• Violence and Hunger Stalk Refugees and Migrants in Albania

    Dozens of refugees and migrants trying to cross Albania have been reduced to begging for food on the streets of Tirana, victims of gang violence and under-funding at a state-run reception centre.
    At midday on April 2, residents of Tirana rushed across the city’s central Skenderbej square, bags of groceries in their hands, before the start of a curfew imposed across Albania to tackle the spread of COVID-19. Twenty-seven-year-old Khaled*, however, dragged his feet on the brown cobblestones, begging for food.

    “Help, we are hungry,” the slight Palestinian refugee said in broken English. He was after bread, biscuits or canned food.

    As a registered asylum seeker, Khaled receives food at the National Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers on the outskirts of the capital. But it’s not enough, he says, and he is frequently left hungry. He gestures to show how much bread they get per day: half the palm of his hand. The stew is inedible, Khaled complains.

    In early April, BIRN spoke to dozens of asylum seekers and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, among hundreds housed in the reception centre in Babrru but who find themselves reduced to begging for food in the capital.

    Some spoke of dire conditions in the centre and the growth of gangs stealing from and assaulting other residents.

    Others, migrants trying to reach Western Europe, said they had been left out in the cold despite seeking refuge at the centre, its doors closed under a lockdown across the country to confront the coronavirus pandemic.

    Allegations of state negligence in Albania’s handling of foreign refugees are not new, but complaints have escalated with the tenfold increase in the number of migrants and refugees arriving in the Balkan country over the past three years.

    Concerned human rights activists warn the failure to provide refugees with sufficient food and shelter is a violation of Albanian’s international obligations.

    “Failure to meet the minimum housing and food standards is a violation of the refugee convention,” said Erida Skëndaj, executive director of the Albanian Helsinki Committee.

    “Despite being poor, the Albanian state has an obligation from the international conventions it has signed to meet the minimum standards, even to give them pocket money,” Skëndaj told BIRN.

    The Albanian Ministry of Interior disputed the allegations.

    “Our structures at the centre are doing their best to serve asylum seekers from morning till night, not only with food but also with medical assistance,” said Deputy Interior Minister Rovena Voda, who is responsible for refugee and asylum issues.

    The National Reception Centre, in a written response, did not address BIRN’s questions concerning food provisions but did acknowledge incidents of physical violence which it said had been resolved with the help of police.

    Barely two euros per day

    Albania is a transit country for migrants from the Middle East and North Africa trying to reach Western Europe via the Balkans.

    They mainly enter from Greece, having crossed the Aegean by boat from Turkey, and continue on to Montenegro or Kosovo. And the numbers have shot up since 2017.

    The Department of Border and Migration at the State Police told BIRN that between January 2019 and February this year, 11,344 irregular migrants had been detained at the Albanian border, a more than tenfold increase on 2017.

    Likewise, the number seeking asylum in Albania rose from 309 in 2017 to 4,386 in 2018, with the largest contingent from Syria followed by Iraq and Morocco.

    The trend has caught Albania unprepared, stretching its capacity to house and feed them.

    Besides the National Reception Centre in Babrru, Albania also has a closed centre in the village of Karec. Together, they can accommodate just 400 people.

    While the number of migrants and refugees has risen, the amount the state spends on each person has not changed in a decade – 330 lek, or 2.6 euros per day per refugee, regardless of how much prices have grown over the same period. Little wonder they have to beg for food, rights activists say.

    On the doorstep of a supermarket on Deshmoret e Kombit Boulevard in Tirana, an asylum seeker from Morocco followed shoppers leaving the store, chanting “Food, please man” over and over again. He was eventually taken away by police, only to return to the supermarket two days later.

    The Moroccan said he too was a resident of the National Reception Centre in Babrru but was forced to beg because food was so scarce. Video on his phone showed piles of rubbish in the hallways, mattresses stacked to the ceiling and broken doors replaced by improvised barricades.

    The office of Albania’s ombudsman, which noted insufficient food and shortages of staff to provide medical and social services during an inspection in April 2019, told BIRN:

    “The norms for the treatment of people accommodated in this centre remain problematic.”

    “Since 2017 onwards we have encountered the issue of daily quotas, which is 330 lek per person, a very low amount relative to the increase in food prices over the years.”

    Nassif from Algeria said he had been stranded in Tirana for six weeks after the pandemic halted his efforts to reach Belgium, where he said most of his family already lives. Detained by police, he was taken to the National Reception Centre in Babrru, where, Nassif said, he was “left at the mercy of fate.”

    Nassif, 27, has also resorted to begging.

    “When I go to eat bread, the cooking is so bad that I even have a problem with the smell of food,” he told BIRN. He described one meal as “a small piece of bread, a kind of dish with cauliflower and vegetables, there is no water, nothing. It’s like a bad-smelling salad.”

    Gang violence

    Naif with another Iraqui man at Skanderberg Square in Tirana. Photo: Nenis Bogdani/BIRN

    The National Reception Centre has capacity for 180 people. It told BIRN it currently had 169 residents, including 20 minors. Yet at the end of March, the centre told the Ombudsman’s Office that it was overcrowded, with 218 residents, of whom 21 were minors.

    The centre has a staff of 15, including a psychologist, a social worker and a translator. The night shift is staffed by two people contracted by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR. Medical support falls to a single nurse, again contracted by the UNHCR.

    A lack of staff in the afternoon and particularly at night is a persistent problem, according to the Ombudsman’s office, which said the centre’s requests for more staffing had been ignored by the Interior Ministry.

    Nassif, the Algerian, said he had been robbed almost the moment he set foot in the Reception Centre and that his complaints to staff had been in vain.

    “The first problem is that gangs have been created,” he told BIRN through a translator. “There are powerful people who have gathered followers around them and are using them to rob us.”

    He said some incidents of violence had resulted in serious injuries and was shocked at the failure of authorities to react.

    “At night, when the lights go out, the perpetrators, the mafia, attack families and we hear the crying children,” he said. “It’s scary.”

    The violence within the Reception Centre in Babrru has caught the attention of the Ombudsman and the UNHCR.

    “UNHCR is aware of reports of several cases of conflict and theft between residents of the National Reception Centre and has addressed these concerns to the responsible authorities,” the agency said in a statement, adding that migrants and asylum seekers also have an obligation to respect law and order.

    The Reception Centre acknowledged an issue with violence between residents but said it had always reacted in a timely fashion.

    “The intervention of the police and that of its Eagle units has been requested immediately in order to resolve the spats,” the centre told BIRN.

    “It is not in our authority to assess the degree of violence, but to act in a timely manner to calm and normalise the situation for a peaceful and secure coexistence within the community of the centre.”

    The centre’s residents said they were simply hoping to hang on until Albania’s borders reopen.

    “In fact, all of us at the camp have the same goal – to leave,” said Enes from Morocco. “But at the moment we are stranded here, the borders are closed, we have nowhere to go.”

    Khaled, the Palestinian, likewise said there would be no giving up: “I will leave for Italy, France or Spain. I want to work, to help my family,” he said.

    The weeks of waiting, however, had left Nassif from Algeria increasingly aimless. “I have no plans,” he said. “I just want the borders to open and to get out of here.”

    * The names of the refugees interviewed for this story have been changed at their request to protect their identities.
    https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/06/violence-and-hunger-stalk-refugees-and-migrants-in-albania

    #Covid-19 #Migration #Migrant #Camp #Babrru #Tirana #Albanie #Karec #Violence

  • Il naufragio della Katër i Radës - #Wikiradio del 28/03/2016 - Rai Radio 3 - RaiPlay Radio
    https://www.raiplayradio.it/audio/2016/03/Il-naufragio-della-Kater-iRades---Wikiradio-del-28032016-dbb214b2-6f12-

    Il 28 marzo 1997, in seguito allo speronamento di una nave della Marina Militare Italiana, la motovedetta Katër i Radës naufraga nel canale d’ #Otranto provocando la morte di 81 albanesi
    con #AlessandroLeogrande

    Repertorio
    – Scena dal film “Aprile” di Nanni Moretti (1998)
    – Servizio del GR1 del 30 Marzo 1997
    – Clip da Tre Soldi (Radio3) del 27 Marzo 2012 (Kater I Rades di Ornella Bellucci)
    – Clip da Tre Soldi (Radio3) del 28 Marzo 2012 (Kater I Rades di Ornella Bellucci)
    – Servizio del GR1 del 29 Marzo 1997
    – Dichiarazioni del PM Leonardo Leone De Castris dal GR1 del 29 Marzo 1997
    – Servizio del TGR Puglia del 30 Giugno 2011
    – Clip da Tre Soldi (Radio3) del 29 Marzo 2012 (Kater I Rades di Ornella Bellucci)
    – Servizio del TGR Puglia del 29 Gennaio 2012
    – Clip da Tre Soldi (Radio3) del 28 Marzo 2012 (Kater I Rades di Ornella Bellucci)

    #italie #migration #naufrage #albanie #KaterIRades @cdb_77 #1997 #podcast #harassement

  • #Grèce : On se tourne vers les réfugiés pour faire face à la #crise_agricole

    Στροφή στους πρόσφυγες για την κρίση στη γεωργία

    Η πρώτη πράξη ένταξης στον παραγωγικό ιστό χιλιάδων προσφύγων που βρίσκονται στη χώρα μας πρόκειται να επιβεβαιωθεί σήμερα στη Βέροια σε μεγάλη σύσκεψη, στη διάρκεια της οποίας θα καθοριστούν οι λεπτομέρειες με τις οποίες οι πρόσφυγες θα πάρουν μέρος στη συλλογή φρούτων κυρίως στους νομούς Πέλλας και Ημαθίας.

    Με δεδομένο ότι η πανδημία έχει καθυστερήσει όλες τις άλλες λύσεις, δηλαδή τη μεταφορά εργατών γης κυρίως από την Αλβανία, οι πρόσφυγες που διαμένουν σε διάφορες δομές της Κεντρικής Μακεδονίας -και όχι μόνο- φαντάζουν αυτή την ώρα η μοναδική λύση καθώς στα χωράφια έχουν ξεκινήσει ήδη τα αραιώματα, ενώ ανελαστικές είναι οι ημερομηνίες εκκίνησης στη συλλογή των πρώιμων ποικιλιών. Ανελαστικός και ο αριθμός των εργατών που χρειάζονται και υπολογίζονται σε 7.000 άτομα.

    Οι άνθρωποι αυτοί είναι απαραίτητοι για να συλλεχθούν οι καρποί των φρούτων σε 193 χιλιάδες στρέμματα με συμπύρηνα ροδάκινα, 210 χιλιάδες στρέμματα με επιτραπέζια ροδάκινα και νεκταρίνια, 100 χιλιάδες στρέμματα με κεράσια και σε μερικές δεκάδες χιλιάδες στρέμματα με βερίκοκα και δαμάσκηνα.

    Ο μεγάλος όγκος της παραγωγής είναι φυσικά στους νομούς Πέλλας και Ημαθίας, χωρίς να παραγνωρίζεται η παραγωγή σε Πιερία και Λάρισα, ενώ στην Πιερία εργάτες γης θα χρειαστούν λίαν συντόμως και για τη σπορά του καπνού.

    « Αν τυχόν κάτι πάει στραβά, τότε », όπως λέει στην « Εφ.Συν. » ο πρόεδρος τις Διεπαγγελματικής Οργάνωσης Πυρηνοκάρπων και Αχλαδιών, Χρήστος Γιαννακάκης, « θα έχουμε μεγάλο πρόβλημα ».

    Σήμερα (Πέμπτη) θα γίνει σύσκεψη στη Βέροια στην οποία θα συμμετάσχουν οι μεγάλοι συνεταιρισμοί, δήμοι και ο Διεθνής Οργανισμός Μετανάστευσης (ΔΟΜ) για να λυθούν διαδικαστικά προβλήματα και καθυστερήσεις που προέκυψαν από την πανδημία.

    « Το σίγουρο είναι πως υπάρχει μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον από τον προσφυγικό κόσμο που βρίσκεται στις δομές της Βέροιας και της Αλεξάνδρειας, ωστόσο, επειδή αυτοί δεν επαρκούν, θα γίνουν κλήσεις για εργάτες στις δομές των Διαβατών, στη Μηλιά Πιερίας, σε δομές της Λάρισας κι αν χρειαστεί, ακόμη και της Αθήνας » μας λέει ο κ. Γιαννακάκης.

    Το σχέδιο αυτό ξεκίνησε από τις 11 Μαρτίου, όταν είχε πραγματοποιηθεί ευρεία σύσκεψη με τη συμμετοχή της Εθνικής Διεπαγγελματικής, του γ.γ. Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής, Υποδοχής και Ασύλου Πάτροκλου Γεωργιάδη, στελεχών του ΟΑΕΔ και του ΔΟΜ, αλλά και εκπροσώπων ΜΚΟ που δραστηριοποιούνται στις δομές προσφύγων.

    Τώρα, όπως λέει ο κ. Γιαννακάκης, ήδη υπάρχουν επιπλέον σκέψεις « να γίνει αξιοποίηση κάποιων από τους 12.000 πρόσφυγες που έχουν υποβάλει αίτηση στο πρόγραμμα “Ηλιος” (προβλέπει επιδότηση ενοικίου και αγορά οικοσκευής) ».

    « Σκεφτήκαμε να κάνουμε ό,τι έχουν κάνει και οι Γερμανοί, οι οποίοι μετέφεραν με πτήσεις τσάρτερ 40.000 εργάτες από τη Ρουμανία. Εμείς θα τους φέρουμε βέβαια με λεωφορεία. Τα μέτρα προστασίας μάς προβληματίζουν, διότι όσοι εργάτες έρθουν από την Αλβανία πρέπει πρώτα να κάνουν το τεστ για τον ιό. Εχουμε κάνει ήδη διερευνητικές επαφές με εργαστήρια στη Θεσσαλονίκη τα οποία μας είπαν ότι μπορούν να μας δώσουν αποτελέσματα μέσα σε 8 ώρες ».

    Με δεδομένο όμως ότι για το κόστος του τεστ η μικρότερη προσφορά που έχει δημοσιοποιηθεί μέχρι τώρα είναι γύρω στα 75 ευρώ έκαστο και με δεδομένο επίσης ότι το κόστος θα το επωμιστούν οι αγρότες, εύκολα γίνεται αντιληπτό ότι πρόκειται για ένα πολύ μεγάλο έξοδο.

    Φαίνεται επίσης ότι μέχρι στιγμής οι ντόπιοι δεν δείχνουν ενδιαφέρον για την εργασία αυτή, αφού στην εκδήλωση ενδιαφέροντος που οργάνωσε ο Δήμος Βέροιας ανταποκρίθηκαν μόλις 40 άτομα από την περιοχή. Το μεροκάματο είναι 30 ευρώ (μαζί με το εργόσημο), άρα καθαρά μένουν περί τα 25 ευρώ.

    Οπως σχολιάζει όμως ο Κρίτωνας Τσικλιάς, γεωπόνος και μέλος του αγροτικού τμήματος του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, « πρέπει να γίνει με σοβαρότητα και πρόγραμμα η πρόσκληση σε ανέργους των περιοχών που αντιμετωπίζουν πρόβλημα, δίνοντάς τους τη δυνατότητα να διατηρούν όλα τα επιδόματα και προνόμια που έχουν την περίοδο της ανεργίας, διότι ουσιαστικά δεν είναι διόλου ελκυστικό να μιλάμε για διακοπή ανεργίας και απασχόληση ολίγων ημερών ή 2-3 μηνών ».

    https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/241335_strofi-stoys-prosfyges-gia-tin-krisi-sti-georgia
    #agriculture #coronavirus #covid-19 #réfugiés #asile #migrations

    Traduction :

    Le premier pas pour que de milliers de réfugiés réintègrent le tissu productif de la Grèce, va être fait aujourd’hui à #Veria (au sud et à l’ouest de Salonique) lors d’une grande réunion, au cours de laquelle seront fixés les détails de la façon dont les réfugiés participeront à la récolte des fruits principalement dans les préfectures de #Pella et Imathia (à l’ouest de Salonique).

    Étant donné que la pandémie a retardé toutes les autres solutions, à savoir le transfert des travailleurs agricoles saisonniers principalement de l’Albanie, les réfugiés vivant dans diverses structures en Macédoine centrale - et pas seulement – semble être actuellement la seule réserve de mains d’œuvre car les dates de début de récolte des variétés précoces de #fruits ne sauraient être reportés. Le nombre de travailleurs nécessaires, estimé à 7 00 personnes, ne saurait être non plus réduit.

    Ces personnes sont nécessaires pour récolter les fruits dans 193 000 acres de #pêches concentrées, 210 000 acres de pêches de table et #nectarines, 100 000 acres de #cerises et dans quelques dizaines de milliers d’acres d’#abricots et de #prunes.

    Le grand volume de production se situe bien sûr dans les préfectures de #Pella et #Imathia, sans ignorer la production de #Pieria et #Larissa, tandis qu’à Pieria des travailleurs de terre seront nécessaires très prochainement pour semer le #tabac.

    « Si quelque chose ne va pas, alors », a-t-il déclaré à Ef.Syn. Christos Giannakakis, président de l’Organisation interprofessionnelle de cultivateurs de fruits à noyau et des #poires, « nous aurons un gros problème ».

    Aujourd’hui (jeudi), il y aura une réunion à Veria à laquelle participeront les principales coopératives, les municipalités concernées et l’Organisation internationale pour les migrantions (#OIM) afin de résoudre les problèmes de procédure et les retards dus à la pandémie.

    « Ce qui est certain, c’est qu’il y a un grand intérêt du monde des réfugiés dans les structures de Veria et d’Alexandrie, cependant, parce que ces réfugiés ne suffisent pas, il y aura des appels à des travailleurs dans les structures de Diavata, de Milia à Pieria, dans les structures de Larissa et si nécessaire , même à Athènes », explique M. Giannakakis.

    Ce plan a débuté le 11 mars, lors d’une réunion de grande envergure avec la participation de l’Interprofessionnel National, le secrétaire général. Politique d’immigration, accueil et asile Patroclus Georgiadis, cadres de l’OAED et de l’OIM, ainsi que des représentants d’ONG actives dans les structures de réfugiés.

    Maintenant, selon M. Giannakakis, il y a déjà des réflexions supplémentaires "pour profiter de certains parmi les 12 000 réfugiés qui ont fait une demande au programme « #Helios » (un programme d’OIM de soutien à l’intégration et qui offre entre autres une subvention pour le loyer et l’équipement en électroménagers : https://greece.iom.int/en/hellenic-integration-support-beneficiaries-international-protection-heli)."

    « Nous avons pensé faire ce que les Allemands ont fait, qui ont transporté 40 000 travailleurs de Roumanie sur des vols charters [à vrai dire 80.000 saisonniers ont été appelés à la rescousse pour sauver les mangeurs des asperges allemands, voir ici : https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/04/21/en-allemagne-pas-d-asperges-sans-roumains_1785811]. Bien entendu, nous, nous les amènerons en bus. Les mesures de protection nous préoccupent, car les travailleurs originaires d’#Albanie doivent d’abord passer le test du virus. Nous avons déjà établi des contacts qui permettent de sonder le terrain avec des laboratoires de Thessalonique qui nous ont dit qu’ils pouvaient nous donner des résultats dans les 8 heures ».

    Cependant, étant donné que le coût du test dans l’offre la plus basse, est d’environ 75 euros chacun, et étant donné que le coût sera supporté par les agriculteurs, il est facile de voir qu’il s’agirait d’une très grosse dépense pour les cultivateurs intéressés.

    Il semble également que jusqu’à présent, les habitants ne manifestent pas d’intérêt pour ce travail, puisque seulement 40 personnes de la région ont répondu à l’appel à des offres d’intérêt organisé par la municipalité de Veria. Le salaire journalier est de 30 euros et il ne reste qu’environ 25 euros net si on enlève les charges qui reviennent au salarié.

    –---

    Ajouté à cette métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/849493

    ping @luciebacon

  • Expérience partagée d’une phyto-épuration
    https://infokiosques.net/spip.php?article1742

    "Nous avions envie d’écrire cette brochure pour partager notre expérience de construction collective d’un système de phyto-épuration à l’Amassada en Aveyron au cours du printemps 2019. Aujourd’hui, on ne peut malheureusement plus en profiter puisqu’un bulldozer a du l’aplatir lors de la destruction des lieux en octobre 2019. L’idée, c’est de faire un retour d’expérience pratique et que cela puisse servir à d’autres qui auraient aussi envie d’installer une phyto-épuration là ou illes sont. Cette brochure ne traitera pas des normes « légales » ou autres pour une installation de ce type. Elle est destinée aux personnes souhaitant faire une phyto avec peu de moyen, de la récup’, pour les squats, occupations, lieux collectifs ..." #E

    / #Guides_pratiques, Infokiosque fantôme (...)

    #Infokiosque_fantôme_partout_
    https://infokiosques.net/IMG/pdf/Experience_partagee_d_une_phyto_epuration-8p-2019-cahier.pdf
    https://infokiosques.net/IMG/pdf/Experience_partagee_d_une_phyto_epuration-8p-2019-fil.pdf

    • Nous avions commencé a faire un potager au printemps, et avions aussi construit une serre. Très vite, on se rend compte que l’eau va nous manquer, au vu de l’été sec qui s’annonce, et également que nous avions mal anticipé la récupération des eaux de pluie. L’Aveyron en été est en proie au manque d’eau, comme une grande majorité des départements français.

      Du coup, nous nous sommes dit qu’avec une phyto-épuration, nous pouvions récupérer facilement l’eau grise : l’eau provenant de la cuisine, non mélangée avec celle des toilettes, vu qu’on utilisait des toilettes seiches.

      En fait, ce problème très local nous vient de raisonnement plus globaux, en nous questionnant sur l’utilisation et le traitement de l’eau, Sur ce territoire en lutte, nous avions la possibilité d’expérimenter d’autres formes de vie et de mettre concrètement en pratique des idées, qui bien souvent n’en reste qu’a des idées, avec la volonté de s’inscrire sur le territoire où nous vivions, et d’y trouver une forme de cohérence. C’est-à-dire questionner nos consommations d’énergies et de ressources (eau, électricité, gestion des déchets, pollutions des sols ...).

      L’électricité ne vient pas de la prise, tout comme l’eau ne vient pas du robinet. Nous trouvons ces visions trop déconnectées de la réalite et nous voulions vivre en conscience du monde qui nous entoure.

    • Les "capsunari" les cueilleurs de fraise, ces travailleurs roumains que l’Europe s’arrache
      https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_les-capsunari-ces-travailleurs-roumains-que-l-europe-s-arrache?id=104931

      Convoités par Londres ou Berlin, ils partent malgré les aléas de la pandémie de coronavirus : aides à domicile ou cueilleurs de fruits roumains se retrouvent au centre de marchandages inédits nés des pénuries de main-d’oeuvre causées par la crise sanitaire.

      "Les saisonniers ne représentent qu’une minorité parmi les émigrants roumains, mais ces dernières semaines, ils sont devenus très visibles » , reconnaît auprès de l’AFP le sociologue Iulian Stanescu de l’Institut de recherches sur la qualité de la vie (ICCV).

      La diaspora roumaine compte environ 4 millions de personnes dans le monde, dont de nombreux informaticiens, médecins et autres diplômés, mais c’est pour les travailleurs les plus précaires et les moins qualifiés que les autorités d’Europe de l’Ouest se mobilisent.

      Malgré les interdictions de voyage en vigueur sur le continent, des dizaines de vols spéciaux ont été affrétés depuis le début de l’épidémie pour transporter la main-d’oeuvre roumaine et sauver les récoltes d’asperges et de fraises allemandes ou britanniques.

      Dernier exemple en date de négociations au sommet : Vienne tente de convaincre Bucarest de mettre en place une liaison ferroviaire hebdomadaire pour faciliter l’acheminement de milliers d’aides à domicile, employées auprès de seniors autrichiens qui ont besoin d’une assistance médicale jour et nuit.

      Exporter plutôt qu’insérer
      Cette pression nourrit des sentiments ambivalents chez les responsables roumains : crainte de voir des travailleurs mal protégés face aux risques de contamination et susceptibles de ramener le virus dans leur pays ; réalisme sur la nécessité économique de cette migration.

      Parfois raillés dans leur pays, où ils sont génériquement désignés comme "capsunari" (cueilleurs de fraises) , les émigrants représentent une source incontournable de transferts d’argent : l’année dernière ils ont envoyé à leurs familles 7,2 milliards de dollars (6,6 milliards d’euros), soit près d’un tiers de plus que les investissements directs étrangers attirés par la Roumanie.

      "Pour les décideurs roumains, quelle que soit leur orientation politique, il a toujours été plus simple d’exporter cette main-d’œuvre que de mettre en place des politiques antipauvreté pour lesquelles il faut dépenser de l’argent" , observe M. Stanescu.

      La transition du pays vers l’économie de marché a entraîné ces trois dernières décennies la fermeture de nombreuses usines héritées du régime communiste et l’effondrement des fermes d’Etat, laissant sur le bord de la route plusieurs millions de travailleurs.

      Du coup, cueillir pendant trois mois des fruits ou des légumes en Europe de l’Ouest permet à ces personnes de survivre pendant les neuf mois restants.

      "Pas le choix"
      "Nous partons parce que nous en avons besoin. Ce n’est pas facile pour nous" , a expliqué jeudi à l’AFP un saisonnier de 35 ans, Ionel, en partance de Bucarest par un vol spécial pour le Royaume-Uni.

      A ses côtés, dans le hall des départs de l’aéroport, des femmes et des hommes de tous âges qui passeront trois mois dans les vignes britanniques. Tous portent des masques, ont constaté des journalistes de l’AFP.

      "Je fais ça depuis longtemps, mais maintenant cela semble différent. Il y a un sentiment étrange. J’ai laissé mes enfants et mes parents à la maison" , ajoute Ionel.

      "Ce n’était pas une décision facile, mais je n’avais pas d’autre choix" , a déclaré Tinca, une jeune femme de 22 ans dont c’est la première saison à l’étranger.
      Selon plusieurs sites qui recrutent pour l’agriculture allemande, les saisonniers y sont payés 9,35 euros l’heure, pouvant tabler sur quelque 1300 euros par mois. En Roumanie, le salaire net moyen s’élève à 660 euros par mois.

      "Nous nous attendons à une hausse du nombre de candidats au départ car il sera encore plus difficile de joindre les deux bouts en #Roumanie" , pays de 19 millions d’habitants, indique à l’AFP Sergiu Marian, responsable de la société Christian Sallemaier qui recrute des #aides-soignantes.

      Alors que les médias évoquent des "abus" de la part d’employeurs peu scrupuleux et s’interrogent sur la prise en charge d’éventuels saisonniers contaminés par le Covid-19, certains critiquent le gouvernement libéral, accusé de permettre que des ressortissants roumains soient "traités tels des esclaves sur des plantations".

      La médiatrice roumaine des droits Renate Weber s’est inquiétée du sort des cueilleurs de fruits partis en Allemagne et a demandé à Berlin des "détails sur les conditions sanitaires et d’hébergement" qui leur sont réservées.

      Le député européen socialiste Victor Negrescu a appelé le médiateur européen à veiller au respect des droits de ses concitoyens. "Les saisonniers roumains ne sont pas des esclaves", a-t-il lancé. "La dignité humaine et la santé ne sont pas négociables".

      Intéressante, la justification économique de l’#esclavage et de la #déportation dans l’#union_européenne, l’#UE par l’#AFP, reproduite par la #RTBF.
      Heureusement, l’union européenne est en train d’annexer l’#Albanie.

  • CoVid-19 dans les #pays_méditerranéens

    En collaboration avec les ingénieurs de la plateforme universitaire de données d’Aix-Marseille (PUD-AMU), l’Observatoire démographique vous propose ci-dessous des ressources #statistiques officielles concernant la situation de l’#épidémie. (Merci aux chercheurs qui nous ont fait des retours pour améliorer cette page : Hala Bayoumi, Eric Verdeil, Philippe Sierra).

    Pour chaque pays, nous donnons le lien vers la ou les sources officielles : #Albanie, #Algérie, #Bosnie-et-Herzégovine, #Bulgarie, #Chypre, #Croatie, #Egypte, #Espagne, #France, #Grèce, #Israël, #Italie, #Jordanie, #Kosovo, #Liban, #Libye, #Macédoine, #Malte, #Maroc, #Monténégro, #Palestine, #Portugal, #Serbie, #Slovénie, #Syrie, #Tunisie, #Turquie

    https://demomed.org/index.php/fr/ressources-en-ligne/coronavirus-situation
    #Méditerranée #comparaison #chiffres #graphiques #contamination #décès #coronavirus #visualisation

    ping @simplicissimus @reka

  • Balkan Countries Close Border Crossings to Stop Coronavirus

    https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/balkan-countries-close-border-crossings-to-stop-coronavirus

    To slow the spread of the coronavirus, several Balkan countries have closed most of their border crossings with neighbouring states, making travel in some parts of the region practically impossible.

    Serbia, Albania and Romania have closed many of their border crossings in order to combat the spread of the coronavirus, leaving some parts of the Balkans practically cut off for civil traffic.

    All countries of the region have either banned entry or introduced special restrictive measures for passengers arriving from countries with mid to high to risk of coronavirus.

    Serbia has closed 44 border crossings with neighbouring Romania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia, so that its border police can focus on the main and most frequently used crossings. Crossings have been closed mainly to increase staff numbers on the main crossings that remain open. Most closed borders are road border crossings but river, railway and ferry transport is also affected.

    Romania has closed several crossing points that connect the country by land with its neighbours. The closures affect crossings to Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Moldova, the Interior Minister, Marcel Vela, announced on Thursday night. He also said the Serbian authorities had unilaterally closed several crossing points, presumably without informing Romania first. The crossings at the Iron Gates, Moravita and Jimbolia remain open on the border with Serbia, Vela added.

    Albania has unilaterally closed several border crossings with neighbouring Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia.

    North Macedonia has not closed any borders so far, but, as a result of the unilateral moves made by its neighbours, two crossings with Serbia and three with Albania are closed. Traffic with Serbia continues only through the main Tabanovce crossing.

    Bosnia and Herzegovina has not closed any of its borders, though passenger control measures have been strengthened and a temporary entry ban has been imposed on arrivals from the countries worst affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

    Croatia has also not closed its borders, even with Italy, the worst affected country in Europe. A government session on Friday was expected to clarify whether the crossings will remain open or not.

    In Montenegro, the border crossing with Albania at Sukobin-Muricani was closed on Friday morning on the request of Albania. Border crossings with Serbia in Jabuka near Pljevlja and at Godovo near Rozaje were closed on Thursday at the request of Serbia.

    Moldova has not closed border crossings, but its neighbours, Ukraine and Romania, have closed some crossings, making travel there harder. Bulgaria also has not closed any border crossings, except those closed from the Serbian side.

    #Covid-19 #migrant #migration #Balkans #Serbie #Albanie #Roumanie #Bulgarie #RépubliquedeMacédoine #Monténégro #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Kosovo #Croatie #Frontière

  • #Frontex wants to disembark refugees in Senegal

    #Hera“ is the only Frontex maritime mission on the territory of a third country. A new agreement might extend this joint border #surveillance.

    The EU border agency Frontex wants to bring back refugees picked up in the Atlantic Ocean to Senegal. The EU Commission should therefore negotiate a so-called #Status_Agreement with the government in Dakar. The proposal can be found in the annual report (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6294-2020-INIT/en/pdf) on the implementation of the Regulation for the surveillance of external sea borders (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0656). It regulates the maritime „operational cooperation“ of Frontex with third countries.

    It would be the first agreement of this kind with an African government. So far, Frontex has only concluded Status Agreements with a number of Western Balkan countries for the joint surveillance of land borders. The only operation to date in a third country (https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries) was launched by the Border Agency in Albania a year ago.

    Frontex has been coordinating the joint operation „Hera“ in the Atlantic since 2006 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc). The reason for the first and thus oldest EU border surveillance mission (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf) was the arrival of many thousands of refugees in boats on the Canary Islands via Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal. For a short period of time, the German Federal Police had also participated in „Hera“ (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/16/098/1609888.pdf), in addition to Portugal, France, Italy, Finland and Luxembourg. Already in 2007 the arrivals decreased drastically. For the past year, Frontex’s „Migratory Map“ (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map) records only 711 irregular arrivals (by December) on Gran Canaria, Tenerife and the other Spanish islands. According to media reports (https://www.laprovincia.es/canarias/2020/03/03/canarias-supera-1200-personas-llegadas/1260792.html), this number has been nearly doubled in the first two months of 2020 alone.

    „Hera“ is the only maritime mission in which Frontex coordinates an operation which, with Senegal, also takes place in the 12-mile zone, the exclusive economic zone and the airspace of a third country. In „Themis“, „Indalo“ and „Poseidon“, the operational plan only covers waters under the jurisdiction and monitoring of EU Member States.

    Currently, „Hera“ is operated by Spain as the „host state“ with support from Portugal. The two countries patrol with frigates and smaller ships and carry out aerial surveillance with a helicopter. They first transmit their information to a control centre in Las Palmas, to which Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal have sent liaison officers. Processed intelligence is then forwarded to the International Coordination Centre (ICC) in Madrid, which manages all operations of the Spanish border authorities and is also responsible for cooperation with Frontex.

    If suspicious boats are detected in the area of operations in „Hera“, a report is made to the competent Maritime Rescue Operations Centre (MRCC). All those picked up in the Spanish Search and Rescue zone have been able to disembark in the Canary Islands in recent years.

    If the refugees are still in the Senegalese #SAR zone, the national coast guard brings them back to the West African country. With a Status Agreement, Frontex assets could do the same. According to SAR Info, a Canadian information platform, the Senegalese national #MRCC (https://sarcontacts.info/countries/senegal) is also responsible for the rescue coordination off the coast of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.

    Before each operation, Frontex is required to assess the possible disembarkation of intercepted refugees in the third countries concerned. In the report for 2018, Leggeri writes that his agency, with the „host states“ of the missions „Themis“ (Italy) and „Indalo“ (Spain), considered such disembarkations to Libya and Tunisia as well as to Morocco to be incompatible with regulations to which Frontex is bound.

    From Frontex’s point of view, however, disembarkations would be possible for Turkey and Senegal, as the governments there do not violate basic fundamental and human rights and also adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, according to which refugees may not be returned to countries from which they have fled. So far, says Leggeri, Frontex and the EU Member States involved in „Poseidon“ and „Hera“ have not forced any persons to Turkey or Senegal.

    The report signed by Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri is as usual one year late, the paper published last week refers to 2018. That was the same year in which the European Union once again wanted to set up „regional disembarkation centres“ in North Africa (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4629). There, asylum applications of persons seeking protection would be examined even before they reach Europe. All the governments in question rejected the proposal, and the African Union also opposed it a year ago. Led by Egypt, the 55 member states criticise the planned EU facilities as „de facto detention centres“ (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa).

    In the report, Leggeri complains that Frontex has too little competence in its four maritime missions. Bilateral agreements, such as those Italy has concluded with Libya (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/italy-halt-abusive-migration-cooperation-libya) or Spain with Morocco (https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/21/inenglish/1550736538_089908.html), allow for much closer cooperation with North African coastguards.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/03/01/frontex-wants-to-disembark-refugees-in-senegal
    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #désembarquement #surveillance_frontalière #accord #accords #frontières

    Et pas mal de matériel sur seenthis autour de...
    #plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement #regional_disembarkation_platforms #Albanie #Océane_atlantique #Atlantique #Allemagne

    –-> voir notamment ici, dans la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765334

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • Famille séparée, femmes enceintes et enfants arrêtés pour remplir un #charter pour l’#Albanie | #StreetPress
    https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1580400042-familles-separees-femmes-enceintes-enfants-arretes-remplir-c

    Il est 6h30 ce lundi 27 janvier, quand les #gendarmes toquent à la porte du domicile familiale. Le père, Zaïmir Mehmti, est menotté devant ses trois enfants, Negi quatre ans, Gezim huit ans, et Fatjon 11 ans. Nevilla, la mère, est enceinte de quatre mois. Ils lui épargnent les bracelets. Mais toute la famille, en situation irrégulière, est emmenée à la gendarmerie. Ils partent à la va-vite, sans leurs affaires, en pensant qu’ils seront rapidement de #retour chez eux, détaillent leurs proches. Ils ne reverront pas leur domicile : le lendemain matin, ils sont renvoyés par avion en Albanie.

    « C’était un peu la “chasse aux Albanais“ », rembobine Bernard Chaboureau, secrétaire général du syndicat de parents d’élèves FCPE 31, et membre du Réseau éducation sans frontières (#RESF). Ce lundi 27 janvier, une vaste opération organisée conjointement par les préfectures de la région d’Occitanie (Haute-Garonne, Ariège, Lozère, Gard, et Pyrénées orientales) a conduit à l’arrestation et l’expulsion de huit familles albanaises, soit 31 personnes, d’après la préfecture de l’Ariège. Un vaste coup de filet monté, selon Bernard, pour « remplir le charter » Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes. L’avion est parti mardi matin de Toulouse, en direction de Tirana, en Albanie. À l’intérieur du coucou, des policiers albanais venus tout spécialement dans l’Hexagone. Du côté de la préfecture on confirme l’expulsion même si l’expression fait tiquer : « C’est une reconduite à la frontière. Ils sont libres de refaire des démarches pour revenir », argumente la pref’ de Haute-Garonne.

  • Greece: Government Hit with Interim Measures and Introducing New List of Safe Country of Origin

    The Greek government adopted on January 4 a Joint Ministerial Decision that declares twelve countries as safe countries of origin. This includes Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Morocco, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia and Ukraine.

    Introducing a list of safe countries of origin is one measure foreseen by the new International Protection Act (IPA) which has been heavily criticised for introducing several restrictions on individual rights and procedural guarantees in the Greek asylum system. Article 83(9) IPA foresees that applicants originating from a safe country of origin are subject to accelerated procedures.

    Until last week, there was no national list of safe countries in Greece and the rules relating to safe countries of origin in Greek law were not applied in practice.

    https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/greece-government-hit-interim-measures-and-introducing-new-list-safe-coun
    #pays-sûrs #liste #Grèce #pays_sûrs #Albanie #Algérie #Arménie #Gambie #Géorgie #Ghana #Inde #Maroc #Sénégal #Togo #Tunisie #Ukraine #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

  • Après le « non » bruxellois à l’#Albanie et à la #Macédoine_du_Nord - REGARD SUR L’EST

    http://regard-est.com/apres-le-non-bruxellois-a-lalbanie-et-a-la-macedoine-du-nord

    Candidates à l’adhésion à l’#Union_européenne depuis, respectivement, 2005 et 2009, la Macédoine du Nord et l’Albanie ont vu leurs espoirs balayés à la mi-octobre, lorsque quatre pays ont opposé leur veto à l’ouverture en 2020 des négociations d’adhésion (35 chapitres indispensables à l’intégration de l’Acquis communautaire). Si l’Espagne, le Danemark, les Pays-Bas et la France ont unanimement dit non à l’Albanie, Paris s’est trouvé seul à juger que la Macédoine du Nord n’était pas prête, s’isolant de la position des autres pays membres : il s’agit d’une « erreur historique », a jugé Jean-Paul Juncker.

    #UE #élargissement

  • New Frontex Regulation : corrected version of the text

    The European Parliament is due to approve a corrected version of the new Frontex Regulation, which was originally agreed between the Council and Parliament in April but has been undergoing revision by legal and linguistic specialists.

    See: REGULATION (EU) 2019/... OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of ... on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-frontex-regulation-ep-approved-corrected-version-2-10-19.pdf)

    And: the version initially agreed between the Parliament and Council in April (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/apr/eu-frontex-final-tAnnex%20to%20LIBE%20letter-EBCG-text.pdf)

    The Regulation was proposed in September 2018 and agreement was reached between the Parliament and Council in April 2019. The speed of the legislative process may explain why the text has to be corrected and approved in accordance with Rule 241 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-9-2019-07-02-RULE-241_EN.html).

    The headline change introduced by the new Regulation is a “standing corps” of 10,000 border guards. The official intention is to introduce the standing corps by 2027, but incoming Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has committed to doing so by 2024 - although an article in DW commented (https://www.dw.com/en/can-the-eus-ursula-von-der-leyen-fulfill-her-promises/a-49625188) that this “looks extremely unlikely, as the member states have repeatedly rejected the move.”

    The new Regulation will also give the agency expanded surveillance powers, an extended mandate in the field of deportations and new possibilities for cooperation with non-EU states. Under its current mandate, Frontex has already begun to operate outside the EU, with an operation launched in Albania in May.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-new-frontex-reg.htm
    #frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-frontières_européens #gardes-frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Albanie #surveillance #renvois #expulsions

    –---

    Sur la coopération avec l’Albanie, voir :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/782260

  • "Je réessaierai" : l’Albanie devenue étape pour les migrants

    Après la fermeture dite de la « route des Balkans » début 2016 puis le renforcement des contrôles par la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie et la Croatie, ce pays pauvre d’Europe du sud-est est devenu un point de passage de migrants. Après le Monténégro, parfois la Bosnie, ils tentent de rejoindre l’Union.

    https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/je-reessaierai-lalbanie-devenue-etape-pour-les-migrants.afp.c
    #Albanie #parcours_migratoire #Balkans #route_des_Balkans

  • Balkans : la destruction programmée des dernières rivières sauvages d’Europe
    https://www.mediapart.fr/studio/panoramique/balkans-la-destruction-programmee-des-dernieres-rivieres-sauvages-deurope-

    Dans les Balkans, il n’y a pas de pétrole, mais il y a de l’eau, faisant de la région le véritable château d’eau de l’Europe. Cet « or bleu » excite les convoitises des oligarques locaux, qui multiplient les projets de centrales hydrauliques, avec la bénédiction – et souvent des subventions – de l’Union européenne. Les citoyens tentent de résister à ce "green washing" des fortunes mal acquises, qui risque de détruire l’environnement et le mode de vie des communautés rurales.

    #ENVIRONNEMENT #Albanie,_Serbie,_Montenegro,_Eau,_Ecologie,_balkans,_europe,_Kosovo,_barrages,_environnement

  • Balkans : la destruction programmée des dernières rivières sauvages d’Europe
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/150819/balkans-la-destruction-programmee-des-dernieres-rivieres-sauvages-deurope

    Dans les Balkans, il n’y a pas de pétrole, mais il y a de l’eau, faisant de la région le véritable château d’eau de l’Europe. Cet « or bleu » excite les convoitises des oligarques locaux, qui multiplient les projets de centrales hydrauliques, avec la bénédiction – et souvent des subventions – de l’Union européenne. Les citoyens tentent de résister à ce "green washing" des fortunes mal acquises, qui risque de détruire l’environnement et le mode de vie des communautés rurales.

    #ENVIRONNEMENT #Albanie,_environnement,_Kosovo,_europe,_Montenegro,_Ecologie,_barrages,_balkans,_Eau,_Serbie

    • European Border and Coast Guard: Launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Today, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, is launching the first ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country. As of 22 May, teams from the Agency will be deployed together with Albanian border guards at the Greek-Albanian border to strengthen border management and enhance security at the EU’s external borders, in full agreement with all concerned countries. This operation marks a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and its Western Balkan partners, and is yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The launch event is taking place in Tirana, Albania, in the presence of Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister and Sandër Lleshaj, Albanian Interior Minister.

      Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said: "With the first ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders.”

      Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, said: “Today we mark a milestone for our agency and the wider cooperation between the European Union and Albania. We are launching the first fully fledged joint operation outside the European Union to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.”

      While Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders, the European Border and Coast Guard is able to lend both technical and operational support and assistance. The European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to support the Albanian border guards in performing border checks at crossing points, for example, and preventing unauthorised entries. All operations and deployments at the Albanian border with Greece will be conducted in full agreement with both the Albanian and Greek authorities.

      At the start of the operation, the Agency will be deploying 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and 1 thermo-vision van from 12 EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.

      Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will contribute to the better management of irregular migration, further enhance security at the EU’s external borders and strengthen the Agency’s ability to act in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, while bringing that neighbourhood closer to the EU.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2591_en.htm
      #externalisation

    • Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Albania at the official launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Ladies and Gentlemen,

      We are here today to celebrate an important achievement and a milestone, both for Albania and for the EU.

      Only six months ago, here in Tirana, the EU signed the status agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard. This agreement, that entered into force three weeks ago, was the first agreement ever of its kind with a neighbouring country.

      Today, we will send off the joint European Border and Coast Guard Teams to be deployed as of tomorrow for the first time in a non-EU Member State. This does not only mark a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and Western Balkan partners, it is also yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The only way to effectively address migration and security challenges we are facing today and those we may be confronted with in the years to come is by working closer together, as neighbours and as partners. What happens in Albania and the Western Balkans affects the European Union, and the other way around.

      Joint approach to border management is a key part of our overall approach to managing migration. It allows us to show to our citizens that their security is at the top of our concerns. But effective partnership in ensuring orderly migration also enables us, as Europe, to remain a place where those in need of protection can find shelter.

      Albania is the first country in the Western Balkans with whom the EU is moving forward with this new important chapter in our joint co-operation on border management.

      This can be a source of pride for both Albania and the EU and an important step that brings us closer together.

      While the overall situation along the Western Balkans route remains stable with continuously low levels of arrivals - it is in fact like night and day when compared to three years ago - we need to remain vigilant.

      The Status Agreement will help us in this effort. It expands the scale of practical, operational cooperation between the EU and Albania and hopefully soon with the rest of the Western Balkan region.

      These are important elements of our co-operation, also in view of the continued implementation of the requirements under the visa liberalisation agreement. Visa-free travel is a great achievement, which brings benefits to all sides and should be safeguarded.

      Together with Albanian border guards, European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to perform border checks at crossing points and perform border surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings and counter cross-border criminality.

      But, let me be clear, Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders. European Border and Coast Guard Teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers in the Albanian territory under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the Republic of Albania.

      Dear Friends,

      When it comes to protecting our borders, ensuring our security and managing migration, the challenges we face are common, and so must be our response.

      The European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement and its implementation will allow us to better work together in all these areas. I hope that these agreements can be finalised also with other Western Balkans partners as soon as possible.

      I wish to thank Prime Minister Edi Rama, the Albanian authorities, and the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Fabrice Leggeri and his team for their close cooperation in bringing this milestone achievement to life. I also want to thank all Member States who have contributed with staff and the personnel who will be part of this first deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams in a neighbouring country.

      With just a few days to go before the European Elections, the need for a more united and stronger European family is more important than ever. We firmly believe that a key priority is to have strong relations with close neighbours, based on a clear balance of rights and obligations – but above all, on genuine partnership. This includes you, fellow Albanians.

      Albania is part of the European family.Our challenges are common. They know no borders. The progress we are witnessing today is another concrete action and proof of our commitment to bring us closer together. To make us stronger.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-2668_en.htm

    • Externalisation: Frontex launches first formal operation outside of the EU and deploys to Albania

      The EU has taken a significant, if geographically small, step in the externalisation of its borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has launched its first Joint Operation on the territory of a non-EU-Member State, as it begins cooperation with Albania on the border with Greece.

      After the launch of the operation in Tirana on 21 May a deployment of 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and a thermo-vision van started yesterday, 22 May (European Commission, link). Twelve Member States (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) have contributed to the operation.

      New agreements

      The move follows the entry into force on 1 May this year of a Status Agreement between the EU and Albania on actions carried out by Frontex in that country (pdf). Those actions are made possible by the conclusion of operational plans, which must be agreed between Frontex and the Albanian authorities.

      The Status Agreement with Albania was the first among several similar agreements to be signed between the Agency and Balkan States, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia.

      The nascent operation in Albania will give Frontex team members certain powers, privileges and immunities on Albanian territory, including the use of force in circumstances authorised by Albanian border police and outlined in the operational plan.

      Frontex does not publish operational plans whilst operations (which can be renewed indefinitely) are ongoing, and documents published after the conclusion of operations (usually in response to requests for access to documents) are often heavily-redacted (Ask the EU, link).

      Relevant articles

      Article 4 of the Status Agreement outlines the tasks and powers of members of Frontex teams operating in Albanian territory. This includes the use of force, if it is authorised by both the Frontex team member’s home Member State and the State of Albania, and takes place in the presence of Albanian border guards. However, Albania can authorise team members to use force in their absence.

      Article 6 of the Status Agreement grants Frontex team members immunity from Albanian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction “in respect of the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the course of the actions carried out in accordance with the operational plan”.

      Although a representative of Albania would be informed in the event of an allegation of criminal activity, it would be up to Frontex’s executive director to certify to the court whether the actions in question were performed as part of an official Agency function and in accordance with the Operational Plan. This certification will be binding on the jurisdiction of Albania. Proceedings may only continue against an individual team member if the executive director confirms that their actions were outside the scope of the exercise of official functions.

      Given the closed nature of the operational plans, this grants the executive director wide discretion and ensures little oversight of the accountability of Agency team members. Notably, Article 6 also states that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. This immunity does not, however, extend to the jurisdiction of team members’ home Member States, and they may also waive the immunity of the individual under Albanian jurisdiction.

      Right to redress

      These measures of immunity alongside the lack of transparency surrounding documents outlining team members’ official functions and activities (the operational plan) raise concerns regarding access to redress for victims of human rights violations that may occur during operations.

      Human rights organisations have denounced the use of force by Frontex team members, only to have those incidents classified by the Agency as par for the course in their operations. Cases include incidents of firearm use that resulted in serious injury (The Intercept, link), but that was considered to have taken place according to the standard rules of engagement. This opacity has implications for individuals’ right to good administration and to the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms.

      If any damage results from actions that were carried out according to the operational plan, Albania will be held liable. This is the most binding liability outlined by the Status Agreement. Albania may only “request” that compensation be paid by the Member State of the team member responsible, or by the Agency, if acts were committed through gross negligence, wilful misconduct or outside the scope of the official functions of the Agency team or staff member.

      Across the board

      The provisions regarding tasks, powers and immunity in the Status Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia are all broadly similar, with the exception of Article 6 of the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This states:

      “Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina… to provide evidence in accordance with the procedural law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

      The Status Agreement with Serbia, an early draft of which did not grant immunity to team members, is now consistent with the Agreement with Albania and includes provisions stating that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses.

      It includes a further provision that:

      “...members of the team may use weapons only when it is absolutely necessary in self-defence to repel an immediate life-threatening attack against themselves or another person, in accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Serbia”.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/may/fx-albania-launch.htm

    • La police des frontières extérieures de l’UE s’introduit en Albanie

      Frontex, l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, a lancé mardi en Albanie sa première opération hors du territoire d’un de ses États membres.

      Cette annonce de la Commission européenne intervient quelques jours avant les élections européennes et au moment où la politique migratoire de l’UE est critiquée par les candidats souverainistes, comme le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini ou le chef de file de la liste française d’extrême droite, Jordan Bardella, qui a récemment qualifié Frontex d’« hôtesse d’accueil pour migrants ».

      Cette opération conjointe en Albanie est « une véritable étape historique rapprochant » les Balkans de l’UE, et témoigne d’une « meilleure gestion de la migration et de la protection de nos frontières communes », a commenté à Tirana le commissaire chargé des migrations, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

      L’Albanie espère convaincre les États membres d’ouvrir des négociations d’adhésion ce printemps, ce qui lui avait été refusé l’an passé. Son premier ministre Edi Rama a salué « un pas très important dans les relations entre l’Albanie et l’Union européenne » et a estimé qu’il « renforçait également la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité ».

      À partir de 22 mai, Frontex déploiera des équipes conjointes à la frontière grecque avec des agents albanais.

      La Commission européenne a passé des accords semblables avec la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui devraient également entrer en vigueur.

      Tous ces pays sont sur une des « routes des Balkans », qui sont toujours empruntées clandestinement par des milliers de personnes en route vers l’Union européenne, même si le flux n’est en rien comparable avec les centaines de milliers de migrants qui ont transité par la région en quelques mois jusqu’à la fermeture des frontières par les pays de l’UE début 2016.

      Ce type d’accord « contribuera à l’amélioration de la gestion de la migration clandestine, renforcera la sécurité aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et consolidera la capacité de l’agence à agir dans le voisinage immédiat de l’UE, tout en rapprochant de l’UE les pays voisins concernés », selon un communiqué de la Commission.

      Pour éviter de revivre le chaos de 2015, l’Union a acté un renforcement considérable de Frontex. Elle disposera notamment d’ici 2027 d’un contingent de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes pour aider des pays débordés.


      https://www.lapresse.ca/international/europe/201905/21/01-5226931-la-police-des-frontieres-exterieures-de-lue-sintroduit-en-albani

    • European Border and Coast Guard Agency began to patrol alongside the Albanian-Greek border in late May (https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118). Similar agreements have recently been concluded with Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina but Albania is the first country to start implementing programs aimed at blocking refugees entering the EU. Bilten states that Frontex employees can carry arms and fight “against any kind of crime, from” illegal migration “to theft of a car or drug trafficking”. Frontex’s mission is not time-bound, i.e. it depends on the EU’s need. The Albanian authorities see it as a step forward to their membership in the Union.

      Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 10.06.2019

      L’article original:
      Što Frontex radi u Albaniji?

      Nakon što je Europska unija službeno zatvorila “balkansku migrantsku rutu”, očajni ljudi počeli su tražiti nove puteve. Jedan od njih prolazi kroz Albaniju, a tamošnja se vlada odrekla kontrole nad vlastitom granicom u nadi da će time udobrovoljiti unijske dužnosnike.

      Agencija za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu, Frontex, počela je krajem prošlog mjeseca patrolirati uz albansko-grčku granicu. Već prvog dana, raspoređeno je pedesetak policajaca iz različitih zemalja članica EU koji bi se u suradnji s albanskim graničarima trebali boriti protiv “ilegalne migracije”. Iako je slične dogovore Unija nedavno sklopila sa zemljama poput Srbije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Crne Gore te Bosne i Hercegovine – a sve s ciljem blokiranja mogućnosti izbjeglica da uđu na područje EU – Albanija je prva zemlja u kojoj je počela provedba tog programa. Zaposlenici Frontexa ne samo da smiju nositi oružje, već imaju i dozvolu da se bore protiv bilo koje vrste kriminala, od “ilegalnih migracija” do krađe automobila ili trgovine drogom. Također, njihova misija nije vremenski ograničena, što znači da će Frontexovi zaposlenici patrolirati s albanske strane granice dok god to Unija smatra potrebnim.

      Unatoč nekim marginalnim glasovima koji su se žalili zbog kršenja nacionalne suverenosti prepuštanjem kontrole nad granicom stranim trupama, javnost je reagirala bilo potpunom nezainteresiranošću ili čak blagom potporom sporazumu koji bi tobože trebao pomoći Albaniji da uđe u Europsku uniju. S puno entuzijazma, lokalni su se mediji hvalili kako su u prva četiri dana Frontexovi zaposlenici već ulovili 92 “ilegalna migranta”. No to nije prvo, a ni najozbiljnije predavanje kontrole nad granicom koje je poduzela albanska vlada. Još od kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih jadranskim i jonskim teritorijalnim vodama Republike Albanije patrolira talijanska Guardia di Finanza. Tih se godina albanska obala često koristila kao most prema Italiji preko kojeg je prelazila većina migranata azijskog porijekla, ne samo zbog blizine južne Italije, već i zbog slabosti državnih aparata tijekom goleme krize 1997. i 1998. godine.

      Helikopteri Guardije di Finanza također kontroliraju albansko nebo u potrazi za poljima kanabisa i to sve u suradnji s lokalnom državnom birokracijom koja je sama dijelom suradnica dilera, a dijelom nesposobna da im se suprotstavi. No posljednjih godina, zbog toga što su druge rute zatvorene, sve veći broj ljudi počeo se kretati iz Grčke preko Albanije, Crne Gore i BiH prema zemljama EU. Prema Međunarodnoj organizaciji za migracije, granicu je prešlo oko 18 tisuća ljudi, uglavnom iz Sirije, Pakistana i Iraka. To predstavlja povećanje od sedam puta u odnosu na godinu ranije. Tek manji dio tih ljudi je ulovljen zbog nedostatka kapaciteta granične kontrole ili pak potpune indiferencije prema ljudima kojima siromašna zemlja poput Albanije nikada neće biti destinacija.
      Tranzitna zemlja

      Oni koje ulove smješteni su u prihvatnom centru blizu Tirane, ali odatle im je relativno jednostavno pobjeći i nastaviti put dalje. Dio njih službeno je zatražio azil u Albaniji, ali to ne znači da će se dulje zadržati u zemlji. Ipak, očekuje se da će ubuduće albanske institucije biti znatno agresivnije u politici repatrijacije migranata. U tome će se susretati s brojnim pravnim i administrativnim problemima: kako objašnjavaju lokalni stručnjaci za migracije, Albanija sa zemljama iz kojih dolazi većina migranata – poput Sirije, Pakistana, Iraka i Afganistana – uopće nema diplomatske odnose niti pravne predstavnike u tim zemljama. Zbog toga je koordiniranje procesa repatrijacije gotovo nemoguće. Također, iako sporazum o repatrijaciji postoji s Grčkoj, njime je predviđeno da se u tu zemlju vraćaju samo oni za koje se može dokazati da su iz nje došli, a većina migranata koji dođu iz Grčke nastoji sakriti svaki trag svog boravka u toj zemlji.

      U takvoj situaciji, čini se izvjesnim da će Albanija biti zemlja u kojoj će sve veći broj ljudi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme. Prije nekih godinu i pol dana, izbila je javna panika s dosta rasističkih tonova. Nakon jednog nespretnog intervjua vladinog dužnosnika njemačkom mediju proširile su se glasine da će se u Albaniju naseliti šesto tisuća Sirijaca. Brojka je već na prvi pogled astronomska s obzirom na to da je stanovništvo zemlje oko tri milijuna ljudi, ali teorije zavjere se obično šire kao požar. Neki od drugorazrednih političara čak su pozvali na oružanu borbu ako dođu Sirijci. No ta je panika zapravo brzo prošla, ali tek nakon što je vlada obećala da neće primiti više izbjeglica od onog broja koji bude određen raspodjelom prema dogovoru u Uniji. Otad zapravo nema nekog osobitog antimigrantskog raspoloženja u javnosti, unatoč tome što tisuće ljudi prolazi kroz zemlju.
      Europski san

      Odnos je uglavnom onaj indiferencije. Tome pridonosi nekoliko stvari: činjenica da je gotovo trećina stanovništva Albanije također odselila u zemlje Unije,1 zatim to što ne postoje neke vjerske i ultranacionalističke stranke, ali najviše to što nitko od migranata nema nikakvu namjeru ostati u zemlji. No zašto je albanska vlada tako nestrpljiva da preda kontrolu granice i suverenitet, odnosno zašto je premijer Edi Rama izgledao tako entuzijastično prilikom ceremonije s Dimitrisom Avramopulosom, europskim povjerenikom za migracije, unutrašnje poslove i državljanstvo? Vlada se nada da će to ubrzati njezin put prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji. Posljednjih pet godina provela je čekajući otvaranje pristupnih pregovora, a predavanje kontrole nad granicom vidi kao još jednu ilustraciju svoje pripadnosti Uniji.

      S druge strane, stalna politička kriza koju su izazvali studentski protesti u prosincu 2018., te kasnije bojkot parlamenta i lokalnih izbora od strane opozicijskih stranaka, stavlja neprestani pritisak na vladu. Očajnički treba pozitivan znak iz EU jer vodi političku i ideološku borbu protiv opozicije oko toga tko je autentičniji kulturni i politički predstavnik europejstva. Vlada naziva opoziciju i njezine nasilne prosvjede antieuropskima, dok opozicija optužuje vladu da svojom korupcijom i povezanošću s organiziranim kriminalom radi protiv europskih želja stanovništva. Prije nekoliko dana, Komisija je predložila početak pristupnih pregovora s Albanijom, no Europsko vijeće je to koje ima zadnju riječ. Očekuje se kako će sve ovisiti o toj odluci. Ideja Europe jedno je od čvorišta vladajuće ideologije koja se desetljećima gradi kao antipod komunizmu i Orijentu te historijska destinacija kojoj Albanci stoljećima teže.

      Neoliberalna rekonstrukcija ekonomije i društva gotovo je uvijek legitimirana tvrdnjama kako su to nužni – iako bolni – koraci prema integraciji u Europsku uniju. Uspješnost ove ideologije ilustrira činjenica da otprilike 90% ispitanih u različitim studijama podržava Albansku integraciju u EU. U toj situaciji ne čudi ni odnos prema Frontexu.

      https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118

    • Frontex expands operations in EU neighbouring countries

      After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A first deployment of the EU border troops has meanwhile been increased.

      The European Commission has now also signed an arrangement with Serbia on „cooperation on border management“. The so-called status agreement regulates the implementation of „Joint Operations“ with the EU border agency Frontex at the common borders with the European Union. It was already published by the Commission in January and has now been ratified by the Serbian Parliament. Kosovo’s territory is excluded.

      The objectives of the agreement include the fight against irregular migration and cross-border crime in accordance with the Frontex Regulation. The EU also promises „increased technical and operational assistance“ to the Serbian border police.

      Model status agreement for „priority third countries“

      The negotiations with Serbia followed a model status agreement approved by the Commission under the „European Migration Agenda“ for operational cooperation with „priority third countries“. The Commission first concluded a status agreement with Albania a year ago, followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro on 7 October this year. Further status agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Macedonia have been negotiated but still need to be ratified by the national parliaments. The European Parliament must also give its assent.

      Once all five status agreements have been signed, Frontex could be deployed throughout the whole Western Balkans with the exception of Kosovo. The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, describes the agreements as „yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU“. All countries concerned are considered candidates for EU membership and the agreement to the Frontex operations is intended to facilitate the negotiations.

      However, this rapprochement is likely to be damaged by the decision of the French government to refuse negotiations on EU membership to Northern Macedonia and Albania despite fulfilling the necessary conditions. The North Macedonian parliament could therefore delay the planned Frontex agreement. The same applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which France’s President Macron described as a „ticking time bomb“ for returning jihadists.

      Police powers and immunity

      The border police officers sent by Frontex from the EU Member States receive a special identity card from the country of deployment and wear their own uniforms with a blue Frontex armband. They will also carry weapons, ammunition and equipment from their sending state and may use force.

      The troops enjoy immunity during Frontex operations. If a criminal offence is found, it will be prosecuted by the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin. Frontex team members also enjoy full protection against civil and administrative prosecution in the State of operation. The latter will also be liable for any damage caused by a member of the team during „all acts performed in the exercise of the official functions“.

      Deployment plan agreed with Greece

      Following the conclusion of the status agreement with Albania, it took six months for Frontex to launch its by now „first-ever joint operation“ on the territory of a neighbouring third country. According to Frontex, the governments in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia have sent personnel to a total of 16 patrol vehicles and one thermovision car.

      According to the operational plan, which Frontex says is agreed with the Greek government, the operation will take place along the entire „green“ border and, in addition to border surveillance in the sections Sopik, Çarçovë, Leskovik, Shtikë, Kapshticë and Livadhja, will include border control at the Albanian-Greek crossing points Kakavija, Tre Urat (Çarçovë), Kapshticë, Rips and Qafe Bote. Frontex has set up support offices in Gjirokaster, Kakavija and Kapshticë to coordinate operations.

      In the meantime, the operation, which started with 50 EU officials, has grown to 66. One sixth comes from the German Federal Police, which also brought along six of the twelve patrol vehicles currently in use. In addition to operational border control, training measures are also planned in Albania. The operation will also facilitate the exchange of operational information and „best practices“.

      No Albanian human rights groups involved

      The new Frontex Regulation will apply from 4 December. The border agency will be then granted more powers and will set up a border troop of 10,000 border guards. The measures taken by Frontex should be observed by a Fundamental Rights Officer, among others. Frontex has also set up a Consultative Forum with non-governmental organisations to advise the Agency on how to prevent infringements.

      For „Joint Operations“ in third countries, the Consultative Forum recommends involving human rights groups active there in the operational plan. However, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, which sends eleven officers to Albania, has „no knowledge“ of the involvement of Albanian non-governmental organisations. The German Government also does not know which Albanian organisations might be asked to participate.

      https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries

  • Spain’s Far-right Vox Received Almost $1M from ’Marxist-Islamist’ Iranian Exiles: Report | News | teleSUR English
    https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Spains-Far-right-Vox-Received-Almost-1M-from-Marxist-Islamist-Irania

    It is unlikely that Vox’s hyper-nationalist voters know that their party scored a significant presence in Spain’s parliament mostly thanks to Zionists, Islamists and foreigners.

    With the April 28 general elections in Spain over, the far-right party Vox gained about 10 percent of parliamentary seats, marking the far-right’s rising comeback into politics four decades after Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. While a less alarmist reading would say that the far-right was always there, hidden in the conservative People’s Party (PP), the fact that they are out in the open strengthens Europe’s wave of far-right xenophobic and anti-European advance.

    The party appealed to voters in one of Spain’s most contested elections since its return to democracy, mostly basing its arguments against leftists politics, social liberals, migrants, charged mainly with an Islamophobic narrative. Emphasizing the return of a long lost Spain and pushing to fight what they refer to as an “Islamist invasion,” which is the “enemy of Europe.” One could summarize it as an Iberian version of “Make Spain Great Again.”

    Yet while this definitely appealed to almost two million voters, many are unaware of where their party’s initial funding came from. Back in January 2019, an investigation made by the newspaper El Pais revealed, through leaked documents, that almost one million euros - approximately 80 percent of its 2014 campaign funding - donated to Vox between its founding in December 2013 and the European Parliament elections in May 2014 came via the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a self-declared “Marxist” organization and an Islamist group made up of Iranian exiles.

    However, this is where things get complicated. The NCRI is based in France and was founded in 1981 by Massoud Rajavi and Abolhassan Banisadr, nowadays its president-elect is Maryam Rajavi (Massoud’s wife). The Rajavis are also the leaders of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). A reason for many to believe that the NCRI is just a front for the MEK, which over the past few decades has managed to create a complicated web of anti-Iranian, pro-Israel and right-wing government support from all over the world.

    To understand MEK, it’s necessary to review the 1953 U.S. and British-backed coup which ousted democratically elected prime minister of Iran Mohammad Mosaddegh and instituted a monarchical dictatorship led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

    The oppression carried out by the Pahlavi royal family led to the creation of many radical groups, one which was MEK, whose ideology combined Marxism and Islamism. Its original anti-west, especially anti-U.S. sentiment pushed for the killing of six U.S citizens in Iran in the 1970s. While in 1979, they enthusiastically cheered the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. After the Iranian Revolution, its young leaders, including Rajavi, pushed for endorsement from the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but were denied.

    So Rajavi, allied with the winner of the country’s first presidential election, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was not an ally of Khomeini, either. Soon Banisadr and MEK became some of Khomeini’s main opposition figures and had fled to Iraq and later to France.

    In the neighboring country, MEK allied with Sadam Hussein to rage war against Iran. In a RAND report, allegations of the group’s complicity with Saddam are corroborated by press reports that quote Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to “take the Kurds under your tanks, and save your bullets for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards."

    The organization was deemed a terrorist organization by the U.S. and European Union for the better part of the 1990s, but things changed after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. This is when the U.S. neoconservative strategist leading the Department of State and the intelligence agencies saw MEK as an asset rather than a liability. Put simply in words they applied the dictum of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

    The U.S.’s dismissal of past crimes reinvigorated MEK’s intense lobbying campaign to have itself removed from terrorist lists in the U.S. and the European Union. MEK, which by the beginning of the 21 century had morphed into a cult-like group according to many testimonies from dissidents, moved from Camp Ashraf to the U.S-created Camp Liberty outside of Baghdad. And that’s when things rapidly changed.

    According to the Guardian, between 2007 and 2012, a number of Iranian nuclear scientists were attacked. In 2012, NBC News, citing two unnamed U.S. officials, reported that the attacks were planned by Israel’s Mossad and executed by MEK operatives inside Iran. By 2009 and 2012, the EU and the U.S. respectively took it out of its terrorist organizations list.

    Soon after it gained support from U.S. politicians like Rudy Giuliani and current National Security Advisor John Bolton, who now call MEK a legitimate opposition to the current Iranian government. As the U.S. neocon forefathers did before, MEK shed its “Marxism.” After the U.S.’s official withdrawal from Iraq, they built MEK a safe have in Albania, near Tirana, where the trail of money can be followed once again.

    Hassan Heyrani, a former member of MEK’s political department who defected in 2018, and handled parts of the organization’s finances in Iraq, when asked by Foreign Policy where he thought the money for MEK came from, he answered: “Saudi Arabia. Without a doubt.” For another former MEK member, Saadalah Saafi, the organization’s money definitely comes from wealthy Arab states that oppose Iran’s government.

    “Mojahedin [MEK] are the tool, not the funders. They aren’t that big. They facilitate,” Massoud Khodabandeh, who once served in the MEK’s security department told Foreign Policy. “You look at it and say, ‘Oh, Mojahedin are funding [Vox].’ No, they are not. The ones that are funding that party are funding Mojahedin as well.”

    Meanwhile, Danny Yatom, the former head of the Mossad, told the Jersulamen Post that Israel can implement some of its anti-Iran plans through MEK if a war were to break out. Saudi Arabia’s state-run television channels have given friendly coverage to the MEK, and Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, even appeared in July 2016 at a MEK rally in Paris.

    With Israel and Saudi Arabia backing MEK, the question of why a far-right movement would take money from an Islamist organization clears up a bit. Israel’s support of European far-right parties has been public. In 2010, a sizeable delegation arrived in Tel Aviv, consisting of some 30 leaders of the European Alliance for Freedom, gathering leaders such as Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Philip Dewinter from Belgium and Jorg Haider’s successor, Heinz-Christian Strache, from Austria.

    Yet for the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, MEK represents an anti-Iranian voice that they so desperately need, and that on the surface didn’t come from them directly. It is unlikely that Vox’s hyper-nationalist voters know that their party scored a significant presence in Spain’s parliament mostly thanks to Zionists, Islamists and foreigners.

    #Espagne #extrême_droite #Israël #Iran #Arabie_Saoudite #OMPI #Albanie

  • L’#Albanie : nouvel eldorado des résistants iraniens

    Après avoir vécu les attaques sanglantes des milices gouvernementales en #Irak, pays qui les hébergeait précédemment, un groupe d’#opposants_au_régime iranien s’est installé en Albanie avec l’aide de l’#ONU, qui a mandaté le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés des Nations-Unies. Là, ils y ont récréé un foyer, une société et des valeurs à l’opposé de la politique des mollah. En préparant leur retour ? À #Achraf-3, nom du nouveau refuge, un militant nous raconte son combat.


    https://cafebabel.com/fr/article/lalbanie-nouvel-eldorado-des-resistants-iraniens-5c9e01e1f723b378c95cd83a
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #réfugiés_iraniens #résistance #Iran #camps_de_réfugiés #camp_d'Achra

  • Matteo #Salvini expulse des détenus roumains et promet le même traitement aux Albanais

    Le ministre italien de l’Intérieur a triomphalement annoncé sur sa page Facebook que Rome allait renvoyer 13 détenus roumains pour qu’ils purgent leur peine dans leur pays d’origine. Une mesure qu’il a promis d’étendre, notamment aux prisonniers albanais.

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/l-italie-renvoie-13-detenus-en-Roumanie
    #expulsions #renvois #criminels_étrangers (pour utilisé la même expression d’une initiative de l’#UDC en #Suisse) #migrations #migrants_roumains #migrants_albanais #Albanie #Roumanie #détention #prisonniers #prisons #emprisonnement #Italie

  • #métaliste (qui va être un grand chantier, car il y a plein d’information sur seenthis, qu’il faudrait réorganiser) sur :
    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #migrations #réfugiés

    Des liens vers des articles généraux sur l’externalisation des frontières de la part de l’ #UE (#EU) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/569305
    https://seenthis.net/messages/390549
    https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

    Ici une tentative (très mal réussie, car évidement, la divergence entre pratiques et les discours à un moment donné, ça se voit !) de l’UE de faire une brochure pour déconstruire les mythes autour de la migration...
    La question de l’externalisation y est abordée dans différentes parties de la brochure :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765967

    Petit chapitre/encadré sur l’externalisation des frontières dans l’ouvrage « (Dé)passer la frontière » :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/769367

    Les origines de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers (maritimes) : accord #USA-#Haïti de #1981 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768694

    L’externalisation des politiques européennes en matière de migration
    https://seenthis.net/messages/787450

    "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/789048

    Partners in crime ? The impacts of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794636
    #paix #stabilité #droits #Libye #Niger #Turquie

  • L’#Autriche et le #Danemark présentent leur projet de #centre_de_déportation pour demandeurs d’asile #déboutés

    La semaine dernière, le Danemark et l’Autriche ont présenté conjointement à Vienne un projet pour réformer le système de l’asile au sein de l’Union européenne. Ce projet prévoit d’établir un centre de déportation basé hors de l’UE pour les demandeurs d’asile refoulés.

    La ministre danoise de la migration, #Inge_Støjberg, s’était rendue à Vienne jeudi, où elle a rencontré le ministre de l’Intérieur autrichien, #Herbert_Kickl, membre du parti d’extrême droite autrichien, le FPÖ.

    Støjberg est membre du parti libéral du Danemark (Venstre), et depuis juin 2015, elle occupe le poste de ministre de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration dans le gouvernement du Premier ministre Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

    Un projet qui n’est pas nouveau

    Leur projet vise à fournir un hébergement aux réfugiés déboutés du droit d’asile plus proche de leur pays d’origine, tout en perturbant les activités des activités de trafiquants.

    La création de centres d’accueil hors de l’Europe, des “#plate-formes_de_retour”, pour accueillir les migrants déboutés du droit d’asile en Europe, en attendant leur retour dans leur pays d’origine, est une idée chère à M. Kickl. Elle avait déjà été proposée cet été, mais jusqu’à présent, aucun pays situé hors de l’UE n’a accepté de se porter candidat pour ouvrir de tels centres sur son territoire. L’#Egypte, le #Maroc, la #Tunisie, l’#Algérie, l’#Albanie, et la #Macédoine ont tous décliné l’invitation jusqu’ici.

    Quant à Mme Støjberg, l’année dernière, elle envisageait d’adopter un projet de l’extrême-droite danoise consistant à exiler les demandeurs d’asile déboutés par son pays sur une ou plusieurs des 300 îles inhabitées au large de la côte danoise.

    Un centre d’accueil hors de l’UE pour décourager les migrants d’entreprendre le voyage

    « Nous maintenons que [les réfugiés] devraient réclamer le droit d’asile dans le premier pays où ils arrivent, plutôt qu’on leur permette de voyager dans toute l’Europe », a affirmé Mme Støjberg. « De notre côté, nous nous engageons à augmenter les capacités d’accueil [des pays voisins des zones de conflit pour gérer les arrivées de demandeurs d’asile]. Cela peut signifier des choses telles que les soins de santé, l’éducation, les gardes-frontières, et un système pour gérer les demandeurs d’asile », a-t-elle ajouté.

    Selon la ministre danoise, un centre d’accueil situé hors de l’UE réduirait la tentation des migrants de se rendre en Europe pour y trouver l’asile. « Si vous pouvez voir à quelle vitesse vous pouvez être renvoyé, il n’y a plus de raison de dépenser votre argent et de risquer votre vie pour vous rendre là-bas », a-t-elle dit.

    Selon elle, le projet respecte les conventions de l’Union européenne en matière de droit des réfugiés, et elle a exhorté les autres pays membres à soutenir le projet.

    Des contours encore très flous

    Néanmoins, le site choisi et le calendrier pour l’ouverture de ce centre n’ont pas été révélés. M. Kickl s’est montré optimiste quant aux perspectives d’aboutissement ce projet, mais n’a pas voulu donner plus de détails.

    Reste à savoir si ce projet sera accepté par les collègues européens de Mme Støjberg et M. Kickl. L’idée de la création de centres de déportation hors de l’UE avait déjà été évoquée cet été, notamment lors d’une réunion des ministres de l’Intérieur des pays membres de l’UE à Innsbruck en Autriche au mois de juillet, et n’avait pas été bien accueillie par un certain nombre d’officiels européens.

    https://fr.express.live/2018/10/09/lautriche-et-le-danemark-presentent-leur-projet-de-centre-de-deportatio

    #centre_d'expulsion #expulsions #renvois #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #UE #EU #île #îles #plate-forme_de_retour

    • Les Danois veulent loger les demandeurs d’asile déboutés sur une #île_déserte

      La ministre danoise de l’Immigration Inger Støjberg (photo) songe à adopter un projet de l’extrême-droite, qui consisterait à exiler les demandeurs d’asile déboutés sur une ou plusieurs des 300 îles inhabitées au large de la côte danoise. À l’heure actuelle, près d’un millier de demandeurs d’asile déboutés au Danemark attendent leur expulsion.

      Støjberg est membre du parti libéral du Danemark (Venstre), et depuis juin 2015, elle occupe le poste de ministre de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration dans le gouvernement du Premier ministre Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

      « Je suis toujours prête à écouter les bonnes idées pour le suivi des demandeurs d’asile », dit-elle dans le journal Berlingske.

      La proposition d’exil des demandeurs d’asile déboutés vient du parti populiste d’extrême droite danois « parti du peuple danois » (Dansk Folkeparti, ou DF). Ce parti soutient la coalition au gouvernement, mais n’en fait pas partie.

      Pourtant, selon Støjberg, le projet est intéressant mais pas immédiatement réalisable. « Il pourrait y avoir des obstacles pratiques et juridiques pour établir un centre de déportation dans un endroit très isolé, et ce sont des choses qu’il faut prendre en compte », a-t-elle déclaré.
      Dansk Folkeparti : loger les demandeurs d’asile déboutés « dans des containers, ou des tentes »
      La plupart des demandeurs d’asile déboutés résident actuellement dans une ancienne #prison d’état dans le centre du pays. Mais les résidents locaux se sont plaints de vols à l’étalage et affirment qu’ils ne se sentent pas en #sécurité en raison de la présence de ces migrants à proximité.

      Selon le DF, le coût ne devrait pas être un obstacle. « Peut-être que nous pouvons trouver une île sur laquelle il y a déjà des constructions, mais sinon, le centre pourrait être établi à partir de n’importe quoi : de #containers dans lesquels les gens pourraient vivre, ou de #tentes ». C’est ce qu’a déclaré le porte-parole du parti, Martin Henriksen.

      Le DF est très attaché à la politique d’asile du gouvernement. L’année dernière, il a suggéré la possibilité que la police impose une #assignation_à_résidence aux demandeurs d’asile mineurs qui se seraient mal comportés.

      Cette proposition faisait suite à la mise en cause que 5 garçons âgés d’entre 14 et 17 ans du centre d’asile de #Tullebølle. Ils avaient été accusés d’#agressions_sexuelles et de #viol commis sur des visiteuses du festival Langeland, sur l’île de Funen.

      https://fr.express.live/2017/12/08/danemark-demandeurs-dasile-deboutes-exil

      #géographie_du_vide #géographie_du_plein

    • Denmark Plans to Isolate Unwanted Migrants on a Small Island

      Denmark plans to house the country’s most unwelcome foreigners in a most unwelcoming place: a tiny, hard-to-reach island that now holds the laboratories, stables and crematory of a center for researching contagious animal diseases.

      As if to make the message clearer, one of the two ferries that serve the island is called the Virus.

      “They are unwanted in Denmark, and they will feel that,” the immigration minister, Inger Stojberg, wrote on Facebook.

      On Friday, the center-right government and the right-wing Danish People’s Party announced an agreement to house as many as 100 people on #Lindholm_Island — foreigners who have been convicted of crimes and rejected asylum seekers who cannot be returned to their home countries.

      The 17-acre island, in an inlet of the Baltic Sea, lies about two miles from the nearest shore, and ferry service is infrequent. Foreigners will be required to report at the island center daily, and face imprisonment if they do not.

      “We’re going to minimize the number of ferry departures as much as at all possible,” Martin Henriksen, a spokesman for the Danish People’s Party on immigration, told TV 2. “We’re going to make it as cumbersome and expensive as possible.”

      The deal allocates about $115 million over four years for immigrant facilities on the island, which are scheduled to open in 2021.

      The finance minister, Kristian Jensen, who led the negotiations, said the island was not a prison, but added that anyone placed there would have to sleep there.

      Louise Holck, deputy executive director of The Danish Institute for Human Rights, said her organization would watch the situation “very closely” for possible violations of Denmark’s international obligations.

      The agreement was reached as part of the annual budget negotiations. Each year, the Danish People’s Party demands restrictions on immigrants or refugees in return for its votes on a budget.

      In Denmark, as in much of Europe, the surge in migration from the Middle East and Africa in 2015 and 2016 prompted a populist, nativist backlash.

      The government has vowed to push immigration law to the limits of international conventions on human rights.

      Legal experts said it was too early to tell whether the Lindholm Island project would cross those boundaries, constituting illegal confinement. They said it resembled an Italian government project that was struck down in 1980 by the European Court of Human Rights.

      The Lindholm Island plan furthers the government’s policy of motivating failed asylum seekers to leave the country by making their lives intolerable.

      Asylum seekers with criminal records are not allowed to work in Denmark. Rejected asylum seekers who cannot be deported are given accommodations, where they cannot prepare their own meals, food and an allowance of about $1.20 per day, which is withheld if they fail to cooperate with the authorities.

      A former immigration minister, Birthe Ronn Hornbech, called the island project “a joke” and a blunder comparable to a soccer player scoring a goal for the opposing team.

      “Nothing will become of this proposal,” she wrote in her newspaper column.

      Many foreigners who have been denied asylum cannot be deported to their home countries for fear of abuse or persecution, or simply because those countries refuse to take them back.

      Hundreds lingering in two deportation centers refuse to leave — a challenge for a government that has promised to get rid of those who have no legal right to remain in Denmark.

      Some have held out for more than a decade despite a steady deterioration in living conditions. An independent study by a former prison director now working for the rights group Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly found conditions in one of the deportation centers to be comparable to those in some prisons, or worse.

      Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said last month that the government’s aim in receiving refugees would no longer be to integrate them, but to host them until they can return to their countries of origin.

      “It’s not easy to ask families to go home, if they’ve actually settled,” he told a meeting of his party. “But it is the morally right thing. We should not make refugees immigrants.”

      This summer, a ban on face coverings was introduced and quickly nicknamed “the burqa ban” as it followed a debate on the Islamic garment seen by some as “un-Danish.” This month, Parliament is expected to pass legislation requiring immigrants who want to obtain citizenship to shake hands with officials as part of the naturalization ceremony — though some Muslims insist that they cannot shake hands with someone of the opposite sex.

      The government contends that hand shakes are “a basic Danish value.”


      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/world/europe/denmark-migrants-island.html
      #Lindholm #mer_Baltique

    • La Danimarca confinerà i migranti su un’isola con gli animali infetti. Così l’Europa muore.

      C’è del marcio in Danimarca. Senza scomodare Amleto e i rimandi shakespeariani, bisogna constatare l’ennesima trovata discriminatoria quanto disumana di un Paese del “civile e ordinato” Nord Europa. Le normative internazionali non consentono l’espulsione di alcuni richiedenti asilo: secondo l’articolo 33 della Convenzione di Ginevra: “Nessuno Stato Contraente espellerà o respingerà, in qualsiasi modo, un rifugiato verso i confini di territori in cui la sua vita o la sua libertà sarebbero minacciate a motivo della sua razza, della sua religione, della sua cittadinanza, della sua appartenenza a un gruppo sociale o delle sue opinioni politiche”. Tali leggi non si possono ignorare, ma evidentemente si possono aggirare. Dunque il governo danese ha pensato bene non di espellere questi immigrati, ma di relegarli su un’isola-prigione.

      Per la precisione si tratta dell’isola di Lindholm, con una superficie di sette ettari. Pressoché deserta, viene usata esclusivamente come luogo per ricerche veterinarie, e vi soggiornano diversi medici che studiano la peste suina e la rabbia canina. Adesso cani e maiali dovranno cedere il posto agli immigrati, che qualcuno, vista la deriva che sta prendendo il pianeta sotto il profilo dei diritti umani, sembra non considerare tanto dissimili.

      L’idea scellerata è della coalizione di governo che comprende i Conservatori e il Dansk Folkeparti. Quest’ultimo, il Partito popolare danese, è noto per la perenne caccia all’immigrato, tanto veemente da far sembrare Matteo Salvini un misto tra Nicola Fratoianni e il Papa. Sull’isola verrà costruito, entro il 2021, un centro di espulsione dove i migranti – un massimo di 125 persone, che hanno compiuto un reato e ai quali è stata rifiutata la richiesta d’asilo – saranno costantemente sorvegliati dalla polizia. Potranno lasciare l’isola solo dopo aver ottenuto permessi speciali, per qualche ora durante la giornata, ma con l’obbligo di tornarvi la sera. E il biglietto del traghetto dovranno pagarselo da soli, a un prezzo inaccessibile per la loro condizione economica. D’altronde, il governo non ha alcuna intenzione di ammorbidire il loro soggiorno, e lo scopo è proprio quello di non permettere loro di lasciare l’isola-prigione. Di tutti i modi escogitati per camuffare una detenzione, questo pare di certo il meno credibile.

      Suonano paradossali anche le precisazioni della sezione danese di Amnesty International, che spiega come la misura riguarderà i soli richiedenti asilo con precedenti penali. Quindi quelli che hanno già scontato una pena in una prigione reale, e che si ritroveranno nuovamente in stato di detenzione, stavolta senza colpe e senza processi, è giusto, secondo un’organizzazione che dovrebbe tutelare i diritti umani, che ne scontino una nuova. Il clima di ostilità nei confronti dei migranti è così accentuato che la misura, palesemente in conflitto con i più basilari principi di tutela delle libertà, ha generato addirittura festeggiamenti sui social. In particolare, è un video a rendere chiaro il sentimento di molti, diffuso in rete dal Dansk Folkeparti: si tratta di un cartone animato dove un uomo di colore, con abiti da musulmano, viene scaricato su un’isola deserta. Il testo di accompagnamento alle immagini recita: “Gli stranieri criminali non hanno motivo di stare in Danimarca. Finché non riusciremo a liberarcene, li trasferiremo sull’isola di Lindholm”. Come cani e maiali, appunto.

      L’isola sarà trasformata in una prigione grazie a un investimento di 100 milioni di dollari che servirà a smantellare i laboratori e le stalle dell’istituto di veterinaria e a costruire la struttura con i dormitori per gli immigrati. Sarà pronta entro il 2021, salvo improbabili ripensamenti o interventi da parte della comunità europea. Inger Støjberg, ministra dell’immigrazione in quota Venstre, partito di destra della coalizione, ha usato Facebook per lanciare un messaggio che suona come un lapidario avvertimento: “Alcuni migranti si accorgeranno di non essere i benvenuti”. In pratica la versione danese di “È finita la pacchia”.

      Già in passato la Danimarca si era distinta per il pugno duro contro i migranti, sino al punto di minare la loro libertà e addirittura privarli dei loro effetti personali. Il Parlamento danese ha infatti approvato nel 2016 una legge tesa a scoraggiare le richieste d’asilo, che conferisce alle autorità il potere di perquisire vestiti e bagagli dei migranti per confiscare beni superiori a 10mila corone (circa 1.350 euro) e usarli per contribuire al loro mantenimento. Eppure la Danimarca, così come gran parte dei paesi del Nord Europa e tutta l’area scandinava, viene dipinta come l’espressione massima del “Paese civile”. Questa definizione a quanto pare si riferisce all’ordine e alla pulizia di una nazione, mentre si chiudono entrambi gli occhi sulle politiche disumane e dal sapore fascista – dove “ordine e pulizia” assumono un altro significato.

      Il governo, intanto, continua a ripetere che quella che verrà realizzata non sarà una prigione, perché non ci saranno vere e proprie celle. Si potrebbe comunque fare un paragone con il regime carcerario, considerando le condizioni nelle quali verseranno gli “ospiti” dell’isola. I danesi hanno probabilmente preso spunto dalla politica sull’immigrazione australiana. L’isola di Nauru, nell’Oceano Pacifico, è il luogo dove il governo “scarica” i richiedenti asilo: per dirla alla Toninelli, i migranti restano a Nauru “per mesi, al massimo anni”. Ci sono intere famiglie, bambini che vengono seguiti dalla polizia anche quando vanno a scuola, mentre gli adulti vengono vessati quotidianamente dalle guardie e vivono in condizioni precarie. Il Guardian Australia ha denunciato abusi su minori e violenze sessuali sulle donne. Ovviamente, in Italia, c’è chi ha lodato il No Way australiano e la detenzione dei migranti a Nauru. È un politico di spicco. Sì, proprio lui.

      Matteo Salvini, durante lo stallo della nave Diciotti, ha dichiarato: “Il mio obiettivo è il No Way australiano. Nessun migrante soccorso in mare mette piede in Australia”. Nel 2015, sulla sua pagina Facebook, si era spinto oltre, parlando proprio di Nauru: “In Australia per me fanno bene! Che dite, affittiamo un’isola anche noi?”. Salvini, invece di gongolare di fronte alle sirene australiane e danesi, dovrebbe semplicemente ripassare la nostra storia. Mandare al confino gli “indesiderati”, cacciandoli su un’isola per allontanarli dalla civiltà, era una prerogativa di Mussolini. Forse il ministro dell’Interno non ha mai sentito parlare di Ventotene o delle isole Tremiti.

      Dopo le leggi speciali del 1926, gli individui ritenuti pericolosi per lo Stato e per l’ordine pubblico venivano spediti in queste isole. È bene sottolineare che, quasi cento anni fa, venivano considerati pericolosi anche gli omosessuali, gli avversari politici, i credenti di fede diversa, come i testimoni di Geova, o i lettori di libri considerati sovversivi. Durante il fascismo vennero emesse 12mila ordinanze dalle commissioni Provinciali, e le isole si riempirono. Una volta giunti in quei luoghi, ai confinati venivano sottratti i documenti personali, non potevano interagire con gli isolani o superare zone di confine sorvegliate da guardie armate. Sulla carta era vietato anche ascoltare la radio o parlare di politica, mentre era permesso l’invio di una sola lettera alla settimana, non più lunga di 24 righe. Da Ventotene passò anche Sandro Pertini, che poi divenne uno dei più amati presidenti della Repubblica. Quando Salvini si lancia in azzardati inviti ad affittare isole, ricordiamoci quanto ci hanno trasmesso i libri di storia.

      È proprio per la memoria storica ancora pulsante, da preservare il più a lungo possibile, che proposte come quella del governo danese dovrebbero mettere in allarme le democrazie europee, che sono sotto attacco anche per questo e non solo per gli attacchi terroristici di individui radicalizzati e riempiti di odio esattamente come i sostenitori di simili politiche.

      Nessun uomo è un’isola, scriveva il poeta John Donne. Rivisitando i suoi versi, auspichiamo “nessun uomo su un’isola”, se viene intesa come prigionia e azzeramento dei diritti fondamentali dell’uomo. Che sia in Danimarca, nel profondo Sud dell’Oceania o in qualche nostalgia malsana di un politico nostrano che strizza troppo spesso l’occhio a un passato nero che non dovrebbe ripetersi.

      https://thevision.com/politica/danimarca-migranti-isolamento

  • Le 5 octobre 2018, l’Union européenne a signé un accord sur la coopération en matière de gestion des frontières entre l’#Albanie et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (#Frontex).

    On 5 October 2018, the European Union signed an agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement was signed on behalf of the EU by Herbert Kickl, Minister of the Interior of Austria and President of the Council, and Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, and on behalf of Albania Interior Minister Fatmir Xhafaj.

    This agreement allows the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to coordinate operational cooperation between EU member states and Albania on the management of the EU’s external borders. The European Border and Coast Guard will be able to take action at the external border involving one or more neighbouring member states and Albania. This can include intervention on Albanian territory, subject to Albania’s agreement.

    The activities included by the agreement are aimed at tackling illegal migration, in particular sudden changes in migratory flows, and cross-border crime, and can involve the provision of increased technical and operational assistance at the border. For each operation, a plan has to be agreed between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and Albania.

    http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/controle-des-frontieres-accord-cooperation-albanie-corps-europe
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #EU #UE

    ping @daphne @marty @albertocampiphoto

  • Albania Cannot “Adopt” Asylum Seekers from Italy

    Over the weekend, the Albanian government announced that it would “adopt” 20 of the 150 Eritrean asylum seekers that had been blocked for a week in the Italian port of Catania by far-right deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini. The refugees were only allowed to leave the ship after the Italian court started proceedings against him.

    The Italian Ombudsman Mauro Palma, claimed that migrants were “de facto deprived of freedom without any legal basis or judicial oversight” and that Salvini and the Italian government had potentially violated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the Italian Constitution, the Geneva Convention, as well as the Italian Criminal Code and Code of Navigation.

    The acceptance of Albania’s offer to take over 20 asylum seekers may yet be another violation, because Albania is a “third country” and not part of the common EU asylum system, the Dublin Convention.

    In an interview with Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Lorenzo Trucco, director of the Association for the Juridical Study of Immigration (ASGI), called the Albanian “solution” a “theater of the absurd”:
    Here we are outside any legal context. Albania is not in the European Union, so we are talking about a relocation to a third country that does not have everything that is foreseen by the common European asylum system. It means that we are not sure that they have the requisites required for the recognition of protection. So a transfer to this country can only take place if the migrants agree, never against their will. In that case it would be a forced removal.

    And then there is the issue of choice. How will anyone selected to go to Albania be selected? It is a theater of the absurd, an attack on the asylum system. Fortunately, there was the intervention of the judiciary.

    Transferring Eritrean refugees from Italy to Albania against their will or after they applied for asylum in Italy (for which they had the right as soon as they disembarked the ship) is a breach of EU law. The Albanian government has given Salvini a pretext for doing so, while also showing how little it understands of how the rule of law works.

    https://exit.al/en/2018/08/27/albania-cannot-adopt-asylum-seekers-from-italy
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #Albanie

    Cette tentative d’externaliser les procédures en Albanie a été pensée pour les réfugiés à bord de la #Diciotti, navire bloqué pendant des jours et des jours en mer car le gouvernement italien a bloqué l’accès sur son territoire.
    Malheureusement, je n’ai pas trop suivi ce dernier épisode, car j’étais loin et pas toujours connectée.
    Il y a tout de même de la documentation ici, qui traite du cas Diciotti, mais pas de la tentative d’externalisation en Albanie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/717803

    cc @isskein @reka

    • L’Italie a demandé au #Monténégro d’accepter des réfugiés du Diciotti

      30 août - 11h30 : « L’Italie a contacté le ministère des Affaires étrangères, lui demandant d’accueillir certains réfugiés du Diciotti », a confirmé le porte-parole du gouvernement monténégrin, Srđan Kusovac. Ces derniers, principalement d’origine africaine, sont bloqués depuis dix jours dans le port de Catane, en Sicile. L’Albanie doit accueillir 20 d’entre eux.

      Vu sur le site du Courrier des Balkans, dernières info, pas de URL propre, malheureusement.

    • Montenegro to Host Some Migrants From Italy

      Montenegrin on Thursday announced that it will take in up to five people from a ship full of migrants that was stranded off the coast of Italy for days.

      The government of Montenegro has said it will receive up to five refugees and migrants who disembarked at a port in Sicily after the Italian authorities kept them on the ship for days.

      “The Government, having acknowledged the principles of humanity and solidarity with people in need as a traditional value of Montenegrin society, confirmed many times in our history, decided that Montenegro should accept up to five migrants from the Diciotto,” the government said on its Twitter account on Thursday evening.

      Montenegro confirmed on August 30 that it had been approached by Italy and asked to take in a number of migrants and refugees, to help end a 10-day standoff with the ship docked off the Italian coast at Catania.

      Podgorica said then it was still mulling whether to take the mostly African-origin migrants and refugees, but had not yet taken a stance.

      “Unanimously, the Government of Montenegro confirms its commitment to the European value system and affirms human dignity,” it said on Twitter on Thursday.

      http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-to-receive-up-to-five-migrants-from-italy-09-06-2018