#apatridie

  • En #Côte_d’Ivoire, une vie suspendue dans le temps pour les éleveurs peuls

    Dans la chaleur de l’après-midi, une dame âgée se penche en avant dans la pièce sombre.

    « On me considère comme une étrangère ici. C’est très désagréable, mais que faire ? »

    Aminata Sidibé calcule son âge en se basant sur l’année de son mariage et celle de l’indépendance de la Côte d’Ivoire. Les deux événements ont eu lieu en 1960. Elle pense qu’elle avait 15 ans à l’époque. Elle serait donc aujourd’hui âgée de 74 ans, ou plus.

    Aminata ne connaît peut-être pas son âge exact mais, à sa manière, elle a ses certitudes : « je suis née, je me suis mariée et j’ai eu mes enfants ici. Et c’est ici que j’ai des petits-enfants et même des arrière-petits-enfants. »

    « On me considère comme une étrangère ici. C’est très désagréable, mais que faire ? »

    Aminata Sidibé et sa famille sont des Peuls, un groupe ethnique d’éleveurs de bétail disséminés dans une douzaine de pays d’Afrique. Bien qu’elle soit la matriarche d’une famille élargie de 45 personnes dont les racines remontent à plusieurs générations en Côte d’Ivoire, pour le pays où vit Aminata, elle et les siens sont des étrangers.

    Le problème de sa famille s’explique par l’absence de citoyenneté que la Côte d’Ivoire ne reconnait que par le droit du sang en réclamant qu’au moins l’un des parents soit ivoirien. Il ne suffit pas d’être né en Côte d’Ivoire. Officiellement, Aminata et le reste de sa famille sont des « Burkinabés », des descendants de ressortissants du Burkina Faso voisin, une distinction qui les expose aux risques de l’apatridie. Du fait que plusieurs générations aient vécu hors du territoire, le Burkina Faso ne peut pas non plus les reconnaître en tant que citoyens.

    « Nous n’avons pas notre place ici », explique le fils d’Animata, Seydou Tall, 56 ans, né en Côte d’Ivoire et titulaire d’un certificat de naissance. Seydou possède un large troupeau. « Je ne veux pas d’une carte consulaire disant que je suis du Burkina Faso. Je ne le suis pas. Je veux avoir la nationalité de mon pays. »

    Dans le monde entier, on recense des millions de personnes sans nationalité. Toute leur vie, les apatrides sont confrontés à des inégalités et à des obstacles qui les empêchent d’exercer leurs droits fondamentaux tels que l’éducation, les soins de santé, l’emploi et la libre circulation.

    En Côte d’Ivoire, le nombre de personnes dépourvues de documents d’identité et risquant l’apatridie - comme les Peuls - est préoccupant. La Côte d’Ivoire a évalué sa population apatride à près de 700 000 personnes à la fin 2017. Cependant, une étude détaillée actuellement en préparation devrait permettre d’obtenir un nombre plus précis et beaucoup plus élevé de personnes apatrides ou risquant l’apatridie.

    Seydou explique qu’avec la nationalité ivoirienne, les membres de sa famille pourraient trouver des emplois qualifiés. Sans certificat de nationalité, ils ne peuvent pas postuler à un emploi formel, ni ouvrir un compte bancaire ou obtenir un permis de conduire.

    Les Peuls sont éleveurs de bétail, sans avoir le droit d’acheter des terres. Le droit de la famille qui s’applique à leurs terres dépend d’un accord privé avec l’ancien propriétaire qui ne leur confère aucune prérogative légale.

    Pour la famille, le chemin vers la citoyenneté est long. Monique Saraka, secrétaire générale de l’Association ivoirienne des femmes juristes, s’est rendue dans la petite ville pour dispenser des conseils à la famille sur leur statut.

    « Beaucoup de Peuls n’ont pas reçu d’éducation formelle et craignent de s’adresser aux autorités », déclare-t-elle. « La plupart n’ont même pas de certificat de naissance. »

    Monique Saraka prédit que, malheureusement, leur chemin vers la nationalité sera difficile ; les membres de la famille devraient déposer une demande de naturalisation.

    « C’est un processus long et lent », concède-t-elle. « Les personnes qui soumettent une demande peuvent attendre 10 ans, ou davantage encore. De plus, il y a la question du coût. Donc, les personnes, surtout dans les régions rurales, sont confrontées à tout cela et se découragent. Elles abandonnent. »

    Son association, avec l’appui du HCR, l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, plaide depuis 2015 pour que des changements soient apportés au système de demande de naturalisation. Le premier objectif est de faciliter l’obtention des documents de base, comme les certificats de naissance. Le gouvernement est sur le point d’adopter une loi rendant le processus gratuit pendant un an.

    Lever les obstacles à l’obtention de la nationalité ivoirienne prendra beaucoup plus de temps. Une loi temporaire ivoirienne facilitant la naturalisation a expiré en 2016.

    « Nous espérons que cette loi sera réintroduite et ajoutée à celle portant sur la nationalité. Ces personnes sont en Côte d’Ivoire depuis quatre générations », explique Monique Saraka. « Il est difficile de les imaginer avec une autre nationalité qu’ivoirienne. »

    La bonne nouvelle, c’est qu’à l’exception d’Aminata qui a perdu ses papiers après le décès de son mari, toutes les générations de sa famille ont un certificat de naissance. Alors que leur quête de citoyenneté ivoirienne se poursuit, les plus jeunes enfants peuvent au moins aller à l’école et s’imaginer un avenir avec les avantages d’une nationalité.

    « J’aime l’histoire, j’aime apprendre le passé », s’enthousiasme Boukary, 15 ans, qui va à l’école depuis cinq ans. « J’aimerais être policier. Je veux parler aux gens et séparer les bons des mauvais. »

    Adiba et Aïsha ont respectivement 13 et 12 ans, et toutes deux veulent devenir enseignantes. Cependant, sans document d’identité, elles ne peuvent pas poursuivre leurs études au-delà de l’enseignement secondaire.

    Dans sa chambre, Aminata, la matriarche, semble résignée à son statut actuel mais elle garde espoir.

    « Je laisse à mes fils le soin de prendre les décisions concernant les papiers », partage-t-elle. « Les gens peuvent dire ce qu’ils veulent, je ne me suis jamais sentie menacée. Même s’ils disent que je suis une étrangère, je leur pardonne. Je m’en remets à Dieu. »

    https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/stories/2019/5/5cd52d4fa/cote-divoire-vie-suspendue-temps-eleveurs-peuls.html
    #apatridie #peuls #éleveurs #nationalité #citoyenneté

  • Paperless people of #post-conflict Iraq

    During the conflict with the Islamic State group (IS), six million Iraqi citizens were forced to flee their homes. Since the end of the conflict, more than four million have returned home, while 1.7 million people still live in displacement. These families struggle to access basic services and face often insurmountable roadblocks to either returning home or rebuilding a life elsewhere. Many, whether still in displacement or returned home, are unable to enjoy their rights as Iraqi citizens and fully engage in the recovery and reconstruction of post-conflict Iraq.

    A foundational reason for this is they do not have proof of their legal identity. Some people lost their documents as they fled their homes; others had them confiscated by various parties to the conflict; and yet others were issued IS documentation, which is of no value now. These paperless people, as a result of lacking critical state-issued civil documents, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, nationality cards and civil IDs, find themselves denied human rights, barred from a range of public services and excluded from recovery and reconstruction efforts.

    Local and international humanitarian agencies like the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) have collectively helped tens of thousands of Iraqis over the last few years obtain, renew, or replace civil documents lost as a result of the most recent crisis. However, an estimated 80,000 families across the country still have family i members missing at least one civil document. The number of children missing documents is likely much higher. At least 45,000 displaced children living in camps alone are estimated to be missing birth certificates. Without these essential civil papers, they are at risk of statelessness and find it incredibly difficult to access services such as education and healthcare.

    This report, based on research conducted by NRC in partnership with DRC and IRC, through the Cash Consortium for Iraq (CCI) shows how a significant portion of Iraqi families living in urban areas formerly under IS control are being denied basic services because they are paperless.


    https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/paperless-people-of-post-conflict-iraq
    #papiers_d'identité #réfugiés #asile #migrations #apatridie #Irak #guerre #conflit #IDPs #déplacés_internes
    #rapport

  • En #Inde, près de deux millions de citoyens, la plupart #musulmans, déchus de leur #nationalité

    La Cour suprême exclut de nombreux citoyens des registres d’état civil de l’#Etat_de_l’Assam.


    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/08/31/en-inde-pres-de-deux-millions-de-citoyens-la-plupart-musulmans-dechus-de-leu
    #citoyenneté #apatridie #Assam #apatrides

    –---------

    En 2018, le Courrier international titrait :
    Inde. Quatre millions d’habitants de l’Assam considérés comme apatrides
    https://seenthis.net/messages/712102

    • India builds detention camps for up to 1.9m people ‘stripped of citizenship’ in Assam

      Ten centres ‘planned’ across northeastern state after national register published
      The Indian government is building mass detention camps after almost two million people were told they could be effectively stripped of citizenship.

      Around 1.9m people in the north-eastern state of Assam were excluded when India published the state’s final National Register of Citizens (NRC) list in August.

      Those excluded from the register will have to appeal to prove they are citizens. The UN and other international rights groups have expressed concern that many could be rendered stateless.

      The citizenship list is part of a drive to detect illegal immigrants in Assam.

      The Indian government claims that the migrants have arrived from neighbouring Muslim-majority Bangladesh.

      Critics say that the register has upended the lives of Muslims who have lived legally in the state for decades.

      Record keeping in parts of rural India is poor and many, including those building the camps, have been caught out by the NRC’s stringent requirements.

      “We don’t have birth certificates,” Malati Hajong, one of the labourers working at a site near the village of Goalpara, told the Reuters news agency.

      The Goalpara camp is one of at least 10 planned detention centres, according to local media reports.

      It is around the size of seven football pitches and designed to hold 3,000 people.

      Officials plan to have a school and hospital at the centre, as well as a high boundary wall and watchtowers for the security forces.

      Critics have accused the Modi administration of using the NRC to target Assam’s large Muslim community.

      But the government says it is simply complying with an order from India’s Supreme Court, which said the NRC had been delayed for too long and set a strict deadline for its completion.

      Government sources say those excluded from the list retain their rights and have 120 days to appeal at local “Foreigners Tribunals”. If that fails, they can take their cases to the High Court of Assam and ultimately the Supreme Court. What happens to those who fail at all levels of appeal is yet to be decided, they said.

      Last month the local chapter of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party expressed dismay after it became apparent that many Hindus had also been excluded from the list.

      Officials said the government may pass legislation to protect legitimate citizens.

      The government is already in the process of bringing legislation to grant citizenship to Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist immigrants from neighbouring countries.

      Muslim immigrants are not included in the law.

      The nationalist, hardline Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) group also called for genuine citizens to be included in the list after it emerged that Hindus had been affected. The RSS and BJP are closely affiliated.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/assam-india-detention-camps-bangladesh-nrc-list-a9099251.html

      #camps_de_détention #détention

    • India Takes Step Toward Blocking Naturalization for Muslims

      A bill establishing a religious test for immigrants has passed the lower house of Parliament, a major step for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu-nationalist agenda.

      India took a major step toward the official marginalization of Muslims on Tuesday as one house of Parliament passed a bill that would establish a religious test for migrants who want to become citizens, solidifying Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu-nationalist agenda.

      The measure would give migrants of all of South Asia’s major religions a clear path to Indian citizenship — except Islam. It is the most significant move yet to profoundly alter India’s secular nature enshrined by its founding leaders when the country gained independence in 1947.

      The bill passed in the lower house, the Lok Sabha, a few minutes after midnight, following a few hours of debate. The vote was 311 to 80. The measure now moves to the upper house, the Rajya Sabha, where Mr. Modi seems to have enough allies that most analysts predict it will soon become law.

      Muslim Indians are deeply unsettled. They see the new measure, called the Citizenship Amendment Bill, as the first step by the governing party to make second-class citizens of India’s 200 million Muslims, one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, and render many of them stateless.
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      “We are heading toward totalitarianism, a fascist state,” said Asaduddin Owaisi, a Muslim lawmaker, who on Monday dramatically tore up a copy of the bill while giving a speech in Parliament. “We are making India a theocratic country.”

      The legislation goes hand in hand with a contentious program that began in the northeastern state of Assam this year, in which all 33 million residents of the state had to prove, with documentary evidence, that they or their ancestors were Indian citizens. Approximately two million people — many of them Muslims, and many of them lifelong residents of India — were left off the state’s citizenship rolls after that exercise.

      Now, Mr. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, or B.J.P., is hoping to expand that kind of citizenship test to other states. And the new legislation would become a guiding principle for who could hope to call themselves Indians.

      Mr. Modi and his party are deeply rooted in an ideology that sees India as a Hindu nation. And since the B.J.P.’s landslide re-election win in May, Mr. Modi’s administration has celebrated one Hindu nationalist victory after another, each a demoralizing drumbeat for Muslims.
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      First came the Assam citizenship tests. Then Mr. Modi stripped away autonomy and statehood for Kashmir, which used to be India’s only Muslim-majority state. And last month, Hindu fundamentalists scored a big court victory allowing them to build a new temple over the ruins of a demolished mosque in the flash point city of Ayodhya.

      With the new citizenship bill, Mr. Modi’s party says it is simply trying to protect persecuted Hindus, Buddhists and Christians (and members of a few smaller religions) who migrate from predominantly Muslim countries such as Pakistan or Afghanistan.

      But the legislation would also make it easier to incarcerate and deport Muslim residents, even those whose families have been in India for generations, if they cannot produce proof of citizenship.

      Under Mr. Modi’s leadership, anti-Muslim sentiment has become blatantly more mainstream and public. Intimidation and attacks against Muslim communities have increased in recent years. And overt displays of Hindu piety and nationalism have become central in pop culture and politics.

      Mr. Modi’s fellow lawmakers in the B.J.P. are unapologetic about their pro-Hindu position.

      “There are Muslim countries, there are Jew countries, everybody has their own identity. And we are a billion-plus, right? We must have one identity,” said Ravi Kishan, a famous action-film hero and member of Parliament who is a central supporter of the citizenship legislation.

      When asked if he was trying to turn India into a Hindu nation, he laughed. “India has always been a Hindu nation,” he said. “The Muslims also are Hindus.” (This is a common Hindu nationalist belief: that India’s Muslims are relatively recent converts, even though Islam arrived in India hundreds of years ago.)

      Even before lawmakers in the Lok Sabha voted, protests were breaking out.

      In Assam, where the citizenship program began last summer, thousands of people have marched in the streets, hoisting placards and torches and shouting out their opposition to the bill.

      People are talking of mass fasts and boycotts of schools and markets. On Monday, some hanged effigies of Mr. Modi and his right-hand man, Amit Shah, the home minister.

      The leaders of the opposition Indian National Congress party are trying to paint the bill as a danger to India’s democracy. After India won its independence, its founding leaders, Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru among them, made a clear decision: Even though the country was 80 percent Hindu, it would not be an officially Hindu nation. Minorities, especially Muslims, would be treated equally.

      Rahul Gandhi, a party leader and great-grandson of Mr. Nehru, said, “India belongs to everybody — all communities, all religions, all cultures.” Shashi Tharoor, the party’s intellectual heavyweight, called the bill an “all-out assault on the very idea of India.”

      But the Congress party is at a low point in its 100-year-plus history. And Mr. Modi’s party has the numbers: With allies, it controls nearly two-thirds of the seats in the lower house.

      Some of Mr. Modi’s critics believe the bill is serving to distract the public from another pressing issue: the economy. For the first time in decades, India’s economy is slowing significantly. It is still huge, but several big industries, like car and motorcycle manufacturing, have seen sales plummet like never before.

      “The economy is in tatters,” said Aman Wadud, a human rights lawyer in Assam. The bill, he said, was “the only issue left to polarize the country and distract people.”

      But forging India into an overtly Hindu nation has been a core goal of Mr. Modi’s party and of the R.S.S., a right-wing volunteer group whose ranks Mr. Modi rose up through and which provides him a backbone of support. And India’s recent moves in Kashmir, along with the Ayodhya temple ruling and the Assam citizenship tests, have been hugely popular with the prime minister’s base.

      Earlier this year, Mr. Modi’s government tried to push similar citizenship legislation. The bill sailed through the lower house but stalled after many politicians in Assam said they did not like the religious dimension the B.J.P. was injecting — or the possibility that a large number of Hindu Bengalis would be made citizens and would be able to legally acquire land in Assam.

      The bill gathered new momentum this fall, after the citizenship test in Assam. Assam has witnessed waves of migration over the years, and many of those people whose citizenship was being questioned were migrants, both Hindus and Muslims, from neighboring Bangladesh.

      Mr. Shah, the home minister and architect of the B.J.P.’s recent political victories, promised to protect the Hindus and other non-Muslims. He has called illegal migrants from Bangladesh “termites,” and along with his other statements made clear that Muslims were his target. Mr. Shah has also promised to impose the citizenship test from Assam on the entire country.

      The citizenship bill is a piece of the campaign to identify and deport Muslims who have been living in India for years, critics of the bill say. It lays out a path to Indian citizenship for migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan if they can prove they have been in India for at least five years and ascribe to the specified religions.

      To overcome the resistance from politicians in Assam, who do not want Hindu or Muslim migrants taking their land, the new version of the bill carves out special protections for areas predominated by indigenous people.

      Mr. Modi’s supporters employ a certain logic when defending the bill’s exclusion of Muslims. They say Muslims are not persecuted in Pakistan, Bangladesh or Afghanistan, which is mostly true. They also say that when India and Pakistan were granted independence in 1947, the British carved out Pakistan as a haven for Muslims, while India remained predominantly Hindu. To them, the extension of that process is to ask illegal Muslims migrants to leave India and seek refuge in neighboring, mainly Muslim nations.

      Article 25 of the Indian Constitution says, “All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.” Given that, many opponents of the bill say the citizenship legislation is patently unconstitutional. But the Hindu nationalists have an answer for that, as well.

      “We are not talking about citizens,” said Ramesh Shinde, a spokesman for the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, a Hindu organization that is considered a far-right group. “We are talking about migrants.”

      Both sides agree on one thing: The bill could have far-reaching consequences.

      The Indian government is already racing to build an enormous network of prisons to house thousands of migrants. If immigration law is applied selectively, Hindu migrants who are swept up in raids may be released and allowed to apply for citizenship, while Muslim migrants could instead be sent to detention camps, opponents say.

      “In every state, Muslims are running around for papers,” said Mr. Wadud, the human rights lawyer in Assam. “An environment of fear has been created.”

      Mr. Kishan, the action hero turned politician, said he would next push to change India’s name to Bharat, the traditional Hindi word for India. But he said that he was not anti-Muslim, and that Muslims living in India legally had nothing to fear.

      “How can I be anti-Muslim? My staff in Mumbai is Muslim,” he said.

      “Hindus and Muslims in India are like this,” he said, interlacing his fingers. “But,” he added with a big smile, “I love Hindus.”

      https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/india-muslims-citizenship-narendra-modi.html

  • “En Colombia hay cerca de 20.000 niños en condición de apatridia”: Juan Ignacio Mondelli

    El oficial regional de Protección de Acnur explica por qué quienes nacen sin una nacionalidad definida se enfrentan a privaciones de derechos básicos como la salud y la educación. El drama de nacer en un Estado, pero no ser reconocidos legalmente.

    https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/en-colombia-hay-cerca-de-20000-ninos-en-condicion-de-apatridia-juan-ig
    #apatridie #chiffres #statistiques #Colombie

  • Un #index sur l’#apatridie compare 18 pays européens et montre que la #Suisse est à la traîne

    Les personnes apatrides sont parmi les plus vulnérables du globe. Elles n’ont tout simplement pas le “droit d’avoir des droits” comme l’expliquait Hannah Arendt. Pour les personnes apatrides, accéder à l’éducation, aux soins, au marché du travail, à la justice ou même à l’ouverture d’un compte en banque, est impossible. En plus, les personnes apatrides sans titre de séjour sont souvent arbitrairement placées en détention administrative bien qu’aucun renvoi (vers quel pays ?) n’est possible. Le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU aux réfugiés (HCR) estime que l’apatridie concerne plus de 10 millions de personnes dans le monde et près de 500’000 personnes en Europe.
    L’Index sur l’apatridie

    L’Index a été mis sur pied par le Réseau européen sur l’apatridie (European Network on Statelessness). Il permet de comparer et évaluer la législation, les politiques et les pratiques des pays européens en matière de protection, de prévention et de réduction de l’apatridie par rapport aux normes et aux bonnes pratiques internationales.

    Depuis février 2019, il permet de comparer simultanément 17 pays européens (Bulgarie, Italie, Lettonie, Norvège, Hongrie, France, Allemagne, Macédoine, Moldavie, Pays Bas, Pologne, Serbie, Slovénie, Royaume Uni, Ukraine, Chypre) en plus de la Suisse sur quatre thèmes principaux : la ratification des principaux traités de protection des personnes apatrides, le comptage des personnes apatrides, la détermination du statut d’apatride, la détention, la prévention et la réduction des apatrides. L’accès à l’index est gratuit et mis à disposition des ONG, des différents services gouvernementaux, des avocats et juristes, des chercheurs et des personnes apatrides elles-mêmes.
    Les manquements à l’égard des apatrides en Suisse

    En comparaison de beaucoup d’autres pays la Suisse est mauvais élève (1). Sur l’index, l’information détaillée sur la pratique des autorités est fournie par la plateforme d’information Humanrights.ch qui insiste sur les mesures légales, administratives et pratiques que la Suisse doit entreprendre pour mieux protéger les apatrides.

    “L’index permet de constater que la Suisse présente une faible protection des personnes apatrides en comparaison des autres États européens, même s’il existe certaines mesures spécifiques positives (voir notre article sur l’apatridie en Suisse). Elle gère plutôt bien l’enregistrement d’enfants nouveaux nés apatrides. Elle fait également en sorte que les pratiques liées à l’adoption ne conduisent pas à créer de nouveaux cas d’apatridie. Idem pour les enfants trouvés. La Suisse ne dispose cependant d’aucune mesure de protection pour les enfants qui naissent apatrides sur son sol, ce qui viole le droit de l’enfant à acquérir une nationalité, comme le spécifient pourtant l’art. 24 du Pacte ONU II et l’art. 7 de la Convention des droits de l’enfant (voir notre article sur les enfants apatrides).”
    Quelques recommandations du HCR

    Notre pays est donc très en retard sur la ratification des traités protégeant les personnes apatrides. En 1972 elle a ratifié la Convention relative au statut des apatrides (1954) qu’elle interprète à sa guise. Elle devrait aussi ratifier la Convention de 1961 sur la réduction des cas d’apatridie, la Convention européenne sur la nationalité de 1997 et la Convention de 2006 sur la prévention des cas d’apatridie en relation avec la succession d’États (2).

    Il est impératif que la Suisse ait une loi spécifique qui réglemente, comme dans neuf autres pays, la procédure de reconnaissance des apatrides. Actuellement, la procédure d’octroi du permis de séjour accordé aux personnes reconnues comme apatrides se base sur le droit général de la procédure administrative. Une loi spéciale permettrait de définir non seulement le statut juridique des personnes concernées en cours de procédure, mais aussi de prévoir des auditions et déterminerait mieux le fardeau de la preuve ainsi que les conditions recours.

    Une autre pratique problématique concerne la #détention_administrative des personnes apatrides. En Suisse, l’apatridie n’est pas considérée comme un fait juridiquement pertinent dans les décisions de détention et un pays de renvoi n’a pas besoin d’être identifié avant la détention. La détention peut aussi être ordonnée pendant que les autorités établissent l’identité de la personne. Si la loi prévoit quelques alternatives à la détention, elles ne sont que rarement appliquées. Actuellement, on ne sait d’ailleurs pas combien de personnes apatrides se trouvent en détention administrative en Suisse en vertu du droit des étrangers.

    https://blogs.letemps.ch/jasmine-caye/2019/04/08/un-index-sur-lapatridie-compare-18-pays-europeens-et-montre-que-la-sui
    #vulnérabilité #rétention #Europe #comparaison

    par @forumasile

  • ‘Where are you from?’ Facing fines and bureaucracy, refugee children in Jordan go undocumented

    Located off the highway in the southern Amman suburbs, the Syrian embassy in Jordan almost looks like it’s made for long waits.

    It’s a quiet day outside, as a group of elderly Syrians wearing traditional keffiyeh scarves sit on a patch of grass next to the sand-colored building smoking cigarettes and passing the time.

    Aside from two flags attached to the roof of the embassy, the steel bars across the windows—shaped in classic Umayyad patterns—are one of the few hints of the otherwise rather anonymous building’s affiliation with Damascus.

    On the wall between the counters, a large bulletin board is plastered with instructions for various civil status procedures: births, marriages and identity cards. Flyers address the “brothers and sisters of the nation” waiting quietly outside.

    But not all Syrians feel welcome here.

    “I feel uncomfortable going to the embassy,” says Bassam al-Karmi, a Syrian refugee in Jordan originally from Deir e-Zor.

    “I can’t control my feelings and might start rambling on about politics and other things,” he explains, adding with a laugh, “I really can’t stand seeing the red [Syrian] flag, either.”

    If possible, al-Karmi says, he avoids approaching the embassy. But when he had his first daughter two years ago, there was no way around it. That’s where he needed to go to register her birth—at least if he wanted her to be recognized as a Syrian national.

    At last week’s international “Brussels III” donor conference, Jordan was commended for its efforts to provide Syrians with legal documentation. The civil status department of Jordan’s Ministry of Interior even maintains a presence in refugee camps, tasked with issuing official birth certificates.

    But acquiring Jordanian documents is only one part of the process. Having them authenticated by the Syrian authorities is a whole other story.

    According to several Syrian refugees in Jordan, bureaucratic procedures, lack of information and high costs are deterring them from registering their children’s births at the Syrian embassy—leaving thousands of Jordanian-born Syrian children without proof of nationality, and some potentially at risk of statelessness.

    When Ahmad Qablan’s second son was born in 2014, one year after the family’s arrival in Jordan, he went through all the procedures and paperwork that were required of him to register them first with the Jordanian authorities and then with the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR.

    When his third son was born, he did the same.

    Even so, years later, neither of them have Syrian documents officially proving their nationality.

    A resident of a refugee camp some 70 kilometers east of the capital, Qablan would have to travel for two and a half hours each way to get Syrian birth certificates for his two sons—by submitting the papers at the Syrian embassy—only to come back again a week later to pick them up.

    But the biggest obstacle to registering, he says, is the fees involved with late registration.

    Even though, as a teacher, Qablan claims to have one of the highest salaries in the camp, the family is only just getting by, he says.

    “Why would I go spend that money at the embassy?”

    If a Syrian child is registered at the embassy later than three months after his or her birth, a $50 fine is added on top of the standard $75 registration fees. For a delay of more than a year, the fine goes up to $100.

    According to al-Karmi, those costs make families postpone the procedure. But the longer they wait, the more expensive it gets. As a result, he and others around him find themselves caught in a spiral of increasing costs.

    “You know the fees will increase,” he says, “but in the end people keep postponing and saying, ‘Maybe there’s another solution’.”

    According to a source from the Syrian embassy, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the press, some refugees even choose to send family members across the border to go through the procedures in Syria itself just to save on consular fees.

    Reports: ‘125,000’ Syrian refugee children born in Jordan

    Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising and ensuing conflict, more than 125,000 Syrian children are estimated to have been born on Jordainan soil, according to reports in Jordanian media. However, with many children going unregistered with the Jordanian government, an accurate number can be hard to find.

    UNHCR counts 107,268 children under the age of five in Jordan.

    Even though the Jordanian government has issued nearly 80,000 birth certificates to Syrian children born in Jordan since 2015, experts say that the vast majority of those remain unregistered with the Syrian embassy.

    One of the largest obstacles to registration, according to aid workers and Syrian refugees alike, is a lack of information about the procedures.

    A former Daraa resident, Qasem a-Nizami attempted to navigate registration after the birth of his now three-month-old daughter, but he wasn’t sure of where to start.

    According to a UN source speaking to Syria Direct on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press, there is no coordination between UNHCR and the Syrian embassy.

    However, refugees can consult UNHCR about steps they need to take to register civil status procedures in Jordan.

    After asking around in his community and finally talking to the Jordanian Civil Status Department’s office in Zaatari camp, where he resides—sometimes receiving contradictory information—a-Nizami soon discovered that the procedures were much more complicated than he thought.

    To get a birth certificate at the Syrian embassy, refugees need to present the passport of the mother and father as well as a Jordanian birth certificate and marriage contract validated by the embassy.

    When a-Nizami got married in Syria, his town was under siege, and—like many other Syrians—the couple wasn’t able to access the government civil registries responsible for recording civil status events. Instead, the couple settled with a traditional Islamic marriage, involving a sheikh and witnesses.

    Today, a-Nizami has finally registered his marriage with the Jordanian authorities and is currently waiting to get the papers.

    “I can’t register my daughter until I’m finished with the trouble that I’m going through now,” he says.

    ‘Undocumented children’

    According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), having valid identity papers is crucial for refugees to access basic rights in a host country like Jordan, and children lacking a Jordanian birth certificate are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking and child marriage.

    “Undocumented children in Jordan cannot prove their identity, access justice and face difficulties in enjoying rights,” the NRC said in an email to Syria Direct.

    The worst case scenario is that some children end up stateless—and because of Syria’s patrilineal nationality laws, this is particularly a risk for female-headed households unable to prove the nationality of the father.

    But a lack of Syrian documents issued by the country’s embassy also has much more immediate consequences.

    Since the Jaber-Naseeb border crossing between Syria and Jordan reopened for traffic in October after a three-year closure, at least 12,842 Syrians have made the trip across the border, according to the UNHCR.

    Crossing the border, however, either requires a passport or an exit permit issued by the Syrian embassy in Jordan—neither of which can be obtained without Syrian identity documents.

    For years, experts have advocated that the lack of civil documentation could be one of the most significant barriers to the return of Syrian refugees, and as governments, UN bodies and humanitarian organizations increasingly grapple with the infinitely complex question of return, the issue of civil documentation is ever more pressing.

    Last week’s international “Brussels III” donor conference also underlined the need for affordable access to civil documentation for Syrians.

    ‘Cut from the tree of her father’

    While the vast majority of Syrians in neighboring countries surveyed by UNHCR earlier this month have a hope of returning to Syria some day, less than six percent expressed intentions to return within the next year.

    For al-Karmi, the hope of things changing in Syria was part of the reason why he kept postponing registration.

    “I was hoping that by the time we had our first child, maybe Assad would be gone,” he explains.

    And although he eventually registered his first-born daughter, the family’s youngest—who is nine months old—still only has Jordanian documents.

    “For the next child we also thought, ‘Bashar will be gone by then’,” al-Karmi says. “But that didn’t happen.”

    Now, he says, the family is doing what they can to make sure their daughters will grow up identifying with their Syrian roots.

    “She’s been cut from the tree of her father,” he says, explaining how they’ve turned to the internet as the only way of nurturing the children’s ties to family members spread out across the globe.

    “We are currently teaching her to remember the answer to, ‘Where are you from?’ and then responding, ‘I’m from Syria’,” he says.

    “This is the most we can do in exile.”

    But not everyone feels a need to raise their children to feel Syrian.

    Abu Abida al-Hourani, a 28-year-old resident of Jordan’s Zaatari camp, is not even interested in registering his two-and-a-half-year-old son at the Syrian embassy.

    “It’s better to belong to a country that will protect my son and make him feel safe and doesn’t deprive him of the most basic rights,” he explains.

    “How am I supposed to raise my son to feel like he belongs in a country full of killing, displacement and injustice?”

    https://syriadirect.org/news/%E2%80%98where-are-you-from%E2%80%99-facing-fines-and-bureaucracy-refug
    #enfants #mineurs #enfance #Jordanie #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #asile #migrations #clandestinisation #certificats_de_naissance #bureaucratie #apatridie

  • #Shamima_Begum: Isis Briton faces move to revoke citizenship

    The Guardian understands the home secretary thinks section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 gives him the power to strip Begum of her UK citizenship.

    He wrote to her family informing them he had made such an order, believing the fact her parents are of Bangladeshi heritage means she can apply for citizenship of that country – though Begum says she has never visited it.

    This is crucial because, while the law bars him from making a person stateless, it allows him to remove citizenship if he can show Begum has behaved “in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK” and he has “reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to become a national of such a country or territory”.


    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/isis-briton-shamima-begum-to-have-uk-citizenship-revoked?CMP=Share_Andr
    #citoyenneté #UK #Angleterre #apatridie #révocation #terrorisme #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #nationalité #déchéance_de_nationalité

    • What do we know about citizenship stripping?

      The Bureau began investigating the Government’s powers to deprive individuals of their British citizenship two years ago.

      The project has involved countless hours spent in court, deep and detailed use of the freedom of information act and the input of respected academics, lawyers and politicians.

      The Counter-Terrorism Bill was presented to Parliament two weeks ago. New powers to remove passports from terror suspects and temporarily exclude suspected jihadists from the UK have focused attention on the Government’s citizenship stripping powers, which have been part of the government’s counter-terrorism tools for nearly a decade.

      A deprivation order can be made where the home secretary believes that it is ‘not conducive’ to the public good for the individual to remain in the country, or where citizenship is believed to have been obtained fraudulently. The Bureau focuses on cases based on ‘not conducive’ grounds, which are related to national security and suspected terrorist activity.

      Until earlier this year, the Government was only able to remove the citizenship of British nationals where doing so wouldn’t leave them stateless. However, in July an amendment to the British Nationality Act (BNA) came into force and powers to deprive a person of their citizenship were expanded. Foreign-born, naturalised individuals can now be stripped of their UK citizenship on national security grounds even if it renders them stateless, a practice described by a former director of public prosecutions as being “beloved of the world’s worst regimes during the 20th century”.

      So what do we know about how these powers are used?
      The numbers

      53 people have been stripped of their British citizenship since 2002 – this includes both people who were considered to have gained their citizenship fraudulently, as well as those who have lost it for national security reasons.
      48 of these were under the Coalition government.
      Since 2006, 27 people have lost their citizenship on national security grounds; 24 of these were under the current Coalition government.
      In 2013, home secretary Theresa May stripped 20 individuals of their British citizenship – more than in all the preceding years of the Coalition put together.
      The Bureau has identified 18 of the 53 cases, 17 of which were deprived of their citizenship on national security grounds.
      15 of the individuals identified by the Bureau who lost their citizenship on national security grounds were abroad at the time of the deprivation order.
      At least five of those who have lost their nationality were born in the UK.
      The previous Labour government used deprivation orders just five times in four years.
      Hilal Al-Jedda was the first individual whose deprivation of citizenship case made it to the Supreme Court. The home secretary lost her appeal as the Supreme Court justices unanimously ruled her deprivation order against Al-Jedda had made him illegally stateless. Instead of returning his passport, just three weeks later the home secretary issued a second deprivation order against him.
      This was one of two deprivation of citizenship cases to have made it to the Supreme Court, Britain’s uppermost court, to date.
      In November 2014 deprivation of citizenship case number two reached the Supreme Court, with the appellant, Minh Pham, also arguing that the deprivation order against him made him unlawfully stateless.
      Two of those stripped of their British citizenship by Theresa May in 2010, London-born Mohamed Sakr and his childhood friend Bilal al Berjawi, were later killed by US drone strikes in Somalia.
      One of the individuals identified by the Bureau, Mahdi Hashi, was the subject of rendition to the US, where he was held in secret for over a month and now faces terror charges.
      Only one individual, Iraqi-born Hilal al-Jedda, is currently known to have been stripped of his British citizenship twice.
      Number of Bureau Q&As on deprivation of citizenship: one.

      https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-12-10/what-do-we-know-about-citizenship-stripping
      #statistiques #chiffres

    • ‘My British citizenship was everything to me. Now I am nobody’ – A former British citizen speaks out

      When a British man took a holiday to visit relatives in Pakistan in January 2012 he had every reason to look forward to returning home. He worked full time at the mobile phone shop beneath his flat in southeast London, he had a busy social life and preparations for his family’s visit to the UK were in full flow.

      Two years later, the man, who cannot be named for legal reasons, is stranded in Pakistan, and claims he is under threat from the Taliban and unable to find work to support his wife and three children.

      He is one of 27 British nationals since 2006 who have had their citizenship removed under secretive government orders on the grounds that their presence in the UK is ‘not conducive to the public good’. He is the first to speak publicly about his ordeal.

      ‘My British citizenship was everything to me. I could travel around the world freely,’ he told the Bureau. ‘That was my identity but now I am nobody.’

      Under current legislation, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, has the power to strip dual nationals of their British citizenship if she deems their presence in the UK ‘not conducive to the public good’, or if their nationality was gained on fraudulent grounds. May recently won a Commons vote paving the way to allow her to strip the citizenship of foreign-born or naturalised UK nationals even if it rendered them stateless. Amendments to the Immigration Bill – including the controversial Article 60 concerning statelessness – are being tabled this week in the House of Lords.

      A Bureau investigation in December 2013 revealed 20 British nationals were stripped of their citizenship last year – more than in all previous years under the Coalition combined. Twelve of these were later revealed to have been cases where an individual had gained citizenship by fraud; the remaining eight are on ‘conducive’ grounds.

      Since 2006 when the current laws entered force, 27 orders have been made on ‘conducive’ grounds, issued in practice against individuals suspected of involvement in extremist activities. The Home Secretary often makes her decision when the individual concerned is outside the UK, and, in at least one case, deliberately waited for a British national to go on holiday before revoking his citizenship.

      The only legal recourse to these decisions, which are taken without judicial approval, is for the individual affected to submit a formal appeal to the Special Immigration and Asylum Committee (Siac), where evidence can be heard in secret, within 28 days of the order being given. These appeals can take years to conclude, leaving individuals – the vast majority of whom have never been charged with an offence – stranded abroad.

      The process has been compared to ‘medieval exile’ by leading human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce.

      The man, who is referred to in court documents as E2, was born in Afghanistan and still holds Afghan citizenship. He claimed asylum in Britain in 1999 after fleeing the Taliban regime in Kabul, and was granted indefinite leave to remain. In 2009 he became a British citizen.

      While his immediate family remained in Pakistan, E2 came to London, where he worked and integrated in the local community. Although this interview was conducted in his native Pashto, E2 can speak some English.

      ‘I worked and I learned English,’ he says. ‘Even now I see myself as a British. If anyone asks me, I tell them that I am British.’

      But, as of March 28 2012, E2 is no longer a British citizen. After E2 boarded a flight to Kabul in January 2012 to visit relatives in Afghanistan and his wife and children in Pakistan, a letter containing May’s signature was sent to his southeast London address from the UK Border Agency, stating he had been deprived of his British nationality. In evidence that remains secret even from him, E2 was accused of involvement in ‘Islamist extremism’ and deemed a national security threat. He denies the allegation and says he has never participated in extremist activity.

      In the letter the Home Secretary wrote: ‘My decision has been taken in part reliance on information which, in my opinion should not be made public in the interest of national security and because disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.’

      E2 says he had no way of knowing his citizenship had been removed and that the first he heard of the decision was when he was met by a British embassy official at Dubai airport on May 25 2012, when he was on his way back to the UK and well after his appeal window shut.

      E2’s lawyer appealed anyway, and submitted to Siac that: ‘Save for written correspondence to the Appellant’s last known address in the UK expressly stating that he has 28 days to appeal, i.e. acknowledging that he was not in the UK, no steps were taken to contact the Appellant by email, telephone or in person until an official from the British Embassy met him at Dubai airport and took his passport from him.’

      The submission noted that ‘it is clear from this [decision] that the [Home Secretary] knew that the Appellant [E2] is out of the country as the deadline referred to is 28 days.’

      The Home Office disputed that E2 was unaware of the order against him, and a judge ruled that he was satisfied ‘on the balance of probabilities’ that E2 did know about the removal of his citizenship. ‘[W]e do not believe his statement,’ the judge added.

      His British passport was confiscated and, after spending 18 hours in an airport cell, E2 was made to board a flight back to Kabul. He has remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since. It is from Pakistan that he agreed to speak to the Bureau last month.

      Daniel Carey, who is representing E2 in a fresh appeal to Siac, says: ‘The practice of waiting until a citizen leaves the UK before depriving them of citizenship, and then opposing them when they appeal out of time, is an intentional attack on citizens’ due process rights.

      ‘By bending an unfair system to its will the government is getting worryingly close to a system of citizenship by executive fiat.’

      While rules governing hearings at Siac mean some evidence against E2 cannot be disclosed on grounds of national security, the Bureau has been able to corroborate key aspects of E2’s version of events, including his best guess as to why his citizenship was stripped. His story revolves around an incident that occurred thousands of miles away from his London home and several years before he saw it for the last time.

      In November 2008, Afghan national Zia ul-Haq Ahadi was kidnapped as he left the home of his infirmed mother in Peshawar, Pakistan. The event might have gone unnoticed were he not the brother of Afghanistan’s then finance minister and former presidential hopeful Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi. Anwar intervened, and after 13 months of tortuous negotiations with the kidnappers, a ransom was paid and Zia was released. E2 claims to have been the man who drove a key negotiator to Zia’s kidnappers.

      While the Bureau has not yet been able to confirm whether E2 had played the role he claimed in the release, a source with detailed knowledge of the kidnapping told the Bureau he was ‘willing to give [E2] some benefit of the doubt because there are elements of truth [in his version of events].’

      The source confirmed a man matching E2’s description was involved in the negotiations.

      ‘We didn’t know officially who the group was, but they were the kidnappers. I didn’t know whether they were with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban,’ E2 says. ‘After releasing the abducted person I came back to London.’

      E2 guesses – since not even his lawyers have seen specific evidence against him – that it was this activity that brought him to the attention of British intelligence services. After this point, he was repeatedly stopped as he travelled to and from London and Afghanistan and Pakistan to visit relatives four times between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2012.

      ‘MI5 questioned me for three or four hours each time I came to London at Heathrow airport,’ he says. ‘They said people like me [Pashtun Afghans] go to Waziristan and from there you start fighting with British and US soldiers.

      ‘The very last time [I was questioned] was years after the [kidnapping]. I was asked to a Metropolitan Police station in London. They showed me pictures of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [former Afghan prime minister and militant with links to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)] along with other leaders and Taliban commanders. They said: ‘You know these guys.’

      He claims he was shown a photo of his wife – a highly intrusive action in conservative Pashtun culture – as well as one of someone he was told was Sirajuddin Haqqani, commander of the Haqqani Network, one of the most lethal TTP-allied groups.

      ‘They said I met him, that I was talking to him and I have connections with him. I said that’s wrong. I told [my interrogator] that you can call [Anwar al-Ahady] and he will explain that he sent me to Waziristan and that I found and released his brother,’ E2 says.

      ‘I don’t know Sirajuddin Haqqani and I didn’t meet him.’

      The Haqqani Network, which operates in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and across the border in Afghanistan, was designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States in September 2012. It has claimed responsibility for a score of attacks against Afghan, Pakistani and NATO security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The UN accuses Sirajuddin Haqqani of being ‘actively involved in the planning and execution of attacks targeting International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), Afghan officials and civilians.’

      E2 says he has no idea whether Haqqani was involved in Zia’s kidnapping, but he believes the security services may have started investigating him when he met the imam of a mosque he visited in North Waziristan.

      ‘The imam had lunch with us and he was with me while I was waiting for my father-in-law. I didn’t take his number but I gave him mine. That imam often called me on my shop’s BT telephone line [in London]. These calls put me in trouble,’ he says.

      If E2’s version of events is accurate, it would mean he gained his British citizenship while he was negotiating Zia’s release. He lost it less than three years later.

      The Home Office offered a boilerplate response to the Bureau’s questions: ‘The Home Secretary will remove British citizenship from individuals where she feels it is conducive to the public good to do so.’

      When challenged specifically on allegations made by E2, the spokesman said the Home Office does not comment on individual cases.

      E2 says he now lives in fear for his safety in Pakistan. Since word has spread that he lost his UK nationality, locals assume he is guilty, which he says puts him at risk of attack from the Pakistani security forces. In addition, he says his family has received threats from the Taliban for his interaction with MI5.

      ‘People back in Afghanistan know that my British passport was revoked because I was accused of working with the Taliban. I can’t visit my relatives and I am an easy target to others,’ he said. ‘Without the British passport here, whether [by] the government or Taliban, we can be executed easily.’

      E2 is not alone in fearing for his life after being exiled from Britain. Two British nationals stripped of their citizenship in 2010 were killed a year later by a US drone strike in Somalia. A third Briton, Mahdi Hashi, disappeared from east Africa after having his citizenship revoked in June 2012 only to appear in a US court after being rendered from Djibouti.

      E2 says if the government was so certain of his involvement in extremism they should allow him to stand trial in a criminal court.

      ‘When somebody’s citizenship is revoked if he is criminal he should be put in jail, otherwise he should be free and should have his passport returned,’ he says.

      ‘My message [to Theresa May] is that my citizenship was revoked illegally. It’s wrong that only by sending a letter that your citizenship is revoked. What kind of democracy is it that?’

      https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-03-17/my-british-citizenship-was-everything-to-me-now-i-am-nobody-a

  • UNHCR | Publication d’un rapport sur l’apatridie en Suisse
    https://asile.ch/2018/11/13/unhcr-publication-dun-rapport-sur-lapatridie-en-suisse

    https://asile.ch/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Capture-d’écran-2018-11-12-à-11.41.45.png

    Le Bureau suisse du UNHCR publie les résultats d’une étude sur la situation des apatrides en Suisse. L’analyse des informations récoltées sur l’ampleur, les causes et les conséquences de l’apatridie a permis de formuler de nombreuses recommandations pratiques. Principal constat : la Suisse peut mieux faire pour protéger et accueillir les personnes apatrides. Le résumé en […]

    • La reconnaissance timide des apatrides en Suisse

      En Europe, la Suisse reste particulièrement restrictive face aux droits accordés internationalement aux personnes apatrides. Une attitude documentée par une étude inédite publiée ce mardi par le bureau helvétique de l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. Souveraineté et lutte contre les abus y priment sur les besoins de protection de ces personnes qui « n’ont pas le droit d’avoir des droits », selon l’expression du HCR.


      https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/politique/la-reconnaissance-timide-des-apatrides-en-suisse/44541420

    • En Suisse, le taux de reconnaissance des apatrides est trop bas selon le HCR qui demande des changements

      Lors d’une conférence récente à Berne, le Bureau du HCR pour la Suisse et le Liechtenstein communiquait les résultats d’une Etude sur l’apatridie en Suisse (1). Elle a été conduite dans le cadre de la campagne mondiale #IBelong (#J’appartiens) du HCR pour mettre fin à l’apatridie dans le monde d’ici 2024. Selon l’ONU, 10 millions de personnes dont un tiers d’enfants dans le monde sont privés de nationalité et n’accèdent que très rarement à l’éducation, à l’emploi et aux soins médicaux (2). Sans aucune protection étatique, elles sont souvent victimes des pires violences. “Invisible. C’est le terme le plus couramment utilisé pour décrire la vie sans nationalité” précise souvent Filippo Grandi, Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés.

      L’étude sur la situation des apatrides en Suisse est critique à l’égard des autorités suisses et aboutit à une série de recommandations

      D’où vient l’inquiétude ? Principalement du taux de reconnaissance bas. En septembre 2018, seulement 606 personnes étaient reconnues comme apatrides alors que 1000 autres personnes figuraient dans les catégories statistiques appelées « sans nationalité » ou « État inconnu ». C’est la procédure de reconnaissance en apatridie qui fait défaut selon le HCR qui estime aussi que les autorités suisse devraient se conformer davantage à la Convention de 1954 relative au statut des apatrides.

      Interrogée après la conférence, Anja Klug, directrice du Bureau du HCR pour la Suisse et le Liechtenstein (HCR) précise que “la Suisse n’est pas la moins bonne élève en Europe. Elle est avec la France et l’Angleterre l’un des seuls pays à avoir une procédure de reconnaissance avec une unité spécialement consacrée à la procédure. Et il faut souligner que la Suisse ne fait pas partie des pays qui créent l’apatridie comme c’est le cas des pays baltes et des pays de l’ex-Yougoslavie où les Roms ont des difficultés importantes pour obtenir la nationalité des pays où ils résident. Mais ce qu’on peut critiquer le plus est le taux de reconnaissance très bas. La situation est particulièrement grave pour les personnes palestiniennes et kurdes en provenance de Syrie qui ne reçoivent que très rarement le statut d’apatride, ce qui est vraiment problématique.”

      A ce jour, la Suisse a adhéré à la Convention de 1954 relative au statut des apatrides qui précise qui est apatride et les droits attachés au statut. Elle tourne encore le dos à la Convention de 1961 sur la réduction des cas d’apatridie, à la Convention européenne de 1997 sur la nationalité et à la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe de 2006 sur la prévention des cas d’apatridie en relation avec la succession d’Etats. Or, l’adhésion à ces instruments est primordiale pour réduire autant que possible les cas d’apatridie en Suisse.

      Parmi les nombreuses recommandations, citons tout d’abord la procédure défaillante de reconnaissance des apatrides qui ne prévoit pas d’audition. Le candidat est un numéro qui est recalé si un document manque au dossier. Il existe une possibilité de recours au Tribunal administratif fédéral (TAF) mais le HCR insiste sur la nécessité d’introduire, comme dans la procédure d’asile, le droit d’être entendu lors d’une audition. Pour cela il faudrait une loi ou une directive, malheureusement inexistante aujourd’hui. En outre, la question du fardeau de la preuve qui incombe uniquement aux candidats et le devoir de démontrer “un intérêt digne d’être protégé” sont deux exigences qui rendent la reconnaissance très difficile. Clairement, les personnes qui soumettent une demande en reconnaissance d’apatridie sont moins bien traités que les requérants d’asile alors qu’ils méritent une procédure semblable.

      Le HCR déplore aussi l’interprétation restrictive que les autorités suisses font de la notion de “personnes apatrides” définie dans la Convention de 1954. La Suisse ne reconnaît pas les personnes apatrides de facto, celles que leur Etat décide de ne pas reconnaître. Pour Anja Klug, une telle interprétation n’est pas conforme à la convention. Elle s’explique dans un article récent (3) : “Si l’on se réfère à la Convention relative au statut des apatrides, la seule question déterminante consiste pourtant à savoir si un Etat considère les personnes concernées comme ses ressortissants ou non. Le même problème se pose pour les personnes qui ont renoncé à leur nationalité (ou n’ont pas fait tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour l’acquérir ou la réintégrer) : le droit suisse ne les reconnaît pas non plus comme des apatrides, même si elles le sont en vertu de la Convention de 1954.” Autre critique, la Suisse exclut systématiquement toutes les personnes qui peuvent bénéficier de la protection d’une organisation de l’ONU. C’est le cas des personnes palestiniennes sous mandat de protection de l’UNRWA. Même si cette manière de faire correspond aux clauses d’exclusion prévues dans la Convention de 1954, pour des raisons pratiques et humanitaire, le HCR recommande de ne pas les exclure automatiquement.

      Autre requête du HCR, celle qui demande à la Suisse de combler les lacunes concernant le statut juridique des apatrides. Si les apatrides jouissent de la plupart des droits minimaux (autorisation de séjour, accès au marché du travail, liberté de circulation, prestations d’aide sociale), le droit au regroupement familial n’est pas garanti et la procédure de naturalisation facilitée n’est ouverte qu’aux mineurs. Or il est nécessaire que les enfants apatrides puissent obtenir automatiquement la citoyenneté suisse, sans en faire la demande sinon ils héritent de l’apatridie de leurs parents. Ce serait le moyen d’éviter la transmission de l’apatridie de générations en générations.

      Enfin, le HCR recommande aux autorités d’abandonner le « Passeport pour étrangers » et de remettre le « Titre de voyage pour apatrides » prévu par la Convention de 1954 et plus largement reconnu à l’international afin de faciliter les voyages à l’étranger. Cette modification pourrait avoir lieu rapidement. Si le Secrétariat d’Etat aux migrations (SEM) est déjà en train de revoir quelques modalités de procédure, il se déclare limité par l’absence de loi spécifique sur l’apatridie. Il s’avère que le manque de connaissance générale de la problématique est flagrante en Suisse. Une amélioration immédiate dans la prise en compte des personnes apatrides passe par une meilleure information mise à disposition des demandeurs et aussi par la formation des personnes qui auditionnent les requérants d’asile.

      Anja Klug estime que “la Suisse a son rôle à jouer en politique étrangère, vis-à-vis de pays comme la Syrie, qui devraient modifier leur législation notamment en matière de transmission de la nationalité par les femmes, ce qui permettrait de diminuer grandement le nombre d’apatrides en provenance de cette région du monde. La Suisse peut et doit encourager d’autres Etats à ne plus être des pays producteurs d’apatrides.”


      https://blogs.letemps.ch/jasmine-caye/2018/11/25/en-suisse-le-taux-de-reconnaissance-des-apatrides-est-trop-bas-selon-l

    • Is India Creating Its Own Rohingya ?

      Echoes of the majoritarian rhetoric preceding the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya can be heard in India as four million, mostly Bengali-origin Muslims, have been effectively turned stateless.

      On July 30, four million residents of the Indian state of Assam were effectively stripped of their nationality after their names were excluded from the recently formed National Register of Citizens.

      Indian authorities claim to have initiated and executed the process to identify illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, which shares several hundred miles of its border with Assam, but it has exacerbated fears of a witch hunt against the Bengali-origin Muslim minority in the state.

      Assam is the most populous of India’s northeastern states. As part of a labyrinthine bureaucratic exercise, 32.9 million people and 65 million documents were screened over five years at a cost of $178 million to ascertain which residents of Assam are citizens. The bureaucrats running the National Register of Citizens accepted 28.9 million claims to Indian citizenship and rejected four million.

      The idea of such screening to determine citizenship goes back to the aftermath of the 1947 Partition of British India into India and Pakistan. A register of citizens set up in Assam in 1951 was never effectively implemented. Twenty-four years after the Partition, the mostly Bengali Eastern Pakistan seceded from Western Pakistan with Indian military help, and Bangladesh was formed on March 24, 1971. The brutal war that accompanied the formation of Bangladesh had sent millions of refugees into the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal.

      Politics over illegal migration from Bangladesh into Assam has been a potent force in the politics of the state for decades. In 2008, an Assam-based NGO approached the Supreme Court of India claiming that 4.1 million illegal immigrants had been registered as voters in the state. In 2014, the Supreme Court ordered the federal government to update the National Register of Citizens.

      The updated list defines as Indian citizens the residents of Assam who were present in the state before March 25, 1971, and their direct descendants. In keeping with this criterion, the N.R.C. asked for certain legal documents to be submitted as proof of citizenship — including the voter lists for all Indian elections up to 1971.

      People born after 1971 could submit documents that link them to parents or grandparents who possessed the primary documents. So each person going through the process had to show a link to a name on the 1951 register and the only two voter lists — those of 1965-66 and 1970-71 — that were ever made public.

      Such criteria, applied across India, left a good percentage of its citizens stateless. Front pages of Indian newspapers have been carrying accounts detailing the absurdities in the list — a 6-year-old who has been left out even though his twin is on the list, a 72-year-old woman who is the only one in her family to be left off, a 13-year-old boy whose parents and sisters are on the list but he is not.

      The Supreme Court, which had ordered the process underlying the National Register of Citizens, has now directed that no action should be initiated against those left out and that a procedure should be set up for dealing with claims and objections. A final list is expected at the end of an appeal process. And it is not clear what transpires at the end of that process, which is expected to be long and harrowing. So far six overcrowded jails doubling as detention centers in Assam house 1,000 “foreigners,” and the Indian government has approved building of a new detention center that can house 3,000 more.

      The N.R.C. may well have set in motion a process that has uncanny parallels with what took place in Myanmar, which also shares a border with Bangladesh. In 1982, a Burmese citizenship law stripped a million Rohingya of the rights they had had since the country’s independence in 1948.

      The Rohingya, like a huge number of those affected by the N.R.C. in Assam, are Muslims of Bengali ethnicity. The denial of citizenship, loss of rights and continued hostility against the Rohingya in Myanmar eventually led to the brutal violence and ethnic cleansing of the past few years. The excuses that majoritarian nationalists made in the context of the Rohingya in Myanmar — that outsiders don’t understand the complexity of the problem and don’t appreciate the anxieties and fears of the ethnic majority — are being repeated in Assam.

      Throughout the 20th century, the fear of being reduced to a minority has repeatedly been invoked to consolidate an ethnic Assamese identity. If at one time it focuses on the number of Bengalis in the state, at another time it focuses on the number of Muslims in the state, ignoring the fact that the majority of the Muslims are Assamese rather than Bengali.

      Ethnic hostilities were most exaggerated when they provided a path to power. Between 1979 and 1985, Assamese ethnonationalist student politicians led a fierce campaign to remove “foreigners” from the state and have their names deleted from voter lists. They contested elections in 1985 and formed the state government in Assam. In the 1980s, the targets were Bengali-origin Muslims and Hindus.

      This began to change with the rise of the Hindu nationalists in India, who worked to frame the Bengali-origin immigrants as two distinct categories: the Bengali-origin Hindus, whom they described as seeking refuge in India from Muslim-majority Bangladesh, and the Bengali-origin Muslims, whom they see as dangerous foreigners who have illegally infiltrated Indian Territory.

      The N.R.C. embodies both the ethnic prejudices of the Assamese majority against those of Bengali origin and the widespread hostility toward Muslims in India. India’s governing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party has been quick to seize on the political opportunity provided by the release of the list. The B.J.P. sees India as the natural home of the Hindus.

      Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a long history of using rhetoric about Pakistan and Bangladesh to allude to Muslims as a threat. In keeping with the same rhetoric, Mr. Modi’s confidante and the president of the B.J.P., Amit Shah, has insisted that his party is committed to implementing the N.R.C. because it is about the “national security, the security of borders and the citizens of this country.”

      India has nowhere to keep the four million people declared stateless if it does not let them continue living their lives. The Indian government has already assured Bangladesh, which is already struggling with the influx of 750,000 Rohingya from Myanmar, that there will be no deportations as a result of the N.R.C. process.

      Most of people declared stateless are likely to be barred from voting as well. While the Indian election commission has declared that their removal from the voter’s list will not be automatic, in effect once their citizenship comes into question, they lose their right to vote.

      Apart from removing a huge number of voters who were likely to vote against the B.J.P., the party has already shown that as Mr. Modi struggles on the economic front, the N.R.C. will be a handy tool to consolidate Hindu voters in Assam — the majority of the people rendered stateless are Muslims — and the rest of the country going into the general elections in the summer of 2019.


      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/india-citizenship-assam-modi-rohingyas.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&cl
      #islam #musulmans #génocide #nettoyage_ethnique

    • s’en remettre à des avantages obtenus par la démographie confessionelle ne représente pas un suplément éthique , c’est peu dire en restant correct . dans le cas Ismael faruqui verdict la remise en question de la cour suprème en est la caricature pesante . C’est totalement inique de dénier aux protestataires montrés sur la photo du nyt le droit de contester ce qu’ils contestent , c’est terriblement biasé !

  • Statelessness, Discrimination and Marginalisation of Roma in Albania

    This new report provides country-specific evidence from Roma and other national stakeholders in Albania, including in-depth legal and policy analysis of the impact of statelessness on Roma communities in the country. It calls on the Albanian Government to focus attention on statelessness among Roma, build capacity and awareness among officials to tackle discrimination, and reform civil registration procedures, which hinder access to crucial documents needed to prove identity and nationality. It highlights that leaving Romani children without a birth certificate means that they are growing up without a nationality. Because of this, many Roma are left struggling to access key services such as education, healthcare and housing.

    https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/roma-belong-albania-english-language.pdf?mc_cid=a8adc3b704&mc_eid=c2b2

    #Roms #rapport #Albanie #apatridie #discriminations #marginalisation

  • Forced displacement at record high of 68.5 million, UNHCR #Global_Trends report reveals

    UNHCR released its Global Trends report this week to coincide with World Refugee Day, detailing the latest statistics on forced displacement across the world. According to the report, over 68.5 million people are currently displaced from their homes for reasons of conflict, violence and other forms of persecution. This figure represents a record high for the fifth consecutive year.

    In 2017 alone, over 16.2 million people were forcibly displaced, a figure which translates to 44,500 people a day, or one person every two seconds. Over two thirds of the world’s refugees originate from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia.

    The report found that over half of those displaced are children, many of whom are unaccompanied or separated from their parents. In 2017 173,800 children sought asylum on their own, although UNHCR states that this figure is likely an underestimation.

    The report dispels a number of common misconceptions about forced displacement, such as the belief that most of those displaced are hosted in countries in the Global North. UNHCR affirms that in fact the opposite is true, stating that “approximately 85 per cent of all refugees at the end of 2017 were granted protection in countries in developing regions, which included nine of the 10 largest refugee-hosting countries”. Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees, now reaching 3.5 million, while Lebanon hosts the greatest number in proportion to its own population.

    Another misconception the report addresses is the number of cross-border displacements. Almost two thirds of those forced to flee are internally displaced within their own borders. In addition, most of those who do cross a national border settle as close as possible to their home.

    The EU also launched its Annual Report from EASO, the European Asylum Support Office, providing an overview of asylum related policies and practices, both at EU and at national level. In 2017, more than 728,000 applications for international protection were lodged in EU countries, with 33% of decisions granting asylum seekers either refugee status or subsidiary protection.

    https://www.ecre.org/forced-displacement-at-record-high-of-68-5-million-unhcr-global-trends-report-
    #statistiques #chiffres #migrations #asile #réfugiés #HCR #monde #2017

    Lien pour télécharger le #rapport :
    http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf
    http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017
    #IDPs #déplacés_internes #apatridie #Rohingya #retour_volontaire #réinstallation #RDC #Congo #république_démocratique_du_congo #taux_de_protection #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés

    Quelques graphiques :


    #cartographie #visualisation

    cc @reka

  • EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU and latest asylum figures


    https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Annual-Report-2017-Final.pdf
    #EASO #rapport #apatridie #statistiques #chiffres #loterie_de_l'asile #taux_de_reconnaissance #EU #UE #Europe #2017 #arrivées #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés

    Concernant #Dublin:

    In 2017, the 26 repor ting countries implemented just over 25 000 transfers ( 174 ) , an increase of a third compared to 2016. Three quarters of all transfers in 2017 stemmed from five EU+ countries: Germany, Greece, Austria, France, and the Netherlands. More than half of the transf erees were received by Germany and Italy. The remainder were spread among the remaining Dublin MSs, with the highest shares occupied by Sweden, France, and Poland ( 175 ) . Generally, those Dublin MSs which implemented the most transfers also had a wider range of recipients. Just under half of all transfers were conducted between contiguous countries, i.e. with a common land border ( 176 ) . This means that the remaining half of the transfers pertained to individuals who had crossed at least one intra - Schengen border . A narrow majority of the transfers were conducted on the basis of take - back requests (53 % of the transfers with reported legal basis) ( 177 ) .

    (p.60)

  • Une #blockchain suisse pour redonner une identité aux #Rohingyas

    La plate-forme d’#identité_numérique #Procivis s’est associée à une ONG pour fournir des identités à 3,5 millions de Rohingyas. Le programme a pour but d’améliorer l’accès des Rohingyas à l’éducation, aux services publics - comme les hôpitaux - et aux services bancaires, mais aussi de rétablir la dignité de cette minorité apatride.

    https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/politique/apatride_une-blockchain-suisse-pour-redonner-une-identit%C3%A9-aux-rohingyas/44023278
    #réfugiés #identité #apatridie #identification

  • “THIS IS OUR HOME”. STATELESS MINORITIES AND THEIR SEARCH FOR CITIZENSHIP

    Discrimination, exclusion and persecution most commonly describe the existence of stateless minorities.
    More than 75% of the world’s known stateless populations belong to minority groups.

    http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/stateless-minorities
    #apatridie #rapport #exclusion #discriminations #persécution #Makonde #Kenya #Pemba #minorités #Macédoine #Roms #Karana #Madagascar #pauvreté #peur

  • "La justice m’a rendue apatride" : comment un incroyable imbroglio a privé une femme de la nationalité française

    https://mobile.francetvinfo.fr/choix/enquete-franceinfo-la-justice-m-a-rendue-apatride-comment-un-incroyable-imbroglio-a-prive-une-femme-de-la-nationalite-francaise_2467784.html#xtref=https://t.co/ncJdZRAGXo?amp=1

    Sur son compte Facebook, elle a choisi comme photo de profil un dessin représentant un visage de femme à demi effacé. Comme le symbole d’une identité dont elle se retrouve aujourd’hui privée. Clara*, 37 ans, n’est officiellement plus française : ainsi en a décidé la cour d’appel de Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle) le 2 mai dernier. Les magistrats, considérant que son acte de naissance était « apocryphe », c’est-à-dire dénué de toute valeur juridique, ont annulé son certificat de nationalité. « Cette décision me rend de fait apatride », dénonce-t-elle.

    Née au Cameroun en 1980 d’une mère camerounaise et d’un père français, Clara est arrivée dans une petite ville de l’est de la France à l’âge de 5 ans. Peu de temps avant, ses parents se sont mariés. Sa mère devient alors française et son père accomplit les démarches officielles pour la reconnaître à l’état civil. Logiquement, Clara acquiert elle aussi la nationalité française. « Le Cameroun n’autorisant pas la double nationalité, elle cesse alors d’être camerounaise », indique son avocate, Marion Partouche. Installée en France, Clara mène une existence on ne peut plus normale : elle va à l’école, étudie, travaille, fonde une famille...
    Mais tout s’écroule en 2014. Clara, qui vit toujours dans la région, demande à l’administration une copie de son acte de naissance. « J’en avais besoin pour me marier avec mon compagnon », explique-t-elle à franceinfo. En faisant cette démarche, elle vient, sans s’en rendre compte, de mettre le doigt dans un incroyable imbroglio administratif et judiciaire.

    Un document caché dans un bâtiment inaccessible

    Puisque Clara est née à Yaoundé, c’est l’ambassade de France au Cameroun qui se charge de la procédure. Sur place, les services consulaires remarquent une anomalie dans le registre d’état civil camerounais : par-dessus l’acte de naissance de Clara est collé celui d’une autre personne, censé avoir été rédigé antérieurement. La machine s’emballe : l’ambassade avise le ministère français de la Justice, et le procureur de Nancy assigne Clara devant le tribunal, afin de faire « constater son extranéité ». En clair, faire constater qu’elle n’est pas française.
    Fin 2015, Clara pousse un ouf de soulagement : le TGI de Nancy lui donne raison et déboute le parquet. Les juges soulignent que ses deux parents étant français, Clara l’est également. Elle porte d’ailleurs le nom de son père, un Français né en France. Mais le parquet fait appel de la décision.
    Pendant tout ce temps, Clara et son avocate tentent de bétonner le dossier, en essayant notamment de prouver que sa mère, avec qui elle n’a plus de contacts, est bien française. Pour cela, son avocate demande à l’administration de lui transmettre une copie de la déclaration de nationalité dont elle a fait l’objet en 1984. Mais pas de chance : le document se trouve à Fontainebleau (Seine-et-Marne), dans un bâtiment des Archives nationales qui menace de s’effondrer. L’avocate reçoit un courrier du ministère de l’Intérieur l’informant que l’édifice est interdit d’accès à toute personne. « Votre demande ne pourra être traitée que lorsque l’accès au dossier pourra être possible, dans un délai non connu actuellement », lui écrit-on.

    L’avocate souligne en outre que c’est le registre d’état civil camerounais dans son ensemble qui est remis en cause, parce qu’il a été mal tenu, ce qui est monnaie courante dans certains pays. Pas l’acte de naissance en lui-même.
    Ni la date ni le lieu de naissance, ni l’identité de ses parents ne sont contestés. L’acte ne comporte aucune mention contradictoire et il a été signé et tamponné par l’officier d’état civil. Mais malgré cela, on va priver cette personne de toute existence légale. C’est invraisemblable !

  • En Malaisie, la société civile au chevet des réfugiés rohingyas - Aude Vidal - Visionscarto
    https://visionscarto.net/rohingyas-malaisie

    En mai 2015, des charniers sont découverts dans la jungle thaïlandaise à la frontière Malaisienne. Les victimes étaient des Rohingyas (peuple musulman de Birmanie) réfugiés ayant fui la Malaisie et les violentes persécutions de ses militaires. Bien que majoritairement musulman, la #Malaisie leur refuse l’asile et les considère comme des migrants économiques clandestins. Entre les initiatives de la société civile pour les accueillir et l’instrumentalisation de leur cause par les autorités, la présence des #Rohingyas est devenue un enjeu majeur de politique intérieure.

    Très beau reportage d’Aude Vidal merci @aude_v
    #réfugiés #persécutions #discrimination

  • ON THE FRONTLINE: Photographing stateless people in Italy

    There’s a small door that’s open on the right side of Ramadan and Elena’s trailer—its aluminium frame barely visible in the dim highway underpass where their mobile home sits propped up on bricks and throw-away stilts. A solitary streetlamp emits a faint amber glow, but no matter, the world beyond the door remains an impenetrable black. Just in front of it, out of what used to be an empty mud-filled stretch of unoccupied land, a backyard was willed into existence; evidence of children at work in its every corner: a soccer ball, a bicycle tipped on its side, a number of wooden sticks strewn randomly all over the patchy lawn which, I presume, the kids use to play catch with Rambo, the family’s crossbreed dog now intently observing my approach.


    http://discoversociety.org/2017/09/05/on-the-frontline-photographing-stateless-people-in-italy
    #Italie #photographie #apatridie
    cc @albertocampiphoto

  • Statelessness and the trouble with citizenship-as-nationality

    Being stateless means lacking citizenship of any country on earth. A stateless person is not a citizen anywhere. But the word ‘citizenship’ arises surprisingly rarely in both academic and non-academic definitions of statelessness. Rather, it’s far more common to define stateless people as lacking nationality of anywhere on earth. I explore the use of nationality as a proxy for citizenship in the field of statelessness, and argue that addressing statelessness successfully rests on a more radical troubling of this ‘citizenship-as-nationality’ model.

    http://discoversociety.org/2017/09/05/statelessness-and-the-trouble-with-citizenship-as-nationality
    #citoyenneté #nationalité #apatridie

  • Rohingya children in Malaysia, an undocumented life | | Al Jazeera
    http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/06/rohingya-children-malaysia-undocumented-life-160620042659161.html

    La contribution date de juin 2016. Les photos sont magnifiques.

    Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia - Many of the approximately 150,000 (PDF) Rohingya who live in Malaysia came here hoping to be relocated to other countries through UNHCR programmes, but some of them have made Malaysia their home, despite the fact that they have no legal status and face many hardships as a result.

    Many Rohingya refugee children are born in Malaysia, and remain stateless owing to the undocumented status of their parents.

    According to Chia Wei, founder of The Berani Project, the main consequences of this undefined status and lack of identification documents is that the children are “cut off [from] the basic child’s rights to education [and] healthcare.”

    The Berani Project is a social enterprise advocating and creating opportunities for the Rohingya communities and other marginalised people in Kuala Lumpur. Wei explains that “many [children] are forced to work from a young age to help their families”.

    #rohingyas #malaisie

  • Birmanie Répression, discrimination
    et nettoyage ethnique en Arakan-FIDH 2000

    https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/birmarak.pdf

    I. L’Arakan
    A. Présentation de l’Arakan
    B. Historique de la présence musulmane en Arakan
    C. Organisation administrative, forces répressives et résistance armée

    II. Le retour forcé et la réinstallation des Rohingyas :
    hypocrisie et contraintes
    A. Les conditions du retour du Bangadesh après l’exode de 1991-92
    B. Réinstallation et réintégration

    III. Répression, discrimination et exclusion en Arakan
    A. La spécificité de la répr
    ession à l’égard des Rohingyas
    B. Les Arakanais : une exploitation sans issue

    IV. Nouvel Exode
    A. Les années 1996 et 1997
    B. L
    ’exode actuel
    C
    Conclusion

  • « L’#exil exige de bien doser sa visibilité »

    Refaire sa vie (4/6). L’émigration politique, témoigne l’écrivain d’origine bosniaque #Velibor_Colic, est une renaissance contrainte, pleine de #contradictions, entre l’amour du pays quitté et celui porté au pays d’accueil.

    Je m’appelle Velibor Colic et je suis réfugié politique. Entre le ciel et la terre, j’occupe un espace de 104 kg et de 195 centimètres. Selon mes estimations, je suis trop sage, trop blond, beau et talentueux, trop intéressant et charmant pour être un migrant. Je suis #polyglotte. Dans ma vie d’avant, j’étais parfois patriote. Depuis, je porte des lunettes.

    J’écris dans les deux #langues, le français et le serbo-croate. Mais il me semble que maintenant j’ai un accent, même en écrivant. C’est ainsi. Ma #frontière, c’est la langue ; mon exil, c’est mon #accent. J’habite mon accent en France depuis vingt-cinq ans. Tout une vie, en fait. Et je me sens bien, tellement bien qu’il m’arrive souvent de penser : tiens, je suis français.

    Puis la crise financière de 2008 est arrivée et, avec elle, un regain de la peur des étrangers. On a commencé à me dire que je n’étais pas français. Depuis, je m’accommode aussi bien que je peux de ce regard que l’on porte sur moi et je surveille les Bourses du monde entier. Rien n’arrive pour la première fois, tout est dans cette terrible répétition. Alors, je vis, je regarde et je note. Mon nom de famille sonne comme une excuse. Mon prénom aussi. Je suis apatride. Une chose est sûre : je suis le numéro 35030002019-13/06/1964, comme l’indique mon titre de séjour. Je suis #réfugié politique.

    Je sais parler. Je sais aussi chanter, quand je veux – Georges Brassens et Adamo, Tombe la neige. Mon nouveau pays a vieilli avec moi ; il est confortable maintenant, comme des chaussures de l’année dernière. Je suis presque comme tout le monde : effrayé devant la violence faite au nom de Dieu, perdu devant la triste Méditerranée devenue un cimetière bleu, attendri parfois devant l’humanité. Mon univers mental est constitué de signes et de gestes : #apprendre et #oublier à la fois. D’abord apprendre, puis oublier. Séparément. L’exil est bipolaire.
    Emotions clandestines

    L’exil est une balance aussi. Mesurer le poids métaphysique...

    http://www.lemonde.fr/festival/article/2017/08/10/l-exil-exige-de-bien-doser-sa-visibilite_5170734_4415198.html
    #apatridie #asile #migrations #réfugié_politique

    cc @sinehebdo