• Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

    « Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

    « Le patrouilleur Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens.

    La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de surveillance aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

    Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données ADS-B, un signal émis par les avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

    Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

    Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

    Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

    Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri.

    L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

    De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

    Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

    Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « centre régional de coordination des sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

    Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

    Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l
    #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Méditerranée #Libye #mer_Méditerranée #pull-backs #pull-back #push-backs

    • Airborne Complicity – Frontex Aerial Surveillance Enables Abuse

      Over the last year, we have partnered with Human Rights Watch to investigate the use by the EU’s border agency, Frontex, of aerial surveillance in the central Mediterranean. The aircraft, several planes and a drone operated by private companies, transmit video feeds and other information to a situation centre in Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, where operational decisions are taken about when and whom to alert about migrants’ boats. Frontex aerial surveillance is key in enabling the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept migrant boatsand return their passengers to Libya, knowing full well that they will face systematic and widespread abuse when forcibly returned there.

      To circumvent Frontex’s lack of transparency on these issues (in processing 27 of 30 freedom of information requests we submitted – the others are pending – Frontex identified thousands of relevant documents but released only 86 of them, most of which were heavily redacted) we cross-referenced official and open-source data, including drone and plane flight tracks, together with information collected by Sea-Watch (through its various search and rescue ships and planes operating in the area), the Alarm Phone, as well as the testimony of survivors who courageously shared their stories with us. 

      Overall, contrary to Frontex claim that its aerial surveillance saves lives, the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Border Forensics demonstrates it is in service of interceptions by Libyan forces, rather than rescue. While the presence of Frontex aircraft has not had a meaningful impact on the death rate at sea, we found a moderate and statistically significant correlation between its aerial assets flights and the number of interceptions performed by the Libyan Coast Guard. On days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels.

      Our reconstruction of the events of July 30, 2021, when several boats carrying migrants were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the area where the drone was patrolling, is a good demonstration of this. The evidence we collected strongly suggests that the droneplayed a key role in facilitating the interception of potentially hundreds of people. 

      The analysis of available data supports the conclusion that the Frontex aerial surveillance forms a central plank of the EU’s strategy to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching Europe by boat and to knowingly return them to unspeakable abuse in Libya. It should be understood in continuity with the progressive withdrawal of EU ships from the central Mediterranean, the handover of responsibility to Libyan forces, and the obstruction of nongovernmental rescue groups which we have been investigating in the frame of the Forensic Oceanography project since several years. 

      The retreat of rescue vessels from the central Mediterranean and the simultaneous increase of surveillance aircraft in the sky is yet another attempt by the EU to further remove itself spatially, physically, and legally from its responsibilities: it allows the EU to maintain a distance from boats in distress, while keeping a close eye from the sky that enables Libyan forces to carry out what we have previously referred to as “refoulement by proxy”. Our investigation seeks to re-establish the connection between Frontex aerial surveillance and the violence captured migrants face at sea and in Libya thereafter.
      Reconstructing 30 July 2021 

      Since the beginning of our research, we have been looking into a number of specific cases of interceptions that involved European aerial assets. Thanks to the relentless effort of documentation by civil society organisations active in the central Mediterranean, in particular the Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, we were able to put together an extensive list of such cases. 

      We eventually decided to focus on the events of July 30, 2021 as a case study. In order to reconstruct what happened on that day, we have combined witness testimonies, data and footage collected by Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, tracks of aerial and naval assets, open-source information and data about disembarkation in Libya as well as two separate databases of interceptions (Frontex’ own JORA database and information from two European Union External Action Service classified documents). 

      Frontex drone’s tracks that day indicate it most likely detected at least two boats later intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard. The rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 witnessed by chance the interception of one of them that took place within the Maltese Search and Rescue Area. The Sea-Watch 3 had not received any distress alert via Frontex despite being in the immediate vicinity of the boat and ready to assist its passengers. 

      Frontex’ own database admits that its aerial surveillance program detected a total of 5 boats on that day. While only further disclosure by Frontex would allow to ultimately assess its impact on each specific interception that took place on that day, the precise geographical coordinates for the five interceptions reported in the classified EEAS documents seem to match at least three peculiar flight patterns of the Frontex drone.
      Analysing Frontex aerial surveillance
      Flight tracking

      In parallel to case reconstructions, we have been tracking the overall activities of Frontex aircraft in the central Mediterranean. Since these planes and drone are chartered from private companies such as DEA Aviation and ADAS, a subsidiary of Airbus, there is no publicly available official list of such assets. The first task was to understand which were the aerial assets patrolling the central Mediterranean on behalf of Frontex. Cross-referencing various identification information (hexcodes, callsigns, etc.) of these planes with those that had been already identified by Sea Watch airborne team and various journalists allowed us to establish a dependable list of Frontex aerial assets operating in the area. 

      Once that was established, we acquired from ADS-B Exchange (the only flight tracking platform that does not block any aircraft for which data is received by their feeders) a large dataset of flight tracking data covering a period of several months (May 2020 to September 2022) for all these aircraft. While the low number of data feeders near our area of interest means that coverage of the recorded data is at times inconsistent, ADS-B flight tracking data (which include latitude, longitude, altitude, and several other parameters) provide an exceptional insight into aerial activities performed by these assets and became a key element in our investigation.

      Thanks to these data, we were able to visualize the extend of each assets operational area over time. Each of these aircraft monitors a specific area of the central Mediterranean. What emerged were also a series of clearly identifiable and consistent search patters that Frontex aircraft are flying off the coast of Libya. More generally, these visualisations have allowed to grasp the extensive, yet tightly knit web of surveillance that results from aerial operations. 

      Pattern analysis

      When observed closely, flight tracks can provide further precious insights into Frontex surveillance activities. Several loops, U-turns, perfect circles, and sharp corners starts to emerge against the strict geometry of standard search patterns. These deviations indicate an aircraft is taking a closer look at something, thus testifying to potential sightings of migrant boats. Inspired by similar projects by John Wiseman, Emmanuel Freundenthal and others, we then started to isolate and taxonomise such search patterns and then wrote code to automatically identify similar patterns across the whole flight tracking dataset we had acquired. While this aspect of the research is still ongoing, it was already very useful in reconstructing the events of July 30, 2021, as detailed in the following section.

      Statistical analysis

      In order to assess the overall impact of aerial surveillance, we also conducted statistical analysis exploring the relation between interceptions carried out by Libyan forces and the presence of Frontex’s aerial assets in the 2021-2022 timeframe. 

      We first compiled several statistical data sources (data from the IOM, the UNHCR, the Maltese government as well as Frontex’ JORA database and a classified report by the European External Action Service) which, despite inconsistencies, have allowed us to measure migrant crossings and deaths, Libyan Coast Guard interceptions, and Frontex aerial presence. 

      The data gathered shows that Frontex aerial surveillance activities have intensified over time, and that they have been increasingly related to interception events. Our analysis reveals that almost one third of the 32,400 people Libyan forces captured at sea and forced back to Libya in 2021 were intercepted thanks to intelligence gathered by Frontex through aerial surveillance. Frontex incident database also shows that while Frontex’s role is very significant in enabling interception to Libya, it has very little impact on detecting boats whose passengers are eventually disembarked in Italy and Malta. 

      We then tested the correlation between Frontex aerial presence and Libyan Coast Guard interceptions over time and in space. The results show a moderate-to-strong and statistically significant correlation between the number of interceptions and the hours of flight flown by Frontex aerial assets. Said otherwise, on days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels. A spatial approach showed that interceptions and flight tracks are autocorrelated in space. At the same time, contrary to Frontex claims that aerial surveillance saves lives at sea, the analysis shows that there is no correlation between death rate and the flight time.

      Read the full statistical analysis here
      Conclusion

      Ultimately these different methods have allowed us to demonstrate how Frontex aerial surveillance (and in particular, because of its wider operational range, its drone) has become a key cog in the “pushback machine” that forces thousands of people back to abuse in Libya. 

      The publication of our findings with Human Rights Watch is the first stage of our ongoing investigation into the impact of European aerial surveillance on the lives and rights of migrants. We plan to continue deepening this investigation over the coming months.

       

      https://www.borderforensics.org/investigations/airborne-complicity
      #surveillance_aérienne #drones

  • What were the historical reasons for the resistance to recognizing #airborne transmission during the #COVID‐19 pandemic? - Jimenez - 2022 - Indoor Air - Wiley Online Library
    https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ina.13070

    The question of whether SARS-CoV-2 is mainly transmitted by droplets or aerosols has been highly controversial. We sought to explain this controversy through a historical analysis of transmission research in other diseases. For most of human history, the dominant paradigm was that many diseases were carried by the air, often over long distances and in a phantasmagorical way. This miasmatic paradigm was challenged in the mid to late 19th century with the rise of germ theory, and as diseases such as cholera, puerperal fever, and malaria were found to actually transmit in other ways. Motivated by his views on the importance of contact/droplet infection, and the resistance he encountered from the remaining influence of miasma theory, prominent public health official Charles Chapin in 1910 helped initiate a successful paradigm shift, deeming airborne transmission most unlikely. This new paradigm became dominant. However, the lack of understanding of aerosols led to systematic errors in the interpretation of research evidence on transmission pathways. For the next five decades, airborne transmission was considered of negligible or minor importance for all major respiratory diseases, until a demonstration of airborne transmission of tuberculosis (which had been mistakenly thought to be transmitted by droplets) in 1962. The contact/droplet paradigm remained dominant, and only a few diseases were widely accepted as airborne before COVID-19: those that were clearly transmitted to people not in the same room. The acceleration of interdisciplinary research inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that airborne transmission is a major mode of transmission for this disease, and is likely to be significant for many respiratory infectious diseases.

    #économie #Gouvernement #militants_de_l'économie

    • Covid-19 : derrière le retard à reconnaître la transmission par l’air, le poids de l’histoire de la médecine
      https://www.liberation.fr/societe/sante/covid-19-derriere-le-retard-a-reconnaitre-la-transmission-par-lair-le-poids-de-lhistoire-de-la-medecine-20220903_FEWQARSVDVFJLJWLJO3BYGSKNM/?redirected=1

      Le 28 mars 2020, L’#OMS tweete « fait : le Covid-19 n’est pas aéroporté », propageant ainsi elle-même une grave #désinformation en matière de santé.

      En réaction à cette fausse affirmation, une petite équipe se forme autour de Lidia Morawska, spécialiste des aérosols à la Queensland University of Technology, et décroche un entretien – en vidéoconférence – avec les responsables de l’OMS. Aux côtés de l’universitaire sont notamment présents une physicienne américaine, Linsey Marr, ou encore l’ingénieur chimiste espagnol José Jimenez. « Nous n’étions ni médecins, ni très connus, nous n’avons pas été entendus », confie ce dernier à Libération.

      Le ton monte même pendant la réunion racontée par le magazine américain Wired. « Ils nous criaient “quelles sont vos preuves ?” J’ai été surpris par leur hostilité. Ils semblaient tellement convaincus de ce qu’ils disaient », se souvient José Jimenez.

      « Ils ne maîtrisaient pas les bases physiques »

      La doxa officielle qui leur est opposée pose que toute gouttelette d’une taille supérieure à cinq micromètres va tomber au sol dans un rayon d’un à deux mètres de distance. Elle ne reste pas en suspension dans l’air. Ces gouttelettes seraient la principale source d’infection. Dès lors, les consignes pour limiter la transmission du Covid seront de s’espacer physiquement, et de se laver les mains fréquemment. Rien sur l’importance de la #ventilation, donc, essentielle pour lutter contre l’#aérosolisation, c’est-à-dire le maintien en suspension de l’air de particules infectieuses.

      « Leurs arguments me semblaient vraiment légers. Ils ne maîtrisaient pas les bases physiques de ce dont ils parlaient. Si ce qu’ils disent était vrai, nous verrions tous les jours les nuages tomber rapidement au sol. Or, ce n’est pas le cas », raconte, encore aujourd’hui médusé, José Jimenez.

      Dès lors, la petite équipe va essayer de comprendre d’où vient cette taille limite de 5 microns qui leur a été opposée, et comment expliquer cette réticence à admettre un nouveau mode de transmission des maladies. Une véritable plongée historique dans la compréhension des épidémies. C’est le sujet de leur dernier article « Quelles étaient les raisons historiques de la résistance à reconnaître la transmission aérienne pendant la pandémie de Covid-19 ? »

      L’aérosolisation, de dogme à superstition

      De l’Antiquité au XIXe siècle, les maladies sont réputées se transmettre par l’air. C’est la théorie des miasmes, qui amènera les scientifiques à nommer le paludisme « malaria » une contraction de l’Italien pour « mauvais air ». Au XIXe siècle, plusieurs médecins mettent à mal ce dogme. Il s’agit de John Snow, qui démontre que l’épidémie de choléra à Londres en 1854 se transmet par l’eau contaminée. Ou encore de Ignaz Semmelweis, qui remarque, à Vienne en 1847, que les femmes ont moins de risques de mourir en couches si l’équipe soignante se lave les mains avant de les accoucher. Tous deux ont en commun de ne pas avoir été écoutés. « Comme nous, ils étaient des outsiders. Ils n’avaient pas beaucoup de #pouvoir », explique José Jimenez.

      Ils se heurtent aussi à des élites qui ont du mal à remettre en cause leurs pratiques et à reconnaître leurs torts. « Admettre que Semmelweis avait raison, c’était, pour les médecins, reconnaître qu’ils causaient du tort à leurs patientes. De même, reconnaître publiquement l’importance des aérosols, c’était, pour l’OMS, admettre son erreur initiale. On ne saura jamais quel contrôle sur l’épidémie on aurait pu avoir si on avait tout de suite considéré le bon mode de transmission, mais je suis persuadé que nous aurions moins de morts », peste encore José Jimenez.

      L’ingénieur William F. Wells a démontré, chez le lapin, que la tuberculose ne se transmettait que si la bactérie était contenue dans des particules de moins de… 5 microns.

      Il faudra encore Pasteur et l’avènement de la théorie microbienne pour que l’idée d’une transmission des maladies par contacts directs avec un malade – ou un animal comme le moustique dans le cas de la malaria – s’impose. En 1910, un épidémiologiste américain, Charles V. Chapin, ira jusqu’à dire que la transmission par aérosol est impossible et relève de la superstition.

      Littérature scientifique mal digérée

      Une position excessive qui ne va pas aider William F. Wells, un ingénieur d’Harvard, à faire connaître ses travaux sur la tuberculose au milieu du XXe siècle. L’histoire a été reconstituée par Katie Randall, membre de la petite équipe de chercheurs, et racontée dans un article d’octobre 2021. Wells a démontré la transmission aéroportée de la maladie en exposant des cochons d’inde à l’air prélevé dans la chambre d’un patient. Il a également démontré, chez le lapin cette fois, que la tuberculose ne se transmettait que si la bactérie était contenue dans des particules de moins de… 5 microns. Tiens, tiens.

      Après guerre, Alexander Langmuir, le premier directeur du département d’épidémiologie au Centre de contrôle des maladies américain, a contribué à populariser ces travaux. Il a aussi écrit un rapport sur le risque de création d’une arme biologique. Selon lui, le plus dangereux serait la création d’un pathogène pouvant être pulvérisé en aérosol de moins de 5 microns, là encore.

      Selon Katie Randall, il ne faut pas chercher plus loin. La fameuse limite entre les aérosols et les gouttelettes viendrait de cette littérature scientifique mal digérée. « Ce que nous espérons démontrer dans cet essai, c’est que bien que les idées sur la taille des gouttelettes et la plage de propagation soient apparemment bien acceptées, leur fondement est confus et trompeur, et n’est pas cohérent avec la physique », écrit-elle en conclusion de son article. Ironie de l’histoire, Wells lui-même avait un émis une taille limite pour l’aérosolisation. Il l’avait fixée à moins de 100 microns… soit 20 fois plus que les 5 micromètres finalement avancés par l’OMS. Il faut croire que cette partie de ces travaux n’a été ni lue, ni retenue.

      Mea culpa partiel

      L’OMS a fini par recommander l’#aération pour lutter contre le Covid-19. Mais les plus ardents défenseurs des « gouttelettes » conservent un schéma de pensée faussé. #Didier_Pittet, par exemple. Il est l’inventeur du gel hydroalcoolique et il a joué un rôle central dans l’approche française face au Covid-19 puisqu’il était président de la mission d’évaluation indépendante de l’exécutif sur la gestion de la pandémie. Interrogé en mai 2021 sur France Inter pour savoir s’il avait changé d’avis sur l’aérosolisation, il fait une réponse confuse : « Personne n’a vraiment changé d’avis en fait. On s’est mis d’accord davantage sur qu’est-ce qu’on appelle un aérosol, […] jusqu’où une gouttelette peut-elle être contagieuse, je pense qu’il n’y a pas eu changement de dogme, parce que si on avait eu un changement de dogme on aurait dû tout d’abord tous changer de #masque parce que les masques qu’on porte aujourd’hui ne sont absolument pas capables de retenir les aérosols. »

      La fin de sa réponse est importante et illustre une dernière raison derrière la réticence à parler d’aérosolisation. Il est beaucoup plus compliqué, et cher, de lutter contre une maladie qui se transmet par l’air que contre une maladie qui se transmet par contact. D’ailleurs la France n’a pas encore mis en place la moindre mesure d’ampleur sur le sujet.

      Mise à jour 4/09 à 9h43 : inversion de « par l’air » et « par contact » dans le dernier paragraphe.

  • Why Covid-19 will never become endemic | The Saturday Paper
    https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2022/01/15/why-covid-19-will-never-become-endemic/164216520013155

    For most of the pandemic Australia has worked to contain the virus through evidence-based public health measures such as border closures, case finding, contact tracing, quarantine, social distancing, vaccines and, at times, lockdown. Sadly, the weaponisation of lockdown as a pointscoring issue and emotional trigger has led to a conflation of lockdown with all other public health measures, most of which do not impinge on freedoms. Denial is a major theme during the pandemic. Denial of airborne transmission, denial of science, denial of Omicron being serious and denial about what it really means to “live with Covid-19”.

    The denial of the airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was started by experts on the World Health Organization infection control committee and allowed all countries to take the easy way out. If handwashing is all you need, onus can be shifted to “personal responsibility”; if ventilation needs to be fixed, that shifts responsibility to governments and private organisations. Australia only acknowledged airborne transmission after the Delta epidemic in mid-2021, almost a year after the WHO acknowledged it. Globally, 18 months was spent on hygiene theatre and actively discouraging mask use. As a result there is low awareness among the general public of the importance of ventilation and masks in reducing their personal risk.

    We had effective campaigns on handwashing, but no campaigns of similar effect have been used to empower people to control their own risk with simple measures such as opening a window. People living in apartments are largely unaware of the structural factors that make them high risk for transmission, or of the simple measures to reduce risk. The failure to focus on airborne transmission has hampered the ability to control the spread and has endangered health workers. Correcting it is critical to the long-term sustainability of health, business and the economy. How can restaurants recover without a safe indoor air plan that may prevent a lockdown cycle that disrupts and ruins their business?

    Denial of Omicron being serious suits an exhausted community who just wish life could go back to 2019. Omicron may be half as deadly as Delta, but Delta was twice as deadly as the 2020 virus. Importantly, the WHO assesses the risk of Omicron as high and reiterates that adequate data on severity in unvaccinated people is not yet available. Even if hospitalisation, admissions to intensive care and death rates are half that of Delta, daily case numbers are 20-30 times higher – and projected to get to 200 times higher. A tsunami of cases will result in large hospitalisation numbers. It is already overwhelming health systems, which common colds and seasonal flu don’t. Nor do they result in ambulance wait times of hours for life-threatening conditions. In addition, a tsunami of absenteeism in the workplace will worsen current shortages, supply chain disruptions and even critical infrastructure such as power. The ACTU has called for an urgent raft of measures to address the workforce crisis.

    As for denial of the risk in children, the majority of vaccine-preventable diseases that we vaccinate children against are mild in most children. Only a small percentage suffer serious complications. Polio and measles are examples where well over 90 per cent of children who become infected do not have severe complications, but in a small percentage there are serious and potentially fatal complications. SARS-CoV-2 is similar. Other than long Covid and multisystem inflammatory syndrome, we are only now learning about other longer-term complications of infection. For instance, there is more than double the risk of developing diabetes in children following Covid-19. A study from the United States showed the virus persisting in the brain, heart, lungs, kidneys and almost every other organ after the initial infection. A rare brain inflammation has been described in adults and children. Another study found a significant drop in cognitive function and IQ in survivors. The virus directly kills heart muscle. It is too early to know if Covid-19 will result in early onset dementia or heart failure in a decade’s time, but the evidence warrants a precautionary approach. We know some infections have very long-term complications – measles, for example, can cause a rare and fatal encephalitis about 10 years after the initial infection. We should do everything possible to prevent mass infection of children and adults.

    Denial of the science of epidemiology is widespread, even among “experts”. We are told repeatedly that SARS-CoV-2 will become “endemic”. But it will never be endemic because it is an epidemic disease and always will be. The key difference is spread. As an epidemic disease, SARS-CoV-2 will always find the unvaccinated, undervaccinated or people with waning immunity and spread rapidly in those groups. Typically, true epidemic infections are spread from person to person, the worst being airborne transmission, and display a waxing and waning pattern such as we have already seen with multiple waves of SARS-CoV-2. Cases rise rapidly over days or weeks, as we have seen with Alpha, Delta and Omicron. No truly endemic disease – malaria, for example – does this.

    This is the reason governments prepare for pandemics. The propensity for epidemics to grow rapidly can stress the health system in a very short time. Respiratory epidemic infections follow this pattern unless eliminated by vaccination or mitigated by non-pharmaceutical measures. Natural infection has never eliminated itself in recorded history. Not smallpox, which displayed the same pattern over thousands of years, and not measles, which is still epidemic in many countries.

    There is hope for better vaccines, schedules and spacing of doses, but we must be agile and pivot with the evidence and have an ambitious strategy. The current strategy is focused on vaccines only, with no attention on safe indoor air or other mitigating factors.
    Eradication occurs when a disease no longer exists in the world – the only example of this in humans is smallpox. Elimination is a technical term and means prevention of sustained community transmission. Countries that met WHO measles elimination criteria, including Australia, still see outbreaks of measles imported through travel, but when elimination is achieved, these do not become uncontrollable.

    Unlike for measles, however, current vaccines do not provide lasting protection. Masks and other public health measures are also needed to prevent the recurrent disruption of epidemic waves. There is hope for better vaccines, schedules and spacing of doses, but we must be agile and pivot with the evidence and have an ambitious strategy. The current strategy is focused on vaccines only, with no attention on safe indoor air or other mitigating factors. Instead, we have seen abandonment of test and trace because of failure to plan ahead for the expected explosion of cases. Testing and tracing are pillars of epidemic control, and the WHO has called on countries to strengthen both to deal with Omicron. Australia has done the opposite.

    Without adequate case finding (which relies on testing at scale) and contact tracing, we are on a runaway train coming off the rails. Testing allows us to find infected people and isolate them so they do not infect others. Now, during the Omicron wave, testing is a massive failure. Both the federal and New South Wales governments made a conscious decision to “let it rip”, but failed to plan for adequate TTIQ (test, trace, isolate, quarantine) capacity. Instead, when it was clear testing capacity was exceeded, they restricted testing to a small fraction of people. Very few people are now eligible for a polymerase chain reaction test (PCR), and rapid antigen tests (RATs) are in short supply. While it has improved the optics by hiding the true scale of cases, this has allowed unfettered transmission.

    Contact tracing is routinely used for many serious infections such as tuberculosis, meningococcal disease, measles or hepatitis A. It is conducted because close contacts are at highest risk of becoming infected next, and if they are not identified and quarantined they will go on to infect others and cause exponential epidemic growth. Contacts need to be traced within 24-48 hours to stop them infecting others. A range of digital contact-tracing methods such as apps, QR codes and tracking digital footprints through other means can be used when case numbers are high. Yet NSW has removed and flip-flopped on QR codes.

    Denial of the reality of “living with Covid-19” has seen us rush headlong into letting it rip in a largely unboosted population, with kids aged five to 11 unvaccinated, without any planning for increased testing, tracing or even procurement of promising new drugs to face the numbers that will come. The booster program has not been expedited, with on Friday less than 17 per cent of the population aged 18 and over having had a third dose, and two doses barely protective against symptomatic infection with Omicron. So Omicron has caused business and hospitality to suffer mass cancellations. Mass absenteeism has crippled supply chains, affecting food, diesel, postal services and almost every other industry. The first serious impacts will be in regional and remote Australia. We saw it in July, when vaccine supplies slated for remote towns were diverted to Sydney, leaving Wilcannia, in the far west of NSW, a sitting duck for the epidemic to come.

    Many do not understand “public health” and equate it with provision of acute health care in public hospitals or confuse it with primary care. Public health is the organised response by society to protect and promote health, and to prevent illness, injury and disability. It is a core responsibility of government.

    Public health comprises three components. The first is “health protection”, such as the banning of smoking in public places, seatbelt legislation or emergency powers that allow pandemic control measures such as lockdowns. “Health promotion” refers to the process by which people are enabled to improve or control their health, through the promotion of mask use, for instance. The third component – “disease prevention and early detection” – includes testing, surveillance, screening and prevention programs. Vaccination programs are an example of disease prevention.

    During the pandemic we have seen resources committed to surge capacity for clinical medicine, but there has been a lack of understanding of the need for public health surge capacity, including TTIQ. The price was paid in the Victorian second wave in 2020. Now, with the abandonment of contact tracing and restrictions on testing during the Omicron wave, we are seeing what happens when this capacity is ignored by government.

    Another outcome of these failures are the unscientific theories being pushed in many countries – such as the argument for “herd immunity by natural infection”, which has become a household narrative during the pandemic despite four pandemic waves providing little protection to date. The same people who peddled herd immunity by natural infection had no ambition to achieve herd immunity by vaccination. Instead they tell us “we have to live with Covid-19” and fall back on negative, defeatist messaging.

    The least ambitious goal of vaccination is to prevent us from dying, and that is the low bar set in Australia. This has reduced policy outcomes to a false binary of dead or alive. There is no concern in this for First Nations people, the disabled, people with chronic medical conditions, people in remote Australia or even children, who are being sent back to school at the peak of the pandemic while primary-schoolers are largely unvaccinated. The hundreds of aged-care outbreaks pass without comment in what essentially has become survival of the fittest and richest.

    The vaccine game is dynamic and ever-changing. Some countries have used ambitious, determined, organised strategies for vaccination and adapted quickly as the evidence has changed. We know the mRNA vaccines can greatly reduce transmission, but current vaccines were developed against the original Wuhan strain and, even after two doses, efficacy wanes. Omicron-matched boosters are in the wind, a seed of hope and a reason to be ambitious, but that will require agile vaccination policy.

    There is a massive vaccine and drug development effort, so it is almost certain we will have better vaccine options, including ones that are variant-proof. But what the past month has shown us is we cannot live with unmitigated Covid-19. Vaccinations will not be enough. We need a ventilation and vaccine-plus strategy to avoid the disruptive epidemic cycle, to protect health and the economy, and to regain a semblance of the life we all want.

    https://seenthis.net/messages/942135

    #covid-19 #contagion_respiratoire #airborne #déni (s) #dénégation #endémie #épidémie #immunité_collective #santé_publique

  • #Airborne transmission of respiratory viruses | Science
    http://science.sciencemag.org/content/373/6558/eabd9149.full

    The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed critical knowledge gaps in our understanding of and a need to update the traditional view of transmission pathways for respiratory viruses. The long-standing definitions of droplet and airborne transmission do not account for the mechanisms by which virus-laden respiratory droplets and aerosols travel through the air and lead to infection. In this Review, we discuss current evidence regarding the transmission of respiratory viruses by aerosols—how they are generated, transported, and deposited, as well as the factors affecting the relative contributions of droplet-spray deposition versus aerosol inhalation as modes of transmission. Improved understanding of aerosol transmission brought about by studies of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection requires a reevaluation of the major transmission pathways for other respiratory viruses, which will allow better-informed controls to reduce airborne transmission.

  • “Four gray wolves (Canis lupus) have been airdropped into Michigan for a very important assignment. The quartet, originally from Canada, has been helicoptered into Isle Royale national park to check the 2,300-square-kilometer island’s moose population, which has exploded in the absence of the canine predator.”

    https://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/canadian-wolves-are-being-airdropped-into-michigan-for-a-special-mission

    #wolf #moose #Isle_Royale #airborne_assault