• La #banlieue, un projet social. Ambitions d’une #politique_urbaine, 1945-1975

    La France, au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, connaît une crise du #logement sans précédent, dont l’appel de l’#abbé_Pierre en 1954 marque le paroxysme. Une action forte s’avère indispensable. C’est dans ce contexte que l’État français a entrepris, dès 1945, l’une des plus formidables expériences sociales et architecturales du XXe siècle : transformer un pays essentiellement rural en une nation urbaine résolument moderne – cela en bâtissant massivement, en #périphérie des villes historiques. Si ces environnements suburbains d’après-guerre, hérissés de #tours, de #barres et de #mégastructures, sont souvent perçus comme le résultat anarchique d’un désintérêt politique, #Kenny_Cupers démontre que leur construction a, au contraire, été guidée par de ferventes #ambitions et #aspirations, notamment au sein de l’Administration. Synthèse très documentée d’une vaste révolution urbaine, des #bidonvilles de l’après-guerre jusqu’aux #villes_nouvelles, ce livre relate et analyse trois décennies d’#expérimentations au cœur desquelles était placé l’#habitat, nouvel enjeu du #modernisme, et établit une véritable généalogie de la banlieue française. Cette histoire détaillée des #projets_urbains de grande envergure menés par la France d’alors – et qui se sont révélés être une #spécificité_nationale – met au jour toute la complexité théorique, sociologique, administrative, etc., qui sous-tend la réalisation de ce « #projet_social ». Cet ouvrage, servi par une iconographie riche et évocatrice, s’appuie en outre sur de précieuses archives de première main.


    https://www.editionsparentheses.com/La-banlieue-un-projet-social
    #urban_matter #livre #histoire #France #géographie_urbaine

    • « l’État français a entrepris, dès 1945, l’une des plus formidables expériences sociales et architecturales du XXe siècle : transformer un pays essentiellement rural en une nation urbaine résolument moderne »



      La France avait comme principal problème un manque de main d’oeuvre pour une industrie en manque de modernisation.
      Un baisse de la natalité, depuis plus d’un siècle, avec aggravation lors de la guerre précédente.

      Par ailleurs, 20 % des logements avaient été détruits par les bombardements.
      A Paris, 10 % de la population vivait à l’hôtel, en meublés.

      Cette modernisation de l’habitat avait aussi été une demande du CNR, comme celui du plein emploi.
      Ce plein emploi a donné ce qui est communément appelé les 30 glorieuses.


  • L’#habitus pour les nuls : plonger dans un lycée élitiste pour comprendre (enfin) de quoi parlait Bourdieu

    Si la notion d’habitus vous a souvent intimidé ou collé la migraine quand on cite Bourdieu ou même Durkheim, découvrez le #documentaire de #Julie_Gavras au #lycée parisien Victor Duruy, qui donne à voir des réussites scolaires ou des façons de parler comme des héritages limpides.


    https://www.franceculture.fr/sociologie/lhabitus-pour-les-nuls
    #élite #France #éducation #enseignement #lycée_Victor_Duruy #Paris #film

    • Les bonnes conditions

      Pendant près de quinze ans, la réalisatrice Julie Gavras a suivi huit adolescents des quartiers chics. Un portrait par l’intime des futures élites, à rebrousse-poil des #stéréotypes.

      Ils sont enfants de bijoutiers, de publicitaires ou de directeurs financiers. Nés avec une cuillère en argent dans la bouche, ils en ont aussi les #problèmes spécifiques : pression de la réussite, exemple intimidant de leurs parents, activités extrascolaires chronophages… Quelle est la part de #déterminisme_social dans leurs pensées, leurs #aspirations, leur quotidien ? Que leur a-t-on transmis, que veulent-ils perpétuer ? Pendant près de quinze ans, Julie Gavras a suivi d’anciens élèves du lycée Victor-Duruy dans le très chic 7e arrondissement de Paris, accompagnée d’Emmanuelle Tricoire, leur professeure d’histoire-géographie. De leurs 16 ans jusqu’à la veille de leurs 30 ans, la réalisatrice les a retrouvés chaque année, de 2003 à 2016, pour consigner leurs confidences, donnant à voir – de l’intérieur – une facette de la reproduction des élites.

      Premières fois
      D’une durée exceptionnelle, le tournage a favorisé le rapport de confiance et le libre cours de la parole, permettant de filmer au plus près ces « primo-arrivants » dans la vie active. D’où la variété des portraits, bienveillants sans être complaisants, intimes sans voyeurisme. À travers eux, le documentaire donne à voir cette décennie déterminante de la vie, période universelle des « premières fois » : amours, voyages, appartements, travail... Chaque fragment de vie s’insère dans un puzzle, dessinant peu à peu les contours d’une classe sociale aisée, rarement représentée à l’écran de façon juste. Tout autant miroir d’une époque, avec ses tendances et son contexte particulier, ce travail de longue haleine s’attaque aux stéréotypes et se regarde comme une saga miniature, ménageant un certain suspense : seront-ils fidèles à leur « bonne condition » ?

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/066346-000-A/les-bonnes-conditions
      #classes_sociales #reproduction_sociale #adolescence #héritage #bourgeoisie


  • Data shows migration more strongly linked to aspiration than desperation.
    https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/data-shows-migration-more-strongly-linked-aspiration-desperation

    A new global analysis of intentions to migrate suggests that individuals preparing to move abroad are more likely to do so out of aspiration for a better life, economic opportunities and development of skills, rather than sheer desperation.

    While the analysis does not include individuals who are forced to migrate, such as refugees and asylum seekers, it provides valuable insights on voluntary migrants.

    Between 2010 and 2015, around 30% of the population of 157 countries around the world expressed a wish to move abroad, while less than 1% have actually migrated.

    The analysis finds that while being dissatisfied with one’s own standard of living is associated with a higher probability to desire and to plan a move abroad, the link with making concrete preparations is less clear.

    In fact, for areas such as Africa and Latin America, those individuals satisfied with their income have a higher probability of preparing to migrate than those who are dissatisfied.

    The analysis shows a gap between the wish and the actual preparation to migrate. As such, the share of the population expressing a desire to migrate is an imperfect measure of what is often portrayed as potential migration.

    A range of factors including being young, male, foreign-born, highly educated, unemployed, or having networks abroad are all strongly associated with a higher likelihood of preparing for international migration.


  • Egypt’s identity crisis - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-identity-crisis/2013/08/16/70d1459c-0524-11e3-88d6-d5795fab4637_print.html

    Remarquable article de #Shibley_Telhami, rarement lu dans un MSM,

    Over the past decade, I’ve conducted opinion polls in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and have found two consistent trends. First, citizens identify less and less with their countries and identify more and more with Islam and as Arabs. Second, Egyptians see themselves as the most religious people in the world.

    The Muslim Brotherhood, which began the post-Mubarak era with justified confidence in its superior political organization, surely must have interpreted such trends as great support for its cause. (This belief was expressed by the group’s former murshed, or guide, as early as 2006 when he said, “Tuz fi Misr,” roughly, “To hell with Egypt.”) But the group drew the wrong lessons from these trends.

    Arabs, like most people, have many contending collective identities, and the weight of each shifts over time; there is rarely a lasting equilibrium. Over the past decade, the rise in people identifying primarily as Muslim was not all or even mostly due to expanding Islamist aspirations. Instead, it resulted mainly from declining identification with the state, thanks to government failings on domestic and foreign policy. Also, the extraordinarily long tenures of individual leaders — Moammar Gaddafi ruled for 42 years and Mubarak for 30 — made it difficult for people to separate state from unpopular ruler. But a vote against something is not the same as a vote in favor of something else.

    Moreover, when Islam itself appears under assault from external forces — as Muslims overwhelmingly perceived it to be in the decade after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — it becomes especially difficult to separate religious identity from popular defiance. You are what you have to defend. For some Egyptians, claiming Islamic identity is about faith, but for many others it is merely about asserting the right to be Muslim and to accept sharia law in the face of Western assault. Muslims do not want to apologize for who they are, for their faith and for all it entails.

    Even attitudes about sharia are easily misunderstood. In my May 2012 poll, two-thirds of respondents said they supported making sharia the basis of Egyptian law. But when I probed more deeply, things became less clear: Of those who supported sharia as the basis of law, only 17 percent said they preferred applying it literally, while 83 percent said they favored applying the spirit of sharia but adapted to modern times. Little surprise that Egyptian commentator Muhammad Hassanein Heikal describes Egypt as a “civil-secular country that loves religion.”

    For the overwhelming majority of Arabs, as for any broadly defined group, collective aspirations help determine the relative power of identities. When Pan Arabism seemed a more effective vehicle for the attainment of dignity at home and abroad in the 1950s, for instance, a shift toward an Arab identity became evident. Similarly, when Islam appeared to be the better vehicle, a shift occurred in that direction. The moves from one identity to another, from Arab to Egyptian to Muslim, reflect citizens’ assessment of their chances to reach their goals. And if there was anything clear after Morsi’s first year in office, it was that the public’s aspirations were dashed by the government’s domestic and international failures.

    Islamists may have also misunderstood Arab attitudes about democracy. When Egyptians are asked which country they would want their own nation to look like, their top choice has been Turkey, a democratic Islamic nation ruled by an Islamist party. And in 2011 and 2012, Egyptians and other Arabs identified Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the leader they most admired outside their own country.

    It is easy to misinterpret such admiration as Arabs seeking only the right mix of Islam and democracy. But the reasons are far more complex, as I found in my polling results. Arabs want a combination of many things that Turkey’s model offered: a country that balances democracy and culture, but also a stable, strong, prosperous nation, and one that makes them feel proud on the world stage. Erdogan, who personally symbolized the mix of Islam and democracy in many Arab minds — at least until the recent upheavals in Turkey — was not selected by Arabs as the favorite leader until he was seen as standing up to Israel on the 2008-09 Gaza war.

    Overall, the resonance of political Islam in the Arab world — and in Egypt in particular — has been exaggerated. To win the presidency last year, the Muslim Brotherhood could rely on its political machinery and the disarray of its opponents; it didn’t need to win the hearts of most Egyptians. But as Morsi learned too late, it couldn’t govern without broader public support.

    However, if Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood overestimated the Islamists’ appeal, Egypt’s transitional rulers seem ready to dismiss it too easily. Public rejection of the Brotherhood does not translate into an embrace of the generals. Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi’s popularity could be fleeting: Despite the Egyptian public’s long-held admiration of the military as an institution, especially immediately after the revolution, their opinion of the generals changed within months, with only 18 percent of Egyptians polled saying they had advanced the goals of the revolution by May 2012.

    ...

    #islam #arabes #islam_politique #dictature #impérialisme #Égypte #aspirations #dignité #identité #appartenances