• L’UE achète des drones à #Airbus pour repérer les bateaux transportant des migrants

    Airbus et deux sociétés d’armement israéliennes ont reçu 100 millions d’euros pour faire voler des drones au-dessus de la #Méditerranée. Le but : identifier les bateaux chargés de migrants qui tentent d’atteindre l’#Europe, selon le Guardian. Un article d’Euractiv Italie.

    Dans le cadre des « services de #surveillance_aérienne_maritime » qu’elle assure, l’#UE a décidé de recourir à des #appareils_téléguidés volant à moyenne altitude à longue endurance, connus du grand public sous le nom de drones. C’est Airbus qui a été mandaté par Bruxelles pour fournir les engins. Le conglomérat européen spécialisé dans l’aéronautique et la défense travaillera avec la société publique #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI). Un deuxième contrat a été signé avec #Elbit_Systems, une société d’#armement israélienne privée. Les deux contrats s’élèvent à 50 millions d’euros chacun, selon une information du journal britannique The Guardian.

    Les opérations seront menées en #Grèce et/ou en #Italie et/ou à #Malte selon le contrat-cadre signé entre #Frontex et les fournisseurs, dans le cadre des mesures de contrôle des frontières du sud de l’Europe.

    Le #budget de l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de gardes-côtes (Frontex), est passé de 6 millions d’euros en 2005 à 460 millions d’euros cette année, ce qui reflète l’importance croissante donnée au contrôle des frontières extérieures en raison de l’immigration. Le service de surveillance aérienne comprendra la mise à disposition d’un flux de #données fiable en temps réel et la capacité de partager ces données en temps réel.

    L’IAI affirme que son drone #Heron, employé couramment par les forces armées israéliennes et allemandes, est en mesure de voler pendant plus de 24 heures et peut parcourir jusqu’à 1 000 miles à partir de sa base à des altitudes supérieures à 35 000 pieds.

    Elbit Systems soutient pour sa part que ses drones #Hermes peuvent voler jusqu’à 36 heures à 30 000 pieds. Le mois dernier, Elbit a annoncé que des drones Hermes avaient été testés avec l’Agence maritime et des garde-côtes britannique au large de la côte ouest du Pays de Galles pour des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage.

    Les drones israéliens sont le résultat d’une technologie de surveillance qu’Israël a développée et testée lors d’une série d’attaques sur Gaza, comme le détaille un rapport de Human Rights Watch. Airbus a fait savoir que son modèle n’était pas en mesure de transporter des armes, et qu’il serait peint en blanc avec le label « Frontex ». Les premiers tests seront effectués en Grèce sur l’île de #Crète.

    Dans le cadre du programme Frontex, le drone italien #Falco_Evo de l’entreprise #Leonardo avait déjà été testé pour des activités de surveillance maritime aérienne dans l’espace aérien civil italien et maltais.

    En juin 2919, le drone avait permis de mettre au jour une pratique fréquemment utilisée par les passeurs : le transbordement de dizaines de personnes d’un « vaisseau -mère » vers une embarcation qui est ensuite laissée à la dérive. La Guardia di Finanza, la police dounière italienne, alertée par les images du drone, avait alors intercepté et saisi un bateau de pêche.

    Reste que l’utilisation de ce type de technologie suscite de nombreuses craintes. Les détracteurs les plus acharnés de la surveillance aérienne par des drones affirment que l’obligation légale d’aider un navire en danger et de sauver des naufragés ne s’applique pas à un engin aérien sans pilote, quel qu’il soit.

    https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/lue-achete-des-drones-a-airbus-pour-reperer-les-bateaux-transportant-des-mi
    #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance_des_frontières #Israël #EU #Union_européenne #UE

    ping @e-traces

  • De la définition de « migrant », par #François_Gemenne

    « Un migrant, c’est quelqu’un qui refuse que sa vie et les #opportunités qui lui seront offertes soit déterminées par son seul #lieu_de_naissance. Il y a aujourd’hui une très grande injustice dans le monde qui est liée au lieu de naissance. »

    https://twitter.com/RomainVeys/status/1318087047136018433

    François Gemenne interviewé par Romain Veys autour de son dernier livre « #On_a_tous_un_ami_noir »


    https://seenthis.net/messages/879416#message879417

    #définition #migrations #migrant

    ping @karine4 @isskein @reka

  • Armenia-Azerbaijan : Who’s the big defense spender ? | Eurasianet

    https://eurasianet.org/armenia-azerbaijan-whos-the-big-defense-spender

    Decades into an intractable conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, plentiful oil has allowed Azerbaijan to spend lavishly on upgrading its military. Armenia’s struggle to compete, by contrast, is bleeding its budget.

    Between 2009 and 2018 Azerbaijan’s military spending totaled almost $24 billion, according to updated data from the Stockholm International and Peace Research Institute. Armenia spent slightly more than $4 billion in the same period.

    #armement #caucase #arménie #azerbaïdjan #karabakh #sipri

  • East Mediterranean tension boosts France’s arms sales – Middle East Monitor
    September 26, 2020 at 12:45 pm
    https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200926-east-mediterranean-tension-boosts-frances-arms-sales

    French-backed tension between East Mediterranean states and Turkey boosts French arms sales, Paul Iddon, contributor to Forbes, revealed on Thursday.

    Iddon noted that French President Emmanuel Macron is a strong critic of Turkey’s foreign policy and poses himself as a supporter of the East Mediterranean states, which are on opposite sides of the tension with Turkey.

    Therefore, the French military has participated in a series of military exercises this year with Turkey’s rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean to signal Paris’ support of these countries.

    He confirmed that France has shown its support for Greece by deploying two Dassault Rafale fighter jets to the Greek island of Crete, along with a warship in August.

    Greece, according to Iddon, turned to France after it had decided to expand its military to buy 18 Rafale jets, including six brand new and 12 second-hand ones that have already served in the French Air Force, noting that Greece is the first European country to buy the Rafale jets.

    Iddon also disclosed that Athens already reached a €260 million ($305 million) deal with France to upgrade its existing fleet of Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets in December 2019. This deal would prevent Turkey from establishing air superiority over the Aegean Sea, or parts of the East Mediterranean.

    Meanwhile, the Republic of Cyprus reached a $262 million arms deal with France for short-range Mistral air defence systems and Exocet anti-ship missiles.

    These deals are not comparable with those reached between France and Egypt, which has been a major rival of Turkey’s since the current President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi came to power through his military coup in July 2013.

    “Under Sisi,” Iddon wrote in Forbes, “Egypt rapidly became a major multi-billion euro French arms client. His country was the first to buy Rafale jets, along with four Gowind corvettes, a FREEM multipurpose frigate, and two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.”

    Iddon concluded: “So long as these territorial disputes and tensions between these countries and Turkey remain unresolved, France isn’t likely going to have any shortage of arms clients in the Eastern Mediterranean anytime soon.”

    #FranceGrèce #FranceTurquie #marchand_de_canons

  • « Made in France - Au service de la guerre », de Sophie Nivelle-Cardinale et Alice Odiot (Arte, 2020, 1 heure), en replay jusqu’au 21 octobre
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/090021-000-A/made-in-france-au-service-de-la-guerre

    Un fabricant de matériel de guerre français est visé par une plainte pour complicité de crime de guerre après la mort de trois enfants palestiniens. Le récit d’un combat judiciaire sans précédent, depuis la bande de Gaza jusqu’au tribunal de Paris.

    Le 17 juillet 2014, pendant l’opération « Bordure protectrice » *, un drone israélien cible une maison dans un quartier populaire de Gaza. Wassim, Afnan et Jihad, trois enfants qui jouaient sur le toit, meurent, les corps criblés par les éclats d’un missile. Un enquêteur palestinien, Yamin al-Madhoun, chargé par l’ONG Al Mezan de récolter les preuves des crimes de guerre commis lors de l’offensive découvre un petit bout de métal parmi les débris. Il y est inscrit « Paris, France » et le nom d’une entreprise française. Pour la première fois, un lien juridique pourrait être établi entre un crime de guerre et un industriel français. Cette pièce à conviction permet le démarrage d’une procédure opposant les parents des enfants disparus à un fabricant de matériel de guerre. Fait inédit dans l’histoire de la jurisprudence française : un juge devra se prononcer sur la complicité d’une société privée à la participation d’un crime de guerre commis par une armée étrangère. La plainte est instruite depuis février 2018 par le pôle « Crimes contre l’humanité – crimes et délits de guerre » du tribunal judiciaire de Paris. L’affaire, en pleine instruction en 2020, était jusqu’ici restée confidentielle.

    « David contre Goliath »
    Les journalistes et documentaristes Sophie Nivelle-Cardinale (Prix Albert-Londres en 2016, pour le documentaire Disparus, la guerre invisible de Syrie) et Alice Odiot (lauréate du même prix en 2012 pour Zambie, à qui profite le cuivre ?) relatent l’affaire, des toits de Gaza jusqu’au cabinet parisien d’avocats qui juge le combat à venir comme celui de « David contre Goliath ». L’on suit le lent cheminement de la justice, en passant par le siège des Nations Unies ou par Tel Aviv, où les réalisatrices ont pu capter la parole de hauts dirigeants de l’armée israélienne. Outre les images glaçantes tournées par l’enquêteur au lendemain du bombardement, le documentaire s’attache aussi longuement aux survivants de la famille Shuheibar, leurs visages sonnés devant les enquêteurs et les avocats, ou leurs regards inquiets tournés vers le ciel. En dix ans, l’ONG Al Mezan a déposé 244 plaintes en Israël concernant plus de 500 civils tués ou blessés par les soldats israéliens dans la bande de Gaza. Aucune n’a abouti. Pour eux, le procès en France représente la seule réponse juridique aux crimes de guerre commis par Israël.

    ============================

    Crimes de guerre à Gaza : une société française visée par une enquête
    Luc Mathieu, Libération, le 22 septembre 2020
    https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/22/made-in-france-a-gaza-une-societe-poursuivie-pour-complicite-de-crimes-de

    Le père d’Afnan a gardé les débris du missile israélien qui a tué sa fille, âgée de 9 ans, le 17 juillet 2014 à Gaza. Il les a rangés dans des sacs en plastique. Dans l’un d’eux, une petite pièce qui ressemble à un fusible, sur laquelle on peut lire une inscription débutant par « Euro » et en dessous « France ».

    Ce débris est le point de départ de l’enquête des journalistes Sophie Nivelle-Cardinale et Alice Odiot. Il est aussi celui d’une procédure judiciaire en France, menée par le pôle crimes contre l’humanité et crimes et délits de guerre du tribunal de grande instance de Paris. Elle vise à déterminer la responsabilité de la société française Exxelia, qui a racheté Eurofarad, fabricant de composants utilisés dans l’industrie de l’armement. Celui retrouvé sur le toit est un capteur, qui sert à commander les ailettes d’un missile. Il n’est pas courant qu’une entreprise française soit poursuivie pour complicité de crimes de guerre. Trois enfants tués

    A Gaza, Yamin al-Mehdoun, enquêteur pour l’ONG Al Mezan, a retrouvé des missiles israéliens non explosés où est intégrée la même pièce. Il suit l’affaire depuis le début. Il était sur le toit de l’immeuble de la famille d’Afnan le 18 juillet 2014. La veille, vers 19 heures, un missile tiré par un drone israélien avait frappé la bâtisse. Trois enfants qui jouaient sont tués : Afnan, Wassim, 8 ans, et Jihad, 10 ans. L’armée israélienne avait lancé dix jours plus tôt l’opération « Bordure protectrice ». Elle s’achèvera fin août par un cessez-le-feu.

    La famille a porté plainte. Elle n’a eu aucun retour des autorités israéliennes. A Paris, leur avocat travaille à distance.. Gaza n’est pas un Etat, mais une enclave palestinienne où les entrées et les sorties sont contrôlées par Israël. Il n’a pas pu s’y rendre. Le juge d’instruction non plus. Lorsqu’il interroge les parents d’Afnan, c’est par vidéoconférence.

    Au cœur du film, qui passe de Gaza à Paris en passant par Genève, où siège la commission des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, la question revient : ceux qui fabriquent et vendent des armes sont-ils responsables des crimes commis par ceux qui les utilisent ? Le film n’y répond pas. C’est à la justice de le faire. L’instruction n’est pas achevée et pourrait durer encore des années. A Gaza, la mère d’Afnan se rappelle que sa fille est morte avec sa poupée préférée dans les bras. Le jouet, souillé de sang, est resté longtemps sur le toit de la maison.

    #Palestine #Gaza #France #Embargo #BDS #armement #Exxelia #Arte #Film #Documentaire

  • Les exportations d’armes russes se tournent vers une nouvelle clientèle
    https://www.franceculture.fr/geopolitique/les-exportations-darmes-russes-se-tournent-vers-une-nouvelle-clientele

    « Par ailleurs, la Russie est connue pour ne pas exiger de conditions, en matière de droits de l’homme par exemple, lorsqu’elle vend », poursuit l’expert.

    Ah les vilains, ben oui parce que c’est bien connu que les autres demandent des garanties sur les droits de l’homme avant de signer leur contrats.

    https://www.rusarmyexpo.com
    https://www.sipri.org
    https://seenthis.net/messages/425094
    #armement #france #usa #urss #marchands_de_canons

  • La #militarisation de la #police a pour principal objectif de favoriser les ventes de l’industrie de l’#armement (et non pas un objectif de sécurité publique) affirment les personnes interrogées dans l’article, quitte à ce qu’en chemin du matériel se « perde ».

    Why police pay nothing for military equipment
    https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/09/why-police-pay-nothing-for-military-equipment.html

    “One of the really troubling developments about the involvement of the federal government in the direct subsidy of purchases of militarized equipment is that this is really about creating a new market for defense contractors rather than really putting questions of public safety first,” said Alex Vitale, the Policing and Social Justice Project Coordinator at Brooklyn College. 

    What makes both 1033 and 1122 programs so powerful is the apparent lack of clear oversight and accountability. The 1122 program, for instance, is not a grant or transfer program and thus is not required to be monitored by the federal government. Meanwhile, the 1033 program has put lethal weapons in the hands of officers who have no justifiable need for such equipment. “We’ve seen instances reported of some small towns, even some college and university police departments that were acquiring military-grade weapons without any demonstrable need for the use of these or the acquisition of these weapons,” according to Nolan.

    In some cases, equipment transferred through these programs has simply vanished due to what appears to be a lack of oversight and poor bookkeeping. “There have been a number of situations where there have been audits of local police departments to try to figure out what they’ve done with this equipment,” said Vitale, “And these departments have been unable to provide adequate records.”

    #insécurité #états-unis #armes

  • États-Unis : les « mini-bombes atomiques », menace pour la paix mondiale
    https://www.les-crises.fr/les-etats-unis-deploient-des-mini-bombes-atomiques-une-regrettable-menace

    Source : Strategic Culture Traduit par les lecteur des Crises Un papier très intéressant (07/02/2020) dans la suite de notre série « Nucléaire / #Armements stratégiques ». Le Pentagone a confirmé qu’il a, pour la première fois, armé certains de ses sous-marins avec des missiles nucléaires à longue portée qui ont un pouvoir de destruction plus faible par rapport aux ogives existantes. Ces « mini-nukes » représentent – malgré un nom évoquant une capacité de destruction moindre – un risque accru de guerre #Nucléaire. L’ogive W76-2 nouvellement déployée et montée sur le système de missiles Trident aurait un rendement explosif de cinq kilotonnes, soit environ 1 % de la W76-1 existante. L’arme supposée à faible rendement est néanmoins un instrument de destruction massive colossale, équivalente à environ un tiers de la (...)

    #Géopolitique #OTAN #USA #Géopolitique,_Armements,_Nucléaire,_OTAN,_USA

  • États-Unis / #Russie : Vers une nouvelle course aux #Armements ? par Éric Juillot
    https://www.les-crises.fr/etats-unis-russie-vers-une-nouvelle-course-aux-armements%e2%80%89-par-eri

    Source : Éric Juillot – Les-Crises Depuis plus de dix ans, les relations russo-américaines sont marquées par un regain de tension sans équivalent depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. Perceptible dès 2008 du fait de l’affrontement armé entre la Russie et la Géorgie, il a pris un tour aigu avec l’éclatement de la crise ukrainienne en 2013. Ce climat dégradé pèse aujourd’hui de tout son poids sur la question du contrôle et de la réduction des moyens militaires stratégiques dont disposent les deux puissances. Si cinquante années de négociations et d’accords ont permis d’aboutir à de réels progrès par-delà les crises et les vicissitudes de l’Histoire, l’époque actuelle voit se multiplier les interrogations, les doutes et les remises en cause, facteurs d’incertitudes, d’instabilités et de crispations géostratégiques. (...)

    #Géopolitique #USA #Géopolitique,_Armements,_Russie,_USA

  • Bloomberg needs to take down Sanders — immediately (opinion) - CNN
    https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/22/opinions/bloomberg-needs-to-take-down-sanders-lockhart/index.html

    If Bloomberg wants to make it past the Democratic National Convention in July, his strategy needs to change —quickly. His first objective is to nab the nomination, and to do that, he needs to direct his resources to take down Sanders before he even has a chance at Trump.

    As it stands, Sanders has a chance to run the table as the rest of the field fights each other for the honor of coming in second. Sanders has emerged as the Democratic front-runner, and his support stands at 25% among Democrats and independents who lean Democratic, according to the most recent Quinnipiac poll.

    But that’s not enough to win the general election. I don’t believe the country is prepared to support a Democratic socialist, and I agree with the theory that Sanders would lose in a matchup against Trump. In a general election battle between two divisive figures who both preach the politics of grievance, I believe Trump will win the battle to the bottom and remain the last man standing.

    Given that the primary calendar dictates that 60% of delegates will be determined by St. Patrick’s Day, the primary race could be effectively over in less than a month. Of all the other Democratic candidates, Bloomberg may be the only one who can stop the Sanders freight train and still have a shot at winning the White House.

    But let’s not forget — Bloomberg is already skipping the first four voting states in favor of concentrating on Super Tuesday. With his disastrous performance in the Las Vegas debate, it appears he won’t be building any organic momentum in this race. He has to buy it.
    If Bloomberg has any chance of winning the nomination, he has to redirect his resources during the primary and run ads against Sanders — not Trump.

    Bloomberg needs to use the next $400 million in ad spending to attack Sanders on his potential weaknesses in a general election and highlight how far left his campaign is. Hitting him on his past record on guns is a must.

  • Matthieu Amiech, Comme le nez au milieu de la figure, 2019
    https://sniadecki.wordpress.com/2020/02/09/amiech-sud-ouest

    Comment en est-on arrivé là ? Comment une ville longtemps caractérisée par son faible dynamisme industriel est-elle ainsi parvenue à la pointe de l’hypermodernité et du capitalisme français ? L’aménagement volontariste du territoire par un Etat central soucieux de compenser des déséquilibres économiques structurels a joué un rôle important. Mais il faut souligner que l’effort de décentralisation a fonctionné à ce point parce qu’il a porté sur des domaines liés à l’armement, au(x) militaire(s), à la guerre. C’est le secret de famille de Toulouse – secret de polichinelle, mais la discrétion à ce sujet a des effets : la prospérité et le dynamisme de la ville et de l’ensemble de la région reposent sur un véritable complexe militaro-industriel, dont je vais brièvement ici retracer la formation.

    Je vais m’appuyer largement, pour cela, sur l’ouvrage (dont les auteurs ont préféré garder l’anonymat) Toulouse nécropole, publié en 2014 et qui a un peu circulé depuis. Ensuite, j’ébaucherai une cartographie du complexe techno-militaro-industriel toulousain à partir de recherches plus personnelles.

    #Toulouse #critique_techno #complexe_militaro-industriel #Matthieu_Amiech #armement #aéronautique #capitalisme

  • Castanerie : néologisme ; utiliser un mensonge par omission ou un arrangement avec la vérité en le faisant passer pour une annonce d’importance et, ce faisant, biaiser pour désamorcer une crise.
    Cela se vérifie encore une fois avec l’annonce du retrait « immédiat » de la #GLIF4, ce dimanche, dans son émission préférée pour ce type de menteries :
    https://www.france.tv/france-3/dimanche-en-politique/1151765-dimanche-en-politique.html
    Sauf que c’est une grenade
    qui n’est plus fabriquée depuis 2014 :

    Elle équipe les forces de l’ordre depuis 2011 et n’est plus produite depuis 2014, elle reste cependant encore utilisée par le gouvernement jusqu’à épuisement des stocks et est remplacée progressivement par la grenade GM2L de Alsetex.
    https://maintiendelordre.fr/grenade-instantanee-gli-f4-sae-810-alsetex

    qui a été officiellement remplacée par la #GL2M après la mutilation de Maxime sur la zad

    Sa remplaçante, la GM2L, déjà en dotation, est par exemple utilisée à Notre-Dame-des-Landes dans les opérations actuelles.
    mai 2018, journal de la gendarmerie nationale : https://lessor.org/a-la-une/la-gli-f4-une-grenade-sur-la-voie-de-garage

    (la ZAD avait d’ailleurs servi de test grandeur nature de pas mal de saloperies : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/24/sur-les-nouvelles-grenades-lacrymogenes-de-40-mm-cm3-et-mp3 )

    dont les stocks sont réduits à peau de chagrin après plus d’un an de gazage intensif des Gilets Jaunes et autres mouvements sociaux...

    Je ne sais même pas si certains les utilisaient encore.
    Du moment que l’on nous laisse les GMD et CM6, le retrait de la GLI-F4 ne me fait ni chaud ni froid.
    Mais c’est un avis très personnel 😉
    Uniform 17👮 : https://twitter.com/17Uniform/status/1221402966319673344

    et dont la remplaçante et tout aussi, si ce n’est plus, dangereuse

    Contrairement à la GLI-F4, la GM2L ne contient pas de TNT mais des éléments pyrotechniques sans effet de souffle surement 48 g d’Hexocire, un mélange de cire et d’héxogène (un explosif plus puissant que la TNT).
    https://maintiendelordre.fr/grenade-lacrymogene-gm2l-sae-820

    Beaucoup tombent dans le panneau de l’annonce, et même si le #fact_checking autonome a fort heureusement progressé (c’est surement la meilleure nouvelle de 2019) cette annonce convaincra uniquement celleux à qui elle est adressée : les personnes susceptibles de voter pour LREM mais qui doutaient un peu quand même à force d’infos sanguinolentes...
    Mettons en perspective 3 faits récents pour mieux voir ce qu’il y a à gazer sous les fumées lacrymos :
    1/ des candidats #LREM qui n’osent pas s’afficher car ils se font chahuter : carte des LREM sans étiquette https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1jZx-vCMTIvDgvBSV_vwMtYdyUw9ee1xh&ll=46.962141096506784%2C2.43753 (à relativiser un peu mais pas tant que ça : https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2020/01/25/cette-carte-participative-des-candidats-lrem-sans-etiquette-est-elle-fiab )
    2/ la modification de la visualisation des résultats des #Municipales2020 : carte des municipales 2020 : un changement de regle qui risque de modifier la geographie electorale
    /.../ le ministère de l’Intérieur en charge de l’organisation des élections et scrutins en France fait le choix de ne plus prendre en compte la couleur politique des candidats dans les villes de moins de 9 000 habitants (1000 habitants auparavant). /.../ : http://www.chroniques-cartographiques.fr/2020/01/carte-des-municipales-2020-un-changement-de-regle-qui-ris
    (voir aussi la discussion avec @odilon ici https://seenthis.net/messages/821675 )
    3/ panique d’un certain « gratin » sur les conséquences d’une débacle : Macron sommé de réagir sur une note très embarrassante du ministère de la Justice : https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/macron-somme-de-reagir-sur-une-note-tres-embarrassante-pour-le-minist

    J’avais prévu un dimanche de calme et de recueillement... Pas merci Castaner. Cet énième mensonge me touche de trop près pour que je me taise mais... j’espère vraiment qu’on va tou-te-s s’engouffrer dans la pseudo brèche de désescalade dans les #Violences_policières pour te faire tomber de ton estrade.

    Bref, rien de nouveau dans la dégueulasserie politicarde du pouvoir

    #armes #armes_non-létales #armement #maintien_de_l'ordre #guerre_aux_pauvres #enfarinage #infox_ministérielle #Castaner_le_menteur

  • A quoi sert la gréve ?
    [part2] A se rassembler, échanger, ne plus être seul-e-s, apprendre beaucoup, s’entraider mieux : Collecte de Désarmons-les ! pour les blessé-es par des armes de police

    présentation : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/13/collecte-de-desarmons-les-pour-les-blesse-es-par-des-armes-de-police
    lien direct : https://www.helloasso.com/associations/on-n-a-qu-un-visage/collectes/soutien-aux-personnes-blessees-par-des-armes-de-police

    Le collectif « Désarmons-les ! » lutte depuis 2014 avec d’autres collectifs comme « Face aux armes de la police » et l’Assemblée des blessé-es auprès de personnes gravement blessées par des tirs de police, et notamment par des balles de Flash ball, de Lanceurs de balles de défense (LBD 40), ainsi que des grenades de désencerclement (DMP) et des grenades explosives GLI F4.

    34 personnes ont été éborgnées par ces armes entre 1999 et 2018, tandis que 3 ont perdu une main et des centaines d’autres ont été blessées de façon irréversible. Au total, nous comptabilisions 53 blessé-es graves en moins de 20 ans.

    Notre recensement des blessé-es avant le mouvement des gilets jaunes : https://desarmons.net/index.php/liste-chronologique-et-revue-de-presse

    Le mouvement des gilets jaunes a vu ce chiffre exploser : en un mois, 15 personnes ont été éborgnées et 4 ont eu la main arrachée, tandis que plusieurs centaines d’autres présentent des blessures diverses, dont de nombreuses fractures ouvertes au visage, traumatismes crâniens et incrustations d’éclats de grenades dans les autres parties du corps.

    Notre recensement des blessé-es au cours du mouvement des gilets jaunes et lycéen : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/04/recensement-provisoire-des-blesses-graves-des-manifestations-du-mois-de-d

    Des cagnottes individuelles ont été lancées, plus ou moins alimentées en fonction de la médiatisation de la personne qui en est à l’origine ou de ses soutiens. D’autres cagnottes sont initiées par des personnes qui n’ont pas ou peu de contacts avec les blessé-es, leurs familles et leurs avocat-es.

    Nos collectifs organisent la défense de blessé-es depuis de nombreuses années, avec l’aide d’avocat-es présent-es dans plusieurs villes françaises, engagé-es et respectueux/ses de la sensibilité et de la situation sociale des personnes blessé-es. Nous échangeons sur les dossiers judiciaires afin de bénéficier des jurisprudences favorables obtenues par les unes et les autres devant les juridictions pénales et administratives. L’Assemblée des blessé-es est aussi un moyen pour les blessé-es de se rencontrer, de sortir de l’isolement et de lutter ensemble contre les violences policières, de bénéficier d’un soutien psychologique et matériel de personnes ayant vécu la même chose.

    Notre collecte ira à la rencontre des personnes qui en ont le plus besoin, y compris en alimentant les cagnottes individuelles les moins fournies ou en donnant directement l’argent récolté aux blessé-es avec lesquels nous sommes en contact, pour les aider à payer les frais médicaux et les frais de justice, les aider à relever la tête après le traumatisme vécu.

    L’argent récolté ira en priorité aux personnes blessées et à leurs proches, mais permettra également de financer les moyens logistiques et matériels déployés pour la sensibilisation du public sur les violences policières : impression de brochures, autocollants et affiches, organisation de conférences/tables rondes à votre demande...

    L’utilisation de l’argent récolté fera l’objet de comptes-rendus transparents et accessibles sur demande à tout moment, pour garantir la transparence de nos démarches.

    Nous appelons à votre solidarité, pour les blessé-es, pour qu’ils et elles puissent se reconstruire dignement, mais aussi pour qu’on obtienne l’interdiction de ces armes.

    Merci par avance.

    Le collectif Désarmons-les !

    #maintien_de_l'ordre #armes #armes_non_letales #armement #police #CRS #repression #violences_policieres #mutilations #blessures

  • A quoi sert la gréve ?
    [part1] A faire un boulot de dingue que nos « patrons » ne nous demandent pas ;) Voir par exemple la base de données caféïnée par Maxime Reynié : MAINTIEN DE L’ORDRE

    Doctrine | Grenades | Lanceurs | Effectifs
    Tout comprendre sur le maintien de l’ordre
    http://maintiendelordre.fr

    Ce site a pour objectif d’apporter le plus d’informations possible sur le maintien de l’ordre français pour que tout le monde puisse s’y documenter et le comprendre facilement. Il sera régulièrement mis à jour pour apporter les dernières informations et modifications sur les éléments du maintien de l’ordre.

    Précisions de @Maxime_Reynie sur twitter :

    Ce n’est pas entièrement fini, il doit rester plusieurs coquilles me connaissant mais voilà, c’est un début ❤️
    On va dire que c’est une béta.
    Je compte aussi rajouter l’armement des polices municipales avec les lanceurs 44mm. Comment s’organise le maintien de l’ordre à Paris avec toutes les unités qu’on y retrouve. etc etc etc etc
    Pour ce qui est des coquilles je vous invite à me DM si vous en trouvez. <3 [ou mail sur le site, note]
    Dernière chose. Le site est lent, même très lent. J’ai pris l’hébergement le moins cher par défauts donc ça risque de ramer si vous êtes plus de 2.
    Pour le COUGAR, un équivalent plus petit existe me rappelle @akraland, ça sera corrigé asap
    /.../ Pour « sources et documents » c’est pas complet encore, je dois m’y retrouver dans les 9798678 pdf que j’ai stocké /.../

    https://twitter.com/Maxime_Reynie/status/1216355277416620037

    Bon par contre, contrairement à ce qu’il dit sur twitter, ça n’est pas un wikipedia, sa mise à jour dépend donc uniquement de lui et sa disponibilité !
    Un gros boulot donc qui vient esthétiquement compléter celui du collectif Desarmons-les https://desarmons.net qui est sans surprise sa première source ! Desarmons-les qui lance une initiative essentielle : une collecte transparente pour les mutilé-e-s : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/13/collecte-de-desarmons-les-pour-les-blesse-es-par-des-armes-de-police (je vais faire un billet à part pour plus de visibilité)

    #maintien_de_l'ordre #armes #armes_non_letales #armement #police #CRS #repression #violences_policieres #flashball #LBD #grenades #lacrymo #Maxime_Reynié

  • Assets in Flight: Libya’s Flying Armories

    On December 26, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced provisional plans to deploy Turkish troops to Libya in defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Since April 2019, the GNA has faced a months-long offensive led by rival leader, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA). Days later, social media outlets, including Twitter, erupted in multiple posts alleging the deployment of Syrian rebels in and around Tripoli. Open-source plane spotters elsewhere identified aircraft transiting between Turkey and Libya, including one operated by Aerotranscargo, a Moldova-based company that in 2017, appeared in a UN Panel of Experts report as one of several Eastern European air freight providers that have operated suspicious flights into Libya, some of which are linked to potentially illicit weapons transfers.

    The aerial re-supply of weapons, materiel, and personnel into conflict zones is not new. However, recent advancements in open source research tools and techniques – especially in publicly accessible flight data – have opened a new frontier in conflict reporting. Using these tools, researchers and investigators can connect conflict events with the underlying logistics that enable the commission of violence and mass atrocities.

    In Libya, the sprawling corporate and logistics networks that connect Europe, Turkey, Sudan, the UAE, Qatar and other regional neighbors have their origins in decades of instability and state collapse on multiple continents. Far from relics of a past era, companies in these jurisdictions have serviced rival factions in the ongoing Libyan civil war now entering its 6th year of sustained conflict.

    Using flight data and corporate records, the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats (CFIT) team at C4ADS takes a deeper look at these aerial supply operations, revealing potential ownership and management ties between Libya’s flying armories and air freight providers in Libya, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the UAE. This series specifically exposes the logistical architecture that has for years channeled weapons, materiel, and personnel in and out of Libya, often using commercial businesses and aircraft that are identifiable through open source research.
    Libya’s TransNational Weapons Air Bridge

    On September 27, 2006 an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (Registration number: 5A-DQA) touched down in Baidoa, Somalia carrying two armored vehicles and an unspecified number of senior Ugandan military officers. The plane, which traveled from Kufra, Libya on its way to Baidoa, was reportedly operated by Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG), a chartered air freight service provider based in Tripoli, Libya. Seven years later, GASG appeared on an air waybill issued for the unofficial transfer of several thousand Caracel F Pistols, which the UN report stated were purchased by a US-based company and exported by UAE-based Caracel International LLC to Libyan forces then-organized under the Ministry of Interior in Mitiga, Libya.

    UN investigators found that the transfer to Libya was one of several potential embargo violations reportedly aided by air freight companies such as GASG. UN investigators specifically found operational ties between air freight companies operating between Libya, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though the relationship between these operators was not fully explored.

    Tracing Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) Ownership and Management

    Despite the lack of publicly available commercial registries in Libya, C4ADS used open data sources – including social media – to identify and verify GASG’s ownership and management as well as the company’s aerial operations.

    Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) was founded in 2003 and headquartered in Tripoli, Libya with offices in Benghazi and Istanbul, Turkey. A 2006 version of the company’s website identified a “Captain Abdussalam I. Aradi” as the company Chairman and Managing Director alongside several other company officials. GASG’s chairman separately appeared as “Abdussalam Aradi” according to a Linkedin Profile that seems to be registered to the company’s managing director. An open-source review of Facebook accounts registered under the name: “Abdussalam Aradi” elsewhere revealed an account with several profile photos that seemingly resemble Captain A. Aradi’s likeness.

    On January 21 2014, an image from a business article identified a “Capt. A. Aradi” as Chairman of GASG during a meeting with officials from Skylink Aviation, an air cargo company which operates in several conflict areas including in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, among others. The article included an image that depicted “Capt. A. Aradi” shaking hands with an individual identified as the President of Skylink Aviation with a Libyan flag and GASG logo set in the background. A separate image of what appears to be the same scene appeared on GASG’s Facebook page on March 3, 2014, this time exposing the company’s three letter ICAO designator – GAK – within the company’s banner as displayed below.

    GASG seemingly re-branded to Global Air in 2006, according to the date listed on the GASG Facebook account (now re-branded to Global Air). Despite the alleged name change, the company is still identified as “Global Aviation and Service Group (GASG)” in the mission and vision sections of the new Global Air Facebook Account as displayed below.

    Additionally, the contact information listed on the new Global Air Facebook account matches the physical address and contact phone number listed on both the GASG and Global Air websites.

    Separately, at least one flyer posted on the GASG Facebook account displayed both the “Global Air” logo and the GASG web address www.global-aviationgroup.com within the same image. This flyer also included the same contact phone number that appeared on the GASG and Global Air websites, suggesting that the two companies are potentially linked despite the change in name and logo.

    Additional images posted on the GASG Facebook account suggest that the change in company logo coincided with the migration from GASG to Global Air. A thorough survey of these images revealed multiple photos bearing both the GASG and Global Air logos as displayed below. In some cases, some of the images retained the full mention of “Global Aviation & Services Group” with a “Global Air” logo appearing at the borders.

    The Mitiga-Baidoa Connection

    C4ADS investigators reviewed additional images posted on the GASG/Global Air Facebook account and the account registered to “Abdussalam Aradi” and found an image of an Ilyushin-76 which matched the aircraft identified by UN investigators in 2006, and again 2013, as the transport aircraft for military equipment sent to Somalia and Libya in potential violation of existing UN restrictions.

    The Facebook account registered to “Abdussalam Aradi” contained an image of an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (Registration Number: 5A-DQA) bearing the Arabic inscription for Global Air (العالمية للطيران) on the front left side of the aircraft as displayed below.

    The same aircraft appeared on an August 23, 2013 post on GASG’s Facebook account, this time photographed with the English “Global Air” visible on the front side of the aircraft as displayed below. While both images lacked Exif data, aircraft spotters have elsewhere attributed the aircraft to GASG in public sightings in both Mitiga and Benghazi in 2007 and 2008 respectively. These sightings seemingly confirm the aircraft’s link to GASG as well its operations in Mitiga specifically, and in Libya at large.

    Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) Links to Turkey

    Further open source review of GASG’s global operations revealed corporate ties to Turkey as well flight operations elsewhere in Libya, Turkey, and the UAE. According to the company’s website, GASG operated direct cargo flights from Istanbul to Tripoli and Benghazi as well as from Dubai to various other African destinations, specifically Njdamena (Chad). GASG’s website also included several flight schedules for international flights between Sabiha International Airport (Turkey) to Mitiga (Libya). Flights between Benghazi and Dubai operated three days a week while those between Sabiha (Turkey) and Mitiga (Libya) operated twice a week.

    A March 23, 2007 filing in the Turkish Gazette confirmed the registration of “Global Aviation and Services Group” (listed as Merkezi Libya ’Da Bulunan Global Aviation and Services Group Türkiye İstanbul Şubesi) under registration number: 619595. The gazette filling also identifies a “Kaptain Abdusalam Ibrahim Aradi” as the company’s general manager, confirming GASG’s corporate presence in Turkey.

    The Moldovan Connection

    In 2017, UN investigators reported that Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) had previously chartered aircraft owned and/or operated by Moldovan company AerotransCargo. The company was registered on August 12, 2011 (Registration Number: 1011600028436) at MD-2026, bd. Dacia 60/5, ap.(of.) 115, sec.Botanica, mun. Chişinău, RM according to the Moldovan company gazette. This address is shared with another Moldova-based company, Air Stork (Registration Number: 1015600032031). Air Stork was established on September 30, 2015 and according to corporate documentation shares some directors and personnel with Aerotransport.

    AerotransCargo and Air Stork also share the same address: MD-2026, bd. Dacia 60/5, ap.(of.) 115, sec.Botanica, mun. Chişinău, RM with five additional companies: Tiramavia Air Transport Company SRL, Tehnoaer LLC, Gelfex-M LLC, Alanar Grup LLC, and Valan Voiaj LLC. Four of the five companies operate in the air transport sector and provide passenger and freight transport services, warehousing, and the supply and repair of flight equipment. C4ADS investigators found similar co-location in other air freight service providers located in Moldova, which like GASG, Aerotranscargo, and Air Stork connect Libya to Eastern Europe.

    On April 15, 2019, the European Union banned Air Stork from operating within EU airspace. This restriction, however, did not include AerotransCargo, potentially allowing Air Stork aircraft to fly under AerotransCargo’s operator code. As noted above, both companies are also co-located and share some of the same owners. In 2017, UN investigators found that at least two Air Stock aircraft ­– Registration Numbers: ER-IBI and ER-IBU – had been transferred from another Moldovan company – Sky Prim Air – whose aircraft was sighted transporting officers and armed groups allied to General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in 2016.

    Additionally, at least one other Air Stork freight aircraft–Registration Number: ER-ABE–was leased to Global Aviation and Services Group on September 19, 2017. A rendered model of this aircraft appears on GASG’s new “Global Air” webpage. An aircraft with tail code ER-ABE was also spotted on April 4, 2018 traveling between Istanbul Sabiha Goken Airport and Misrata International airport by Plane Finder, an open source flight data aggregator.

    GASG and AerotransCargo’s Forays into Libya

    According to the Moldovan aircraft registry, AerotransCargo operates four Boeing 747-412 cargo aircraft with the following registration and ICAO numbers: ER-BAM (ICAO: 504E27), ER-BBJ (ICAO: 504E43), ER-JAI (ICAO: 504E36), and ER-BAJ.

    According to the Moldovan civilian aircraft registry, the AerotransCargo fleet operates under the following ICAO designator: ATG, which allows for the identification of individual flights operated by the airline. In 2017, UN investigators reported that GASG had previously chartered AerotransCargo aircraft on an undisclosed number of trips to Libya. These trips would have likely occurred under GASG’s ICAO designator: GAK making the relationship between GASG and AerotransCargo potentially visible in open flight data. Using flight data from ADS-B Exchange, C4ADS investigators found multiple flights by all four AerotransCargo aircraft flying under the GAK designator, including some that involved flights between Turkey and Libya.

    This flight data also revealed that between April 19, 2017 and May 5, 2019, three of the four AerotransCargo aircraft – Registration Numbers: ER-JAI, ER-BBJ, and ER-BAM –used GASG call signs – GAK3011 and GAK3012 – during trips between Turkey and Mitiga International Airport in Tripoli, Libya.

    While the available ADSB data is incomplete, each aircraft transmitted low altitude readings (between 25 and 50 feet) while near Mitiga airport, suggesting potential landing at the airport. Each of these aircraft also appeared on the Aerotranscargo webpage and were linked to the airline by the Moldovan civilian aircraft register though they operated under the GASG operator code during this time period. These findings seemingly confirm GASG’s use of Aerotranscargo aircraft as originally reported by the UN Panel of Experts.

    Whereas public reporting on weapons flows into Libya has dominantly relied on traditional reporting methods, ADS-B data provides an additional mode of verification and attribution not extensively used in conflict reporting. When combined with satellite imagery, ADS-B data opens up a new frontier in open source investigations, especially in data scarce environments.

    Over the next weeks and months, C4ADS will delve deeper into the airborne re-supply of Libyan armed groups with a principal focus on the role of commercial airliners in this pipeline movement of weapons, materiel, and personnel. This reporting will focus on the combined use of ADS-B flight data and satellite imagery, and highlight the innovative use of new technologies in open source reporting in conflict zones. This approach emphasizes the use of open data to expose the illicit logistic architectures that fuel and sustain conflict as a core thematic prerogative of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats initiative at C4ADS.

    https://c4ads.org/blogposts/2019/7/30/assets-in-flight-libyas-flying-armories
    #armes #commerce_d'armes #Turquie #armement #Libye

    ping @fil @reka @simplicissimus

  • #Avis sur la légalité internationale des transferts d’armes vers l’#Arabie_saoudite, les #Émirats_arabes_unis et les membres de la coalition militairement impliqués au #Yémen

    Le présent avis traite de la #légalité, au regard du #droit_international, des transferts d’armes vers l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et les membres de la Coalition militairement impliqués au Yémen. L’avis n’évalue pas la légalité de tels transferts à la lumière du droit interne de chaque État fournisseur, pas plus qu’il n’examine en détail les obligations des groupes armés non étatiques ou des entreprises dans leurs rôles de fournisseurs et d’utilisateurs d’armes.

    L’accent est mis ici sur les #obligations_juridiques_internationales des parties au #conflit au Yémen et des États tiers qui leur fournissent leurs armes. Seront examinées ci-après les principales #normes_internationales applicables aux décisions de #transfert_d’armes qui visent à assurer la #protection_de_la_population_civile au Yémen et de l’#infrastructure_civile indispensable à sa survie.

    Les États qui transfèrent des armes à d’autres pays sont soumis aux normes du droit de la responsabilité internationale de l’État. Ils ont l’obligation de retenir ces transferts d’armes lorsqu’il est raisonnablement prévisible que les destinataires les utiliseront pour commettre des violations graves du droit international ou de les détourneront vers d’autres utilisateurs. Tel qu’expliqué ci-après, les États qui fournissent des armes aux parties au conflit au Yémen portent une énorme #responsabilité en regard du grand nombre de personnes civiles qui ont subi de graves blessures et des pertes, y compris à leur domicile, entraînant des déplacements internes et externes massifs de population. Les infrastructures civiles essentielles à la survie de la population ont été détruites ou gravement endommagées lors d’attaques armées, et l’accès à l’aide humanitaire reste entravé par les forces armées et les milices. Selon les Nations Unies, des millions de personnes souffrent de ce qui a été qualifié de la “pire crise humanitaire du monde”.


    https://ipisresearch.be/publication/avis-sur-la-legalite-internationale-des-transferts-darmes-vers-larabie-
    #armes #armement #commerce_d'armes #Emirats_arabes_unis #protection_civile #guerre

    ping @reka

  • Israel’s dirty arms deals with Myanmar - Haaretz Editorial - Israel News | Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/israel-s-dirty-arms-deals-with-myanmar-1.6429524

    Official Israel does not allow the publication of reports on the arming of Myanmar. In a hearing on petitions to the High Court of Justice filed in the last year and a half by human rights activists and attorney Eitay Mack against Israel’s weapons sales to Myanmar, the Defense Ministry argued that the court had no authority to rule on defense exports. Israeli spokesmen justified the supplying of weapons with the claim that “both sides committed war crimes,” claims that were rejected in the UN report. The court’s ruling on the petition is classified, but according to testimony from Myanmar the weapons sales are continuing, even in the midst of the crimes.

    Israel has a long history of arming dark regimes, from Latin America through the Balkans and Africa, to Asia. The findings of the UN panel’s report require an examination of this method, whose economic benefits cannot serve as a counterweight to the atrocities. Attorney General Avichai Mendelblit must order an investigation to determine whether the individuals who approved the arms sales to Myanmar were complicit in genocide in accordance with Israel’s 1950 Law for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In addition, he must see to it that the findings are made public.

  • Noël à Chambord d’Émilie Lanez : Ce « pacte » avec les chasseurs que Macron aurait voulu garder secret | Vanity Fair
    https://www.vanityfair.fr/pouvoir/politique/story/noel-a-chambord-demilie-lanez-ce-pacte-avec-les-chasseurs-que-macron-aurait-voulu-garder-secret/10615

    Aussi, Willy Schraen assure que la période des gilets jaunes aurait été bien plus violente – voire sanglante – s’il n’avait pas convaincu les chasseurs de ne pas aller manifester. Dès les premiers jours de la gronde, en novembre 2018, le président de la fédération nationale a reçu des centaines d’appels de ses adhérents qui se disaient prêts à occuper les ronds-points. « Si j’avais pas stoppé tout de suite, ils étaient 500 000 sur les ronds-points et y aurait eu des gars armés. J’ai beaucoup parlé, beaucoup écrit, mes gars ils étaient tous gilets jaunes au début, tous. Mais eux, ils ont des fusils », confie-t-il, comme pour faire trembler le lecteur de Noël à Chambord, et prouver que même en 2019, les chasseurs ont toujours de l’influence.

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

  • Les exportations d’armes suisses explosent

    Au 30 septembre, l’industrie militaire helvétique affiche des chiffres record. Parmi les destinataires : l’#Arabie_saoudite, la #Turquie ou le #Koweït.

    Depuis le premier janvier, les entreprises suisses du secteur de l’armement ont exporté pour près d’un demi-milliard de francs (496 millions). Discrètement annoncé dans de nouvelles statistiques publiées ce mardi par le Secrétariat d’Etat à l’économie (Seco), le montant révèle la santé éclatante de la branche, dont les ventes ont grimpé de 60% par rapport aux trois premiers trimestres de l’année dernière (299 millions). La présence de plusieurs dictatures parmi les destinataires n’a pas manqué de susciter l’ire des opposants au commerce d’armes.

    https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/exportations-darmes-suisses-explosent

    #exportation #armes #commerce_d'armes #Suisse #armement

    ping @visionscarto