#albanie

#Sali_Berisha #Berisha #condamnation #justice #corruption #Albanie

Enregistrement webinaire Albanie

A l’occasion de la sortie de la Note d’analyse « Albanie : enjeux migratoires dans les Balkans. Transit, émigration, retours forcés : des mobilités entravées », La Cimade a organisé un webinaire afin de présenter nos observations et analyses.

▻https://vimeo.com/826189577

I rischi della presenza di Frontex in Africa: tanto potere, poca responsabilità

https://i0.wp.com/altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2023/04/Frontex-Senegal.jpg

L’eurodeputata #Tineke_Strik è stata in Senegal e Mauritania a fine febbraio 2023: in un’intervista ad Altreconomia ricostruisce lo stato dell’arte degli accordi che l’Ue vorrebbe concludere con i due Paesi ritenuti “chiave” nel contrasto ai flussi migratori. Denunciando la necessità di una riforma strutturale dell’Agenzia.

A un anno di distanza dalle dimissioni del suo ex direttore Fabrice Leggeri, le istituzioni europee non vogliono mettere limiti all’attività di Frontex. Come abbiamo ricostruito sul numero di aprile di Altreconomia, infatti, l’Agenzia -che dal primo marzo 2023 è guidata da Hans Leijtens- continua a svolgere un ruolo centrale nelle politiche migratorie dell’Unione europea nonostante le pesanti rivelazioni dell’Ufficio europeo antifrode (Olaf), che ha ricostruito nel dettaglio il malfunzionamento nelle operazioni delle divise blu lungo i confini europei.

Ma non solo. Un aspetto particolarmente preoccupante sono le operazioni al di fuori dei Paesi dell’Unione, che rientrano sempre di più tra le priorità di Frontex in un’ottica di esternalizzazione delle frontiere per “fermare” preventivamente i flussi di persone dirette verso l’Europa. Non a caso, a luglio 2022, nonostante i contenuti del rapporto Olaf chiuso solo pochi mesi prima, la Commissione europea ha dato il via libera ai negoziati con Senegal e Mauritania per stringere un cosiddetto working arrangement e permettere così agli “agenti europei” di operare nei due Paesi africani (segnaliamo anche la recente ricerca pubblicata dall’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione sul tema).

Per monitorare lo stato dell’arte di questi accordi l’eurodeputata Tineke Strik, tra le poche a opporsi e a denunciare senza sconti gli effetti delle politiche migratorie europee e il ruolo di Frontex, a fine febbraio 2023 ha svolto una missione di monitoraggio nei due Paesi. Già professoressa di Diritto della cittadinanza e delle migrazioni dell’Università di Radboud di Nimega, in Olanda, è stata eletta al Parlamento europeo nel 2019 nelle fila di GroenLinks (Sinistra verde). L’abbiamo intervistata.

Onorevole Strik, secondo quanto ricostruito dalla vostra visita (ha partecipato alla missione anche Cornelia Erns, di LeftEu, ndr), a che punto sono i negoziati con il Senegal?
TS La nostra impressione è che le autorità senegalesi non siano così desiderose di concludere un accordo di status con l’Unione europea sulla presenza di Frontex nel Paese. L’approccio di Bruxelles nei confronti della migrazione come sappiamo è molto incentrato su sicurezza e gestione delle frontiere; i senegalesi, invece, sono più interessati a un intervento sostenibile e incentrato sullo sviluppo, che offra soluzioni e affronti le cause profonde che spingono le persone a partire. Sono molti i cittadini del Senegal emigrano verso l’Europa: idealmente, il governo vuole che rimangano nel Paese, ma capisce meglio di quanto non lo facciano le istituzioni Ue che si può intervenire sulla migrazione solo affrontando le cause alla radice e migliorando la situazione nel contesto di partenza. Allo stesso tempo, le navi europee continuano a pescare lungo le coste del Paese (minacciando la pesca artigianale, ndr), le aziende europee evadono le tasse e il latte sovvenzionato dall’Ue viene scaricato sul mercato senegalese, causando disoccupazione e impedendo lo sviluppo dell’economia locale. Sono soprattutto gli accordi di pesca ad aver alimentato le partenze dal Senegal, dal momento che le comunità di pescatori sono state private della loro principale fonte di reddito. Serve domandarsi se l’Unione sia veramente interessata allo sviluppo e ad affrontare le cause profonde della migrazione. E lo stesso discorso può essere fatto su molti dei Paesi d’origine delle persone che cercano poi protezione in Europa.

Dakar vede di buon occhio l’intervento dell’Unione europea? Quale tipo di operazioni andrebbero a svolgere gli agenti di Frontex nel Paese?
TS Abbiamo avuto la sensazione che l’Ue non ascoltasse le richieste delle autorità senegalesi -ad esempio in materia di rilascio di visti d’ingresso- e ci hanno espresso preoccupazioni relative ai diritti fondamentali in merito a qualsiasi potenziale cooperazione con Frontex, data la reputazione dell’Agenzia. È difficile dire che tipo di supporto sia previsto, ma nei negoziati l’Unione sta puntando sia alle frontiere terrestri sia a quelle marittime.

Che cosa sta avvenendo in Mauritania?
TS Sebbene questo Paese sembri disposto a concludere un accordo sullo status di Frontex -soprattutto nell’ottica di ottenere un maggiore riconoscimento da parte dell’Europa-, preferisce comunque mantenere l’autonomia nella gestione delle proprie frontiere e quindi non prevede una presenza permanente dei funzionari dell’Agenzia nel Paese. Considerano l’accordo sullo status più come un quadro giuridico, per consentire la presenza di Frontex in caso di aumento della pressione migratoria. Inoltre, come il Senegal, ritengono che l’Europa debba ascoltare e accogliere le loro richieste, che riguardano principalmente i visti e altre aree di cooperazione. Anche in questo caso, Bruxelles chiede il mandato più ampio possibile per gli agenti in divisa blu durante i negoziati per “mantenere aperte le opzioni [più ampie]”, come dicono loro stessi. Ma credo sia chiaro che il loro obiettivo è quello di operare sia alle frontiere marittime sia a quelle terrestri.
Questo a livello “istituzionale”. Qual è invece la posizione della società civile?
TS In entrambi i Paesi è molto critica. In parte a causa della cattiva reputazione di Frontex in relazione ai diritti umani, ma anche a causa dell’esperienza che i cittadini senegalesi e mauritani hanno già sperimentato con la Guardia civil spagnola, presente nei due Stati, che ritengono stia intaccando la sovranità per quanto riguarda la gestione delle frontiere. È previsto che il mandato di Frontex sia addirittura esecutivo, a differenza di quello della Guardia civil, che può impegnarsi solo in pattugliamenti congiunti in cui le autorità nazionali sono al comando. Quindi la sovranità di entrambi i Paesi sarebbe ulteriormente minata.

Perché a suo avviso sarebbe problematica la presenza di agenti di Frontex nei due Paesi?
TS L’immunità che l’Unione europea vorrebbe per i propri operativi dispiegati in Africa non è solo connessa allo svolgimento delle loro funzioni ma si estende al di fuori di esse, a questo si aggiunge la possibilità di essere armati. Penso sia problematico il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali dei naufraghi intercettati in mare, poiché è difficile ottenere l’accesso all’asilo sia in Senegal sia in Mauritania. In questo Paese, ad esempio, l’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (Unhcr) impiega molto tempo per determinare il loro bisogno di protezione: fanno eccezione i maliani, che riescono a ottenerla in “appena” due anni. E durante l’attesa queste persone non hanno quasi diritti.

Ma se ottengono la protezione è comunque molto difficile registrarsi presso l’amministrazione, cosa necessaria per avere accesso al mercato del lavoro, alle scuole o all’assistenza sanitaria. E le conseguenze che ne derivano sono le continue retate, i fermi e le deportazioni alla frontiera, per impedire alle persone di partire. A causa delle attuali intercettazioni in mare, le rotte migratorie si stanno spostando sulla terra ferma e puntano verso l’Algeria: l’attraversamento del deserto può essere mortale. Il problema principale è che Frontex deve rispettare il diritto dell’Unione europea anche se opera in un Paese terzo in cui si applicano norme giuridiche diverse, ma l’Agenzia andrà a operare sotto il comando delle guardie di frontiera di un Paese che non è vincolato dalle “regole” europee. Come può Frontex garantire di non essere coinvolta in operazioni che violano le norme fondamentali del diritto comunitario, se determinate azioni non sono illegali in quel Paese? Sulla carta è possibile presentare un reclamo a Frontex, ma poi nella pratica questo strumento in quali termini sarebbe accessibile ed efficace?

Un anno dopo le dimissioni dell’ex direttore Leggeri ritiene che Frontex si sia pienamente assunta la responsabilità di quanto accaduto? Può davvero, secondo lei, diventare un attore affidabile per l’Ue?
TS Prima devono accadere molte cose. Non abbiamo ancora visto una riforma fondamentale: c’è ancora un forte bisogno di maggiore trasparenza, di un atteggiamento più fermo nei confronti degli Stati membri ospitanti e di un uso conseguente dell’articolo 46 che prevede la sospensione delle operazioni in caso di violazioni dei diritti umani (abbiamo già raccontato il ruolo dell’Agenzia nei respingimenti tra Grecia e Turchia, ndr). Questi problemi saranno ovviamente esacerbati nella cooperazione con i Paesi terzi, perché la responsabilità sarà ancora più difficile da raggiungere.

▻https://altreconomia.it/i-rischi-della-presenza-di-frontex-in-africa-tanto-potere-poca-responsa

«Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare». La missione di ASGI in Senegal e Mauritania

Lo scorso 29 marzo è stato pubblicato il rapporto «Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare» (►https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania), frutto del sopralluogo giuridico effettuato tra il 7 e il 13 maggio 2022 da una delegazione di ASGI composta da Alice Fill, Lorenzo Figoni, Matteo Astuti, Diletta Agresta, Adelaide Massimi (avvocate e avvocati, operatori e operatrici legali, ricercatori e ricercatrici).

Il sopralluogo aveva l’obiettivo di analizzare lo sviluppo delle politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo della mobilità e di blocco delle frontiere implementate dall’Unione Europea in Mauritania e in Senegal – due paesi a cui, come la Turchia o gli stati balcanici più orientali, gli stati membri hanno delegato la gestione dei flussi migratori concordando politiche sempre più ostacolanti per lo spostamento delle persone.

Nel corso del sopralluogo sono stati intervistati, tra Mauritania e Senegal, più di 40 interlocutori afferenti a istituzioni, società civile, popolazione migrante e organizzazioni, tra cui OIM, UNHCR, delegazioni dell’UE. Intercettare questi soggetti ha consentito ad ASGI di andare oltre le informazioni vincolate all’ufficialità delle dichiarazioni pubbliche e di approfondire le pratiche illegittime portate avanti su questi territori.

Il report parte dalle già assodate intenzioni di collaborazione tra l’Unione Europea e le autorità senegalesi e mauritane – una collaborazione che in entrambi i paesi sembra connotata nel senso del controllo e della sorveglianza; per quanto riguarda il Senegal, si fa menzione del ben noto status agreement, proposto nel febbraio 2022 a Dakar dalla Commissaria europea agli affari interni Ylva Johansson, con il quale si intende estendere il controllo di Frontex in Senegal.

L’obiettivo di tale accordo era il controllo della cosiddetta rotta delle Canarie, che tra il 2018 e il 2022 è stata sempre più battuta. Sebbene la proposta abbia generato accese discussioni nella società civile senegalese, preoccupata all’idea di cedere parte della sovranità del paese sul controllo delle frontiere esterne, con tale accordo, elaborato con un disegno molto simile a quello che regola le modalità di intervento di Frontex nei Balcani, si legittimerebbe ufficialmente l’attività di controllo dell’agenzia UE in paesi terzi, e in particolare fuori dal continente europeo.

Per quanto riguarda la Mauritania, si menziona l’Action Plan pubblicato da Frontex il 7 giugno 2022, con il quale si prospetta una possibilità di collaborare operativamente sul territorio mauritano, in particolare per lo sviluppo di governance in materia migratoria.

Senegal

Sin dai primi anni Duemila, il dialogo tra istituzioni europee e senegalesi è stato focalizzato sulle politiche di riammissione dei cittadini senegalesi presenti in UE in maniera irregolare e dei cosiddetti ritorni volontari, le politiche di gestione delle frontiere senegalesi e il controllo della costa, la promozione di una legislazione anti-trafficking e anti-smuggling. Tutto questo si è intensificato quando, a partire dal 2018, la rotta delle Canarie è tornata a essere una rotta molto percorsa. L’operatività delle agenzie europee in Senegal per la gestione delle migrazioni si declina principalmente nei seguenti obiettivi:

1. Monitoraggio delle frontiere terrestri e marittime. Il memorandum firmato nel 2006 da Senegal e Spagna ha sancito la collaborazione ufficiale tra le forze di polizia europee e quelle senegalesi in operazioni congiunte di pattugliamento; a questo si aggiunge, sempre nello stesso anno, una presenza sempre più intensiva di Frontex al largo delle coste senegalesi.

2. Lotta alla tratta e al traffico. Su questo fronte dell’operatività congiunta tra forze senegalesi ed europee, la normativa di riferimento è la legge n. 06 del 10 maggio 2005, che offre delle direttive per il contrasto della tratta di persone e del traffico. Tale documento, non distinguendo mai fra “tratta” e “traffico”, di fatto criminalizza la migrazione irregolare tout court, dal momento che viene utilizzato in maniera estensiva (e arbitraria) come strumento di controllo e di repressione della mobilità – fu utilizzato, ad esempio, per accusare di traffico di esseri umani un padre che aveva imbarcato suo figlio su un mezzo che poi naufragato.

Il sistema di asilo in Senegal

Il Senegal aderisce alla Convenzione del 1951 sullo status de rifugiati e del relativo Protocollo del 1967; la valutazione delle domande di asilo fa capo alla Commissione Nazionale di Eleggibilità (CNE), che al deposito della richiesta di asilo emette un permesso di soggiorno della durata di 3 mesi, rinnovabile fino all’esito dell’audizione di fronte alla CNE; l’esito della CNE è ricorribile in primo grado presso la Commissione stessa e, nel caso di ulteriore rifiuto, presso il Presidente della Repubblica. Quando il richiedente asilo depone la propria domanda, subentra l’UNHCR, che nel paese è molto presente e finanzia ONG locali per fornire assistenza.

Il 5 aprile 2022 l’Assemblea Nazionale senegalese ha approvato una nuova legge sullo status dei rifugiati e degli apolidi, una legge che, stando a diverse associazioni locali, sulla carta estenderebbe i diritti cui i rifugiati hanno accesso; tuttavia, le stesse associazioni temono che a tale miglioramento possa non seguire un’applicazione effettiva della normativa.
Mauritania

Data la collocazione geografica del paese, a ridosso dell’Atlantico e delle isole Canarie, in prossimità di paesi ad alto indice di emigrazione (Senegal, Mali, Marocco), la Mauritania rappresenta un territorio strategico per il monitoraggio dei flussi migratori diretti in Europa. Pertanto, analogamente a quanto avvenuto in Senegal, anche in Mauritania la Spagna ha proceduto a rafforzare la cooperazione in tema di politiche migratorie e di gestione del controllo delle frontiere e a incrementare la presenta e l’impegno di attori esterni – in primis di agenzie quali Frontex – per interventi di contenimento dei flussi e di riammissione di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania.

Relativamente alla Mauritania, l’obiettivo principale delle istituzioni europee sembra essere la prevenzione dell’immigrazione lungo la rotta delle Canarie. La normativa di riferimento è l’Accordo di riammissione bilaterale firmato con la Spagna nel luglio 2003. Con tale accordo, la Spagna può chiedere alla Mauritania di riammettere sul proprio territorio cittadini mauritani e non solo, anche altri cittadini provenienti da paesi terzi che “si presume” siano transitati per la Mauritania prima di entrare irregolarmente in Spagna. Oltre a tali interventi, il report di ASGI menziona l’Operazione Hera di Frontex e vari interventi di cooperazione allo sviluppo promossi dalla Spagna “con finalità tutt’altro che umanitarie”, bensì di gestione della mobilità.

In tale regione, nella fase degli sbarchi risulta molto dubbio il ruolo giocato da organizzazioni come OIM e UNHCR, poiché non è codificato; interlocutori diversi hanno fornito informazioni contrastanti sulla disponibilità di UNHCR a intervenire in supporto e su segnalazione delle ONG presenti al momento dello sbarco. In ogni caso, se effettivamente UNHCR fosse assente agli sbarchi, ciò determinerebbe una sostanziale impossibilità di accesso alle procedure di protezione internazionale da parte di qualsiasi potenziale richiedente asilo che venga intercettato in mare.

Anche in questo territorio la costruzione della figura del “trafficante” diventa un dispositivo di criminalizzazione e repressione della mobilità sulla rotta atlantica, strumentale alla soddisfazione di richieste europee.
La detenzione dei cittadini stranieri

Tra Nouakchott e Nouadhibou vi sono tre centri di detenzione per persone migranti; uno di questi (il Centro di Detenzione di Nouadhibou 2 (anche detto “El Guantanamito”), venne realizzato grazie a dei fondi di un’agenzia di cooperazione spagnola. Sovraffollamento, precarietà igienico-sanitaria e impossibilità di accesso a cure e assistenza legale hanno caratterizzato tali centri. Quando El Guantanamito fu chiuso, i commissariati di polizia sono diventati i principali luoghi deputati alla detenzione dei cittadini stranieri; in tali centri, vengono detenute non solo le persone intercettate in prossimità delle coste mauritane, ma anche i cittadini stranieri riammessi dalla Spagna, e anche le persone presenti irregolarmente su territorio mauritano. Risulta delicato il tema dell’accesso a tali commissariati, dal momento che il sopralluogo ha rilevato che le ONG non hanno il permesso di entrarvi, mentre le organizzazioni internazionali sì – ciò nonostante, nessuna delle persone precedentemente sottoposte a detenzione con cui la delegazione ASGI ha avuto modo di interloquire ha dichiarato di aver riscontrato la presenza di organizzazioni all’interno di questi centri.

La detenzione amministrativa risulta essere “un tassello essenziale della politica di contenimento dei flussi di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania”. Il passaggio successivo alla detenzione delle persone migranti è l’allontanamento, che si svolge in forma di veri e propri respingimenti sommari e informali, senza che i migranti siano messi nelle condizioni né di dichiarare la propria nazionalità né di conoscere la procedura di ritorno volontario.
Il ruolo delle organizzazioni internazionali in Mauritania

OIM riveste un ruolo centrale nel panorama delle politiche di esternalizzazione e di blocco dei cittadini stranieri in Mauritania, tramite il supporto delle autorità di pubblica sicurezza mauritane nello sviluppo di politiche di contenimento della libertà di movimento – strategie e interventi che suggeriscono una connotazione securitaria della presenza dell’associazione nel paese, a scapito di una umanitaria.

Nonostante anche la Mauritania sia firmataria della Convenzione di Ginevra, non esiste a oggi una legge nazionale sul diritto di asilo nel paese. UNHCR testimonia come dal 2015 esiste un progetto di legge sull’asilo, ma che questo sia tuttora “in attesa di adozione”.

Pertanto, le procedure di asilo in Mauritania sono gestite interamente da UNHCR. Tali procedure si differenziano a seconda della pericolosità delle regioni di provenienza delle persone migranti; in particolare, i migranti maliani provenienti dalle regioni considerate più pericolose vengono registrati come rifugiati prima facie, quanto non accade invece per i richiedenti asilo provenienti dalle aree urbane, per loro, l’iter dell’asilo è ben più lungo, e prevede una sorta di “pre-pre-registrazione” presso un ente partner di UNHCR, cui segue una pre-registrazione accordata da UNHCR previo appuntamento, e solo in seguito alla registrazione viene riconosciuto un certificato di richiesta di asilo, valido per sei mesi, in attesa di audizione per la determinazione dello status di rifugiato.

Le tempistiche per il riconoscimento di protezione, poi, sono differenti a seconda del grado di vulnerabilità del richiedente e in taluni casi potevano condurre ad anni e anni di attesa. Alla complessità della procedura si aggiunge che non tutti i potenziali richiedenti asilo possono accedervi – ad esempio, chi proviene da alcuni stati, come la Sierra Leone, considerati “paesi sicuri” secondo una categorizzazione fornita dall’Unione Africana.
Conclusioni

In fase conclusiva, il report si sofferma sul ruolo fondamentale giocato dall’Unione Europea nel forzare le politiche senegalesi e mauritane nel senso della sicurezza e del contenimento, a scapito della tutela delle persone migranti nei loro diritti fondamentali. Le principali preoccupazioni evidenziate sono rappresentate dalla prospettiva della conclusione dello status agreement tra Frontex e i due paesi, perché tale ratifica ufficializzerebbe non solo la presenza, ma un ruolo legittimo e attivo di un’agenzia europea nel controllo di frontiere che si dispiegano ben oltre i confini territoriali comunitari, ben oltre le acque territoriali, spingendo le maglie del controllo dei flussi fin dentro le terre di quegli stati da cui le persone fuggono puntando all’Unione Europea. La delegazione, tuttavia, sottolinea che vi sono aree in cui la società civile senegalese e mauritana risulta particolarmente politicizzata, dunque in grado di esprimere insofferenza o aperta contrarietà nei confronti delle ingerenze europee nei loro paesi. Infine, da interviste, colloqui e incontri con diretti interessati e testimoni, il ruolo di organizzazioni internazionali come le citate OIM e UNHCR appare nella maggior parte dei casi “fluido o sfuggevole”; una prospettiva, questa, che sembra confermare l’ambivalenza delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali, soggetti messi innanzitutto al servizio degli interessi delle istituzioni europee.

Il report si conclude auspicando una prosecuzione di studio e analisi al fine di continuare a monitorare gli sviluppi politici e legislativi che legano l’Unione Europea e questi territori nella gestione operativa delle migrazioni.

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/05/un-laboratorio-di-esternalizzazione-tra-frontiere-di-terra-e-di-mare

Pubblicato il rapporto #ASGI della missione in Senegal e Mauritania

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Il Senegal e la Mauritania sono paesi fondamentali lungo la rotta che conduce dall’Africa occidentale alle isole Canarie. Nel 2020, dopo alcuni anni in cui la rotta era stata meno utilizzata, vi è stato un incremento del 900% degli arrivi rispetto all’anno precedente. Il dato ha portato la Spagna e le istituzioni europee a concentrarsi nuovamente sui due paesi. La cosiddetta Rotta Atlantica, che a partire dal 2006 era stata teatro di sperimentazioni di pratiche di contenimento e selezione della mobilità e di delega dei controlli alle frontiere e del diritto di asilo, è tornata all’attenzione internazionale: da febbraio 2022 sono in corso negoziazioni per la firma di un accordo di status con Frontex per permettere il dispiegamento dei suoi agenti in Senegal e Mauritania.

Al fine di indagare l’attuazione delle politiche di esternalizzazione e i loro effetti, dal 7 al 13 maggio 2022 un gruppo di socз ASGI – avvocatз, operatorз legali e ricercatorз – ha effettuato un sopralluogo giuridico a Nouakchott, Mauritania e a Dakar, Senegal.

Il report restituisce il quadro ricostruito nel corso del sopralluogo, durante il quale è stato possibile intervistare oltre 45 interlocutori tra istituzioni, organizzazioni internazionali, ONG e persone migranti.

►https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania
#rapport

Au Sénégal, les desseins de Frontex se heurtent aux résistances locales

Tout semblait devoir aller très vite : début 2022, l’Union européenne propose de déployer sa force anti-migration Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises, et le président Macky Sall y semble favorable. Mais c’était compter sans l’opposition de la société civile, qui refuse de voir le Sénégal ériger des murs à la place de l’Europe.

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Agents armés, navires, drones et systèmes de sécurité sophistiqués : Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes créée en 2004, a sorti le grand jeu pour dissuader les Africains de prendre la direction des îles Canaries – et donc de l’Europe –, l’une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Cet arsenal, auquel s’ajoutent des programmes de formation de la police aux frontières, est la pierre angulaire de la proposition faite début 2022 par le Conseil de l’Europe au Sénégal. Finalement, Dakar a refusé de la signer sous la pression de la société civile, même si les négociations ne sont pas closes. Dans un climat politique incandescent à l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2024, le président sénégalais, Macky Sall, soupçonné de vouloir briguer un troisième mandat, a préféré prendre son temps et a fini par revenir sur sa position initiale, qui semblait ouverte à cette collaboration. Dans le même temps, la Mauritanie voisine, elle, a entamé des négociations avec Bruxelles.

L’histoire débute le 11 février 2022 : lors d’une conférence de presse à Dakar, la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures du Conseil de l’Europe, Ylva Johansson, officialise la proposition européenne de déployer Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises. « C’est mon offre et j’espère que le gouvernement sénégalais sera intéressé par cette opportunité unique », indique-t-elle. En cas d’accord, elle annonce que l’agence européenne sera déployée dans le pays au plus tard au cours de l’été 2022. Dans les jours qui ont suivi l’annonce de Mme Johansson, plusieurs associations de la société civile sénégalaise ont organisé des manifestations et des sit-in à Dakar contre la signature de cet accord, jugé contraire aux intérêts nationaux et régionaux.

Une frontière déplacée vers la côte sénégalaise

« Il s’agit d’un #dispositif_policier très coûteux qui ne permet pas de résoudre les problèmes d’immigration tant en Afrique qu’en Europe. C’est pourquoi il est impopulaire en Afrique. Frontex participe, avec des moyens militaires, à l’édification de murs chez nous, en déplaçant la frontière européenne vers la côte sénégalaise. C’est inacceptable, dénonce Seydi Gassama, le directeur exécutif d’Amnesty International au Sénégal. L’UE exerce une forte pression sur les États africains. Une grande partie de l’aide européenne au développement est désormais conditionnée à la lutte contre la migration irrégulière. Les États africains doivent pouvoir jouer un rôle actif dans ce jeu, ils ne doivent pas accepter ce qu’on leur impose, c’est-à-dire des politiques contraires aux intérêts de leurs propres communautés. » Le défenseur des droits humains rappelle que les transferts de fonds des migrants pèsent très lourd dans l’économie du pays : selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, ils ont atteint 2,66 milliards de dollars (2,47 milliards d’euros) au Sénégal en 2021, soit 9,6 % du PIB (presque le double du total de l’aide internationale au développement allouée au pays, de l’ordre de 1,38 milliard de dollars en 2021). « Aujourd’hui, en visitant la plupart des villages sénégalais, que ce soit dans la région de Fouta, au Sénégal oriental ou en Haute-Casamance, il est clair que tout ce qui fonctionne – hôpitaux, dispensaires, routes, écoles – a été construit grâce aux envois de fonds des émigrés », souligne M. Gassama.

« Quitter son lieu de naissance pour aller vivre dans un autre pays est un droit humain fondamental, consacré par l’article 13 de la Convention de Genève de 1951, poursuit-il. Les sociétés capitalistes comme celles de l’Union européenne ne peuvent pas dire aux pays africains : “Vous devez accepter la libre circulation des capitaux et des services, alors que nous n’acceptons pas la libre circulation des travailleurs”. » Selon lui, « l’Europe devrait garantir des routes migratoires régulières, quasi inexistantes aujourd’hui, et s’attaquer simultanément aux racines profondes de l’exclusion, de la pauvreté, de la crise démocratique et de l’instabilité dans les pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest afin d’offrir aux jeunes des perspectives alternatives à l’émigration et au recrutement dans les rangs des groupes djihadistes ».

Depuis le siège du Forum social sénégalais (FSS), à Dakar, Mamadou Mignane Diouf abonde : « L’UE a un comportement inhumain, intellectuellement et diplomatiquement malhonnête. » Le coordinateur du FSS cite le cas récent de l’accueil réservé aux réfugiés ukrainiens ayant fui la guerre, qui contraste avec les naufrages incessants en Méditerranée et dans l’océan Atlantique, et avec la fermeture des ports italiens aux bateaux des ONG internationales engagées dans des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage des migrants. « Quel est ce monde dans lequel les droits de l’homme ne sont accordés qu’à certaines personnes en fonction de leur origine ?, se désole-t-il. À chaque réunion internationale sur la migration, nous répétons aux dirigeants européens que s’ils investissaient un tiers de ce qu’ils allouent à Frontex dans des politiques de développement local transparentes, les jeunes Africains ne seraient plus contraints de partir. » Le budget total alloué à Frontex, en constante augmentation depuis 2016, a dépassé les 754 millions d’euros en 2022, contre 535 millions l’année précédente.
Une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières

Boubacar Seye, directeur de l’ONG Horizon sans Frontières, parle de son côté d’une « gestion catastrophique et inhumaine des frontières et des phénomènes migratoires ». Selon les estimations de l’ONG espagnole Caminando Fronteras, engagée dans la surveillance quotidienne de ce qu’elle appelle la « nécro-frontière ouest-euro-africaine », entre 2018 et 2022, 7 865 personnes originaires de 31 pays différents, dont 1 273 femmes et 383 enfants, auraient trouvé la mort en tentant de rejoindre les côtes espagnoles des Canaries à bord de pirogues en bois et de canots pneumatiques cabossés – soit une moyenne de 6 victimes chaque jour. Il s’agit de l’une des routes migratoires les plus dangereuses et les plus meurtrières au monde, avec le triste record, ces cinq dernières années, d’au moins 250 bateaux qui auraient coulé avec leurs passagers à bord. Le dernier naufrage connu a eu lieu le 2 octobre 2022. Selon le récit d’un jeune Ivoirien de 27 ans, seul survivant, le bateau a coulé après neuf jours de mer, emportant avec lui 33 vies.

Selon les chiffres fournis par le ministère espagnol de l’Intérieur, environ 15 000 personnes sont arrivées aux îles Canaries en 2022 – un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2021 (21 000) et 2020 (23 000). Et pour cause : la Guardia Civil espagnole a déployé des navires et des hélicoptères sur les côtes du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie, dans le cadre de l’opération « Hera » mise en place dès 2006 (l’année de la « crise des pirogues ») grâce à des accords de coopération militaire avec les deux pays africains, et en coordination avec Frontex.

« Les frontières de l’Europe sont devenues des lieux de souffrance, des cimetières, au lieu d’être des entrelacs de communication et de partage, dénonce Boubacar Seye, qui a obtenu la nationalité espagnole. L’Europe se barricade derrière des frontières juridiques, politiques et physiques. Aujourd’hui, les frontières sont équipées de moyens de surveillance très avancés. Mais, malgré tout, les naufrages et les massacres d’innocents continuent. Il y a manifestement un problème. » Une question surtout le hante : « Combien d’argent a-t-on injecté dans la lutte contre la migration irrégulière en Afrique au fil des ans ? Il n’y a jamais eu d’évaluation. Demander publiquement un audit transparent, en tant que citoyen européen et chercheur, m’a coûté la prison. » L’activiste a été détenu pendant une vingtaine de jours en janvier 2021 au Sénégal pour avoir osé demander des comptes sur l’utilisation des fonds européens. De la fenêtre de son bureau, à Dakar, il regarde l’océan et s’alarme : « L’ère post-Covid et post-guerre en Ukraine va générer encore plus de tensions géopolitiques liées aux migrations. »
Un outil policier contesté à gauche

Bruxelles, novembre 2022. Nous rencontrons des professeurs, des experts des questions migratoires et des militants belges qui dénoncent l’approche néocoloniale des politiques migratoires de l’Union européenne (UE). Il est en revanche plus difficile d’échanger quelques mots avec les députés européens, occupés à courir d’une aile à l’autre du Parlement européen, où l’on n’entre que sur invitation. Quelques heures avant la fin de notre mission, nous parvenons toutefois à rencontrer Amandine Bach, conseillère politique sur les questions migratoires pour le groupe parlementaire de gauche The Left. « Nous sommes le seul parti qui s’oppose systématiquement à Frontex en tant qu’outil policier pour gérer et contenir les flux migratoires vers l’UE », affirme-t-elle.

Mme Bach souligne la différence entre « statut agreement » (accord sur le statut) et « working arrangement » (arrangement de travail) : « Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple question juridique. Le premier, c’est-à-dire celui initialement proposé au Sénégal, est un accord formel qui permet à Frontex un déploiement pleinement opérationnel. Il est négocié par le Conseil de l’Europe, puis soumis au vote du Parlement européen, qui ne peut que le ratifier ou non, sans possibilité de proposer des amendements. Le second, en revanche, est plus symbolique qu’opérationnel et offre un cadre juridique plus simple. Il n’est pas discuté par le Parlement et n’implique pas le déploiement d’agents et de moyens, mais il réglemente la coopération et l’échange d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les États tiers. » Autre différence substantielle : seul l’accord sur le statut peut donner – en fonction de ce qui a été négocié entre les parties – une immunité partielle ou totale aux agents de Frontex sur le sol non européen. L’agence dispose actuellement de tels accords dans les Balkans, avec des déploiements en Serbie et en Albanie (d’autres accords seront bientôt opérationnels en Macédoine du Nord et peut-être en Bosnie, pays avec lequel des négociations sont en cours).

Cornelia Ernst (du groupe parlementaire The Left), la rapporteuse de l’accord entre Frontex et le Sénégal nommée en décembre 2022, va droit au but : « Je suis sceptique, j’ai beaucoup de doutes sur ce type d’accord. La Commission européenne ne discute pas seulement avec le Sénégal, mais aussi avec la Mauritanie et d’autres pays africains. Le Sénégal est un pays de transit pour les réfugiés de toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest, et l’UE lui offre donc de l’argent dans l’espoir qu’il accepte d’arrêter les réfugiés. Nous pensons que cela met en danger la liberté de circulation et d’autres droits sociaux fondamentaux des personnes, ainsi que le développement des pays concernés, comme cela s’est déjà produit au Soudan. » Et d’ajouter : « J’ai entendu dire que le Sénégal n’est pas intéressé pour le moment par un “statut agreement”, mais n’est pas fermé à un “working arrangement” avec Frontex, contrairement à la Mauritanie, qui négocie un accord substantiel qui devrait prévoir un déploiement de Frontex. »

Selon Mme Ernst, la stratégie de Frontex consiste à envoyer des agents, des armes, des véhicules, des drones, des bateaux et des équipements de surveillance sophistiqués, tels que des caméras thermiques, et à fournir une formation aux gardes-frontières locaux. C’est ainsi qu’ils entendent « protéger » l’Europe en empêchant les réfugiés de poursuivre leur voyage. La question est de savoir ce qu’il adviendra de ces réfugiés bloqués au Sénégal ou en Mauritanie en cas d’accord.
Des rapports accablants

Principal outil de dissuasion développé par l’UE en réponse à la « crise migratoire » de 2015-2016, Frontex a bénéficié en 2019 d’un renforcement substantiel de son mandat, avec le déploiement de 10 000 gardes-frontières prévu d’ici à 2027 (ils sont environ 1 500 aujourd’hui) et des pouvoirs accrus en matière de coopération avec les pays non européens, y compris ceux qui ne sont pas limitrophes de l’UE. Mais les résultats son maigres. Un rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne d’août 2021 souligne « l’inefficacité de Frontex dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière et la criminalité transfrontalière ». Un autre rapport de l’Office européen de lutte antifraude (Olaf), publié en mars 2022, a quant à lui révélé des responsabilités directes et indirectes dans des « actes de mauvaise conduite » à l’encontre des exilés, allant du harcèlement aux violations des droits fondamentaux en Grèce, en passant par le refoulement illégal de migrants dans le cadre d’opérations de rapatriement en Hongrie.

Ces rapports pointent du doigt les plus hautes sphères de Frontex, tout comme le Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG), une commission d’enquête créée en février 2021 par le Parlement européen dans le but de « contrôler en permanence tous les aspects du fonctionnement de Frontex, y compris le renforcement de son rôle et de ses ressources pour la gestion intégrée des frontières et l’application correcte du droit communautaire ». Ces révélations ont conduit, en mars 2021, à la décision du Parlement européen de suspendre temporairement l’extension du budget de Frontex et, en mai 2022, à la démission de Fabrice Leggeri, qui était à la tête de l’agence depuis 2015.
Un tabou à Dakar

« Actuellement aucun cadre juridique n’a été défini avec un État africain », affirme Frontex. Si dans un premier temps l’agence nous a indiqué que les discussions avec le Sénégal étaient en cours – « tant que les négociations sur l’accord de statut sont en cours, nous ne pouvons pas les commenter » (19 janvier 2023) –, elle a rétropédalé quelques jours plus tard en précisant que « si les négociations de la Commission européenne avec le Sénégal sur un accord de statut n’ont pas encore commencé, Frontex est au courant des négociations en cours entre la Commission européenne et la Mauritanie » (1er février 2023).

Interrogé sur les négociations avec le Sénégal, la chargée de communication de Frontex, Paulina Bakula, nous a envoyé par courriel la réponse suivant : « Nous entretenons une relation de coopération étroite avec les autorités sénégalaises chargées de la gestion des frontières et de la lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière, en particulier avec la Direction générale de la police nationale, mais aussi avec la gendarmerie, l’armée de l’air et la marine. » En effet, la coopération avec le Sénégal a été renforcée avec la mise en place d’un officier de liaison Frontex à Dakar en janvier 2020. « Compte tenu de la pression continue sur la route Canaries-océan Atlantique, poursuit Paulina Bakula, le Sénégal reste l’un des pays prioritaires pour la coopération opérationnelle de Frontex en Afrique de l’Ouest. Cependant, en l’absence d’un cadre juridique pour la coopération avec le Sénégal, l’agence a actuellement des possibilités très limitées de fournir un soutien opérationnel. »

Interpellée sur la question des droits de l’homme en cas de déploiement opérationnel en Afrique de l’Ouest, Paulina Bakula écrit : « Si l’UE conclut de tels accords avec des partenaires africains à l’avenir, il incombera à Frontex de veiller à ce qu’ils soient mis en œuvre dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux et que des garanties efficaces soient mises en place pendant les activités opérationnelles. »

Malgré des demandes d’entretien répétées durant huit mois, formalisées à la fois par courriel et par courrier, aucune autorité sénégalaise n’a accepté de répondre à nos questions. « Le gouvernement est conscient de la sensibilité du sujet pour l’opinion publique nationale et régionale, c’est pourquoi il ne veut pas en parler. Et il ne le fera probablement pas avant les élections présidentielles de 2024 », confie, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, un homme politique sénégalais. Il constate que la question migratoire est devenue, ces dernières années, autant un ciment pour la société civile qu’un tabou pour la classe politique ouest-africaine.

▻https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Senegal-les-desseins-de-Frontex-se-heurtent-aux-resistances-locales
#conditionnalité #conditionnalité_de_l'aide_au_développement #remittances #résistance

What is Frontex doing in Senegal? Secret services also participate in their network of “#Risk_Analysis_Cells”

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Frontex has been allowed to conclude stationing agreements with third countries since 2016. However, the government in Dakar does not currently want to allow EU border police into the country. Nevertheless, Frontex has been active there since 2006.

When Frontex was founded in 2004, the EU states wrote into its border agency’s charter that it could only be deployed within the Union. With developments often described as the “refugee crisis,” that changed in the new 2016 regulation, which since then has allowed the EU Commission to negotiate agreements with third countries to send Frontex there. So far, four Balkan states have decided to let the EU migration defense agency into the country – Bosnia and Herzegovina could become the fifth candidate.

Frontex also wanted to conclude a status agreement with Senegal based on this model (►https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t). In February 2022, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, announced that such a treaty would be ready for signing by the summer (►https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220211-eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal). However, this did not happen: Despite high-level visits from the EU (►https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t), the government in Dakar is apparently not even prepared to sign a so-called working agreement. It would allow authorities in the country to exchange personal data with Frontex.

Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometers of external border; like neighboring Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Senegal is considered a safe country of origin by Germany and other EU member states like Luxembourg.

Even without new agreements, Frontex has been active on migration from Senegal practically since its founding: the border agency’s first (and, with its end in 2019, longest) mission started in 2006 under the name “#Hera” between West Africa and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf). Border authorities from Mauritania were also involved. The background to this was the sharp increase in crossings from the countries at the time, which were said to have declined successfully under “Hera.” For this purpose, Frontex received permission from Dakar to enter territorial waters of Senegal with vessels dispatched from member states.

Senegal has already been a member of the “#Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community” (#AFIC) since 2015. This “community”, which has been in existence since 2010, aims to improve Frontex’s risk analysis and involves various security agencies to this end. The aim is to combat cross-border crimes, which include smuggling as well as terrorism. Today, 30 African countries are members of AFIC. Frontex has opened an AFIC office in five of these countries, including Senegal since 2019 (▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-opens-risk-analysis-cell-in-senegal-6nkN3B). The tasks of the Frontex liaison officer stationed there include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states.

The personnel of the national “Risk Analysis Cells” are trained by Frontex. Their staff are to collect strategic data on crime and analyze their modus operandi, EU satellite surveillance is also used for this purpose (▻https://twitter.com/matthimon/status/855425552148295680). Personal data is not processed in the process. From the information gathered, Frontex produces, in addition to various dossiers, an annual situation report, which the agency calls an “#Pre-frontier_information_picture.”

Officially, only national law enforcement agencies participate in the AFIC network, provided they have received a “mandate for border management” from their governments. In Senegal, these are the National Police and the Air and Border Police, in addition to the “Department for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Similar Practices.” According to the German government, the EU civil-military missions in Niger and Libya are also involved in AFIC’s work.

Information is not exchanged with intelligence services “within the framework of AFIC activities by definition,” explains the EU Commission in its answer to a parliamentary question. However, the word “by definition” does not exclude the possibility that they are nevertheless involved and also contribute strategic information. In addition, in many countries, police authorities also take on intelligence activities – quite differently from how this is regulated in Germany, for example, in the separation requirement for these authorities. However, according to Frontex’s response to a FOIA request, intelligence agencies are also directly involved in AFIC: Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire send their domestic secret services to AFIC meetings, and a “#Center_for_Monitoring_and_Profiling” from Senegal also participates.

Cooperation with Senegal is paying off for the EU: Since 2021, the total number of arrivals of refugees and migrants from Senegal via the so-called Atlantic route as well as the Western Mediterranean route has decreased significantly. The recognition rate for asylum seekers from the country is currently around ten percent in the EU.

►https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/27/what-is-frontex-doing-in-senegal-secret-services-also-participate-in-t
#services_de_renseignement #données #services_secrets

- 15 countries covered: Austria, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Albania

ce qui veut dire que si on inclut la France et ses 10aines de pushback à la frontière avec l’Italie (Montgenèvre en particulier) par semaine (jours !) on doit arriver à des chiffres nettement supérieurs...

#Frontex

At the Heart of Fortress Europe

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The study provides a broad mapping of Austrian-based multilateral cooperation, actors, and or­ganisations that are heavily involved in EU border externalisation policies far beyond Austrian borders – and therefore in the violent and sometimes lethal approach to people on the move.

Since the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015 and the sealing of the Balkan Route in 2016, people on the move are trying to make their way to the European Schengen area via Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Frontex, the Western Balkans has become one of the main migrant routes to Europe. The actors examined here are therefore of particular importance.

▻https://www.transform-network.net/publications/issue/at-the-heart-of-fortress-europe

#rapport

Austria’s Role in Border Externalization Policies in the Western Balkans

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbNAUw1AD24&feature=emb_logo

Balkans : la #Serbie, la #Hongrie et l’Autriche s’unissent contre l’immigration illégale

La Serbie a accepté mercredi, en concertation avec la Hongrie et l’Autriche, de déployer des forces de police supplémentaires à sa frontière Sud avec la Macédoine du Nord, afin de lutter contre l’immigration illégale. L’Autriche va envoyer 100 policiers en renfort dans cette zone.

La Serbie est parvenue à un accord avec la Hongrie et l’Autriche, mercredi 16 novembre, sur le déploiement de patrouilles de police conjointes le long de sa frontière Sud.

« Nous avons convenu d’engager plus de police (...) à la frontière avec la Macédoine du Nord », a déclaré le président serbe Aleksandar Vucic, lors d’une conférence de presse organisée après la signature de l’accord avec les Premiers ministres hongrois et autrichien, Viktor Orban et Karl Nehammer.

L’accord vise à freiner en amont les arrivées dans l’Union européenne (UE), la Serbie étant utilisée comme un pays de transit par les migrants. La route des Balkans occidentaux, via la Turquie, la Bulgarie, la Macédoine du Nord et la Serbie, reste la principale porte d’entrée dans l’UE pour les migrants. Près de 130 000 entrées irrégulières dans l’UE à partir de la route des Balkans occidentaux ont été enregistrées sur les dix premiers mois de l’année 2022, soit le nombre le plus fort depuis le pic de la crise migratoire de 2015, selon Frontex.
« La migration illégale ne devrait pas être gérée, elle devrait être stoppée »

Karl Nehammer a annoncé que son pays allait déployer 100 officiers de police pour aider son voisin serbe à patrouiller la frontière avec la Macédoine du Nord. Ces patrouilles seront secondées par des moyens techniques tels que « des caméras à vision thermique, des drones et des véhicules », a précisé le Premier ministre autrichien. Le même genre de matériel est déjà utilisé à la frontière serbo-hongroise où, depuis 2017, une clôture s’étend sur 160 km.

Viktor Orban a, de son côté, affirmé que, depuis le début de l’année 2022, la Hongrie avait empêché 250 000 franchissements illégaux de frontières, dont beaucoup organisés par des passeurs armés. « La migration illégale ne devrait pas être gérée, elle devrait être stoppée », a-t-il ajouté, décrivant la situation à la frontière avec la Serbie comme « difficile ».

Conséquence du mur érigé entre la Serbie et la Hongrie : les migrants se tournent vers les passeurs, seuls espoirs pour les aider à franchir. Résultat, dans la zone, leur mainmise s’exerce partout, dans les camps informels comme à l’intérieur des centres officiels, comme a pu le constater InfoMigrants sur place en octobre.
En finir avec le « tourisme de l’asile »

Toujours mercredi, Aleksandar Vucic a déclaré que son pays imposait désormais des visas aux ressortissants de la Tunisie et du Burundi, une mesure déjà annoncée en octobre mais qui entre ces jours-ci en vigueur.

L’UE et la Suisse avaient fait pression pendant plusieurs semaines sur la Serbie afin qu’elle modifie sa politique des visas. Ces pays avaient reproché à la Serbie de servir de porte d’entrée vers l’UE à des migrants turcs, indiens, tunisiens, cubains et burundais, dispensés de visas jusque là pour venir dans le pays. C’est maintenant chose faite.

Le président de la Serbie, du pays candidat à l’UE depuis 2012, avait promis que Belgrade alignerait sa politique des visas sur celle de Bruxelles « d’ici la fin de l’année » en commençant par la révocation des dispenses accordées aux Tunisiens, Burundais et Indiens. « Bientôt, deux autres pays seront soumis à cette même mesure car nous devrons avoir le même régime de visas que l’UE », a-t-il prévenu, sans préciser de quels pays il s’agissait.

« Je suis reconnaissant envers le président de la Serbie pour tout ce qu’il fait pour en finir avec le ’tourisme de l’asile’ », a réagi, mercredi, Karl Nehammer.

Ensemble, les Tunisiens, les Burundais, les Indiens, les Cubains et les Turcs représentent seulement 20% des migrants passés par la route des Balkans occidentaux depuis janvier 2022. La grande majorité des personnes qui transitent par la Serbie ne sont donc pas des exilés exemptés de visas. La plupart sont originaires d’Afghanistan et de Syrie.

▻http://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/44816/balkans--la-serbie-la-hongrie-et-lautriche-sunissent-contre-limmigrati

Tracking the Pact: EU seeks to seal off Balkan Route with expanded Frontex deployments

The European Commission wants to launch negotiations with Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania so that EU border agency Frontex can extend its zone of operations. Currently, Frontex operations in those states can only take place at the borders they share with EU member states, in accordance with the 2016 Frontex Regulation. Upgrading the EU’s agreements with the Balkan states to take into account the powers granted to Frontex by the 2019 Regulation will make it possible to deploy EU border guards at non-EU borders - for example, between Bosnia and Serbia, or between Serbia and Montenegro. An agreement with North Macedonia has already been signed. The aim is to halt the irregular movement of people through the Balkans towards “core” EU member states.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/3546/eu-frontex-balkans.jpg

In order to launch negotiations the Commission needs the approval of the Council of the EU, and has thus sent to the Council four recommendations that, once they are signed off, will allow it to enter into negotiations with each of the four states:

- Albania (COM(2022) 690 final, in Council doc. 14060/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Bosnia and Herzegovina (COM(2022) 691 final, in Council doc. 14061/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Montenegro (COM(2022) 692 final, in Council doc. 14062/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
– Serbia (COM(2022) 693 final, in Council doc. 14063/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)

An upgraded agreement with North Macedonia based on the 2019 Frontex Regulation has already been approved.

Each of the documents contains an explanatory memorandum before coming to the draft text of the proposed Council Recommendations.

For example, the proposal on Albania notes:

“Albania lies on the Western Balkans migration route, which sees significant irregular migration towards the core of the European Union, both via land and across the Adriatic Sea...

Given that Albania is a neighbouring third country that remains an important country of transit for irregular migration to the European Union, the value of cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the relevant authorities of Albania remains high. Albania has been a model for the successful deployment of Frontex joint operations to third countries, and it therefore represents an ideal candidate for the expansion of such cooperation.”

Amongst other things, the memoranda note bilateral agreements signed by each of the states - for example, Bosnia has signed “readmission agreements with all the Western Balkan countries, Türkiye, Russia, Moldova and Pakistan whose practical implementation started in August 2022.” The intention is that Balkan states will not just prevent people from arriving in “core” EU territory - they will also deport them.

There is no mention in any of the documents of the controversy the agency is mired in for its failure to uphold fundamental rights standards within the EU, in particular at the Greek-Turkish border, as confirmed by the recently-published report of the European Anti-Fraud Office.

An annex to each of the above documents contains the negotiating directives for the Commission to follow, subject to possible amendment and then approval by the Council.

- Albania (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Montenegro (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
- Serbia (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)

Although marked ’SENSITIVE’ (as are the proposals for recommendations), the annexes merely state that the agreement with each country should meet the standards set out in the model status agreement adopted by the European Commission in December last year.

The final terms of the agreements are of course subject to negotiations with each state, with the texts then sent to the Council and Parliament for approval (or not).

This is likely to lead to certain discrepancies. For example, the current status agreements with Balkan states contain differences on the privileges and immunities of officials deployed on Frontex operations:

“While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision [on whether to waive criminal immunity or not] will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.”

Negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex operations in Senegal and Mauritania are also ongoing. When approved, Frontex operations in those two countries will be the first ones outside the European continent.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/october/tracking-the-pact-eu-seeks-to-seal-off-balkan-route-with-expanded-fronte

Communiqué de presse du Conseil de l’UE du 24 février 2023 au sujet du nouvel accord conclu entre Frontex et la Macédoine du Nord (signé en octobre 2022, déploiement opérationnel à partir du 1er avril 2023: ►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr).

Le communiqué refait le point sur les accords entre Frontex et les Etats non UE :

- Border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules.
- In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.
- An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.
- The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

–---

Border management: EU concludes agreement with North Macedonia on Frontex cooperation

The Council gave today its final green light to an agreement with North Macedonia on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement will allow joint operations to be organised and Frontex border management teams to be deployed in North Macedonia, subject to the country’s agreement.

As of 1st April, Frontex will be able to assist North Macedonia in its efforts to manage migratory flows, counter illegal immigration, and tackle cross-border crime. Reinforcing controls along North Macedonia’s borders will contribute to further enhancing security at the EU’s external borders.

In line with the European border and coast guard regulation, the agreement also includes provisions for compliance monitoring and for the protection of fundamental rights.

Background

In 2019 a new Frontex regulation was adopted, broadening the agency’s mandate on several areas, including cooperation with third countries. The new mandate allows the agency to assist those countries with a status agreement throughout their territory and not only in the regions bordering the EU, as was the case with the previous mandate. It also allows Frontex staff to exercise executive powers, such as border checks and registration of persons. Status agreements allowing for joint operations can now be concluded with a wider range of countries and are no longer limited to neighbouring countries.

Frontex had border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules. In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.

An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.

The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

►https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr

https://www.roots-routes.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ixhal-Bori%C3%A7i.jpg

ping @albertocampiphoto

#Kosovo, #Macédoine_du_Nord et #Albanie
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926161

#Ouganda
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926609

#Soudan
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/928552

Et aussi ce plan de l’#Angleterre (#UK) de vouloir créer des #offshore_asylum_centres au #Pakistan et en #Turquie...
UK plans #offshore_asylum_centres in other countries for Afghans
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926960

Des textes sur l’analyse générale de ce phénomène et pratique, dans ce fil de discussion :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/930862

Et les réfugiés afghans bloqués dans des #bases_militaires aux #USA :

Military Bases Turn Into Small Cities as Afghans Wait Months for Homes in U.S.
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/931827

Afghans in Uganda

https://www.independent.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Afghan.jpg

On Aug. 17, Ugandans woke up to the news that the government had agreed to temporarily host about 2,000 Afghan refugees following a request from the U.S government.

Until then, many Ugandans had known about the long-running conflict in faraway Afghanistan. But few could have imagined their country somehow getting involved – albeit as a refuge of humanitarian assistance in the crisis.

Instead, when the Taliban fighters swiftly swept through the country and took over the capital, Kabul in the middle of August, thousands of Afghans immediately started scampering for their lives when President Ashraf Ghani left Afghanistan and was widely quoted saying he did so to avoid bloodshed.

Esther Davinia Anyakun, Uganda’s state minister for relief, disaster preparedness and refugees, broke the news that America had requested Uganda to host 2,000 of the fleeing Afghans.

She said President Yoweri Museveni had ordered her to make preparations to host 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan who would be brought in shifts of 500.

She revealed that the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) had secured the Imperial Group of hotels in Entebbe as a transit centre for the Afghans to arrive at and be screened. She said the Afghans are expected to stay in Uganda for at least three months before being relocated to a third country.

In the early morning of Aug.25, a chartered flight carrying 51 evacuees from Afghanistan touched down at the old airport in Entebbe. The Independent understands the flight was organised by an Afghan-American services company known as #Sayara_International.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Uganda, an American humanitarian agency that has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years and in Uganda since 1998, received the Afghan evacuees and they will be helping them with accommodation, healthcare and general welfare services during their temporary stay in Uganda.

“The IRC is proud to be complementing the efforts of the Government of Uganda and US embassy to receive and support 51 Afghan evacuees that arrived in Uganda at 7.53am this morning,” Elijah Okeyo, the IRC Uganda Country Director said shortly after the Afghan evacuees’ arrival in Uganda.

“The evacuees from Afghanistan will stay temporarily in Uganda whilst in transit whilst applying for asylum to countries of resettlement such as the US.”

“Uganda has a long history and tradition of welcoming refugees from all over the world and is one of the world’s largest refugee hosting countries, with 1.5 million refugees mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Foreign Affairs ministry said the evacuees who included men, women and children underwent the necessary security screening as well as the mandatory COVID-19 testing and the required quarantine procedures.

A statement from the American embassy in Kampala noted that as the largest bilateral supporter of refugees in Uganda and their Ugandan host communities, the United States appreciates the Ugandan people for their generosity and hospitality toward these communities.

“The Government of Uganda has once again demonstrated a willingness to play its part in matters of international concern. We commend its efforts and those of the local and international organizations in Uganda who are providing humanitarian support in partnership with the Government of Uganda for these evacuees from Afghanistan.”

“The United States appreciates the Government of Uganda’s offer to provide temporary assistance to Afghanistan evacuees and commends international organization representatives in Uganda for their partnership and for lending their expertise and support to Afghanistan evacuees,” the spokesperson of the US mission in Kampala told The Independent in an email.

▻https://www.independent.co.ug/afghans-in-uganda

Afghan refugees might complicate Ugandan politics

Ugandans worry the US will ignore human rights violations

https://globalvoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Nyakabande-refugee-camp.jpg

Uganda is often praised as a model of hospitability for refugees. The country is home to at least 1.5 million refugees and has a remarkable open border tradition that spans decades, despite dealing with high domestic poverty levels. But the news that Uganda might be a destination country for Afghan refugees following the US withdrawal from that country in August 2021 has raised alarms in Uganda. Some local human rights defenders are concerned that accepting Afghan refugees might excuse President Yoweri Museveni’s continued authoritarian rule.

(...)

▻https://globalvoices.org/2021/09/27/afghan-refugees-might-complicate-ugandan-politics

Prime Minister Rama Confirms Albania Will Accept Afghan Refugees

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama announced that Albania will accept Afghan refugees fleeing Taliban rule.

Rama made the announcement this morning, confirming reports that the American government had asked Albania to host Afghan refugees waiting for their US visas.

He expects Albania to become a transition destination, as Afghan refugees wait to settle in the US.

He also said that he didn’t know if Kosovo’s government had been asked to do the same. Nevertheless, he expressed his hopes that if approached, Kosovo would also accept the US’s request.

In his post, Rama mentioned that Albania had already agreed to host several hundreds high risk refugees, such as intellectual figures and women, at the request of various institutions. Rama did not name the institutions in question.

Earlier this week, Reuters wrote that the US government had been conducting secret talks with Kosovo and Albania to temporarily house Afghan refugees who had worked for the US government.

▻https://exit.al/en/2021/08/15/prime-minister-rama-confirms-albania-will-accept-afghan-refugees

HEBRENJTË, AFGANËT, SHQIPËRIA

https://i.imgur.com/7Hg5TXp.png

Nuk e ka shqiptaria një histori më të lavdishme për botën, se sa marrja në mbrojtje e hebrenjve gjatë Luftës së Dytë Botërore. Askush s’ua kërkoi gjyshërve tanë ta rrezikonin jetën e tyre për të shpëtuar hebrenjtë, siç pakkush bëri në Europën e përpirë nga flama naziste. Ata e bënë. Pa dallim krahine e feje. Disa syresh e paguan me jetën e tyre, po asnjë hebre për be nuk e dorëzuan tek nazistët. Falë nderit të tyre shqiptar, Shqipëria u bë vendi i vetëm i Europës që pati më shumë hebrenj pas Luftës së Dytë se sa para nisjes së saj.
Përpara disa vitesh, ne strehuam në Shqipëri mbi dymijë njerëz që përndiqen nga regjimi i ajatollahëve të Iranit. U shpëtuam jetën, duke i tërhequr nga i quajturi, Camp Liberty, në Irak, ku sulmoheshin prej shërbimit sekret iranian e thereshin të gjallë. Dhe e vërteta, ndryshe nga ç’jashtënxorri çisterna e mexhelisit të korruptuar mediatik të Tiranës, është se askush nuk na e vuri litarin në fyt, përkundrazi.
Qeveria e mëparshme kishte marrë mbi njëqind syresh prej tyre, me kërkesë të qeverisë amerikane dhe nder i kishte bërë vetes e këtij vendi. Më pas ne morëm afro treqind të tjerë. Mirëpo përtej moralit në vetvete të kësaj fabule njerëzore, ca shqipo mendjefikur e harrojnë se ne jemi kahera aleatë të Shteteve të Bashkuara, jo vetëm kur na duhen për hallet tona, siç na u deshën bombat e tyre për t’u mbrojtur nga spastrimi etnik i Sllobodan Millosheviçit ; siç na u desh zëri i tyre i superfuqishëm për ta hapur rrugën e pavarësisë së Kosovës apo për ta anëtarësuar Shqipërinë në NATO ; siç na duhet gjithnjë mbështetja e tyre për të forcuar pozitat tona kombëtare e shtetërore, po edhe kur ne u duhemi atyre ndonjëherë, jo për t’i shpëtuar ata siç ata na kanë shpëtuar ne në kthesa historike, por për t’u gjendur në krah të tyre kur edhe ata, ja që ndodh, kanë nevojë për diçka të vogël prej nesh.
Por ata qindra iranianë të ardhur me kërkesë të aleatëve amerikanë, u bënë mbi dymijë jo me insistimin amerikan, po me kërkesën tonë drejtuar miqve tanë të mëdhenj ! Po po, e lexuat tamam, pjesën e madhe të iranianëve në rrezik për jetën të mbetur në mëshirë të fatit e kërkuam ne, pas një masakre të llahtarshme atje në Camp Liberty, ku u vranë me dhjetra, mes të cilëve plot gra e fëmijë.
Dhe për ta mbyllur këtë pjesë, pyetja ime është : Çfarë problemi u kanë krijuar sharësve e mallkuesve pa din e as iman të rrjeteve sociale, ata njerëz të shkretë, që rrinë mbyllur dhe jetojnë me hallin e tyre e me paratë e tyre, në zonën e banuar të ndërtuar po me fondet e tyre diku në periferi të Tiranës ?
Zero probleme.
Tani le të vijmë tek lajmi i parmbrëmshëm se Amerika kërkon të sjellë përkohësisht në Shqipëri e në Kosovë, afganë të shkretë që vetëm pse u rreshtuan me NATO-n e ndihmuan ushtarët tanë në misionin e tyre paqeruajtës, rrezikojnë të theren si kafshë nga talebanët. Menjëherë pas daljes së lajmit, qysh dje në mëngjes, ka nisur të hidhet përpjetë llumi njerëzor i rrjeteve sociale, me sharjet e mallkimet e shqipes së vet bazike me 100 fjalë - edhe ato të shkruara për ibret - me të cilat mbron me zjarrin e padijes detin nga greku, dheun nga serbi, ajrin nga armiku imagjinar i radhës, duke shpërfaqur krejt egërsinë e injorancës, në emër të një kinse patriotizmi mu si ai i talebanëve, të cilët tjetrin, të ndryshmin e këdo mendon si ai, e konsiderojnë një armik që duhet asgjësuar, sakatuar e poshtëruar, vetëm pse as nuk është i verbër si ata, as nuk friket nga helmi i kafshimit të tyre.
Nuk e di nëse amerikanët i kanë kërkuar edhe Kosovës të strehojë afganët që u ekspozuan si miq dhe mbështetës të ushtrive aleate ; uroj që në rast se po, qeveria e Kosovës të përgjigjet pozitivisht, për nderin e saj e të Kosovës sigurisht. Por bëj me dije se në Samitin e NATO-s isha unë që e ngrita këtë shqetësim, për jetët e bashkëpunëtorëve afganë të Aleancës pas tërheqjes së saj nga Afganistani. Madje iu referova si shembull eksperiencës tragjike të kundërshtarëve të regjimit komunist në vendin tonë, që vrau, burgosi, torturoi, shkatërroi çdo armik të brendshëm pasi triumfoi mbi armiqtë e jashtëm dhe mbylli totalisht Shqipërinë, siç do të bëjnë së shpejti tanimë, talebanët me Afganistanin.
Thashë në samit se pas tërheqjes së ushtrive të saj, bashkësia e qytetërimit demokratik të NATO-s nuk mund t’i lerë në mëshirën e barbarëve triumfatorë, njerëzit e ekspozuar si mbështetës të afërt të misioneve paqeruajtëse atje. Dhe nënvizova me gojën plot, se Shqipëria ishte e gatshme të merrte pjesën e saj të barrës, të cilën të gjitha vendet e NATO-s duhet ta ndajnë mes tyre. Kjo është bindja ime, jo vetëm si njeri i një populli që ka shpëtuar hebrenjtë nga nazistët e shekullit të XX, po edhe si kryeministër i një vendi që i njeh mirë të dyja anët e medaljes, qoftë kur të lënë vetëm në duart e një regjimi xhelatësh në atdheun tënd, qoftë kur kërkon një jetë të re si i huaj në vendet e të tjerëve.
Eshtë e vërtetë po, se ditët e fundit qeveria amerikane i ka kërkuar Shqipërisë të vlerësojë nëse mund të shërbejë si një vend tranzit, për një numër të caktuar emigrantësh politikë afganë, të cilët destinacion fundor kanë Shtetet e Bashkuara. Dhe padiskutim që ne nuk do të themi jo, e jo thjesht pse na e kërkojnë aleatët tanë të mëdhenj, po sepse ne jemi Shqipëria ! Shqipëria është shtëpia e shqiptarit që as me Kanun, as me Zakon, e as me Moral po të doni, nuk ua përplas derën në fytyrë të panjohurve që trokasin për mbrojtje. Ne nuk jemi të pasur, por s’jemi as pa kujtesë, as pa zakone, as pa moral dhe është në nderin tonë t’u gjendemi të tjerëve, siç të tjerë na janë gjendur ne, po sidomos të mos u kthejmë kurrizin hallexhinjve të huaj, siç shpesh na e kthyen ne dikur, kur ishim të huaj hallexhinj. Kjo është arsyeja morale pse ende pa ardhur kërkesa e qeverisë amerikane, ne kemi mikpritur dy kërkesa prej dy institucionesh shoqërore shumë të respektueshme përtej oqeanit, për të vlerësuar strehimin e përkohshëm në Shqipëri të disa qindra personave, nga rrethet intelektuale dhe të grave aktiviste afgane, të cilët janë nga të parët në listat e ekzekutimeve të barbarëve të Afganistanit.
Kujt nuk është dakord me gjithë sa thashë për këtë lajm, i them me keqardhje se kjo nuk e ndryshon qëndrimin tim e të shumicës qeverisëse në emër të Shqipërisë. Shqipëria nuk është e salltanetit të atyre që hidhen për të në flakën e ndezur nga egërsia dhe padija e kinse patriotizmit, por është e amanetit shekullor të mikpritjes së të panjohurve në rrezik🇦🇱

▻https://www.facebook.com/edirama.al/posts/10158954065891523

L’Albanie et le Kosovo vont accueillir « plusieurs milliers » de réfugiés d’Afghanistan

L’Albanie et le Kosovo ont confirmé mener des négociations secrètes avec les États-Unis pour accueillir « plusieurs milliers » de ressortissants d’Afghanistan qui ont collaboré avec les forces américaines, le temps que soit examinée leur demande d’asile.

(Avec Radio Slobodna Evropa et Top Chanel TV) - Le gouvernement du Kosovo a confirmé qu’il travaillait « depuis la mi-juillet » avec les autorités américaines pour élaborer un plan permettant d’accueillir des Afghans qui ont collaboré avec les États-Unis. Luan Dalipi, chef de cabinet du Premier ministre Albin Kurti, a confirmé à Radio Free Europe (RFE) que les pourparlers « se concluaient positivement ». « Il faut régler beaucoup de questions logistiques, techniques, sécuritaires et sociales. Nous agissons avec prudence. Les États-Unis sont notre allié et partenaire stratégique. »

La Présidente du Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani, a également confirmé qu’elle avait été contactée par l’ambassadeur américain à Pristina, Philip Kosnett, qui lui a fait part de la demande du Président Joe Biden que le Kosovo puisse accueillir temporairement des civils afghans. Elle a expliqué que le Kosovo avait accepté cette « sans aucune hésitation et sans aucune condition ». « Les ressortissants afghans devront passer par un processus d’évaluation sécuritaire, ils ne resteront que temporairement au Kosovo, jusqu’à ce que leurs documents d’immigration aux États-Unis soient établis », a précisé Vjosa Osmani.

Le 13 août, l’agence Reuters avait annoncé que le gouvernement américain menait des négociations secrètes avec l’Albanie et le Kosovo pour trouver un hébergement temporaire pour des Afghans qui ont coopéré avec les forces américaines en Afghanistan. Les sources de Reuters assurent que les États-Unis offriraient au Kosovo des avantages économiques et politiques en contrepartie de l’accueil de plusieurs milliers d’Afghans. Cependant, des diplomates américains auraient exprimé des inquiétudes quant aux capacités du Kosovo à mener à bien cette mission.
Le précédent des Moudjahidines du peuple en Albanie

Alors que les talibans sont rapidement en train de reprendre le contrôle de tout l’Afghanistan, de nombreux Afghans qui ont coopéré avec les forces internationales craignent des représailles. Le département d’État américain a annoncé un programme qui permettra à des milliers d’Afghans de s’installer aux États-Unis en tant que réfugiés. Cependant, ils doivent d’abord être placés dans un pays tiers, où ils séjourneront pendant « douze à quatorze mois », le temps de l’analyse de leur demande de visa américain.

Le Premier ministre d’Albanie Edi Rama a également confirmé dimanche 15 août qu’elle avait répondu positivement à la demande des États-Unis, et que son pays allait accueillir « quelques centaines » de réfugiés afghans. L’Albanie accueille déjà plusieurs milliers de moudjahidines du peuple d’Iran, évacués depuis leurs bases situées en Irak. Ils sont arrivés en Albanie en 2013 et 2014. Le camp d’Ashraf-3, situé près de Durrës, accueille plus de 3000 membres de l’organisation.

▻https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Albanie-Kosovo-vont-accueillir-refugies-d-afghanistan

Balkan Countries Offer Refuge to Afghans After Taliban Takeover

After Taliban forces swept to power in Afghanistan, governments in Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia have accepted a US request to offer temporary refuge to some political refugees who are fleeing the country in fear of retaliation.

Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia have expressed readiness to temporarily host an undefined number of Afghans fleeing their country after Taliban forces seized control over the weekend as the United States pulled out.

“It is true that in recent days, US government has asked Albania to assess if we could serve as a transit country for a certain number of Afghan political migrants, which have US as the final destination. And undoubtedly we will not say no, not only because our allies are asking this, but because we are Albania,” Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said in a statement on Facebook on Sunday.

The final destination for the refugees, who fear retaliation from the Taliban because they cooperated with NATO forces in Afghanistan, is the US. Their number is so far unknown.

Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani also confirmed that her country agreed to the request to give temporary safe haven refugees “without any hesitation”.

“Kosovo respects the international right and obligation to not close the door to refugees,” Osmani said.

The Kosovo government said that discussions with the US government over hosting the refugees started in mid-July.

Luan Dalipi, chief of staff of Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, told BIRN that since then, the government has been in “constant communication and cooperation” with the US authorities.

“There are many logistical, technical, security and social issues we are carefully addressing. The US is our main ally and our strategic partner,” Dalipi said.

North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev told media on Sunday that his country will accept civilians from Afghanistan who need evacuation and that they will be allowed to stay in the country until a more permanent solution is found for them.

“With the aim of saving the lives of the local population [in Afghanistan], we have informed the US that we are ready to accept civilians from Afghanistan who over the past 20 years have been working for peace in that country, who were the local support for the allied NATO troops, including our forces, including activists from the humanitarian and human rights organisations,” Zaev said.

He said that North Macedonia could accommodate the refugees in hotels and resorts, and that the financial cost for this accommodation, until a more permanent solution is found, will be covered by the US.

“We are a country of solidarity. Our people and our society have always given support and help, the same way we have been receiving help during major catastrophes,” Zaev said.

Washington wants to evacuate thousands of people from Afghanistan and has been seeking other countries to host them temporarily while their papers for entering the US are finalised.

Adrian Shtuni, a Washington-based foreign policy and security specialist, told BIRN that Tirana and Pristina’s move to shelter Afghans was “as much a sign of moral leadership and humanitarian compassion as it is a confirmation that Albanians are reliable partners of the United States”.

“The main concerns associated with refugee relocations are often related to potential security risks and financial costs. From a security perspective, there’s no reason to believe the contingent of Afghan refugees would present a risk. These are interpreters and contractors (as well as family members) employed by the US Military, waiting to be issued Special Immigration Visas by the US State Department. They are not former fighters or militants,” Shtuni said.

Adrian Shtuni said that both Albania and Kosovo will not be burdened by hosting the Afghans because “the refugee contingent will be a few hundred people and nor Albania neither Kosovo are intended as their final destination the financial costs will be contained”.

The chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Menendez, welcomed Albania’s decision to give temporary safe haven to the Afghans.

“The people of Albania are once again showing the world what ‘BESA’ [‘word of honour’ in Albanian] means. You have our respect and thanks,” Menendez wrote on Twitter on Sunday.

▻https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/16/balkan-countries-offer-refuge-to-afghans-after-taliban-takeover

#Macédoine_du_Nord

Après le #Kosovo et l’#Albanie, c’est au tour de l’#Ouganda d’avoir accepté d’accueillir temporairement (dans l’attente d’un visa de la part des #USA) des réfugiés afghans :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926609

Et le Royaume-Uni:
#UK plans #offshore_asylum_centres in other countries for Afghans :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926960
#Turquie #Pakistan #Angleterre

Les premiers Afghans exfiltrés par les États-Unis sont arrivés en Albanie et au Kosovo

Un premier groupe de 111 réfugiés afghans exfiltrés par les États-Unis est arrivé dimanche soir au Kosovo. Un autre groupe de 121 réfugiés était arrivé vendredi matin en Albanie. Ils doivent séjourner temporairement dans ces pays jusqu’à ce qu’ils obtiennent leur visa américain.

(#paywall)

▻https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Les-premiers-Afghans-exfiltres-par-les-Etats-Unis-arrivent-en-Alb

Quand l’Afghanistan était une manne financière pour les Kosovars

Les États-Unis ont demandé au Kosovo d’abriter des Afghans devant quitter leur pays pour des raisons de sécurité. Pristina a aussitôt accepté. Les Kosovars connaissent en effet bien l’Afghanistan : depuis 2001, des milliers d’entre eux ont travaillé pour des #contractants américains dans la reconstruction du pays.

Traduit par Belgzim Kamberi (article original : ▻https://www.koha.net/veshtrime/284704/kur-afganistani-ishte-parajse-financiare-per-kosovaret). Depuis la prise du pouvoir par les talibans en Afghanistan, le Kosovo est l’un des rares pays à qui les États-Unis ont demandé d’abriter un certain nombre d’Afghans devant quitter le pays pour des raisons de sécurité. Pristina a accepté. Même si l’on ne sait pas encore combien de personne cela représente, la nouvelle semble avoir été bien accueillie par l’opinion publique.

Cela n’est pas une surprise. Depuis 2001, les Kosovars ont développé des liens avec l’Afghanistan. Ils sont notamment des milliers à avoir travaillé à la reconstruction du pays, recevant pendant des années des salaires de différents contractants américains. Selon un rapport de l’Institut GAP publié en novembre 2011, 7000 à 8000 Kosovars ont été engagés entre 2001 et 2011 sur différents chantiers en tant que chauffeurs, mécaniciens, ou occupaient d’autres emplois physiques...

Les Kosovars ont été principalement engagés par les entreprises américaines #Fluor_Group, #Dyncorp_International et #Kellogg_Brown & Root, les même qui étaient chargées de la construction de la #base_militaire américaine #Bondsteel, près de #Ferizaj, au Kosovo. Cette base employait entre 2000 et 2500 Kosovars au début des années 2000. Il n’est donc pas étonnant que ces contractants aient fait appel aux services des Kosovars pour leurs missions en Afghanistan.

Des millions d’euros pour l’#économie kosovare

En Afghanistan, le salaire de base annuel pour les ressortissants des pays en développement, dont font partie les pays des Balkans, se situait en effet entre 14 800 et 29 700 dollars. Pour l’économie kosovare, cela a représenté 50 à 55 millions d’euros de rentrées annuelles, soit plus d’un demi-milliard d’euros sur la période 2001-2011. La plus grande partie des #travailleurs_kosovars en Afghanistan provenait de la région de Ferizaj (56%), de Pristina (21%) et Gjilan (19%).

Les revenus depuis l’Afghanistan n’étaient pas considérés comme des rémittences (les fonds envoyés au pays par les émigrés) par la Banque centrale du Kosovo. Mais si on les compare avec les rémittences envoyées d’autres pays, l’Afghanistan se rangeait tout de suite après l’Allemagne et la Suisse.

Le travail là-bas n’était pourtant pas sans danger. De 2001 à 2011, 78 595 travailleurs employés par des contractants américains ont été blessés sur leur lieu de travail et 2871 y ont perdu la vie. Les Kosovars n’ont pas été épargnés. En octobre 2004, Shqipe Hebibi, qui travaillait pour le bureau des Nations-Unies en Afghanistan, a été kidnappée, avant d’être libérée un mois plus tard. En octobre 2011, une employée originaire de Ferizaj a perdu la vie. On ne connaît pas le nombre de travailleurs kosovars blessés en Afghanistan ces dernières années. Selon les informations de Pristina, seuls trois Kosovars étaient présents en Afghanistan quand le pays est tombé aux mains des talibans. Deux d’entre aux auraient réussi de sortir du pays.

▻https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Quand-l-Afghanistan-etait-un-paradis-financier-pour-les-kosovares

Afghanistan : les témoignages des premiers évacués transférés en Albanie

Ils sont arrivés à Tirana dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi. Les premiers 121 réfugiés afghans ont été provisoirement installés dans les bâtiments de la Cité universitaire. En quittant Kaboul, ils ne savaient pas qu’ils partaient pour l’Albanie...

Témoignages.

Je travaillais pour le ministère de l’Agriculture dans le cadre d’un projet financé par USAID. J’étais responsable de la communication. J’ai un master de la Khazak American Free University et plus de treize ans d’expérience, mais je ne sais pas si mon diplôme sera encore reconnu quelque part. J’avais un bon travail, un bon salaire, tout se passait bien. Maintenant, je ne sais pas si je vais devoir travailler comme serveur quelque part, ou bien comme chauffeur Uber. Ma vie a été bouleversée », raconte Ahmad [Tous les noms ont été modifiés, NDLR], l’un de ces premiers réfugiés afghans arrivés en Albanie. « J’avais encore de l’espoir. Je pense que la jeunesse avait le devoir d’aider l’Afghanistan à se développer, mais nous n’avions plus d’autre choix que de partir ». La fuite n’a pourtant pas été facile. Ahmad et sa famille, comme beaucoup d’autres, ont dû attendre des heures, voire des jours, pour pénétrer dans l’aéroport de Kaboul, où des milliers de personnes se pressaient pour s’échapper.

39 de ces premiers Afghans venus en Albanie sont d’anciens employés du ministère de l’Agriculture, qui travaillaient sur un projet américain mené en partenariat avec l’Université du Michigan. Leur évacuation a été bien organisée. « Il était difficile d’embarquer à bord d’un avion même avec un visa valide », raconte toutefois Ali, la quarantaine. « Mais nos amis et nos collègues américains nous ont aidés. Une fois dans l’avion, la vie semblait à nouveau simple. »

Avant de partir, ils ne savaient pas qu’ils allaient venir en Albanie. La destination leur a été communiquée deux ou trois heures avant le décollage. De toute façon, leur but était de monter dans un avion, quelle qu’en soit la destination. « Quand je suis parti, ma dignité ne comptait plus. À l’aéroport, nous dormions au milieu des poubelles. Cela n’aurait pas dû se passer comme cela, nous sommes tous des êtres humains… On a des sentiments », confie Ahmad, au bord des larmes.

Les réfugiés arrivés samedi 28 août ont été accueillis par la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Olta Xhaçka, et par l’ambassadrice des États-Unis en Albanie. De l’aéroport, ils ont été immédiatement amenés dans les bâtiments 11 et 12 de la Cité universitaire de Tirana. C’est là qu’ils seront logés jusqu’à nouvel ordre.

“Parmi les choses déconseillée : parler aux journalistes. Et la recommandation ne valait pas seulement pour les Afghans.”

« Même dans mon propre pays, je n’avais pas cette possibilité d’atterrir à l’aéroport, de monter directement dans un bus et de m’en aller », explique Ali. L’enregistrement des documents s’est déroulé durant la matinée de samedi. Des employés municipaux ont accompagnés les réfugiés pendant presque toute la journée, leur montrant où aller et leur donnant des indications sur ce qu’ils devaient faire. Parmi les choses déconseillée : parler aux journalistes. Et la recommandation ne valait pas seulement pour les Afghans, la direction de la Cité universitaire et la municipalité n’étant pas plus ouvertes à la communication.

L’enregistrement à la police était plutôt simple, ne durant souvent pas plus d’une demi-heure. Les gens qui ne possédaient pas de passeport du tout, un passeport périmé ou bien juste le tazkira, la pièce d’identité afghane, ont été mis en relation avec la police. « Je n’ai pas d’informations particulières, mais si l’on croit les rumeurs qui courent parmi les évacués, les pays tiers comme l’Albanie facilitent les visites à l’ambassade afghane pour pouvoir récupérer nos passeports et recevoir le visa américain », explique Ahmad. Ses enfants n’ont pas de documents d’identité. Ahmad espère recevoir le précieux visa américain dans les vingt prochains jours. En général, les réfugiés afghans ne veulent pas rester en Albanie, mais partir pour les États-Unis ou vers d’autres pays européens.

Obligés de ne prendre qu’un petit sac à main à leur embarquement à Kaboul, les réfugiés n’ont presque pas de vêtements de rechange et, le plus souvent, pas un sou dans les poches. En collaboration avec les États-Unis, le gouvernement albanais va aider ces personnes à satisfaire leurs besoins fondamentaux. Vers 15h, une liste de tout ce dont les réfugiés avaient besoin a été dressée. « On a rempli des formulaires, mais ils n’ont pas pris nos mesures... Je ne sais pas quel genre de vêtements ils vont m’apporter », plaisante Ahmad.

Malgré la présence de soignants, la seule assistance médicale reçue jusqu’à présent a été le test de dépistage de la Covid-19. Les réfugiés n’ont pas encore été invités à consulter une cellule d’aide psychologique. Mal renseignés sur ce qu’il leur ait ou non permis de faire, ces derniers essaient de ne pas s’éloigner de la petite rue qui relie les bâtiments où ils sont logés au bureau de la police. Ils ne veulent pas créer de problèmes et tiennent à faire bonne impression aux Albanais. Préoccupés par le sort de la famille qu’ils ont laissée derrière eux et de la situation en Afghanistan, où ils aimeraient revenir un jour, leur but est dans l’immédiat de savoir où ils vont pouvoir s’installer pour commencer une nouvelle vie.

▻https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Afghanistan-temoignages-premiers-evacues-Albanie

The fact that the Afghan refugees who were evacuated by NATO and who are currently in Kosovo, have been in detention since their arrival, speaks of the fact that the human rights of refugees from Afghanistan are constantly being violated. Namely, the refugees are housed inside two camps, Camp Bechtel and Camp Lyia, and according to a spokesman for the US Embassy in Kosovo, the refugees were not allowed to move freely outside the camps to protect the safety of them and other Kosovo citizens. It should be noted that these are not the first Afghan refugees in Kosovo. Refugees who go through the so-called Balkan route also come to Kosovo and meantime have the right to move freely. What is even more worrying is the kind of limbo in which the evacuated refugees currently are. It is still unclear how visas will be granted, or what types of visas will be obtained. If the rule of restriction of movement is maintained until people are granted visas, the question arises as to how will they access services, health care, education, especially bearing in mind that the duration of this process is unknown.

Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodosli, du 24.09.2021

Afghan evacuees in Kosovo de facto detained

The first group of Afghan evacuees landed in Kosovo on August 29 following a chaotic airport evacuation in the wake of the United States’ abrupt exit from Afghanistan after 20 years of war. These Afghans’ futures are unclear, as is their present situation. But one thing is clear: they aren’t being granted the right to move freely.

In fact, it is easier for an Afghan asylum seeker who arrived in Kosovo through the difficult Balkan route to move about the country. Once in Kosovo such an asylum seeker can request asylum, with or without identification. They will be offered basic amenities, an identification card, and, notably, the freedom to move in and out of the asylum housing complex.

But this is not the case for the approximately 1,000 Afghans brought by NATO into Kosovo as part of an international effort to offer safe haven to thousands who fear persecution after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

On August 16 Kosovo’s government approved a decision offering Afghan evacuees — largely U.S. visa applicants, former NATO contractors and their families — temporary protection, a form of immediate protection different from the refugee status recognized in the Law on Asylum. Persons under temporary protection enjoy clearly defined rights, such as the right to schooling, healthcare and freedom of movement.

The government’s decision specifies that freedom of movement may be restricted if considered necessary, and that a verification process will be put in place for issues of national security.

Since arriving, the evacuees have been housed at two camps referred to as Camp Bechtel and Camp Liya, located on the premises of the Bechtel Enka company and inside the U.S. military base Bondsteel. NATO’s international command is running Camp Bechtel and the U.S. is running Camp Liya inside Bondsteel.

As of yet, there has been no public information provided about the living conditions of these Afghan evacuees, a contrast to other countries, including some in the region, where journalists have been granted access to speak directly to arriving refugees.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has declined to answer K2.0’s questions on the matter, while the minister of Internal Affairs, Xhelal Sveçla, gave few details during a recent press conference. When asked about the evacuees’ freedom of movement, Sveçla said that movement outside the camp would be organized only if necessary, noting apparent security concerns.

Neither NATO nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs have granted media access to the Afghan evacuees’ living conditions, while the government of Kosovo has not formally asked international organizations working in this field to assist.

The government insists that the U.S. and NATO have promised a quick operation with Kosovo only functioning as a transit country. NATO spokesperson Jason Salata said that “Camp Bechtel is a temporary lodging until they identify follow-on resettlement options.”

A first group of 117 NATO-affiliated Afghan evacuees departed Camp Bechtel for the UK on September 16.

Government spokesperson Perparim Kryeziu told K2.0 that Kosovo’s legal framework guarantees freedom of movement, but he noted it also foresees specific cases where restrictions are allowed.

“At the moment, we are in the process of providing Afghan citizens with all necessary documents,” said Kryeziu. “Due to this and also taking into consideration their own safety for the moment they are free to move within their hosting facilities. However, we expect them to have the opportunity to move freely outside these facilities in the near future following the finalization of documents and other needed administrative procedures.”

The law on asylum specifies cases in which freedom of movement can be restricted for persons under international protection. It also says that each individual must be given the right to complain about their restriction of movement, and in the case of children, it also states that detention should be only a last measure.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Kosovo agreed to respond to K2.0’s questions on the issue only after specifically designated “U.S.-affiliated” evacuees arrived on September 13.

The embassy spokesperson said that “to ensure the health and safety of both Afghan guests and Kosovan hosts, the Government of Kosovo has stated that Afghans being temporarily hosted at Camp Liya must remain within the boundaries of the facility while U.S. interagency teams work to complete processing for their eventual admission to the United States or resettlement in a third country.”

The spokesperson also said that U.S. law enforcement members arrived in Kosovo to screen and vet all U.S.-affiliated Afghan “travelers” before they are allowed into the United States.

According to the embassy spokesperson, who referred to the Afghans as travelers, all Afghans currently hosted at Camp Liya have already transited through other third countries since leaving Afghanistan, where they received initial biometric and medical screenings.

Who’s in charge?

Human rights experts are having difficulty accessing knowledge about the condition of Afghan evacuees in Kosovo.

Jelena Sesar, Amnesty International’s researcher for the Balkans and the EU, said that the lack of information about the status of the facilities or the management of the camps makes it hard to monitor any potential human rights violations.

“Under normal circumstances, the temporary protection status would guarantee people full freedom of movement on the territory of Kosovo, food, clothes, access to health and education, and a range of other support services,” said Sesar. “This does not seem to be the case here. Afghan nationals in Bechtel-Enka and Bondsteel are not allowed to go out and media and humanitarian organizations do not seem to have access to the camps.”

While the government of Kosovo created the legal framework for temporary protection, the outsized role of NATO and the U.S. in the management of camps and processing of Afghans makes it unclear what role, if any, the government of Kosovo has in activities occurring within its own borders.

“If these Afghan families are to remain in Kosovo until their Special Immigrant Visas are processed, which can take a very long time for some applicants, it is essential that Kosovo’s authorities assume full responsibility for the management of the camps and ensure that the protection needs of the people there are fully met, as required by law,” Sesar said.

“This entails full freedom of movement and access to health, education and other support, as well as access to asylum procedures in Kosovo,” she said. “If the current approach doesn’t change, these people would be subjected to an indefinite confinement and a de-facto detention, which would be contrary to Kosovo’s and international law.”

Unanswered questions

In early September the Associated Press, citing an anonymous U.S. government source, reported that Kosovo has agreed to take in Afghans who fail to clear initial rounds of screening and host them for up to a year, raising questions about potential reasons behind restrictions on evacuees’ freedom of movement.

The temporary protection provided by Kosovo has a limit of one year with the possibility of extension, according to the Law on Asylum.

The AP’s reporting shows the conditions established at other transit sites like in Germany or Italy, where the authorities are given a two week deadline to complete the verification and processing of evacuees.

According to the government source the AP spoke to, transferring Afghans to Kosovo who do not pass the initial screening is a response to potential gaps in security that may have occurred during the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan.

There is a rising use of transit countries in the asylum process. Countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark proposed legislation to send asylum seekers to third countries while their applications are processed, something that human rights advocates and international organizations like the United Nations have criticized.

The evacuations out of the Kabul airport were chaotic and deadly, leaving the world with terrible images, such as the footage of bodies plummeting from the sky after people attempted to cling to the exterior of a U.S. military plane. In the chaos of the last days of the evacuation, two suicide bombers and gunmen at the airport led to the deaths of 60 Afghans and 13 U.S. troops.

The people who made it onto the planes in the midst of this chaos are considered the lucky ones. But many of those who were evacuated were already in the process of migrating to the U.S.

The Afghan evacuees awaiting entry into the U.S. and other affiliated countries are largely people who had already started the Special Immigrant Visa process as well as applicants for a special U.S. refugee program. They are former contractors who worked with international governments as well as in vulnerable professions such as journalists, as well as these peoples’ families.

Neither NATO nor the government of Kosovo have responded to K2.0’s questions submitted about the AP’s report.

The U.S. Embassy in Kosovo published a statement saying that such reports may leave people with the “incorrect impression” that the U.S. is sending to Kosovo individuals they deem inadmissible. The statement insists, “this is not the case,” and says that American officials in Kosovo are assisting in the processing of applicants who may require additional paperwork in order to clarify “an applicant’s identity, employment history or other ties to the United States.”

“Afghan travelers being temporarily hosted at Camp Liya are in the process of having their paperwork and eligibilities confirmed for eventual admission to the United States or resettlement to a third country,” a U.S. embassy spokesperson told K2.0. “None have been deemed inadmissible to the United States because their cases are still being processed.”

On the matter of how long the process may take, the spokesperson said that “under the agreement with the Government of Kosovo, U.S.-affiliated Afghan travelers may shelter at Camp Liya for up to a year while their cases are being processed for eventual admission to the United States or resettlement in a third country. However, individuals may be approved for travel to the United States sooner, as soon as their processing is complete.”

On September 10, the minister of Internal Affairs met with representatives of international organizations who could provide assistance, but the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration have not yet received a formal request to assist in the operation.

The IOM and UNHCR in Kosovo could only tell K2.0 that they are monitoring the situation closely. Sources from these organizations said that they have little information about the Afghan evacuees and remain on standby awaiting a request for assistance from the government.

According to Amnesty International’s Sesar, “the inaccessibility of the camps to independent and public scrutiny raises concerns about the conditions in these facilities as well as the commitment to genuinely assist Afghans who had to flee their country.”

The situation is no clearer for Jeff Crisp, international migration expert from the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University. “The rapid evacuation from Kabul has certainly left many questions unanswered,” said Crisp via email to K2.0, who offered a number of questions that can be used to hold institutions accountable.

“How were decisions made with respect to the temporary locations to which they have been sent? What will happen to any refugees who are ‘screened out’ by the U.S., is there a risk that they could become stateless, or be sent back to Afghanistan?”

Millions displaced

The long war in Afghanistan has displaced an enormous number of people. It is estimated by UNHCR that only in the first half of 2021 more than half a million people were newly displaced in Afghanistan, while 3 million were displaced in 2020.

Afghans have often taken the long refugee journey far into Europe, across the Balkans. Despite not being a key country on the Balkan refugee route, Kosovo registered 31 Afghan asylum seekers in the first half of 2021, while many others pass through unnoticed and uncounted, continuing their journey to seek asylum further on in other European countries.

After the U.S. exit from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover, the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic published an advisory, asking members and cooperative third countries to stop any forced returns for Afghans who saw their asylum requests rejected and had not yet been deported, and asked states to offer asylum to Afghans forced to flee and to cooperate in protecting their rights.

▻https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/afghan-evacuees-in-kosovo-de-facto-detained

https://i.imgur.com/Tbu02kQ.png

Kosovo : #camps_fermés pour les Afghans évacués

Le 16 août dernier, alors que Kaboul venait de tomber entre les mains des Talibans, le Kosovo a accepté d’accueillir sur son sol 2000 Afghans nécessitant d’être évacués. Aujourd’hui, personne ne sait combien sont réellement arrivés. Selon les informations disponibles, environ un millier seraient aujourd’hui hébergés au Kosovo.

Les autorités de Pristina se sont engagées à leur offrir une « protection temporaire », différente du statut de réfugié, mais censée leur donner un accès à la scolarisation et aux soins, et leur garantir la liberté de mouvement. Or, il semble qu’aucun de ces droits ne soit respecté. Les informations restent confidentielles et les journalistes ne sont pas autorisés à visiter les deux camps d’accueil, l’un se trouvant sur un site appartenant au conglomérat turco-américain Bechtel-Enka, l’autre dans la controversée base américaine de Bondsteel. Les travailleurs humanitaires n’ont pas de permis pour opérer auprès de ces Afghans et ni le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (UNHCR), ni l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) ne sont impliqués dans la gestion de leur situation.

Pour justifier un tel isolement, le gouvernement d’Albin Kurti met en avant des questions de « sécurité nationale » et souligne que la liberté de mouvement des personnes bénéficiant de la protection temporaire peut être restreinte si nécessaire. Le ministre de l’Intérieur Xhelal Sveçla a tenu une conférence de presse, mais s’est montré avare en détails. C’est tout juste s’il a reconnu que les déplacements à l’extérieur des camps ne seraient organisés qu’en cas d’extrême nécessité. Un processus de vérification, des identités notamment, a été mis en place pour des questions de sécurité nationale, a-t-il indiqué.

Le Kosovo n’est « qu’un pays de transit » pour ces Afghans avant qu’ils ne soient accueillis dans un pays tiers, insistent les autorités. « Le camp Bechtel est un hébergement temporaire jusqu’à ce que soient identifiées des options de réinstallation ultérieures », a confirmé le porte-parole de l’Otan, Jason Salata. Le 16 septembre, 117 Afghans ayant travaillé pour l’Otan ont ainsi pris la route du Royaume-Uni.

Du côté de l’Ambassade des États-Unis, on explique que des policiers sont arrivés au Kosovo pour des opérations de contrôle des Afghans évacués afin de s’assurer qu’ils offrent toutes les garanties pour obtenir l’autorisation d’entrer sur le territoire américain.

« Si l’approche actuelle ne change pas, ces personnes seraient soumises à un confinement indéfini et à une détention de facto, ce qui serait contraire au droit du Kosovo et au droit international », souligne Jelena Sesar, analyste à Amnesty International, interrogée par Kosovo 2.0. La protection temporaire fournie par le Kosovo est limitée à un an, avec possibilité de prolongation, conformément à la loi sur l’asile. Une durée particulièrement longue comparée à d’autres pays de transit, comme l’Allemagne ou l’Italie, où les autorités ne disposent que d’un délai de quinze jours pour opérer les vérifications nécessaires. Rappelons que la plupart des Afghans évacués aujourd’hui en transit avaient déjà entamé la procédure d’obtention de visas spéciaux en tant qu’anciens contractants pour des gouvernements étrangers ou des organisations internationales.

« L’inaccessibilité des camps à un examen indépendant et public soulève des inquiétudes quant aux conditions de vie dans ces installations, de même qu’à l’engagement à aider véritablement les Afghans qui ont dû fuir leur pays », déplore Jelena Sesar.
Dans des hôtels au bord de l’Adriatique

Lorsque les premiers vols transportant des réfugiés afghans sont arrivés en Albanie, à la mi-août, le Premier ministre albanais avait été catégorique : aucun ne serait placé dans un camp de réfugiés, des installations qualifiées de « déshumanisantes » par Edi Rama. Sur Twitter, il avait alors publié deux images accolées, l’une montrant des centaines d’Afghans entassés dans un avion militaire américain à l’aéroport de Kaboul, l’autre des milliers d’Albanais prenant d’assaut un cargo, en 1991, après la chute du régime communiste.

Très critiqué pour sa dérive autoritaire, Edi Rama a ici trouvé un moyen de se racheter une bonne image auprès des Occidentaux. À bon compte : personne ne sait combien Tirana a reçu d’aide de la part des États-Unis pour prendre en charge ces réfugiés. « Nous devons nous préparer aussi à ce que le financement des organisations américaines prenne fin », s’est contenté de dire le Premier ministre albanais, interrogé par Le Monde.

Aujourd’hui, 700 Afghans sont hébergés dans des hôtels de la côte adriatique, surtout au nord de Tirana, entre Lezhe et Shëngjin. Des colis de bienvenue contenant des produits de première nécessité ont été préparés pour les nouveaux arrivants, des équipes de travailleurs humanitaires offrant une aide médicale et psychologique étaient sur place et, très vite, certains journalistes autorisés ont pu constater que les réfugiés étaient libres de se mêler aux clients habituels sur les plages et au bord des piscines des hôtels.

Les Afghans vivant en Albanie ont obtenu le statut de « protection temporaire » pour un an, avec la possibilité d’une prolongation si nécessaire. Si leurs droits, notamment la liberté de mouvement, sont garantis par la loi albanaise sur l’asile, les autorités se sont toutefois réservé le droit de restreindre la liberté de mouvement de certaines personnes « si cela est jugé nécessaire, sur la base de l’évaluation individuelle de chaque cas ».

Cet accueil n’est pas une première pour l’Albanie : depuis 2014, déjà à la demande de Washington, le pays accueille 3000 moudjahidines du peuple iranien, arrivés après le retrait des forces américaines d’Irak, où ces opposants radicaux au régime de Téhéran avaient été regroupés, ainsi que cinq Ouïgours sortis de Guantanamo en 2006.

En Macédoine du Nord, les 200 Afghans arrivés à Skopje ont été logés dans plusieurs hôtels réquisitionnés autour de la capitale et un jeune homme homosexuel a même reçu l’autorisation d’être accueilli dans un refuge destiné aux personnes LGBT+. Si les médias ne peuvent pas accéder à ces sites, les ONG de défense des droits humains qui s’y sont rendues assurent qu’aucun signe de violations de leurs libertés individuelles n’est à déplorer.

« Jusqu’à présent, nous n’avons pas reçu de plaintes suggérant que les droits de l’homme des réfugiés sont menacés », raconté à Balkan Insight Uranija Pirovska, la responsable du Comité Helsinki pour les droits de l’homme de Macédoine du Nord. « Nous avons pu visiter l’hôtel Bellevue [près de Skopje] et nous allons continuer à surveiller leur statut pendant leur séjour ici. » La présence policière est visible autour des centres d’accueil, mais la liberté de mouvement des Afghans n’est pas restreinte.

▻https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Afghans-evacues-en-camps-fermes-au-Kosovo-a-l-hotel-en-Albanie-et

#hôtels

#France, 2017

Emmanuel #Macron veut créer des « hotspots » pour gérer les demandes d’asile en #Libye
►https://seenthis.net/messages/618133

Macron veut « identifier » les demandeurs d’asile au #Tchad et au #Niger
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/704970#message704972
voir aussi tout le fil de discussion :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/704970

#hotspot #hotspots #hubs #hub #centres_de_tri

#Allemagne, 2017
Tiré du livre « Entre accueil et rejet, ce que les villes font aux migrants » (►https://www.lepassagerclandestin.fr/catalogue/bibliotheque-des-frontieres/entre-accueil-et-rejet)

« Le projet du gouvernement fédéral allemand de déplacer dans des camps situés dans le Sud tunisien les demandeurs d’asile en cours de procédure » (p.95)
–-> avec cette note de bas de page :
"Il n’a, pour l’heure, pas été donné suite à ce projet. Les accords entre l’Allemagne et la Tunisie concernent uniquement le rapatriement de citoyens tunisiens déboutés du droit d’asile. Voir Jeanne Cavelier, « Tensions entre Berlin et Tunis sur les immigrés », Le Monde, 15.02.2017.
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/02/15/tensions-entre-berlin-et-tunis-sur-les-immigres_5079826_3214.html

voir aussi :
Chahed : No plans for Tunisian asylum centers

With the EU looking to stem the flow of asylum seekers crossing the Sea, Chahed rejected the idea of similar proposals to those adopted by Libya two weeks ago at the EU Malta Summit.
While Libya has agreed to set up “safe” refugee camps for Europe-bound migrants, Chahed said he saw no option for such an agreement between Europe and Tunisia. “Tunisia is a very young democracy and I don’t think that it will work, or that we have the capacity for refugee camps here,” he said, adding that any prospective solution must be made in conjunction with Libya.

▻http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-prime-minister-we-bear-no-responsibility-for-berlin-attack/a-37539969

#Tunisie

–—

#Allemagne, 2019

Germany wants asylum seekers assessed before reaching Europe
►https://seenthis.net/messages/808684

Les mots de Seehofer :

“We have to realize that the Dublin system has failed, (...) (This) system cannot be the basis for the EU’s future asylum policy,” Seehofer said. “We need a new philosophy that starts at the external borders. (...) Our proposition: Effective protection of Europe’s external borders, where we check whether someone has a need for protection or has to be returned immediately. This means we need a unified set of rules.”

#Horst_Seehofer #Seehofer

–—

Allemagne, novembre 2023 :
Sous la pression des libéraux, l’#Allemagne souhaite externaliser le traitement de demandes d’asile en Afrique
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1024206

Ni Macron ni Seehofer n’ont rien inventé...

Proposition de l’#Angleterre de #Tony_Blair de 2003...

The idea of establishing reception centres in third countries, however, is not new. It was first suggested, unsuccessfully, by Tony Blair in 2003 [►https://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/feb/05/asylum.immigrationasylumandrefugees] It was then taken over by the former German Interior Minister Otto Schily in 2005,[ “German Interior Ministry, Effektiver Schutz für Flüchtlinge, wirkungsvolle Bekämpfung illegaler Migration – Überlegungen des Bundesministers des Innern zur Einrichtung einer EU-Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Nordafrika 9 September 2005.”] who proposed to establish asylum centres in North Africa, and more recently Italy. The original 2003 Blair proposal was that any third-country national who sought asylum in the EU would be returned immediately to a centre in a third country where his or her application would be considered.

►https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/offshore-processing-asylum-applications-out-sight-out-mind
#UK

v. aussi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/704970#message704974
#Transit_Processing_Centres (#TPCs) #UK

#Blair

#Autriche, 2018

Österreich plant mit einigen EU-Ländern Aufnahmelager außerhalb der EU

►https://seenthis.net/messages/701836

C’est aussi une proposition danoise :
L’Autriche et le #Danemark veulent ouvrir des camps d’expulsés aux portes de l’UE
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/701836#message702655

Et l’#Italie de #Salvini qui s’allie à Seehofer et Kurz sur cette idée :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/701836#message701897

#Albanie #Sebastian_Kurz #Kurz #Afrique_du_Nord

#Espagne, 2018

El Gobierno español no descarta apoyar la creación de centros de selección de inmigrantes en África

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/701836#message703556

#Borrell

#Danemark, 2020

Le Danemark revient à la charge...
Danish government : Pushing migration outside Europe’s boundaries
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/900120

#Angleterre, 2020

Revealed: No 10 explores sending asylum seekers to Moldova, Morocco and Papua New Guinea
►https://seenthis.net/messages/879221

#Moldavie #Maroc #Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée
#île_de_l'Ascension et #île_Sainte-Hélène #offshore_detention_centres

Danemark, 2021
Danish lawmakers approve plan to locate asylum center abroad
►https://seenthis.net/messages/918427

Décembre 2021 : Rapport du Comité des Nations Unies de suivi de la Convention pour l’Elimination des Discrimination Raciales (CERD en anglais) —> préoccupations vives à l’encontre de la #loi récemment adopté visant à externaliser l’examen des demandes d’asile au #Rwanda :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/939363

#Angleterre, 2021

Senior Tories have demanded a radical overhaul of the asylum system to allow migrants to claim refuge at UK embassies anywhere in the world.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/938880
#ambassades #ambassade

#Royaume-Uni, 2022 Boris Johnson annonce avoir signé un accord avec Kigali pour envoyer des demandeurs d’asile au Rwanda
►https://seenthis.net/messages/957141

#Danemark, 2022

Denmark in talks with #Rwanda on transfer of asylum-seekers
►https://seenthis.net/messages/959222

The EU and Offshore Asylum Processing: Why Looking to Australia Is Not a Way Forward

​The European Union appears to often look to Australia as a country that has successfully managed to seal its – maritime – borders and control migration. This has been most concretely demonstrated by Denmark’s newly passed legislation, which allows for the relocation of asylum seekers to third countries while their applications are being processed. This raises concerns and expectations that other countries might follow suit. In this policy brief, we show why seeking to emulate the Australian model is not a good idea, and how it would breach a number of fundamental human rights principles upon which the EU is built.

▻https://reliefweb.int/report/world/eu-and-offshore-asylum-processing-why-looking-australia-not-way-forward
#Australie #modèle_australien

1986 déjà... le Danemark avait essayé:

*The extra-territorial processing of asylum claims

The extra-territorial processing of asylum claims is not a new idea. As long ago as 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to create UN centres where asylum claims would be processed and the resettlement of refugees would be coordinated among all states. A few years later, the idea of establishing European processing centres was considered at the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees following a Dutch initiative. The Danish government also advocated the idea of ‘reception in the region’ during the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) in 2001.

▻https://www.fmreview.org/destination-europe/leonard-kaunert

–---

Del resto, già alcuni anni prima - nel 1986 - la Danimarca aveva proposto una bozza di risoluzione all’assemblea generale dell’Onu in cui si ipotizzava la creazione di centri per l’elaborazione di richieste di asilo nelle diverse regioni di origine di potenziali profughi. Coloro che si fossero recati in paesi terzi per presentarvi domanda di asilo avrebbero dovuto essere respinti verso i centri regionali in modo da essere sottoposti lì alla regolare procedura. Lo stesso concetto sarebbe stato riproposto dal governo dei Paesi Bassi, nel 1993, a una riunione del gruppo Igc (Intergovernmental consultations for asylum). Entrambe le iniziative fallirono.

Source: Cuttitta, 2007, p. 126: ▻https://journals.openedition.org/conflits/5593?&id=5593

#extra-territorialité

#Autriche, 2023:
Austrian government wants to outsource asylum procedures to Africa
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1015796

#Italie et #Albanie, 2023:
Migranti, accordo Italia-Albania. Meloni: “Centri italiani nel loro Paese”. Il Pd: “Un pericoloso pasticcio”. Ue: “L’Italia rispetti il diritto comunitario”

►https://seenthis.net/messages/1025186

#Autriche et #Angleterre, novembre 2023:
Austria to work with UK on Rwanda-style plan for asylum seekers
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1025269

Expulsion vers le #Rwanda. La #Suisse, pionnière d’une externalisation illégale ?

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1032780

Suggestion : ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1027498

(Si tu trouves que ce n’est pas pertinent, tu peux effacer).

Mars 2024: Von der Leyen’s EU group plans #Rwanda-style asylum schemes
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1045616
#EU #UE #Union_européenne

Rwanda trips by UK ministers and officials have already cost over £400,000
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1047149

Frontex confronted with allegations of violence in North Macedonia

Allegations that officials deployed on Frontex operations have participated in or condoned violence against people on the move in North Macedonia must be investigated, says a letter (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/2494/letter-to-frontex-sw-and-bvmn.pdf) sent to Frontex today by #Statewatch and #Border_Violence_Monitoring_Network (#BVMN).

Allegations that officials deployed on Frontex operations have participated in or condoned violence against people on the move in North Macedonia must be investigated, says a letter sent to Frontex today by Statewatch and Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN).

Since September 2019, volunteers for BVMN have gathered five separate testimonies from people pushed back from North Macedonia to Greece alleging the presence of Frontex officers on North Macedonian territory, where the agency has no legal authority to act. The reports involve a total of 130 people.

The testimonies include allegations that officers deployed by Frontex engaged in or condoned brutal violence – including the use of tasers and electroshock batons, throwing people into rivers, and tying people up and beating them.

Frontex says it has no records of any such incidents. The agency’s press office said to Statewatch last month that “Frontex does not have any operational activities at the land border from the North Macedonian side,” and “is only present on the Greek side of the border.”

The letter, addressed to Frontex’s executive director, the new Fundamental Rights Officer, and the agency’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, calls for a thorough investigation into the allegations to clarify the facts and ensure appropriate action against any individuals found to have engaged in, condoned or consented to violence and/or to have acted on North Macedonian territory.

The violence allegedly meted out or condoned by Frontex officials is part of a broader wave of violence against people on the move through North Macedonia. Since February 2019, BVMN volunteers have gathered 37 reports of pushbacks from North Macedonia to Greece, which are likely only a fraction of the total number of pushback cases.

The five reports alleging the presence of Frontex officials are a subset of 15 testimonies that cite the involvement of foreign officials working alongside North Macedonian officers.

An analysis published today by Statewatch (►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/foreign-agents-and-violence-against-migrants-at-the-greek-macedonian-bor) looks at the deployment of foreign border guards to North Macedonia, which since 2015 has played a key role in the EU’s efforts to prevent migrants and refugees departing from Greece to reach ‘core’ EU territory further north.

A number of states (members of the EU and other states in the region) have signed bilateral deals with the North Macedonian government that allow the deployment of border guards in the country.

Frontex, meanwhile, is not yet legally able to operate there. An agreement between the EU and North Macedonia is in the works, but is being held up in a dispute over language (►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu).

The agency must provide answers and an investigation into the numerous allegations of its officials being involved in abuse.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/june/frontex-confronted-with-allegations-of-violence-in-north-macedonia
#Macédoine_du_Nord

Briefing: External action: Frontex operations outside the EU

The EU has negotiated five agreements with states in the Balkans that allow Frontex operations on their territories, and most of the agreements have now been approved by both sides. This briefing looks at the main provisions of those agreements, highlights key differences and similarities, and argues that they will likely serve as a template for future deals with states that do not border the EU, as made possible by the 2019 Regulation governing Frontex.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/2010/2021-03-frontex.jpg

For an overview of the key points of the agreements, see the table at the end of this article, or here as a PDF (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/2011/eu-frontex-external-action-briefing-table.pdf).

Frontex launched its first official joint operation on non-EU territory at Albania’s border with Greece in May 2019. Still ongoing today, this was the first operation resulting from a series of Status Agreements between the EU and a number of Western Balkan states – Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.

These agreements make it possible for Frontex to undertake operations on those other states’ territories. Signed in accordance with the agency’s 2016 Regulation, all five agreements allow the agency to carry out joint operations and rapid border interventions on the states’ borders, where those borders are coterminous with those of an EU member state or states. Frontex can also assist those states with deportation operations from EU member states to those countries. Since the entry into force of Frontex’s 2019 mandate, the EU can now also make such agreements with states that do not border EU territory.

The contents of the status agreements, all based on a template document produced by the Commission, are very similar, with small but important differences emerging from the negotiation procedures with each state, explored below.

The first agreements in context

The five Balkan states targeted for the first agreements make up what is seen by officials as a “buffer zone” between Greece and other Schengen states, and they have long been embroiled in the bloc’s border policies. Through long negotiations over accession to the Union (►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/albania-dealing-with-a-new-migration-framework-on-the-edge-of-the-empire), Western Balkan states are at various stages of approximating domestic law with the EU’s legal ‘acquis’, involving substantial amendments to migration and asylum systems.

In theory, these systems must match up to EU legal and fundamental rights standards in order to allow accession, though violence against migrants is well documented on both sides of these “coterminous borders”. The so-called Balkan Route is the site of well-documented abuses (▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/january/eu-the-black-book-of-pushbacks-testimonies-of-pushbacks-affecting-over-1) suffered by people on the move, recently compiled and published in a ‘Black Book of pushbacks’ which detail violence perpetrated by border agents, member state police and soldiers. Pushbacks from Croatia (▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/november/european-commission-plans-to-visit-croatia-in-light-of-human-rights-viol) and Hungary are particularly notorious, with Frontex finally withdrawing its support for operations in Hungary (▻https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/frontex-suspends-operations-in-hungary) in January this year due to the state’s violation of a European Court of Justice ruling against pushbacks into Serbia.

The agency had long-insisted that its presence discouraged fundamental rights violations (►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/february/frontex-management-board-pushes-back-against-secrecy-proposals-in-prelim) - a far less credible claim in the wake of allegations (►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/february/frontex-management-board-pushes-back-against-secrecy-proposals-in-prelim) of Frontex complicity in serious incidents in the Aegean, including possible pushbacks.

Frontex expands external operations while future agreements remain on hold

Following deployment of officers to Montenegro’s border with Croatia in July, Frontex launched a second operation in Montenegro in October. The third executive operation outside the EU (and the second in Montenegro), the aim of this activity is “to tackle cross-border crime at the country’s sea borders, including the smuggling of drugs and weapons, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and terrorism”.

The agency says it will provide aerial surveillance, deploy officers from EU member states, and provide technical and operational assistance with coast guard functions in international waters, “including search and rescue support, fisheries control and environmental protection”.

The agreement with Serbia was approved by the European Parliament in February this year, along with the agreement with Montenegro. Three presidential entities need to sign the agreement in order for it to be ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s government; the Serb entity has so far refused to do so.

Meanwhile, the agreement with North Macedonia was due to be tabled in the European Parliament this autumn, but negotiations have been held up, in part by Bulgaria’s objection to the language in which it is written. According to the site European Western Balkans, “Bulgaria does not recognise the language of North Macedonia as ‘Macedonian’”, but “as a dialect of Bulgarian”. It will apparently take “a change in terminology regarding Macedonian language in order to allow progress in drafting a final negotiating framework”. While negotiations are stalled, the agreement cannot be considered by the European Parliament.

Once the status agreements are in force, Frontex operations are launched in accordance with an operational plan agreed with each state. These plans include the circumstances under which Frontex staff can use executive powers and other details of the operations not available elsewhere. These plans are not systematically made public and although it is possible for the public to request their release, Frontex can refuse access to them. These non-public documents contain important provisions on fundamental rights and data protection, as well as details on the aims and objectives of the agency’s operations.

Fundamental rights

Under article 8 of the agreements with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (article 9 of the other agreements) all parties are obliged to:

“[H]ave a complaint mechanism to deal with allegations of a breach of fundamental rights committed by its staff in the exercise of their official functions in the course of a joint operation, rapid border intervention or return operation performed under this agreement”.

Both Frontex and the host state must operate such a complaints mechanism, to handle allegations against their own team members. Frontex’s complaint mechanism is currently the subject of an Ombudsman inquiry, following years of research showing it up as inaccessible and ineffective. Details of updates bringing the mechanism into line with Frontex’s 2019 Regulation have not yet been made public, although the rules set out in that Regulation have problems of their own. It is noteworthy that the agreements do not explicitly require an independent complaints mechanism.

On the question of parallel complaints mechanisms for Frontex officers and host country officers, a Frontex spokesperson explained:

“The complaints team within Frontex Fundamental Rights Office has been working since 2019 on the concept of how to deal with complaints concerning Frontex activities in [Albania]. For that purpose, the FRO team met with competent national authorities in Albania in October 2019. Both parties agreed on the draft of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the purpose of which is a coordination between both complaints mechanisms. The MoU draft proposal was shared with Albanian authorities for their consideration on September 2020 and finalization of the modalities.

The draft of this MoU will serve as basis for other third countries arrangements on the coexistence of complaints mechanisms, such as the case for Montenegro.”

An extra article 3

The agreements with Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia contain an article not included in the agreements with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From article 3, on launching an action:

“The Agency may propose launching an action to the competent authorities of [the host state].

The competent authorities of [the host state] may also request the Agency to consider launching an action.”

The launching of any action requires the consent of competent authorities of the host-state and of Frontex (Article 3(2) of the status agreements), while any disputes over the content of the status agreements shall be resolved between the non-EU state in question and the European Commission (Article 11).

Privileges and immunities of the members of the team

Members of teams deployed in each of the host states shall enjoy immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the host state, for all acts carried out in the exercise of official functions, where these are committed in the course of actions contained in the operational plan (articles 6 or 7). It is at the discretion of the executive director of Frontex (currently Fabrice Leggeri) to determine whether acts were committed in the course of actions following the operational plan. This immunity may be waived by the team members’ home state – that is to say, the state of nationality of a Frontex team member, such as Spain or Germany.

While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

A further difficulty with this article was highlighted earlier this year in an internal Frontex report: Protocol No 7 annexed to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU, under which the privileges and immunities Agency and its statutory staff are covered, is not applicable outside of the EU. The Commission has not yet responded to a request for comment on an investigation said to be underway into this issue.

Acting on behalf of the host non-EU state

Across the status agreements, members of the teams are limited to performing tasks and exercising powers in the host territory in the presence and under instructions of the host state’s border guards or other relevant authorities. The host state may authorise members of teams to act on its behalf, taking into consideration the views of the agency via its coordinating officer. The agreement with Serbia contains extra emphasis (article 5):

“the competent authority of the Republic of Serbia may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf as long as the overall responsibility and command and control functions remain with the border guards or other police officers of the Republic of Serbia present at all times.”

This agreement also emphasises that “the members of the team referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 to 6 do not include agency staff”.

Members of teams shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons as permitted by the host state, home state, and Frontex. Each host state may authorise members of the team to use force in the absence of border guards or other relevant staff under article 4 (6) – Albania and Bosnia and Herzegoviina – or 5 (6) – Montenegro,

Access to databases

The agreements with Albania and Montenegro allow the host state to authorise members of the team to consult national databases if necessary for the operational aims or for return operations. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s status agreements are more cautious, allowing certain data from national databases to be shared at the request of a member of the team, provided it is needed to fulfil operational aims as outlined in the operational plan. The agreement with Serbia contains, once more, additional provisions: “members of the team may be communicated only information concerning relevant facts which is necessary for performing their tasks and exercising their powers”, though it also includes in the subsequent paragraph:

“For the purposes of fulfilling operational aims specified in the operation plan and the implementing actions, the competent authority of the Republic of Serbia and members of the team may exchange other information and findings”.

Language on discrimination

The agreement with Serbia once again follows slightly different wording to the others in terms of the prohibition of discrimination. The agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia recite:

“While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, they shall not arbitrarily discriminate against persons on any grounds including sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation or gender identity.”

However, the agreement with Serbia does not include (▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/july/eu-frontex-in-the-balkans-serbian-government-rejects-eu-s-criminal-immun) any reference to gender identity.

Obligation to give evidence as witnesses in criminal proceedings

Under each of the agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia, members of the team shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. Not only does the agreement with Montenegro omit this provision, it also outlines:

“Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Montenegro, while respecting paragraphs 3 and 4, to provide evidence through a statement and in accordance with the procedural law of Montenegro.”

Frontex and home state obligation not to jeopardise criminal proceedings

The agreement with Serbia is the only agreement not to include an obligation on the agency and home state of a team member to “refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise possible subsequent criminal prosecution of the member of the team by the competent authorities” of the host non-EU state.

Lingering uncertainty

On top of uncertainty over when the agreements with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina might be completed, questions remain regarding the accessibility of complaints mechanisms and the application of rules governing privileges and immunity of team members, even in Albania and Montenegro, where operations have been launched already.

Additionally, since the entry into force of its new regulation in 2019 and the removal of provisions limiting Frontex’s extra-EU operations only to neighbouring states, the EU can now conclude status agreements with countries not bordering the EU. The implementation of these agreements, as well as their contents, will likely set a precedent for negotiations and operations further afield.

►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu
#Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #buffer-zone #zone-tampon

Albania: dealing with a new migration framework on the edge of the empire

In 2014, Albania was formally accepted as a candidate for membership to the EU. The country is aiming to approximate its domestic law with the EU legal ’acquis’ within the next two years, prompting big changes in the country’s immigration and asylum system - at least on paper. Currently, those systems cannot be said to meet fundamental rights or EU legal standards, but given conditions within the EU itself - notably in Greece - it remains to be seen whether this will be a barrier to Albania joining the bloc.

Background

In the 1990s Albania, a small country in the middle of the Balkans, was just emerging from a harsh communist dictatorship. In 1991, a new era in Europe began for the country, as it opened diplomatic relationships with the then-European Community. But it was not until 2014 that Albania was formally accepted as a candidate for membership of the EU, following the endorsement of the European Council.[1]

In that time, the European Community had evolved into the fortress of the European Union, its borders and expansion reminiscent of the spread of the Roman Empire. Speaking of the EU’s borders, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte has even commented, “big empires go down if the external borders are not well-protected”.[2] Since 2014, Albania has been racing to fulfil all the requirements needed to be accepted among the fabulous 27, making major changes in the five main areas identified by the EU: public administration, rule of law, tackling corruption, organised crime and fundamental rights.

In February 2018, the European Commission declared that further enlargement to encompass the states of the ‘Western Balkans’ (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) would be “an investment in the EU’s security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens”.[3] In short, the EU was presenting a so-called win-win agreement, where all sides stand to gain.

In March 2020 – following a limping reform of the justice system, some destabilizing stop-and-go of talks between the EU and Albania, a gloomy summer election crisis in 2019, German concerns, a temporary French veto and a devastating earthquake in November 2019 – the EU finally said ‘I do’ and committed to opening accession negotiations with Albania, in a statement that underscored the need to ‘keep an eye’ on the country:

“The Council further invites the Commission to continue to monitor the progress and compliance in all areas related to the opening of negotiations and to carry out and complete the process of analytical examination of the EU acquis with the country, starting with the fundamentals’ cluster”.[4]

Aligning Albania with the EU’s “area of freedom, security and justice”

The current ‘Project Plan for European integration 2020-2022’[5] lists all the legislative reforms and changes required to align Albanian and EU law. The full approximation of Albanian law with that of the European Union, and its full and effective implementation, is one of the criteria for membership. Indeed, the process of membership negotiations is in itself that process of approximation.

The process involves the following steps: analysis of EU legislation; identification of deficiencies or contradictory acts of Albanian law; drafting or reviewing of the approximated Albanian acts; and monitoring the implementation of approximated legislation. The 24th chapter of the plan, on “justice, freedom and security”, focuses on: border control; visas; external migration; asylum; police cooperation; the fight against organised crime and terrorism; cooperation on drugs issues; customs; and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters.

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the area of Freedom, Security and Justice is regulated in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, running from Article 67 to Article 89.[6] This covers secondary legislation on: border checks, asylum and immigration; police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; judicial cooperation in civil matters; and police cooperation. Primary and secondary legislation is complemented by a large body of jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU, whose primacy is a cornerstone principle of EU law. The acquis inherited by Albania for this specific chapter consists of a volume of 392 acts, divided into a “hard acquis” (which derives from binding acts such as treaties, directives, regulations, etc.) and a “soft acquis” (which derives from standards, principles and recommendations of EU or other relevant international organizations).

Updating the laws on immigration and borders

The government affirms to have completed and adopted a comprehensive national cross-sectoral migration strategy, included a new strategy on the diaspora for the period 2018-2024.[7] The government also says it has updated a contingency plan for a possible massive influx of migrants and asylum seekers, expected to be approved soon. But the other side of the coin is that Albania, as the project plan admits, is largely unprepared to host and protect migrants on its territory. Albania currently has one reception centre for irregular migrants in Karreç, with a capacity of only 150 beds. The centre was visited in September 2019 by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which found it to be inadequate in many respects.[8] Even more concerning is the lack of facilities for unaccompanied minors.

According to a footnote in a 2016 law,[9] Albania’s border control legislation has been aligned with the Schengen Borders Code.[10] However, it appears that the wider legal framework for managing Albania’s external borders is not yet fully in line with EU standards. The government reports that the implementation of the integrated border management strategy and action plan is proceeding: the reconstruction of the two border crossing points Hani i Hotit and Morina has been completed; the country has signed a protocol with Montenegro on the establishment of joint checkpoints; the trilateral centre in Plav (in Northern Macedonia) has become operational; an agreement with Kosovo on the joint border crossing point in Morina has been concluded; anti-corruption preventive measures have been implemented at border crossing points through the installation of cameras; and cooperation between agencies and neighbouring countries has improved.

Frontex: already on the scene

The section of the government’s report on regular and irregular immigration states that the agreement with the EU permitting the deployment of Frontex officials on Albanian territory was finalised in February 2019.[11] The deployment began on 22 May 2019, for an indefinite period.[12]

The joint operation – Frontex’s first outside the EU – deploys 50 EU officers in Albania to “help Albanian authorities with border surveillance and border checks… They will also assist their Albanian counterparts in screening of migrants”.[13] This is not the first time that an EU presence has been active on Albanian territory – an Italian operation in 1997 sought to prevent migration, and there have also been monitoring missions. However, the Frontex presence is an executive mission, marking a more active departure from the monitoring exercises of the past.[14]

The Albanian Minister of Internal Affairs, Sander Lleshaj, has described the operation as “really effective, very collaborative… crucial in the way to EU integration”.[15] The Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has said the operation makes Albania a contributor to the EU in countering illegal migration and organised crime.[16] The Albanian press has so far expressed an uncritical view of the Frontex mission. In a state where many are supportive of EU accession, appetite for critical investigation is possibly low.

And asylum?

Albania reports that its Asylum Law is partially in line with the EU acquis. The country has the necessary institutions and procedures to handle asylum applications. Complaints can be filed with the National Commission for Refugees and Asylum, which was established in 2017 and reopened in 2019. All relevant national legislation should be publicly available on the government website,[17] but the information available does not clarify if complaints related to the application process are admissible, or if the word “complaints” refers to appeals related to unsuccessful applications. Regarding the asylum procedure, applications are registered by the Border and Migration Police by filling out the pre-screening forms, then reported to the Directorate of Asylum and Citizenship to proceed with the status determination procedures.

Although the number of asylum seekers increased significantly in 2018, with 5,730 arrivals, the authorities say they have responded to the large number of asylum applications. According to UNHCR asylum applications that year increased to 4,378, a 14-fold increase compared to 2017.[18] Albania’s official Gazette outlined in March 2020 that the number of people applying for asylum was at its highest in 2018, and 40 times higher than it had been in 2015.[19] According to the Project Plan for European integration, an asylum database has been functioning since April 2019; it serves as an integral data centre between the Directorate of Asylum and Citizenship, the Directorate of Border and Migration and the National Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers, exchanging information in real time between these institutions and enabling the completion of procedures as well as the issuance of statistics.

The government also says it tripled its reception capacity for asylum seekers in October 2017. Total reception capacity, including the national reception centre in Tirana and the temporary accommodation centres in Gjirokastra and Korça, reaches almost 380 places. In October 2019, a new centre with a reception capacity of 60 beds was inaugurated to cope with the expected increase of people needing temporary housing in Kapshticë/Korça,[20] which has the same parameters as the transit centre in Gërhot of Gjirokastra.

Summary

Both Albania and the EU have undergone a transformative thirty years, with talks of accession beginning six years ago. The EU sees Albania’s incorporation into the bloc as a way of contributing to the economic growth and strengthened security; a different understanding of “expanding the fortress”. Accession negotiations were reinvigorated in March 2020, and the current goal is for Albania to approximate its law to the EU acquis, and implement those measures, within two years. This includes legislation on immigration and borders, which have been updated on paper. Though conditions for asylum seekers and migrants in Albania are not in line with fundamental rights law or the EU acquis, nor are those in EU member states – most notably the Greek island hotspots. The deployment of the EU’s border agency in Albania, unlikely to be criticised locally, represents further step in the EU’s mission to control migration across a wider terrain.

Sara Ianovitz, Ph.D. in International Law

►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/albania-dealing-with-a-new-migration-framework-on-the-edge-of-the-empire

#Albanie

Foreign agents and violence against migrants at the Greek-Macedonian border

An increasing number of reports of violent pushbacks at the Greek-Macedonian border have been collected by volunteers in recent years. Some reports allege the presence of Frontex, but bilateral policing deals in place may also explain the presence of foreign officers in Macedonia. The violence underpins a long-standing plan to close the ‘Balkan Route’ and keep people out of ‘core’ EU territory. Whoever is behind the violence, there is no shortage of border guards to mete it out – but justice is in short supply.

Midnight in Macedonia

Around midnight on 14 August last year, a group of some 20 people were intercepted by border police just north of the Greek-Macedonian border, near the small town of Gevgelija. What happened next, according to the testimony of one member of the group, makes for grim reading.

“[T]he police officers approached the group and became physically violent. The officers struck various group-members with their batons. Others were pepper-sprayed, including the women and children. After this, the officers loaded the group into a van and left them there without any air conditioning, jammed, soaking in sweat for around two hours, while going about to catch more transit groups. In the end, they squashed around 40 people in a van for fit for ten persons.”[1]

Macedonian officials were not the only ones involved in the operation. The testimony also recounts “foreign officers wearing uniforms with the European Union flags on their shoulders,” the distinctive mark of EU border agency Frontex.

Foreign agents

The testimony is one of five reports gathered by Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), altogether involving some 130 people, that describe violence being meted out in the presence of, or even by, border guards allegedly deployed by Frontex on North Macedonian territory. A further 10 reports gathered by the network, encompassing some 123 people, recount the use of violence by foreign border guards and police officers operating in North Macedonia, but do not mention uniforms bearing the EU flag.[2]

Statewatch and Border Violence Monitoring Network have written to Frontex to demand an investigation into the allegations recounted in this article. Read more here.

The violence recounted in those testimonies is shocking. According to the report on the 14 August incident, after cramming people into the van, the police drove them to the banks of the Vardar river. There, they threw peoples’ possessions into the water, took their phones and money, and “the group was beaten brutally with metal electroshock batons and some people were thrown into the river by the police. One person was thrown in despite crying and begging not to be thrown in.” They were subsequently taken back to the border and pushed through a gate leading to the Greek side, while police beat them with electroshock batons.

In that incident, the witness said that officials with uniforms bearing EU flags were present, but did not directly participate in the violence. But a report from the same area, concerning an incident less than a week later, refers to officials in uniforms bearing Croatian, Slovenian, Czech and EU flags, who bound a group of four men with zip ties and beat three of them with batons (one of the group, who was a minor, was spared the beating).[3] Reports of other incidents allege the presence of Italian, German and Austrian officials.

No reports at Frontex

While BVMN volunteers have gathered multiple testimonies that allege Frontex’s presence or involvement in violence in North Macedonia, the agency itself says it has received no reports of any such incidents. The agency also denies any presence in the country – in May, a press officer told Statewatch that “Frontex does not have any operational activities at the land border from the North Macedonian side,” and “is only present on the Greek side of the border.”

In December 2020, Frontex responded to an access to documents request filed by Statewatch some months earlier. The request sought copies of all serious incident reports (SIRs) concerning the agency’s activities at the Greek-Macedonian land border from 1 January 2020 onwards. SIRs are supposed to be filed by officials deployed on Frontex operations for a variety of reasons, including in case of “suspected violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations.”[4]

In its response, the agency said that it did not hold any SIRs concerning the geographic area and time period covered by the request. This does not mean, however, that the incidents recorded by BVMN did not take place – it may simply be that nobody is reporting them.

A working group set up by Frontex’s own Management Board, in response to allegations of involvement in pushbacks in Greece, found numerous problems with the agency’s reporting system. It noted that there was no way of monitoring the quality of reports submitted, and there were no confidential avenues for team members to report rights violations by their colleagues.

The report also called for “a newly introduced culture,” suggesting that the existing ambience at the agency is not one in which the rights of migrants and refugees are at the forefront of officials’ minds. The working group said that the agency needed “awareness of and sensitiveness towards possible misconduct,”[5] a call it repeated in its final report.[6]

Not even numbers

Serious incident reports may not exist, but the request from Statewatch to Frontex also sought to establish the scale of the agency’s activities at the Greek-Macedonian border through another means – by requesting data on the number of migrants and migrant smugglers apprehended at the Greek-Macedonian border over the same period (1 January 2020 onwards).

This data, argued Frontex, could not be released – doing so “would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks,” despite the request seeking nothing more than figures that Frontex itself has published in previous reports.

A public evaluation of the tongue-twistingly titled ‘Joint Operation Flexible Operational Activities 2018 Land on Border Surveillance’ (JO FOA Land) says that in 2018, 16,337 migrants and 313 smugglers were apprehended in the area covered by the operation – “the ‘green borders’ of Greece with Turkey, the North Macedonia [sic] and Albania, Bulgaria with Turkey, North Macedonia and Serbia.”[7] Yet for reasons known only to Frontex, providing a breakdown of these figures for the Greek-Macedonian border would apparently undermine public security.

A significant presence

According to Frontex’s evaluation report, 25 member states took part in operations at land borders in south-eastern Europe in 2018, along with 47 officers acting as observers from six different “third countries”, namely Georgia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. Over 1,800 officials were deployed by Frontex over the course of the year. The operations recorded 2,011 “incidents”.

A substantial Frontex presence at the border between Greece and North Macedonia has been in place since then. In a response to a parliamentary question from German MEP Özlem Demirel, the European Commission said last June that at Greece’s land borders with Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Turkey, 71 officials, 24 patrols and three “thermo-vision vans” were deployed as part of the 2020 edition of JO FOA Land. Thirteen different member states were providing contributions to the operation: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.[8]

While Frontex denies any physical presence on North Macedonia territory, the testimonies gathered by BVMN that allege the presence or participation of Frontex officials in violent acts raise serious questions for the agency. All the testimonies concern incidents that took place in North Macedonia, where the agency has no legal basis to operate. An agreement between the EU and North Macedonia that would permit Frontex deployments, similar to those currently in place with Montenegro and Albania, is facing hold-ups due to objections from the Bulgarian authorities.[9]

Bilateral agreements

Frontex operations are not the only deployments of foreign officials in North Macedonia. As noted above, nine of the 15 reports gathered by BVMN describing the involvement of non-Macedonian officers in pushbacks to Greece make no mention of Frontex at all. There are, however, multiple references to violence being meted out by officials in uniforms bearing the flags of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany and Serbia.

The presence of some of these officials in the country is made possible by bilateral border control agreements. North Macedonia has cooperation agreements with eight other states in the region (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Serbia), who provide the Macedonian authorities “with assistance from foreign police officers in patrolling the south border with Greece and in performing their daily duties.”[10] The agreement with Austria, Hungary and Serbia has come in for particular criticism, as it is a memorandum of understanding rather than a formal agreement, and therefore has faced no parliamentary scrutiny in Macedonia.[11] Germany, meanwhile, does not appear to have such a formal agreement with North Macedonia at the federal level – which makes the allegations of the presence of German officers puzzling – but the EU’s largest state has provided a ready supply of equipment, including vehicles, mobile thermal imaging cameras, boots and torches.[12]

The Croatian and Czech governments have made extensive deployments under these agreements. Between December 2015 (when Croatia and North Macedonia signed a police cooperation deal) and February 2019 “over 560 Croatian police… intercepted almost 6,000 illegal migrants in North Macedonia.”[13] The Czech deployments have been even larger – by December 2019, “1,147 police officers [had] been sent to North Macedonia” to police the border with Greece, according to the Czech government.[14]

High-level police coordination preceded the signing of many of these agreements. In July 2016, the police chiefs of 12 states said that “the deployment of foreign police officers along borders which are strongly affected by irregular migration conveys a strong message that the countries concerned are resolute in jointly coping with the migration crisis.”[15] Under the agreements with Macedonia, foreign officials can “use technical equipment and vehicles with symbols, wear uniforms, carry weapons and other means of coercion”.[16] In some instances, it seems coercion tips over into outright violence.

An incident dating from 16 August 2020, recorded by BVMN volunteers, refers to officers “with black ski masks over their faces” and “Croatian and Czech flags emblazoned on their uniforms.” The interviewees said that “these officers were violent with them – kicking the group, destroying their mobile phones, taking their money, insulting them, pushing their faces on the ground with tied hands behind the back. One of the respondents was also attacked by a dog, while the officers [were] laughing at him.”[17] As far back as March 2016, an activist supporting refugees at the increasingly well-guarded Greek-Macedonian border told the newspaper Lidovky that, in Macedonia, “the Czech police are known for violence and unprofessionalism.”[18]

Buffer states in the Balkans

Bilateral cooperation between EU states and North Macedonia extends far beyond these police cooperation agreements. In September 2020, the German Presidency of the Council of the EU described the region stretching from Turkey to Hungary (known in official jargon as the “Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans”) as being “of great strategic importance for the EU in terms of migration management.”[19] Significant attention is therefore being given to reinforcing the ability of states in the region to control peoples’ movements (an issue highlighted in another recent Statewatch report).

As of May 2020, 15 EU member states were providing bilateral “support” on migration issues to states in the Western Balkans through a total of 228 activities, according to a survey carried out by the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU. The majority of that support was focused on control measures, “namely border management and combating the smuggling of migrants (over 50% of all MS activities),” said a summary produced by the Presidency. More than 50% of the 228 activities were taking place in Serbia and North Macedonia, both of which border EU territory.[20]

The Croatian Presidency highlighted the “geopolitical importance” of those two countries, given that “Member States’ focus is on the prevention of irregular migratory movements to the EU.” This was “both expected and understandable, but may contribute to strengthening the Western Balkan partners’ self-perception as a transit region, which poses a challenge for the further improvement of all aspects of their migration capacities.” Rather than a transit region, the plan is to provide ‘capacity-building’ and technical assistance to develop buffer states that can keep people out of the ‘core’ of the EU after they depart from Greece.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/2489/2021-06-fx-mac-04.jpg

This is, of course, not a new plan. In February and March 2016, as the EU-Turkey deal was heading for agreement and in the wake of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people travelling by foot, road and rail to the ‘core’ of the EU, the ‘Balkan Route’ was declared closed by EU leaders. Initially done on the crude, discriminatory basis of nationality,[21] exclusion measures were extended to apply to all those crossing borders in the region. That process of closure continues today, and violence is a longstanding component of the strategy.[22] Indeed, it is a prerequisite for it to work effectively, and has been denounced repeatedly over the years by NGOs and international organisations. In March 2016, the Macedonian authorities sought supplies of pepper spray, tasers, rubber bullets, “special bomb (shock, with rubber balls)” and “acoustic device to break the mob.”[23] The concern now may be with smaller groups of people attempting to pass through the country, rather than with “the mob”, but the violence is no less brutal.

►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/foreign-agents-and-violence-against-migrants-at-the-greek-macedonian-bor

Frontex at Fault : European Border Force Complicit in ‘Illegal’ Pushbacks

Vessels from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, have been complicit in maritime “pushback” operations to drive away refugees and migrants attempting to enter the European Union via Greek waters, a joint investigation by Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, ARD and TV Asahi has found.

Open source data suggests Frontex assets were actively involved in one pushback incident at the Greek-Turkish maritime border in the Aegean Sea, were present at another and have been in the vicinity of four more since March.

Although Frontex assets were not at the immediate scene of those latter four incidents, the signature of a pushback is distinctive, and would likely have been visible on radar, with visual tools common on such vessels or to the naked eye.

The Greek Coast Guard (HCG) has long been accused of illegal pushbacks.

These are described by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), a legal and educational non-profit, as incidents where refugees and migrants are forced back over a border without consideration of individual circumstances and without any possibility to apply for asylum or to put forward arguments against the measures taken.

In the Aegean Sea, pushbacks generally occur in two ways. The first type is the most common: Dinghies travelling from Turkey to Greece are blocked from landing on Greek soil by the HCG. This could mean either physically blocking the dinghy until it runs out of fuel, or disabling the engine. After the engine no longer works the dinghy can then either be pushed back into Turkish territorial water with waves, or towed if the wind is not favourable.

The second type of pushback is employed when people have managed to land on Greek soil. In this case they are detained, placed in a liferaft with no means of propulsion, towed into the middle of the Aegean Sea and then abandoned.

Pushbacks will often result in standoffs between the HCG and Turkish Coast Guard (TCG), both of which will standby, refusing to aid dinghies in distress and carrying out unsafe manoeuvres around them.

The role of Frontex assets in such incidents, however, has never been recorded before.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/image-1-1200x680.png

Dana Schmalz, an international law expert at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg said the incidents highlighted in this investigation were likely “illegal” and “violate the prohibition of refoulement and maritime law.” The prohibition of refoulement refers to rules banning the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers and is described by the UN Refugee Agency as a “rule of customary international law.”

Schmalz added that if Frontex personnel stopped an overcrowded dinghy of the type seen in footage documented during this investigation, they would be obliged to rescue its occupants immediately. “If they don’t do that, even make waves [or] instead drive away and then let the Greeks do the dirty work – then they are involved in the illegal pushback.”

Despite being presented with numerous examples of the practice, a spokesperson for the Greek Maritime Ministry Greek denied claims of pushbacks, describing allegations of illegal actions relating to the incidents documented in this article as “tendentious.” They added that HCG officers act in compliance with the country’s international obligations.

Frontex said that the host states it works with have the final say in how operations on its territory or search and rescue zone are carried out. However, it added that Frontex had notified HCG which confirmed an internal inquiry had been launched into each of the reported incidents. Yet Frontex did not say when it notified HCG or when the inquiry had begun.

On July 24, the director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, told the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) at the European Parliament that the agency had observed and recorded just a single incident which may have been a pushback in the Aegean.

Our investigation — which looked at the presence of Frontex assets in the Aegean Sea and observed their movements over many months — appears to contradict that assertion.

This was despite the difficulty in tracking many Frontex assets because their transponder information was either not registered, not turned on, or was out of range. As such, we were only able to view a snapshot of Frontex operations.

Frontex, an agency of the European Union, is tasked with border control of the Schengen Area. Its activities in the Aegean are called Operation Poseidon.
How we Recorded Pushbacks: Identification of Assets

There were two main steps to establishing that Frontex had participated in pushback operations. The first was to identify what assets had been deployed in Operation Poseidon. The second was to establish whether these assets had participated in pushback operations.

The first step was carried out using open sources. These included social media posts, vessel tracking sites and information published by Frontex itself. We were also able to establish the number of personnel and assets present in the operational area thanks to questions asked in the European Parliament.

According to this response, Operation Poseidon has 185 personnel, one offshore patrol vessel (OPV), eight coastal patrol boats (CPB), one coastal patrol vessel (CPV), four thermal vision vehicles (TVV) and three patrol cars.

There is also a “Rapid Border Intervention”, which contains additional assets on top of those dedicated to Operation Poseidon. This includes 74 personnel, two CPBs, two CPVs, one helicopter and three TVVs.

In total we used open sources to identify 22 assets, including vessels, helicopters and planes, which operated in the Aegean during 2020. Although this is more than the total given in the answer to parliamentary questions above, some of these assets were rotating in or out of theater.
Tracking Assets

Some assets featured regularly on the open source record. For example, Romanian and Bulgarian vessels regularly transit through the Bosphorus strait, where there is an active ship-spotting community. As such it was possible to identify their operational rotations, including vessels heading to and returning from deployments roughly every three months. However, other assets were more difficult to track, and their presence on the open source record consisted of a single image or video.

https://i.imgur.com/MOOW5q3.png

▻https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1262417193083510784

In order to track these assets and identify if they had participated in pushbacks, we required far more data than was available on social media. As such, we turned to AIS and transponder data, publicly available information about the location of particular ships or aircraft, available through sites such as Marine Traffic or Flight Radar 24.

Many of the assets we identified either did not have their information publicly listed, or appeared to only turn on their transponders under certain circumstances, such as when in port. This made them extremely difficult to track. However, some assets did have their transponders on. We began to collect this data, buying additional, more granular data from ship and flight tracking companies on dates when pushbacks had been reported.

We combined this tracking data with our own database of reported pushbacks, which we obtained through both public reports and information collected by NGOs such as Consolidated Rescue Group (CRG), Monitoring Rescue Cell (MRC) and Alarm Phone, who track these events. These included the coordinates of reported pushback events, frequently sent by the occupants of the dinghies. By overlaying these datasets we identified multiple pushback incidents in which Frontex assets were in the vicinity. Once we had identified these priority incidents we could then examine the specifics of what had happened.
Incidents

Using this data we identified six pushback incidents since March in which Frontex assets were either in the vicinity or participated directly. We have separated these into four “proximity incidents,” where Frontex assets were within five kilometers of the incident, and two “confirmed incidents,” where we can be certain that Frontex were present at the site of pushbacks themselves.
Proximity Incidents

April 28-29: In an incident we have previously reported, a group of refugees and migrants made landfall on Samos. They claim they were then detained, placed in a life-raft without any means of propulsion and towed into the middle of the Mycale Strait. A surveillance plane overflew the area twice while this pushback took place.

June 4: Two dinghies were reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Nortada appears to have been present around 15 kilometers from the first incident and just over one kilometer away from the second.

June 5: A dinghy was reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Nortada was approximately two to three kilometers away.

August 19: A dinghy was reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Molivos was five kilometers away and appears to have changed course and headed towards the pushback before its transponder either lost signal or was turned off.

In these cases, Frontex assets were recorded as being within a certain range, rather than participating directly. Their exact knowledge of what was happening at these distances is difficult to confirm. Operation Poseidon’s mission includes a significant number of tasks requiring surveillance, and its assets are able to use both radar and visual tools, such as low-light or infrared cameras, to observe the environment around them.

For example, we know that the Molivos is equipped with an FLIR camera similar to this one seen on another Portuguese Frontex vessel. This model is capable of x36 magnification, with low light and infrared cameras.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-1-Picture-of-Molivos-with-camera-juxtaposition-1200x900.jpg

The boats that migrants use to make this crossing are very basic, inflatable rubber dinghies several meters long with a single outboard motor. Due to their construction, it is unlikely that these boats would be visible on radar. However, pushbacks don’t just involve a single dinghy. By their definition they must involve at least one other vessel. From images and videos of pushbacks we have reviewed, it is clear that they often involve multiple ships from both the Greek and Turkish coast guards.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-2-ships-surrounding-dinghy-1200x335.jpg

As stated above, ships from both Greece and Turkey will frequently attempt to push the dinghies across the sea border using waves. These vessels manoeuvre in a circular pattern at a relatively high speed close to the dinghy. This manoeuvre is not only dangerous because of the risk of collision, the waves it generates also represent a threat to the overcrowded and often fragile dinghies.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8BdEHtBWp4&feature=emb_logo

As such, although a dinghy itself may not show up on radar, the signature of a pushback would. Multiple large and small vessels from both TCG and HCG, some of which are carrying out unusual manoeuvres in order to create waves, would be very difficult to miss. Indeed you can even see this kind of event from space.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-2.1-aegean_sea_greece_turkey_20200815_1067_crop_1920_logo-1200x675.jpg

There’s also the matter of visual range. The same factors that make a pushback visible on radar will also make it visible to the eye or other visual systems such as surveillance cameras. Even at a range of a few kilometers in calm seas and good conditions, a dinghy would likely be visible, although exact details such as the nature of its passengers might not be. The other aspects of pushbacks which we have already described would also certainly be visible.

The case of the April 28-29 pushback is a good illustration of surveillance assets passing very close to the results of a pushback.
April 28

In an incident previously covered by Bellingcat, a group of 22 migrants who landed on Samos were detained by Greek law enforcement. They were then placed on a life raft without any means of propulsion, and towed into the middle of the Mycale Strait by the Greek coast guard. In response to our request for comment at the time, the Greek government denied these people had ever reached Greek territory, despite witness statements, images, and videos showing this had in fact happened.

As the life raft was floating in the strait, a private sureveillance plane passed over the area twice at 5,000 feet, once at 02:41 AM and once at 03:18 AM. This plane, G-WKTH, belongs to DEA Aviation, which provides aerial surveillance services to Frontex. In a promotional video from Frontex, it is claimed these feeds are live-streamed back to the Frontex HQ in Warsaw

The plane is reportedly equipped with an MX-15 camera, which has both low-light and infrared sensors. Considering this plane is specifically employed for aerial surveillance, it would be surprising if it did not identify the life raft full of people and, according to one member of this group, the presence of Greek and later Turkish vessels.

Indeed, the Frontex executive director’s response to the LIBE committee of the European Parliament indicates this may have been the incident Frontex reported as having seen. In this reply a “Serious Incident Report (‘SIR’) was created based on a sighting of an incident by aerial surveillance where people were transferred on a rubber boat from a vessel and later on rescued by Turkish authorities.
Active incidents

In two cases on June 8 and August 15, it seems certain that Frontex was aware of pushbacks as they took place. Indeed, on June 8, it appears that a Frontex vessel participated in a pushback, physically blocking a dinghy from reaching Greek territory.

We will first address the incident on August 15, where a Frontext vessel was present at the scene of a pushback, before examining the June 8, where a Frontex asset appears to have participated in a pushback.
August 15

On the morning of August 15 there were reports of a confrontation between the Greek and Turkish coast guards. As well as multiple photos posted to social media by locals, this was also reported as a pushback by CRG, MRC, Alarm Phone and Aegean Boat Report.

CRG and MRC also posted videos from people on this dinghy, with CRG’s video showing an engine without a starter cord, claiming it had been taken by the Greek Coast Guard. In the videos, the dinghy is surrounded by vessels from both the Greek and Turkish coast guards. We have previously noted that disabling the motor of dinghies is a tactic that has reportedly been used by the Greek Coast Guard.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-3-Engine-Comparison-1200x691.jpg

Most of the images of this incident are taken from a distance, making identification of the vessels difficult. However, we were also sent an image of this confrontation that is very clear. In this image we can clearly see the presence of MAI1102, a Romanian border forces vessel which had just arrived in theater.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-4-15-August-Incident-1200x517.jpg

The metadata of this image is consistent with the date and time of this incident. Indeed, the ships can be seen arrayed in almost exactly the same manner in a video filmed by the people on the boat.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-5-Comparison-of-vid-and-image-1200x671.jpg

Although it is not possible to be certain of exactly how far away MAI1102 is from this pushback, we can see that it is certainly within visual range of the confrontation and the dinghy itself.
June 8

On the morning of June 8 a pushback was reported to have taken place, again off the north-east coast of Lesbos. The Turkish coast guard reported it rescued 47 migrants after a pushback by the Greek Coast Guard that day. Footage published by Anadolu Agency appeared to show the Romanian Frontex vessel MAI1103 blocking a dinghy.

We investigated this incident further, obtaining other videos from the TCG, as well as tracking data of vessels that appeared to be in the vicinity at the time, such as the NATO ship, Berlin. Using these sources we were able to reconstruct what happened.

After initially trying to cross under the cover of darkness, the dinghy was intercepted and physically blocked from proceeding by MAI1103 early in the morning.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoNJXY3pa_U&feature=emb_logo

We can see the exact time and a set of coordinates in one of the videos we obtained.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-6-Screenshot-with-time-and-loc-1200x728.jpg

We plotted the coordinates visible on the screen as they changed. It became clear these were not the location of the vessel with the camera, but rather the location of the dinghy and MAI1103.

We can visually confirm the general location by comparing a panoramic view that is visible in one of the videos against the appearance of the landscape from the coordinates which appear on the camera feed.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-7-lanscape-comparison-1200x164.jpg

We can now start to build a picture of what happened that morning.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-8-Visualisation-1-from-Logan-1200x959.jpg

We can see that the dinghy was extremely close to MAI1103, and is being physically blocked by the ship. Indeed the two vessels are close enough that it appears that personnel on MAI1103 are communicating with people in the dinghy.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qD_I--2LPA&feature=emb_logo

At one point MAI1103 makes a pass close to the dinghy at enough speed to generate waves, a maneuver that previously only HCG and TCG have been seen making. It is especially dangerous due to the overloaded and unseaworthy nature of the dinghies.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iUm1_e2R6A&feature=emb_logo

Eventually HCG vessels arrive and MAI1103 leaves, resulting in a standoff between the TCG and HCG. This lasted several hours and gradually moved to the north-west, observed by the NATO ship Berlin.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-9-Visualisation-2-from-Logan.jpg

During this period the dinghy was approached at least twice by a rigid-hulled inflatable boat 060 (RHIB) from the HCG.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WODSvxnmoc&feature=emb_logo

In what appears to be the final segment of video taken at about 09:30 AM we see the TCG radar screen, which can be exactly matched with the Turkish coast. This radar screen matches perfectly with the location and heading of the Berlin at this time, as we can see by overlaying a plot of the Berlin’s course with the radar screen.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-10-ALT-1200x481.jpg

As well as matching the movement of vessels to AIS data, we can further verify that these videos are from the same incident by examining the passengers in the dinghy. We can see that in the earliest videos, showing the MAI1103 with the dinghy, there is clearly a person wearing a white hood, alongside someone who appears to be wearing a reddish top. The presence of these passengers helps to verify that all these videos are indeed from the same incident on June 8.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-11-Hood-comparison.jpg

In the final stage of the pushback at 10:30 AM it is possible to see the Portuguese Frontex vessel Nortada within 5 km with both AIS data and on the TCG radar screen. The Nortada had been in that vicinity since at least 09:11 AM that morning. Although it may not have been able to pick up this dinghy on its radar, it would have certainly been within visual range of the larger ships surrounding it. After the pushback, the Nortada continued its patrol off North Lesbos.

https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Image-12-Visualisation-4-from-Logan-1200x959.jpg

Conclusion

Over the course of this investigation we collected a huge amount of information on Frontex activities in the Aegean Sea. Most of Frontex’s assets were impossible to track because their transponder information was either not registered, not turned on, or was out of range. As such, we were only able to view a snapshot of Frontex operations.

Despite this limited view, we still managed to identify multiple instances in which Frontex was either present at pushbacks, or close enough to be able to understand what was taking place. In at least one incident it appears that a Frontex vessel actively participated in a pushback. It is possible that there are other incidents we have not been able to capture.

In a statement provided in response to this investigation, Frontex stated that it applies “the highest standards of border control to its operations” and that its officers are bound by a code of conduct that looks to prevent refoulement and to uphold human rights.

The statement continued that Frontex’s executive director had notified the HGC regarding all reported incidents and that Greek authorities confirmed that an internal inquiry had been launched.

A spokesperson for the Greek Maritime Ministry said the actions of HCG officers were “carried out in full compliance with the country’s international obligations, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.”

The spokesperson added that thousands of migrants had been rescued throughout the refugee crisis of recent years by the HCG, that allegations of illegality were “tendentious” and that the “operation practices of the Greek authorities have never included such [illegal] actions.”

▻https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/10/23/frontex-at-fault-european-border-force-complicit-in-illegal-pushbacks

#forensic_architecture #architecture_forensique

EU Border Agency Frontex Complicit in Greek Refugee Pushback Campaign

Greek border guards have been forcing large numbers of refugees back to sea in pushback operations that violate international law. #DER_SPIEGEL and its reporting partners have learned that the European Union is also complicit in the highly controversial practice.

Jouma al-Badi thought he was safe when he first set foot on European soil on April 28. Together with 21 other refugees, he had been taken in a rubber dinghy from Turkey to the Greek island of Samos. The young Syrian planned to apply for political asylum. He documented his arrival in videos. Local residents also remember the refugees.

Greek security forces captured the migrants. Under international law, it is their duty to give the new arrivals a hearing and field their applications for asylum. Instead, according to al-Badi, the officers dragged them back out to sea and released them on an inflatable rubber raft. Videos obtained by DER SPIEGEL also show him on the raft.

For an entire night and a morning, Greek border guards kept pushing the men and women away as their raft floated around in circles. The Turkish coast guard filmed the maneuver.

An aircraft used by the European border protection agency Frontex also passed over the refugees. The crew of the surveillance plane, with the registration identifier "G-WKTH,” were part of a European Union operation in Greece. The plane twice flew over the Strait of Mykali, where al-Badi and the other migrants were located. According to flight data that has been viewed by DER SPIEGEL, the first flight happened at 2:41 a.m. and the second at 3:18 a.m.

The plane’s crew has a standard MX-15 camera on board with an infrared sensor and a sensor for poor lighting conditions. Even at night, the sensors are capable of detecting small objects on the water. According to a Frontex promotional video, the camera images are streamed live to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, Poland. But Frontex didn’t send any help.

The waves struck the Syrian in the face. He eventually ran out of strength and thought he was going to die.

The Greek government denies it conducted pushbacks of refugees to Turkey, even though DER SPIEGEL and other media have fully documented several of these operations, known as pushbacks. Greek border guards are growing increasingly ruthless. As in the case of al-Badi, they are now pushing even refugees who have reached the Greek isles back to sea in operations that are illegal under international law.

Frontex officials have publicly claimed that they know nothing about pushbacks by Greek border guards. The agency has 600 employees deployed in Greece as well as ships, drones and aircraft.

Together with Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat, "Report Mainz” — a program on ARD, the German public broadcaster — and Japanese broadcaster TV Asahi, DER SPIEGEL spent several months reporting in the Aegean Sea region. The reporters tracked the positions of Frontex units and compared them with position data from pushbacks recorded by NGOs and migrants. They interviewed witnesses, refugees and Frontex staff. They viewed internal documents and dozens of videos and satellite photos.

Their research proves for the first time that Frontex officials know about the Greek border guards’ illegal practices – and that the agency itself is at times involved in the pushbacks. Breaking the law has become an everyday occurrence at Europe’s borders, and the EU is allowing it to happen.

Samira Mohammad could already see Lesbos when the men with the masks arrived. The Syrian woman, who does not want to provide her real name, is 45 years old. That morning of August 15, she was sitting in a rubber dinghy with dozens of other people. She recalls how Greek border guards tried in vain to stop the arrivals and how they steered toward the boat repeatedly and pushed it back toward Turkey multiple times. She says the Turkish coast guard held them off. Locals even have a name for the cynical game: "Greek water polo.”

Mohammad claims the Greek officials took their gasoline and destroyed the engine. And that masked Greek border guards then boarded the dinghy. Several refugees claim that they forced the migrants to tie the shaky rubber dinghy to a speedboat at gunpoint. The border guards then towed the boat toward Turkey. Videos corroborate the statements made by the refugees, and the destroyed engine is clearly visible.

Mohammad said she was scared to death during those moments. Her entire family had been onboard, including her pregnant daughter-in-law, who was later hospitalized with severe bleeding.

The maneuver off the coast of Lesbos lasted hours, and the Turkish Navy didn’t rescue the refugees until noon.

A Romanian Frontex boat was also on site that morning. The MAI 1102 was located only a few hundred meters away from the refugee boat. The boat can be clearly identified in a photo. A German navy ship on a NATO mission that observed the incident reported it to the German government. It also stated that Frontex people had been present. This is documented in an internal paper that has been obtained by DER SPIEGEL. Nevertheless, this pushback has never been revealed publicly before now.

On June 8, Frontex officials went one step further, with the MAI 1103, a ship also flying the Romanian flag. It directly blocked a refugee boat. The incident can be seen in several videos recorded by the Turkish coast guard and verified by DER SPIEGEL. It shows officials standing on the deck, where they are obviously communicating with the refugees floating in the water in front of them.

Later, the MAI 1103 passes the refugees traveling at high speed, with waves beating against the boat. The Romanian officials then withdrew and the Greek coast guard took over the operation.

"These pushbacks violate the ban on collective expulsions and international maritime law,” says Dana Schmalz, an expert on international law at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg. She notes that if Frontex officials stopped a completely overcrowded inflatable boat, they would be required to rescue the people immediately. "If they don’t do that and even make waves instead, only to drive away and let the Greeks do the dirty work, then they are still involved in the illegal pushback,” she says.

Reporting by DER SPIEGEL and its partners found that a Frontex surveillance plane or Portuguese or Romanian Frontex ships were near at least six pushbacks in the area since April. The number of undetected cases could actually be much higher.

The vast majority of Frontex vessels patrol the Aegean Sea with their AIS transponders switched off or untraceable in order to prevent giving away their positions. Their presence can only be verified with difficulty through videos and photos.

When contacted for comment by DER SPIEGEL, Frontex did not deny the individual incidents, instead stating that the officials protected the fundamental rights of migrants and respected their right to non-refoulement. It further stated that the incidents that had been reported were forwarded to the Greek coast guard, which opened an investigation into the matter. The Greek government gave a blanket denial to the allegations, saying that it complies with the law and does not carry out illegal deportations.

Under Frontex’s statutes, police officers are required to file so-called Serious Incident Reports to document violations of the law. But people familiar with the situation say that fewer and fewer of these reports are getting filed. The sources said the Frontex border guards, who are sent to Greece from all over Europe, frown upon such reports because they cause trouble for the host country.

►https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-border-agency-frontex-complicit-in-greek-refugee-pushback-campaign-a-4b6c

–---

en allemand :
▻https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-frontex-in-griechenland-in-illegale-pushbacks-verwickelt-a-0000

Bruxelles veut des explications de Frontex, accusée de procéder à des refoulements illégaux de migrants

La #Commission_européenne a sollicité une réunion extraordinaire urgente du conseil d’administration de Frontex, l’agence européenne pour la protection des frontières, mise en cause pour des refoulements illégaux de migrants en mer Égée. Un article d’Euroefe.

« Après s’être coordonnés avec la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, mes services ont demandé, au nom de la Commission, la convocation d’une réunion extraordinaire du conseil d’administration de Frontex le 10 novembre pour discuter des incidents présumés de refoulement en Grèce et de la protection des droits fondamentaux », a écrit Ylva Johansson, la commissaire chargée des migrations, dans un tweet.

D’après des enquêtes menées par différents médias, Frontex aurait procédé à des refoulements illégaux de migrants en mer Égée, à la frontière entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Et ce à au moins six reprises.

L’hebdomadaire allemand Der Spiegel a révélé le 23 octobre qu’il avait enquêté sur ces incidents en collaboration avec les médias numériques néerlandais Lighthouse Reports et britannique Bellingcat, ainsi qu’avec deux chaînes de télévision, l’Allemande ARD et la Japonaise Asahi.

Ces médias disposent de films montrant comment, depuis le mois d’avril, des agents de Frontex ont procédé à ce que l’on appelle des « pushbacks » (refoulements) de migrants pour les empêcher d’atteindre le sol européen, une pratique illégale.

Une vidéo montre comment un bateau de l’agence européenne bloque le passage d’une embarcation occupée par des migrants, avant de les dépasser à grande vitesse, provoquant ainsi de grosses vagues. Par la suite, les garde-côtes grecs obligent la barque à faire demi-tour vers la Turquie.

De son côté, Frontex a nié les accusations et assuré au Spiegel que ses agents protégeaient les droits fondamentaux des migrants et respectaient le droit au non-refoulement.

Le gouvernement grec a également nié catégoriquement ces accusations.

▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/bruxelles-veut-des-explications-de-frontex-accusee-de-proceder-a-des-refoulements-illegaux-de-migrants/?_ga=2.223583131.1633915392.1603989521-379746837.1590938192

Greek coast guard performed huge pushback involving 197 people and 7 life rafts!

https://i.imgur.com/X4Kmqzl.png

A boat carrying 197 people tried to cross from Turkey to Italy on Tuesday, but got in to bad weather and sat course towards Crete. Close to the south shore of Crete they had engine problems and the Greek Coast Guard was alerted 09.00.
The coast guard divided the people on two coast guard vessels, 121 men and boys on one vessel and 76 people, families on the other. Reports from the refugees clearly states that some of them where abuse while onboard the HCG vessel, footage and video testimony has been provided. Most of their phones was confiscated by the Greek coast guard, but a few managed to hide their phones, and was able to send out distress messages.
The first group containing the 121 males was forced in to 3 life rafts before first light on Wednesday the 21th just north of Rhodes, and found and picked up by Turkish coast guard 08.50 south of Marmaris.
The second group with the families, 76 people, was put in 4 life rafts around noon north west of Simi, drifting for hours and not picked up by Turkish coast guard before 17.30 south west of Datça.
This shows that the Greek coast guard is determined to prevent anyone to reach Greek soil, no matter the consequences or potential harm they may inflict on innocent people fleeing war and persecution.
This is by far the largest pushback Aegean Boat Report has been able to document, but I guess nothing is a surprise anymore. No measures have been taken by the EU to try to stop this illegal practice by the Greek government, even do they have received overwhelming amounts of evidence.

▻https://www.facebook.com/AegeanBoatReport/posts/951612422028529

Έστειλαν πίσω 200 πρόσφυγες γιατί ήταν… τζιχαντιστές

Τεκμηριωμένη καταγγελία για τη μεγαλύτερη ώς τώρα καταγεγραμμένη επαναπροώθηση προσφύγων από το Λιμενικό προς την Τουρκία με μεγάλη και κρυφή επιχείρηση του Λιμενικού εν μέσω σφοδρής κακοκαιρίας νότια της Κρήτης ● Έντεχνη προσπάθεια οι 200 άνθρωποι, μεταξύ αυτών και γυναικόπαιδα, να εμφανιστούν ως… ισλαμιστές τρομοκράτες.

Ακόμα μια καταγγελία για βίαιες επαναπροωθήσεις προσφύγων από το Λιμενικό έρχεται στο φως τις τελευταίες ημέρες, την ίδια στιγμή που η κυβέρνηση πανηγυρίζει για τη μείωση των προσφυγικών ροών προς τα νησιά, χωρίς όμως να εξηγεί πώς έχει επιτευχθεί η μείωση αυτή.

Η υπόθεση αφορά πλοιάριο με περίπου 200 ανθρώπους που έφτασαν στα ανοιχτά της Κρήτης, προερχόμενοι από Τουρκία και με τελικό προορισμό την Ιταλία. Στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση υπάρχει μια περίεργη αλληλουχία γεγονότων και « ειδήσεων » τόσο στα κρητικά όσο και τα κεντρικά ΜΜΕ. Το πρωί της Τρίτης 20 Οκτωβρίου σε όλα τα ηλεκτρονικά ΜΜΕ της Κρήτης μεταδίδεται η είδηση για « κινητοποίηση του Λιμενικού » για σκάφος με 200 μετανάστες στη θαλάσσια περιοχή νότια της νήσου Χρυσής (Γαϊδουρονήσι), στην Ιεράπετρα. Το προηγούμενο βράδυ η Κρήτη είχε χτυπηθεί σφοδρά από την κακοκαιρία και το πρωί τα βλέμματα όλων ήταν στις εκτεταμένες καταστροφές που προκάλεσε το χαλάζι σε καλλιέργειες και υποδομές, κυρίως στην ανατολική πλευρά του νησιού. Την ίδια κακοκαιρία προφανώς αντιμετώπισαν και οι 200 επιβαίνοντες στο σκάφος, μεταξύ των οποίων υπήρχαν γυναίκες και παιδιά.

Στις πρώτες αναφορές και σε ερωτήσεις δημοσιογράφων προς το Λιμεναρχείο Ιεράπετρας γινόταν λόγος για « αδυναμία του Λιμενικού να εντοπίσει το πλοιάριο », ωστόσο δινόταν η πληροφορία πως τα σκάφη θα έμεναν στα ανοιχτά λόγω της κακοκαιρίας και για την περίπτωση που χρειαστεί, να παράσχουν βοήθεια αν εντοπίσουν τους πρόσφυγες. Λίγες ώρες αργότερα η είδηση εξαφανίστηκε από τα ΜΜΕ και δημιουργήθηκε η εντύπωση πως τα σκάφη του Λιμενικού δεν βρήκαν ποτέ το πλοιάριο με τους πρόσφυγες.
Τους βρήκαν ;

Ωστόσο τα πράγματα φαίνεται πως έγιναν διαφορετικά. Τέσσερις μέρες μετά, η οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report, η οποία και στο παρελθόν έχει αποκαλύψει παράνομες επιχειρήσεις επαναπροώθησης λέμβων με μετανάστες προς την Τουρκία από τις ελληνικές αρχές και τη Frontex, καταγγέλλει πως το Λιμενικό όχι μόνο βρήκε τους πρόσφυγες στα ανοιχτά της Κρήτης αλλά προχώρησε και με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες στην επαναπροώθησή τους στην Τουρκία. Η οργάνωση καταγγέλλει πως η ελληνική Ακτοφυλακή εντόπισε τους πρόσφυγες στις 9 το πρωί της Τρίτης (όπως δηλαδή μετέδιδαν αρχικά και τα κρητικά ΜΜΕ). Στη συνέχεια, πάντα σύμφωνα με την καταγγελία, οι άνδρες του Λιμενικού επιβίβασαν τους 197 πρόσφυγες σε δύο επιχειρησιακά σκάφη χωρίζοντάς τους σε δύο ομάδες. Στην πρώτη ομάδα μπήκαν 121 άνδρες και αγόρια, ενώ στη δεύτερη μπήκαν οικογένειες με γυναίκες και παιδιά, συνολικά 76 άτομα. Και οι δύο ομάδες, πάντα σύμφωνα με την καταγγελία, μεταφέρθηκαν στη θαλάσσια περιοχή βόρεια της Ρόδου, όπου και εξαναγκάστηκαν με τη βία να επιβιβαστούν σε συνολικά επτά θαλάσσιες σωστικές σχεδίες αφού προηγουμένως τους είχαν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα κινητά τηλέφωνα. Και οι επτά σχεδίες « σπρώχτηκαν » προς τις ακτές της Τουρκίας, εν μέσω κακοκαιρίας και κατά παράβαση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και του δίκαιου της θάλασσας.

Στιγμιότυπα από την επαναπροώθηση των προσφύγων (Φωτογραφίες από την οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report).

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Οι τρεις πρώτες σχεδίες, με 121 άτομα, εξωθήθηκαν τα ξημερώματα της Τετάρτης 21/10 προς την περιοχή της Μαρμαρίδας, όπου και εντοπίστηκαν από το τουρκικό Λιμενικό που τους περισυνέλεξε. Το δεύτερο γκρουπ, όπου βρίσκονταν οι γυναίκες και τα παιδιά, εξαναγκάστηκε να επιβιβαστεί σε τέσσερις σωστικές σχεδίες και επαναπροωθήθηκε προς την Τουρκία από τη θαλάσσια περιοχή δυτικά της Σύμης, το μεσημέρι της Τετάρτης. Τους περισυνέλεξε το τουρκικό Λιμενικό το απόγευμα της ίδιας μέρας στην περιοχή νοτιοδυτικά της πόλης Ντάκτα. Οπως αναφέρουν μάλιστα κάποιοι από τους επιβαίνοντες, χτυπήθηκαν από τους Ελληνες λιμενικούς, ενώ υπάρχει και σχετικό φωτογραφικό υλικό που τραβήχτηκε μετά την περισυλλογή τους από τις τουρκικές αρχές. Σε μία από τις φωτογραφίες φαίνεται ένας άνθρωπος με μώλωπες στην κοιλιά και με γύψο σε σημεία και των δύο χεριών του.

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Πρωτοσέλιδο

Την ίδια μέρα, πάντως, που έγινε η καταγγελία από την Aegean Boat Report (το Σάββατο) η εφημερίδα « ΤΑ ΝΕΑ » κυκλοφορούσε με τίτλο « Προετοιμαστείτε για Τζιχαντιστές », αναφερόμενη στο μήνυμα που, σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες της εφημερίδας, έστειλε σε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο ο Αιγύπτιος πρόεδρος Αλ Σίσι κατά την τριμερή συνάντηση που πραγματοποιήθηκε στη Λευκωσία. Το μήνυμα υποτίθεται πως αφορούσε τις πληροφορίες που έχει η Αίγυπτος για τις κινήσεις του Ερντογάν και το πώς χρησιμοποιεί τον ισλαμιστικό παράγοντα. Σε κάποια κρητικά ΜΜΕ οι δύο υποθέσεις δεν άργησαν να συνδεθούν με αναφορές για το… περίεργο σκάφος στο οποίο, σύμφωνα με τα δημοσιεύματα, επέβαιναν « άτομα εμφανιζόμενα ως μετανάστες » και το οποίο, σύμφωνα με τις διοχετευμένες πληροφορίες, έχει κινητοποιήσει όχι μόνο το Λιμενικό αλλά και τον Στρατό, την ΕΥΠ ακόμα και ξένες μυστικές υπηρεσίες !

Όπως αποκαλύπτεται, πάντως, οι επικίνδυνοι « τζιχαντιστές », τόσο οι άνδρες όσο και τα γυναικόπαιδα, είχαν ήδη από την Τετάρτη επαναπροωθηθεί παράνομα στην Τουρκία. Η Οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report αναφέρει πως αυτή είναι η μεγαλύτερη περίπτωση « pushback » που καταφέρνει να καταγράψει και τονίζει πως η Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση δεν έχει επιβάλει ακόμα καμία κύρωση στην Ελλάδα για τις παράνομες επαναπροωθήσεις, παρά τα ακλόνητα στοιχεία που έχουν τεθεί στη διάθεση των ευρωπαϊκών αρχών.

▻https://www.efsyn.gr/efkriti/koinonia/265835_esteilan-piso-200-prosfyges-giati-itan-tzihantistes

Greece’s coast guard accused of mass migrant pushbacks

An NGO, the #Aegean_Boat_Report (ABR), has accused the Greek coast guard of pushing back 197 migrants at sea last week.

Greek coast guards have been accused by the NGO Aegean Boat Report (ABR) of performing illegal pushbacks involving 197 people and seven life rafts off the coast of the island of Crete in the Southern Aegean.

A boat carrying 197 people was on its way trying to cross from Turkey to Italy on October 20 but ran into bad weather and changed course towards Crete, the NGO said.

Close to the south shore of Crete, the vessel reported engine problems and, according to the Norwegian organization, the Greek coast guard was alerted at 9 am.

’’The Greek coast guard divided the people into two groups onto two coast guard vessels, 121 men and boys on one vessel, and 76 people, mostly families, on the other.

Abuse on board

Reports from the refugees clearly state that some of them were abused while onboard the Hellenic coast guard vessel, with footage and video testimony being provided,’’ said ABR via a media statement.

According to ABR, the first group with the 121 men and boys were forced into three life rafts in the early hours of Wednesday, October 21 just north of Rhodes, before being found and picked up by the Turkish coast guard at 8:50 am south of Marmaris.

The second group of 76 people, made up of families, were put into four life rafts at around noon north-west of the islands of Simi, drifting for hours and not picked up by Turkish coast guards before 5:30 pm south-west of Data.

’Largest pushback’ ABR has documented

’’This shows that the Greek coast guard is determined to prevent anyone from reaching Greek soil, no matter the consequences or potential harm they may inflict on innocent people fleeing war and persecution’’, added ABR.

’’This is by far the largest pushback Aegean Boat Report has been able to document, but I guess nothing is a surprise anymore. No measures have been taken by the EU to try to stop this illegal practice by the Greek government, even if they have received overwhelming amounts of evidence.’’

29 NGOs and humanitarian groups sent an open letter to Parliament Last week’s incidents were reported after an appeal was launched by several prominent NGOs and humanitarian groups earlier this month on the topic of illegal pushbacks.

A total of 29 organizations sent an open letter to Parliament urging it to investigate reports of illegal pushbacks at the country’s land and sea borders with neighboring Turkey.

The letter called on the Greek Parliament to ’’immediately conduct an effective, transparent and impartial investigation into allegations that personnel from the Coast Guard, the Greek Police and the Greek Army, sometimes in close cooperation with masked men in uniform, have engaged in such actions, which are not only illegal but also endanger the lives and safety of displaced people."

Tensions on migration in Greece

Tensions on the migrant issue in Greece continue to run high following September’s fires which destroyed the controversial Moria open camp on Lesbos, and widespread lockdowns at refugee camps across the country following outbreaks of coronavirus cases.

The reports of pushbacks taking place have prompted action from humanitarian rights groups, with the joint-appeal calling for disciplinary and criminal sanctions, as deemed appropriate, “on anyone in uniform who are found to have participated in such illegal activities, but also for their superiors who are responsible for the administration of these bodies.”

“The investigation should establish the identity and relationship of the masked men and other unidentified officers to law enforcement, and take steps to hold them to account.”

State pushes ahead with migrant camps

Meanwhile, in related developments, the government is pressing ahead with plans to create more secure and strictly controlled ’’closed’’ migrant reception centers on the Aegean islands.

With the COVID-19 pandemic creating further challenges and complications for the operation of existing camps, most of which are under lockdown due to positive cases of the virus, the state is aiming to build new ’’permanent’’ structures, starting with one on Lesbos.

The situation on Lesbos is the primary concern right now, as the current temporary facility which was hastily set up in the Kara Tepe area on the coast after Moria was burned down, has already flooded twice with the first rainfalls of the season.

Lesbos Mayor Stratis Kytelis met with government officials in Athens last week to discuss the location of a new permanent facility on the island, although the plans are being met with resistance from local community groups.Greece’s health authorities, meanwhile, are also conducting regular COVID-19 tests at migrant camps on the Aegean islands to ensure that any outbreak is quickly contained.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/28139/greece-s-coast-guard-accused-of-mass-migrant-pushbacks

Frontex sous pression après des accusations de refoulement de migrants aux portes de la Grèce

C’est une première : mardi 10 novembre, le conseil d’administration de l’Agence européenne des garde-frontières et de garde-côtes Frontex devra examiner des accusations de refoulements illégaux (ou « pushbacks ») de migrants en mer Egée. Elles ont été portées contre Frontex par un groupe de médias. En octobre, le site d’investigation Bellingcat et le magazine Der Spiegel notamment, avaient rapporté, images et témoignages à l’appui, six épisodes au cours desquels des embarcations avaient été bloquées, contrairement aux règles internationales sur le non-refoulement.

Celles-ci stipulent que des personnes ne peuvent être renvoyées vers un pays, avant un examen de leur situation, si leur existence est en danger en raison de leur race, leur religion, leur nationalité ou leur appartenance à un groupe social ou politique.

Il aura apparemment fallu une intervention ferme de la Commission européenne pour que la direction de Frontex, devenue le premier corps en uniforme et la plus importante agence de l’Union avec un budget de quelque 500 millions d’euros, accepte de convoquer un conseil extraordinaire. Dans un premier temps, elle s’était contentée d’affirmer, le 24 octobre, qu’elle respectait la loi internationale et était en contact avec la Grèce, qui devait ouvrir « une enquête interne ».
Enquête interne

« Si l’agence est impliquée dans de telles actions, c’est totalement inacceptable », déclarait pour sa part la commissaire à la migration, Ylva Johansson, le 26 octobre. Le lendemain, Frontex promettait une enquête interne et, même si elle n’exerce pas une tutelle directe sur l’agence, la Commission obtenait la convocation d’une réunion. A charge pour Fabrice Leggeri, le directeur français, de fournir des explications détaillées.

« La Grèce ne participe pas à des refoulements, a affirmé de son côté le ministre grec des migrations, Notis Mitarachi. Nous gardons nos frontières en respectant le droit international et nous continuons à sauver des centaines de migrants tous les jours en Méditerranée », a-t-il précisé.

Athènes fait face depuis des mois à de nombreuses accusations de refoulement en mer Egée et à la frontière terrestre avec la Turquie, dans l’Evros. Le 14 août déjà, le New York Times avait affirmé que les gardes-côtes grecs avaient abandonné en « pleine mer » des canots remplis de migrants. Interviewé par CNN, le premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis avait démenti : « Cela n’est jamais arrivé. Nous sommes les victimes d’une vaste campagne de désinformation », suggérant que les journalistes avaient interrogé principalement des sources turques voulant décrédibiliser les autorités grecques.

Depuis l’envoi par la Turquie de milliers de réfugiés à la frontière terrestre de l’Evros, en mars, Athènes a toujours assuré vouloir « protéger ses frontières » qui sont aussi celles de l’Europe et faire face à « une menace ». Le gouvernement a renforcé le contrôle des frontières en embauchant notamment du personnel supplémentaire. Entre avril et juillet, les arrivées à Lesbos ont diminué de 85 % par rapport à l’année dernière, selon le ministère des migrations.
Des « abus sont trop nombreux pour être ignorés »

Pour de nombreuses ONG présentes sur le terrain, cette diminution spectaculaire est le résultat de « pushbacks ». Selon Human Rights Watch, « les preuves et les rapports décrivant les abus sont trop nombreux pour être ignorés ». L’organisation dit avoir interrogé des victimes et des témoins qui décrivent comment les garde-côtes grecs, la police, et des hommes masqués et vêtus d’habits sombres ont effectué depuis les îles de Rhodes, de Samos et Simi, des refoulements illégaux de personnes sur de petits canots gonflables.

A la fin août, le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) de l’ONU se disait « inquiet de l’augmentation des publications depuis mars 2020 attestant de refoulements illégaux ». « Le HCR a reçu des rapports et des témoignages de personnes abandonnées en pleine mer pendant un long moment, souvent sur des rafiots surpeuplés », précisait le communiqué.

L’Observatoire grec des accords d’Helsinki a déjà déposé une plainte auprès de la Cour suprême grecque pour le refoulement de plus de 1 300 personnes en s’appuyant sur les témoignages recueillis par plusieurs ONG. En septembre, 29 organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ont par ailleurs adressé une lettre au premier ministre et au parlement grecs pour réclamer une enquête. Leur courrier est encore sans réponse alors que 35 membres d’ONG font, eux, l’objet d’une investigation : ils sont suspectés d’avoir renseigné des migrants sur les positions des gardes-côtes ainsi que des passeurs sur des lieux d’accostage. Ces humanitaires travaillent pour des organisations qui ont dénoncé avec le plus de véhémence les refoulements vers la Turquie par les gardes-côtes grecs.

Frontex, qui a engagé en Grèce quelque six cents agents dotés de divers moyens de surveillance, a déjà fait l’objet d’autres accusations mais affirme à chaque fois respecter un code de conduite qui prohibe strictement les refoulements. La communication très cadenassée de l’agence ne détaille toutefois pas comment les contrôles sont vraiment exercés. L’action du service interne chargé de contrôler le respect des droits fondamentaux reste également nébuleuse. Une situation déplorée par le HCR, membre du forum consultatif chargé de conseiller l’agence européenne dans son action.

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/05/frontex-sous-pression-apres-des-accusations-de-refoulement-de-migrants-aux-p

EU: Probe Frontex Complicity in Border Abuses. Ensure Independent and Effective Investigation

The top governing body of the European Union Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) should urgently establish an independent inquiry into allegations of its involvement in unlawful operations to stop migrants from reaching the European Union (EU), Human Rights Watch said today.

The agency’s board will hold an extraordinary meeting on November 10, 2020. Frontex should also address serious and persistent violations by border and law enforcement officers of the countries where it operates.

“The fact that Frontex may have become complicit in abuses at Greece’s borders is extremely serious,” said Eva Cossé, Western Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Management Board of Frontex should quickly open an inquiry into Frontex involvement in – or actions to disregard or cover up – abuses against people seeking protection from conflicts and persecution.”

On October 23, a group of media outlets published a detailed investigative report alleging Frontex involvement in pushback operations at the Greek-Turkish maritime border, in the Aegean Sea. The reports said that asylum seekers and migrants were prevented from reaching EU soil or were forced out of EU waters. Such pushbacks violate international law, Human Rights Watch said.

EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson said on October 28 that she had asked, in coordination with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, “to convene an urgent extraordinary Frontex Management Board meeting on 10 November, to discuss alleged push-back incidents in Greece and fundamental rights protection.”

Frontex’s mandate obliges officers and the officers of member states deployed to respect fundamental rights, but the agency has been under heavy criticism for the shortcomings of its internal monitoring and accountability mechanisms. On October 27, Frontex announced an internal inquiry into the incidents reported by the media.

In recent years, nongovernmental groups and media outlets have consistently reported the unlawful return, including through pushbacks, of groups and individuals from Greece to Turkey, by Greek law enforcement officers or unidentified masked men who appear to be working in tandem with border enforcement officials.

Since Frontex deployed officers along the full length of the Turkey-Greece land border in March, Human Rights Watch has documented that Greek law enforcement officers routinely summarily returned asylum seekers and migrants through the land border with Turkey. Human Rights Watch found that officers in some cases used violence and often confiscated and destroyed migrants’ belongings.

Greek authorities have said that police officers wearing dark blue uniforms work at police stations. Border patrol police officers wear military camouflage uniforms. Frontex guards wear their national uniforms, with a blue armband with the EU flag.

In July, Human Rights Watch documented collective expulsions, through the Evros river land border, of asylum seekers rounded up from deep inside Greece.

In a June 19 response to questions posed by Human Rights Watch, Frontex wrote that no abuses against migrants by Greek border guards or by police or border guards of other EU member states deployed under Frontex had been reported to Frontex. It said that Frontex does not have the authority to investigate allegations of abuse by EU member states’ police or border guards deployed in Greece. It said that such investigations are conducted by the competent national authorities.

In June, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said it was deeply concerned about persistent reports of pushbacks and collective expulsions of migrants, in some cases violent, at Greece’s border with Turkey. In August, the UN Refugee Agency flagged concerns over the increasing number of credible reports of pushbacks at Greece’s land and sea borders.

In May 2019, Frontex told Human Rights Watch that it had not detected any human rights violations or pushbacks during its operational presence at Croatia’s border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite consistent evidence of brutal pushbacks, reports from international and regional organizations, and the confirmation by Croatian officials that such abuses were taking place.

Under the Frontex mandate, its executive director has the authority to, and should, withdraw financing, and suspend or terminate its activities if there are serious violations of fundamental rights related to its activities. The executive director is also expected to take into account information provided by relevant international organizations.

On July 6, during a debate at the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on fundamental rights at the Greek border, Johansson said that pushbacks by Greek border guards should be investigated. In its new Pact on Migration and Asylum, presented on September 23, the European Commission recommended to member states to set up an independent monitoring mechanism, amid increased allegations of abuse at the EU’s external borders.

Members of the Frontex Management Board should set up an independent, prompt, effective, transparent, and impartial investigation into allegations that officers deployed by Frontex were involved in unlawful operations of pushbacks of asylum seekers. Any officer found to have engaged in such illegal acts, as well as their commanding officers and officials who have command responsibility over such forces, should be subject to disciplinary and criminal sanctions, as applicable.

The investigation should also identify whether Frontex failed to report or otherwise address allegations of serious fundamental rights violations committed by law enforcement or border officers of the member state hosting operations.

“An EU agency with a clear mandate to act in compliance with fundamental rights has the responsibility to do everything possible to prevent such severe violations,” Cossé said. “If Frontex not only turned a blind eye to abuses committed under its sight, or worse, directly took part in them, it becomes every EU member state’s responsibility.”

▻https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/09/eu-probe-frontex-complicity-border-abuses

Frontex calls for committee to consider questions related to sea surveillance

Today, Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri has called for the creation of an evaluation committee to consider legal questions related to the Agency’s surveillance of external sea borders and accommodating the concerns raised by Member States about “hybrid threats” affecting their national security at external borders where the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will deploy its standing corps.

Under the Frontex proposal, the committee would be coordinated by the European Commission with the participation of Member States on a volunteer basis. It would address various questions, in particular those related to Regulation 2014/656 in the light of the current operational situation.

https://frontex.europa.eu/thumb/Images_News/2019/DSC01483.prop_750x.8c1ad27d24.jpg

Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri also expressed the Agency’s continued commitment to highest standards of protection of fundamental rights.

“Any allegation of misconduct or infringement of international treaties or fundamental rights in the framework of joint operations coordinated by Frontex is treated with grave concern and carefully investigated,” said Fabrice Leggeri.

“I am committed to reinforce the office of the Fundamental Rights Officer and to gradually increase its budget,” he added.

Leggeri also proposed that the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer to play a bigger role in raising awareness of the operational officers on the legal requirements that they need to apply on everyday basis in the field.

“This could apply not only to the Frontex-deployed staff, but also to the staff of the International Coordination Centres, who often play an essential part in deciding to react to complicated events,” Leggeri said.

▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-calls-for-committee-to-consider-questions-related-to-sea-surv

#Ombudsman opens inquiry to assess European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) ‘#Complaints_Mechanism’

European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly has opened an inquiry to look into how the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) deals with alleged breaches of fundamental rights. In particular, the investigation will assess the effectiveness and transparency of Frontex’s Complaints Mechanism for those who believe their rights have been violated in the context of Frontex border operations, as well as the role and independence of Frontex’s ‘Fundamental Rights Officer’.

In 2013, as part of a previous inquiry, the Ombudsman recommended that Frontex set up an individual complaints mechanism, and that its Fundamental Rights Officer be in charge of the mechanism. Since then, such a mechanism was put in place and further developed, with a view to providing safeguards for fundamental rights in the context of Frontex’s expanding mandate, as well as ensuring increased accountability and redress for those impacted by its actions.

This inquiry focuses on whether the Complaints Mechanism and the Fundamental Rights Officer are truly empowered to deal with the issues faced by migrants and asylum seekers who feel their rights have been violated under Frontex operations.

In opening the inquiry, the Ombudsman has sent a set of detailed questions to Frontex on the Complaints Mechanism and the Fundamental Rights Officer. She has also informed members of the European Network of Ombudsmen (ENO), with a view to their possible participation in the inquiry, as part of the ENO’s parallel work. This is important, given the role of national authorities in Frontex operations, and the fact that some national ombudsmen are responsible for following up on complaints related to this.

Among other things, the questions set out by the Ombudsman look at: how and when Frontex will be updating the mechanism to reflect its expanded mandate; what happens to complainants who are faced with forced return while their complaint is still being processed; what appeal possibilities are open to complainants; how Frontex monitors complaints against national authorities; how those who have been affected by Frontex operations but are in non-EU countries can complain about alleged breaches of fundamental rights, including the issue of language; and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer in this process.

▻https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/news-document/en/134739