• The big wall


    https://thebigwall.org/en

    An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent.

    There are satellites, drones, ships, cooperation projects, police posts, repatriation flights, training centers. They are the bricks of an invisible but tangible and often violent wall. Erected starting in 2015 onwards, thanks to over one billion euros of public money. With one goal: to eliminate those movements by sea, from North Africa to Italy, which in 2015 caused an outcry over a “refugee crisis”. Here we tell you about the (fragile) foundations and the (dramatic) impacts of this project. Which must be changed, urgently.

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    Ready, Set, Go

    Imagine a board game, Risk style. The board is a huge geographical map, which descends south from Italy, including the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa and almost reaching the equator, in Cameroon, South Sudan, Rwanda. Places we know little about and read rarely about.

    Each player distributes activity cards and objects between countries and along borders. In Ethiopia there is a camera crew shooting TV series called ‘Miraj’ [mirage], which recounts the misadventures of naive youth who rely on shady characters to reach Europe. There is military equipment, distributed almost everywhere: off-road vehicles for the Tunisian border police, ambulances and tank trucks for the army in Niger, patrol boats for Libya, surveillance drones taking off from Sicily.

    There is technology: satellite systems on ships in the Mediterranean, software for recording fingerprints in Egypt, laptops for the Nigerian police. And still: coming and going of flights between Libya and Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia. Maritime coordination centers, police posts in the middle of the Sahara, job orientation offices in Tunisia or Ethiopia, clinics in Uganda, facilities for minors in Eritrea, and refugee camps in Sudan.

    Hold your breath for a moment longer, because we still haven’t mentioned the training courses. And there are many: to produce yogurt in Ivory Coast, open a farm in Senegal or a beauty salon in Nigeria, to learn about the rights of refugees, or how to use a radar station.

    Crazed pawns, overlapping cards and unclear rules. Except for one: from these African countries, more than 25 of them, not one person should make it to Italy. There is only one exception allowed: leaving with a visa. Embassy officials, however, have precise instructions: anyone who doesn’t have something to return to should not be accepted. Relationships, family, and friends don’t count, but only incomes, properties, businesses, and titles do.

    For a young professional, a worker, a student, an activist, anyone looking for safety, future and adventure beyond the borders of the continent, for people like me writing and perhaps like you reading, the only allies become the facilitators, those who Europe calls traffickers and who, from friends, can turn into worst enemies.

    We called it The Big Wall. It could be one of those strategy games that keeps going throughout the night, for fans of geopolitics, conflicts, finance. But this is real life, and it’s the result of years of investments, experiments, documents and meetings. At first disorderly, sporadic, then systematized and increased since 2015, when United Nations agencies, echoed by the international media, sounded an alarm: there is a migrant crisis happening and Europe must intervene. Immediately.

    Italy was at the forefront, and all those agreements, projects, and programs from previous years suddenly converged and multiplied, becoming bricks of a wall that, from an increasingly militarized Mediterranean, moved south, to the travelers’ countries of origin.

    The basic idea, which bounced around chancelleries and European institutions, was to use multiple tools: development cooperation, support for security forces, on-site protection of refugees, repatriation, information campaigns on the risks of irregular migration. This, in the language of Brussels, was a “comprehensive approach”.

    We talked to some of the protagonists of this story — those who built the wall, who tried to jump it, and who would like to demolish it — and we looked through thousands of pages of reports, minutes, resolutions, decrees, calls for tenders, contracts, newspaper articles, research, to understand how much money Italy has spent, where, and what impacts it has had. Months of work to discover not only that this wall has dramatic consequences, but that the European – and Italian – approach to international migration stems from erroneous premises, from an emergency stance that has disastrous results for everyone, including European citizens.
    Libya: the tip of the iceberg

    It was the start of the 2017/2018 academic year and Omer Shatz, professor of international law, offered his Sciences Po students the opportunity to work alongside him on the preparation of a dossier. For the students of the faculty, this was nothing new. In the classrooms of the austere building on the Rive Gauche of Paris, which European and African heads of state have passed though, not least Emmanuel Macron, it’s normal to work on real life materials: peace agreements in Colombia, trials against dictators and foreign fighters. Those who walk on those marble floors already know that they will be able to speak with confidence in circles that matter, in politics as well as diplomacy.

    Shatz, who as a criminal lawyer in Israel is familiar with abuses and rights violations, launched his students a new challenge: to bring Europe to the International Criminal Court for the first time. “Since it was created, the court has only condemned African citizens – dictators, militia leaders – but showing European responsibility was urgent,” he explains.

    One year after first proposing the plan, Shatz sent an envelope to the Court’s headquarters, in the Dutch town of The Hague. With his colleague Juan Branco and eight of his students he recounted, in 245 pages, cases of “widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population”, linked to “crimes against humanity consciously committed by European actors, in the central Mediterranean and in Libya, in line with Italian and European Union policies”.

    The civilian population to which they refer comprises migrants and refugees, swallowed by the waves or intercepted in the central Mediterranean and brought back to shore by Libyan assets, to be placed in a seemingly endless cycle of detention. Among them are the 13.000 dead recorded since 2015, in the stretch of sea between North Africa and Italy, out of 523.000 people who survived the crossing, but also the many African and Asian citizens, who are rarely counted, who were tortured in Libya and died in any of the dozens of detention centers for foreigners, often run by militias.

    “At first we thought that the EU and Italy were outsourcing dirty work to Libya to block people, which in jargon is called ‘aiding and abetting’ in the commission of a crime, then we realized that the Europeans were actually the conductors of these operations, while the Libyans performed”, says Shatz, who, at the end of 2020, was preparing a second document for the International Criminal Court to include more names, those of the “anonymous officials of the European and Italian bureaucracy who participated in this criminal enterprise”, which was centered around the “reinvention of the Libyan Coast Guard, conceived by Italian actors”.

    Identifying heads of department, office directors, and institution executives in democratic countries as alleged criminals might seem excessive. For Shatz, however, “this is the first time, after the Nuremberg trials, after Eichmann, that Europe has committed crimes of this magnitude, outside of an armed conflict”. The court, which routinely rejects at least 95 percent of the cases presented, did not do so with Shatz and his students’ case. “Encouraging news, but that does not mean that the start of proceedings is around the corner”, explains the lawyer.

    At the basis of the alleged crimes, he continues, are “regulations, memoranda of understanding, maritime cooperation, detention centers, patrols and drones” created and financed by the European Union and Italy. Here Shatz is speaking about the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya to “reduce the flow of illegal migrants”, as the text of the document states. An objective to be achieved through training and support for the two maritime patrol forces of the very fragile Libyan national unity government, by “adapting” the existing detention centers, and supporting local development initiatives.

    Signed in Rome on February 2, 2017 and in force until 2023, the text is grafted onto the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed by Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Gaddafi in 2008, but is tied to a specific budget: that of the so-called Africa Fund, established in 2016 as the “Fund for extraordinary interventions to relaunch dialogue and cooperation with African countries of priority importance for migration routes” and extended in 2020 — as the Migration Fund — to non-African countries too.

    310 million euros were allocated in total between the end of 2016 and November 2020, and 252 of those were disbursed, according to our reconstruction.

    A multiplication of tools and funds that, explains Mario Giro, “was born after the summit between the European Union and African leaders in Malta, in November 2015”. According to the former undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2013, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs between 2016 and 2018, that summit in Malta “sanctioned the triumph of a European obsession, that of reducing migration from Africa at all costs: in exchange of this containment, there was a willingness to spend, invest”. For Giro, the one in Malta was an “attempt to come together, but not a real partnership”.

    Libya, where more than 90 percent of those attempting to cross the central Mediterranean departed from in those years, was the heart of a project in which Italian funds and interests support and integrate with programs by the European Union and other member states. It was an all-European dialogue, from which powerful Africans — political leaders but also policemen, militiamen, and the traffickers themselves — tried to obtain something: legitimacy, funds, equipment.

    Fragmented and torn apart by a decade-long conflict, Libya was however not alone. In October 2015, just before the handshakes and the usual photographs at the Malta meeting, the European Commission established an Emergency Trust Fund to “address the root causes of migration in Africa”.

    To do so, as Dutch researcher Thomas Spijkerboer will reconstruct years later, the EU executive declared a state of emergency in the 26 African countries that benefit from the Fund, thus justifying the choice to circumvent European competition rules in favor of direct award procedures. However “it’s implausible – Spijkerboeker will go on to argue – that there is a crisis in all 26 African countries where the Trust Fund operates through the duration of the Trust Fund”, now extended until the end of 2021.

    However, the imperative, as an advisor to the Budget Commission of the European Parliament explains, was to act immediately: “not within a few weeks, but days, hours“.

    Faced with a Libya still ineffective at stopping flows to the north, it was in fact necessary to intervene further south, traveling backwards along the routes that converge from dozens of African countries and go towards Tripolitania. And — like dominoes in reverse — raising borders and convincing, or forcing, potential travelers to stop in their countries of origin or in others along the way, before they arrived on the shores of the Mediterranean.

    For the first time since decolonization, human mobility in Africa became the keystone of Italian policies on the continent, so much so that analysts began speaking of migration diplomacy. Factors such as the number of migrants leaving from a given country and the number of border posts or repatriations all became part of the political game, on the same level as profits from oil extraction, promises of investment, arms sales, or trade agreements.

    Comprising projects, funds, and programs, this migration diplomacy comes at a cost. For the period between January 2015 and November 2020, we tracked down 317 funding lines managed by Italy with its own funds and partially co-financed by the European Union. A total of 1.337 billion euros, spent over five years and destined to eight different items of expenditure. Here Libya is in first place, but it is not alone.

    A long story, in short

    For simplicity’s sake, we can say that it all started in the hot summer of 2002, with an almost surrealist lightning war over a barren rock on the edge of the Mediterranean: the Isla de Persejil, the island of parsley. A little island in the Strait of Gibraltar, disputed for decades between Morocco and Spain, which had its ephemeral moment of glory when in July of that year the Moroccan monarchy sent six soldiers, some tents and a flag. Jose-Maria Aznar’s government quickly responded with a reconquista to the sound of fighter-bombers, frigates, and helicopters.

    Peace was signed only a few weeks later and the island went back to being a land of shepherds and military patrols. Which from then on, however, were joint ones.

    “There was talk of combating drug trafficking and illegal fishing, but the reality was different: these were the first anti-immigration operations co-managed by Spanish and Moroccan soldiers”, explains Sebastian Cobarrubias, professor of geography at the University of Zaragoza. The model, he says, was the one of Franco-Spanish counter-terrorism operations in the Basque Country, exported from the Pyrenees to the sea border.

    A process of externalization of Spanish and European migration policy was born following those events in 2002, and culminating years later with the crisis de los cayucos, the pirogue crisis: the arrival of tens of thousands of people – 31,000 in 2006 alone – in the Canary Islands, following extremely dangerous crossings from Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco.

    In close dialogue with the European Commission, which saw the Spanish border as the most porous one of the fragile Schengen area, the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero reacted quickly. “Within a few months, cooperation and repatriation agreements were signed with nine African countries,” says Cobarrubias, who fought for years, with little success, to obtain the texts of the agreements.

    The events of the late 2000s look terribly similar to what Italy will try to implement a decade later with its Mediterranean neighbors, Libya first of all. So much so that in 2016 it was the Spanish Minister of the Interior himself, Jorge Fernández Díaz, who recalled that “the Spanish one is a European management model, reproducible in other contexts”. A vision confirmed by the European Commission officials with whom we spoke.

    At the heart of the Spanish strategy, which over a few short years led to a drastic decrease of arrivals by sea, was the opening of new diplomatic offices in Africa, the launch of local development projects, and above all the support given to the security forces of partner countries.

    Cobarrubias recounts at least four characteristic elements of the Madrid approach: the construction of new patrol forces “such as the Mauritanian Coast Guard, which did not exist and was created by Spain thanks to European funds, with the support of the newly created Frontex agency”; direct and indirect support for detention centers, such as the infamous ‘Guantanamito’, or little Guantanamo, denounced by civil society organizations in Mauritania; the real-time collection of border data and information, carried out by the SIVE satellite system, a prototype of Eurosur, an incredibly expensive intelligence center on the EU’s external borders launched in 2013, based on drones, satellites, airplanes, and sensors; and finally, the strategy of working backwards along migration routes, to seal borders, from the sea to the Sahara desert, and investing locally with development and governance programs, which Spain did during the two phases of the so-called Plan Africa, between 2006 and 2012.

    Replace “Spain” with “Italy”, and “Mauritania” with “Libya”, and you’ll have an idea of what happened years later, in an attempt to seal another European border.

    The main legacy of the Spanish model, according to the Italian sociologist Lorenzo Gabrielli, however, is the negative conditionality, which is the fact of conditioning the disbursement of these loans – for security forces, ministries, trade agreements – at the level of the African partners’ cooperation in the management of migration, constantly threatening to reduce investments if there are not enough repatriations being carried out, or if controls and pushbacks fail. An idea that is reminiscent both of the enlargement process of the European Union, with all the access restrictions placed on candidate countries, and of the Schengen Treaty, the attempt to break down internal European borders, which, as a consequence, created the need to protect a new common border, the external one.
    La externalización europea del control migratorio: ¿La acción española como modelo? Read more

    At the end of 2015, when almost 150,000 people had reached the Italian coast and over 850,000 had crossed Turkey and the Balkans to enter the European Union, the story of the maritime migration to Spain had almost faded from memory.

    But something remained of it: a management model. Based, once again, on an idea of crisis.

    “We tried to apply it to post-Gaddafi Libya – explains Stefano Manservisi, who over the past decade has chaired two key departments for migration policies in the EU Commission, Home Affairs and Development Cooperation – but in 2013 we soon realized that things had blown up, that that there was no government to talk to: the whole strategy had to be reformulated”.

    Going backwards, through routes and processes

    The six-month presidency of the European Council, in 2014, was the perfect opportunity for Italy.

    In November of that year, Matteo Renzi’s government hosted a conference in Rome to launch the Khartoum Process, the brand new initiative for the migration route between the EU and the Horn of Africa, modeled on the Rabat Process, born in 2006, at the apex of the crisis de los cayucos, after pressure from Spain. It’s a regional cooperation platform between EU countries and nine African countries, based on the exchange of information and coordination between governments, to manage migration.
    Il processo di Khartoum: l’Italia e l’Europa contro le migrazioni Read more

    Warning: if you start to find terms such as ‘process’ and ‘coordination platform’ nebulous, don’t worry. The backbone of European policies is made of these structures: meetings, committees, negotiating tables with unattractive names, whose roles elude most of us. It’s a tendency towards the multiplication of dialogue and decision spaces, that the migration policies of recent years have, if possible, accentuated, in the name of flexibility, of being ready for any eventuality. Of continuous crisis.

    Let’s go back to that inter-ministerial meeting in Rome that gave life to the Khartoum Process and in which Libya, where the civil war had resumed violently a few months earlier, was not present.

    Italy thus began looking beyond Libya, to the so-called countries of origin and transit. Such as Ethiopia, a historic beneficiary of Italian development cooperation, and Sudan. Indeed, both nations host refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, two of the main countries of origin of those who cross the central Mediterranean between 2013 and 2015. Improving their living conditions was urgent, to prevent them from traveling again, from dreaming of Europe. In Niger, on the other hand, which is an access corridor to Libya for those traveling from countries such as Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, and Mali, Italy co-financed a study for a new law against migrant smuggling, then adopted in 2015, which became the cornerstone of a radical attempt to reduce movement across the Sahara desert, which you will read about later.

    A year later, with the Malta summit and the birth of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Italy was therefore ready to act. With a 123 million euro contribution, allocated from 2017 through the Africa Fund and the Migration Fund, Italy became the second donor country, and one of the most active in trying to manage those over 4 billion euros allocated for five years. [If you are curious about the financing mechanisms of the Trust Fund, read here: https://thebigwall.org/en/trust-fund/].

    Through the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), born in 2014 as an operational branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy immediately made itself available to manage European Fund projects, and one idea seemed to be the driving one: using classic development programs, but implemented in record time, to offer on-site alternatives to young people eager to leave, while improving access to basic services.

    Local development, therefore, became the intervention to address the so-called root causes of migration. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newborn AICS, it seemed a winning approach. Unsurprisingly, the first project approved through the Trust Fund for Africa was managed by the Italian agency in Ethiopia.

    “Stemming irregular migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia” received 19.8 million euros in funding, a rare sum for local development interventions. The goal was to create job opportunities and open career guidance centers for young people in four Ethiopian regions. Or at least that’s how it seemed. In the first place, among the objectives listed in the project sheet, there is in fact another one: to reduce irregular migration.

    In the logical matrix of the project, which insiders know is the presentation – through data, indicators and figures – of the expected results, there is no indicator that appears next to the “reduction of irregular migration” objective. There is no way, it’s implicitly admitted, to verify that that goal has been achieved. That the young person trained to start a micro-enterprise in the Wollo area, for example, is one less migrant.

    Bizarre, not to mention wrong. But indicative of the problems of an approach of which, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains to us, “Italy had made itself the spokesperson in Europe”.

    “The mantra was that more development would stop migration, and at a certain point that worked for everyone: for AICS, which justified its funds in the face of political landscape that was scared by the issue of landings, and for many NGOs, which immediately understood that migrations were the parsley to be sprinkled on the funding requests that were presented”, explains the official, who, like so many in this story, prefers to remain anonymous.

    This idea of the root causes was reproduced, as in an echo chamber, “without programmatic documents, without guidelines, but on the wave of a vague idea of political consensus around the goal of containing migration”, he adds. This makes it almost impossible to talk about, so much so that a proposal for new guidelines on immigration and development, drawn up during 2020 by AICS, was set aside for months.

    Indeed, if someone were to say, as evidenced by scholars such as Michael Clemens, that development can also increase migration, and that migration itself is a source of development, the whole ‘root causes’ idea would collapse and the already tight cooperation budgets would risk being cut, in the name of the same absolute imperative as always: reducing arrivals to Italy and Europe.

    Maintaining a vague, costly and unverifiable approach is equally damaging.

    Bram Frouws, director of the Mixed Migration Center, a think-tank that studies international mobility, points out, for example, how the ‘root cause’ approach arises from a vision of migration as a problem to be eradicated rather than managed, and that paradoxically, the definition of these deep causes always remains superficial. In fact, there is never talk of how international fishing agreements damage local communities, nor of land grabbing by speculators, major construction work, or corruption and arms sales. There is only talk of generic economic vulnerability, of a country’s lack of stability. An almost abstract phenomenon, in which European actors are exempt from any responsibility.

    There is another problem: in the name of the fight against irregular migration, interventions have shifted from poorer and truly vulnerable countries and populations to regions with ‘high migratory rates’, a term repeated in dozens of project descriptions funded over the past few years, distorting one of the cardinal principles of development aid, codified in regulations and agreements: that of responding to the most urgent needs of a given population, and of not imposing external priorities, even more so if it is countries considered richer are the ones doing it.

    The Nigerien experiment

    While Ethiopia and Sudan absorb the most substantial share of funds destined to tackle the root causes of migration — respectively 47 and 32 million euros out of a total expenditure of 195 million euros — Niger, which for years has been contending for the podium of least developed country on the planet with Central African Republic according to the United Nations Human Development Index — benefits from just over 10 million euros.

    Here in fact it’s more urgent, for Italy and the EU, to intervene on border control rather than root causes, to stop the flow of people that cross the country until they arrive in Agadez, to then disappear in the Sahara and emerge, days later — if all goes well — in southern Libya. In 2016, the International Organization for Migration counted nearly 300,000 people passing through a single checkpoint along the road to Libya. The figure bounced between the offices of the European Commission, and from there to the Farnesina, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: faced with an uncontrollable Libya, intervening in Niger became a priority.

    Italy did it in great style, even before opening an embassy in the country, in February 2017: with a contribution to the state budget of Niger of 50 million euros, part of the Africa Fund, included as part of a maxi-program managed by the EU in the country and paid out in several installments.

    While the project documents list a number of conditions for the continuation of the funding, including increased monitoring along the routes to Libya and the adoption of regulations and strategies for border control, some local and European officials with whom we have spoken think that the assessments were made with one eye closed: the important thing was in fact to provide those funds to be spent in a country that for Italy, until then, had been synonymous only with tourism in the Sahara dunes and development in rural areas.

    Having become a priority in the New Partnership Framework on Migration, yet another EU operational program, launched in 2016, Niger seemed thus exempt from controls on the management of funds to which beneficiaries of European funds are normally subject to.

    “Our control mechanisms, the Court of Auditors, the Parliament and the anti-corruption Authority, do not work, and yet the European partners have injected millions of euros into state coffers, without imposing transparency mechanisms”, reports then Ali Idrissa Nani , president of the Réseau des Organizations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse du Budget (ROTAB), a network of associations that seeks to monitor state spending in Niger.

    “It leaves me embittered, but for some years we we’ve had the impression that civil liberties, human rights, and participation are no longer a European priority“, continues Nani, who —- at the end of 2020 — has just filed a complaint with the Court of Niamey, to ask the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the possible disappearance of at least 120 million euros in funds from the Ministry of Defense, a Pandora’s box uncovered by local and international journalists.

    For Nani, who like other Nigerien activists spent most of 2018 in prison for encouraging demonstrations against high living costs, this explosion of European and Italian cooperation didn’t do the country any good, and in fact favoured authoritarian tendencies, and limited even more the independence of the judiciary.

    For their part, the Nigerien rulers have more than others seized the opportunity offered by European donors to obtain legitimacy and support. Right after the Valletta summit, they were the first to present an action plan to reduce migration to Libya, which they abruptly implemented in mid-2016, applying the anti-trafficking law whose preliminary study was financed by Italy, with the aim of emptying the city of #Agadez of migrants from other countries.

    The transport of people to the Libyan border, an activity that until that point happened in the light of day and was sanctioned at least informally by the local authorities, thus became illegal from one day to the next. Hundreds of drivers, intermediaries, and facilitators were arrested, and an entire economy crashed

    But did the movement of people really decrease? Almost impossible to tell. The only data available are those of the International Organization for Migration, which continues to record the number of transits at certain police posts. But drivers and foreign travelers no longer pass through them, fearing they will be arrested or stopped. Routes and journeys, as always happens, are remodeled, only to reappear elsewhere. Over the border with Chad, or in Algeria, or in a risky zigzagging of small tracks, to avoid patrols.

    For Hamidou Manou Nabara, a Nigerien sociologist and researcher, the problems with this type of cooperation are manifold.

    On the one hand, it restricted the free movement guaranteed within the Economic Community of West African States, a sort of ‘Schengen area’ between 15 countries in the region, making half of Niger, from Agadez to the north, a no-go areas for foreign citizens, even though they still had the right to move throughout the national territory.

    Finally, those traveling north were made even more vulnerable. “The control of borders and migratory movements was justified on humanitarian grounds, to contrast human trafficking, but in reality very few victims of trafficking were ever identified: the center of this cooperation is repression”, explains Nabara.

    Increasing controls, through military and police operations, actually exposes travelers to greater violations of human rights, both by state agents and passeurs, making the Sahara crossings longer and riskier.

    The fight against human trafficking, a slogan repeated by European and African leaders and a central expenditure item of the Italian intervention between Africa and the Mediterranean — 142 million euros in five years —- actually risks having the opposite effect. Because a trafiicker’s bread and butter, in addition to people’s desire to travel, is closed borders and denied visas.

    A reinvented frontier

    Galvanized by the activism of the European Commission after the launch of the Trust Fund but under pressure internally, faced with a discourse on migration that seemed to invade every public space — from the front pages of newspapers to television talk-shows — and unable to agree on how to manage migration within the Schengen area, European rulers thus found an agreement outside the continent: to add more bricks to that wall that must reduce movements through the Mediterranean.

    Between 2015 and 2016, Italian, Dutch, German, French and European Union ministers, presidents and senior officials travel relentlessly between countries considered priorities for migration, and increasingly for security, and invite their colleagues to the European capitals. A coming and going of flights to Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tunisia, Senegal, Chad, Guinea, to make agreements, negotiate.

    “Niamey had become a crossroads for European diplomats”, remembers Ali Idrissa Nani, “but few understood the reasons”.

    However, unlike the border with Turkey, where the agreement signed with the EU at the beginning of 2016 in no time reduced the arrival of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi citizens in Greece, the continent’s other ‘hot’ border, promises of speed and effectiveness by the Trust Fund for Africa did not seem to materialize. Departures from Libya, in particular, remained constant. And in the meantime, in the upcoming election in a divided Italy, the issue of migration seemed to be tipping the balance, capable of shifting votes and alliances.

    It is at that point that the Italian Ministry of the Interior, newly led by Marco Minniti, put its foot on the accelerator. The Viminale, the Italian Ministry of the Interior, became the orchestrator of a new intervention plan, refined between Rome and Brussels, with German support, which went back to focusing everything on Libya and on that stretch of sea that separates it from Italy.

    “In those months the phones were hot, everyone was looking for Marco“, says an official of the Interior Ministry, who admits that “the Ministry of the Interior had snatched the Libyan dossier from Foreign Affairs, but only because up until then the Foreign Ministry hadn’t obtained anything” .

    Minniti’s first move was the signing of the new Memorandum with Libya, which gave way to a tripartite plan.

    At the top of the agenda was the creation of a maritime interception device for boats departing from the Libyan coast, through the reconstruction of the Coast Guard and the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS), the two patrol forces belonging to the Ministry of Defense and that of the Interior, and the establishment of a rescue coordination center, prerequisites for Libya to declare to the International Maritime Organization that it had a Search and Rescue Area, so that the Italian Coast Guard could ask Libyan colleagues to intervene if there were boats in trouble.

    Accompanying this work in Libya is a jungle of Italian and EU missions, surveillance systems and military operations — from the European Frontex, Eunavfor Med and Eubam Libya, to the Italian military mission “Safe Waters” — equipped with drones, planes, patrol boats, whose task is to monitor the Libyan Sea, which is increasingly emptied by the European humanitarian ships that started operating in 2014 (whose maneuvering spaces are in the meantime reduced to the bone due to various strategies) to support Libyan interception operations.

    The second point of the ‘Minniti agenda’ was to progressively empty Libya of migrants and refugees, so that an escape by sea would become increasingly difficult. Between 2017 and 2020, the Libyan assets, which are in large part composed of patrol boats donated by Italy, intercepted and returned to shore about 56,000 people according to data released by UN agencies. The Italian-European plan envisages two solutions: for economic migrants, the return to the country of origin; for refugees, the possibility of obtaining protection.

    There is one part of this plan that worked better, at least in terms of European wishes: repatriation, presented as ‘assisted voluntary return’. This vision was propelled by images, released in October 2017 by CNN as part of a report on the abuse of foreigners in Libya, of what appears to be a slave auction. The images reopened the unhealed wounds of the slave trade through Atlantic and Sahara, and helped the creation of a Joint Initiative between the International Organization for Migration, the European Union, and the African Union, aimed at returning and reintegrating people in the countries of origin.

    Part of the Italian funding for IOM was injected into this complex system of repatriation by air, from Tripoli to more than 20 countries, which has contributed to the repatriation of 87,000 people over three years. 33,000 from Libya, and 37,000 from Niger.

    A similar program for refugees, which envisages transit through other African countries (Niger and Rwanda gave their availability) and from there resettlement to Europe or North America, recorded much lower numbers: 3,300 evacuations between the end of 2017 and the end of 2020. For the 47,000 people registered as refugees in Libya, leaving the country without returning to their home country, to the starting point, is almost impossible.

    Finally, there is a third, lesser-known point of the Italian plan: even in Libya, Italy wants to intervene on the root causes of migration, or rather on the economies linked to the transit and smuggling of migrants. The scheme is simple: support basic services and local authorities in migrant transit areas, in exchange for this transit being controlled and reduced. The transit of people brings with it the circulation of currency, a more valuable asset than usual in a country at war, and this above all in the south of Libya, in the immense Saharan region of Fezzan, the gateway to the country, bordering Algeria, Niger, and Chad and almost inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.

    A game in which intelligence plays central role (as also revealed by the journalist Lorenzo D’Agostino on Foreign Policy), as indeed it did in another negotiation and exchange of money: those 5 million euros destined — according to various journalistic reconstructions — to a Sabratha militia, the Anas Al-Dabbashi Brigade, to stop departures from the coastal city.

    A year later, its leader, Ahmed Al-Dabbashi, will be sanctioned by the UN Security Council, as leader for criminal activities related to human trafficking.

    The one built in record time by the ministry led by Marco Minniti is therefore a complicated and expensive puzzle. To finance it, there are above all the Trust Fund for Africa of the EU, and the Italian Africa Fund, initially headed only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unpacked among several ministries for the occasion, but also the Internal Security Fund of the EU, which funds military equipment for all Italian security forces, as well as funds and activities from the Ministry of Defense.

    A significant part of those 666 million euros dedicated to border control, but also of funds to support governance and fight traffickers, converges and enters this plan: a machine that was built too quickly, among whose wheels human rights and Libya’s peace process are sacrificed.

    “We were looking for an immediate result and we lost sight of the big picture, sacrificing peace on the altar of the fight against migration, when Libya was in pieces, in the hands of militias who were holding us hostage”. This is how former Deputy Minister Mario Giro describes the troubled handling of the Libyan dossier.

    For Marwa Mohamed, a Libyan activist, all these funds and interventions were “provided without any real clause of respect for human rights, and have fragmented the country even more, because they were intercepted by the militias, which are the same ones that manage both the smuggling of migrants that detention centers, such as that of Abd el-Rahman al-Milad, known as ‘al-Bija’ ”.

    Projects aimed at Libyan municipalities, included in the interventions on the root causes of migration — such as the whole detention system, invigorated by the introduction of people intercepted at sea (and ‘improved’ through millions of euros of Italian funds) — offer legitimacy, when they do not finance it directly, to the ramified and violent system of local powers that the German political scientist Wolfram Lacher defines as the ‘Tripoli militia cartel‘. [for more details on the many Italian funds in Libya, read here].
    Fondi italiani in Libia Read more

    “Bringing migrants back to shore, perpetuating a detention system, does not only mean subjecting people to new abuses, but also enriching the militias, fueling the conflict”, continues Mohamed, who is now based in London, where she is a spokesman of the Libyan Lawyers for Justice organization.

    The last few years of Italian cooperation, she argues, have been “a sequence of lost opportunities”. And to those who tell you — Italian and European officials especially — that reforming justice, putting an end to that absolute impunity that strengthens the militias, is too difficult, Mohamed replies without hesitation: “to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, the authorities contacted the militias close to the Tripoli government one by one and in the meantime built a non-existent structure from scratch, the Libyan Coast Guard: and you’re telling me that you can’t put the judicial system back on its feet and protect refugees? ”

    The only thing that mattered, however, in that summer of 2017, were the numbers. Which, for the first time since 2013, were falling again, and quickly. In the month of August there were 80 percent fewer landings than the year before. And so it would be for the following months and years.

    “Since then, we have continued to allocate, renewing programs and projects, without asking for any guarantee in exchange for the treatment of migrants”, explains Matteo De Bellis, researcher at Amnesty International, remembering that the Italian promise to modify the Memorandum of Understanding, introducing clauses of protection, has been on stop since the controversial renewal of the document, in February 2020.

    Repatriations, evacuations, promises

    We are 1500 kilometers of road, and sand, south of Tripoli. Here Salah* spends his days escaping a merciless sun. The last three years of the life of the thirty-year-old Sudanese have not offered much else and now, like many fellow sufferers, he does not hide his fatigue.

    We are in a camp 15 kilometers from Agadez, in Niger, in the middle of the Sahara desert, where Salah lives with a thousand people, mostly Sudanese from the Darfur region, the epicenter of one of the most dramatic and lethal conflicts of recent decades.

    Like almost all the inhabitants of this temporary Saharan settlement, managed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and — at the end of 2020 — undergoing rehabilitation also thanks to Italian funds, he passed through Libya and since 2017, after three years of interceptions at sea and detention, he’s been desperately searching for a way out, for a future.

    Salah fled Darfur in 2016, after receiving threats from pro-government armed militias, and reached Tripoli after a series of vicissitudes and violence. In late spring 2017, he sailed from nearby Zawiya with 115 other people. They were intercepted, brought back to shore and imprisoned in a detention center, formally headed by the government but in fact controlled by the Al-Nasr militia, linked to the trafficker Al-Bija.

    “They beat us everywhere, for days, raped some women in front of us, and asked everyone to call families to get money sent,” Salah recalls. Months later, after paying some money and escaping, he crossed the Sahara again, up to Agadez. UNHCR had just opened a facility and from there, as rumour had it, you could ask to be resettled to Europe.

    Faced with sealed maritime borders, and after experiencing torture and abuse, that faint hope set in motion almost two thousand people, who, hoping to reach Italy, found themselves on the edges of the Sahara, along what many, by virtue of investments and negotiations, had started to call the ‘new European frontier’.

    Three years later, a little over a thousand people remain of that initial group. Only a few dozen of them had access to resettlement, while many returned to Libya, and to all of its abuses.

    Something similar is also happening in Tunisia, where since 2017, the number of migrants and refugees entering the country has increased. They are fleeing by land and sometimes by sea from Libya, going to crowd UN structures. Then, faced with a lack of real prospects, they return to Libya.

    For Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Federation for Economic and Social Rights, “in Tunisia European partners have financed a non-reception: overcrowded centers in unworthy conditions, which have become recruitment areas for traffickers, because in fact there are two options offered there: go home or try to get back to the sea “.

    In short, even the interventions for the protection of migrants and refugees must be read in a broader context, of a contraction of mobility and human rights. “The refugee management itself has submitted to the goal of containment, which is the true original sin of the Italian and European strategy,” admits a UNHCR official.

    This dogma of containment, at any cost, affects everyone — people who travel, humanitarian actors, civil society, local governments — by distorting priorities, diverting funds, and undermining future relationships and prospects. The same ones that European officials call partnerships and which in the case of Africa, as reiterated in 2020 by President Ursula Von Der Leyen, should be “between equals”.

    Let’s take another example: the Egypt of President Abdel Fetah Al-Sisi. Since 2016, it has been increasingly isolated on the international level, also due to violent internal repression, which Italy knows something about. Among the thousands of people who have been disappeared or killed in recent years, is researcher Giulio Regeni, whose body was thrown on the side of a road north of Cairo in February 2016.

    Around the time of the murder, in which the complicity and cover-ups by the Egyptian security forces were immediately evident, the Italian Ministry of the Interior restarted its dialogue with the country. “It’s absurd, but Italy started to support Egypt in negotiations with the European Union,” explains lawyer Muhammed Al-Kashef, a member of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Right and now a refugee in Germany.

    By inserting itself on an already existing cooperation project that saw italy, for example, finance the use of fingerprint-recording software used by the Egyptian police, the Italian Ministry of the Interior was able to create a police academy in Cairo, inaugurated in 2018 with European funds, to train the border guards of over 20 African countries. Italy also backed Egyptian requests within the Khartoum Process and, on a different front, sells weapons and conducts joint naval exercises.

    “Rome could have played a role in Egypt, supporting the democratic process after the 2011 revolution, but it preferred to fall into the migration trap, fearing a wave of migration that would never happen,” says Al-Kashef.

    With one result: “they have helped transform Egypt into a country that kills dreams, and often dreamers too, and from which all young people today want to escape”. Much more so than in 2015 or that hopeful 2011.

    Cracks in the wall, and how to widen them

    If you have read this far, following personal stories and routes of people and funds, you will have understood one thing, above all: that the beating heart of this strategy, set up by Italy with the participation of the European Union and vice versa, is the reduction of migrations across the Mediterranean. The wall, in fact.

    Now try to add other European countries to this picture. Since 2015 many have fully adopted — or returned to — this process of ‘externalization’ of migration policies. Spain, where the Canary Islands route reopened in 2019, demonstrating the fragility of the model you read about above; France, with its strategic network in the former colonies, the so-called Françafrique. And then Germany, Belgium, Holland, United Kingdom, Austria.

    Complicated, isn’t it? This great wall’s bricks and builders keep multiplying. Even more strategies, meetings, committees, funds and documents. And often, the same lack of transparency, which makes reconstructing these loans – understanding which cement, sand, and lime mixture was used, i.e. who really benefited from the expense, what equipment was provided, how the results were monitored – a long process, when it’s not impossible.

    The Pact on Migration and Asylum of the European Union, presented in September 2020, seems to confirm this: cooperation with third countries and relaunching repatriations are at its core.

    Even the European Union budget for the seven-year period 2021-2027, approved in December 2020, continues to focus on this expenditure, for example by earmarking for migration projects 10 percent of the new Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, equipped with 70 billion euros, but also diverting a large part of the Immigration and Asylum Fund (8.7 billion) towards support for repatriation, and foreseeing 12.1 billion euros for border control.

    While now, with the new US presidency, some have called into question the future of the wall on the border with Mexico, perhaps the most famous of the anti-migrant barriers in the world, the wall built in the Mediterranean and further south, up to the equator, has seemingly never been so strong.

    But economists, sociologists, human rights defenders, analysts and travelers all demonstrate the problems with this model. “It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it,” says David Kipp, a researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs, a government-funded think-tank.

    For Kipp, however, we must begin to deflate this migration bubble, and go back to addressing migration as a human phenomenon, to be understood and managed. “I dream of the moment when this issue will be normalized, and will become something boring,” he admits timidly.

    To do this, cracks must be opened in the wall and in a model that seems solid but really isn’t, that has undesirable effects, violates human rights, and isolates Europe and Italy.

    Anna Knoll, researcher at the European Center for Development Policy Management, explains for example that European policies have tried to limit movements even within Africa, while the future of the continent is the freedom of movement of goods and people, and “for Europe, it is an excellent time to support this, also given the pressure from other international players, China first of all”.

    For Sabelo Mbokazi, who heads the Labor and Migration department of the Social Affairs Commission of the African Union (AU), there is one issue on which the two continental blocs have divergent positions: legal entry channels. “For the EU, they are something residual, we have a much broader vision,” he explains. And this will be one of the themes of the next EU-AU summit, which was postponed several times in 2020.

    It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it
    David Kipp - researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs

    Indeed, the issue of legal access channels to the Italian and European territory is one of the most important, and so far almost imperceptible, cracks in this Big Wall. In the last five years, Italy has spent just 15 million euros on it, 1.1 percent of the total expenditure dedicated to external dimensions of migration.

    The European Union hasn’t done any better. “Legal migration, which was one of the pillars of the strategy born in Valletta in 2015, has remained a dead letter, but if we limit ourselves to closing the borders, we will not go far”, says Stefano Manservisi, who as a senior official of the EU Commission worked on all the migration dossiers during those years.

    Yet we all know that a trafficker’s worst enemy are passport stamps, visas, and airline tickets.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=HmR96ySikkY

    Helen Dempster, who’s an economist at the Center for Global Development, spends her days studying how to do this: how to open legal channels of entry, and how to get states to think about it. And there is an effective example: we must not end up like Japan.

    “For decades, Japan has had very restrictive migration policies, it hasn’t allowed anyone in”, explains Dempster, “but in recent years it has realized that, with its aging population, it soon won’t have enough people to do basic jobs, pay taxes, and finance pensions”. And so, in April 2019, the Asian country began accepting work visa applications, hoping to attract 500,000 foreign workers.

    In Europe, however, “the hysteria surrounding migration in 2015 and 2016 stopped all debate“. Slowly, things are starting to move again. On the other hand, several European states, Italy and Germany especially, have one thing in common with Japan: an increasingly aging population.

    “All European labor ministries know that they must act quickly, but there are two preconceptions: that it is difficult to develop adequate projects, and that public opinion is against it.” For Dempster, who helped design an access program to the Belgian IT sector for Moroccan workers, these are false problems. “If we want to look at it from the point of view of the security of the receiving countries, bringing a person with a passport allows us to have a lot more information about who they are, which we do not have if we force them to arrive by sea”, she explains.

    Let’s look at some figures to make it easier: in 2007, Italy made 340,000 entry visas available, half of them seasonal, for non-EU workers, as part of the Flows Decree, Italy’s main legal entry channel adopted annually by the government. Few people cried “invasion” back then. Ten years later, in 2017, those 119,000 people who reached Italy through the Mediterranean seemed a disproportionate number. In the same year, the quotas of the Flow decree were just 30,000.

    Perhaps these numbers aren’t comparable, and building legal entry programs is certainly long, expensive, and apparently impractical, if we think of the economic and social effects of the coronavirus pandemic in which we are immersed. For Dempster, however, “it is important to be ready, to launch pilot programs, to create infrastructures and relationships”. So that we don’t end up like Japan, “which has urgently launched an access program for workers, without really knowing how to manage them”.

    The Spanish case, as already mentioned, shows how a model born twenty years ago, and then adopted along all the borders between Europe and Africa, does not really work.

    As international mobility declined, aided by the pandemic, at least 41,000 people landed in Spain in 2020, almost all of them in the Canary Islands. Numbers that take us back to 2006 and remind us how, after all, this ‘outsourcing’ offers costly and ineffective solutions.

    It’s reminiscent of so-called planned obsolescence, the production model for which a technological object isn’t built to last, inducing the consumer to replace it after a few years. But continually renewing and re-financing these walls can be convenient for multinational security companies, shipyards, political speculators, authoritarian regimes, and international traffickers. Certainly not for citizens, who — from the Italian and European institutions — would expect better products. May they think of what the world will be like in 10, 30, 50 years, and avoid trampling human rights and canceling democratic processes in the name of a goal that — history seems to teach — is short-lived. The ideas are not lacking. [At this link you’ll find the recommendations developed by ActionAid: https://thebigwall.org/en/recommendations/].

    https://thebigwall.org/en
    #Italie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #frontières #business #Afrique #budget #Afrique_du_Nord #Libye #chiffres #Niger #Soudan #Ethiopie #Sénégal #root_causes #causes_profondes #contrôles_frontaliers #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #propagande #campagne #dissuasion

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et plus précisément :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765328

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_

  • Assiste-t-on à une mondialisation de la protestation sociale ?
    https://reporterre.net/Assiste-t-on-a-une-mondialisation-de-la-protestation-sociale

    De Haïti au Soudan, en passant par les rues d’Alger et de Hong Kong, une vague contestataire mondiale secoue le Sud. Portant le visage d’une jeunesse …

    #Afrique #Afrique_de_l'Est #Algérie #Asie #Afrique_du_Nord

  • Publication: The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa

    https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-geography-of-conflict-in-north-and-west-africa_02181039-en

    African governments are increasingly confronted with new forms of political violence. The situation is particularly worrying in the Sahara-Sahel where violence is on the rise. This degrading security situation has prompted African countries and their partners to intervene militarily to stabilise the region and to prevent the spread of extremism and violence against civilians. However, these initiatives face many obstacles due to the transnational nature and geography of violence. Tensions regionalise across state borders when armed groups, defeated by counter-insurgency efforts, relocate to other countries. This study maps the evolution of violence across North and West Africa, with a particular focus on Mali, Lake Chad and Libya. In the regions experiencing the highest levels of political insecurity, it identifies whether and how conflicts tend to cluster or spread, potentially across national borders. The work is based on a new spatial indicator of political violence designed to assess the long-term evolution of conflicts and provide policy options.

    #Geography_of_conflict #Géographie_des_conflits #North_Africa #West_Africa #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_de_l_Ouest #Geography #Conflicts #Géographie #Conflits

  • Accueil de la base de données d’images
    http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ulysse

    Recommandé par un jeune historien (https://twitter.com/ArthurAsseraf) qui vient de sortir un livre sur l’histoire du #colonialisme, cette base de données pleines de merveilles, dans le genre de celle qui est affichée ci-dessous.

    #algérie #afrique_du_nord #clichés_arabes

    • ‘We failed to reach Europe – now our families disown us’

      Most of the West African migrants who fail to reach Europe eventually return to their own countries, but it can be a bitter homecoming. In Sierra Leone, returnees are often rejected by relatives and friends. They’re seen as failures, and many stole from their families to pay for their journey.

      Some readers will find this story disturbing

      Fatmata breaks into sobs when she remembers the six months she spent in slavery as the “wife” of a Tuareg nomad who seized her in the Sahara desert.

      “They call him Ahmed. He was so huge and so wicked,” she says. “He said, ’You are a slave, you are black. You people are from hell.’ He told me when somebody has a slave, you can do whatever you want to do. Not only him. Sometimes he would tell his friend, ’You can have a taste of anything inside my house.’ They tortured me every day.”

      That was only the beginning of the horrors Fatmata, aged 28, from Freetown, Sierra Leone, experienced as she tried to cross West Africa to the Mediterranean. She eventually escaped from Ahmed, but was recaptured by traffickers who held her in their own private jail in Algeria.

      After she and other migrants broke out, Fatmata, deeply traumatised, decided to abandon her dreams of a new life in Europe - and go back to where she started. She applied to an intergovernmental agency, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which pays the fares for migrants who want to return home.

      Last December, she arrived back in Freetown, by bus from Mali - after nearly two years away. But there were no emotional reunions, no welcomes, no embraces. Nearly a year later, Fatmata hasn’t even seen her mother - or the daughter, now eight, she left behind.

      “I was so happy to come back,” she says. “But I wish I had not.”

      When she got back, she called her brother. But his reaction terrified her. “He told me, ’You should not even have come home. You should just die where you went, because you didn’t bring anything back home.’”

      After that, she says, “I didn’t have the heart to go and see my mother.”

      Fatmata
      Image caption Fatmata thought she’d be able to pay back the money she stole

      But her family didn’t reject her just because she was a failure. It was also because of how she funded her journey.

      She stole 25 million leones - about US $2,600 at today’s exchange rate, but then worth a lot more - from her aunt. It was money her aunt had given her to buy clothes, that could then be resold as part of her trading business. Her aunt regularly trusted her in that way.

      “I was only thinking how to get the money and go,” Fatmata says, though she adds that she’s not a selfish person. “If I had succeeded in going to Europe, I decided that I would triple the money, I would take good care of my aunt and my mum.”

      But Fatmata’s aunt’s business never recovered from the loss of the money. And - to make things even worse - the theft has caused a rift between the aunt and her sister, Fatmata’s mother, whom she falsely accuses of being in on Fatmata’s plan.

      “I’m in pain, serious pain!” her mother says, when I visit her. “The day I set eyes on Fatmata, she will end up in the police station - and I will die.”

      It’s a story that’s repeated in the families of many of the 3,000 or so Sierra Leoneans who have returned in the last two years after failing to reach Europe.

      At one time, relatives often raised the money to send someone, but there’s less willingness to do that now that stories of imprisonment and death along the route have multiplied. Now, many would-be migrants keep their plans secret, and take whatever money they can, sometimes even selling the title deeds to the family land.

      Jamilatu
      Image caption Jamilatu stole money which had been lent to her mother

      At the headquarters of the Advocacy Network Against Irregular Migration, a voluntary group that helps returned migrants rebuild their lives, all the returnees I meet have stolen from their families.

      Jamilatu, aged 21, who escaped with Fatmata from the traffickers’ prison in Algeria, took a plastic bag of cash worth $3,500 from her mother’s room when she was out of the house. The money didn’t even belong to her mother. It had all been lent to her by neighbours, as part of a microcredit scheme.

      After Jamilatu left, the furious creditors besieged her mother’s house, threatening to kill her if she didn’t return the money. She was forced to flee Freetown for Bo, three hours away in the south of the country, leaving her three other children behind with their father.

      “My mum doesn’t want to talk to me, because of the money,” Jamilatu says. “So since I came back, I haven’t seen her. And I want to see my mum - it’s over two years now that I’m not seeing her.”

      Jamilatu and her mother
      Image caption Jamilatu has been estranged from her mother for more than two years

      I visit her mother, Maryatu, at her new home in Bo, and after a long conversation she says she would like to see Jamilatu again, despite the suffering she’s caused.

      But when they meet, soon afterwards, it’s a short, awkward and almost silent reunion. They embrace stiffly. Then Jamilatu kneels in front of her, asking for forgiveness. Neither looks the other in the eye.

      Afterwards, Jamilatu goes straight back to Freetown.

      “I am the happiest woman on Earth today because I have seen my mum,” she says. But she doesn’t look happy. Her mother has told her they can’t live under the same roof again until Jamilatu has raised the money to repay the creditors.

      It’s hard to see how that will be possible. Jamilatu, like Fatmata, has no job. They both depend on support from Advocacy Network Against Irregular Migration. The group was founded by Sheku Bangura, himself a returned migrant, who lobbies the Sierra Leonean government to do more for returnees - currently there’s very little official support - and tries to give practical help himself. He finds accommodation for those who are homeless, intervenes with the police if returnees get into trouble, and organises basic psychological counselling.

      Sheku Bangura
      Image caption Sheku Bangura has personal experience of the challenges faced by returnees

      “I have had a lot of migrants who have mental problems,” he says. “These young people, they are on the streets, they don’t have place to sleep. It’s not really easy for them.”

      One of those helping out at the Advocacy Network is 31-year-old Alimamy, who set out across the Sahara three years ago, after stealing and selling an expensive water-packaging machine belonging to his uncle.

      One of his two travelling companions died of starvation in the desert. The second drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean in a dinghy. Alimamy ended up in a Libyan detention camp. He was only rescued in November 2017 when the IOM began organising flights from Tripoli to West Africa for those who wanted to go home.

      Emaciated and exhausted, he accepted the offer of a ticket, but he was terrified of the reception he would get. “I was thinking I should not come back to Sierra Leone, because I know my uncle has a very high temper,” he says.

      Alimamy
      Image caption Alimamy’s attempt to reach Europe ended in a Libyan migration detention centre

      Since returning, Alimamy has lived with friends. His elder brother, Sheik Umar, a former professional footballer, says: “We are hearing he is in Freetown, he is suffering. And yet he hasn’t got the guts to face any of us in the family.”

      Sheik Umar says he used to be close to his brother, but if he sees him now, he will ensure he is “arrested, prosecuted and convicted”.

      “If he dies in prison, I will not have any regrets, I am sure no family members will have regret, because of the shame he has put on all of us.”

      He says the water-packaging business Alimamy had been entrusted to run by his uncle could have generated enough money to support the whole family.

      “But he misused that opportunity and all of us are in this mess now… Wherever I go now, people taunt me. Our mother is sick, she has moved to a village. That (business) was the beginning of our hopes. But Alimamy has shattered all of that.”

      Alimamy himself is angry and frustrated. “I have come back home, no impact, just like I’m zero,” he says. “The place where I am living, it’s like a hell for me. The way people look at me, I don’t feel happy. They’re looking at me like I’m not human.”

      Sheik Umar
      Image caption Sheik Umar says his family has suffered as a result of Alimamy’s actions

      The IOM offers migrants who return voluntarily to their home countries in Africa “re-integration allowances” worth up to 1,500 euros (£1,270). The money comes from a 347m-euro fund financed mainly by the European Union. But the allowances aren’t paid in cash. If they were, most people would just use them to repay their relatives. So the IOM pays for goods or services that applicants can prove they need to set up a specific business.

      Alimamy got an allowance to buy a motorcycle to rent out to other drivers to use as a taxi. But after just four months, one of the drivers went off with it and never came back. Alimamy himself had become a victim of theft.

      As for Fatmata and Jamilatu, they never received an allowance because they returned from Mali at a time when some other Sierra Leoneans were abusing the system by catching a bus to Mali, pretending they’d returned from across the Sahara, and claiming the allowance. So everyone returning from Mali lost out, including Fatmata and Jamilatu.

      Awareness raising event organised by the Advocacy Network

      Now, all three returnees take part in “awareness-raising” events organised by the Advocacy Network. They go out on the streets with placards and loudspeakers to warn other young people of the dangers of illegal migration, and urge them to stay in “sweet Sierra Leone”.

      But for them, home is no longer sweet. All three are consumed by feelings of worthlessness.

      Fatmata says: “I have nothing to offer, I have nothing to show. I can’t even go and see my daughter, I only see the pictures, because I have nothing to give her when I get there, so I can’t.”

      Alimamy says the “stigmatisation” he suffers is forcing him to do the opposite of what he says on the streets. He wants to make another attempt to reach Europe.

      “Staying here is like a hell for me,” he says. I remind him of the horrors he experienced on his first attempt, being enslaved, imprisoned, and seeing friends die.

      “Well,” he says, “I have been through that, and I’m sure I could cope.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-50391297

      #return_migration #Sierra_Leone #Advocacy_Network_Against_Irregular_Migration #Sheku_Bangura #awareness-raising [sic] #stigmatisation #mental_health #trauma #IOM #re-integration_allowances

    • A Hard Lesson for Migrants Who Give Up: There May Be No Welcome Mat Back Home

      Jessica Kablan, 27, came back to Ivory Coast seven months pregnant by a man she had turned to for protection on the road.Credit...Yagazie Emezi for The New York Times

      THIAROYE-SUR-MER, Senegal — The fishing village has long sent its men to sea, but after foreign trawlers scraped the bottom clean, the men began coming back empty-handed. It has long sent its men abroad for work, too, but their luck is often no better.

      Last November, when El Hadji Macoura Diop, a 37-year-old fisherman, failed to reach Europe by boat, he could not bring himself to call his wife and tell her he was giving up. “I knew it would just destroy her,” he said.

      Hard as it is to leave home for an unknown land and an uncertain future, coming back, migrants say, can be even harder. Often, they feel ashamed to admit defeat, especially to families that may have scrimped to raise money for their trip. And they struggle to reintegrate into the societies they left behind.

      In 2010, when he was 19, Yaya Guindo fled his life herding cattle in a small farming village in Ivory Coast. Last winter, after eight years on the road working in construction and at restaurants, he returned, broken and defeated, from a detention center in Libya.

      He tried to go home, he said, but his friends mocked him. “I didn’t have anything,” he said. “I was embarrassed.”

      The experiences of Mr. Diop and Mr. Guindo are far from unusual. Researchers estimate that one out of four people who migrate in search of opportunity return to their country of birth — some by choice, others not.

      Just since 2017, the International Organization for Migration has helped more than 62,000 migrants return to 13 countries in West and Central Africa, transported on charter flights and buses arranged by the agency. Many said they wanted to go home after being detained in abysmal conditions in Libyan detention centers, like one in Tajoura that was bombed in early July, killing more than 50 people.

      Once back, they are offered help reintegrating, including temporary shelter, pocket money, job training and psychological counseling.

      “These people left for a reason, and if you don’t address that, they will keep dying at sea,” said Florence Kim, a spokeswoman for the International Organization for Migration, which runs the program. “If you give people what they needed in the first place, they don’t need to take the risks.”

      The organization placed Mr. Guindo in a training program as a restaurant worker in a trendy neighborhood of Abidjan, the largest city in Ivory Coast. Other returning migrants have been given training as carpenters, tailors or shopkeepers.

      But after the initial support, the migrants are on their own.

      “We’re trying not to create a parallel system where migrants who are coming back to their country would have better service than Ivorians who chose not to leave,” Lavinia Prati, a reintegration officer for the International Organization for Migration.

      The transition can be rocky.

      Mr. Guindo, for example, has angered his employers by skipping work to play basketball for a local club. He says he needs to maintain good relations with the club because it is giving him housing in exchange for playing.

      Yet as hard as it is to adjust, Mr. Guindo said he was staying put.

      “I saw people dying of hunger, I saw women raped, men beheaded,” he said. “What I saw, what I lived, what I heard — I would not leave again.”

      Another returnee to Ivory Coast, Jessica Kablan, 27, came back seven months pregnant by a man she had turned to for protection on the road. Although the nature of the relationship was intrinsically coercive, it seemed to her the best choice she could make under the circumstances. When her boyfriend back home — who had helped pay for her trip — realized she was pregnant, he ended the relationship.

      She does not blame him.

      “I came back with a child,” she said. “How could he accept that?”

      Meliane Lorng, a psychologist who counsels returning migrants through the International Organization for Migration, says the women with children often don’t tell their families that they are back, “because the infant is the living testimony that they were raped.”

      Uncounted other migrants, like the fisherman, have returned on their own, without the help of humanitarian agencies.

      Thiaroye-sur-Mer has been a major source of migration for more than a decade. Hundreds of men have tried to reach Europe — mainly Spain. Everyone knows the migrant motto, “Barca ou barzakh”: Wolof for “Barcelona or die.”

      Some make it. Some die trying. And some return, said Moustapha Diouf, himself a returned migrant, who created a community center for them.

      To the outsider, Thiaroye-sur-Mer can seem like an idyllic place, not somewhere people would be eager to leave: Men sit on the beach, mending their nets, while children play in the surf. But when they do come back home, migrants often get a stark reminder of why they left in the first place.

      One recent day, Mr. Diop, the fisherman who abandoned his attempt to reach Europe, and his five partners came back to shore with about 100 small silver fish called sardinella in their nets. Once the owner of the boat got his share, they would earn about a dollar each, he said.

      There was a time when some migrants setting off in hopes of a better life left right from the shores of the village by pirogue, the colorfully painted wooden canoes used for fishing. More recently, the grapevine has advised them to go by air to Morocco, where Senegalese do not need visas, and then catch passage across the Mediterranean with a smuggler.

      From the roofs of the village houses, the view of the ocean goes on forever. It is easy to imagine that Europe might be just beyond the horizon. And it is possible to forget, if only for a moment, the many dangers of the journey.

      Often, it is the women who encourage the men to migrate.

      Mr. Diop’s mother, Fatou Ndaw, 55, chose him to go because he was the oldest of three brothers, and a fisherman. “He was the one who knows how to read the signs of the ocean,” she said.

      Mr. Diop tried twice.

      On his first attempt, in 2006, he headed for the Canary Islands. Along the way, he watched as six people from his village died after bouts of vomiting and dehydration, their bodies tossed overboard with a prayer.

      Mr. Diop landed, but he was deported two days before an uncle living in Spain arrived to claim him, he said.

      To pay for his second attempt, last fall, Mr. Diop’s mother sold her jewelry; his wife, Mbayang Hanne, saved the money that she earned frying doughnuts under a tent on the beach and selling them with coffee.

      Mr. Diop bought a round-trip plane ticket to Casablanca, where he did not need a visa and could stay with a childhood friend. From there, he took a bus to Tangier and boarded a boat for Spain.

      This time, his boat was stopped before it reached international waters. Mr. Diop says he was fingerprinted and dropped at the Algerian border. He walked 16 hours with other migrants until a car picked them up and took them to Casablanca.

      In Casablanca, the weather was bad and the boats were not running. He slept on the street in the rain. His round-trip ticket on Royal Air Maroc was expiring in two days. Homesick and miserable, Mr. Diop called his parents. They advised him to use the ticket to return home.

      He spent some sleepless nights agonizing over whether to call his wife, and decided not to.

      At the airport back in Dakar, he did not even have enough money for a taxi. A stranger took pity on him and drove him home.

      To Mr. Diop’s relief, his wife was out when he got there — but all that did was put off the inevitable. When she returned, she was shocked to find him in the house.

      It was hard to explain why he had failed when so many others had succeeded. Some of his neighbors, Mr. Diop felt, were judging him. But others told him it was not his fault.

      “Europe doesn’t belong to anybody,” he recalled their telling him. “If God decides, one day you’ll have breakfast in Europe. Never give up.”

      And he has not. Mr. Diop says he is not discouraged by deaths he has seen on the migrant path. It is simply part of the risk, he says.

      He and his family are saving for him to leave again.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/world/africa/africa-migrants-return-home.html

    • Video: Sent back to Ivory Coast, illegal migrants face stigma, rejection

      https://youtu.be/n3moMpBDD64

      It’s the contradiction of Ivory Coast. While its economy is one of the most dynamic in Africa, more and more of its people are setting out into the desert towards the Mediterranean in a bid to reach Europe. Some succeed, but for others, the journey is cut short and they are sent back to Ivory Coast. Returning home is often difficult as it comes with a sense of failure and rejection from their loved ones. Our Abidjan correspondents report.

      https://www.france24.com/en/20180905-focus-ivory-coast-returnees-illegal-migrants-europe-libya-mediter

    • Ivory Coast: the migration challenge

      Ivory Coast is one of the major departure points for migrants travelling illegally to Europe. Without a job or a tangible future in their country, many risk their lives seeking a better one abroad. To combat this pattern, the European Union is working in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Collective reintegration projects, such as business partnerships between returning migrants and members of their community, aim to discourage risky irregular migration through sustainable work and dialogue at home. To see how it works, Euronews travels to Ivory Coast, which recently hosted the African Union-European Union summit.

      Abidjan, Ivory Coast’s economic capital, is one of West Africa’s most highly urbanised cities. But behind its apparent success story, and despite being among the world’s biggest exporters of cacao, coffee and bananas, Ivory Coast is still plagued by poverty, which affected nearly half the population in 2015. Many young people faced with unemployment try to reach Europe. According to the IOM and the EU, among the 155.000 migrants who reached Europe between January and November 2017, most came from West Africa.

      Europe isn’t the Eldorado

      We meet Jean-Marie in the capital Abidjan. He is one of many who was seduced by the prospect of a better life beyond his country’s borders. A promising football talent, he was lured to Tunisia by a so-called “sports agent” who took his money and disappeared.

      “In the first weeks everything went well, I only understood it was a scam after a while because I never saw that person again, he disappeared with the 2.500 euros I gave him,” Jean-Marie Gbougouri tells us. “So, in the end, I was stuck over there, I had nothing left. So for me, Eldorado is not necessarily Europe. Of course, we all dream of going to Europe, but not in those conditions. I’m in good shape, but taking a boat to Italy isn’t going to change my situation. So I’d rather go home and invest my energy in my own country and see what happens.”

      The IOM helped Jean-Marie return home and set up a business as a chicken farmer. Voluntary return and its follow-up are priorities for the EU, which funds the IOM’s projects. According to the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, interviewed by Euronews, the EU has helped 14,000 people return home this year.

      Once home, the migrants need assistance says the IOM’s director in Ivory Coast, Marina Schramm: “There is this point of failure which is why it is extremely important for us to work on the psychological and psychosocial support, create an identity again, build self-confidence. And I think therefore training is extremely important, having a diploma makes someone out of you again, not just someone that came back with nothing.”

      Boosting cacao revenue

      To prevent Ivory Coast’s youth from leaving, there need to be jobs for them. The country is the world’s biggest producer of cacao, most of which is consumed as chocolate in Europe and North America. But cocoa farmers in Africa are deeply affected by the fluctuating prices of cocoa. Overproduction this year caused prices to drop.

      Moreover, what Ivory Coast lacks, says Euronews’ Isabel Marques da Silva, is the processing industry.

      “A cooperative working in the fair trade business gets better prices for its cacao. But the added value is in the transformation process, which does not takes place in Ivory Coast. So in the end, the farmers get less than 10 percent of the price of a chocolate bar made and sold in Europe,” she says.

      There are exceptions like the Société Coopérative Equitable du Bandama, in the town of M’Brimbo, northeast of Abidjan. It brings together Ivory Coast’s first certified organic and fair trade cocoa producers.

      Thanks to this certification they have developed their own trade channels and are therefore spared the price fluctuations of the regular market. The next step would be to make the chocolate locally.

      “We’ll need funding, or at least someone to help train us locally so that we can make the chocolate here,” says SCEB president Jean Evariste Salo. “In Europe, people are tired of eating toxic food, they’re starting to ask for organic produce: organic is the future.”

      Boosting digital growth

      Entrepreneurship in Africa is booming as is the digital economy.

      Computer engineer Guiako Obin is the co-founder of Babylab, a Fab Lab where local children in the deprived neighbourhood of Abobo in Abidjan can come and learn about computers, upcycling and coding.

      “What we need is to lobby local authorities in order to copy what’s being done in other parts of Ivory Coast and Africa,” Guiako tells us.

      The development of digital opportunities was at the heart of the recent EU-Africa Business Forum in Abidjan.

      According to Stefano Manservisi, head of International Cooperation and Development at the EU, “(The priority is) interconnectivity, access to basic information, and access to services which are more transparent, more affordable, in terms also of the relationships between people and the administration, but also people and the market.”

      The forum took place ahead of the EU-African summit, where leaders agreed on four key priorities for the coming years including economic opportunities for youth, peace and security, mobility and migration, and cooperation on governance.

      –-> #vidéo on:

      https://www.euronews.com/2017/12/05/ivory-coast-the-migration-challenge

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (1/6) : Ibrahim raconte l’enfer libyen

      Des migrants dans un centre de détention, en Libye, avant d’être rapatriés dans leur pays, le 2 décembre 2017

      RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Si le phénomène a ralenti aujourd’hui, il y a encore deux ans, ce sont des centaines de jeunes hommes, de jeunes femmes et même d’enfants qui tentaient chaque mois de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Italie. Ibrahim Doumbia, 31 ans, est l’un d’entre eux. Pour lui, l’enfer a duré plus d’un an.
      Publicité

      Dans son petit atelier de couture en bord de route à Daloa, Ibrahim Doumbia raconte un rêve d’Europe qui a viré au cauchemar, dès le désert nigérien. « Tu sais, les gens parlent beaucoup de la mer, la mer. Mais là où les gens restent beaucoup, c’est dans le désert. Le désert, c’est un cimetière, confie-t-il. S’il y a un problème d’eau qui arrive à un moment, même à ton frère, le peu d’eau qu’il te reste, tu ne peux pas lui donner. Celui qui nous transporte, souvent, il veut même sortir avec une de nos sœurs, mais la fille ne peut pas refuser, parce que si elle refuse, nous restons tous bloqués dans le désert. »

      En Libye, l’enfer continue. A Bani Walid d’abord. La captivité, le travail forcé, les coups, le viol pour les femmes. Puis une évasion. Arrivé à Tripoli, il tente la traversée vers l’Italie avec des dizaines d’autres, sur deux radeaux de fortune. « Il y avait la tempête. Ce n’était pas facile. Il y avait trop de vagues. Et ils ont commencé à couler. Nous, on était obligés de nous éloigner un peu. Parce que, si d’autres essayaient de plonger dans la mer pour les remonter, nous tous risquions de couler. On les a regardés mourir. On ne pouvait pas. »

      Neuf mois dans un camp pour migrants assimilé à une « prison »

      Après cet échec : de nouveau la détention dans un camp pour migrants. « Moi, je suis resté dans cette prison pendant neuf mois. Chaque jour que Dieu fait, on voyait l’un de nos frères qui mourait. Souvent, vers trois heures du matin, ils venaient et frappaient tout le monde. Chacun essayait d’appeler ses parents, pour qu’ils essaient de tout faire pour les libérer de cette prison-là. »

      Rapatrié il y a deux ans, Ibrahim est un survivant. Hanté chaque nuit par les images de cette aventure dramatique, il s’estime chanceux de s’en être sorti. Aujourd’hui, il tente de dissuader les candidats au départ.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190313-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-16-ibrahim-raconte-conditions-periple-libye

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (2/6) : une réinsertion incertaine


      Des migrants ivoiriens venus de Libye, de retour au pays, le 20 novembre 2017

      RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Chaque mois, des jeunes hommes, des jeunes femmes et même des enfants décident de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Europe. Des jeunes qui travaillent pour économiser un pécule pour partir, souvent avec l’aide de leur famille. Malheur à ceux qui doivent rentrer au pays où l’emploi stable se fait rare.
      Publicité

      Jean Martial vient d’obtenir un petit local ou il peut vendre ses fripes. A 35 ans, il a déjà tenté une fois de « partir à l’aventure », mais il s’est cassé les dents en Libye. Pour prendre la route, Jean Martial avait travaillé afin d’économiser 800 000 francs CFA, environ 1 200 euros. Et pour lui permettre de revenir, sa famille lui a envoyé de l’argent.

      Pour autant, cet échec n’a pas fait disparaître son envie d’Europe. « L’Europe, c’est le rêve de chaque personne ici. Si vous voyiez la misère et la souffrance que nous traversons. Aujourd’hui, si tu es en Europe, par la grâce de Dieu tu trouves un petit boulot, tu peux t’occuper de ta famille. Là-bas, au moins, le fonctionnaire est bien payé, le petit débrouillard est bien payé. »

      « Ce qui manque ici, ce sont les opportunités pour les jeunes »

      L’ONG italienne CeVi (Centro di volontariato internazionale) est arrivée en 2006 à Daloa, ville considérée il y a encore deux ou trois ans commela plaque tournante ivoirienne des départs vers l’Europe. CeVi fait notamment de la sensibilisation, auprès des populations et des autorités, et aide ceux qui sont revenus, les « retournés » à se réinsérer.

      « Ce qui manque ici, ce sont les opportunités pour les jeunes et surtout une perspective de stabilité. Parce que, quand on est commerçant, on ne sait jamais combien on va gagner dans le mois, si on va pouvoir envoyer les enfants à l’école, explique Laura Visentin de CeVi. Daloa, c’est vrai, est une grande ville. Mais au final, c’est comme si c’était un village, parce qu’il n’y a pas d’usine. Au-delà de la fonction publique, il n’y a pas d’entreprises. Et le problème c’est que, si un enfant demande un million pour partir, la famille cotise. Mais si un enfant demande un million pour commencer un petit business ici, la famille ne donne pas. »

      Ces dernières années, les stratégies des ONG, des autorités ou des grandes agences semblent porter leurs fruits. Les départs de Daloa ont manifestement baissé, mais le phénomène existe toujours.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190314-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-26-reinsertion-avenir-cevi

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (3/6) : le récit de Junior, 9 ans

      Migrants au large des côtes libyennes, le 19 juin 2017.

      RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Si le phénomène a un peu ralenti aujourd’hui, il y a encore deux ans, ce sont des centaines de personnes qui tentaient chaque mois de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Italie. Des hommes, des femmes, et même des enfants, souvent seuls. Junior avait neuf ans quand il a tenté de rejoindre l’Europe avec le rêve de devenir ingénieur.
      Publicité

      Junior a désormais onze ans et un regard d’acier. Dans son quartier, tout le monde le considère comme un petit génie de l’électronique. Quand il est parti, il n’avait que neuf ans. L’aventure a duré douze mois. Son âge ne lui a pas épargné la faim, la soif, les coups ou la captivité. Ni même d’assister à des meurtres pour rien ou presque. « Il y a le désert, pour le traverser aussi c’était dur. On peut venir là, prendre une lame, te tuer parce que tu as bu l’eau ou bien parce que tu as payé le pain et mangé. On peut arracher ton argent, prendre une lame, te tuer... »

      Un beau matin, Junior a volé l’argent que cachait son père et est parti sans le dire à personne. Direction l’Europe pour devenir ingénieur. « Si j’avais réussi, j’aurais pu aider ma famille, parce que j’ai des petits frères. Il y a beaucoup de mes amis qui sont partis, c’est pour ça que j’ai pris la route. Je peux partir, si je vois que ça ne va pas encore. Je peux retenter. Ou bien je prends une autre route, si je vois qu’il y a une autre route, je peux prendre ça. Ma famille n’a rien, je peux l’aider. »

      « Tu partais pour aller faire quoi là-bas, à ton âge ? »

      Vendeur de pneus rechapés, M. Amossa, le père de junior, a des yeux pleins d’admiration pour ce petit garçon qui lui a donné des mois d’angoisse. « Quand il est revenu, je lui ai demandé : "Tu partais pour aller faire quoi là-bas, à ton âge ?" Il m’a répondu qu’il partait pour développer sa connaissance. Comme lui-même, il aime faire les fabrications. S’il y a délestage, il y a des trucs qu’il fabrique, il donne à sa grand-mère et puis ça alimente la maison. Je ne sais pas comment il a fabriqué tout ça. Au début, c’est vrai, je lui ai dit de rester tranquille, de continuer son étude… S’il veut aller à l’aventure pour se chercher, ça viendra avec le temps. »

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190315-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-3-6-junior-9-ans-recit

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (4/6) : la honte et la gêne après l’échec

      Migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye à leur arrivée à l’aéroport d’Abidjan, lundi 20 novembre 2017.

      Toute la semaine, RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe, en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire. Elle a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe mais, pour beaucoup, le voyage s’est arrêté avant, souvent en Libye. Pour ces hommes et ces femmes, le retour à Daloa est alors synonyme de honte.
      Publicité

      Elle souhaite se faire appeler Mimi. Partie pour la Libye afin de gagner l’Europe, elle n’a jamais pu traverser la Méditerranée. Au bout de sept mois de calvaire, elle a été rapatriée à Abidjan par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM).

      « La manière dont tu rentres au pays, ce n’est pas celle que tu as décidée, ce n’est pas cette manière-là que tu as voulue. On est rentré avec désespoir. On s’est dit qu’on a vraiment perdu du temps, notre argent… On a perdu plein, plein de choses. On n’a vraiment pas le moral. Je me disais que je préférais encore la mort que de revenir comme ça », se confie-t-elle.

      La honte d’avoir menti à sa mère et d’avoir pris son argent. La honte de l’échec, aussi. Les premières semaines, Mimi se cache chez une de ses sœurs, à Abidjan. Puis elle fait un accident vasculaire cérébral (AVC). « Trop de pensées », dit-elle.

      Soignée, elle finira, plusieurs mois après, par retourner à Daloa garder la maison de sa mère qui, à son tour, est partie à Abidjan suivre des soins. A Daloa, le sentiment de honte est encore plus fort et elle ne quitte quasiment pas sa cour.

      « Comme je suis moi-même de Daloa, c’est mon voyage qui m’empêchait de venir m’installer ici à cause de la honte, de la gêne. Le fait de partir et de ne pas avoir réussi le voyage, les gens vont mal l’interpréter. Voilà pourquoi je suis dans mon coin. Je suis là, je ne fais rien pour le moment et tout cela me stresse encore plus. Je suis malade depuis mon retour. Je prends des médicaments pour éviter trop de stress et, par conséquent, je suis renfermée, trop renfermée. Avant, ce n’était pas ça ma vie », témoigne-t-elle.

      Malgré tout, Mimi a un projet, celui d’ouvrir une échoppe de jus de fruits sur la rue qui passe devant sa cour. Plus une thérapie qu’un business.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190316-cote-ivoire-migrants-retour-libye-daloa-mediterranee-oim-europe-echec-h

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (5/6) : sensibilisation auprès des « mamans »

      Des migrants africains secourus au large de la Libye en août 2018.

      Toute la semaine RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe. Aujourd’hui, du constat de tous, le phénomène a fortement ralenti. La répression de quelques passeurs et la sensibilisation de masse sont passées par là. Sensibilisation mieux ciblée aussi, notamment envers les « mamans ».
      Publicité

      Dans cette cour du quartier Orly, de Daloa, comme chaque mercredi, une douzaine de mamans du quartier se retrouvent pour discuter, boire le thé et manger des bonbons. Parmi ces femmes, Awa Touré.

      « Il y a beaucoup de mamans dont les enfants sont partis. Toutes les mamans se décarcassent pour avoir l’argent pour donner aux enfants qui s’en vont. Mais, moi, mon enfant n’est pas parti. C’est mon seul garçon. Il est commerçant et vend des pneus. Je lui ai dit : « il ne faut pas partir ». Il est resté. Je veux qu’il reste à côté de moi et puis, je me débrouille. L’argent que je touche, je le lui donne. Je veux qu’il ait un magasin à lui », raconte-t-elle.

      La famille, et les mères en particulier, sont souvent pourvoyeuses de fonds pour les candidats au départ. Du coup, ces mamans sont, depuis quelque temps, la cible de la sensibilisation de la part d’ONG. Laura Visentin de l’organisation italienne CeVi, est présente à Daloa, depuis douze ans.

      « On faisait de la sensibilisation avec les jeunes parce que l’on pensait que c’était nos cibles dans la mesure où ce sont eux qui partent. Mais après, on a compris que souvent, ce sont les mamans elles-mêmes qui poussent les enfants à partir et là, nous avons commencé à faire de la sensibilisation avec elles, à montrer des documentaires sur le désert et sur la traversée de la mer. Il y a beaucoup de mamans qui ont commencé à pleurer. Elles ont dit : « Mais moi, j’ai envoyé mon enfant comme ça. Je ne savais pas que c’était comme ça. Personne ne nous a dit ». Et c’est à partir de là que la pression de la famille a diminué un peu et aujourd’hui, les mamans, au lieu d’encourager, elles découragent », explique Laura Visentin.

      Si ce facteur n’est pas le seul qui explique la baisse du nombre de départs de Daloa depuis deux ans, « c’en est un », estiment les acteurs sur le terrain.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190317-cote-ivoire-migrants-retour-daloa-ong-cevi-laura-visentin-sensibilisati

    • Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (6/6) : la lutte contre les passeurs

      Une centaine de migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye, le 20 novembre 2017 (photo d’illustration).

      RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Cote d’Ivoire a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe. Aujourd’hui, du constat de tous, le phénomène a fortement ralenti. La sensibilisation est passée par là. Mais la répression aussi. Aujourd’hui selon le gouvernement, une cinquantaine de passeurs dans tout le pays ont été condamnés.
      Publicité

      Adama est un repenti. Arrivé d’Abidjan il y a environ cinq ans, il a été pendant deux ans et demi un passeur. Lui préfère le terme de « démarcheur », qui aidait les candidats au départ à atteindre l’Europe, en moyenne une quinzaine par mois.

      « A cette époque-là, j’étais à Daloa. Quand je prenais quelqu’un, bien avant qu’il décolle, je discutais avec la famille. Si on finissait par tomber d’accord, on donnait le chemin au niveau des différents correspondants qu’on avait dans les différentes villes. Quand il arrivait à Agadez, la famille payait le restant d’argent. A l’époque, de la Côte d’Ivoire à la Libye, on prenait 600 000 francs CFA. De la Côte d’Ivoire en Italie, on prenait 900-950 000. »

      Adama a passé un an en prison à cause de son activité. Aujourd’hui, il fait de la sensibilisation lorsqu’il n’est pas dans sa petite menuiserie ouverte aux quatre vents. Il y a quelques années encore, Daloa comptait une trentaine de passeurs, selon lui. La plupart se serait volatilisée.

      La migration ralentit. Conséquence de la politique des autorités, estime Yaya Sylla, premier adjoint au maire, à commencer par la lutte contre ces passeurs.

      « Dans un premier temps, il s’agit de récupérer celui qui le fait. C’est plus facile de le repérer s’il n’est pas de Daloa. Ensuite, nous jouons au niveau de la sensibilisation. Et en tant qu’autorité, nous faisons en sorte de pouvoir mettre la jeunesse au travail. Parce que tout part de là. Nous avons mis beaucoup de programmes en place pour l’emploi des jeunes. »

      Depuis des années, ce sont les ONG et les organisations de jeunesse qui sont en première ligne pour dissuader les candidats au départ de prendre la route, et leurs familles de les soutenir.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190318-cote-ivoire-serie-migrants-passeurs-daloa

    • Côte d’Ivoire : retour de Libye de migrants ivoiriens

      Migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye à leur arrivée à l’aéroport d’Abidjan, lundi 20 novembre 2017.

      Quelque 155 migrants ivoiriens en Libye ont été rapatriés lundi soir à Abidjan. Ces candidats à l’émigration en Europe, dont le voyage s’est arrêté en Libye, ont été accueillis par la direction des Ivoiriens de l’étranger et l’Organisation internationale pour les Migrations.
      Publicité

      Dans la zone charter de l’aéroport d’Abidjan les enfants courent et s’amusent sur les tapis à bagages à l’arrêt. Les parents souvent épuisés par leur périple, parfois gênés de revenir sous les objectifs des appareils photos ou de caméras de télévision, aimeraient que les formalités d’enregistrement soient expédiées pour pouvoir aller se reposer.

      http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20171121-cote-ivoire-migrants-libye-retour-abidjan-reportage

  • African migrants allege mistreatment in North Africa

    Egypt hosts more than 6 million migrants, more than half of them from Sudan and South Sudan.

    North African countries have long been a refuge for sub-Saharan migrants trying to escape war or poverty. However, the streets of Cairo, #Tunis or #Tripoli can turn dangerous, with racist harassment and violence.

    While Europe has been wrestling with racist violence, North African countries, with complex situations including their own illegal emigration problems, have made only small steps in addressing the issue.

    For some migrants, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are the closest and easiest countries for them to enter. For others, the countries are a point of transit before attempting the Mediterranean crossing to Europe.

    The International Organisation for Migration said Egypt hosts more than 6 million migrants, more than half of them from Sudan and South Sudan, where simmering conflicts displace tens of thousands of people annually.

    At least two dozen sub-Saharan Africans, including four children, in Cairo told the Associated Press they have endured racist insults, sexual harassment or other abuses in the past three months.

    The children said they have had rocks and trash thrown at them as they go to or from school. One Ethiopian woman said neighbours pound on the windows of her family’s home, yelling “slaves” before disappearing.

    A study last year by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights indicated that 50% of immigrant respondents from sub-Saharan African countries said their migration experience, after several years spent in Tunisia, was “a failure,” while 41% described the experience as “successful.”

    Among those questioned about their medium-term goals, 54% expressed a desire to leave for Europe and 42% expressed a preference to return to their country of origin. Only 2% said they preferred to settle in Tunisia.

    The study stated that 48.3% of respondents said it is necessary to review the legal status of migrants.

    Respondents called on Tunisia to allow African migrants to benefit from work opportunities in the country, defend their rights, facilitate the acquirement of residence permit and revise social security laws, in a way that would simplify procedures to obtain Tunisian nationality for migrants’ children born in the country and allow foreigners to open bank accounts.

    In Libya, a country plagued by corruption and caught in civil war, the picture looks gloomier for African migrants. A report by the Associated Press said millions of dollars from the European Union had been diverted to networks of militiamen, traffickers and Coast Guard members who allegedly exploit migrants. The report said UN officials knew militia networks were getting the money.

    The report revealed torture, extortion and other abuse for ransom in migrant detention centres and under the nose of the United Nations, often in compounds that receive millions of dollars in aid. This was in addition to reports of disappearances from detention centres, with migrants allegedly sold to traffickers or sent to other centres.

    In Libya, abuses generally go unpunished amid the chaos in the country. In Tunisia and Egypt, however, there were signs the two countries were starting to recognise and censure racist crimes.

    In November, a video showing three Egyptian teenagers bullying South Sudanese schoolboy John Manuth triggered a public outcry. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi later hosted Manuth at a youth forum and made a rare high-level acknowledgement of the problem.

    “They are our guests and negative treatment is not acceptable and not allowed,” Sisi said.

    In 2018, a court sentenced to seven years in prison a man who was known to harass refugees and who beat to death a South Sudanese teacher who had worked in a community-run school for refugees in Cairo.

    In Tunisia, the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Act was adopted in October 2018, with penalties ranging from 1-3 months in prison for racist language and 1-3 years for inciting hatred, disseminating ideas about racial superiority or supporting a racist organisation or activity.

    The law, which created a National Instance against Racial Discrimination to present an annual report to the parliament, commits the state to undertake awareness and training campaigns.

    https://thearabweekly.com/african-migrants-allege-mistreatment-north-africa

    #Afrique_du_Nord #réfugiés #asile #migrations #migrants_sub-sahariens #villes #Maghreb #Moyen-Orient #Le_Caire #violence #racisme #xénophobie #Egypte #Libye #Tunisie

    ping @_kg_

  • Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017

    A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.

    The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.

    See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)

    It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:

    “guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”

    The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).

    The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.

    The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.

    The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):

    "For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."

    At the same time:

    “The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”

    Those return operations included Frontex’s:

    “first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
    #Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans

    • EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations

      The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.

      The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:

      “The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”

      The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.

      When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.

      Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.

      The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:

      “The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”

      European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):

      “- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
      - More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
      - Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries

      New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”

      See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)

      The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm

  • #Décès du président de l’association des ivoiriens de #Tunisie après une attaque au couteau lors d’un braquage

    Le président de l’#association_des_ivoiriens de Tunisie #Falikou_Coulibaly, a succombé, dans la soirée du dimanche de ses blessures, après un braquage qui a mal tourné du côté de Dar Fadhal, à la Soukra.

    Selon une source sécuritaire, citée par la radio Mosaïque FM, 6 personnes ont été arrêtées dont une personne qui aurait attaqué le jeune homme au couteau.

    La criminalité a largement augmenté en Tunisie depuis 2011.

    “Quelque 185.617 affaires criminelles, tous délits confondus ont été recensées au cours des dix premiers mois de l’année 2018, un chiffre qui pourrait atteindre le pic de 200 mille à la fin de l’année” avait affirmé en novembre dernier, le président de l’Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques (ITES), Néji Jalloul.

    L’Amiral, Kamel Akrout, premier conseiller à la Sécurité nationale auprès du président de la République, avait quant à lui révélé que 48% des prisonniers sont des jeunes, 58% d’entre eux ont entre 15 et 17 ans. 4% des élèves, au sein des collèges et des lycées, consomment de la drogue, et 5% parmi les étudiants.

    Pour lui, cela est dû à la situation qui règne sur le pays après le 14 janvier. “Il y a de la négligence, du laisser-aller, que ce soit de la part de la famille, qui les délaisse, ou de la société en perte de valeurs”, a-t-il signalé.

    “Il y a une justice punitive assez développée, à mon avis. Mais le plus important ce n’est pas la dissuasion, car cela est synonyme d’échec (...) Ce qu’il faut, c’est la prévention, c’est le plus important”, a-t-il affirmé, “Et la prévention n’est pas que de la responsabilité du gouvernement ou de l’État, mais de toute la société. Ce sont nos enfants, l’avenir du pays”.

    https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/deces-du-president-de-lassociation-des-ivoiriens-de-tunisie-apres-u
    ping @_kg_

    • Après la mort de Falikou Coulibaly, la communauté subsaharienne de Tunis entre stupeur et indignation (VIDÉO)

      Le président de l’association des ivoiriens de Tunisie Falikou Coulibaly a succombé à ses blessures après un braquage.

      Plusieurs dizaines d’africains subsahariens se sont réuni, lundi, devant l’hôpital Mongi Slim, à l’appel de l’Association des Étudiants et Stagiaires Africains en Tunisie, criant leur détresse face à la mort du président de l’association des ivoiriens de Tunisie, Falikou Coulibaly, à la suite d’une attaque au couteau pendant un braquage, survenu dimanche à la Soukra.

      _ AESAT
      URGENT URGENT :
      L’Association des Etudiants et Stagiaires Africains en Tunisie condamne avec la plus grande fermeté l’agression à l’arme blanche (des coups de couteau) de notre frère Falikou Coulibaly de nationalité Ivoirienne rendant ainsi l’âme à l’hôpital de Mongi Slim. Nous lançons un appel fort à l’endroit des autorités Tunisiennes sur le devoir de la protection des Etrangers.
      Ainsi un appel à mobilisation pour un rassemblement est prévu aujourd’hui à 9h devant l’hôpital Monji Slim.
      Toutes nos condoléances à la famille de la victime et à la communauté Ivoirienne en Tunisie.

      https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2028583227177956&id=443648175671477_

      “Ici, on nous agresse, on nous tue sans savoir pourquoi” s’emporte une jeune femme. “On nous tue !” déplore pour sa part un jeune homme.

      – vidéo : https://www.facebook.com/ayebbechir.ayeb/videos/2219546101441724/?t=0

      – vidéo : https://twitter.com/medzepplin/status/1077146719392014336

      Contacté par le HuffPost Tunisie, un membre de l’AESAT, déplore cet énième acte de violence, ayant conduit cette fois-ci à la mort : “Cela devait arriver !! À force de nous faire attaquer, de nous faire injurier, de nous faire violenter, sans sanctions contre nos agresseurs, la mort était inévitable. Je ne dis pas que Falikou a été tué parce qu’il est noir, mais le fait est là, nous perdons un de nos frères les plus proches et les plus actifs au sein de la communauté”.

      Stupeur sur les réseaux sociaux

      Sur les réseaux sociaux, l’heure est à la stupeur après ce crime, entre condoléances, appels à la mobilisation et condamnations.

      Une marche spontanée, en mémoire de Falikou, vers l’ambassade ivoirienne en Tunisie se déroule actuellement.

      – vidéo : https://www.facebook.com/Union.Leaders.Africains/videos/2178537942411256/?t=0

      _ Union des leaders Africains
      L’ALDA exprime ses sincères condoléances à la famille du président de l’AIT qui a été assassiné suite à une agression à l’arme blanche (Braquage).
      Actuellement il y a une marche spontanée vers l’ambassade de Côte d’Ivoire en Tunisie.
      Nous sommes solidaires avec la communauté ivoirienne en Tunisie.

      https://www.facebook.com/Union.Leaders.Africains/posts/1138674886314256_

      _ Yamina Thabet
      Terriblement choquée par le meurtre de Coullibaly Fallikou , 33 ans , président de l’Association des Ivoiriens en Tunisie .... terriblement triste et choquée par une telle violence ! Ce qui était arrivé à Najmatar comme déchaînement raciste, n’écarte pas pour moi la piste du règlement de compte ..
      Paix à son âme et sincères condoléances à toute sa famille et à la communauté ivoirienne

      https://www.facebook.com/yamina.thabet/posts/10216616546873601_

      _ Jean Marie Kone
      TRISTE NOUVELLE :
      En effet, triste nouvelle : le jeune étudiant ivoirien Falikou COULIBALY résidant enTunisie ne fêtera pas le réveillon 2018 parmis les siens.
      L’ignominie de son assassinat le week-end en pleine capitale tunisienne marquera à jamais son symbolisme sacrificiel, la marche inexorable vers la réalisation effective de l’Etat de droit en Tunisie.
      Mais, du fond de ce malheur qui noue encore les tripes, méditons froidement sur l’avenir que cet événement nous propose.
      Face à ce drame confirmé et désormais archivé dans la mémoire collective de la communauté des africains subsahariens et en particulier des ivoiriens résidents en Tunisie , je voudrais présenter toutes mes sincères condoléances à toute la famille, amis, et compatriotes du jeune frère COULIBALY.
      Je souhaite que la lumière soit faite sur cette énième assassinat que je qualifie d’inacceptable, de barbarie et sauvage.
      Heureusement, que la Tunisie et la côte d’Ivoire
      entretiennent de bons rapports depuis très longtemps et que nous n,accepterons pas qu’une minorité d’individus ni foi ni lois viennent perturber cette cohésion qui existe entre nos deux "peuples amis et frères ".
      Chers amis et chers compatriotes, je vous invite à la retenue et la sérénité totale afin que les autorités tunisiennes et ivoiriennes mènent des enquêtes pour situer les responsabilités.
      Repose en paix frero Cool !
      Bon courage à toutes et à tous !
      Vive la fraternité et l’intégration africaine !
      #JMK_

      https://www.facebook.com/africa.i.ua/posts/1116490248518762_

      Rafik Shimi
      Une nouvelle journée ordinaire pour les tunisiens, mais un début de semaine triste et sanglant pour nos amis ivoiriens résidents en Tunisie.
      Hier soir, le jeune Falikou Coulibaly, étudiant ivoirien en Tunisie et président de l’AIT ( association des ivoiriens en Tunisie) a été sauvagement poignardé par des criminels tunisiens dans la région de Soukra à Tunis, et le pauvre a trouvé la MORT, succombant à ses blessures.
      Vous vous rappelez bien mon dernier appel il y a une semaine pour le secours des africains subsahariens résidents en Tunisie, mais personne ne s’y intéressait.
      Je présente mes condoléances et mes excuses au nom des tunisiens libres à toute la famille du défunt et À Bas le Racisme !

      https://www.facebook.com/rafikbi9a/posts/10156281715308740_

      _ Mabrouka Khedir
      A dieu mon ami , paix à ton âme ...
      Le président de l’association des ivoiriens en Tunisie AIT - Association des Ivoiriens en Tunisie FALIKOU COULIBALY poignardé au couteau dans un braquage à Tunis ...

      https://www.facebook.com/mabrouka.journaliste/posts/798810053800993_

      _ #OIM Tunisie
      [Condoléances] C’est avec beaucoup de tristesse que nous avons appris la nouvelle du décès tragique de Falikou Coulibaly, survenu hier dans la nuit du Dimanche 23 Décembre 2018.
      Selon les sources sécuritaires, M. Coulibaly a perdu la vie en succombant à ses blessures suite à une agression à l’arme blanche dans le quartier de La Soukra, Gouvernorat de l’Ariana. Six suspects ont été arrêtés par les autorités locales. L’enquête suit son cours.
      Nous présentons nos sincères condoléances à la jeune épouse de M. Coulibaly et sa petite famille, à ses proches et à toute la communauté ivoirienne en Tunisie à qui nous assurons notre soutien et notre solidarité.
      Nous nous rappellerons avec gratitude de l’excellente coopération avec M. Coulibaly et de sa contribution décisive aux efforts visant à promouvoir les droits humains, l’intégration et la cohésion sociale et à célébrer le vivre-ensemble au sein de la communauté ivoirienne et migrante en Tunisie.
      Nous saluons finalement l’engagement continu de la Tunisie en matière de Droits Humains. Nous restons toutefois consternés par la mort prématurée du jeune Falikou Coulibaly et nous condamnons fermement toute forme de violence, quels qu’en soient la victime et l’auteur.

      https://www.facebook.com/iomtunis/posts/281702155880300_

      Le président de l’association des ivoiriens de Tunisie Falikou Coulibaly, a succombé, dans la soirée du dimanche à ses blessures, après un braquage qui a mal tourné du côté de Dar Fadhal, à la Soukra.

      Selon une source sécuritaire, citée par la radio Mosaïque FM, 6 personnes ont été arrêtées dont une personne qui aurait attaqué le jeune homme au couteau.

      https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/apres-la-mort-de-falikou-coulibaly-la-communaute-subsaharienne-de-t

      @deka : j’ai des vidéo témoignages en plus, partagés par les réseaux, fais signe si t’as besoin...

    • Racisme : « La Tunisie doit proclamer son africanité ! »

      Tribune. Mon pays, la Tunisie, se trouve au nord de l’Afrique, à la pointe septentrionale, si proche de l’Europe mais aussi étranger au continent auquel il appartient. Ce petit pays a réalisé d’extraordinaires avancées modernistes, comme l’abolition de l’esclavage en 1846 – une première dans le monde arabo-musulman –, avec une longueur d’avance sur les Etats-Unis et la France. Ou le code du statut personnel, qui octroie en 1956 aux Tunisiennes des droits et une liberté dont rêvent encore des millions de femmes dans le monde.

      Seule une frange de la population est restée dans l’ombre de ces avancées. Même après la « révolution » de 2011, les Tunisiens noirs peinent encore à trouver leur juste place dans la société. Les raisons sont multiples, mais la principale est la méconnaissance de l’Histoire. Dans la mémoire collective, le Noir est arrivé en #Afrique_du_Nord asservi, les chaînes aux pieds, chose que certains compatriotes nous crachent à la figure au moment où nous nous y attendons le moins. On sous-entend ceci : « Quoi que vous fassiez, n’oubliez surtout pas que vous êtes arrivés ici en tant qu’esclaves, que nous achetions pour quelques pièces. » Mais ont-ils pensé, ne serait-ce qu’une fois, que les Noirs pouvaient aussi être des enfants de la région ?
      Lire aussi A Tunis, le meurtre d’un Ivoirien cristallise la colère de la #communauté_subsaharienne

      Le grand tacticien Hannibal Barca était un guerrier noir. Pourtant, peu à peu, il est devenu méconnaissable, ses représentations prenant les couleurs et les traits d’un Nord-Africain. Fini les cheveux frisés et le nez aplati des pièces vues dans mon enfance au musée du Bardo. Tout se transforme, même l’Histoire ! Comment voulez-vous que les jeunes Tunisiens se sentent africains s’ils méconnaissent le passé du continent ? Combien d’entre eux connaissent Cheikh Anta Diop et ses œuvres capitales ? Ont-ils une idée de qui était Thomas Sankara, l’homme intègre, ou encore le président-poète Léopold Sedar Senghor, l’un des pères de la négritude, mouvement de résistance d’une Afrique qui s’éveille ?

      Crimes de haine

      Quand je leur parle de #racisme, mes compatriotes ont des réactions assez amusantes. Ils ou elles ont toujours un ou une ami(e) noir(e) avec qui ils mangent dans la même assiette. Mais seraient-ils prêts, pour autant, à l’épouser ? Le Tunisien a beaucoup de mal à reconnaître que le racisme existe dans son pays, comme partout ailleurs. Quand le racisme mène à l’#agression, les commentateurs ont vite fait de disqualifier cette motivation de l’#attaque. On parle de « déséquilibrés » qu’il ne faut surtout pas prendre au sérieux. Pourtant, ces dernières années, la liste des victimes de #crimes de haine s’est tristement allongée.

      Le 7 décembre 2016, à Tunis, une jeune Ivoirienne échappe in extremis à une tentative d’#égorgement. Dix-sept jours plus tard, à la veille de Noël, deux étudiantes congolaises sont poignardées en plein centre-ville à 11 heures du matin. Un jeune Congolais qui tente de les secourir est, lui, atteint au bras. Ces victimes ont survécu mais elles ont gardé de douloureuses séquelles physiques et psychologiques. Quant à l’agresseur, il avouera ne pas supporter de voir des Noirs parler une autre langue entre eux. Il ne sera pas inquiété par la justice car considéré comme malade.

      Quelque mois après ces attaques, un douanier tunisien noir, en vacances avec sa famille dans un hôtel à Mahdia (centre-est), est agressé par un serveur qui refuse de le servir à cause de la couleur de sa peau. Le douanier termine ses congés à l’hôpital.

      Le 23 décembre 2018, l’Ivoirien Falikou Coulibaly, 33 ans, père de deux enfants, est poignardé à mort à Tunis. Décidément, en Tunisie, les veilles de Noël ont un goût de larmes et de sang pour certaines communautés.

      Sortir du #silence

      Ce #meurtre s’est produit deux mois après l’adoption d’une loi pénalisant le racisme en Tunisie. C’était une première dans le #monde_arabe. Ce texte, que nous attendions avec impatience, a été voté par 125 députés. On notera l’absence, ce jour-là, d’environ 40 % des représentants du peuple… La Tunisie aime à dire qu’elle est africaine, mais dans les faits elle ne proclame ni son #africanité, ni son caractère #multiethnique. Une #multiculturalité qui n’est d’ailleurs pas inscrite dans la nouvelle Constitution post- « révolution ».

      Malgré tout, cette #loi permet aux victimes de racisme de sortir du silence et à la société tunisienne de s’extraire de son long déni. Mon constat est cependant amer : les lois – celle-ci ou celle à venir concernant les #migrants – sont écrites avec le sang de nos congénères, nos frères et sœurs, citoyens subsahariens. Une société change non pas grâce à ses réglementations pénalisantes mais par la volonté de tous d’adhérer à un #projet_commun, celui du « #vivre_ensemble ». La loi est un recours quand l’éducation échoue.

      Pour combattre la bête immonde, l’#Education_nationale doit lancer un travail en profondeur. Le racisme et la violence se manifestent dès le plus jeune âge, à l’école. Il est nécessaire de former les enseignants. Sur le volet de la représentation, une présence visuelle des Noirs dans les #médias, les publicités, les affiches, au cinéma, à la télévision me parait indispensable. Ceci afin que le Tunisien noir ne soit plus cette tache de naissance que l’on porte honteusement sur le visage et qu’on veut oublier ou faire disparaître, mais un joli grain de beauté.

      #Saadia_Mosbah est présidente de l’Association M’nemty (« mon rêve »), qui lutte contre les discriminations raciales en Tunisie.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/12/29/racisme-la-tunisie-doit-proclamer-son-africanite_5403434_3212.html

  • Why Spain is a Window into the E.U. Migration Control Industry

    Spain’s migration control policies in North Africa dating back over a decade are now replicated across the E.U. Gonzalo Fanjul outlines PorCausa’s investigation into Spain’s migration control industry and its warning signs for the rest of Europe.

    There was a problem and we fixed it.” For laconic President José María Aznar, these words were quite the political statement. The then Spanish president was speaking in July 1996, after 103 Sub-Saharan migrants who had reached Melilla, a Spanish enclave in North Africa, were drugged, handcuffed and taken to four African countries by military aircraft.

    President Aznar lay the moral and political foundations of a system based on the securitization, externalization and, increasingly, the privatization of border management. This system was consolidated by subsequent Spanish governments and later extended to the rest of the European Union, setting the grounds for a thriving business: the industry of migration control.

    Between 2001 and 2010, long before Europe faced the so-called “refugee crisis,” Spain built two walls in its North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, signed combined development and repatriation agreements with nine African countries, passed two major pieces of legislation on migration, and fostered inter-regional migration initiatives such as the Rabat Process. Spain also designed and established the Integral System of External Surveillance, to this day one of the most sophisticated border surveillance mechanisms in the world.

    The ultimate purpose of these efforts was clear: to deter irregular migration, humanely if possible, but at any cost if necessary.

    Spain was the first European country to utilize a full array of control and cooperation instruments in countries along the migration route to Europe. The system proved effective during the “cayuco crisis” in 2005 and 2006. Following a seven-fold increase in the number of arrivals from West Africa to the Canary Islands by boat, Spain made agreements with several West African countries to block the route, forcing migrants to take the even riskier Sahel passage.

    Although the E.U. questioned the humanitarian consequences of these deals at the time, less than a decade later officials across the continent have replicated large parts of the Spanish system, including the E.U. Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and agreements between the Italian and the Libyan governments.

    Today, 2005 seems like different world. That year, the E.U. adopted its Global Approach on Migration and Mobility, which balanced the “prevention of irregular migration and trafficking” with promising language on the “fostering of well-managed migration” and the “maximization” of its development impact.

    Since then, the combined effect of the Great Recession – an institutional crisis – and the increased arrival of refugees has diluted reformist efforts in Europe. Migration policies are being defined by ideological nationalism and economic protectionism. Many politicians in Europe are electorally profiting from these trends. The case of Spain also illustrates that the system is ripe for financial profit.

    For over a year, Spanish investigative journalism organization porCausa mapped the industry of migration control in Spain. We detailed the ecosystem of actors and interests facilitating the industry, whose operations rely almost exclusively on public funding. A myriad private contractors and civil society organizations operate in four sectors: border protection and surveillance; detention and expulsion of irregular migrants; reception and integration of migrants; and externalization of migration control through agreements with private organisations and public institutions in third countries.

    We began by focusing on securitization and border management. We found that between 2002 and 2017 Spain allocated at least 610 million euros ($720 million) of public funding through 943 contracts related to the deterrence, detention and expulsion of migrants. Our analysis reached two striking conclusions and one question for future research.

    Firstly, we discovered the major role that the E.U. plays in Spain’s migration control industry. Just over 70 percent of the 610 million euros came from different European funds, such as those related to External Borders, Return and Internal Security, as well as the E.U. border agency Frontex. Thus, Spanish public spending is determined by the policy priorities established by E.U. institutions and member states. Those E.U. institutions have since diligently replicated the Spanish approach. With the E.U. now driving these policies forward, the approach is likely to be replicated in other European countries.

    Secondly, our data highlights how resources are concentrated in the hands of a few businesses. Ten out of the 350 companies included in our database received over half of the 610 million euros. These companies have enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Spanish government in other sectors such as defence, construction and communications, and are now gaining a privileged role in the highly sensitive areas of border surveillance and migration control.

    Our research also surfaced a troubling question that has shaped the second phase of our inquiry: to what extent are these companies influencing Spanish migration policy? The capture of rules and institutions by elites in an economic system has been documented in sectors such as defence, taxation or pharmaceuticals. That this could also be happening to borders and migration policy should alarm public opinion and regulators. For example, the key role played by private technology companies in the design and implementation of Spain’s Integral System of External Surveillance demonstrates the need for further investigation.

    Spain’s industry of migration control may be the prototype of a growing global phenomenon. Migration policies have been taken over by border deterrence goals and narratives. Meanwhile, border control is increasingly dependent on the technology and management of private companies. As E.U.-level priorities intersect with those of the highly-concentrated – and possibly politically influential – migration control industry, Europe risks being trapped in a political and budgetary vicious circle based on the premise of migration-as-a-problem, complicating any future reform efforts towards a more open migration system.

    https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/05/21/why-spain-is-a-window-into-the-e-u-migration-control-industry
    #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #modèle_espagnol #migrations #contrôles_migratoires #asile #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #réfugiés #histoire

  • #métaliste (qui va être un grand chantier, car il y a plein d’information sur seenthis, qu’il faudrait réorganiser) sur :
    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #migrations #réfugiés

    Des liens vers des articles généraux sur l’externalisation des frontières de la part de l’ #UE (#EU) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/569305
    https://seenthis.net/messages/390549
    https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

    Ici une tentative (très mal réussie, car évidement, la divergence entre pratiques et les discours à un moment donné, ça se voit !) de l’UE de faire une brochure pour déconstruire les mythes autour de la migration...
    La question de l’externalisation y est abordée dans différentes parties de la brochure :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765967

    Petit chapitre/encadré sur l’externalisation des frontières dans l’ouvrage "(Dé)passer la frontière" :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/769367

    Les origines de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers (maritimes) : accord #USA-#Haïti de #1981 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768694

    L’externalisation des politiques européennes en matière de migration
    https://seenthis.net/messages/787450

    "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/789048

    Partners in crime ? The impacts of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794636
    #paix #stabilité #droits #Libye #Niger #Turquie

    Proceedings of the conference “Externalisation of borders : detention practices and denial of the right to asylum”
    https://seenthis.net/messages/880193

  • Cartographie numérique : Cartographier l’Afrique (du Sahel et du Sahara à la Méditerranée)

    http://cartonumerique.blogspot.com/2018/09/cartographier-lafrique-du-sahel-et-du.html

    Cartographier l’Afrique (du Sahel et du Sahara à la Méditerranée)
    Dans l’esprit de l’atelier cartographique proposé sur ce blog, il s’agit de proposer des scénarios pédagogiques permettant non seulement d’utiliser des productions cartographiques existantes, mais également de pouvoir élaborer ses propres cartes en fonction du thème d’étude et de l’outil cartographique que l’on souhaite mobiliser. L’étude de l’Afrique entre dans les programmes de géographie scolaire et dans le cadre de la question de géographie au CAPES et à l’Agrégation (l’Afrique du Sahel et du Sahara à la Méditerranée) . C’est un thème sur lequel on trouve des données statistiques, mais celles-ci ne sont pas toujours fiables ni récentes. Les données sont disponibles en général par pays ou à l’échelle de l’Afrique toute entière, mais rarement à l’échelle sub-continentale (ou alors selon le découpage classique Afrique du Nord / Afrique de l’Ouest).

    Nous donnons ci-dessous des ressources pour aider les étudiants et les enseignants à « avoir les cartes en main », pour être à même de comprendre les grands enjeux sur cette question. L’approche nécessite d’être conduite à différentes échelles, celle du continent africain, mais aussi celle des états et des régions constituant ce vaste ensemble territorial. Nous avons classé les ressources selon deux entrées : d’une part les « cartes à voir » à travers une banque de productions cartographiques déjà disponibles et d’autre part les « cartes à faire » à travers des jeux de données à utiliser et à adapter selon ses propres besoins.

    #cartographie #afrique #afrique_du_nord

  • Nouvelle page internet sur le thème des #mixed_migrations
    About the Mixed Migration Centre

    The MMC is a leading source for independent and high quality data, information, research and analysis on mixed migration. Through the provision of credible evidence and expertise, the MMC aims to support agencies, policy makers and practitioners to make well-informed decisions, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to contribute to protection and assistance responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in the sector responding to mixed migration.

    http://www.mixedmigration.org

    Régions couvertes :
    #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Yémen #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Moyen-Orient #Asie

    cc @isskein @reka

    #mixed_migration #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • #Fonds_fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique : 90.5 millions d’euros supplémentaires pour renforcer la gestion des frontières et la protection des migrants en Afrique du Nord

    La Commission européenne a approuvé ce jour 3 nouveaux programmes relatifs à la migration en #Afrique_du_Nord, pour un montant total supérieur à 90 millions d’euros.

    Cette décision fait suite aux conclusions du #Conseil_européen de la semaine dernière, au cours duquel les dirigeants européens se sont engagés à intensifier l’aide le long de la route de la #Méditerranée_centrale. Les nouveaux programmes au titre du fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique accroîtront l’aide de l’UE en faveur des réfugiés et des migrants vulnérables et amélioreront les capacités de gestion des frontières des pays partenaires.

    Mme Federica Mogherini, haute représentante/vice-présidente, a fait le commentaire suivant : « Les nouveaux programmes adoptés aujourd’hui intensifieront l’action que nous menons en vue de gérer les flux migratoires de manière humaine et durable, en sauvant et en protégeant la vie de réfugiés et de migrants et en leur fournissant une aide et en luttant contre les trafiquants et les passeurs. Notre approche intégrée combine une action en mer et une action conjointe avec des pays partenaires le long des routes migratoires, y compris en Libye et au Sahel. Ce travail a déjà porté ses fruits et en portera encore davantage si les États membres se conforment aux engagements qu’ils ont pris depuis la création du fonds fiduciaire à La Valette, en 2015. »

    M. Johannes Hahn, commissaire chargé de la politique européenne de voisinage et des négociations d’élargissement, a ajouté : « La formule du #partenariat est déterminante pour relever les défis posés par la migration irrégulière. En travaillant de concert avec nos voisins du sud, nous pouvons faire face à ce problème et procurer des avantages aux pays partenaires, aux migrants et à l’Europe. Les nouveaux programmes de ce jour aideront les autorités à améliorer la gestion des frontières, tout en assurant la protection des migrants vulnérables et l’octroi d’une aide d’urgence à ces derniers. »

    D’un montant de 90,5 millions d’euros, l’aide récemment adoptée financera 3 programmes, qui viendront compléter les efforts actuellement déployés par l’UE dans la région :

    Au moyen du programme de gestion des frontières de la région du Maghreb, d’une valeur de 55 millions d’euros, l’UE soutiendra les efforts consentis par les institutions nationales au #Maroc et en #Tunisie en vue de sauver des vies humaines en mer, d’améliorer la gestion des frontières maritimes et de lutter contre les passeurs opérant dans la région. Mis en œuvre par le ministère de l’intérieur italien et le #Centre_international_pour_le_développement_des_politiques_migratoires (#CIDPM), ce programme mettra l’accent sur le renforcement des capacités, ainsi que sur la fourniture d’équipements et leur entretien.
    En s’appuyant sur les programmes existants, l’UE accroîtra son aide en faveur de la protection des réfugiés et des migrants en #Libye aux points de #débarquement, dans les centres de #rétention, dans les régions méridionales désertiques éloignées et en milieu urbain. D’une valeur de 29 millions d’euros, le programme d’« approche intégrée de la protection et d’aide d’urgence aux migrants vulnérables et bloqués en Libye » sera mis en œuvre conjointement avec l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (#OIM) et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (#HCR). Il encouragera aussi les initiatives visant à ouvrir des perspectives économiques aux migrants sur le marché du travail national, en concertation avec le ministère libyen du travail.
    Avec 6,5 millions d’euros supplémentaires, l’UE renforcera son aide aux migrants vulnérables, à l’appui de la stratégie nationale du #Maroc en matière de migration, adoptée en 2014. L’accès des migrants vulnérables aux services de base en sera facilité et la capacité des associations et organisations locales à fournir efficacement ces services s’en trouvera améliorée. Les organisations de la société civile mettront en œuvre ce programme.

    Contexte

    Le fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique a été créé en 2015 en vue de remédier aux causes profondes des migrations irrégulières et des déplacements forcés. Le budget alloué s’élève jusqu’ici à 3,43 milliards d’euros et provient de l’UE, de ses États membres et d’autres donateurs. À ce jour, 164 programmes ont été approuvés pour les 3 régions concernées (Afrique du Nord, Sahel/lac Tchad et Corne de l’Afrique), pour un montant total d’environ 3,06 milliards d’euros.

    Avec l’enveloppe supplémentaire d’aujourd’hui, 461 millions d’euros du volet « Afrique du Nord » ont été mobilisés en faveur de 19 programmes satisfaisant aux multiples besoins dans la région et au-delà.

    Les programmes adoptés se conforment à l’engagement pris lors du Conseil européen du 28 juin 2018 d’intensifier l’aide le long de la route de la Méditerranée centrale en faveur des communautés côtières et méridionales, de conditions d’accueil humaines et d’une coopération avec les pays d’origine et de transit, tout en augmentant l’aide aux pays touchés par l’augmentation des flux migratoires le long de la route de la Méditerranée occidentale, et notamment le Maroc. L’UE maintient son soutien aux activités menées en Libye par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4366_fr.htm
    #fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l'Union_européenne_pour_l’Afrique #Afrique #fonds_fiduciaire #externalisation #frontières #asile #migrations #réfguiés #UE #EU #détention_administrative #désert #IOM

    cc @_kg_

  • Österreich plant mit einigen EU-Ländern Aufnahmelager außerhalb der EU

    Österreich arbeite „mit einer kleinen Gruppe von Staaten“ an dem Projekt, sagte Kurz. Die Pläne seien bisher allerdings „sehr vertraulich“, um die „Durchsetzbarkeit“ des Projekts zu erhöhen. Auf die Frage, ob ein solches Aufnahmezentrum in Albanien eingerichtet werden könnte, sagte Kurz: „Wir werden sehen.“

    In der vergangenen Woche hatte bereits der dänische Ministerpräsident Lars Lökke Rasmussen bestätigt, dass einige EU-Länder, darunter auch Österreich, Aufnahmezentren für abgelehnte Asylbewerber außerhalb der EU einrichten wollen. In österreichischen Medienberichten war zuletzt mehrfach von Albanien als möglichem Standort die Rede.

    https://www.welt.de/newsticker/news1/article177463654/Fluechtlinge-Oesterreich-plant-mit-einigen-EU-Laendern-Aufnahmelager-ausserhalb
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #Albanie #hotspots (sorte de hotspot en dehors de l’UE) #Autriche #Danemark

    –----

    voir la métaliste sur les tentatives d’externalisation de la procédure d’asile de différents pays européens dans l’histoire :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/900122

    • C’est à la même occasion de la proposition d’un #axe contre l’immigration illégale...

      Les ministres de l’Intérieur allemand, autrichien et italien créent un « axe » contre l’immigration illégale

      « A notre avis, il faut un axe des volontaires dans la lutte contre l’immigration illégale », a annoncé le chancelier autrichien #Sebastian_Kurz, mercredi.


      https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/migrants/les-ministres-de-l-interieur-allemand-autrichien-et-italien-creent-un-a
      #Allemagne #Italie

    • L’Autriche et le Danemark veulent ouvrir des camps d’expulsés aux portes de l’UE

      Selon le premier ministre danois, Copenhague est en discussion avec Vienne et « d’autres pays » de l’Union pour la mise en place d’un « nouveau régime européen de l’asile ».

      Leurs divisions et la pression des populistes font décidément naître les idées les plus renversantes parmi les dirigeants européens quant au traitement à réserver aux demandeurs d’asile et au refoulement de ceux qui ne peuvent prétendre à celui-ci.

      Mardi 5 juin, le premier ministre danois, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, a annoncé que son pays était en discussion avec l’Autriche – qui assumera bientôt la présidence tournante de l’Union – et « d’autres pays » pour la mise en place d’un « nouveau régime européen de l’asile ». Point central du dispositif : la création de « centres communs de réception et d’expulsion en Europe ». En clair, des camps de rétention, où se retrouveraient des migrants ne pouvant prétendre à une demande d’asile, ou ne pouvant être rapidement renvoyés.

      M. Rasmussen n’a pas mentionné la possible localisation de ces camps. Ils ne seraient pas, selon lui, « sur la liste des destinations préférées des migrants et des passeurs ». Il s’agirait en fait, selon plusieurs sources, de l’Albanie et du Kosovo, candidats à l’adhésion à l’UE. Le premier ministre a évoqué des contacts « avec d’autres dirigeants européens » et se disait « optimiste », quant à la mise en place d’un projet pilote « d’ici à la fin de l’année ». Les premières discussions auraient en fait eu lieu à Sofia, en marge du sommet entre les dirigeants des Vingt-Huit et cinq pays des Balkans occidentaux, le 17 mai.

      Les sociaux-démocrates et les populistes du Parti du peuple danois (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) – ces derniers soutiennent M. Rasmussen au Parlement – ont fait savoir qu’ils étaient favorables à la proposition du premier ministre. La formation populiste avait déjà proposé de transformer une île inhabitée du royaume, située en dehors du territoire de l’Union, en centre de détention pour les déboutés. La ministre libérale de l’immigration, Inger Stojberg, avait répondu qu’elle était « toujours prête à examiner de bonnes idées », même si celle-ci présentait « des défis pratiques et légaux ».

      Paris semble tomber des nues

      A Bruxelles, mercredi, le chancelier conservateur autrichien Sebastian Kurz présentait avec son gouvernement les principaux axes de sa présidence, qui démarrera le 1er juillet. Il aurait voulu que toute l’attention soit portée sur sa volonté de renforcer les frontières extérieures de l’Union et sur ses propositions pour le budget post-Brexit – ses deux priorités.

      Or, il a évidemment été interrogé sur les propos de M. Rasmussen et a dû les confirmer, tout en ajoutant prudemment qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’un projet porté par sa future présidence mais « d’une initiative émanant d’un cercle restreint auquel le Danemark appartenait ». Quels autres Etats membres seraient concernés ?

      Les Pays-Bas, semble-t-il, mais la diplomatie néerlandaise affirmait, jeudi, ne pas vouloir se prononcer sur la concrétisation du projet. La Belgique, elle, n’aurait pas été consultée même si, lundi, lors d’une réunion des ministres européens de l’intérieur et de la migration, son secrétaire d’Etat, le nationaliste flamand Theo Francken, avait évoqué la nécessité d’empêcher l’accostage des bateaux en Europe – « push back » – et proclamé « la mort » du règlement de Dublin. Celui-ci oblige les pays de première arrivée (Italie et Grèce surtout) à enregistrer un migrant avant son transfert éventuel vers un autre Etat membre.

      L’Allemagne ? Mme Merkel aurait été « approchée » mais, jeudi, lors d’un congrès du Parti populaire européen, à Munich, elle insistait surtout sur le contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’Union et suggérait la nécessité de reproduire, avec d’autres pays tiers, l’accord conclu avec la Turquie pour la gestion des migrants. La famille des conservateurs européens prône toujours la relocalisation de demandeurs d’asile dans l’Union, à partir de pays tiers. Un proche de la chancelière ne cachait pas son scepticisme l’égard des plans de Copenhague et Vienne.

      La France, alors ? Sa diplomatie semble tomber des nues. Paris œuvre à un texte pour sortir le dossier migratoire de l’ornière mais ne pourrait accepter l’idée de camps de rétention. « Inimaginable », aussi, dit une source diplomatique, de voir des pays des Balkans se ranger à de telles initiatives, même en échange d’un coup de pouce financier ou d’une accélération de l’examen de leur dossier d’adhésion.

      Bruxelles inquiète des dérives

      Du côté de la Commission européenne – dont le président, Jean-Claude Juncker, recevait mercredi M. Kurz – la réponse est embarrassée. Le collège résume les projets en question à des « initiatives nationales », en soulignant qu’il serait préférable d’avoir une approche européenne, fondée sur « les valeurs » de l’Union.

      Bruxelles s’inquiète surtout des dérives du débat et redoute la multiplication des incidents avec la future présidence autrichienne, susceptible de rallier les voix de la Hongrie, de la Pologne ou d’autres Etats membres, hostiles à l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile.

      De précédents projets visant à la création de centres « d’accueil », sur le territoire libyen notamment, avaient été prudemment écartés. L’idée d’ouvrir des camps dans des pays européens, hors UE, portée par le ministre autrichien de l’intérieur, Herbert Kickl, poids lourd du FPÖ (Parti autrichien de la Liberté) est vue comme un nouvel obstacle à toute solution consensuelle.

      M. Kickl a aussi promis d’augmenter le nombre des personnes reconduites aux frontières. En 2017, 11 974 déboutés du droit d’asile ont quitté l’Autriche et 58 % d’entre eux ont été éloignés de force. Le ministre a également confirmé la mise en place d’une nouvelle police des frontières et annoncé que son pays ne participerait plus au programme de répartition des réfugiés arrivés en Grèce et en Italie. Il souhaite d’ailleurs que désormais, plus aucune demande d’asile ne soit étudiée sur le sol européen.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/06/08/l-autriche-et-le-danemark-veulent-ouvrir-des-camps-d-expulses-aux-portes-de-
      #Kosovo

    • L’étonnante proposition de #Donald_Tusk sur les réfugiés

      Le président du Conseil européen Donald Tusk envisage la création de centres en dehors de l’UE pour distinguer rapidement les personnes éligibles à l’asile et les migrants économiques qui ne peuvent y prétendre, ressort-il d’un projet de conclusions qu’il a fait parvenir aux chefs d’Etats et de gouvernement européens dans la perspective du sommet des 28 et 29 juin.

      Cette proposition, avancée par M. Tusk pour sortir de l’impasse sur la question migratoire, est un « #potentiel_game-changer », d’après un diplomate européen.

      Ces « plateformes régionales de débarquement » permettraient d’accueillir des personnes sauvées en mer alors qu’elles essayaient de rejoindre l’UE. Elles seraient gérées en coopération avec le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (UNHCR) et l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM).

      Le document ne précise toutefois pas où elles se situeraient. Une source européenne a néanmoins précisé qu’elles étaient envisagées « en dehors de l’UE » sans donner plus de détails.

      La Tunisie et l’Albanie sont régulièrement citées comme étant susceptibles d’accueillir de telles installations. Le secrétaire d’Etat belge à l’Asile et la Migration, Theo Francken (N-VA), avait d’ailleurs récemment suggéré de ramener les migrants secourus en mer vers le pays du Maghreb pour ensuite les trier. Une idée similaire avait aussi été avancée dès 2016 par le dirigeant ultranationaliste hongrois Viktor Orban.

      Outre la création de ces « plateformes », Donald Tusk propose aux dirigeants de renforcer les moyens financiers consacrés à la lutte contre la migration illégale et d’offrir un soutien plus important aux garde-côtes libyens. Il souligne aussi la nécessité d’une coopération accrue avec des pays d’origine et de transit des migrants, pour éviter de connaître à nouveau un afflux comparable à celui de 2015.

      Les « plateformes de débarquement » seraient destinées aux migrants qui, malgré toutes ces mesures, tenteraient la traversée de la Méditerranée et seraient « secourus dans le cadre d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage ».

      Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement se pencheront en détail sur les propositions de M. Tusk lors du sommet des 28 et 29 juin. Ils aborderont également l’épineuse question de la réforme du règlement de Dublin, pierre angulaire du régime d’asile européen.

      Après trois ans de palabres, les 28 Etats membres de l’UE ne sont en effet pas parvenus à s’accorder sur une réforme de ce texte, dont les failles ont été révélées lors de l’afflux massif et soudain de migrants dans l’Union en 2015.

      Ce règlement, qui détermine l’Etat membre responsable d’une demande d’asile dans l’UE, fait pour l’heure peser une pression démesurée sur les pays de « première entrée », en particulier l’Italie et la Grèce. Les chances qu’un compromis se dégage sur ce point lors du sommet semblent toutefois infimes, pour ne pas dire inexistantes.

      http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/l-etonnante-proposition-de-donald-tusk-sur-les-refugies-5b29222e5532a296888d

      autre mot barbare : #potentiel_game-changer

    • L’axe commence à se mettre en place...

      Germany and Austria start joint police work to combat illegal migration

      The Austrian and German federal police and the Bavarian state police plan for the first time this Friday to work together in their border area to assess ways they can combat increasing illegal immigration and crime. The authorities will start by taking a closer look at rail traffic.

      https://www.thelocal.de/20180601/germany-and-austria-strengthen-borders-to-combat-risky-illegal-migration

    • Migranti, Conte: «In autunno vertice sulla Libia». E intanto a Innsbruck asse con Germania e Austria

      Il premier: «Invierò una lettera da spedire a Juncker e a Tusk». Intanto, intesa a tre per arginare i flussi migratori in modo da far arrivare in Europa solo chi fugge da una guerra.

      «Il merito dell’Italia è stato riuscire a ricondurre in un quadro unitario organico vari aspetti di un fenomeno complesso e avere compreso che il fenomeno della gestione dei flussi migratori non è emergenziale». Così il presidente del Consiglio Giuseppe Conte in conferenza stampa alla fine del vertice Nato. «Stiamo organizzando una conferenza in Italia sulla Libia in autunno per dar seguito a quella di Parigi», ha aggiunto il premier,«il processo di stabilizzazione non può riguardare solo l’Italia ma nemmeno soltanto Macron». Sulla Libia, ha spiegato invece Conte, «c’è tanto da fare, il Paese va affiancato» nel suo percorso di stabilizzazione che porti alle elezioni. Ma Conte ha avvertito che «se arriviamo troppo presto alle elezioni, si rischia di avere il caos totale. Bisogna prima creare le condizioni sociali ed economiche necessarie per reggere l’impatto di un sistema democratico».

      «Presto una lettera a Juncker e Tusk»

      Il presidente del Consiglio ha affermato poi di non aver parlato di Libia con Trump a Bruxelles: lo farà nel dettaglio nella sua prossima visita negli Usa. «Il problema», ha detto, «non è modificare il regolamento di Dublino» che è «asfittico come approccio, è assolutamente inadeguato. I principi delle Conclusioni Ue attestano che è superato». Conte ha parlato di una lettera da spedire a Juncker presidente della Commissione europea e a Tusk a capo del Consiglio europeo: «Nella mia lettera si chiederà che anche Sophia, anche questa missione internazionale sia adeguata alle conclusioni del Consiglio Ue. E così per le altre». «La mia lettera partirà molto presto, non so a che punto è Juncker ma appena rientrerò a Roma lavorerò a questo». «L’ultima notizia», ha poi detto, «è che la nave Diciotti si sta avviando in porto. Abbiamo dato indicazione di individuare le persone o i migranti che si sono resi responsabili di atti che contrastano con le nostre leggi».

      Il vertice a tre

      In mattinata, sul tema migranti era già stato protagonista Matteo Salvini, ministro dell’Interno. Un’intesa a tre, un «asse di volenterosi» guidato da Austria, Germania e Italia per arginare i flussi migratori. È ciò che è emerso dall’incontro trilaterale fra Salvini e gli omologhi tedeschi e austriaci, Horst Seehofer e Herbert Kickl a Innsbruck, che precede il vertice Ue. Si tratta di un’intesa per frenare le partenze di migranti e gli sbarchi, in modo da far giungere in Europa solo chi fugge da una guerra.

      Salvini: «Proposte italiane diventano proposte europee»

      «Le proposte italiane su migranti diventano proposte europee: contiamo che finalmente l’Europa torni a difendere i confini e il diritto e alla sicurezza dei 500 milioni di europei» ha detti Matteo Salvini. «Con i colleghi di Austria e Germania - ha spiegato al termine dell’incontro - abbiamo affrontato il grande problema degli arrivi: se si riducono questi si risolvono anche i problemi minori interni tra le nazioni e non ci sarà alcun problema alle frontiere». «Meno migranti, meno sbarchi e meno morti» ha poi aggiunto. «Chiederemo sostegno alle autorità libiche, dare a Tripoli il diritto ai rimpatri e la redistribuzione delle quote degli arrivi. Chiederemo alle missioni internazionali di non usare l’Italia come unico punto d’arrivo e il sostegno nelle operazioni di soccorso, protezione e riaccompagnamento di migliaia di clandestini nei luoghi di partenza. Credo quindi - ha detto poi Salvini - che questo nucleo di amicizia e di intervento serio concreto ed efficiente di Italia, Germania ed Austria, possa essere un nucleo che darà un impulso positivo a tutta Europa per riconoscere il diritto di asilo a quella minoranza di donne e bambini che fuggono dalle guerre ed evitare l’arrivo e la morte di decine di migliaia di persone che non scappano da nessuna guerra».

      «Proteggere le frontiere esterne all’Unione Europea»

      A fargli eco il ministro dell’Interno tedesco Seehofer:«I tre Paesi si sono messi d’accordo per controllare l’immigrazione. Vogliamo introdurre ordine nella politica migratoria ma garantire un approccio umanitario e proteggere effettivamente le frontiere esterne dell’Unione Europea». «Sarebbe importante - sottolinea poi il ministro - che l’intera Unione europea decidesse qualcosa. Noi possiamo avere delle iniziative, ma l’Unione europea deve avere un’opinione comune. Sono ottimista e qui abbiamo l’occasione di procedere in una direzione positiva». E il ministro dell’Interno austriaco Kickl sottolinea come «questo asse di volenterosi può prendere iniziative ma è l’intera Unione Europea che deve intervenire». «Le cose sono relativamente semplice - aggiunge - noi tre siamo d’accordo sul fatto che vogliamo mettere ordine» e «mandare il chiaro messaggio che in futuro non dovrebbe essere possibile calpestare il suolo europeo se non si ha il diritto alla protezione». Previsto un nuovo incontro a Vienna sempre fra i ministri dell’Interno di Italia Germania e Austria il prossimo 19 luglio.


      https://www.corriere.it/politica/18_luglio_12/migranti-asse-germania-austria-fermare-sbarchi-6ba33c18-859b-11e8-b570-8bf3

  • Manufacturing Smugglers: From Irregular to Clandestine Mobility in the Sahara - Julien Brachet, 2018

    http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002716217744529

    For decades, mobility between the Sahel and northern Africa was mostly irregular, but not clandestine. Most of the border crossings were supervised and (illegally) taxed by border police; everyone knew who did what with whom, and Saharan drivers were not thought of as smugglers of people. Starting in the early 2000s, European countries intervened, considering all trans-Saharan movements as a first step on a journey toward Europe, thus encouraging national authorities to stop them. This led to the tightening of border controls across northwest Africa. This article shows how the resulting criminalization of travel to and through the Sahara has led to the development of specialized passenger transport as a clandestine activity, resulting in an increase in the human and financial costs of those journeys. Thus, smugglers, as a particular category of actors, appear as directly manufactured by the migration policies that were drafted to control them.

    #migrations #asile #afrique_du_nord #sahara

  • La #Mondialisation des pauvres. Loin de Wall Street et de Davos

    La mondialisation ne se résume pas au succès de quelques multinationales et à la richesse d’une minorité de nantis. Les acteurs les plus engagés dans la mondialisation demeurent discrets, souvent invisibles. Depuis une trentaine d’années, les routes de l’échange transnational ont connu de profondes mutations. Elles relient aujourd’hui la Chine, l’atelier du monde, à un « marché des pauvres » fort de quatre milliards de consommateurs, en Algérie, au Nigeria ou en Côte d’Ivoire. Pour apercevoir ces nouvelles « Routes de la Soie », il faut se détacher d’une vision occidentalo-centrée et déplacer le regard vers des espaces jugés marginaux, où s’inventent des pratiques globales qui bouleversent l’économie du monde. On découvre alors une « autre mondialisation », vue d’en bas, du point de vue des acteurs qui la font.


    http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/la-mondialisation-des-pauvres-armelle-choplin/9782021366525
    #livre #globalisation #marginalité #économie #marges #géographie_de_la_mondialisation #ressources_pédagogiques #post-modernisme #pauvreté #économie #marginalité #géographie #géographie_économique
    #inégalités #mondialisation_des_pauvres

    • Olivier Pliez : « Avec le #bas_de_gamme et la #contrefaçon, la mondialisation s’installe au plus près des pauvres »

      Les géographes #Armelle_Choplin et #Olivier_Pliez ont suivi à travers le monde les #vêtements, #jouets et autres extensions de cheveux de leur lieu de fabrication jusqu’au marché où ils sont vendus. Ces objets sont les indices d’une « mondialisation des pauvres » qui s’étend jusque dans les pays occidentaux.
      Peut-on parler de mondialisation sans passer par Wall Street, Davos, et tous les hauts lieux qui en sont habituellement les symboles ? Oui, répondent les géographes Armelle Choplin et Olivier Pliez dans la Mondialisation des pauvres (Seuil, La République des idées, 2018). Délaissant Manhattan ou la City de Londres, ils se sont rendus en #Afrique_du_Nord et dans le #golfe_de_Guinée, mais aussi en #Turquie et en #Chine, pour montrer que des espaces pauvres, que nous croyons exclus de la globalisation économique, ont aussi leurs réseaux internationaux. A défaut d’actions et de flux financiers, ces circuits voient transiter des produits bas de gamme : vêtements, électroménager, tongs, extensions de cheveux ou encore parpaings et ciment.
      En retraçant les parcours de ces #objets, ils dessinent les #réseaux d’une « #mondialisation_par_le_bas », de plus en plus sophistiqués et de plus en plus étendus. Né au cours des années 90 dans les marchés installés dans de nombreuses villes méditerranéennes comme Marseille, ce commerce à bas prix explose dans des métropoles chinoises d’envergure mondiale, où les produits bas de gamme s’exportent par conteneurs entiers. Olivier Pliez revient sur les logiques d’organisation de ce #commerce.

      Vous présentez cette « mondialisation par le bas » en suivant des objets à travers le monde. Comment les avez-vous choisis ?

      Nous avons sélectionné ceux qui révélaient l’étendue des réseaux à travers le monde. Nous racontons ainsi comment un homme d’affaires a fait fortune grâce aux extensions de cheveux artificiels : simple revendeur de mèches à Barbès dans les années 80, il est ensuite devenu le principal revendeur pour l’Europe, avant d’installer ses propres usines au Bénin puis au Nigeria, où il emploie 7 000 personnes ! Cet exemple de réussite économique, où des produits fabriqués en Afrique se vendent en Europe, nous pousse à sortir de nos schémas habituels : l’Afrique n’est pas seulement un continent pris au piège de la Françafrique ou de la Chinafrique. Certes, la mondialisation est avant tout un rapport de dominant-dominé, avec des riches qui exploitent des pauvres, des Nord qui profitent des Sud. Mais ces espaces pauvres et dominés intéressent le marché car ce sont des lieux de #consommation - je pense à des produits neufs mais aussi, par exemple, aux voitures de seconde main en provenance d’Europe - et parfois même des lieux de production d’objets que l’on ne trouve pas ailleurs. Nous essayons donc de montrer comment des marchands, des fabricants, qui ne sont pas les plus armés face à la mondialisation, arrivent tout de même à tirer parti de ces #réseaux_d’échanges.

      Comment a évolué ce commerce au fil du temps ?

      Tout a commencé dans les années 80 avec le « #commerce_au_cabas » : des gens se rendaient dans des marchés tel celui de #Belsunce à #Marseille. Ils achetaient des produits bas de gamme comme des vêtements, des objets électroniques ou du petit électroménager, qu’ils ramenaient à la main au Maghreb pour les rerevendre. Ce commerce est un succès, et la demande se fait de plus en plus forte, à tel point que les marchands augmentent les volumes et achètent les marchandises par conteneurs entiers. Ils vont alors se fournir vers des villes plus grandes : d’abord #Istanbul, puis #Dubaï, et enfin, des villes chinoises comme #Yiwu : véritable #ville-marché à deux heures de train au sud de Shanghai, on y trouve des magasins d’usines ouverts 364 jours par an, où l’on peut se fournir en « menus articles », c’est-à-dire des #appareils_ménagers, des #jouets, de la #papeterie, des #vêtements ou encore des #objets_religieux. Dans les cafés, des marchands parlent « affaires », dans toutes les langues.

      Marseille, Istanbul, Dubaï, et maintenant Yiwu : pourquoi ce commerce se déplace-t-il à l’Est ?

      Chaque changement de ville correspond à un élargissement des lieux de consommation, et donc à une augmentation de la demande. A Marseille dans les années 90, le marché alimente surtout le #Maghreb. Puis les marchands maghrébins sont partis se fournir à Istanbul, au moment où la chute de l’URSS fait exploser la demande de consommation dans l’aire ex-soviétique. Cette ville offre alors des prix plus intéressants que Marseille. Lorsque Dubaï émerge à son tour, ce sont l’#Iran et toute la #corne_de_l’Afrique qui s’ajoutent à la liste des lieux de consommation. Enfin, en Chine, Yiwu est une #ville_globale, qui vend des produits dans le monde entier. En plus des affiches en arabe ou en russe, on voit aussi des panneaux en espagnol, preuve de la présence de marchands latino-américains.

      Les villes qui se font doubler perdent-elles leur rôle commercial ?

      A Marseille, le #marché_de_Belsunce a disparu et le quartier est en cours de #gentrification. A Istanbul ou Dubaï, villes très internationales, le commerce reste très actif mais répond à des besoins plus spécifiques : par exemple, Dubaï assure des livraisons plus rapides que Yiwu. Plus largement, pour rester en compétition, de nombreuses villes se spécialisent : celles de #Malaisie vendent des #meubles_en_bois, celles du #Vietnam du #textile, etc.

      Qu’est-ce qui explique en Chine le succès de Yiwu, bien moins connue qu’Istanbul ou Dubaï ?

      Yiwu est connue des grossistes, pas des touristes. Contrairement à ses concurrentes, elle s’est développée pour le marché, alors qu’ailleurs, le marché naissait dans la ville préexistante. A la fin des années 90, Yiwu a fait le choix d’installer des magasins ouverts toute l’année, alors que ses concurrentes chinoises proposaient des foires ouvertes dans un temps limité, ce qui était plus contraignant pour les acheteurs. De plus, elle permet l’exportation sur de petits volumes - l’équivalent d’un demi-conteneur -, ce qui attire des marchands moins fortunés. Et puis, Yiwu a aussi élargi ses gammes de produits, en continuant à vendre du bas de gamme, mais en ajoutant des éléments de meilleure qualité, toujours dans le domaine du vêtement, des jouets, du papier. Il y a quelques années, on y trouvait jusqu’à 90 % de produits de contrefaçon. Ce n’est plus le cas. Cela permet d’atteindre de nouveaux marchés de consommation, jusque dans les pays du Nord ! En France, certaines grandes surfaces discount ou de petites boutiques proposent des produits venus de villes comme Yiwu.

      Donc, la « mondialisation des pauvres » concerne aussi les pays riches ?

      Oui. On le voit par exemple à #El_Eulma, le plus grand marché d’#Algérie, connu dans tout le Maghreb. On y trouve notamment des vêtements et des #fournitures_scolaires que tout le monde vient acheter, y compris des personnes qui vivent en Europe mais qui y viennent pendant leurs vacances. Les mêmes types de produits sont ainsi présents en #Afrique, en #Amérique_latine, en #Asie_du_Sud-Est, mais aussi ainsi dans les pays occidentaux : à Yiwu, les Etats-Unis et l’UE figurent en bonne place dans les listes de clients importants. C’est en quelque sorte l’illustration concrète des nouvelles routes de la soie que la Chine étend dans le monde entier. Aujourd’hui, des trains relient Yiwu à Téhéran, mais aussi à Madrid et à Londres ou Budapest. Economiquement, le #transport_maritime reste moins coûteux, mais c’est un symbole important de l’étendue de sa puissance commerciale.

      Ces réseaux commerciaux pourront-ils satisfaire les futurs besoins de l’Afrique, en forte croissance démographique ?

      En ce qui concerne le besoin de consommation, oui. Ce sera notamment le cas du golfe de Guinée : cette région portuaire de 30 millions d’habitants, anglophones ou francophones, a de bons atouts pour s’intégrer aux réseaux mondiaux. Pour d’autres zones, comme pour la bordure méridionale du Sahel, ce sera plus dur, même si les grandes capitales de cette zone affichent des publicités pour le port le plus proche, ce qui montre l’existence de lien avec le commerce international. En revanche, les activités économiques ne fourniront pas d’emploi à tout le monde, loin de là.

      Votre livre montre des commerçants qui circulent dans le monde entier. Comment analyser les contraintes que leur impose la politique migratoire européenne ?

      Tous les spécialistes des migrations disent depuis trente ans : laissez-les circuler ! Les conséquences de la fermeture des frontières européennes sont faciles à mesurer. Dans les années 90 et 2000, Istanbul a attiré de nombreux commerçants qui ne pouvaient pas se rendre en France faute de #visa. Aux Etats-Unis, des travaux ont montré la même chose dans les relations avec l’Amérique latine : les personnes avec un double visa circulaient et créaient cette mondialisation. Quand les contraintes de circulation s’accroissent, le commerce ne s’arrête pas, il se reporte. C’est bien ce qu’ont compris les Chinois en créant Yiwu et en y garantissant un bon accueil des marchands maghrébins, et plus largement, arabes.

      Avec cette image d’hommes et de produits circulant pour le plus grand bien de tous, ne glisse-t-on pas vers une « mondialisation heureuse » qui néglige la question des inégalités ?

      Nous dénonçons cette mondialisation qui est source d’inégalités. Mais nous essayons de comprendre comment elle s’installe au plus près des pauvres pour les inclure dans le #marché. Ce n’est pas une mondialisation plus angélique que l’autre, mais on n’en parle pas ou peu, notamment parce qu’il est difficile de quantifier les #flux qui circulent, comme on le fait pour les autres lieux de la mondialisation. Il manquait aussi une géographie à ce champ très marqué par les sociologues et les anthropologues, c’est ce que nous avons voulu faire.

      http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/04/06/olivier-pliez-avec-le-bas-de-gamme-et-la-contrefacon-la-mondialisation-s-
      #frontières #ouverture_des_frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #circulation #route_de_la_soie (les nouvelles "routes de la soie")

  • L’organisation du cerveau humain moderne a émergé seulement récemment

    Encore une publication de l’Institut Max-Planck

    https://www.mpg.de/11883269/homo-sapiens-brain-evolution

    Le résumé sur ScienceDaily : Modern human brain organization emerged only recently : Homo sapiens fossils demonstrate a gradual evolution of the human brain towards its modern globular shape — ScienceDaily

    https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/01/180125105444.htm
    /images/2018/01/180125105444_1_540x360.jpg

    They add to the accumulating archeological and paleoanthropological evidence demonstrating that Homo sapiens is an evolving species with deep African roots and long-lasting gradual changes in behavioral modernity, brain organization, and potentially brain function.

    Si l’évolution n’est que le résultat de l’adaptation aux conditions du milieu environnemental, sommes-nous des éternels inadaptés ?

    #préhistoire #évolution #cerveau #Max-Planck Institut
    #300000BP #Jebel_Irhoud #Afrique_du_Nord #Florisbad #Afrique-du-Sud #260000BP Omo_Kibish #Afrique_de_l'Est #Ethiopie #195000BP

  • CartoMundi, une cartothèque historique sur l’#Europe_du_Sud, l’#Afrique_du_Nord et le #Moyen-Orient (principalement) — Géoconfluences

    http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/actualites/veille/cartomundi-cartes-historiques

    Belle initiative, et aussi, mode de représentation visuel très intéressant avec cette carte de Yougoslavie.

    Source : http://www.cartomundi.fr/site/E01.aspx?FC=65112

    Nous transmettons une annonce des auteurs du site CartoMundi – Valorisation en ligne du patrimoine cartographique, développé par l’université d’Aix-Marseille, dans le cadre de la Maison méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’homme et avec le soutien du laboratoire Telemme. Cette information est « à diffuser sans modération », d’après les auteurs eux-mêmes :

    « Le site web CartoMundi est régulièrement alimenté par de nouvelles références et de nouvelles reproductions. On en compte actuellement plus de 6 500 dont la moitié représente les pays du sud et de l’est méditerranéen où la documentation cartographique n’est pas aisément accessible.

    La liste qui suit correspond aux séries cartographiques reproduites. Elle est organisée par continents ; chaque ligne de cette liste est un lien hypertexte qui permet d’accéder directement aux reproductions correspondantes sur CartoMundi, sans passer par le moteur de recherche. Depuis cette entrée, le tableau d’assemblage situé en bas à gauche de l’écran permet de naviguer dans chaque série en passant d’une feuille à l’autre. »

    #cartographie #visualisation #Sémiologie #cartes_anciennes

  • Emmanuel #Macron veut créer des « hotspots » pour gérer les demandes d’asile en #Libye

    « La France va créer dès cet été en Libye des #hotspots », des centres d’examen pour les candidats à l’asile, a annoncé le président Emmanuel Macron ce matin en marge d’une visite d’un centre d’hébergement de réfugiés à Orléans (Loiret). « L’idée est de créer en Libye des hotspots afin d’éviter aux gens de prendre des risques fous alors qu’ils ne sont pas tous éligibles à l’asile. Les gens, on va aller les chercher. Je compte le faire dès cet été », avec ou sans l’Europe, a-t-il ajouté.

    http://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/emmanuel-macron-veut-creer-des-hotspots-pour-gerer-les-demandes-dasile-en
    #hotspot #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #France

    cc @i_s_

    –---

    voir la métaliste sur les tentatives de certains pays européens d’externaliser la #procédure_d'asile :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/900122