• Astérix et Obélix : humour assurance tous risques
    https://www.franceculture.fr/theme/bande-dessinee/asterix-et-obelix-humour-assurance-tous-risques

    « Pause toujours, nous on continue ! », « Ce sont des Thraces qu’on aimerait suivre », « Tous les étés, les Ibères deviennent plus rudes », « Il ne faut jamais parler sèchement à un Numide »... Les ressorts humoristiques des albums d’Astérix, qu’il s’agisse de jeux de mots comme ici, de pastiches de tableaux (Le Radeau de la méduse) ou encore de chansons ("Je veux revoir ma Normandie"), de comique de répétition, de détournements… en sont la substantifique moelle, et peut-être ce qui leur a valu un succès aussi flamboyant et pérenne. Pourtant, ces héros à braies et gros nez ont vu le jour à une époque où la #bande_dessinée humoristique ne faisait pas franchement dans la dentelle. Comment #Uderzo, et surtout #Goscinny, ont-ils pu se démarquer par leur humour, et surtout, d’où le célèbre scénariste tirait-il son goût de la calembredaine spirituelle ?


    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/fictions-theatre-et-cie/la-zizanie-dapres-lalbum-de-rene-goscinny-et-albert-uderzo
    Pour la première fois sur #France_Culture, l’adaptation en fiction d’un des plus fameux albums du petit Gaulois. Sons, bruitages, musique originale, et verve des comédiens pour faire résonner au mieux cette « guerre psychologique » envoyée par César afin de déstabiliser le village irréductible.
    https://www.asterix.com/la-collection/les-albums/la-zizanie

  • Christophe Castaner présente les mesures contre l’ #agribashing dans des fermes du Finistère
    https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/agriculture-peche/christophe-castaner-presente-les-mesures-contre-l-agribashing-dans-des-fe

    Lutter contre les intrusions dans les élevages et l’agribashing de façon générale : c’est l’objectif des trois dispositifs mis en place par l’Etat auprès des agriculteurs, notamment la cellule Déméter lancée fin octobre. Le ministre de l’Intérieur Christophe Castaner l’a présentée officiellement ce vendredi lors d’un déplacement dans le Finistère, dans des exploitations porcine et laitière, à Saint-Pabu et Kernilis.
    Une cellule pour coordonner l’action des gendarmes

    Le fonctionnement de la cellule Déméter, lancée fin octobre au sein de la Direction Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale (DDGN), a été détaillé. « Elle s’occupe à la fois de coordonner les enquêtes judiciaires sur le terrain mais aussi des renseignements pour mieux connaître les mouvements plus radicaux animalistes et antispécistes », explique le colonel Bertrand Pallot qui l’anime.

    « Jusque là, il y avait des enquêtes locales et pas forcément coordonnées, ajoute le ministre de l’Intérieur Christophe Castaner. Il y a aussi un renforcement des moyens dans le judiciaire, qui permettra de lier des faits semblant distincts mais dont les auteurs sont au cœur du système. Cela constituerait des associations de malfaiteurs sur lesquelles on devrait enquêter ».
    Des observatoires de l’agribashing

    Le ministre de l’Intérieur a signé par ailleurs une convention avec les Jeunes Agriculteurs et la FNSEA pour _" mettre en place des mesures de prévention et d’intervention au plus près des territoires_, département par département", précise Christophe Castaner. Des observatoires départementaux viennent également d’être lancés pour lutter contre l’agribashing.

    Appliquons la loi, et veillons s’il est nécessaire à la faire évoluer.

    « Il y a une montée en pression : le fait d’être suivi sur les routes, harangué dans son champ... Au-delà des intrusions, il y a nombre de manifestations négatives vis-à-vis de notre métier », estime Jean-Alain Guivanach, président de la FDSEA du Finistère.
    41 intrusions dans des élevages finistériens

    « Les atteintes au monde agricole sont nombreuses : ce sont près de 1.000 incidents qui se sont produits contre le monde agricole au nom de la cause animale cette année », indique Christophe Castaner. Selon la FDSEA du Finistère, 41 élevages du département ont subi des intrusions cette année, contre 16 en 2018 et 8 en 2017.

    _"_La cellule Déméter a permis de recenser dans le Finistère 12 éleveurs victimes d’intrusions depuis un an sur leurs exploitations, précise le colonel Nicolas Duvinage. Parmi eux, huit n’ont pas souhaité porter plainte car ils étaient tellement traumatisés qu’ils voulaient tourner la page au plus vite". Trois autres éleveurs ont été victimes de tentatives de repérages , trois autres ont subi des menaces et injures en raison de leur profession.

    « Le signalement des intrusions est important mais ne suffit pas, constate Jean-Alain Guivanach. Une cellule comme Déméter est un signe positif de la volonté de travail des services de gendarmerie ». Reste la question des intrusions sans effraction : aujourd’hui, _" c’est mal condamné_, ce qui nous pousse à demander une évolution de la législation ", précise le syndicaliste. Selon Christophe Castaner, des discussions sont en cours à ce sujet avec la Garde des Sceaux.

    #clientélisme #bouchers

  • La Recomposition des mondes

    Que se trame-t-il exactement sur la #Zad de #Notre-Dame-des-Landes ?


    Notre anthropologue dessinateur mène l’enquête : s’agit-il d’un kyste peuplé de hippies violents ? Trop drogués pour comprendre qu’il faut partir puisque le projet d’aéroport est abandonné ? Ou de l’avant-poste, en Occident, d’un nouveau rapport au monde, affranchi de la distinction entre Nature et Culture ?

    L’enquête emprunte des chemins imprévisibles sur ce bocage qui, d’emblée, nous absorbe, nous transforme et recompose les liens que nous entretenons avec les plantes, les animaux et le territoire.

    Ancien chercheur en sciences cognitives et philosophie, #Alessandro_Pignocchi s’est lancé dans la bande dessinée avec son blog, #Puntish (http://puntish.blogspot.com). Son premier roman graphique, Anent. Nouvelles des Indiens Jivaros (Steinkis), raconte ses découvertes et ses déconvenues dans la jungle amazonienne, sur les traces de l’anthropologue Philippe Descola. Dans les deux suivants, Petit traité d’écologie sauvage et La Cosmologie du futur, il décrit un monde où l’animisme des Indiens d’Amazonie est devenu la pensée dominante, et où un anthropologue jivaro tente de sauver ce qui reste de la culture occidentale.

    http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/la-recomposition-des-mondes-alessandro-pignocchi/9782021421224
    #BD #bande_dessinée #livre #NDDL
    #désobéissance #ZAD #résistance #expulsions #Vraies_Rouges #protection_de_la_nature #exploitation #nature #culture

  • « MOUVEMENT LYCÉEN : IMPRÉVISIBLE & DÉTERMINÉ La métropole Lilloise connait un important mouvement lycéen depuis deux semaines. »
    https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1205941417673138176.html

    Contre Parcoursup, la réforme du baccalauréat, la réforme des #retraites, la précarité étudiante, ainsi que le désastre environnemental actuel et à venir : tous les jours, plusieurs lycées de la métropole sont bloqués.
    Mardi dernier, on comptait au moins 13 établissements mobilisés. Tout comme ce jeudi 12 décembre. Des centaines de lycéen-ne-s se réunissent dans le centre-ville et manifestent spontanément, massivement et sauvagement.
    À Roubaix, Tourcoing, Marcq-en-Baroeul, Villeneuve d’Ascq, La Madeleine, Lambersart, Lille, les lycées se soulèvent. Chaque matin, vers 7h, les lycéen-ne-s se retrouvent devant leurs bahuts pour bloquer afin d’empêcher la tenue des cours, libérer du temps et manifester. (...)

    #Greve #GreveGénérale #Lille #BlocusLycéens #lycéens

    • Une chronique lilloise à trois voix. Esquinte - Courriers autour du 10 décembre
      https://esquinte.info/Courriers-autour-du-10-decembre

      Dans la rue nationale, quelle surprise de voir des gens s’organiser pour couper le gaz aux banques, agences et autres grandes enseignes du parcours comme le Printemps. Interpellé, je vais voir un travailleur du gaz qui me dira « Chacun peut bloquer à son échelle, moi je suis dans le gaz, l’autre dans l’électricité, du coup on coupe le gaz et l’électricité ! » C’est simple. Et surtout très efficace. Au cœur de la rue nationale, ce sera les agences et les pubs qui prendront cher. Lors d’une action, quelques syndiqués de la CGT iront emmerder ceux qui brisaient les vitrines. Et ça ira jusqu’à donner des coups. C’était anecdotique. Mais au moins, ça aura le mérite que le soir même à l’assemblée générale, tout le monde soit d’accord pour se déclarer solidaire des formes d’actions, tout en condamnant l’action des types de la CGT.

      https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELdSVm4XUAAhKgJ?format=jpg

      #EDF #CGT #banderole_game

  • « Le plus grand défi pour les femmes aujourd’hui, c’est de ne pas se taire » | National Geographic
    https://www.nationalgeographic.fr/photographie/2019/11/le-plus-grand-defi-pour-les-femmes-aujourdhui-cest-de-ne-pas-se-t

    #Pénélope_Bagieu, 37 ans, est #dessinatrice de #bandes_dessinées, auteure notamment des Culottées, ouvrage en deux tomes comprenant des courtes biographies de femmes ayant bravé des interdits ou des normes sociales relevant du sexisme ou du patriarcat. En juillet 2019, elle a reçu le #prix_Eisner de la meilleure édition américaine d’une œuvre internationale – l’une des plus hautes distinctions mondiales de la bande dessinée.

    Quel est le plus grand défi pour les #femmes d’aujourd’hui ?

    Celui de ne pas se taire. Bien qu’on vous rappelle, chaque jour un peu plus, que votre parole ne vaut pas autant que celle d’un homme, il ne faut pas avoir peur de prendre la parole, de nous énerver contre des choses qui nous semblent injustes. Et ce, dans tous les domaines.

  • #Bande_passante & #Bond : les jeux vidéo en streaming.

    Le service de jeu vidéo à la demande lancé par Google s’annonce très consommateur en bande passante. Un obstacle potentiel à son déploiement, et un point de friction probable avec les fournisseurs d’accès internet.

    https://www.lesechos.fr/tech-medias/hightech/jeux-video-la-connexion-internet-pourrait-limiter-les-ambitions-de-google-a

    #fai #bandwidth #energy #energie #5G #lobby

    traduction : une connexion haut débit - voire très haut débit - sera obligatoire pour s’offrir l’expérience minimale du service de jeu vidéo à la demande en termes de résolution et de graphisme. Pour la 4K, le débit nécessaire est évalué à 30 mégabits . Sans compter le débit requis par la manette sans fil, elle aussi connectée

    #5G : rappel https://www.ieb.be/Sur-Terre-comme-au-ciel

  • Vivere

    Il dono di Selma ha salvato tre vite. Lei era una profuga palestinese di 49 anni, scappata col marito e due figli adolescenti dalla Siria dilaniata dalla guerra. Il passaggio in Egitto, l’avventuroso viaggio con altri migranti su un barcone condotto da scafisti, i soccorsi della Guardia costiera italiana che la trovano in fin di vita al largo di Siracusa. Inutili i disperati tentativi di salvarla: Selma muore. E il marito insieme ai figli, grazie alla mediazione di un medico nefrologo palestinese che lavora nell’ospedale della città siciliana, decide: “Facciamo ciò che è giusto”. Gli organi della donna vengono donati a tre italiani, da tempo in attesa di trapianto. Per Selma e i familiari l’Italia doveva essere solo una tappa: erano diretti in Svezia, dove vive e lavora il figlio maggiore. Lei si è fermata in Sicilia, è stata sepolta a Malta: ma la sua morte ha permesso ad altre vite di continuare.


    https://www.fandangoeditore.it/shop/marchi-editoriali/coconino-press/dokumenta/vivere

    #transplantation_d'organes #BD #livre #bande_dessinée #don #vie #don_d'organes #Ugo_Bertotti #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens

  • Une saison à l’#ONU

    Tout le monde a entendu parler de l’ONU, mais combien savent exactement ce qu’elle fait et comment elle fonctionne ? Et 70 ans après sa fondation, difficile de dire que les Nations Unies ont rempli leur ambition de départ : maintenir la paix et la sécurité dans le monde ! Pendant quatre ans, Karim Lebhour a observé comme correspondant de presse l’impuissance du Conseil de sécurité, le recul de la domination occidentale, et l’avènement d’une nouvelle guerre froide avec la Russie et les nombreux travers et défaillances de l’ONU. Ses chroniques parfois décalées, souvent drôles, toujours édifiantes, nous font entrer dans le quotidien de cette administration gigantesque qui rassemble des dizaines d’agences et emploie quelque 44 000 personnes !


    http://steinkis.com/une-saison-agrave-l-onu-3-94.html
    #nations_unies #BD #livre #bande_dessinée

  • La #ZAD c’est plus grand que nous

    En 2000, l’ancien projet d’aéroport du Grand Ouest est réactivé dans le bocage de #Notre-Dame-des-Landes, près de Nantes.
    En 2009, après tous les recours juridiques imaginables, des habitants envisagent de s’opposer physiquement au démarrage des travaux et lancent l’appel des « habitant-e-s qui résistent ». Des centaines de jeunes gens de la France entière, issus des luttes politiques écologiques, antiautoritaires ou à la recherche de modes de vie alternatifs, commencent à venir s’installer sur la zone promise aux grands travaux.
    Le 16 octobre 2012, le gouvernement Ayrault lance « l’#opération_César » qui a pour but d’évacuer, par la force, Notre-Dame-des-Landes et d’en chasser les occupants qui s’opposent au projet de construction de l’aéroport.
    Le 17 janvier 2018, le projet est officiellement abandonné. Entre ces deux dates, les zadistes résistent, s’organisent collectivement, cultivent, avec l’aide des paysans restés sur place, des terres dans le bocage, rêvent d’une autre façon de vivre : « Nous sommes une armée de rêveurs (rêveuses) et pour cette raison nous sommes invincibles. »



    http://www.futuropolis.fr/fiche_titre.php?id_article=F00068
    #BD #livre #bande_dessinée #roman_graphique #NDDL #résistance #rêve

  • « C’est fou à quel point ces #murs et ces #grilles sont hautes. On côtoie ces murs en permanence.
    Ils limitent notre quotidien. Ils sont l’affirmation de la négation de l’autre.
    Mais on les a intégrés, leur #violence a été assimilée. On accepte sans le percevoir le #pouvoir de contrainte, la #dépossession de l’#espace qu’ils représentent »

    #géographie_urbaine #villes #urban_matter #barrières

    Source : une #BD de #Margot_Gustaedt dont le titre est "Les renards sans pelage" , qui n’a pas été publiée. C’est son travail de diplôme.

    La BD porte sur les #violences_policières et sur l’affaire du #lycée_Arago

    D’autres travaux de Margot, que j’ai rencontrée en Grèce lors d’une summer school à Athènes sur les villes-refuge, car elle travaillait à une nouvelle BD avec une étudiante qui suivait la summer school :
    https://margotgustaedt.tumblr.com

    ping @reka @davduf @isskein

    • Ne pas mourir comme des chiens

      Les luttes se croisent et se ressemblent, comme celles des Kurdes et des gilets jaunes. Le même combat pour la liberté et l’égalité sociale rencontre la même répression. La dessinatrice Mamoste Dîn nous fait découvrir le camp autogéré d’exilé·es kurdes de Lavrio en Grèce. Dans un subtil va-et-vient entre la Grèce et la France, entre les histoires personnelles et les combats politiques des activistes kurdes et de la jeune Judith, venue documenter leur quotidien, nous partageons un moment de la vie du camp et apprenons à connaître et à aimer ses habitant·es.


      https://seenthis.net/messages/845470

      #BD #bande_dessinée

    • GRECIA : IN CORSO LO SGOMBERO DEL CAMPO PROFUGHI DI LAVRIO, AUTORGANIZZATO SECONDO I PRINCIPI DEL CONFEDERALISMO DEMOCRATICO

      Raid della polizia greca al campo profughi autogestito di Lavrio, vicino Atene, abitato da rifugiati curdi, siriani e turchi che dal 2017 controllano e organizzano la struttura – sorta negli anni ’80 – secondo i princìpi del confederalismo democratico e senza la presenza, all’interno, di autorità e istituzioni dello stato greco.

      La polizia ellenica ha fatto irruzione nel campo di Lavrio intorno alle 03:00 di oggi, mercoledì 5 luglio, iniziando a deportare gli abitanti in altre strutture, chiuse e controllate dalle autorità, a 200 km di distanza.

      Il ministero greco per la migrazione e l’asilo ha comunicato “la chiusura graduale del campo profughi, perchè non adatto ad ospitare rifugiati”. In realtà l’attacco al campo di Lavrio è politico, e risponde alle pressioni del governo turco. Ankara, e in particolare il regime di Erdogan, Akp e Mhp, preme su Atene per lo smantellamento. Per lo stato turco Lavrio “ospita membri del Partito dei Lavoratori del Kurdistan (Pkk) e di altri gruppi fuorilegge della sinistra turca”, con Erdogan che ha definito Lavrio un “campo di addestramento per terroristi”.

      https://www.radiondadurto.org/2023/07/05/grecia-in-corso-lo-sgombero-del-campo-profughi-di-lavrio-autorganizza

    • In Lavrio, a self-governed camp of Kurdish exiles

      A reportage from Lavrio, approximately 60 km to the southeast of Athens, done in December 2017, during a long halt in a self-governed camp of Kurdish exiles.

      High on the mast, a flag of the PKK1floats above a group of two-storey buildings reminiscent of a disaffected high school. Built some sixty years ago one hour south of Athens in the harbor town of Lavrio in order to shelter refugees fleeing the Soviet Union, and located in the heart of the town a few steps away from the harbour, for the past 35 years the camp has mostly sheltered Kurdish and Turkish political exiles, mainly members or sympathizers of the PKK but also of the MLKP and of the MKP2. For the past 3 years they have been joined by Kurdish families fleeing the war in Syria. The first camp was insufficient to greet them all, a second camp was opened on a vacant lot on the outskirts of town, at the foot of hills covered in Mediterranean vegetation; this second camp is made up of refurbished containers better suited to sheltering families than the shared rooms in the main camp.
      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC03896-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC04005-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      Up until July 31 2017, the Greek government provided daily aid to the exiles through the Greek Red Cross. But under pressure from Turkey, it abruptly ceased all contacts with the camp and its occupants, and has left the premises and completely withdrawn from all aid. A vague justification for closing down the camp was provided for “non-compliance with Greek and European laws”, notably as pertains to “entrances and exits”. If this kind of pressure exerted by Turkey is nothing new since regime opponents are in the camp, the inhabitants can now only rely on the solidarity of the locals and of organizations such as the Greek church which brings food parcels to the occupants every week. This, despite the fact the influx of exiles has not dwindled.

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC04168-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      A self-governed camp

      The camp occupants’ refusal to abandon their self-governance served as an excuse for the Greek State’s withdrawal.

      “There’s an organization in the camp. A committee is elected by the occupants, of which I’m the spokesperson,” Sedat, a man in his forties, explains. “We organize daily life within the camp, we manage communications with the associations who come in, with the Greek government. We must also manage hygiene and life in general. Within this committe, there is also a youth committee subdivided into several sub-committees: culture, art…We must manage the circulation of people, the budget, it’s difficult but with so many refugees, it’s important work. The occupants choose their representatives and we manage as best we can until we leave. Then, they hold new elections.”

      “350 people live here. Women, men, in all kinds of situations. They can stay between a year to two and a half years. Most stay between 5 to 6 months. There is no governmental aid nor aid from international organizations. We must organize and cover all our expenses. We hope the Greek government won’t use any kind of force against us, but we think the Greek people will be on our side, the camp has existed for over 35 years. The PKK is well known locally, and so are the Kurds. The Turkish government has exerted pressure on the Greek government in an attempt to destroy this camp. We make a local contribution to the Greek economy by buying from the local bakery, and from the local shops. The Greeks are also suffering from a financial crisis, but we try to link up with the local people. We try not to be too much of a bother. We know we are in their country, that we are guests here.”

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC03918-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      “We’re not here for the fun of it.”

      He continues: “We’re not here for the fun of it. If there is war in our country, it is because of international powers, but we don’t judge the peoples of Europe. We would also love to be living in our country. The biggest need is for an official recognition of this camp, there are people from all four parts of Kurdistan here. We would wish to obtain the status of a refugee camp despite the attacks from the Turkish State. We do not wish to live in camps with people who joined ISIS. Three of our activists were murdered by the Turkish State in the heart of Paris, we don’t want to see that happening here. They still have a list of people they want killed, our occupants are afraid. And we want to protect them. This is why we want this official status. Refugees have rights, we ask international organizations to recognize us. The people here are not children of wealthy ones but we try to live in dignity. If they imagine they will make us back down by starving us to death, they are mistaken I don’t want to go into the details of our insufficiency of funds. As is the case for every woman, man, child, baby and young person, the people here have the same needs. Food, hygiene, everything you need to live with dignity, do we have all that? Of course not, but we try to live with minimal conditions. I have been here for 5 months. In Kurdistan, I was responsible for the BDP in Bitlis3. They wanted to jail me, I had to flee. Perhaps we were not brave enough to fight,” he concludes with a bitter smile.

      We find many elected members of the HDP or of the BDP like Sedat in the camp. The story of each of the occupants in the camp in worthy of a novel. We meet several young people who had to leave Kurdistan because they were threatened with several years in jail for having upheld the use of the Kurdish language, for having participated in demonstrations, others for their political, cultural and social involvement.

      As a whole, the families from Rojava are less politically aware. They have fled from war, and have often lost members of their family. The camp is also a refuge for several women who had to flee alone with their children. For all of them the road was hazardous.

      Mohammed relates : “We fled from Damascus. We arrived in Cizire,4then in Qamislo5for work. Then we passed over into South Kurdistan in Duhok, then into Turkey. We walked for over 9 hours. Once in Turkey, they asked us for 900 Turkey lira to take us to Istanbul? We stayed over 15 days over there. We went to Edirne,6my children had nothing left to eat. The police saw us and told us to to away, to go away from there. All they wanted was to get rid of us. We stayed with someone for two nights, and crossed the river to the other side around 7PM. We went through the forest. You have to be quick or else you never get through. We walked for a for long time. We have been here for 3 months. I don’t know when we will leave. When we will get out of here. The Assad government sentenced me to 6 years in jail, if only they told me I wouldn’t be sentenced, I would go straight back to Qamislo.”
      Self-governance and daily management

      Even more than the precarious living conditions, the hardest for the refugees is dealing with the waiting and the boredom that settles over them along with the feeling of no longer having any grip over the course of events. Despite the days that stretch out, all of them hang on to the hope of rapidly finding a way to reach the country of their destination.

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC03735-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      For them, Greece is nothing but a transit station. Uncertainty about the future keeps them from investing fully in the present moment. Starting an activity in the camp, learning Greek, launching a project with an objective in the middle term, would be acknowledging that the wait may be long, thus pushing further into the future the goal they gave themselves when they took the hard decision to leave – a choice that was no such thing when the alternative was either prison or death; an expensive choice also, smugglers demanding several thousand euros at each stage of the journey, eliminating by the same token the ones who can’t afford to leave. Far from family and friends, the exiles’ morale gets eroded as the months go by, even if friendships are born in the camp between people sharing common histories and cultures. Reunions also, on occasion, with old companions from the struggle or from university.

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC04801-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg

      Every week, the occupants of each room meet to criticize and self-criticize, and to discuss ways to improve the organization. This is also the time for resolving any tensions that may have cropped up: so-and-so did not wash the dishes when it was his turn to do so, another stayed in bed past noon… Or to express one’s unhappiness, as did G. who talks about the depressing time at New Year’s, far from his family, after spending six months waiting, and seeing no end to it. Each room then designates a representative to the camp’s general assembly which chooses the elected committee for the overall organization. This system is based on that of democratic confederalism, the PKK’s political paradigm since 2005, which aims at organizing society in assemblies, from the lowest rung, known as the commune, to the largest. Within the camp, each room thus corresponds to a commune.

      The youth committee also attempts to organize activities. Discussion sessions and debates are held four days a week. The passing months see different celebrations or commemorations. In December, for instance, a ceremony was organized to honor the martyrs of Roboski and, a few days later, a large section of the camp got involved in organizing the New Year celebration, a rare moment of collective relaxation.

      The rest of the time, the exiles relieve the boredom from morning till night by walking around the camp or by seaside and by drinking tea or coffee in the vicinity. Some go fishing early in the morning, others go to Athens for a few days to settle administrative formalities, to walk around or to visit acquaintances who have chosen to live there in one of the many self-administered squats in town. The Kurdish movement participated in the opening of City Plaza, notably, one of the most developed reception centers for exiles.

      A lot of discussions occur in the camp, around everything and nothing, over news from Kurdistan, but mostly about ways to leave. Upon arriving in Greece, the exiles spend a few days in custody, after which they are given a paper informing them they must make an appointment to file a request for asylum. This official request often takes over a year to be processed, and the ones making the request are mostly political cadres to whom the Party forbids clandestine passages. The others seek clandestine means for leaving Greece and filing their request in another country. The Dublin III Rule stipulates that the asylum request must be processed in the country where it is first registered, a way for France and Germany to avoid dealing with exiles who arrived through other countries. However, none of the exiles wish to stay in Greece.

      Since smugglers are forbidden access to the camp, the exiles contact them by phone. The smugglers send them photos of dozens of IDs from all European countries. Everyone then tries to find one with a face resembling his own. These are sold several thousand euros, with uncertain outcomes; several have tried to get through the controls with them, only to get caught. Others think to leave on foot, with or without smugglers, but failures are even greater that way. End of 2017, the situation became even harder with reinforced border controls. Siyar, who has been in the camp for 3 months, puts at only fifteen people or so the number of those who have managed to get through.

      The exiles head where their family ties are or, failing those, where they have friends. Germany, Switzerland and Sweden are the destinations of choice. For many, France has maintained an image of sympathy towards the Kurds, but it has been largely tarnished by the conditions it has reserved to migrants these last years. Moreover, learning the language is complicated. For the younger ones hope to master the language of their host country as soon as possible in order to pick up their studies or their professional activity.

      If the search for better living conditions spurs on most of the exiles, many also see it as a way to continue their political struggle sheltered from repression.

      As is the case in the cultural sector, for Hassan, a young literature professor who had to run out of his classroom to avoid arrest for upholding the use of the Kurdish tongue. The young man hopes to go on working for the recognition and development of the zaza dialect. In pedagogy, as for Dilek* who was destined for teaching until the police tried to force her into becoming an informer, threatening her with heavy jail sentences when she refused. Or to make known the PKK’s struggle, as for Fırat* : “I’ve been here for 3 months. I want to continue my activities in Europe. After living the Kurdish reality, it is essential to talk about it, to share our project. This is a moral duty for every Kurd. We must tell our story to the world. We must explain what is going on, we must tell of the sufferings, widen the struggle. (…) Democratic confederalism must not only take root only in Rojava, it must spread to the whole world. It may evolve in Rojava, but it must go on improving. It must not be limited to that area, but must spread to the four corners of Kurdistan. It is thus my duty to explain why I am here, it is my responsibility as a Kurd. We must fight for our people, for democratic confederalism.”

      https://www.kedistan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSC04008-photo-loez-lavrio.jpg
      https://www.kedistan.net/2018/03/07/lavrio-self-governed-camp-kurdish-exiles

  • Léo Malet : « Il n’y a pas souvent de brouillard sur le pont de Tolbiac »
    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-nuits-de-france-culture/leo-malet-il-ny-pas-souvent-de-brouillard-sur-le-pont-de-0


    En 1982, Sylvie Andreu signait une série estivale intitulée « Quatre semaines de vacances à Paris ». Dans l’un des épisodes il était question des écrivains du 13ème arrondissement, dont Léo Malet qui racontait son rapport au lieu, magnifiquement décrit dans « Brouillard au pont de Tolbiac ».


    https://www.casterman.com/Bande-dessinee/Auteurs/tardi
    #Léo_Malet #Tardi #Paris #bande_dessinée #Tolbiac

  • Né en 1950 dans le Jura, Alex Barbier est renvoyé de l’éducation nationale alors qu’il est professeur de dessin. Motif : « attitude subversive ». En publiant Lycaons dans les pages de Charlie hebdo en 1975, il devient le premier auteur de bande dessinée à utiliser la « couleur directe » Ecarté par la frilosité des éditeurs, il travaille la peinture sans jamais abandonner la bande dessinée.
    https://www.du9.org/entretien/alex-barbier-le-dernier-fauve-du

    Le problème existentiel avec lequel je n’ai rien résolu, et auquel je ne peux pas échapper, c’est la mort. Je vais mourir et ça me fait chier. J’en ai extrêmement peur. Ma mère est morte l’été dernier… ce fut une énorme épreuve. Je ne suis absolument pas débarrassé de tout ça, mais d’une manière existentielle, je n’ai plus aucun problème. Je ne veux pas mourir mais je vais le faire quand même, et si mourir me fait peur, vivre non !
    C’est sûrement pour ça que je me sens si bien aujourd’hui.


    http://www.fremok.org/site.php?type=P&id=32
    #Alex_Barbier #FRMK #bande_dessinée #du9

  • Les éditeurs de bande-dessinées de Thierry Bellefroid

    Interviews de dix éditeurs ou responsables éditoriaux, présidant aux destinées de L’Association, Cornélius, Delcourt, Frémok, Glénat, Soleil, Casterman, Dargaud, Dargaud Bénélux/Kana, Les Humanoïdes associés, plus l’histoire du rachat de Dupuis par le groupe Média-Participations en 2004. On comparera avec profit les propos de JC Menu (L’Association) : « On ne fait pas des livres pour être compris, ni même lus, d’ailleurs... » et de Mourad Boudjellal (Soleil) : « Je ne sais pas quand, je ne sais pas avec qui, je ne sais pas comment, mais je serai un jour le numéro 1 dans l’édition de bande dessinée. »

    http://www.stripologie.com/les-ouvrages/60-les-editeurs-de-bande-dessinee-9782873930554.html

    « René Char dit que le bon poète se reconnait surtout ua nombre de mauvais poèmes qu’il n’a pas écrits. C’est pareil pour l’édition. » Menu

    https://www.du9.org/chronique/editeurs-de-bandes-dessinees-les


    http://www.graphzines.net/editeurs/editions-l-association
    l’association est aussi sur tumblr https://lassociation.tumblr.com
    éditeurs de bande-dessinées et autre micro-éditions, des images, uniquement des images :
    http://www.graphzines.net/editeurs
    #éditions #BD #bande_dessinée

  • Yann Moix : pourquoi tant de complaisance ?
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/030919/yann-moix-pourquoi-tant-de-complaisance

    L’affaire Moix dépasse amplement la querelle familiale ou l’étude de cas psychologique, surtout depuis le tir de barrage médiatique déployé le week-end dernier pour absoudre l’écrivain-chroniqueur. Elle entache les éditions Grasset, implique un certain milieu germanopratin et met en lumière les dysfonctionnements du service public audiovisuel.

    #LIVRES #Bernard-Henri_Lévy,_Antisémitisme,_négationnisme,_Yann_Moix,_Olivier_Nora,_Grasset

  • pour rendre à notre manière hommage à #Massimo_Mattioli, qui vient de mourir, l’équipe de pré Carré met en ligne le travail qui lui a été consacré par aurélien Leif dans nos numéros 4 et 5 (septembre 2014/ février 2015)

    http://www.le-terrier.net/pre_carre/mattioli/index.htm

    consultation en ligne et pdf téléchargeable

    Requiescat in pace

    #bande_dessinée #bd #expérimentation #art

  • Puisque j’en suis à enchaîner les manoeuvres dilatoires à haut prétexte culturel pour ne pas faire mon boulot, autant partager ce qu’il y a de plus chouette dans mes dérives :

    https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65397918/f11.image.r=Histoire%20pittoresque,%20dramatique%20et%20caricaturale%20d

    c’est peu dire que ce bouquin de Doré est renversant, qu’il présente une intelligence très vive des propriétés irremplaçables des bandes dessinées pour rendre sensibles certaines modalités du dessin comme monde et comme trajet, comme représentation et comme matérialité etc. On pense souvent à McKay pour ça, mais d’autres, très tôt, se sont jetés là dessus comme sur une opportunité inédite de faire approcher ce que le dessin seul était impuissant à faire saisir.
    Bref, regardez-ça et laissez-vous embarquer.

  • Le numéro 0 de la revue #Nunatak , Revue d’histoires, cultures et #luttes des #montagnes...


    Sommaire :

    La revue est disponible en ligne :
    https://revuenunatak.noblogs.org/files/2016/09/nunatakzero.pdf

    Je mettrai ci-dessous des mots-clés et citations des articles...

    –-----

    métaliste des numéros recensés sur seenthis :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/926433

    #revue #montagne #Alpes #montagnes

  • #métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements

    Je viens de lire dans un compte-rendu de réunion qui a eu lieu à Milan en juin 2019, ce commentaire, sur la situation à la #frontière italo-slovène :

    Gianfranco Schiavone :

    «Quello che sicuramente dovrebbe diventare una questione delicata é l’annunciato avvio delle pattuglie italo slovene in frontiera con l’obiettivo dichiarato alla stampa di bloccare gli arrivi. Con riammissione senza formalita’ delle persone irregolari intercettate nella fascia dei 5 km dalla frontiera . Queste sono le dichiarazioni pubbliche di questi giorni»

    Une #zone_frontalière de #5_km dans laquelle ont lieu des #refoulements directs.

    #Italie #Slovénie #frontière_sud-alpine #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontière_mobile #bande_frontalière #frontières_mobiles #zone_frontalière #zones_frontalières #zone-frontière

    Ceci me rappelle d’autres cas, en Europe et ailleurs, dans lesquels des procédures semblables (la frontière n’est plus une #ligne, mais une #zone) ont été mises en place, j’essaie de les mettre sur ce fil de discussion.
    Si quelqu’un a d’autres cas à signaler, les contributions sont bienvenues...

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4 @isskein

    • A la frontière entre franco-italienne :

      Dans un amendement, l’élu a proposé « une zone limitée aux communes limitrophes ou une bande de 10 kms par rapport à la frontière. » Le gouvernement en a accepté le principe, mais « le délimitera de manière précise par décret pour coller à la réalité du terrain. »

      http://alpesdusud.alpes1.com/news/locales/67705/alpes-du-sud-refus-d-entree-pour-les-migrants-vers-une-evolution-
      #France #Italie #frontière_sud-alpine

    • L’article 10 de la loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme modifie l’article 78-2 du Code de procédure pénale relatif aux contrôles d’identités. Il permet ainsi des contrôles aux frontières pour une durée de douze heures consécutives (contre six auparavant). Il les élargit « aux abords » de 373 gares et dans un rayon de dix kilomètres des ports et aéroports au nombre des points de passage frontaliers. Bien au-delà des simples frontières de l’Hexagone, c’est une partie importante du territoire français qui est ainsi couvert, dont des villes entières comme Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, etc.

      source, p.25 : https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf
      #France

    • Frontière entre #Italie et #Slovénie :

      This month saw the introduction of joint Slovenian and Italian police patrols on their mutual border, raising concerns about the retrenchment of national boundaries contra the Schengen Agreement. The collaboration between authorities, due to be implemented until the end of September, mobilises four joint operations per week, with respective police forces able to enter 10km into the territory of their neighboring state in order to apprehend migrants. Mixed operations by member states signifies a growing trend towards the securitization of the EU’s internal borders, and in this case a tightening of controls on the departure point from the West Balkan route.

      The patrols aim at stemming the transit of migrants from the western Slovenian regions of #Goriška and #Obalno-kraška, into the eastern region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy. Given the extensive pushback apparatus being employed by Slovenian and Croatian officials, arrival in Italy has often been the first place where persons-in-transit can apply for international protection without the threat of summary removal. However, these developments in cross border patrols highlight a growing effort on the part of the Italian government to prevent people seeking sanctuary on its territory.

      (p.15-16)

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/July-2019-Final-Report.pdf

      –—

      While the exact number of persons arriving via the Slovenian-Italian border is unknown, there has been a sharp rise since April (http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2020/11/09/friuli-venezia-giulia-immigrazione-fedriga-ripensare-politiche-di-controllo-) of people entering Italy from the Balkan route. Not only in Trieste, but also around the province of #Udine, arrivals have increased compared to last year. In Udine, around 100 people (https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/11/30/migranti-oltre-cento-persone-rintracciate-nelludinese_9fdae48d-8174-4ea1-b221-8) were identified in one day. This has been met with a huge rise in chain pushbacks, initiated by Italian authorities via readmissions to Slovenia. From January to October 2020, 1321 people (https://www.rainews.it/tgr/fvg/articoli/2020/11/fvg-massimiliano-fedriga-migranti-arrivi-emergenza-98da1880-455e-4c59-9dc9-6) have been returned via the informal readmissions agreement , representing a fivefold increase when compared with the statistics from 2019.

      But instead of dealing with this deficit in adherence to international asylum law, in recent months Italian authorities have only sought to adapt border controls to apprehend more people. Border checks are now focusing on trucks, cars and smaller border crossings (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu4es3xXVc8&feature=youtu.be

      ), rather than focusing solely on the military patrols of the forested area. This fits into a strategy of heightened control, pioneered by the Governor of the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region Massimiliano Fedriga who hopes to deploy more detection equipment at the border. The aim is to choke off any onward transit beyond the first 10km of Italian territory, and therefore apply the fast tracked process of readmission to the maximum number of new arrivals.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/892914

      #10_km

    • Kuster Backs Bill To Reduce 100-Mile Zone for Border Patrol Checkpoints

      Congresswoman Ann McLane Kuster is cosponsoring legislation to reduce border zones from 100 to 25 miles from the border (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3852?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22border+zone%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1), within which U.S. Customs and Border Patrol can set up immigration checkpoints.

      Congressman Peter Welch of Vermont is the prime sponsor of the legislation.

      Kuster was stopped at one such immigration checkpoint in June of this year. The checkpoint, on I-93 in Woodstock, around 90 miles from the border, resulted in 29 tickets for alleged immigration violations.

      The violations were for legal visitors who did not have appropriate paperwork on them, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

      According to a map from CityLabs, the entire state of New Hampshire falls within a border zone (which includes coastal borders).

      “I think it has a chilling effect,” says Kuster. “It’s not the free and open America that we know.”

      Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a similar bill to the Senate.

      https://www.nhpr.org/post/kuster-backs-bill-reduce-100-mile-zone-border-patrol-checkpoints#stream/0
      #USA #Etats-Unis

    • Inside the Massive U.S. ’Border Zone’

      All of Michigan, D.C., and a large chunk of Pennsylvania are part of the area where Border Patrol has expanded search and seizure rights. Here’s what it means to live or travel there.

      https://cdn.citylab.com/media/img/citylab/2018/05/03_Esri_Map/940.png?mod=1548686763

      https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/who-lives-in-border-patrols-100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275
      #cartographie #visualisation
      #100-Mile_Zone

      déjà signalé sur seenthis par @reka en 2018 :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/727225

    • En #Hongrie, les pushbacks, largement pratiqués depuis des années, ont été légalisés en mars 2017 par de nouvelles dispositions permettant aux forces de l’ordre de refouler automatiquement toute personne interpellée sur le territoire hongrois et considérée en situation irrégulière. Ces personnes sont ramenées jusqu’à la clôture et renvoyées de l’autre côté. Si elles manifestent leur volonté de demander l’asile, on leur signifie qu’elles doivent repartir en Serbie et passer par les zones de transit. Pourtant, se trouvant géographiquement et juridiquement en Hongrie (le mur étant situé à 1,5 mètre à l’intérieur du tracé officiel de la frontière), les autorités ont l’obligation de prendre en compte ces demandes d’asile en vertu des conventions européennes et des textes internationaux dont la Hongrie est signataire.

      Tiré du rapport de La Cimade (2018), pp.37-38 :
      https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf

    • Le zone di transito e di frontiera – commento dell’ASGI al decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019

      Il 7 settembre 2009 sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 210 (https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) è stato pubblicato il decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019 che individua le zone di transito e di frontiera dove potrà trovare applicazione la procedura accelerata per l’esame nel merito delle domande di protezione internazionale e istituisce due nuove sezioni delle Commissioni territoriali , come previsto dall’art. 28 bis co. 1 quater del D.lgs. n. 25/2008, introdotto dal d.l. n. 113/2018.

      Le zone di frontiera o di transito sono individuate in quelle esistenti nelle seguenti province:

      –Trieste e Gorizia;

      –Crotone, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce e Brindisi;

      –Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Siracusa, Catania, Messina;

      –Trapani, Agrigento;

      –Città metropolitana di Cagliari e Sud Sardegna.

      Il decreto ministeriale istituisce altresì due nuove sezioni , Matera e Ragusa, le quali operano rispettivamente nella commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato di Bari, per la zona di frontiera di Matera, e nella commissione territoriale di Siracusa, per la zona di frontiera di Ragusa.

      Nel commento qui pubblicato ASGI sottolinea come le nuove disposizioni paiono contrastare con le norme dell’Unione Europea perché si riferiscono in modo assolutamente generico alle “zone di transito o di frontiera individuate in quelle esistenti nelle province” e non ad aree delimitate, quali ad esempio i porti o le aree aeroportuali o altri luoghi coincidenti con frontiere fisiche con Paesi terzi non appartenenti all’Unione europea.

      ASGI evidenzia come “l’applicazione delle procedure accelerate alle domande presentate nelle zone individuate nel decreto ministeriale comporta una restrizione dell’effettivo esercizio dei diritti di cui ogni straniero è titolare allorché manifesta la volontà di presentare la domanda di asilo e una conseguente contrazione del diritto di difesa, in ragione del dimezzamento dei termini di impugnazione e dell’assenza di un effetto sospensivo automatico derivante dalla proposizione del ricorso previsti, in modo differente per le varie ipotesi specifiche, dall’art. 35 bis D. Lgs. 25/08”.

      A tal fine ASGI ricorda che:

      – ai cittadini di Paesi terzi o apolidi tenuti in centri di trattenimento o presenti ai valichi di frontiera, comprese le zone di transito alla frontiere esterne, che desiderino presentare una domanda di protezione internazionale, gli Stati membri devono garantire l’informazione, anche sull’accesso procedura per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, adeguati servizi di interpretariato,
      nonché l’effettivo accesso a tali aree alle organizzazioni e alle persone che prestano consulenza e assistenza ai richiedenti asilo (art. 8 Direttiva 2013/32/UE);

      – gli Stati membri devono provvedere affinché l’avvocato o altro consulente legale che assiste o rappresenta un richiedente possa accedere alle aree chiuse, quali i centri di trattenimento e le zone di transito (art. 23 par. 2) e analoga possibilità deve essere garantita all’UNHCR (art. 29, par. 1);

      – ai sensi dell’art. 46 par. 1 il richiedente ha diritto a un ricorso effettivo dinanzi a un giudice anche nel caso in cui la decisione sulla domanda di protezione internazionale venga presa in frontiera o nelle zone di transito.

      E’ evidente, conclude ASGI nel commento al Decreto, che vi sia il rischio che lo straniero espulso o respinto e che abbia presentato domanda di protezione internazionale dopo l’espulsione o il respingimento in una zona di frontiera tra quelle indicate nel nuovo decreto ministeriale si veda esaminata la sua domanda in modo sommario mentre è trattenuto in condizioni e luoghi imprecisati e inaccessibili di fatto a difensori e organizzazioni di tutela dei diritti.

      Occorre invece ribadire che la presentazione della domanda di protezione internazionale in frontiera riguarderà spesso persone rese ulteriormente vulnerabili dalle condizioni traumatiche del viaggio ed alle quali andrà perciò in ogni caso garantito un esame adeguato della domanda di protezione internazionale e l’applicazione delle garanzie e dei diritti previsti a tutela dei richiedenti protezione internazionale dalle disposizioni nazionali e dell’Unione Europea.

      https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/asilo-zone-transito-frontiera

    • La loi renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme étend à nouveau les contrôles d’identités frontaliers

      Avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi du 30 octobre 2017, les #contrôles_frontaliers étaient autorisés dans les espaces publics des #gares, #ports et #aéroports ouverts au trafic international (désignés par un arrêté ministériel) et dans une zone située entre la frontière terrestre et une ligne tracée de 20 kilomètres en deçà. Le législateur avait étendu les zones frontalières, notamment dans les territoires ultra-marins (où la convention de Schengen n’est pourtant pas applicable).

      https://www.editions-legislatives.fr/actualite/la-loi-renforcant-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-etend-a-nouvea
      #France #20_km #20_kilomètres #espace_public #gares_internationales

    • The Grand Chamber Judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary: Immigration Detention and how the Ground beneath our Feet Continues to Erode

      The ECtHR has been for a long time criticized for its approach to immigration detention that diverts from the generally applicable principles to deprivation of liberty in other contexts. As Cathryn Costello has observed in her article Immigration Detention: The Ground beneath our Feet, a major weakness in the Court’s approach has been the failure to scrutinize the necessity of immigration detention under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary delivered on 21 November 2019 has further eroded the protection extended to asylum-seekers under the Convention to the point that restrictions imposed upon asylum-seekers might not even be qualified as deprivation of liberty worthy of the protection of Article 5. The Grand Chamber overruled on this point the unanimously adopted Chamber judgment that found that the holding of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ between Hungary and Serbia actually amounts to deprivation of liberty.

      In this blog, I will briefly describe the facts of the case, the findings of the Grand Chamber under Article 3 ECHR that was also invoked by the applicants and then I will focus on the reasoning as to the applicability of Article 5.

      The case concerned two Bangladeshi nationals who transited through Greece, the Republic of Northern Macedonia (as it is now known) and Serbia before reaching Hungary, where they immediately applied for asylum. They found themselves in the transit zone on the land border between Hungary and Serbia, where they were held for 23 days pending the examination of their asylum applications. The applications were rejected on the same day on the ground that the applicants had transited through Serbia that, according to Hungary, was a safe third country. The rejections were confirmed on appeal, an order for their expulsion was issued, the applicants were escorted out of the transit zone and they crossed back into Serbia.

      Procedural Breach of Article 3 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber established that Hungary ‘failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision before removing the applicants from Hungary’ to Serbia (para 163). No finding was made on the issue as to whether Hungary was substantively in breach of the right not to be subjected to refoulement given the conditions in Serbia and the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedures that might lead to chain refoulement. This omission follows a trend in the Court’s reasoning that can be described as a procedural turn: focus on the quality of the national decision making processes rather than on the substantive accuracy of the decisions taken at national level.[1] This omission, however, had important consequences for the application of Article 5 to the applicants’ case, the most controversial aspect in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning.

      The Chamber’s reasoning under Article 5 ECHR

      On this aspect, the Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber’s conclusion that the applicants were deprived of their liberty. The fundamental question here is whether ‘the stay’ (Hungary used the term ‘accommodation’) of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ with an exit door open to Serbia, but closed to Hungary, amounts to deprivation of liberty (i.e. detention) in the sense of Article 5 ECHR. Asylum seekers in the transit zone were denied access to the Hungarian territory,[2] but they could leave to Serbia. This creates a complex intertwinement between deprivation of liberty (Article 5(1)(f)) normally understood as not allowing somebody to leave a place, on the one hand, and not allowing somebody to enter a place. Entering a State can be very relevant from the perspective of the obligation upon this State not to refoule, which necessitates a procedure for determining whether there is a risk of refoulement.

      In its judgment from 14 March 2017 the Chamber unanimously answered in positive: by holding them in the transit zone, Hungary deprived the applicants from their liberty, which was in violation of Article 5(1)(f) since this measures had no legal basis in the national law. The Chamber clarified that‘[t]he mere fact that it was possible for them to leave voluntarily returning to Serbia which never consented to their readmission cannot rule out an infringement of the right to liberty.’ (para 55). In this way the Chamber reaffirmed the reasoning in Amuur v France where the Court observed ‘[…] this possibility [to leave voluntary the country] becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.’ (para 48) It follows that although the transit zone at the French airport was, as France argued, “open to the outside”, the applicants were still considered as having been detained since this ‘outside’ did not offer a level of protection comparable to the one in France.

      The Chamber followed this reasoning from Amuur v France in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, which led to the recognition that ‘[…] the applicants could not have left the transit zone in the direction of Serbia without unwanted and grave consequences, that is, without forfeiting their asylum claims and running the risk of refoulement’ (para 55). The Chamber also added that ‘To hold otherwise would void the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention by compelling the applicants to choose between liberty and the pursuit of a procedure ultimately aimed to shelter them from the risk of exposure to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.’ (para 56)

      The ‘practical and realistic’ approach of the Grand Chamber under Article 5 ECHR

      The Grand Chamber in its reasoning broke precisely this linkage between the applicability of Article 5 (the qualification of a treatment as deprivation of liberty) and Article 3 (protection from refoulement). The Grand Chamber performed the following important moves to achieve this. First, it stated that ‘its approach should be practical and realistic, having regard to the present-day conditions and challenges’, which implied that States were not only entitled to control their borders, but also ‘to take measures against foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration.’ (para 213). With Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Court has thus added another nuance to its well-established point of departure in cases dealing with migrants. This point of departure has been that States are entitled, subject to their treaty obligations, to control their borders. The new addition introduced with Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary and also repeated in Z.A. and Others v Russia, a Grand Chamber judgment issued on the same day, concerns States’ right to prevent ‘foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration’. This addition, however, does not seem appropriate given that the applicants themselves in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary never circumvented any immigration control restrictions. They applied immediately for asylum.

      This ‘practical and realistic approach’ also implied an endorsement of the representation of the situation as one of ‘crisis’:[3] ‘the Court observes that the Hungarian authorities were in conditions of a mass influx of asylum-seekers and migrants at the border, which necessitated rapidly putting in place measures to deal with what was clearly a crisis situation.’ (para 228) In the same paragraph, the Grand Chamber went on to almost praise Hungary for having processed the applicants’ claims so fast event though it was ‘a crisis’: ‘Despite the ensuring very significant difficulties, the applicants’ asylum claims and their judicial appeals were examined within three weeks and two days.’ It appears as if the Grand Chamber at this stage had already forgotten its findings made earlier in the judgment under Article 3 that the national procedure for examining the applicants’ claims was deficient. This ultimately gave the basis for the Grand Chamber to find a violation of Article 3.

      The distinction based on how asylum-seekers arrive and the type of border they find themselves at

      The second move performed by the Grand Chamber implied the introduction of a distinction between ‘staying at airport transit zones’ (para 214) and at reception centers located on islands (para 216), on the one hand, and a transit zone located on the land border between two Council of Europe Member States (para 219). This meant, as the Court reasoned, that the applicants did not have to take a plane to leave the zone, they could simply walk out of the zone. In other words, it was practically possible for them to do it on their own and they did not need anybody’s help. As the Court continued to reason in para 236, ‘Indeed, unlike the case of Amuur, where the French courts described the applicants’ confinement as an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty”, in the present case the Hungarian authorities were apparently convinced that the applicants could realistically leave in the direction of Serbia [emphasis added].’ This quotation also begs the comment as to why what the national authorities were or were not convinced about actually mattered. In addition, the reference in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary as to how the national authorities had qualified the situation is also bizarre given that ‘deprivation of liberty’ is an autonomous concept under the Convention. On this point, the two dissenting judges, Judge Bianku and Judge Vućinić criticized the majority by highlighting that ‘the Court has reiterated on many occasions that it does not consider itself bound by the domestic courts’ legal conclusions as to the existence of a deprivation of liberty.’

      Narrowing down the importance of Amuur v France

      The third move performed by the Court is playing down the importance of and narrowing the relevance of Amuur v France. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Grand Chamber reiterated (para 239) the most significant pronouncement from Amuur: the possibility to leave the zone ‘becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is included to take them in.’ It then noted that this reasoning ‘must be read in close relation to the factual and legal context in that case.’ This meant that in contrast to the situation in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, in Amuur the applicants could not leave ‘without authorization to board an airplane and without diplomatic assurance concerning their only possible destination, Syria, a country “not bound by the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ (para 240) On this point Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary can be also distinguished from Z.A. and Others v Russia, where the Grand Chamber observed that ‘[…] unlike in land border transit zones, in this particular case leaving the Sheremetyevo airport transit zone would have required planning, contacting aviation companies, purchasing tickets and possibly applying for a visa depending on the destination.’ (para 154) For the applicants in Ilias and Ahmed ‘it was practically possible […] to walk to the border and cross into Serbia, a country bound by the Geneva Convention.’ (para 241). The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the applicants feared of the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedure and the related risk of removal to the Republic of North Macedonia or Greece. (para 242) However, what seems to be crucial is that their fears were not related to ‘direct threat to their life or health’ (para 242). It follows that the possibility to leave for a place will not preclude the qualification of the situation as one of detention, only if this place poses a direct threat to life or health.

      As noted by the two dissenting judges, it did not seem to matter for the majority that the applicants could not enter Serbia lawfully. In this way, the majority’s reasoning under Article 5 appears to endorse a situation where people are just pushed out of the border without some formal procedures with elementary guarantees.

      Read as a whole the Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary is inconsistent: it contains two findings that are difficult to square together. The Court concluded that since the applicants would not be exposed to a direct risk in Serbia, they were not detained in Hungary. At the same time, Hungary violated Article 3 of the Convention since it did not conduct a proper assessment of the risks that the applicants could face if they were to return to Serbia.

      Overall weakening of the protection of Article 5 ECHR

      One final comment is due. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, the Grand Chamber summarized the following factors for determining whether ‘confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones and reception centers’ can be defined as deprivation of liberty: ‘i) the applicants’ individual situation and their choices, ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose, iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events, and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants.’ (para 217) (see also Z.A. and Others v Russia, para 145) Among these criteria particular attention needs to be directed to the applicable legal regime and the availability of procedural protection. In principle, Article 5, if found applicable, offers certain guarantees (e.g. statutory basis for the deprivation of liberty, access to proceedings for challenging the lawfulness of the detention). The Court seems to have inserted such considerations at the definitional stage of its analysis. For example, in Z.A. and Others v Russia, the Grand Chamber when it examined whether the confinement of the applicants in the airport transit zone amounted to deprivation of liberty, noted that they were left ‘in a legal limbo without any possibility of challenging the measure restricting their liberty’ (para 146). This played a role for the Grand Chamber to conclude that the applicants in Z.A. and Others v Russia were indeed deprived of liberty and Article 5 was thus found applicable. In contrast, the Grand Chamber in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary observed that certain procedural guarantees applied to the applicants’ case (para 226), which also played a role for the final conclusion that Article 5 was not applicable. In sum, instead of scrutinizing the national legal regime and the access to procedural guarantees as part of the substantive analysis under Article 5, where a single deficiency leads to a finding of a violation (i.e. it is sufficient to find a violation of Article 5 if there is no strictly defined statutory basis for the applicants’ detention), the Court has muddled these criteria together with other factors and made them pertinent for the definitional analysis. This ultimately weakens the roles of these criteria and creates uncertainty.

      [1] See V Stoyanova, ‘How Exception must “Very Exceptional” Be? Non-refoulement, Socio-Economic Deprivation and Paposhvili v Belgium’ (2017) International Journal of Refugee Law 29(4) 580.

      [2] See B Nagy, ‘From Reluctance to Total Denial: Asylum Policy in Hungary 2015-2018’ in V Stoyanova and E Karageorgiou (eds) The New Asylum and Transit Countries in Europe during and in the Aftermath of the 2015/2016 Crisis (Brill 2019) 17.

      [3] Boldizsar Nagy has argued that this representation made by the Hungarian government is a lie. See B Nagy, Restricting access to asylum and contempt of courts: illiberals at work in Hungary, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/restricting-access-to-asylum-and-contempt-of-courts-illiberals-at

      https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/12/23/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-ilias-and-ahmed-v-hungary-immigra
      #justice #CEDH #Hongrie #CourEDH

    • Entre la #Pologne et la #Biélorussie :

      Si cette famille a pu être aidée, c’est aussi parce qu’elle a réussi à dépasser la zone de l’état d’urgence : une bande de 3 km tracée par la Pologne tout du long de sa frontière avec la Biélorussie, formellement interdite d’accès aux organisations comme aux journalistes.
      Le long de la frontière, les migrants se retrouvent donc seuls entre les gardes-frontières polonais et biélorusses. Côté polonais, ils sont ramenés manu militari en Biélorussie… En Biélorussie, ils sont également refoulés : depuis octobre, le pays refuse de laisser entrer les migrants déjà passés côté européen. « La seule chance de sortir de la Pologne, c’est d’entrer en Biélorussie. La seule chance de sortir de la Biélorussie, c’est d’entrer en Pologne. C’est comme un ping-pong », confie Nelson (pseudonyme), un migrant originaire de la République démocratique du Congo qui a contacté notre rédaction.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199
      et plus précisément ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948201

      –-

      Et l’article de Médiapart :
      Entre la Pologne et le Belarus, les migrants abandonnés dans une #zone_de_non-droit
      https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948202

    • « À titre de mesures compensatoires à l’entrée en vigueur de la convention de Schengen – qui, du reste, n’était pas encore applicable –, la loi du 10 août 1993 instaure les contrôles dits frontaliers : la police, la gendarmerie et la douane peuvent vérifier l’identité de toute personne, pour s’assurer qu’elle respecte les obligations liées à la détention d’un titre de circulation ou de séjour, dans la zone frontalière et dans les zones publiques des ports, aéroports et gares ouvertes au trafic international. La zone frontalière est une bande de terre, large de 20 km, longeant la frontière terrestre ; les ports, gares ou autres aérogares visés figurent sur une longue liste fixée par un arrêté ministériel. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 16)

      –-

      « Il suffit de passer quelques heures à la gare de Menton pour le constater. Pour les personnes présumées étrangères, la liberté d’aller et de venir dans les espaces placés sous surveillance est restreinte. Elle a encore été réduite avec la loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme qui modifie, une fois de plus, le texte de loi sur les contrôles d’identité en étendant les zones frontalières autour de certains ports et aéroports qui constituent des points de passage frontaliers au sens du code frontières Schengen, soit « tout point de passage autorisé par les autorités compétentes pour le franchissement des frontières extérieures ». Dans ces nouvelles zones, la police pourra procéder à des opérations de contrôle sans avoir besoin de motiver son intervention. La loi de 2017 a également prévu que les contrôles frontaliers puissent s’effectuer « aux abords des gares » et non plus seulement dans les zones publiques de ces lieux. La formulation souffre, c’est peu de le dire, d’un manque de précision qui donne plus de latitude encore aux forces de l’ordre. »

      (Ferré 2018 : 19)

      source : Nathalie Ferré, « La France s’enferme à double tour », Plein Droit, 2018, n°116.

      #20_km #20_kilomètres

    • #Pyrénées, frontière #Espagne-#France, témoignage d’une personne ayant acheté un terrain en zone frontalière :

      « En ce moment, on croise plein de voitures de forces de l’ordre, ce qui est étonnant en plein hiver car il n’y a personne. Il y a aussi des barrages de police réguliers car ils savent que des gens se font prendre sur la route », raconte Camille Rosa, cofondatrice d’une cantine solidaire à Perpignan. « On a acheté avec des copains un petit terrain vers Cerbère. Un jour, des gendarmes sont venus fouiller notre camion alors que mes enfants faisaient la sieste à l’intérieur. J’ai tenté de m’interposer, mais ils m’ont dit que sur la #zone_frontalière, ils avaient une #commission_rogatoire_permanente », poursuit-elle.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/950934

    • #France :

      Le contrôle d’identité « Schengen » permet de vérifier le respect des obligations liées aux titres et documents d’identité et de voyage. Il peut avoir lieu dans une zone située à moins de #20_kilomètres de la frontière terrestre séparant la France d’un pays limitrophe (Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, Luxembourg et Suisse). Si le contrôle a lieu sur l’autoroute ou dans un train, la zone s’étend jusqu’au 1er péage ou l’arrêt après les 20 kilomètres. Le contrôle peut être effectué dans un port, un aéroport ou une gare et ses abords accessible au public et ouverte au trafic international. Le contrôle ne peut pas être pratiqué plus de 12 heures consécutives dans un même lieu et ne peut pas être systématique.

      Depuis la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure, des contrôles d’identité peuvent également être effectués dans un rayon de #10_kilomètres autour de certains #ports et #aéroports sur le territoire.

      C’est ce dernier contrôle qui concerne majoritairement les personnes se présentant à la frontière francoitalienne, mais certaines situations suivies par les militants locaux laissent penser que d’autres types de contrôles ont pu servir pour justifier les arrestations de personnes au-delà de la bande des 20 kilomètres ou des zones transfrontalières.

      Rapport de l’Anafé, Persona non grata, 2019 : http://www.anafe.org/spip.php?article520

      –—

      Rapport CNCDH 2018, p.7 :

      « la préfète des Hautes-Alpes a expliqué que la zone permettant de procéder à des refus d’entrée avait été définie par son prédécesseur mais qu’elle ne correspondait pas nécessairement à la bande des 20 kms14. Selon la PAF, les refus d’entrée peuvent être prononcés dès lors que l’étranger est contrôlé sur le territoire des communes de Montgenèvre et Nevache, et donc jusqu’à l’entrée de Briançon. »
      Il convient de rappeler que des contrôles aléatoires, hors du cadre dérogatoire prévu en cas de rétablissement des frontières, peuvent être opérés, conformément à l’article 78-2 du code de procédure pénale, dans une zone comprise entre la frontière terrestre de la France avec les Etats de l’espace et une ligne tracée à 20 kilomètres en deçà, ainsi que dans les zones accessibles au public des ports, aéroports et gares ferroviaires ou routières ouverts au trafic international et désignés par arrêté et aux abords de ces gares. Ces contrôles sont toutefois strictement encadrés, notamment par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Les personnes interpellées sur ce fondement peuvent faire l’objet d’une procédure de réadmission. En revanche, lorsque les contrôles aux frontières intérieures sont rétablis, les autorités françaises peuvent refuser l’entrée aux étrangers ne remplissant pas les conditions d’entrée sur le territoire aux frontières terrestres et leur notifier une décision de non-admission. Ces étrangers sont considérés comme n’étant pas entrés sur le territoire

      https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-situation-des-migrants-la-frontiere-franco-italienne

      #10_km #20_km

    • Sur le #Bibby_Stockholm barge at #Portland Port :

      “Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission”

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1000870#message1011761

      voir aussi :

      “The circumstances at Portland Port are very different because where the barge is to be positioned is below the mean low water mark. This means that the barge is outside of our planning control and there is no requirement for planning permission from the council.”

      https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/2023/07/18/leaders-comments-on-the-home-office-barge

      #UK #Angleterre

    • The ‘Border’ under EU Law

      The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

      In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

      Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

      By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/1018938#message1023987
      #fiction_de_non-entrée

      –—

      Ce terme est empruntée d’une vieille loi des Etats-Unis, The Immigration Act 1891 :

      “The Immigration Act 1891 was the first to expressly mention detention, as it made provision for officers to ’inspect all such aliens’ or ’to orcier a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a de ignated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is made’. The Act alsa created the very important provision that came to be known as the ’entry fiction’. According to this, a removal to shore for examination ’shall not be considered a landing during the pendency of such examination’. This was a criticallegal (and constitutional) innovation because it meant that th ose incarcerated must be treated as if they were not there. This was both an attempt to treat the place of detention as if it were sim ply an extension ofbeing held on board ship, but also something more serious. The concept of being physically detained within the territorial land-mass of the United States but not being considered legally present was radical. It suggested a kind of limbo - with the detention centre constituting perhaps an extra-legal space- putting immigrants beyond the reach of constitutional norms, pending a final executive decision to land or deport them.”

      source : Daniel Wilsher, Immigration detention : law, history, politics, 2012, p. 13