Until a couple of weeks ago few people in the UK, and almost no politicians or pundits, knew or cared about Article 50. What was important for them was instead something which had no real legal significance (even if politically significant), a non-binding referendum on whether the UK should remain part of the EU. That referendum also had a binary nature: you either voted Remain or Leave. As it happened, a couple of days ago, the clear (if not large) majority of voters voted Leave.
Now a problem in UK politics comes from a mismatch – a disconnection – between the result of the referendum vote and the invoking of Article 50. One has not automatically led to the other, and it may not do so.
The supporters of Remain campaign did not think about this, because they thought they were going to win. But the supporters of the Leave campaign also did not think much about this, as it seems they regarded winning the referendum as an end in itself to bring about their desired “Brexit”.
It appears that few if any people involved in the campaigns on either side thought about what would come next in the event of a Leave vote.
On the day the result of the referendum became known, the Prime Minister David Cameron did not do something, and I believe the omission was significant (I have discussed this here).
In essence, Cameron did not invoke Article 50: no notification was sent to the European Union. In my view, the failure to send the notification on the very day after the referendum will mean that there is a strong chance it will never be sent at all.
Since the referendum result there has been considerable media and political discussion and speculation about Article 50. This post examines a few of the contentions which have been made about Article 50 – in particular the first two paragraphs of the Article – and sets out whether they seem good points or bad points.