai diretti responsabili».

      L’analisi dell’uso dei fondi europei e italiani per attività di controllo delle frontiere – anche grazie alla retorica “aiutiamoli a casa loro” – evidenzia una parte dei progetti finanziati con l’Eutf (Centro operativo Regionale di supporto al processo di Khartoum e all’Iniziativa nel Corno d’Africa) prevede la formazione di forze di polizia e guardie di frontiera, la diffusione del sistema biometrico per la tracciabilità delle persone e la “donazione” di elicotteri, veicoli e navi di pattuglia, apparecchiature di sorveglianza e monitoraggio, «aprendo cosi alla relazione sempre più strutturata tra migrazione, sviluppo e sicurezza». L’obiettivo dell’istituzione del Fondo fiduciario era quello di ottenere maggior collaborazione da parte dei governi locali nel controllo dei flussi attraverso il finanziamento di programmi di sviluppo (sia nei Paesi di origine che di transito) e mediante il rafforzamento delle forze di polizia lungo le rotte. Una strategia europea «drammaticamente efficace»: nel 2017 il numero di ingressi irregolari in Europa è diminuito del 67%. Una diminuzione che si accompagna ad una pesante riduzione del rispetto dei diritti sia dei migranti, in mare e in terra, che della popolazione di molti dei Paesi africani coinvolti. Italia e Ue hanno calpestato tanto le Convenzioni internazionali di cui sono firmatarie che i diritti fondamentali, tra cui il diritto alla vita. La chiusura della rotta del Mediterraneo ha portato l’Italia, grazie al contributo europeo, a subappaltare le operazioni di salvataggio alla Guardia costiera libica, pur cosciente, come evidenziato dalla decisione del Consiglio di sicurezza dell’Onu, del profondo legame di questo corpo con le milizie, nonché delle violenze perpetrate sia in mare che sulla terraferma. La campagna denigratoria delle Ong che salvano vite in mare è funzionale alle politiche di esternalizzazione delle frontiere.

      Se i migranti vengono esposti a rischi sempre maggiori non se la passano meglio i cittadini dei Paesi di transito contro i quali vengono adoperati gli “aiuti a casa loro” gentilmente forniti dall’Europa. Una dinamica visibile sia nel Mediterraneo orientale, fra Turchia e Siria (l’Ue è particolarmente affabile di fronte alla deriva dittatoriale di Erdogan suo partner nel blocco di profughi afgani e siriani), sia sulla rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale. Armarsi per diventare il gendarme d’Europa è una scusa per rafforzare l’arsenale nazionale, spesso a discapito dei loro stessi cittadini. Un accordo tra Italia ed Egitto del settembre 2017, nell’ambito del progetto Itepa, prevede l’istituzione di un centro di formazione per alti funzionari di polizia incaricati della gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione dai Paesi africani presso l’Accademia di polizia egiziana. Con buona pace della battaglia per verità e giustizia per Giulio Regeni.

      Ricapitolando: i governi Ue hanno firmato accordi per legittimare i governi di tali Paesi chiudendo un occhio sulle violazioni dei diritti umani e finanziando e formando aguzzini già abbondantemente specializzati nella repressione e negli abusi dei diritti umani.

      Il Sudan è al centro dello scacchiere delle rotte migratorie, luogo di transito obbligato per i migliaia di rifugiati del Corno d’Africa ma anche paese di origine. La collaborazione della Fortezza Europa con Al Bashir «è uno strumento di repressione dei rifugiati obbligati a transitare da quel paese per fuggire, ma anche per i cittadini sudanesi in Europa, a rischio di sistematica e delle popolazioni rimaste nel paese che, con il ruolo rafforzato del dittatore sudanese, rischiano un ulteriore aumento della repressione». Un attivista incontrato durante la missione effettuata da Arci a Khartoum nel dicembre del 2016 spiega: «Non ci sarà mai giustizia per il Darfour fino a quando i vostri Stati considereranno Al Bashir un interlocutore credibile per il controllo dei migranti invece di chiudere ogni dialogo con lui. Per Al Bashir l’esternalizzazione delle frontiere è un modo per far vacillare l’embargo economico e politico imposto dopo i molteplici mandati di arresto emessi dalla Corte penale internazionale per crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità.

      Nel 2016 il dittatore sudanese ha dispiegato una nuova forza paramilitare – i Rapid support forces (Rsf) – alla frontiera nord con la Libia per il controllo dei migranti in uscita. Tra le fila dei RSF ci sono molti capi della milizia Jan Jaweed, tra le forze che più si sono sporcate le mani di sangue per l’eccidio nel Darfour e ora riciclati dallo stesso Al Bashir. Dalla fine del 2017 è stato annunciato il dispiegamento dei RSF anche nella regione di Kassala, nella zona di confine con l’Eritrea. «Di fatto la presenza di questi miliziani non fa altro che aumentare il numero d’interlocutori a cui i migranti sono obbligati a pagare tangenti e le violenze che sono costretti a subire». Refugees Deeply denuncia come personaggi chiave del regime sono i principali complici del traffico di migranti. Coloro che fingono davanti ai funzionari europei di controllare le frontiere sono di fatto coloro che gestiscono il passaggio. Una formula che l’Europa già conosceva all’epoca di Gheddafi che chiudeva e apriva le frontiere libiche «lucrando sulla vita di chi cercava di trovare rifugio, in nome della collaborazione con la UE». A Khartoum il clima di terrore che vivono i rifugiati eritrei è palpabile, vivono nascosti per evitare di essere arrestatie sanzionati o dalla polizia “dell’ordine pubblico” (di matrice islamica) che in tribunali speciali giudica comportamenti considerati illegali, o per aver violato il Sudan’s Passport and Immigration Act per cui incombono multe fino a360$. Il contributo europeo in Sudan per il controllo della migrazione ammonta a 200 milioni di euro. Nei campi avvengono continue incursioni da parte di sicari del regime di Afewerky o di trafficanti che rapiscono gli eritrei obbligandoli poi a telefonare alla famiglia in Europa, promettendola liberazione solo in cambio di soldi e progetti (come BMM e ROCK) consentono al regime sudanese di aggirare l’embargo di armi.

      Il report è un pozzo di informazioni. Per esempio quella dell’accordo di polizia firmato il 3 agosto del 2016 dal capo della nostra Polizia Gabrielli con il suo omologo sudanese che ha permesso di attuare il charter Torino-Khartoum del 24 agosto carico di sudanesi, molti provenienti dal Darfour, arrestati in retate a Ventimiglia. Le autorità italiane sarebbero rimaste totalmente impunite per questa violazione dei diritti umani se non fosse per l’importante azione di Asgi e Arci che, in collaborazione con i parlamentari europei della GUE, hanno incontrato alcuni dei sudanesi espulsi da Torino portando il loro caso davanti alla Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo. Le polizie di Francia e Belgio si comportano proprio come quella italiana.

      Il Niger è il principale beneficiario del Fondo Fiduciario Europeo per l’Africa – quasi 200 milioni di progetti finanziati ad oggi a cui si aggiunge la recente promessa di ulteriori 500 milioni nella regione del Sahel – e del nostrano Fondo Africa – 50 milioni di euro in cambio dei quali il Niger si impegna a creare nuove unità specializzare necessarie al controllo dei confini e nuovi posti di frontiera – così come dei fondi allo sviluppo: è ormai la frontiera sud dell’Europa, «il laboratorio più avanzato della politica di esternalizzazione». La criminalizzazione del “traffico illecito dei migranti” sancito nel 2015 obbliga a nascondersi chi tenta di andare verso l’Algeria o la Libia e in alcuni casi di imbarcarsi poi verso Italia e Spagna. I ghetti si spostano sempre più alla periferia della città, le partenze si fanno di notte e alla spicciolata. I costi del viaggio aumentano. Un ex passeur, citato nello studio, dice: «Se prima andare in Libia costava 150mila FCFA e in Algeria 75mila, ora, con l’aumento dei controlli ed il rischio i farsi arrestare, i prezzi sono saliti: 400mila per la Libia e 150mila per l’Algeria». L’Algeria ha risposto con sistematiche e violentissime retate di migranti ed il loro abbandono alla sua frontiera sud senza distinzioni in base allo status dei migranti. Il Teneré, come il Mediterraneo, si sta trasformando in un deserto di morte. Ma come spiega in un’inchiesta Giacomo Zandonini, in Libia, nonostante la criminalizzazione, si è continuato a entrare.

      L’Ue, con il Fondo Fiduciario, ha cercato di proporre delle alternative di riconversione per spingere i passeurs a lasciare l’attività, ma a una cifra che risulta ridicola a fronte dei milioni di FCFA che un passeur poteva guadagnare trasportando uomini e donne nel deserto.

      In Niger, uno dei Paesi più poveri al mondo seppure ricco di materie prime qualiuranio, oro e petrolio, si fronteggiano anche gli interessi italiani contro quelli francesi. Bazoum, ministro dell’interno nigerino sta negando all’Italia l’accesso dei suoi militari nel nord del paese. Annunciata prima come operazione Deserto Rosso, poi rinnegata, la missione militare italiana in Niger è stata infine ripresentata al voto al Parlamento a Camere sciolte nel febbraio 2018, con un budget di 30 milioni di euro per 9 mesi di presenza di 400 uomini nel nord del paese. Riproposta dalla neo ministra Trenta con riferimento ad un eventuale appoggio agli americani che proprio ad Agadez stanno costruendo un enorme base per i droni armati. Lo stop alla presenza armata italiana è probabilmente legata ad una opposizione francese che non cede tanto facilmente la roccaforte di Madama, al confine con la Libia.

      Infine la Tunisia, collaboratore dell’Ue nel ruolo di intercettazione dei migranti partiti dalle coste della vicina Libia e perciò rifornita di mezzi navali. Un contributo del Fondo Africa, istituito nel 2017, per un totale di 12 milioni di euro, è transitato dal MAECI al Dipartimento di Sicurezza del Ministero degli Interni alla voce “Migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, inclusi la lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. La Commissione ha annunciato lo stanziamento di ulteriori 55 milioni di euro in Marocco e Tunisia in un programma che sarà gestito dal Ministero degli Interni Italiano e ICMPD (InternationalCentre for Migration Policy Development). Se la Tunisia dimostra un alto grado di collaborazione nelle attività di monitoraggio delle proprie coste e di identificazione dei suoi cittadini in vista dell’espulsione, sembra però rigettare l’idea di costruzione di punti di sbarco dei migranti partiti dalla Libia sul suo territorio. Asgi, Arci e l’associazione tunisina FTDES, nel maggio 2018, hanno monitorato le procedure di espulsione dei cittadini tunisini dall’aeroporto di Palermo. Numerose le violazioni dei diritti di cui sono stati vittime durante la loro permanenza in Italia, ed in particolare detenzione illegale senza convalida del giudice all’interno di una struttura – l’hotspot – che manca di base giuridica nella legislazione italiana, nonché spesso vittime di trattamenti degradanti. I tunisini lamentano la presenza di sonniferi nel cibo e l’inganno usato per l’espulsione, facendo credere loro che dopo il trasferimento a Palermo sarebbero stati poi liberati. Lo stesso Garante Nazionale dei diritti delle persone detenute o private della libertà personale, a seguito del monitoraggio effettuato sulle operazioni di rimpatrio, esprime viva preoccupazione per la «pratica di non avvisare gli interessati per tempo dell’imminente rimpatrio, e cioè con un anticipo utile a verificare eventuali aggiornamenti della propria posizione giuridica, prepararsi non solo materialmente ma anche psicologicamente alla partenza e avvisare i familiari del proprio ritorno in patria». A nessuno è stato permesso difare richiesta d’asilo in una logica assurda per cui l’Italia considera i tunisini provenienti da un paese sicuro, in contrasto con la convenzione di Ginevra per cui lo studio di ogni caso deve essere fatto sulla base della singola storia personale e non sulla base del paese di origine. Con i polsi bloccati da fascette di plastica, i tunisini sono scortati da due poliziotti ciascuno fino all’aeroporto di Enfidha, più discreto di quello di Tunisi. Spesso picchiati e insultati, vengono poi rilasciati, senza neanche un centesimo in tasca. Molti sono al secondo, terzo viaggio.

      https://left.it/2018/08/07/giochi-pericolosi-delocalizzare-in-africa-le-frontiere-ue

    • Europe Is Making Its Migration Problem Worse. The Dangers of Aiding Autocrats

      Three years after the apex of the European refugee crisis, the European Union’s immigration and refugee policy is still in utter disarray. In July, Greek officials warned that they were unable to cope with the tens of thousands of migrants held on islands in the Aegean Sea. Italy’s new right-wing government has taken to turning rescue ships with hundreds of refugees away from its ports, leaving them adrift in the Mediterranean in search of a friendly harbor. Spain offered to take in one of the ships stuck in limbo, but soon thereafter turned away a second one.

      Behind the scenes, however, European leaders have been working in concert to prevent a new upsurge in arrivals, especially from sub-Saharan Africa. Their strategy: helping would-be migrants before they ever set out for Europe by pumping money and technical aid into the states along Africa’s main migrant corridors. The idea, as an agreement hashed out at a summit in Brussels this June put it, is to generate “substantial socio-economic transformation” so people no longer want to leave for a better life. Yet the EU’s plans ignore the fact that economic development in low-income countries does not reduce migration; it encourages it. Faced with this reality, the EU will increasingly have to rely on payoffs to smugglers, autocratic regimes, and militias to curb the flow of migrants—worsening the instability that has pushed many to leave in the first place.

      https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-09-05/europe-making-its-migration-problem-worse?cid=soc-tw-rdr

    • À QUI VA LA FORTUNE DÉPENSÉE POUR LUTTER CONTRE L’IMMIGRATION ?

      La politique migratoire européenne, de plus en plus restrictive, est une aubaine pour de nombreuses sociétés privées. En effet, les Etats européens sous-traitent des pans entiers de la gestion des migrations : surveillance des frontières, construction, entretien, surveillance et gestion de murs et de centres de rétention, délivrance des visas, livraison de repas, etc. Tous les éléments de cette politique coûteuse, inefficace et criminelle, profitent à de grandes entreprises, comme #Bouygues ou #Sodexo, pour ne citer que deux exemples français.

      Les migrations font partie de l’histoire de l’humanité mais les frontières n’ont jamais été aussi fermées qu’aujourd’hui. Les conventions issues des politiques migratoires actuelles ont divisé les migrants en différentes catégories (politiques, économiques, climatiques...) en fonction de la supposée légitimité ou non d’avoir accès au droit d’asile ou à séjourner sur un territoire étranger. « Le migrant économique », qui se déplace pour fuir la misère engendrée par les politiques liées au remboursement de la dette, est la catégorie qui bénéficie du moins de droits et son accès aux territoires extérieurs varie en fonction des besoins de main-d’œuvre ou des politiques de fermetures aux frontières.

      Ainsi, parmi les millions de personnes qui fuient leurs conditions de vie indécentes, celles qui migrent pour des raisons économiques seraient des migrants illégitimes ? Tout comme celles à qui on n’accorde pas le statut de réfugié politique mettant leur vie en péril ? Confrontés à une crise migratoire ou une crise de l’accueil ? Ces flux migratoires liés aux situations économiques sont en grande partie le résultat des politiques d’austérité et d’endettement insoutenables imposés par les Institutions financières internationales et les pays industrialisés du Nord aux pays appauvris du Sud, et par les pays du centre – dont ceux de l’Europe – aux pays de la périphérie. Ces politiques ont eu comme effet d’amplifier le phénomène de la pauvreté, de généraliser la précarité et, par conséquent, des situations d’exils. Les situations qui encouragent l’exode de populations pauvres sont la conséquence d’enjeux géostratégiques liés aux ressources et donc aux richesses, ou sont provoqués par l’hémorragie de capitaux pour honorer le service d’une dette bien souvent entachée d’illégitimité.

      Malmenés par la guerre ou la misère, les candidats à l’exil se retrouvent sur des routes rendues de plus en plus périlleuses par les politiques de gestion de l’immigration irrégulière. En plus d’être extrêmement coûteuses pour les populations qui en supportent les coûts, ces politiques criminalisent les migrants et les forcent à emprunter des voies de plus en plus dangereuses, comme les traversées en mer sur de frêles embarcations et à devoir s’adresser à la mafia des passeurs. Elles sont criminelles, coûteuses et inefficaces. Les murs n’ont jamais résolu de conflits et ne bénéficient qu’aux firmes qui les conçoivent, les construisent et les contrôlent.

      Loin d’adopter une politique d’accueil aux réfugiés conformément au droit international tel que stipulé par la Convention de Genève, les États adoptent des politiques sécuritaires qui bafouent le droit fondamental de liberté de circulation inscrit dans l’article 13 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme |1|. Alors que de nouveaux traités de libre-commerce ne cessent de prôner la libre-circulation des marchandises et des capitaux, les candidats à l’exil font face à des « agences de sécurité » lourdement armées et équipées par les grands industriels qui enfreignent le droit de circulation des laissés-pour-compte. Le fond de la Méditerranée est transformé en véritable fosse commune |2|, les frontières se referment et des murs sont érigés un peu partout sur la planète. Une fois passée la frontière, s’ils ne sont pas déportés vers leur pays d’origine, les migrants s’entassent dans des camps inhumains ou sont enfermés dans des centres de détention |3| qui leur sont dédiés, tels les 260 que l’on compte au sein de l’UE en 2015 |4|. Seule une faible proportion d’entre eux, suivant un fastidieux parcours bureaucratique, parvient à obtenir un droit à l’asile distribué avec parcimonie.

      A quel point les politiques migratoires européennes sont-elles dictées par l’activité de lobbying des entreprises privées de l’armement et de la sécurité ? Avec ces politiques sécuritaires, les migrants sont considérés non plus comme des personnes mais comme des numéros remplissant des quotas arbitraires pour honorer des courbes statistiques irrationnelles satisfaisant bien plus les cours de la Bourse que le bien-être collectif et les valeurs de partage et de solidarité.

      Qu’importent les conditions de travail des employés et les conditions d’accueil des migrants au mépris de leurs droits et de la dignité humaine, de plus en plus d’entreprises privées nationales ou multinationales profitent d’un business en pleine expansion aux dépens de la justice sociale et des budgets de nos États.

      Frontex, une agence européenne coûteuse, puissante, opaque et sans contrôle démocratique

      L’Europe a créé l’espace Schengen en 1985, elle l’a communautarisé en 1997 avec le traité d’Amsterdam. L’objectif annoncé était de créer un espace de « liberté, de sécurité et de justice » au sein de l’Union européenne (UE). Dans les faits, la liberté de circulation au sein de l’Europe a avancé à deux vitesses en fonction des pays et a principalement concerné les marchandises. Au fur-et-à-mesure, l’UE s’est coordonnée pour contrôler ses frontières extérieures en tentant d’appliquer une politique commune et un « soutien » aux pays ayant une frontière extérieure propice à l’entrée de migrants comme la Grèce, l’Espagne ou encore l’Italie. Depuis 2005, L’UE s’est dotée d’un arsenal militaire, l’agence Frontex, pour la gestion de la coopération aux frontières extérieures des États membres de l’Union européenne. Cette agence est la plus financée des agences de l’UE à l’heure où des efforts budgétaires sont imposés dans tous les secteurs.

      Cette agence possède des avions, des hélicoptères, des navires, des unités de radars, des détecteurs de vision nocturne mobiles, des outils aériens, des détecteurs de battement cardiaque... Frontex organise des vols de déportations, des opérations conjointes aux frontières terrestres, maritimes et aériennes |5|, la formation des gardes-frontières, le partage d’informations et de systèmes d’informations notamment via son système EUROSUR, qui a pour objectif la mise en commun de tous les systèmes de surveillance et de détections des pays membres de l’UE, etc. Son budget annuel n’a cessé d’augmenter jusqu’à ce jour : de 19 millions d’euros en 2006, il est passé à 238,7 millions en 2016 ! Les moyens militaires qui lui sont dévolus et son autonomie par rapport aux États membres ne cessent de croître.

      Depuis fin 2015, la tendance vers une ingérence de la Commission européenne dans les États membres s’accentue : La Commission européenne élargit le mandat de Frontex, elle devient « le corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes ». Cette nouvelle agence peut dorénavant agir dans le processus d’acquisition d’équipement des États membres. Elle a notamment la possibilité d’intervention directe dans un État membre sans son consentement par simple décision de la Commission européenne. Elle a par exemple la possibilité de faire des « opérations de retour conjoint » de sa propre initiative |6|, l’objectif étant de sous-traiter à l’agence le renvoi forcé des personnes indésirables, à moindre coût mais au détriment du respect des droits humains.

      Migreurop et Statewatch, deux ONG qui défendent les droits des migrants, ont dénoncé une zone de flou entourant l’agence Frontex qui ne permet pas de faire respecter les droits humains fondamentaux : une responsabilité diluée entre l’agence et les États, une violation du droit d’asile et un risque de traitement inhumains et dégradants. La priorité du sauvetage en mer, normalement reconnue à Frontex, passe en second plan face au contrôle militarisé. En novembre 2014, l’Italie illustre dramatiquement cette situation en mettant fin à Mare Nostrum, opération de sauvetage de la marine italienne qui a sauvé des dizaines de milliers de vies en mer. L’opération Triton mise en place par Frontex l’a remplacée avec un budget trois fois moindre, une portée géographique plus limitée et surtout avec un changement de perspective orienté sur le renforcement des frontières plutôt que les missions de recherche et sauvetage en mer |7|.

      Plus Frontex est subventionnée, plus elle délègue à des entreprises privées. Via l’argent public qu’elle perçoit, l’agence s’adresse à des entreprises privées pour la surveillance aériennes mais aussi pour la technologie de pointe (drones, appareils de visions nocturnes…). De nombreuses multinationales se retrouvent à assumer les « services » qui étaient auparavant assumés par les États et pour des questions de rentabilité propre au secteur privé, les coûts augmentent. Le contrôle aux frontières est devenu un business florissant.

      Le complexe militaro-industriel de l’immigration irrégulière un business florissant qui grève les caisses des États

      La dangerosité accrue des parcours profite aux passeurs et aux réseaux criminels auxquels les migrants sont obligés de faire appel, alors que ces mêmes politiques de gestion des flux migratoires disent les combattre. Mais, d’autres secteurs d’activité moins médiatisés tirent un avantage financier bien plus important de l’immigration irrégulière, tellement important qu’on peut se demander s’ils ne font pas tout pour l’encourager ! Pour les gestionnaires des centres de détentions pour migrants ; les sociétés qui y assurent la livraison des repas, la sécurité ou le nettoyage ; les entreprises qui fournissent gardes et escortes de celles et ceux que l’on expulse ; les fabricants d’armes et l’industrie aéronautique ; la technologie de pointe pour la surveillance des frontières ou les sous-traitants pour la délivrance des visas, la crise des migrants constitue une véritable aubaine, voire un filon en or.

      Cette proportion non négligeable de services autrefois du ressort exclusif de l’État est maintenant gérée par de grands groupes privés qui – pour des raisons d’image notamment – s’abritent derrière une kyrielle de sous-traitants. Cette privatisation rampante grève encore plus les caisses des pouvoirs publics, favorise l’opacité et dilue les responsabilités en cas d’incident au cours des interventions, mettant les États à l’abri de violations de la loi, pourtant fréquentes |8|.

      Instrumentalisation de l’aide publique au développement

      L’Union européenne utilise les financements de l’#Aide_publique_au_développement (#APD) pour contrôler les flux migratoires, comme avec le #Centre_d’Information_et_de_Gestion_des_Migrations (#CIGEM) inauguré en octobre 2008 à Bamako au Mali par exemple4. Ainsi, le 10e #Fonds_européen_de_développement (#FED) finance, en #Mauritanie, la formation de la police aux frontières. Pour atteindre les objectifs qu’ils se sont eux mêmes fixés (allouer 0,7 % du revenu national brut à l’APD), certains États membres de l’UE comptabilisent dans l’APD des dépenses qui n’en sont clairement pas. Malgré les réticences des États membres à harmoniser leurs politiques migratoires internes, ils arrivent à se coordonner pour leur gestion extérieure.

      « Crise migratoire » ou « crise de l’accueil » ? L’Europe externalise ses frontières

      À la croisée des chemins entre l’Europe et l’Asie, la Turquie et la Grèce sont des pays de transit pour de nombreux migrants et réfugiés faisant face aux conflits chroniques et à l’instabilité politique et économique du Moyen-Orient. Après avoir ouvert ses frontières en 2015, dans un contexte de crise, l’UE se rétracte, dépourvue d’une réflexion à long terme sur sa politique d’accueil.

      Ainsi, sans grande opposition du gouvernement Tsipras, l’UE signe avec le gouvernement turc un accord visant à contrôler et filtrer l’immigration. L’accord qui entre en vigueur le 20 mars 2016, prévoit de renvoyer en Turquie tout nouveau migrant, réfugiés syriens compris, arrivé en Grèce. Et pour chaque Syrien renvoyé, l’UE réinstallera en Europe, un autre Syrien séjournant en territoire turc. On pourrait croire à un vulgaire arrangement comptable, il n’en est rien. Le rapport est clairement déséquilibré. L’UE a spécifié un quota maximum de 72 000 syriens réinstallés alors que plus d’1 millions ont été refoulés du territoire européen. Par ces échanges déshumanisés, l’UE se donne la liberté de choisir ses immigrés en fonction de ses intérêts économiques. En échange, l’UE promet 6 milliards d’euros à la Turquie, dit vouloir relancer les négociations d’adhésion du pays à l’Union et accélère le processus de libéralisation des visas pour les citoyens turcs. De plus, Ankara s’engage à enrayer le flux migratoire vers l’Europe. En conséquence de quoi, l’argent donné sert bien plus à ériger des murs qu’à accueillir. Déjà, béton, barbelés et militaires s’installent à la frontière turco-syrienne pour consolider l’Europe forteresse.

      D’autres accords ont déjà été conclus en ce sens mais aucun n’avait atteint de tels montants, ni ne comportait de tels enjeux. Le fait qu’il soit conclu directement par l’UE marque également le début d’une nouvelle ère. L’institution eurocrate négocie maintenant au nom et en amont de ses États membres, se substituant aux politiques nationales en termes d’affaires étrangères.Avec cet accord, l’UE se targue de respecter le droit international. Mais autant la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme que la Convention de Genève sur les réfugiées stipulent qu’une expulsion ne peut se faire que vers un pays considéré comme sûr. Or, on ne peut décemment pas, à la signature de l’accord, considérer la Turquie comme une terre sûre et accueillante pour les migrants. Le président Erdoğan a en effet entamé une purge sans précédent et se révèle encore plus répressif envers ses opposants politiques, depuis qu’il sait l’Europe dépendante et conciliante. Et il ne suffit pas de fustiger le gouvernement turc. Au cœur même de l’Europe, les murs s’érigent et les politiques autoritaires et xénophobes refont surface.
      Privatisation de la « gestion » des migrations

      Une telle gestion de l’immigration grève les recettes des États pour, in fine, bénéficier aux sociétés privées et leurs actionnaires aux dépens de la satisfaction des services publics essentiels aux populations concernées. Le lobbying de ces sociétés s’inscrit dans une surenchère militariste qui profite aux grandes entreprises du secteur. Au lieu d’investir dans des infrastructures d’accueil dignes et dans la gestion des conflits dont les pays industrialisés sont en grande partie responsables, l’orientation politique de nos dirigeants va dans le sens d’un accroissement des budgets liés à la sécurité et aux polices aux frontières.

      Les flux migratoires constituent non seulement une source de revenus pour les passeurs, mais également, dans des proportions bien plus importantes, un juteux business pour les grandes entreprises, qui rappelons-le, s’arrangent pour payer le moins d’impôt sur leurs bénéfices et accroître les dividendes de leurs actionnaires. Le marché de la sécurisation des frontières, estimé à quelques 15 milliards d’euros en 2015, est en pleine croissance et devrait augmenter à plus de 29 milliards d’euros par an en 2022 |9|.

      Dans un contexte de crise migratoire aiguë, de contrôles exacerbés, de détentions et déportations en forte augmentation, une multitude de sociétés privées se sont trouvé un juteux créneau pour amasser des profits.

      Concrètement, de plus en plus de sociétés privées bénéficient de la sous-traitance de la délivrance des visas (un marché entre autres dominé par les entreprises #VFS et #TLS_Contact), et facturent aux administrations publiques la saisie des données personnelles, la prise des empreintes digitales, des photos numérisées... Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, le recours au privé a fait monter les prix des visas et le coût supplémentaire est supporté par les requérants. Mais les demandes introduites pour obtenir visas ou permis de séjour ne sont pas à la portée de tout le monde et beaucoup se retrouvent apatrides ou sans-papiers, indésirables au regard de la loi.

      La gestion des centres de détention pour migrants où sont placés les sans-papiers en attente d’expulsion est, elle aussi, sous-traitée à des entreprises privées. Ce transfert vers la sphère privée renforce le monopole des trois ou quatre multinationales qui, à l’échelle mondiale, se partagent le marché de la détention. Ainsi, près de la moitié des 11 centres de détention pour migrants du Royaume-Uni sont gérés par des groupes privés. Ces entreprises ont tout intérêt à augmenter la durée d’incarcération et font du lobbying en ce sens, non sans résultats. Ainsi, les sociétés de sécurité privées prospèrent à mesure que le nombre de migrants augmente |10|. En outre, l’hébergement d’urgence est devenu un secteur lucratif pour les sociétés privées qui perçoivent des fonds de certains États comme l’Italie, aux dépens d’associations humanitaires qui traditionnellement prennent en charge les réfugiés.

      En Belgique, entre 2008 et 2012, le budget consacré aux rapatriements forcés - frais de renvois, sans même compter les séjours en centre fermé des quelque 8 000 détenus chaque année - est passé de 5,8 millions d’euros à 8,07 millions d’euros |11|.

      La société française Sodexo a vu les détentions de migrants comme une opportunité d’extension de ses activités dans les prisons. L’empire du béton et des médias français Bouygues est chargé de la construction des centres de détention pour migrants dans le cadre de contrats de #partenariats_publics-privés (#PPP) |12| et l’entreprise de nettoyage #Onet y propose ses services. Au Royaume-Uni, des multinationales de la sécurité telles #G4S (anciennement Group 4 Securitor) |13|, Serco ou #Geo, ont pris leur essor grâce au boom des privatisations. Aux États-Unis, #CCA et GEO sont les principales entreprises qui conçoivent, construisent, financent et exploitent les centres de détention et #Sodexho_Marriott est le premier fournisseur de services alimentaire de ces établissements.

      Certaines sociétés en profitent même pour faire travailler leurs détenus en attente de leur expulsion. Ainsi, au centre de Yarl’s Wood géré par l’entreprise #Serco au Royaume-Uni, le service à la cantine ou le nettoyage des locaux est effectué par des femmes détenues contre une rémunération 23 fois moindre que le salaire pratiqué à l’extérieur pour ce type de tâche (50 pence de l’heure en 2011, soit 58 centimes d’euros). Le groupe GEO, qui en 2003 a obtenu la gestion du camp de Guantanamo « offre » à ses occupants aux centres de Harmondsworth près de l’aéroport d’Heathrow et de Dungavel en Écosse, des « opportunités de travail rémunéré » pour des services allant de la peinture au nettoyage |14|. Ces entreprises ne lésinent pas sur l’opportunité d’exploiter une main d’œuvre très bon marché et sans droits.

      L’immigration rapporte plus qu’elle ne coûte

      Les quelques migrants qui finalement parviennent à destination se mettent alors à la recherche d’un emploi et le pays d’accueil profite d’une main-d’œuvre bon marché dont il s’épargne les frais de formation payée par le pays d’origine |15|. Une telle main-d’œuvre, flexible et exploitable à merci, comble un besoin dont les économies des pays industrialisés ne peuvent se passer si facilement.

      Loin de constituer une menace et contrairement à une idée fausse, les migrations ont généralement un impact positif sur les économies des pays d’accueil. Sur un plan purement économique, d’après l’OCDE, un immigré rapporte en moyenne 3 500 euros de rentrées fiscales annuelles au pays qui l’accueille |16|. Les sans-papiers qui travaillent ont des fiches de paies, souvent au nom de tierce personne et cotisent à une couverture sociale dont ils ne peuvent bénéficier.

      En définitive, s’installe le doute quant aux résultats attendus d’une telle stratégie de gestion des flux de déplacements humains. La politique anti-migratoire mise en œuvre tue, l’Europe compte les morts mais continue à dresser ses barricades. Pourtant les migrations ne sont pas un problème, un fléau en tant que tel contre lequel il faut lutter. Les migrations sont la conséquence des conflits, des persécutions, des catastrophes environnementales, des injustices sociales et économiques dans le monde. Et c’est à ces causes-là qu’il faut s’attaquer, si l’on veut mener une politique migratoire réellement juste et humaine.

      https://www.lautrequotidien.fr/articles/lesprofiteurs
      #privatisation #Frontex

    • Border-induced displacement: The ethical and legal implications of distance-creation through externalization

      Introduction: The role of #distance

      The externalization of European border control can be defined as the range of processes whereby European actors and Member States complement policies to control migration across their territorial boundaries with initiatives that realize such control extra-territorially and through other countries and organs rather than their own. The phenomenon has multiple dimensions. The spatial dimension captures the remoteness of the geographical distance that is interposed between the locus of power and the locus of surveillance. But there is also a relational dimension, regarding the multiplicity of actors engaged in the venture through bilateral and multilateral interactions, usually through coercive dynamics of conditional reward, incentive, or penalization. And there are functional and instrumental dimensions too, concerning the cost-effectiveness of distance-creation (in both ethical and legal grounds) vis-à-vis the (unwanted) migrant, who, removed from sight, is no longer considered of concern to the supervising State,[1] and the range of externalizing policy devices at the service of externalising agents in terms of purpose, format, delivery, and ultimate control.[2] European borders thus (re-)emerge as ubiquitous, multi-modal and translational systems of coercion – as an interconnected network of ‘little Guantánamos’.[3] This, in turn, creates a distance, both physically and ethically, that is utilized to shift away concomitant responsibilities.[4]
      Distance, as the next sections will demonstrate, plays a crucial role as a mechanism not only of dispersion of legal duties, blurring the lines of causation and making attribution of wrongful conduct a difficult task, but also as an artefact of oppression and displacement in itself. It does not prevent (unwanted) migration but rather makes it unviable through legally sanctioned, safe channels, diverting it through ever more perilous routes. The immediate effect of this distance that externalization engenders is at least threefold. First, it leads to the disempowerment of migrants, who are left with no options for safe and legal escape, being instead coerced into dangerous courses operated by smugglers. Second, it legitimizes the actors enforcing externalized control on behalf, and for the benefit, of the European Union and its Member States. Repressive forces in third countries gain standing as valid interlocutors for cooperation, as a result; their democratic and human rights credentials becoming secondary, if at all relevant, as the Libyan case illustrates below. Third, legal alternatives, like the relaxation of controls or the creation of safe and regular pathways, are rejected; perceived as an illogical concession to the failure of the externalization project.
      The final outcome, and what constitutes the focus of this contribution, is the ‘border-induced displacement’ effect,[5] resulting from the combination of the processes of extraterritorialisation and externalization taken together. Border-induced displacement is not equivalent to the original reasons forcing people into exile, but rather functions as a second-order type of (re-)displacement, produced precisely via (the violence implicated in) border control. This then leads to forms of ‘engineered regionalism’, that is, politics re-producing displacement in certain areas closest to the origin of flows.[6] ‘Safe third country’ rules and practices are the main vehicle of this development, discernible also within the EU, where the Dublin System has ‘rulified’ an asymmetric allocation of responsibility for asylum claims to peripheral countries situated at the external common frontiers of the Union, like Spain, Italy and Greece.[7] In the case of externalization, border-induced displacement is then imposed upon already-displaced persons by non-European actors implementing the EU’s pre-emptive control agenda, reinforcing prevailing patterns of exploitation and existing hierarchies of exclusion and subordination.
      The ethical and legal consequences of ‘distance-creation’ are what we turn to analyse in the remainder of this article. Section 2 pays attention to the assumptions and ethical and political-economic dimensions behind this strategy, discussing exit control, coercion, and the democratic legitimization of unelected actors enforcing the EU border within third countries. Section 3 investigates the legal impact of externalization and extraterritorialization, centring on the apparent accountability gaps that it generates, contesting the legality of responsibility dispersion mechanisms. The overall conclusion we reach is that the ‘rulification’ of externalization at EU level does not render it ethically and legally tenable under international law. The ‘lawification’ at EU level of practices inconsistent with human rights is insufficient to render them compatible with international legal standards.
      2. Ethical distance-creation: Examining attempts to justify externalization and border-induced displacement

      Although immigration ethics has thrived as a discipline since its late arrival in the 1980s, debates on border control between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism have often remained at an ideational level and generally based on liberal democratic foundations,[8] thus overlooking the composite ways through which border control is realized and experienced on the ground. This includes practices of externalization and extra-territorialization. Often, the assumptions guiding ethical debates on border control have reproduced a territorially trapped gaze, circumscribed by methodological nationalism,[9] which, through a set of idealized premises, reduces the complex and transnational dynamics of displacement and border control to a phenomenon of mis-placement between territorially bordered societies.[10] Such reduction is marred by what can be called reactive and regionalist postulations. These view border control, first, as a manifestation of State agency, and, second, as only a response to migration flows. Third, they naturalize the containment of displacement within certain regions, perceiving the phenomenon as geographically and morally distant from Europe.
      But immigration ethics is far from alone in reproducing methodological nationalism and reactive and regionalist conjectures, as these mirror prevailing paradigms about the relationship between displacement and borders.[11] However, it is instructive, nonetheless, to examine European externalization by applying existing ethical debates about the democratic legitimacy, coercion, and rights of border control to the issue of externalization.[12]
      2.1. The democratic legitimacy question

      One fundamental debate has concerned the democratic legitimacy of border control as such. Assuming that freedom and democracy are instrumentally valuable for securing individual autonomy, a principled concern is that the coercive aspects of border control amount to violations of autonomy when they happen without the consent of those exposed to them. In order for border control to be legitimate from a liberal democratic perspective, it would have to be justifiable to non-members – however the demos may initially be defined – through a deliberative process.[13] Yet, proponents of border control might argue that access to asylum procedures can resolve this concern, if asylum applications are seen as granting such deliberative voice to them. Although this debate has only concerned an undifferentiated notion of border control, we can extend it to the politics of externalization, if we imagine proponents to argue that, if externalized control is able to respect individual autonomy, it might also be deemed democratically legitimate.[14] The strength of such an argument will then depend on the meaning and function of externalization.
      European externalization processes occur when European Member States, through bi-, multi- or supranational venues, complement policies of controlling cross-border migration into their territories with pre-emptive initiatives realizing such control extra-territorially and/or through sub-contracting to actors and agencies other than their own.[15] Externalization has been discussed in terms of policy transfer, issue-linkages, and ripple effects,[16] but, crucially, its dynamics apply also to intra-European relations. For many years, the Dublin system has served to transfer the border control burdens of North-Western Member States to South-Eastern ones, causing heated discussions about lacking solidarity,[17] similar to those between European and non-European countries.[18]
      Justifications offered for externalization oscillate between grammars of securitized control and humanitarian care.[19] For instance, the June 2018 proposal by the EU ministers about ‘controlled centres’ and ‘regional disembarkation platforms’, whereto ‘boat migrants’ can be deported, is framed as an innovative idea allowing Member States both to ‘stem illegal migration’ and simultaneously save vulnerable migrants by breaking the ‘business model’ of smugglers and traffickers purportedly in accordance with human rights and the rule of law.[20]
      Yet, the 2018 externalization proposal is not as innovative as it may seem. Between the 1980s and mid-2000s, five very similar – and similarly controversial – externalization proposals were put forth by the British, Danish, Dutch, and German governments and by the European Commission. And they all revolved around externalized centres in Eastern Europe and North Africa whereto EU Member States would send asylum seekers or interdicted ‘boat migrants’. The terminologies varied from ‘regional protection areas’ by the British, ‘processing centres’ by the Danes, ‘reception centres’ by the Dutch, ‘EU reception centres’ by the German, and ‘Regional Protection Programmes’ (RPPs) by the European Commission.[21] All but the RPP proposal focused on administrative deportation from European territory, so that, as put by the Blair government, ‘refoulement should be possible and the notion of an asylum seeker in[land] should die’.[22] By 2005, the German proposal had dropped any talk of extraterritorial asylum processing and moved on to identifying Libya as a promising collaborator for pre-emptive containment.[23] In light of the concurrent dysfunctional intra-European dynamics of the Dublin system, the proposals between 1986 and 2018 illustrate how the externalization logic has long been invoked as a magic remedy to the Dublin ills, always couched in crisis-laden and emergency-driven rhetoric, while also holding out vague promises of protection.
      Externalization can be criticized for co-opting protection in favour of methods of ‘consensual containment’ that re-produce displacement in regions neighbouring the EU.[24] For instance, especially since 2017, Italy and the EU have pursued a policy of transferring search and rescue to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG), thereby effectively turning missions into operations of exit control. It is due to their material contribution and close involvement in the internal command-and-control structure of the Libyan forces that the LYCG performed 19,452 pull-backs in 2017.[25] Political discourses on externalization can, however, be seen as arguing that this kind of regionalist engineering creates ‘protection elsewhere’ based on three claims, popular in ethical discussions on border control within liberal national regimes. In the following, we analyse them through standing ethical debates about coercion and prevention, peoples’ rights to enter and exit territories, and democratic legitimacy.
      2.2. Coercion: From ‘protection elsewhere’ to ‘protection nowhere’

      First comes the claim that border control, and thus also its externalized manifestations, is not illegitimately coercive, because it is only preventive. Here, coercion has been referred to as when individuals are forced to do a specific thing, while prevention is taken to mean when they are forced not to do a specific thing.[26] Second comes the aforementioned argument that border control can be legitimate when agreed upon democratically.[27] Third follows the statement of an entry/exit-asymmetry signifying that people’s rights against one State not to prevent them from exiting its territory is held to be morally paramount, but that it does not entail an equally forceful obligation on any other State to let them enter their territory.[28]
      Combining these claims, we then arrive at a ‘protection elsewhere’ argument maintaining that externalization is legitimate, since agreed to by all governments involved, and because it preserves displaced persons’ rights through extraterritorial asylum processing. Even if the policy may block their movement, this argument goes, it only prevents them from entering European territory, while still allowing them to find protection elsewhere, after having exited their own country. The zero-sum game effect that the generalisation of this policy would generate goes unaverted – if all countries did the same there would be ‘protection nowhere’.[29]
      But this argument is categorically flawed. Its definitions of coercion and prevention are problematic and rest upon a disconnect between abstract assumptions about border control guiding liberal nationalistic immigration ethics and the actual reality of displacement and European border surveillance, discounting its concrete effects on the ground. EU externalization practices yield extremely coercive checks amounting to violent regimes of exit control, also contravening the legally-sanctioned right – assumed in debates on immigration ethics – to leave one’s own country.[30] That is, even if one, for the sake of argument, assumes the right to exit to hold more value than that of entry – since at international law one is universally applicable while the other is only opposable to one’s own country[31] – actual externalization practices still violate not just the latter, but also the former.[32] The containment of migrants in Libyan detention structures, for instance, reveals an abusive regime that bars access to asylum. Amnesty International has counted twenty reports from reliable monitors, including UN and EU sources, attesting to this reality.[33] The abject brutality facing displaced persons, contained and circulated through externalization, can only be labelled non-coercive prevention from a Eurocentric, and extremely abstract vantage point. In truth, they cause suffering on such a scale that they may amount to atrocity crimes, according to the ICC Prosecutor,[34] and, as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has put it, they constitute ‘an outrage to the conscience of humanity’ – at least as far as the situation in Libya is concerned.[35] Collaborative border infrastructures are endowed with the power to coerce at a distance, with externalization leading to practices of ‘remote control’ that extraterritorially negate access to the European asylum systems to those (theoretically) entitled to international protection,[36] literally ‘trapping’ migrants in a constant ‘cycle of abuse’.[37]
      Nevertheless, even if the ethical ‘protection elsewhere’ argument must be rejected as an invalid justification for current European externalization policies the reasons for it are instructive. Seeing how externalization produces highly coercive collaborative regimes of exit control makes clear the problematic ramifications of the reactive and regionalist assumptions on which it rests. Conventional views on international relations and forced migration see the displacement to which borders respond as induced by conflicts or developmental or environmental factors.[38] Yet, while attention to the causes of displacement is important, this model embraces borders as only reactive to – rather than also constitutive of – displacement. But this is wrong. A range of border practices and infrastructures, performed at or beyond the physical frontiers of the EU, such as interdiction, detention, and deportation, do not just react to, but also in themselves cause displacement, by diverting flows towards increasingly dangerous routes and by multiplying death ratios at sea and at border zones.[39] This ‘border-induced displacement’, therefore, challenges the regionalist and reactive premise that the production of forced migration is primarily a problem created outside European territory and agency and contests the structural incorporation of (foreseeably lethal) coercion as a legitimate mechanism of border control.
      EU-Libyan relations, since the 2000s, illustrate how externalization has built the infrastructures enabling this kind of coercive re-displacement. This problematizes prevailing assumptions still dominating immigration ethics and politics, namely that the agency of border control consists of States’ discretion over movement across their territorial borders. Externalization underscores the need to consider more composite notions of agency – and thus responsibility – decoupled from national territories, and spanning several governments, organisations as well as non-state actors.
      The decades-long European-Libyan collaboration on border control is a case in point. After the European Commission decided to lift its arms embargo against Libya in 2004, two ‘technical missions’ followed. The first, in 2004, was meant to ‘identify concrete measures for possible balanced EU-Libyan cooperation particularly on illegal immigration’ and the second, in 2007, to develop ‘an operational and technical partnership’ for extraterritorial border control.[40] The case of Libya is but one example of how European externalization policies have facilitated the transformation of European border control into a flourishing market of violent deterrence and containment,[41] with little to do with a rights-based protection paradigm, and also how third countries’ control apparatuses have become a lucrative export venture for the arms-, security-, and IT-industries of the EU Member States.[42]
      2.3. Trading in rights for border control

      Companies like Spanish Indra, British BAE Systems, Italian Leonardo, French Thales and Ocea, Dutch Damen, German Rheinmetall and Airbus all compete for contracts to expand the capacity for surveillance and control of not just Libya, but also other Eastern European, North African and Middle Eastern countries collaborating on EU externalization. In 2012, an industrial consulting actor valued the global border industry at €25.8 billion, projecting an increase to €56 billion by 2022.[43] And European sales of patrol boats, jeeps, planes, drones, satellites, helicopters, radar systems and whole surveillance mechanisms for border control purposes were part of the EU export licenses worth €82 billion to the Middle East and North Africa between 2005–2014.[44] This political economy of externalization also applies to the industries of EU partner countries. For instance, in 2016, the EU channelled more than €83 million to contracts with Turkish Aselsan and Otokar to provide heavily armoured vehicles placed, respectively, at the Greek-Turkish border and the newly constructed 911 kilometre border-wall between Turkey and Syria.[45]
      The dynamics reshaping third-country border infrastructures elucidate how borders can function as engines of, rather than just responses to, displacement. This means that arguments for externalization appealing to democratic legitimacy face more problems than merely the barring of access to asylum procedures: First, because when EU Member States use their political-economic leverage to make externalization deals with non-EU countries, they are effectively asking them to replace their own public interest with the EU preference of avoiding asylum seeker flows towards the Member States. Second, because several examples, like the EU collaboration with Libyan actors, including militias and former traffickers, as further discussed in the next section, illustrate how the EU’s externalization partners very often lack democratic legitimacy.[46] EU border externalization entrenches forms of undemocratic governance in third countries, empowering undemocratic actors, transforming their relative weight within domestic structures, and weakening democratic channels of scrutiny, accountability, and power control. Externalization thereby risks creating a vicious cycle, where the influx of arms and funds to those actors willing to enact the European containment agenda grants them political validity, which is then used to undermine not only migrant rights, but also to repress domestic opposition and dissidence and thus destabilize internal democratisation processes. The short-term European goal of preventing asylum seeker flows thereby risks compromising the stated long-term goal of tackling the root causes of displacement,[47] which is sacrificed in the altar of externalised ‘integrated border management’.[48]
      3. Legal distance-creation: The juridical implications of externalization and border-induced displacement

      Externalization has not only been encapsulated in political and policy arguments and practices, but has also been embedded in law through the ‘protection elsewhere’ model. The ‘protection elsewhere’ model ultimately rests on the assumption that refugees and migrants are best served ‘at home’, whether it be in their countries of origin or in the neighbouring region (but away from the EU at any rate). ‘Onward movements’ defy this logic and are thus seriously penalized. Responsibility for reception and asylum has accordingly been delegated (or redirected) to countries proximate to the source of flows, via targeted rules on ‘safe third countries’ and readmission agreements that legalise the practice. But, as stated above, this (re-)allocation of protection duties to peripheral States is also part and parcel of the Common European Asylum System within the EU. The Dublin Regulation enshrines and ‘rulifies’ this vision for the Member States, allowing non-external border countries to deflect responsibility in a legal manner.
      Against this background, EU countries feel legitimized to claim their own irresponsibility vis-à-vis non-Member States,[49] projecting the model onto their external relations and imposing compliance with EU control rules as a matter of course. Fatalities at sea and elsewhere are then presented as the result of disorder and illegality; something avoidable if only (EU) rules were observed and effectively enforced by non-EU partners. The structural conditions imposed by the externalization apparatus, and the injustice that ensues, are usually disregarded or downplayed as unintended collateral damage. The fact that illegality is the only way out of a situation of want or persecution, and that smuggling is the only remaining vehicle to reach safety, is routinely silenced. It is the smugglers who profit of the precarious situation of ‘boat migrants’ – the argument goes. So, the eradication of smuggling and a return to (EU) law and order is portrayed as the solution. The option to relax border control rules and adapt them to the imperatives of human dignity, decriminalising the irregular movement of forced migrants, is not even contemplated. That would be perceived as an illogical concession; a descent into chaos and the negation of the rule of (EU) law. This EU-centric conception of the law is what sustains the externalization edifice and nurtures the collaboration with third countries.
      At the legal-strategic level, externalization politics are accompanied by at least two degrees of ‘irresponsibilitization’, enshrined in, and sanctioned by, EU law: responsibility diffusion and responsibility denial. ‘Diffusion’ refers to the relational dimension of externalization, to situations of multi-actor alliance where the causation chain and attribution operation become unclear, with different agents and organs of different States contributing to a particular (unlawful) result. By contrast, ‘denial’ captures scenarios of outright disclaiming of responsibility, where this is said to belong to a different actor altogether, according to the (usually EU-based) rules in place (or their self-serving interpretation).
      3.1. Responsibility diffusion

      The creation of physical distance, via exit control, disembarkation platforms, holding sites, or reception camps abroad, contributes to ‘irresponsibilitization’ through diffusion. None of the proposals put forth so far clarifies exactly who should be considered responsible for those intercepted in, and repatriated to, Libya or any alternative location hosting the centres. The overall supposition appears to be that EU Member States would ultimately escape the task.[50] But there is some residual notion that European countries could not completely ‘circumvent’ their obligations[51] – albeit without elaboration, even the Legal Service of the European Parliament concedes that migrants sent to disembarkation platforms located outside the territory of the Member States ‘should benefit from the guarantees provided for in the 1951 Geneva Convention […] and in the European Convention of Human Rights’, including the principle of non-refoulement.[52]
      Actually, under international law, ‘no State can avoid responsibility by outsourcing or contracting out its obligations’.[53] Cooperation with third countries does not exonerate EU Member States from their non-refoulement and related duties – both under general customary law and as per the relevant international Conventions.[54] According to the Strasbourg Court, ‘[w]here States establish […] international agreements to pursue cooperation in certain fields of activity’, whatever their legal nature, validity, and intent,[55] ‘there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights’. With this in mind, it would be ‘incompatible with the purpose and object of the [European Convention of Human Rights][56] if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such [agreements]’.[57] As a result, ‘[i]n so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the Contracting State […]’.[58] Despite its cooperation with Libya or any other third country, the independent responsibility of each EU Member State participating in the scheme of externalized migration controls subsists, ‘where the person[s] in question […] risk suffering a flagrant denial of the guarantees and rights secured to [them] under the Convention’.[59]
      Nor would Member States be able to evade responsibility by transferring functions to the UNHCR or the IOM – whatever their support and potential separate liability.[60] ‘Absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by such a transfer would [again] be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention’, as Strasbourg clarifies. The final effect would be for ‘the guarantees of the Convention [to] be limited or excluded at will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards’,[61] negating the basic premise of the pacta sunt servanda principle.[62] And the same is true in regard to other instruments of international human rights law.
      Even though several actors combine to produce re-displacement, individual responsibility for its effects cannot be deflected. The principle is well established in international law. Article 47 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) contemplates precisely the scenario where several States participate in the same internationally wrongful act, stipulating that in such cases ‘the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act’.[63] Each State retains responsibility and, according to the ILC Commentary, ‘is separately responsible for the conduct attributable to it’. The fact that one or more additional States also contribute to the same act in no way reduces the responsibility of each single country.[64] So, any orders or transfers performed, or orchestrated by, EU Member States will engage their responsibility for any resulting breaches of their international commitments.
      Neither the ‘disembarkation platforms’ proposal, nor any other of the similar initiatives emerged since the 1980s explored above specifies where exactly those repatriated or ‘pulled back’, whether to Libya or other third countries, would be accommodated.[65] It is conceivable that proponents envisage offshore reception centres to be closed, since the ultimate aim is to contain and deter irregular movement.[66] This then entails large-scale, and potentially long-term, detention, in breach of Article 5 ECHR guarantees,[67] which have been recognised to apply extraterritorially, extending to cases of deprivation of liberty abroad.[68] Yet, the border-induced displacement effects of externalization practices, like involuntary retention in international waters, forcible transfer to warships, coercive escorting or imposing of a certain course, constitute restrictions of physical freedom and need to accommodate the legal safeguards of the Convention.[69]
      It is not known whether the ‘disembarkation platforms’ proposal foresees transfers to the country concerned to be automatic. Should that be the case, EU Member States risk incurring direct and indirect violations of the prohibition of collective expulsion and the (non-derogable/non-limitable) protection against refoulement. Regarding the latter, the Strasbourg Court attaches paramount importance to country information contained in reports from independent sources,[70] so that when reliable accounts of the circumstances prevailing in the receiving State make it ‘sufficiently real and probable’ that the general situation entails a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, a refoulement presumption is activated and removal cannot be performed.[71] What is more, on account of the absolute character of Article 3, Contracting Parties must undertake the relevant investigation proprio motu and abstain from actions/omissions that put individuals at risk. As the Court asserted in Hirsi, ‘it [is] for the national authorities, faced with a situation in which human rights [are] systematically violated […] to find out about the treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return’.[72] So, the Member States concerned are to comply with their non-refoulement obligations proactively, regardless of whether the persons in question seek protection or specifically alert of the dangers faced upon return. The fact that potential applicants fail to request asylum or to formally oppose their removal does not absolve Contracting Parties of their Convention duties,[73] and especially their positive due diligence obligations.
      This includes the requirement to provide access to adequate procedures.[74] Member States must offer a real opportunity for individuals to submit and defend their claims,[75] including an ‘effective remedy’.[76] This requires that the remedy in question be able to ‘prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible’. Therefore, ‘it is inconsistent with Article 13 [ECHR] for such measures to be executed before the national authorities [of the Member State concerned] have examined whether they are compatible with the Convention’.[77] In these cases, appeals must have ‘automatic suspensive effect’.[78] And screening on board interdicting vessels or somewhere else offshore cannot satisfy these requirements.[79] Procedural responsibilities, just like substantive guarantees, cannot be deflected, postponed, or negated. The ultimate guarantors of ECHR safeguards are the Contracting Parties, which must ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’.[80]
      Due diligence commands the dual duty to refrain from any conduct that may result in arbitrary violations as well as the obligation to enact laws and policies that effectively protect individuals against abuse. Following the Human Rights Committee’s recent General Comment on the Right to Life, by analogy, State Parties are required to ‘organise all State organs and governance structures through which public authority is exercised in a manner consistent with the need to respect and ensure [human rights]’. This includes a duty of ‘continuous supervision’ in order to ‘prevent, investigate, punish and remedy’ any harm.[81] As a result, actions such as the ‘sale […] of […] weapons’, and presumably other similar law enforcement and border control equipment, must be preceded by a conscientious examination of its foreseeable impact on human rights.[82] As members of the international community and as subjects of customary law, States must take into account
      ‘their responsibility […] to protect lives and to oppose widespread or systematic attacks on [human rights]’[83] – like those sustained by migrants in Libya.[84] And, in particular, States have an obligation under general international law ‘not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States and non-State actors that violate [human rights]’.[85]

      All these reasons should lead to the rejection of ‘disembarkation platforms’ and similar initiatives as ‘externalization fantasyland’.[86] EU Member States should not invest in a formula that promotes cooperation with human rights perpetrators and impedes the fulfilment of their pre-contracted obligations – such a course would hardly qualify as a good faith implementation of their binding commitments.[87] Instead, domestic systems of territorial protection should be reinforced, including the necessary intra-EU solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanisms to make them effective.[88] Physical distance-creation, through off-shoring and outsourcing, does not translate into an erasure or diminution of legal duties. EU rules on ‘safe third countries’ and readmission cannot (unilaterally) undo international standards.[89]
      3.2. Responsibility denial

      Besides tools of responsibility deflection, mechanisms of outright denial of obligations are equally challenging. Usually, the capacitation of third countries’ control infrastructures, mimicking the Schengen ‘integrated border management’ system,[90] is framed as unproblematic. The transfer of funds, know-how, and equipment, as in the cases referred to in the previous section, are considered to emanate from a spirit of solidarity with non-EU partners and to be fully in line with the relevant criteria. The ethical distance between the EU or Member State gifting assets, ceding resources, or providing training and any potential human rights violations that may ensue is taken to preclude liability. There is no intent – no dolus specialis – intervening in the operation. Thus, the denial of responsibility on the European side for the atrocities in Libya, the abuses in Turkey, or the fatalities at sea associated with border-induced displacement, commonly recurs.[91]
      Yet, international law paints a more complex picture.[92] If one considers that it is ‘thanks’[93] to Italy, for instance, that the LYCG continues to exist in any functional form in the post-Kaddafi period,[94] an outright denial of responsibility becomes difficult.[95]
      Especially since the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and the Libyan Government of National Accord in February 2017,[96] the delivery of training, equipment, and assets (including the four main patrol vessels employed by the LYCG) has intensified. Italy has created a dedicated ‘Africa Fund’, € 2.5 million of which has been allocated to the maintenance of LYCG boats and the training of their crews.[97] The EU, too, has committed € 46 million to prop up Libyan interdiction capacity.[98] It has been calculated that the total combined investment by Italy and the EU will be € 285 million by 2023,[99] with the EU alone providing € 282 million – most of which via programmes administered, coordinated, or supervised by Italy.[100] In addition, an extension of the Mare Sicuro Operation, named NAURAS,[101] was approved by the Italian Parliament in August 2017, consisting of four ships, four helicopters, and 600 servicemen, of which 70 per cent are deployed at sea, with the other 30 per cent stationed in Tripoli harbour. Their key mission, as declared by the Italian Navy itself, is to ‘establish [the] operational condition[s] for LN/LNCG [i.e. Libyan Navy and LYCG] assets and develop C2 [ie command-and-control] capabilities’. Meanwhile, an ‘ITN [ie Italian Navy] naval asset in Tripoli Harbour [is] acting as LNCC [ie Libyan Navy Communication Centre] and logistic assistance/support hub’, thus assuming the function of a floating maritime rescue coordination centre.[102]
      The nature of the LYCG as a proxy for Italian interdiction has furthermore been confirmed by the judge of Catania adjudicating on the related case concerning the rescue ship Open Arms of the NGO Proactiva. In his decision, the judge takes as proven the crucial role played by Italy in leading LYCG operations. The judge goes so far as to affirm that the interventions of Libyan patrol vessels happen ‘under the aegis of the Italian Navy’ and that the coordination of rescue missions is ‘essentially entrusted to the Italian Navy, with its own naval assets and with those provided to the Libyans’.[103] This corroborates the ‘high degree of integration’ between the two,[104] and the ‘effective control’ exercised by Italy over LYCG operations, making ensuing violations attributable to it.[105]
      The subsequent abuse of those pulled back to Tripoli happens despite Italy’s knowledge of the desperate situation facing migrants in Libya, including widespread and systematic torture, rape, inhuman and degrading treatment, and enslavement. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs himself admitted that ‘taking [migrants] back to Libya, at this moment, means taking them back to hell’.[106] Nonetheless, the interdiction by proxy policy of Italy continues.[107] Amnesty International estimates that there are over 10,000 persons currently held in official detention centres in Libya – all of which funded through EU/Italian money. And, virtually all of them have been brought there as a result of their interdiction at sea by the EU/Italian-equipped and -trained LYCG.[108] Consequently, the combination of control exercised – though ‘contactless’[109] – and the knowledge of the circumstances migrants face should be understood to render Italy answerable for the resulting human rights violations, even if the LYCG is used as a surrogate.
      As per Article 8 ARSIWA, ‘[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons [such as the LYCG] shall be considered an act of a State [i.e. Italy in this case]’, when the group in question ‘is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct’. Taking the Italian Navy and the Judge of Catania’s assertions at face value, the LYCG are to be considered ‘auxiliaries’ of the Italian border machinery deployed extraterritorially, ‘instructed to carry out particular [interdiction] missions abroad’. The Italian Navy conducts the specific operations through its NAURAS effectives exercising coordination as well as command-and-control functions, meaning that the (wrongful) conduct of the LYCG shall be considered ‘an integral part of the operations’ aimed at impeding departures across the Central Mediterranean and thus be attributed to Italy.[110] It is the Italian authorities that locate targets, relay maritime coordinates, and equip and mandate the LYCG to proceed to the interdiction of migrant boats.[111] It is Italy that ‘directs’ the operations in a way that ‘does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion but rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind’.[112] Italian intervention is a sine qua non for the ‘pull-backs’ at sea to materialise, which could not be carried out autonomously by the LYCG.[113] Italy exercises ‘such a degree of control […] as to justify treating the [LYCG] as acting on its behalf’.[114]
      Italy’s involvement in Libyan search and rescue (or rather, interdiction) operations, in different ways and throughout time, rather than just an instance of complicity,[115] engaging indirect responsibility, can thus be characterised as a breach entailing direct responsibility, consisting of a ‘composite act’. Article 15 ARSIWA establishes that an international obligation (of non-refoulement, for instance, and of non-arbitrary interference with the right to leave) may indeed be violated via ‘a series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful’. The financing or training of the LYCG alone may be harmless and perfectly licit, but, when taken together and alongside the infiltration of the command-and-control chain of the LYCG by the Italian Navy, the whole, in light of the final outcome of pull-backs, becomes an illicit under international law.
      Italian jurisdiction may indeed be engaged not only in relation to action occurring within its territory and in other areas subject to its ‘effective control’, but, as the Human Rights Committee has stated, also regarding conduct ‘having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right[s] […] of individuals [abroad]’.[116] The obligation to respect and protect human rights extends beyond territorial domain to all persons subject to its jurisdiction, that is, to ‘all persons over whose enjoyment of the right[s] [concerned] it exercises power’, including ‘persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose [rights are] nonetheless impacted by its military and other activities’ – the transfer of money, equipment and enforcement capacity thus acquiring a significance of its own as a possible trigger of independent responsibility for wrongful conduct.[117] Not only the aiding and abetting of human rights violations is of relevance, whatever the form the assistance provided to the LYCG may take (whether commercial, financial, political, or logistical), but also actions (or omissions) that impede the effective enjoyment of human rights – counting the right to leave any country, to seek protection from harm, and to non-refoulement – matter too, from a legal perspective.[118] Following the Legal Service of the European Parliament in the context of its viability analysis of ‘disembarkation platforms’, engagement in any formal or informal arrangement with third countries – including Libya – to finance or contribute to the functioning of externalized structures of migration control ‘have to respect the prescriptions of the relevant provisions of international law’[119] – presumably including those under the ECHR, the ICCPR and general customary norms.[120] Failure to do so flouts the obligations concerned. Direct perpetration of an international wrong is not a pre-requisite for legal responsibility. Indirect contraventions – including via proxy – incur liability as well.[121]
      Distance-creation, through the ‘rulification’ of ‘irresponsibility’ in legal texts or self-seeking effectuations, does not do away with international obligations, nor does it legitimize the suffering it provokes. The EU and its Member States must come to recognise the predictable effect and implications of their externalization agenda. And, alongside the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, acknowledge that, as currently designed, their ‘migration policies can amount to ill-treatment’.[122] Actually, ‘[t]he primary cause for the massive abuse suffered by migrants […] is neither migration itself, nor organised crime […] but the growing tendency of States to base their official migration policies and practices on deterrence, criminalisation and discrimination’.[123] It is this distinct strategy that causes border-induced displacement, breaches human rights obligations and triggers international legal responsibility.[124]
      4. Conclusion: ‘Rulification’ as the co-option of protection

      ‘Rulification’ does not represent a paradigm shift in European politics, but rather an up-scaling of the logic observable also in proposals pursued from the 1980s and onwards and which have led to the integration of the concepts of ‘first country of arrival’, ‘safe third country’ and maritime interdiction within the legal architecture of the common borders and asylum acquis, the primary purpose of which has been the avoidance of asylum seekers on EU territory. It is the abuse and exploitation entrenched within externalization strategies that engenders border-induced displacement in Europe’s border-region. With EU Member States viewing the opening up of legal escape routes as an irrational concession, the side-effects of externalization are exacerbated as the systemic logic of asymmetric, diffused, and denied responsibility for displaced persons is reproduced further and further away from Europe, and closer and closer to the repressive regimes people attempt to escape from.
      The reactionary and regionalist assumptions underpinning externalization arguments and practices tell a securitized tale of displacements constantly generated and managed far removed from European territory and agency. However, distance-creation strategies, whether ethical, spatial, or legal, belong to the category of ‘policies based on deterrence, militarization and extraterritoriality’, denounced by UN Special Rapporteurs and others, ‘which implicitly or explicitly tolerate [and perpetuate] the risk of migrant deaths as part of an effective control of entry’.[125] As the previous sections demonstrate, the structural nature of externalization problematizes traditional assumptions and debates in immigration ethics and politics. It traps migrants in a ‘vicious circle’ of more control, more danger, and more displacement, where they must rely on facilitators to escape life-threatening perils.[126]
      But smuggling and trafficking is the consequence, rather than the cause, of suffering. Suffering is embedded in the externalization system by design through the vehicle of ‘rulification’, which serves to launder the pernicious (and perfectly foreseeable) impact of extra-territorialised/externalised coercion into ‘law-ified’ (and purportedly unintended) side effects. At the same time, the European transfer of equipment and capacity for control outwards also risks undermining processes of accountability and democratic legitimacy in regions bordering Europe. And the ‘rulification’ of border-induced displacement does not make these implications any more palatable. In the words of UN Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard, it is simply ‘not acceptable’ to deter entry by endangering life.[127] The fallacy of coercion-based protection needs to give way to an ethically grounded and legally sustainable rights-honouring paradigm. This is not to contest the legal existence of borders or their enforcement, but to challenge the legitimacy of mechanisms through which they are presently enacted in a manner incompatible with the most basic requirements of international law.

      http://www.qil-qdi.org/border-induced-displacement-the-ethical-and-legal-implications-of-distance-
      #responsabilité #déni_de_responsabilité #protection