• ’Bangladesh agrees to allow India to construct fence in 13 places’

    Bangladesh government has in principle, agreed to allow India to erect barbed wire fencing along the zero-line in at least 13 areas along the India-Bangladesh border in #Meghalaya, a senior Indian official told PTI on Sunday.

    As per the Indira-Mujib pact of 1972, no permanent structure can be built within the 150 yards of the border.

    In 1975, a guideline for the management of the 4,000 km long India-Bangladesh border was formulated by the two countries which also agreed not to construct any permanent structure within the 150-yard limit.

    ’Following India’s request, the Bangladesh government has in principle agreed to allow construction of fencing on zero-line in at least 13 areas of the state within the zero line,’ the official said to Press Trust of India.

    Fencing at the identified areas along the zero line at #East_Jaintia_Hills district, #West_Jaintia_Hills district, #East_Khasi_Hills district and #South_West_Khasi_Hills district will be taken up accordingly, he said, the Indian news agency added.

    The state government had identified those areas where erection of fencing 150 yards away from zero-line would not be feasible and as such approached India to seek permission from Bangladesh, the official said.

    The matter is awaiting final nod from the Bangladesh government as all line departments including the BGB has sent their note of agreement on the matter, he said.

    Of the 443 km-long India-Bangladesh border in Meghalaya, about 100 km was unfenced. Earthworks have already begun for the remaining patches, the official said, says PTI.

    Till date, some problems have cropped up in the erection of fencing on certain stretches of the border due to existence of low-lying areas, human habitations, cemetery and cash crops within the 150 yards of the border, a BSF official.

    According to PTI, checking of illegal cross-border activities has been a major challenge for the BSF manning it, the official said.

    The Bangladesh government in 2012 had allowed India to erect barbed wire fencing along the zero-line in Tripura’s Mohanpur market, near the international border.

    https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/205887/Bangladesh-agrees-to-allow-India-to-construct
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #Bangladesh #Inde #frontières

    Localisation:

    ping @reka @fil

  • Le #Bangladesh veut-il noyer ses #réfugiés_rohingyas ?

    Confronté à la présence sur son territoire d’un million de réfugiés musulmans chassés de Birmanie par les crimes massifs de l’armée et des milices bouddhistes, Dacca envisage d’en transférer 100 000 sur une île prison, dans le golfe du Bengale, menacée d’inondation par la mousson. Ce projet vient relancer les interrogations sur le rôle controversé de l’Organisation des Nations unies en #Birmanie.
    Dans les semaines qui viennent, le gouvernement du Bangladesh pourrait transférer plusieurs milliers de réfugiés rohingyas, chassés de Birmanie entre 2012 et 2017, dans une #île du #golfe_du_Bengale menacée de submersion et tenue pour « inhabitable » par les ONG locales. Préparé depuis des mois par le ministère de la gestion des catastrophes et des secours et par la Commission d’aide et de rapatriement des réfugiés, ce #transfert, qui devrait dans un premier temps concerner 350 familles – soit près de 1 500 personnes – puis s’étendre à 7 000 personnes, devrait par la suite être imposé à près de 100 000 réfugiés.

    Selon les agences des Nations unies – Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) et Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) –, plus de 950 000 s’entassent aujourd’hui au Bangladesh dans plusieurs camps de la région de #Cox’s_Bazar, près de la frontière birmane. Près de 710 000 membres de cette minorité musulmane de Birmanie, ostracisée par le gouvernement de #Naypidaw, sont arrivés depuis août 2017, victimes du #nettoyage_ethnique déclenché par l’armée avec l’appui des milices villageoises bouddhistes.

    Les #baraquements sur #pilotis déjà construits par le gouvernement bangladais sur l’#île de #Bhasan_Char, à une heure de bateau de la terre ferme la plus proche, dans le #delta_du_Meghna, sont destinés à héberger plus de 92 000 personnes. En principe, les réfugiés désignés pour ce premier transfert doivent être volontaires.

    C’est en tout cas ce que les autorités du Bangladesh ont indiqué aux agences des Nations unies en charge des réfugiés rohingyas. Mais l’ONG régionale Fortify Rights, qui a interrogé, dans trois camps de réfugiés différents, quatorze personnes dont les noms figurent sur la liste des premiers transférables, a constaté qu’en réalité, aucune d’entre elles n’avait été consultée.

    « Dans notre camp, a déclaré aux enquêteurs de Fortify Rights l’un des délégués non élus des réfugiés chargé des relations avec l’administration locale, aucune famille n’accepte d’être transférée dans cette île. Les gens ont peur d’aller vivre là-bas. Ils disent que c’est une île flottante. » « Île qui flotte », c’est d’ailleurs ce que signifie Bhasan Char dans la langue locale.

    Les réfractaires n’ont pas tort. Apparue seulement depuis une vingtaine d’années, cette île, constituée d’alluvions du #Meghna, qui réunit les eaux du Gange et du Brahmapoutre, émerge à peine des eaux. Partiellement couverte de forêt, elle est restée inhabitée depuis son apparition en raison de sa vulnérabilité à la mousson et aux cyclones, fréquents dans cette région de la mi-avril à début novembre. Cyclones d’autant plus redoutés et destructeurs que l’altitude moyenne du Bangladesh ne dépasse pas 12 mètres. Selon les travaux des hydrologues locaux, la moitié du pays serait d’ailleurs submergée si le niveau des eaux montait seulement d’un mètre.

    « Ce projet est inhumain, a confié aux journalistes du Bangla Tribune, un officier de la marine du Bangladesh stationné dans l’île, dont l’accès est interdit par l’armée. Même la marée haute submerge aujourd’hui une partie de l’île. En novembre1970, le cyclone Bhola n’a fait aucun survivant sur l’île voisine de Nijhum Dwip. Et Bhasan Char est encore plus bas sur l’eau que Nijhum Dwip. » « Un grand nombre de questions demeurent sans réponses, observait, après une visite sur place en janvier dernier, la psychologue coréenne Yanghee Lee, rapporteure spéciale de l’ONU pour la situation des droits de l’homme en Birmanie. Mais la question principale demeure de savoir si cette île est véritablement habitable. »

    « Chaque année, pendant la mousson, ont confié aux enquêteurs de Human Rights Watch les habitants de l’île voisine de Hatiya, une partie de Bhasan Char est érodée par l’eau. Nous n’osons même pas y mettre les pieds. Comment des milliers de Rohingyas pourraient-ils y vivre ? » Par ailleurs, la navigation dans les parages de l’île est jugée si dangereuse, par temps incertain, que les pêcheurs du delta hésitent à s’y aventurer. Les reporters d’un journal local ont dû attendre six jours avant que la météo devienne favorable et qu’un volontaire accepte de les embarquer.

    À toutes ces objections des ONG, d’une partie de la presse locale et de plusieurs agences des Nations unies, le gouvernement bangladais répond que rien n’a été négligé. Une digue, haute de près de trois mètres et longue de 13 km, a été érigée autour de l’enclave de 6,7 km² affectée à l’hébergement des Rohingyas. Chacune des 120 unités de logement du complexe comprend douze bâtiments sur pilotis, une mare et un abri en béton destiné à héberger 23 familles en cas de cyclone et à recevoir les réserves de produits alimentaires. Conçus, selon les architectes, pour résister à des vents de 260 km/h, les abris pourront aussi être utilisés comme salles de classe, centres communautaires et dispensaires.

    Construit en parpaings, chaque bâtiment d’habitation contient, sous un toit de tôle métallique, seize chambres de 3,5 m sur 4 m, huit W.-C., deux douches et deux cuisines collectives. Destinées à héberger des familles de quatre personnes, les chambres s’ouvrent sur une coursive par une porte et une fenêtre à barreaux. Un réseau de collecte de l’eau de pluie, des panneaux solaires et des générateurs de biogaz sont également prévus. Des postes de police assureront la sécurité et 120 caméras de surveillance seront installées par la marine.

    Compte tenu des conditions de navigation très difficiles dans l’estuaire de la Meghna et du statut militarisé de l’île, la liberté de mouvement des réfugiés comme leur aptitude à assurer leur subsistance seront réduites à néant. « Bhasan Char sera l’équivalent d’une prison », estimait en mars dernier Brad Adams, directeur pour l’Asie de Human Rights Watch.
    Aung San Suu Kyi n’a pas soulevé un sourcil

    Aucun hôpital n’est prévu sur l’île. En cas d’urgence, les malades ou les blessés devront être transférés vers l’hôpital de l’île de Hatiya, à une heure de bateau lorsque le temps le permet. Faute de production locale, la quasi-totalité de l’alimentation devra être acheminée depuis le continent. La densité de population de ce complexe dont les blocs, disposés sur un plan orthogonal, sont séparés par d’étroites allées rectilignes, dépassera, lorsqu’il sera totalement occupé, 65 000 habitants au kilomètre carré, soit six fois celle du cœur de New York.

    On le voit, ce « paradis pour les Rohingyas », selon le principal architecte du projet, Ahmed Mukta, qui partage son activité entre Dacca et Londres, tient davantage du cauchemar concentrationnaire submersible que du tremplin vers une nouvelle vie pour les réfugiés birmans du Bangladesh. Ce n’est pourtant pas faute de temps et de réflexion sur la nature et la gestion du complexe. L’idée de transférer les réfugiés birmans sur Bhasan Char circulait depuis 2015 parmi les responsables birmans. À ce moment, leur nombre ne dépassait pas 250 000.

    Alimentés depuis 1990 par un chapelet de flambées de haine anti-musulmanes que le pouvoir birman tolérait quand il ne les allumait pas lui-même, plusieurs camps s’étaient créés dans la région de Cox’s Bazar pour accueillir les réfugiés chassés par la terreur ou contraints à l’exil par leur statut spécial. Musulmans dans un pays en écrasante majorité bouddhiste, les Rohingyas se sentent depuis toujours, selon l’ONU, « privés de leurs droits politiques, marginalisés économiquement et discriminés au motif de leur origine ethnique ».

    Le projet s’était apparemment endormi au fond d’un tiroir lorsqu’en août 2017, après la véritable campagne de nettoyage ethnique déclenchée par Tatmadaw (l’armée birmane) et ses milices, près de 740 000 Rohingyas ont fui précipitamment l’État de Rakhine, (autrefois appelé Arakan) où ils vivaient pour se réfugier de l’autre côté de la frontière, au Bangladesh, auprès de leurs frères, exilés parfois depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans. En quelques jours, le nombre de Rohingyas dans le district de Cox’s Bazar a atteint un million de personnes et le camp de réfugiés de Kutupalong est devenu le plus peuplé de la planète.

    Nourrie par divers trafics, par le prosélytisme des émissaires islamistes, par la présence de gangs criminels et par l’activisme des agents de l’Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) à la recherche de recrues pour combattre l’armée birmane, une insécurité, rapidement jugée incontrôlable par les autorités locales, s’est installée dans la région. Insécurité qui a contribué à aggraver les tensions entre les réfugiés et la population locale qui reproche aux Rohingyas de voler les petits boulots – employés de restaurant, livreurs, conducteurs de pousse-pousse – en soudoyant les policiers et en acceptant des salaires inférieurs, alors qu’ils ne sont officiellement pas autorisés à travailler.

    Cette situation est d’autant plus inacceptable pour le gouvernement de Dacca que Cox’s Bazar et sa plage de 120 km constituent l’une des rares attractions touristiques du pays.

    Pour mettre un terme à ce chaos, le gouvernement de Dacca a d’abord compté sur une campagne de retours volontaires et ordonnés des Rohingyas en Birmanie. Il y a un an, 2 200 d’entre eux avaient ainsi été placés sur une liste de rapatriement. Tentative vaine : faute d’obtenir des garanties de sécurité et de liberté du gouvernement birman, aucun réfugié n’a accepté de rentrer. Le même refus a été opposé aux autorités en août dernier lorsqu’une deuxième liste de 3 500 réfugiés a été proposée. Selon les chiffres fournis par le gouvernement birman lui-même, 31 réfugiés seulement sont rentrés du Bangladesh entre mai 2018 et mai 2019.

    Les conditions, le plus souvent atroces, dans lesquelles les Rohingyas ont été contraints de fuir en août 2017 et ce qu’ils soupçonnent de ce qui les attendrait au retour expliquent largement ces refus. Selon le rapport de la Mission d’établissement des faits de l’ONU remis au Conseil des droits de l’homme le 8 août 2019 [on peut le lire ici], les Rohingyas ont été victimes, un an plus tôt, de multiples « crimes de droit international, y compris des crimes de génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes de guerre ».

    Selon ce document, « la responsabilité de l’État [birman – ndlr] est engagée au regard de l’interdiction des crimes de génocide et des crimes contre l’humanité, ainsi que d’autres violations du droit international des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire ».

    Le rapport précise que « la mission a établi une liste confidentielle de personnes soupçonnées d’avoir participé à des crimes de droit international, y compris des crimes de génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes de guerre, dans les États de Rakhine, kachin et shan depuis 2011. Cette liste […] contient plus d’une centaine de noms, parmi lesquels ceux de membres et de commandants de la Tatmadaw, de la police, de la police des frontières et des autres forces de sécurité, y compris de fonctionnaires de l’administration pénitentiaire, ainsi que les noms de représentants des autorités civiles, au niveau des districts, des États et du pays, de personnes privées et de membres de groupes armés non étatiques. […] La liste mentionne aussi un grand nombre d’entités avec lesquelles les auteurs présumés de violations étaient liés, notamment certaines unités des forces de sécurité, des groupes armés non étatiques et des entreprises ».

    On comprend dans ces conditions que, rien n’ayant changé depuis cet été sanglant en Birmanie où Aung San Suu Kyi, prix Nobel de la paix 1991, n’a pas levé un sourcil devant ces crimes, les Rohingyas préfèrent l’incertain chaos de leur statut de réfugiés à la certitude d’un retour à la terreur. Et refusent le rapatriement. Ce qui a conduit, début 2018, la première ministre bangladaise Sheikh Hasina à sortir de son tiroir le projet de transfert, en sommeil depuis 2015, pour le mettre en œuvre « en priorité ».

    Près de 300 millions de dollars ont été investis par Dacca dans ce projet, destiné dans un premier temps à réduire la population des camps où la situation est la plus tendue. Selon le représentant du gouvernement à Cox’s Bazar, Kamal Hossain, les opérations de transfert pourraient commencer « fin novembre ou début décembre ».

    Au cours d’une récente réunion à Dacca entre des représentants du ministère des affaires étrangères du Bangladesh et des responsables des Nations unies, les officiels bangladais auraient « conseillé » à leurs interlocuteurs d’inclure Bhasan Char dans le plan de financement de l’ONU pour 2020, sans quoi le gouvernement de Dacca pourrait ne pas approuver ce plan. Les responsables des Nations unies à Dacca ont refusé de confirmer ou démentir, mais plusieurs d’entre eux, s’exprimant officieusement, ont indiqué qu’ils étaient soumis « à une forte pression pour endosser le projet de Bhasan Char ».

    Interrogé sur la possibilité d’organiser le transfert des réfugiés sans l’aval des Nations unies, le ministre bangladais des affaires étrangères Abul Kalam Abdul Momen a répondu : « Oui, c’est possible, nous pouvons le faire. » La première ministre, de son côté, a été plus prudente. En octobre, elle se contentait de répéter que son administration ne prendrait sa décision qu’après avoir consulté les Nations unies et les autres partenaires internationaux du Bangladesh.

    L’un de ces partenaires, dont l’aide en matière d’assistance humanitaire est précieuse pour Dacca, vient de donner son avis. Lors d’une intervention fin octobre à la Chambre des représentants, Alice G. Wells, secrétaire adjointe du bureau de l’Asie du Sud et du Centre au Département d’État, a demandé au gouvernement du Bangladesh d’ajourner tout transfert de réfugiés vers Bhasan Char jusqu’à ce qu’un groupe d’experts indépendants détermine si c’est un lieu approprié. Washington ayant versé depuis août 2017 669 millions de dollars d’aide à Dacca, on peut imaginer que cette suggestion sera entendue.
    Les « défaillances systémiques » de l’ONU

    Les Nations unies sont pour l’instant discrètes sur ce dossier. On sait seulement qu’une délégation doit se rendre sur l’île les jours prochains. Il est vrai que face à ce qui s’est passé ces dernières années en Birmanie, et surtout face à la question des Rohingyas, la position de l’ONU n’a pas toujours été claire et son action a longtemps manqué de lucidité et d’efficacité. C’est le moins qu’on puisse dire.

    Certes l’actuel secrétaire général, António Guterres, a réagi rapidement et vigoureusement au sanglant nettoyage ethnique qui venait de commencer en Birmanie en adressant dès le 2 septembre 2017 une lettre au Conseil de sécurité dans laquelle il demandait un « effort concerté » pour empêcher l’escalade de la crise dans l’État de Rakhine, d’où 400 000 Rohingyas avaient déjà fui pour échapper aux atrocités.

    Mais il n’a pu obtenir de réaction rapide et efficace du Conseil. Il a fallu discuter deux semaines pour obtenir une réunion et 38 jours de plus pour obtenir une déclaration officielle de pure forme. Quant à obtenir l’envoi sur place d’une équipe d’observateurs de l’ONU en mesure de constater et dénoncer l’usage de la violence, il en était moins question que jamais : la Birmanie s’y opposait et son allié et protecteur chinois, membre du Conseil et détenteur du droit de veto, soutenait la position du gouvernement birman. Et personne, pour des raisons diverses, ne voulait s’en prendre à Pékin sur ce terrain.

    En l’occurrence, l’indifférence des États membres, peu mobilisés par le massacre de Rohingyas, venait s’ajouter aux divisions et différences de vues qui caractérisaient la bureaucratie de l’ONU dans cette affaire. Divergences qui expliquaient largement l’indifférence et la passivité de l’organisation depuis la campagne anti-Rohingyas de 2012 jusqu’au nettoyage ethnique sanglant de 2017.

    Incarnation de cette indifférence et de cette passivité, c’est-à-dire de la priorité que le système des Nations unies en Birmanie accordait aux considérations politiques et économiques sur la sécurité et les besoins humanitaires des Rohingyas, Renata Lok-Dessallien, la représentante de l’ONU en Birmanie depuis 2014, a quitté ses fonctions en octobre 2017, discrètement appelée par New York à d’autres fonctions, en dépit des réticences du gouvernement birman. Mais il était clair, à l’intérieur de l’organisation, qu’elle n’était pas la seule responsable de cette dérive désastreuse.

    Dans un rapport de 36 pages, commandé début 2018 par le secrétaire général et remis en mai dernier, l’économiste et diplomate guatémaltèque Gert Rosenthal, chargé de réaliser un diagnostic de l’action de l’ONU en Birmanie entre 2010 et 2018, constate qu’en effet, l’organisation n’a pas été à son meilleur pendant les années qui ont précédé le nettoyage ethnique d’août 2017 au cours duquel 7 000 Rohingyas au moins ont été tués, plus de 700 000 contraints à l’exil, des centaines de milliers d’autres chassés de leurs villages incendiés et enfermés dans des camps, le tout dans un climat de violence et de haine extrême [le rapport – en anglais – peut être lu ici].

    Selon Gert Rosenthal, qui constate des « défaillances systémiques » au sein de l’ONU, nombre d’agents des Nations unies ont été influencés ou déroutés par l’attitude de Aung San Suu Kyi, icône du combat pour la démocratie devenue, après les élections de 2015, l’alliée, l’otage et la caution des militaires et du clergé bouddhiste. C’est-à-dire la complice, par son silence, des crimes commis en 2017. Mais l’auteur du rapport pointe surtout la difficulté, pour les agences de l’ONU sur place, à choisir entre deux stratégies.

    L’une est la « diplomatie tranquille » qui vise à préserver dans la durée la présence et l’action, même limitée, de l’organisation au prix d’une certaine discrétion sur les obligations humanitaires et les droits de l’homme. L’autre est le « plaidoyer sans concession » qui entend faire respecter les obligations internationales par le pays hôte et implique éventuellement l’usage de mesures « intrusives », telles que des sanctions ou la menace de fermer l’accès du pays aux marchés internationaux, aux investissements et au tourisme.

    À première vue, entre ces deux options, le secrétaire général de l’ONU a fait son choix. Après une visite à Cox’s Bazar, en juillet 2018, il affirmait qu’à ses yeux, « les Rohingyas ont toujours été l’un des peuples, sinon le peuple le plus discriminé du monde, sans la moindre reconnaissance de ses droits les plus élémentaires, à commencer par le droit à la citoyenneté dans son propre pays, le Myanmar [la Birmanie] ».

    Il reste à vérifier aujourd’hui si, face à la menace brandie par Dacca de transférer jusqu’à 100 000 réfugiés rohingyas sur une île concentrationnaire et submersible, les Nations unies, c’est-à-dire le système onusien, mais aussi les États membres, choisiront le « plaidoyer sans concession » ou la « diplomatie tranquille ».

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/131119/le-bangladesh-veut-il-noyer-ses-refugies-rohingyas?onglet=full

    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #rohingyas #Bangladesh #camps_de_réfugiés

    ping @reka

    • Bangladesh Turning Refugee Camps into Open-Air Prisons

      Bangladesh Army Chief Gen. Aziz Ahmed said this week that a plan to surround the Rohingya refugee camps in #Cox’s_Bazar with barbed wire fences and guard towers was “in full swing.” The plan is the latest in a series of policies effectively cutting off more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees from the outside world. The refugees have been living under an internet blackout for more than 75 days.

      Bangladesh is struggling to manage the massive refugee influx and the challenges of handling grievances from the local community, yet there is no end in sight because Myanmar has refused to create conditions for the refugees’ safe and voluntary return. But fencing in refugees in what will essentially be open-air prisons and cutting off communication services are neither necessary nor proportional measures to maintain camp security and are contrary to international human rights law.

      Humanitarian aid workers reported the internet shutdown has seriously hampered their ability to provide assistance, particularly in responding to emergencies. The fencing will place refugees at further risk should they urgently need to evacuate or obtain medical and other humanitarian services.

      Refugees told Human Rights Watch the fencing will hinder their ability to contact relatives spread throughout the camps and brings back memories of restrictions on movement and the abuses they fled in Myanmar.

      The internet shutdown has already hampered refugees’ efforts to communicate with relatives and friends still in Myanmar, which is critical for gaining reliable information about conditions in Rakhine State to determine whether it is safe to return home.

      The Bangladesh government should immediately stop its plans to curtail refugees’ basic rights or risk squandering the international goodwill it earned when it opened its borders to a desperate people fleeing the Myanmar military’s brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing.

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/26/bangladesh-turning-refugee-camps-open-air-prisons
      #internet #barbelés #liberté_de_mouvement

  • Je découvre ces deux articles qui se focalisent sur les #réfugiés et les #animaux... un regard assez nouveau...

    The important role of animals in refugee lives

    Refugees are people who have been forcibly displaced across a border. What do animals have to do with them? A lot.

    Companion animals, for example, are important to many people’s emotional wellbeing. “For people forced to flee,” the Norwegian Refugee Council recently noted, “a pet can be a vital source of comfort.” At the sterile and hyper-modern Azraq refugee camp in Jordan, Syrian refugees would pay a high price for caged birds (30-40 Jordanian dinars each, roughly €35-50). In Syria, many people keep a bird at home. At Azraq keeping a bird is one way of making a plastic and metal shelter into a home.

    In many contexts, refugees also depend on animals for their livelihoods. Humanitarian assistance understandably focuses on supporting people, but if refugees’ working animals and livestock perish then their experience of displacement can worsen drastically: they lose the means to support themselves in exile, or to return home and rebuild their lives.

    Ever since the earliest days of modern refugee camps, at the time of the First World War, agencies responsible for refugees have had to think about animals too. When the British army in the Middle East built a camp at Baquba near Baghdad in 1918 to house nearly 50,000 Armenian and Assyrian refugees, there were some animals that they needed to keep out. Fumigation procedures and netting were used against lice and mosquitos, carriers of typhus and malaria respectively. But refugee agencies also needed to let larger animals in. The people in the camp, especially the Assyrians, were accompanied by seven or eight thousand sheep and goats, and about six thousand larger animals like horses and cattle. Many of the people depended on their animals for their livelihood and for any prospect of permanent settlement, so they all needed to be accommodated and cared for.

    There are similar examples around the world today, like the longstanding camps for Sahrawi refugees in southwestern Algeria. There, goats and camels are socially and economically significant animals: goat barns, enclosures often made of scrap metal, are a prominent part of the camps’ increasingly urban landscape, while camel butcheries are important shops.

    This helps us understand why the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees now has programmes to support refugees’ animals. For example, in 2015, with funding from the IKEA Foundation, the organization assisted 6,000 Malian refugees in Burkina Faso and their 47,000 animals: helping animals helps the people too, in this case to earn a living (and achieve economic integration) through small-scale dairy farming. It also helps us understand how conflicts can arise between refugees and host communities when refugees’ animals compete for grazing or water with local animals, or damage local farmers’ crops.

    Starting in 2011, nearly 125,000 people from Blue Nile state in Sudan fled from a government offensive into Maban country, South Sudan, with hundreds of thousands of animals (about half of whom soon died, stressed by the journey). Peacefully managing their interactions with local residents and a community of nomadic herders who also regularly migrated through the county was a complex task for the South Sudanese government and humanitarian agencies. It required careful negotiations to allocate grazing zones as far as 60km from the camps where the refugees lived, schedule access to watering points, and agree a different route for the nomads’ migration.

    In Bangladesh, meanwhile, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has recently been involved in efforts to prevent conflict between refugees and wild animals. Nearly a million Rohingya refugees from state persecution in Myanmar live in semi-formal camps near Cox’s Bazar that have grown up since 2017, but these block the migration routes of critically endangered Asian elephants. The International Union’s conflict mitigation programme includes building lookout towers, training Rohingya observers, and running an arts-based education project.

    And this highlights a final issue. The elephants at Cox’s Bazar are endangered because of ecological pressures caused by humans. But increasingly, humans too are endangered—and displaced—by ecological pressures. In the late 2000s, a years-long drought in Syria, worsened by human-caused climate change, pushed over a million rural Syrians off the land. (The country’s total livestock fell by a third.) The political and economic pressure that this generated was a significant factor in the crisis that ignited into war in 2011, in turn displacing millions more people. Hundreds of thousands of them fled to Jordan, one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, where the increased extraction of groundwater has lowered the water table, drying out oases in the Jordanian desert. Wild birds migrating across the desert have to fly further to find water and rest, meaning fewer survive the journey. In the Syrian war, and in many other conflicts around the world, human and animal displacements are intersecting under environmental stress. If we want to understand human displacement and respond to it adequately, we need to be thinking about animals too.

    https://blog.oup.com/2019/10/the-important-role-of-animals-in-refugee-lives
    #rapport_aux_animaux #animaux_de_compagnie

    • ‘Tusk force’ set up to protect refugees and elephants in #Bangladesh

      UNHCR and the International Union for Conservation of Nature are working together to mitigate incidents between elephants and humans in the world’s largest refugee settlement.

      Battered and badly bruised, Anwar Begum, a Rohingya refugee, surveys the damage around her bamboo shelter.

      Sleeping mats ripped apart; plastic buckets and even metal cooking pots and plates torn and dented. Her shelter was toppled – but neighbours in Kutupalong refugee settlement near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, have helped her re-erect it.

      “I’m very grateful, thanks to the almighty, to be alive,” the 45-year-old said. “But I’m terrified.”

      Just a few days earlier, in the middle of the night, a wild elephant entered her small shelter and killed her husband, 50-year-old Yakub Ali. It was one of several elephants that wandered into the camp, damaging shelters and injuring their occupants, following their usual migratory path.

      Anwar and her family fled their home in Myanmar six months ago, settling in the vast Kutupalong refugee settlement. “We weren’t aware of any elephant presence here,” she said. “I remember once seeing elephants back home in Myanmar, but in the distance – never close up like this.”

      Clearly shaken, Anwar recounted the events that occurred that night. “It was around 1 a.m. I heard a heavy sound and felt the roof falling onto us. It was quick and loud. I started screaming. It all went very fast and my husband was killed”.

      Anwar was treated in hospital for three days. By the time she came back to the settlement, neighbours had helped to rebuild her shelter. UNHCR’s partners have now provided her with new household items, and Anwar has received counselling from UN Refugee Agency protection staff.

      UNHCR and its partner IUCN – the International Union for Conservation of Nature – have now launched an action plan to try to prevent incidents like this, which have resulted in the deaths of at least 10 refugees, including young children, in Kutupalong settlement.

      “This partnership is critical not only to ensure the conservation of elephants, but to protect refugees.”

      The highly congested site, which used to be forest land, lies along one of the migratory routes between Myanmar and Bangladesh for critically endangered Asian elephants.

      The so-called ‘tusk force’ will work with both the local host community and refugees, in close consultation with the Bangladesh Forest Department and the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s Office.

      Mitigation plans include installing watch-towers in key spots around the settlement, as well as setting up Elephant Response Teams who can sound the alarm if elephants enter the site. Elephant routes and corridors will be clearly marked, so that people will know which areas to avoid. Campaigns will also be carried out to create better awareness of the risks.

      “This partnership is critical not only to ensure the conservation of elephants, but to protect refugees, a number of whom have tragically already lost their lives,” said Kevin Allen, UNHCR’s head of emergency operations in Cox’s Bazar district.

      The project is part of a wider initiative by UNHCR and the IUCN, in support of government activities, to mitigate some of the environmental impacts linked to the establishment of refugee settlements in Cox’s Bazar.

      Other plans include carrying out environmental education and awareness among refugees and the host communities about the importance of forest resources as well as taking steps to improve the environment in the refugee settlement areas and nearby surroundings.

      The project leaders will also advocate for reforestation programmes to ensure that natural resources and a shared environment are better protected.

      https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2018/3/5a9801d64/tusk-force-set-protect-refugees-elephants-bangladesh.html
      #éléphants #IUCN #sécurité

    • Bangladesh elephant rampage highlights dangers for refugees

      A refugee prays on a hill overlooking Kutupalong camp after another Rohingya burial.

      After fleeing flames and gunfire in Myanmar, Rohingya refugee Jane Alam thought danger was behind him in Bangladesh.

      But as he slept last night in a fragile shelter in a forested area near Kutupalong refugee camp, rampaging elephants crashed in on top of his family.

      The 18-year-old’s father and a seven-month-old baby were killed in the attack, which also injured seven of his relatives.

      “We thought we would be safe here.”

      Grazed on the cheek, neck and hip, he trekked barefoot up a hillside overlooking the makeshift camp this morning to bury them.

      “We thought we would be safe here,” he says, numb with disbelief, standing beside his father’s grave, marked with small bamboo stakes.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy_fkc5qRt8

      A few paces away, the tiny body of his infant relative lies on the muddy ground, wrapped in a white cloth. A man scoops out her shallow grave with a farm tool as a group of men stand solemnly by.

      The deaths highlight one of the unexpected dangers facing refugees and the risks as humanitarian actors respond to the arrival in Bangladesh of at least 429,000 people who have fled the latest outbreak of violence that erupted in Myanmar on August 25.

      As two formal refugee camps in Bangladesh are overwhelmed, thousands are seeking shelter where they can - some in an uninhabited forested area outside Kutupalong camp.

      “The area is currently completely wild, so the people who are settling-in where there is wildlife,” says Franklin Golay, a staff member for UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, who is working to provide water, sanitation and shelter at the informal camp.

      “There are elephants roaming around that pose a threat,” he says.

      Asian elephants are considered a critically endangered species in Bangladesh, where conservationists estimate there are presently just 239 living in the wild. Many roam in the Chittagong area in the southeast of the country, where the refugee influx is concentrated.

      Local residents say the elephants are drawn to populated areas in the Monsoon season, when fruit including mangos and jackfruit ripen.

      Securing the rugged and partially forested area to mitigate the risk could be achieved with lights or electric fencing, Golay says.

      But for Alam’s grieving family, who fled persecution across the border in Myanmar, the attack is a stark reminder that their trials are not yet over.

      “We ran from danger, and we are still in a dangerous situation now,” says Ali Hussein, the dead man’s uncle. “This cannot be forgotten.”

      https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/9/59c37c0f16/bangladesh-elephant-rampage-highlights-dangers-refugees.html

  • Bangladesh’s disappearing river lands

    ‘If the river starts eroding again, this area will be wiped off’.

    Every year in Bangladesh, thousands of hectares of land crumble into the rivers that wind through this South Asian nation, swallowing homes and pushing families away from their rural villages.

    This land erosion peaks during the June-to-October monsoon season, which brings torrential rains and swells the country’s rivers. This year, erosion destroyed the homes of at least 8,000 people in Bangladesh’s northern districts during heavy July floods that swept through the region and displaced at least 300,000 people across the country. Hundreds more households have been stranded in recent days.

    Rita Begum understands the dangers. Last year, she was one of some 44,000 people in Shariatpur, an impoverished district south of the capital, Dhaka, who lost their homes in what people here say was the worst erosion in seven years. Over four months, the Padma River gobbled up two square kilometres of silt land in Naria, a sub-district.

    Rita, a 51-year-old widow, saw her home and garden destroyed. Now, she lives on rented land in a makeshift shed pieced together with iron sheeting from the remnants of her old house.

    “I have no soil beneath my feet,” she said. “My relatives’ homes are now under water too.”

    Erosion has long been a part of life in Bangladesh, which sits on a massive river delta. The Padma’s rushing waters constantly shift and transform the shape of the river, eating away at its sandy banks. Deforestation, weather extremes, strong currents, and the accumulation of silt all contribute to erosion. But researchers say a warming climate is accelerating today’s risks by intensifying rains and floods – sinking communities deeper into poverty.

    The UN says Bangladesh is one of the world’s most vulnerable to climate change – and one of the least prepared for the rising sea levels, weather extremes, and food security threats that could follow.

    And the World Bank estimates there could be 13 million climate migrants here halfway through this century.

    Now, she lives on rented land in a makeshift shed pieced together with iron sheeting from the remnants of her old house.

    Bangladesh already faces frequent disasters, yet the yearly crises ignited by erosion see little of the spotlight compared to monsoon floods, landslides, and cyclones.

    “Even our policymakers don’t care about it, let alone the international community,” said Abu Syed, a scientist and a contributing author of a report by the UN body assessing climate research.

    But erosion is quietly and permanently altering Bangladesh’s landscape. From 1973 through 2017, Bangladesh’s three major rivers – the Padma, the Meghna, and the Jamuna – have engulfed more than 160,000 hectares of land, according to statistics provided by the UN. That’s roughly five times the land mass of the country’s capital.

    And the Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information Services, a government think-tank, forecasts that erosion could eat up another 4,500 hectares by the end of 2020, potentially displacing another 45,000 people.

    Experts who study Bangladesh’s rivers say the government response to erosion, while improving, has largely been ad hoc and temporary – sandbags thrown against already crumbling land, for example, rather than forward-looking planning to better adapt to the waterways.

    And many who have already lost their homes to erosion, like Rita, have struggled to rebuild their lives without land, or have been forced to join the 300,000 to 400,000 people each year estimated to migrate to teeming Dhaka driven in part by environmental pressures.

    Disaster deepens poverty, fuels migration

    Today Rita shares her shed with her three sons; she’s just scraping by, earning the equivalent of less than $4 a month as a maid. There is no running water or sanitation: Rita treks down a steep slope to fetch water from the same river that devoured her home.

    In nearby Kedarpur village, Aklima Begum, 57, lost not only her home, but her rickshaw-puller husband, who died when a chunk of earth crumpled from beneath a riverside market last August. The sudden collapse washed away 29 people, though some were later rescued.

    “We didn’t find his body,” Aklima said.

    Last year’s disaster has had a lasting impact on both rich and poor here. Year Baksh Laskar, a local businessman, saw most of his house vanish into the river, but he invited 70 neighbouring families to set up makeshift homes on his remaining land.

    “They are helpless,” he said. “Where will these people go?”

    With homes and farmland disappeared, many in the area have left for good, according to Hafez Mohammad Sanaullah, a local government representative.

    “This erosion is severe. People got scattered,” he said.

    Humanitarian aid helped to prevent hunger in the disaster’s aftermath last year, but emergency support doesn’t fix longer-term problems faced by a landless community. Sanaullah singled out housing and jobs as the two biggest problems: “People who used to do farming can’t do it any longer,” he said.

    Babur Ali, the municipality’s mayor, estimated at least 10 percent of the people displaced by last year’s erosion have moved to Dhaka or other urban areas in Bangladesh.

    The government’s Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, which oversees response and recovery programmes, is building three projects in the area to house some 5,000 erosion survivors, an official told The New Humanitarian.

    The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society said it has asked district officials for land to set up a “cluster village” – barrack-like housing where people share common facilities. But the land has not yet been granted, said Nazmul Azam Khan, the organisation’s director.
    Preparing for future threats

    The Bangladesh Water Development Board – the government agency that oversees the management of rivers – in December started a $130-million project intended to shield a nine-kilometre stretch of Naria from further erosion.

    This includes the dredging of waterways to remove excess sediment – which can divert a river’s flow and contribute to erosion – and installing sandbags and concrete blocks to buttress the steep riverbanks.

    There are also plans to erect structures in the river that would redirect water away from the fragile banks, said project head Prakash Krishna Sarker.

    But these changes are part of a three-year project; the bulk of the work wasn’t ready in time for this year’s monsoon season in Naria, and it won’t be finished by next year’s either.

    “People are concerned. If the river starts eroding again, this area will be wiped off,” said Sanaullah.Bangladesh’s government last year approved a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure plan to better manage the country’s rivers, including tackling erosion. AKM Enamul Hoque Shameem, the deputy minister for water resources, said the plans include dredging, river training, and bank protection. He told The New Humanitarian that erosion-vulnerable areas like Shariatpur are a “top priority”.
    Climate pressures

    But this work would be carried out over decades – the current deadline is the year 2100.

    By then, researchers say, the impacts of climate change will be in full force. A 2013 study published in the International Journal of Sciences forecasts that the amount of land lost annually due to erosion along Bangladesh’s three main rivers could jump by 18 percent by the end of the century.

    As with floods, drought, storms, and other disasters that strike each year, erosion is already pushing displaced Bangladeshis to migrate.

    Rabeya Begum, 55, was a resident of Naria until last August. After her home washed away, she packed up and fled to a Dhaka slum – the destination for most migrants pushed out by disasters or other environmental pressures.

    “I don’t feel good staying at my son-in-law’s house,” said Rabeya, who lost her husband to a stroke months after the erosion uprooted her.

    Life without her own land, she said, is like being “afloat in the water”.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/Bangladesh-river-erosion-engulfs-homes-climate-change-migration
    #Bangladesh #érosion #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #migrations #inondations #climat #changement_climatique #Shariatpur #Dhaka #Padma_River #Naria #destruction #terre #sécurité_alimentaire #pauvreté

  • Au #Bangladesh, deux ans après l’afflux de #réfugiés_rohingyas, l’#hostilité grandit

    Quand des centaines de milliers de musulmans rohingyas, victimes d’exactions en #Birmanie, ont fui pour se réfugier à partir de l’été 2017 au Bangladesh, les populations locales les ont souvent bien accueillies. Mais deux ans après l’afflux de réfugiés, l’hostilité grandit.

    « Au départ, en tant que membres de la communauté musulmane, nous les avons aidés », raconte Riazul Haque. Cet ouvrier qui habite près de la ville frontalière d’Ukhiya, dans le district de Cox’s Bazar (sud-est du Bangladesh), a permis à une soixantaine de familles de s’établir sur un lopin de terre lui appartenant, pensant qu’elles allaient rester deux ou trois mois maximum.

    « Aujourd’hui, on a l’impression que les Rohingyas encore établis en Birmanie vont bientôt arriver au Bangladesh », s’inquiète-t-il.

    Ukhiya comptait environ 300.000 habitants, mais l’arrivée massive de réfugiés, à partir d’août 2017, a plus que triplé la population.

    La plupart des réfugiés sont logés dans le camp tentaculaire de Kutupalong. D’autres, qui disposent de davantage de ressources, ont tenté de se faire une place dans la société bangladaise.

    Pollution et criminalité en hausse, perte d’emplois : les locaux les accusent de tous les maux.

    « Ils nous volent les petits boulots en soudoyant les forces de l’ordre », assure Mohammad Sojol, qui a perdu son emploi de conducteur de pousse-pousse car, selon lui, les propriétaires des véhicules préfèrent désormais embaucher des réfugiés contre un salaire inférieur, même si ces derniers ne sont officiellement pas autorisés à travailler.

    A la suite de protestations, certains Rohingyas qui s’étaient installés en dehors des camps officiels sont maintenant obligés d’y retourner et leurs enfants sont expulsés des écoles locales.

    – Gangs de la drogue -

    Les Rohingyas, une minorité ethnique musulmane, ont fui les exactions - qualifiées de « génocide » par des enquêteurs de l’ONU - de l’armée birmane et de milices bouddhistes.

    Seule une poignée d’entre eux sont rentrés, craignant pour leur sécurité dans un pays où ils se voient refuser la citoyenneté et sont traités comme des clandestins.

    Le fait que ces réfugiés soient « inactifs dans les camps (les rend) instables », estime Ikbal Hossain, chef intérimaire de la police du district de Cox’s Bazar.

    « Ils reçoivent toutes sortes d’aides, mais ils ont beaucoup de temps libre », relève-t-il, ajoutant que beaucoup sont tombés entre les mains de trafiquants de drogue.

    Des dizaines de millions de comprimés de méthamphétamine (yaba) entrent depuis la Birmanie, un des premiers producteurs au monde de cette drogue de synthèse, au Bangladesh via les camps.

    Et les trafiquants utilisent les Rohingyas comme mules, chargées d’acheminer les stupéfiants dans les villes voisines.

    Au moins 13 Rohingyas, soupçonnés de transporter des milliers de yaba, ont été abattus au cours d’affrontements avec la police.

    Et la présence des gangs de la drogue dans les camps a renforcé l’insécurité et les violences, incitant le Bangladesh à accroître la présence policière.

    Selon la police, le taux de criminalité est ici supérieur aux statistiques nationales du pays, qui enregistre quelque 3.000 meurtres par an pour 168 millions d’habitants.

    318 plaintes au pénal ont été déposées contre des Rohingyas depuis août 2017, dont 31 pour meurtres, d’après Ikbal Hossain. Mais selon des experts, le nombre de crimes dans les camps serait bien supérieur aux chiffres de la police.

    « Nous ne nous sentons pas en sécurité la nuit, mais je ne peux pas quitter ma maison, sinon le reste de mes terres sera également occupé par des réfugiés », déplore Rabeya Begum, une femme au foyer vivant dans le hameau de Madhurchhara, à proximité du camp de Kutupalong.

    Mohib Ullah, un responsable de la communauté rohingya, réfute entretenir de mauvaises relations avec la population locale. « Nous nous entraidons car nous sommes voisins (...) Nous ferions la même chose pour eux ».

    Quelque 3.500 Rohingyas ont été autorisés à rentrer du Bangladesh en Birmanie à compter de jeudi, s’ils le souhaitent.

    En novembre 2018, une précédente tentative de placer quelque 2.200 d’entre eux sur une liste de rapatriement avait échoué, les réfugiés, sans garantie de sécurité en Birmanie, refusant de quitter les camps.

    https://www.liberation.fr/depeches/2019/08/21/au-bangladesh-deux-ans-apres-l-afflux-de-refugies-rohingyas-l-hostilite-g
    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #Rohingyas #camps #camps_de_réfugiés

  • #Mau_Mau - #Con_chi_fugge

    Chi scappa perché c’è una guerra
    chi gli hanno preso la sua terra
    chi si è salvato da un inferno
    finendo in un C.I.E. moderno

    Non si vive non si vive così
    Che faresti se vivessi così?
    Per la gente di
    Mali Siria Eritrea
    Nigeria Senegal
    io griderò
    che con chi fugge io starò!

    Chi sarà sempre uno straniero
    chi sogna un lavoro vero
    chi cerca cibo e trova bombe
    e chi si è perso tra le onde

    Non si vive non si vive così
    che faresti se vivessi così?
    Per la gente di
    Gambia Palestina Bangladesh
    Egitto Libia
    urlerò
    che con chi fugge io starò!

    Chi comanda ha messo un muro 
    un confine immaginario
    si è spartito questa Terra
    l’esodo è planetario

    Attraverso i 7 mari
    c’è una schiavitù moderna
    gli interessi dei potenti
    e sangue sopra i continenti

    ma con chi fugge io starò

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XltxNObQ_lo


    #fuite #solidarité #asile #conflits #guerre #migrations #réfugiés #musique_et_politique #chanson #musique

    ping @sinehebdo

    • Trois morts et des dizaines de migrants portés disparus en Méditerranée

      Trois migrants ont été retrouvés noyés, vendredi 10 mars [sic : 10 mai], et des dizaines d’autres sont portés disparus après le naufrage d’une embarcation dans les eaux internationales au large de la Tunisie, ont fait savoir les autorités tunisiennes à l’Agence France-Presse (AFP).

      Un bateau de pêche a pu sauver seize migrants, a affirmé le porte-parole du ministère de la défense, Mohamed Zekri, précisant que, selon les rescapés, soixante à soixante-dix Africains subsahariens se trouvaient à bord de l’embarcation. Selon le Croissant rouge local, il pourrait y avoir eu jusqu’à 90 passagers dans l’embarcation, ce qui porterait le bilan à plus de 70 disparus. « On ne connaîtra probablement jamais le nombre exact de morts », a estimé Mongi Slim, responsable du Croissant rouge à Zarzis (sud-est de la Tunisie).

      Selon le ministère de la défense, l’embarcation est partie jeudi de Zouara, ville côtière de Libye, à 120 km à l’ouest de Tripoli, et se trouvait à 60 km au large de Sfax, ville côtière du centre de la Tunisie. Les passagers tentaient de rejoindre illégalement l’Italie, d’après le porte-parole du ministère de l’intérieur tunisien, Sofiène Zaag. Les rescapés ont été ramenés au port de Zarzis par un bateau militaire qui participait aux opérations de recherche.

      Ce naufrage dans les eaux internationales au large de la Tunisie intervient alors que les navires de secours européens se sont retirés de cette zone de passage des migrants et que la plupart des bateaux humanitaires rencontrent des difficultés pour y accéder.
      La voie maritime la plus meurtrière au monde

      Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), qui tire la sonnette d’alarme depuis plusieurs mois, a appelé à « renforcer les capacités des opérations de recherches et de secours dans toute la zone ». « Si nous n’agissons pas maintenant, il est presque certain que nous verrons de nouvelles tragédies dans les semaines et mois à venir », a souligné Vincent Cochetel, envoyé spécial du HCR pour la Méditerranée.

      Le Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux, une ONG tunisienne, a de son côté condamné une « tragédie humaine » qui est « le résultat inévitable des politiques restrictives et inhumaines de l’Union européenne ».

      Depuis la mise en place, mi-2018, d’une zone de secours et de sauvetage confiée aux autorités libyennes, les garde-côtes libyens sont chargés de récupérer les migrants en détresse. Ils ont intercepté plusieurs centaines de migrants cette semaine qu’ils ont ramenés en Libye, malgré les violents combats en cours dans ce pays frontalier de la Tunisie. Les agences de l’ONU et des organisations humanitaires rappellent régulièrement leur opposition à ce que les migrants arrêtés en mer soient ramenés en Libye, où ils se retrouvent placés « en détention arbitraire » ou à la merci de milices.

      Les navires humanitaires, qui dénoncent des entraves croissantes à leur action, sont de moins en moins nombreux à parcourir la zone. Fin 2018, les ONG Médecins sans frontières (MSF) et SOS Méditerranée ont dû mettre un terme aux opérations de leur bateau, l’Aquarius. Plusieurs autres navires humanitaires occidentaux ont été bloqués à quai après des procédures administratives ou judiciaires.

      Selon le HCR, « la Méditerranée est depuis plusieurs années la voie maritime la plus meurtrière au monde pour les réfugiés et les migrants, avec un taux de mortalité qui a fortement augmenté » en 2018. Depuis début 2019, un migrant sur quatre partis de Libye meurt en mer.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/05/10/trois-morts-et-des-dizaines-de-migrants-portes-disparus-en-mediterranee_5460

    • Tunisie : Naufrage du bateau des migrants, nationalités des 16 rescapés

      Les seize rescapés secourus vendredi, suite à l’effondrement de leur embarcation, sont arrivés au port de #Zarzis, à bord d’un bateau militaire.

      Quatorze personnes ont déclaré être du #Bangladesh, tandis que deux autres sont de nationalité Egyptienne et Marocaine, selon une source sécuritaire.

      On rappelle que plus de 70 migrants sont morts noyés, suite au naufrage au large de #Sfax de leur embarcation partie de #Libye, en partance vers l’Italie.

      https://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-naufrage-du-bateau-des-migrants-nationalites-des-16-rescap
      #Maroc #Egypte

  • Neuer Ausschaffungsdeal der Schweiz mit Bangladesch

    Le Bangladesh est le 62e pays avec lequel les autorités suisses ont conclu un accord de déportation. Selon l’accord, les dirigeants du Bangladesh s’engagent à aider la Suisse en matière de contrôle d’identité et à reprendre les personnes expulsées de force contre leur gré. Dans son communiqué de presse sur l’accord, le Secrétariat d’Etat aux migrations salue également sa brutalité remarquable en matière de refoulements : „Avec un taux de renvoi de près de 60 %, la Suisse est l’un des pays d’Europe les plus efficaces en matière d’exécution des renvois. De plus, le nombre de cas en suspens a été ramené de 7293 unités à l’automne 2013 à 3949 à la fin de l’année 2018.“

    https://migrant-solidarity-network.ch/fr/2019/04/18/neuer-ausschaffungsdeal-der-schweiz-mit-bangladesch
    l’ #efficacité prime, au pays de Heidi, évidemment
    #Bangladesh #accord_de_réadmission #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #Suisse

    • La Suisse et le Bangladesh formalisent leur collaboration dans le domaine du retour

      La Suisse et le Bangladesh ont posé les bases juridiques de leur collaboration dans le domaine du retour des personnes qui se trouvent en situation irrégulière sur le territoire helvétique. À ce jour, la Suisse a ainsi conclu des accords en matière de retour avec 62 pays.

      Notamment lors de la crise migratoire de 2015-2016, de nombreux migrants ont quitté le Bangladesh pour gagner illégalement l’Europe en passant par la Méditerranée centrale. Le renvoi de requérants d’asile déboutés a été pour tous les pays européens source de difficultés dans la collaboration avec le Bangladesh.

      Au terme de rencontres bilatérales, la Suisse est parvenue à donner une base juridique à sa collaboration opérationnelle avec le Bangladesh dans le domaine du retour. Le Bangladesh s’est en effet engagé à épauler la Suisse dans les procédures d’identification des migrants et à reprendre ses ressortissants tenus de quitter la Suisse. Cette collaboration opérationnelle repose sur une convention que le Bangladesh a conclue avec l’Union européenne en 2017. Par ailleurs, des experts des autorités compétentes se rencontreront régulièrement afin de garantir une application correcte de l’accord conclu.
      Autres améliorations dans le domaine du retour

      Avec un taux de renvoi de près de 60 %, la Suisse est l’un des pays d’Europe les plus efficaces en matière d’exécution des renvois. De plus, le nombre de cas en suspens a été ramené de 7293 unités à l’automne 2013 à 3949 à la fin de l’année 2018. Au total, la Suisse a conclu des #accords_de_réadmission, des accords migratoires ou des partenariats migratoires avec 62 pays.

      https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/documentation/communiques.msg-id-74615.html
      #expulsions
      ping @i_s_

  • Record High #Remittances Sent Globally in #2018

    Remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached a record high in 2018, according to the World Bank’s latest Migration and Development Brief.

    The Bank estimates that officially recorded annual remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached $529 billion in 2018, an increase of 9.6 percent over the previous record high of $483 billion in 2017. Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, reached $689 billion in 2018, up from $633 billion in 2017.

    Regionally, growth in remittance inflows ranged from almost 7 percent in East Asia and the Pacific to 12 percent in South Asia. The overall increase was driven by a stronger economy and employment situation in the United States and a rebound in outward flows from some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Russian Federation. Excluding China, remittances to low- and middle-income countries ($462 billion) were significantly larger than foreign direct investment flows in 2018 ($344 billion).

    Among countries, the top remittance recipients were India with $79 billion, followed by China ($67 billion), Mexico ($36 billion), the Philippines ($34 billion), and Egypt ($29 billion).

    In 2019, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are expected to reach $550 billion, to become their largest source of external financing.

    The global average cost of sending $200 remained high, at around 7 percent in the first quarter of 2019, according to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database. Reducing remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030 is a global target under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7. Remittance costs across many African corridors and small islands in the Pacific remain above 10 percent.

    Banks were the most expensive remittance channels, charging an average fee of 11 percent in the first quarter of 2019. Post offices were the next most expensive, at over 7 percent. Remittance fees tend to include a premium where national post offices have an exclusive partnership with a money transfer operator. This premium was on average 1.5 percent worldwide and as high as 4 percent in some countries in the last quarter of 2018.

    On ways to lower remittance costs, Dilip Ratha, lead author of the Brief and head of KNOMAD, said, “Remittances are on track to become the largest source of external financing in developing countries. The high costs of money transfers reduce the benefits of migration. Renegotiating exclusive partnerships and letting new players operate through national post offices, banks, and telecommunications companies will increase competition and lower remittance prices.”

    The Brief notes that banks’ ongoing de-risking practices, which have involved the closure of the bank accounts of some remittance service providers, are driving up remittance costs.

    The Brief also reports progress toward the SDG target of reducing the recruitment costs paid by migrant workers, which tend to be high, especially for lower-skilled migrants.

    “Millions of low-skilled migrant workers are vulnerable to recruitment malpractices, including exorbitant recruitment costs. We need to boost efforts to create jobs in developing countries and to monitor and reduce recruitment costs paid by these workers,” said Michal Rutkowski, Senior Director of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice at the World Bank. The World Bank and the International Labour Organization are collaborating to develop indicators for worker-paid recruitment costs, to support the SDG of promoting safe, orderly, and regular migration.

    Regional Remittance Trends

    Remittances to the East Asia and Pacific region grew almost 7 percent to $143 billion in 2018, faster than the 5 percent growth in 2017. Remittances to the Philippines rose to $34 billion, but growth in remittances was slower due to a drop in private transfers from the GCC countries. Flows to Indonesia increased by 25 percent in 2018, after a muted performance in 2017.

    After posting 22 percent growth in 2017, remittances to Europe and Central Asia grew an estimated 11 percent to $59 billion in 2018. Continued growth in economic activity increased outbound remittances from Poland, Russia, Spain, and the United States, major sources of remittances to the region. Smaller remittance-dependent countries in the region, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, benefited from the sustained rebound of economic activity in Russia. Ukraine, the region’s largest remittance recipient, received a new record of more than $14 billion in 2018, up about 19 percent over 2017. This surge in Ukraine also reflects a revised methodology for estimating incoming remittances, as well as growth in neighboring countries’ demand for migrant workers.

    Remittances flows into Latin America and the Caribbean grew 10 percent to $88 billion in 2018, supported by the strong U.S. economy. Mexico continued to receive the most remittances in the region, posting about $36 billion in 2018, up 11 percent over the previous year. Colombia and Ecuador, which have migrants in Spain, posted 16 percent and 8 percent growth, respectively. Three other countries in the region posted double-digit growth: Guatemala (13 percent) as well as Dominican Republic and Honduras (both 10 percent), reflecting robust outbound remittances from the United States.

    Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa grew 9 percent to $62 billion in 2018. The growth was driven by Egypt’s rapid remittance growth of around 17 percent. Beyond 2018, the growth of remittances to the region is expected to continue, albeit at a slower pace of around 3 percent in 2019 due to moderating growth in the Euro Area.

    Remittances to South Asia grew 12 percent to $131 billion in 2018, outpacing the 6 percent growth in 2017. The upsurge was driven by stronger economic conditions in the United States and a pick-up in oil prices, which had a positive impact on outward remittances from some GCC countries. Remittances grew by more than 14 percent in India, where a flooding disaster in Kerala likely boosted the financial help that migrants sent to families. In Pakistan, remittance growth was moderate (7 percent), due to significant declines in inflows from Saudi Arabia, its largest remittance source. In Bangladesh, remittances showed a brisk uptick in 2018 (15 percent).

    Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa grew almost 10 percent to $46 billion in 2018, supported by strong economic conditions in high-income economies. Looking at remittances as a share of GDP, Comoros has the largest share, followed by the Gambia , Lesotho, Cabo Verde, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Togo, Ghana, and Nigeria.

    The Migration and Development Brief and the latest migration and remittances data are available at www.knomad.org. Interact with migration experts at http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove

    http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018?cid=ECR_TT_worldbank_EN_EXT
    #remittances #statistiques #chiffres #migrations #diaspora

    #Rapport ici :


    https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief_31_0.pdf

    ping @reka

    • Immigrati, boom di rimesse: più di 6 miliardi all’estero. Lo strano caso dei cinesi «spariti»

      Bangladesh, Romania, Filippine: ecco il podio delle rimesse degli immigrati che vivono e lavorano in Italia. Il trend è in forte aumento: nel 2018 sono stati inviati all’estero 6,2 miliardi di euro, con una crescita annua del 20, 7 per cento.
      A registrarlo è uno studio della Fondazione Leone Moressa su dati Banca d’Italia, dopo il crollo del 2013 e alcuni anni di sostanziale stabilizzazione, oggi il volume di rimesse rappresenta lo 0,35% del Pil.

      Il primato del Bangladesh
      Per la prima volta, nel 2018 il Bangladesh è il primo Paese di destinazione delle rimesse, con oltre 730 milioni di euro complessivi (11,8% delle rimesse totali).
      Il Bangladesh nell’ultimo anno ha registrato un +35,7%, mentre negli ultimi sei anni ha più che triplicato il volume.

      Il secondo Paese di destinazione è la Romania, con un andamento stabile: +0,3% nell’ultimo anno e -14,3% negli ultimi sei.
      Da notare come tra i primi sei Paesi ben quattro siano asiatici: oltre al Bangladesh, anche Filippine, Pakistan e India. Proprio i Paesi dell’Asia meridionale sono quelli che negli ultimi anni hanno registrato il maggiore incremento di rimesse inviate. Il Pakistan ha registrato un aumento del +73,9% nell’ultimo anno. Anche India e Sri Lanka sono in forte espansione.

      Praticamente scomparsa la Cina, che fino a pochi anni fa rappresentava il primo Paese di destinazione e oggi non è nemmeno tra i primi 15 Paesi per destinazione delle rimesse.
      Mediamente, ciascun immigrato in Italia ha inviato in patria poco più di 1.200 euro nel corso del 2018 (circa 100 euro al mese). Valore che scende sotto la media per le due nazionalità più numerose: Romania (50,29 euro mensili) e Marocco (66,14 euro). Tra le comunità più numerose il valore più alto è quello del Bangladesh: ciascun cittadino ha inviato oltre 460 euro al mese. Anche i senegalesi hanno inviato mediamente oltre 300 euro mensili.

      https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2019-04-17/immigrati-boom-rimesse-piu-6-miliardi-all-estero-strano-caso-cinesi-spa
      #Italie #Chine #Bangladesh #Roumanie #Philippines

  • Filmart: Bangladeshi Filmmaker Documents the Plight of the #Rohingya People: “A Tragedy With a Very Human Face”

    Documentary director #Abid_Hossain_Khan ’s debut feature ’#Belonging' is told from the perspective of a six-year-old girl as she searches for her missing family in the sprawling Rohingya refugee camps across the border from Myanmar in #Bangladesh.


    https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/abid-hossain-khan-documents-plight-rohingya-people-a-tragedy-a-ve
    #film #documentaire #réfugiés #camps_de_réfugiés #Myanmar #Birmanie #réfugiés_rohingya #frontières

  • UN envoy fears ’new crisis’ for Rohingya Muslims if moved to remote Bangladesh island

    A United Nations human rights investigator on #Myanmar has voiced deep concern at Bangladesh’s plan to relocate 23,000 Rohingya refugees to a remote island, saying it may not be habitable and could create a “new crisis”.

    https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-12/un-envoy-fears-new-crisis-for-rohingya-muslims/10890932
    #réfugiés #îles #île #Bangladesh #rohingya #réfugiés_rohingya #asile #migrations #Birmanie

    • Polly Pallister-Wilkins signale sur twitter (https://twitter.com/PollyWilkins/status/1105366496291753984) le lien à faire avec le concept de #penal_humanitarianism (#humanitarisme_pénal)

      Introducing the New Themed Series on Penal Humanitarianism

      Humanitarianism is many things to many people. It is an ethos, an array of sentiments and moral principles, an imperative to intervene, and a way of ‘doing good’ by bettering the human condition through targeting suffering. It is also a form of governance. In Border Criminologies’ new themed series, we look closer at the intersections of humanitarian reason with penal governance, and particularly the transfer of penal power beyond the nation state.

      The study of humanitarian sentiments in criminology has mainly focused on how these sensibilities have ‘humanized’ or ‘civilized’ punishment. As such, the notion of humanism in the study of crime, punishment, and justice is associated with human rights implementation in penal practices and with normative bulwark against penal populism; indeed, with a ‘softening’ of penal power.

      This themed series takes a slightly different approach. While non-punitive forces have a major place in the humanitarian sensibility, we explore how humanitarianism is put to work on and for penal power. In doing so, we look at how muscular forms of power – expulsion, punishment, war – are justified and extended through the invocation of humanitarian reason.

      In the following post, Mary Bosworth revisits themes from her 2017 article and addresses current developments on UK programmes delivered overseas to ‘manage migration’. She shows that through an expansion of these programmes, migration management and crime governance has not only elided, but ‘criminal justice investment appears to have become a humanitarian goal in its own right’. Similarly concerned with what happens at the border, Katja Franko and Helene O.I. Gundhus observed the paradox and contradictions between humanitarian ideals in the performative work of governmental discourses, and the lack of concern for migrants’ vulnerability in their article on Frontex operations.

      However, in their blog post they caution against a one-dimensional understanding of humanitarianism as legitimizing policy and the status quo. It may cloud from view agency and resistance in practice, and, they argue, ‘the dialectics of change arising from the moral discomfort of doing border work’. The critical, difficult question lurking beneath their post asks what language is left if not that of the sanctity of the human, and of humanity.

      Moving outside the European territorial border, Eva Magdalena Stambøl however corroborates the observation that penal power takes on a humanitarian rationale when it travels. Sharing with us some fascinating findings from her current PhD work on EU’s crime control in West Africa, and, more specifically, observations from her fieldwork in Niger, she addresses how the rationale behind the EU’s fight against ‘migrant smugglers’ in Niger is framed as a humanitarian obligation. In the process, however, the EU projects penal power beyond Europe and consolidates power in the ‘host’ state, in this case, Niger.

      Moving beyond nation-state borders and into the ‘international’, ‘global’, and ‘cosmopolitan’, my own research demonstrates how the power to punish is particularly driven by humanitarian reason when punishment is delinked from its association with the national altogether. I delve into the field of international criminal justice and show how it is animated by a humanitarian impetus to ‘do something’ about the suffering of distant others, and how, in particular, the human rights movement have been central to the fight against impunity for international crimes. Through the articulation of moral outrage, humanitarian sensibilities have found their expression in a call for criminal punishment to end impunity for violence against distant others. However, building on an ethnographic study of international criminal justice, which is forthcoming in the Clarendon Studies in Criminology published by Oxford University Press, I demonstrate how penal power remains deeply embedded in structural relations of (global) power, and that it functions to expand and consolidate these global inequalities further. Removed from the checks and balances of democratic institutions, I suggest that penal policies may be more reliant on categorical representations of good and evil, civilization and barbarity, humanity and inhumanity, as such representational dichotomies seem particularly apt to delineate the boundaries of cosmopolitan society.

      In the next post I co-wrote with Anette Bringedal Houge, we address the fight against sexual violence in conflict as penal humanitarianism par excellence, building on our study published in Law & Society Review. While attention towards conflict-related sexual violence is critically important, we take issue with the overwhelming dominance of criminal law solutions on academic, policy, and activist agendas, as the fight against conflict-related sexual violence has become the fight against impunity. We observe that the combination of a victim-oriented justification for international justice and graphic reproductions of the violence victims suffer, are central in the advocacy and policy fields responding to this particular type of violence. Indeed, we hold that it epitomizes how humanitarianism facilitates the expansion of penal power but take issue with what it means for how we address this type of violence.

      In the final post of this series, Teresa Degenhardt offers a discomforting view on the dark side of virtue as she reflects on how penal power is reassembled outside the state and within the international, under the aegis of human rights, humanitarianism, and the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine. Through the case of Libya, she claims that the global north, through various international interventions, ‘established its jurisdiction over local events’. Through what she calls a ‘pedagogy of liberal institutions’, Degenhardt argues that ‘the global north shaped governance through sovereign structures at the local level while re-articulating sovereign power at the global level’, in an argument that, albeit on a different scale, parallels that of Stambøl.

      The posts in this themed series raise difficult questions about the nature of penal power, humanitarianism, and the state. Through these diverse examples, each post demonstrates that while the nation state continues to operate as an essential territorial site of punishment, the power to punish has become increasingly complex. This challenges the epistemological privilege of the nation state framework in the study of punishment.

      However, while this thematic series focuses on how penal power travels through humanitarianism, we should, as Franko and Gundhus indicate, be careful of dismissing humanitarian sensibilities and logics as fraudulent rhetoric for a will to power. Indeed, we might – or perhaps should – proceed differently, given that in these times of pushback against international liberalism and human rights, and resurgent religion and nationalism, humanitarian reason is losing traction. Following an unmasking of humanitarianism as a logic of governance by both critical (leftist) scholars and rightwing populism alike, perhaps there is a need to revisit the potency of humanitarianism as normative bulwark against muscular power, and to carve out the boundaries of a humanitarian space of resistance, solidarity and dignity within a criminology of humanitarianism. Such a task can only be done through empirical and meticulous analysis of the uses and abuses of humanitarianism as an ethics of care.

      https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/03/introducing-new

    • Most Rohingya refugees refuse to go to #Bhasan_Char island – Xchange survey

      Nearly all Rohingya refugees asked about relocating to a silt island in the Bay of Bengal refused to go, a new survey reveals.

      According to a new report published by the migration research and data analysis outfit Xchange Foundation, the vast majority of their respondents (98.4%) ‘categorically refused’ to go to Bhasan Char, while 98.7% of respondents were aware of the plan.

      From the over 1,000 respondents who expressed their opinion, concerns were raised about their safety, security and placement in a location further from Myanmar.

      Decades long limbo

      The findings obtained by the recent Xchange Foundation Report entitled ‘WE DO NOT BELIEVE MYANMAR!,’ chart the protracted living conditions and uncertain future of almost three quarters of a million recent Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar region of Bangladesh. Accumulated together with previous generations of Rohingya, there are approximately 1.2m living across over a dozen camps in the region.

      This is the sixth survey carried out by the Xchange Foundation on the experiences and conditions facing Rohingya refugees.

      The region has been host to Rohingya refugees for just over the last three decades with the recent crackdown and massacre by the Myanmar military in August 2017 forcing whole families and communities to flee westward to Bangladesh.

      While discussions between the Bangladeshi and Myanmar government over the repatriation of recent Rohingya refugees have been plagued by inertia and lukewarm commitment, the Bangladeshi government has been planning on relocating over 100,000 Rohingya refugees to the silt island of Bhasan Char in the Bay of Bengal. This process was expected to take place in the middle of April, according to a Bangladeshi government minister.

      State Minister for Disaster and Relief Management Md Enamur Rahman, told the Dhaka Tribune ‘Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has instructed last week to complete the relocation 23,000 Rohingya families to Bhashan Char by Apr 15.’

      Is it safe?

      Numerous humanitarian organisations including Human Rights Watch, have expressed their concerns over the government’s proposals, saying there are few assurances that Rohingya refugees will be safe or their access to free movement, health, education and employment will be secured.

      HRW reported in March that the Bangladeshi authorities had issued assurances that there wouldn’t be forcible relocation but that the move was designed to relieve pressure on the refugee camps and settlements across Cox’s Bazar.

      The move would see the relocation of 23,000 Rohingya families to a specially constructed complex of 1,440 housing blocks, equipped with flood and cyclone shelter and flood walls. The project is estimated to have cost the Bangladeshi government over €250 million.

      To prepare the island, joint efforts of British engineering and environmental hydraulics company HR Wallingford and the Chinese construction company Sinohydro, have been responsible for the construction of a 13km flood embankment which encircles the island.

      When asked by the Xchange survey team one Male Rohingya of 28 years old said, ‘We saw videos of Bhasan Char; it’s not a safe place and also during the raining season it floods.’ An older female of 42 said, ‘I’m afraid to go to Bhasan Char, because I think there is a risk to my life and my children.’

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DM8wlvLddnw

      Threat of flooding

      Bhasan Char or ‘Thengar Char,’ didn’t exist 20 years ago.

      The island is understood to have formed through gradual silt deposits forming a island around 30km from the Bangladeshi mainland. Until now, human activity on the island has been very minimal with it being largely used for cattle and only reachable by a 3.5 hour boat trip.

      But, the island is subject to the tides. It is reported that the island loses around 5,000 square acres of its territory from low to high tide (15,000 – 10,000 acres (54 square kilometres) respectively).

      This is worsened by the threat of the monsoon and cyclone season which according to HRW’s testimony can result in parts of the island eroding. This is recorded as being around one kilometre a year, ABC News reports.

      Golam Mahabub Sarwar of the Bangladeshi Ministry of Land, says that a high tide during a strong cyclone could completely flood the island. This is exemplifed by the 6 metre tidal range which is seen on fellow islands.

      New crisis

      The UN Envoy Yanghee Lee has warned that the Bangladesh government goes through with the relocation, it could risk creating a ‘new crisis’.

      Lee warned that she was uncertain of the island was ‘truly habitable’ for the over 23,000 families expected to live there.

      The Special Rapporteur to Myanmar made the comments to the Human Rights Council in March, saying that if the relocations were made without consent from the people it would affect, it had, ‘potential to create a new crisis.’

      She stressed that before refugees are relocated, the United Nations, ‘must be allowed to conduct a full technical and humanitarian assessment’ as well as allowing the beneficiary communities to visit and decide if it is right for them.

      https://www.newsbook.com.mt/artikli/2019/05/07/most-rohingya-refugees-refuse-to-go-to-bhasan-char-island-xchange-survey/?lang=en

    • Rohingya Refugees to Move to Flood-Prone Bangladesh Island

      Thousands of Rohingya living in Bangladesh refugee camps have agreed to move to an island in the #Bay_of_Bengal, officials said Sunday, despite fears the site is prone to flooding.

      Dhaka has long wanted to move 100,000 refugees to the muddy silt islet, saying it would take pressure off the overcrowded border camps where almost a million Rohingya live.

      Some 740,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar in August 2017 in the face of a military crackdown, joining 200,000 refugees already in makeshift tent settlements at Cox’s Bazar.

      Relocations begin soon

      Bangladesh’s refugee commissioner, Mahbub Alam, said officials overseeing the relocation would be posted to #Bhashan_Char_island in the next few days.

      Approximately 6,000-7,000 refugees have expressed their willingness to be relocated to Bhashan Char, Alam told AFP from Cox’s Bazar, adding that “the number is rising.”

      He did not say when the refugees would be moved, but a senior Navy officer involved in building facilities on the island said it could start by December, with some 500 refugees sent daily.

      Bangladesh had been planning since last year to relocate Rohingya to the desolate flood-prone site, which is an hour by boat from the mainland.

      Rights groups have warned the island, which emerged from the sea only about two decades ago, might not be able to withstand violent storms during the annual monsoon season.

      In the past half-century, powerful cyclones have killed hundreds of thousands of people in the Meghna river estuary where the island is located.

      Rohingya leaders would be taken to Bhashan Char to view the facilities and living conditions, Alam said.

      Safety facilities built on the island include a 9-feet (3 meter) high embankment along its perimeter to keep out tidal surges during cyclones, and a warehouse to store months’ worth of rations, he added.

      Overcrowding in camp

      Rohingya father-of-four Nur Hossain, 50, said he and his family agreed to relocate to #Bhashan_Char after they were shown video footage of the shelters.

      “I have agreed to go. The camp here (at Leda) is very overcrowded. There are food and housing problems,” the 50-year-old told AFP.

      There was no immediate comment from the U.N., although Bangladeshi officials said they expect a delegation would visit the island in the next few weeks.

      https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/rohingya-refugees-move-flood-prone-bangladesh-island

    • Bangladesh : des réfugiés rohingyas acceptent de partir sur une île

      Des milliers de Rohingyas vivant dans des camps de réfugiés au Bangladesh ont accepté de partir pour une île isolée du golfe du Bengale, ont annoncé dimanche les autorités, en dépit des risques d’inondations.

      Dacca a depuis longtemps fait part de son intention de transférer 100.000 réfugiés musulmans rohingyas des camps de réfugiés surpeuplés, près de la frontière birmane, vers un îlot de vase boueux et isolé du golfe du Bengale.

      Le gouvernement du Bangladesh y voit une solution pour résoudre le problème des camps de réfugiés surpeuplés où vivent près d’un million de Rohingyas.

      Environ 740.000 Rohingyas ont fui la Birmanie pour le Bangladesh en 2017 pour échapper à une répression militaire massive. Ils ont rejoint les quelque 200.000 réfugiés vivant déjà dans le district bangladais frontalier de Cox’s Bazar (sud-est).

      Le commissaire bangladais aux réfugiés, Mahbub Alam, a indiqué que des fonctionnaires seront détachés, dans les prochains jours, afin de superviser cette installation.

      « Environ 6.000 à 7.000 réfugiés ont déjà exprimé leur volonté d’être réinstallés à Bhashan Char », a déclaré Alam à l’AFP depuis Cox’s Bazar, affirmant que « leur nombre est en augmentation ».

      Il n’a cependant pas donné de chiffres sur le nombre de réfugiés qui seront ainsi déplacés.

      Selon un officier supérieur de la marine qui participe à la construction d’installations sur l’île, cette opération pourrait débuter en décembre et environ 500 réfugiés seraient envoyés quotidiennement sur cette île située à une heure de bateau de la terre ferme la plus proche.

      Des groupes de défense des droits affirment que Bhashan Char est susceptible d’être submergée lors des moussons.

      Au cours des cinquante dernières années, de puissants cyclones ont fait des centaines de milliers de morts dans l’estuaire de la rivière Meghna, où l’île se situe.

      Des responsables rohingyas seront conduits à Bhashan Char afin d’y découvrir les installations et leurs conditions de vie, a affirmé M. Alam.

      Des responsables locaux ont assuré qu’une digue de trois mètres a été construite autour de l’île pour la protéger de la montée des eaux en cas de cyclone.

      Nur Hossain, un réfugié rohingya, père de quatre enfants, a déclaré que sa famille et lui ont accepté de partir pour Bhashan Char après avoir vu des images vidéo des abris.

      « Le camp ici (à Leda) est très surpeuplé. Il y a des problèmes de nourriture et de logement », a déclaré à l’AFP cet homme de 50 ans.

      L’ONU n’a jusqu’à présent pas fait de déclaration à ce sujet. Des responsables bangladais ont cependant déclaré qu’une délégation des Nations unies se rendra sur l’île au cours des prochaines semaines.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/bangladesh-des-refugies-rohingyas-acceptent-de-partir-sur-une

    • Rohingya: il Bangladesh vuole trasferirli su un’isola sperduta e pericolosa

      Le violenze dell’esercito del Myanmar avevano costretto centinaia di migliaia di Rohingya a rifugiarsi in Bangladesh nel 2017. E quando ancora un rientro nelle loro terre d’origine sembra lontano, Dacca cerca di mandarne 100 mila su un’isola remota e pericolosa nel Golfo del Bengala

      Non sono bastate le violenze dell’esercito del Myanmar e degli estremisti buddisti, che nell’agosto 2017 hanno costretto centinaia di migliaia di Rohingya a rifugiarsi in Bangladesh. E non bastano neanche le condizioni precarie in cui vivono nei fatiscenti campi profughi gestiti da Dacca. Il dramma di questa popolazione, che secondo le Nazioni Unite è una delle minoranze più perseguitate al mondo, non sembra avere fine.

      La scorsa settimana il governo del Bangladesh ha annunciato che alla fine di novembre inizierà il trasferimento di 100 mila rifugiati Rohingya a Bhasan Char, una remota isola nel Golfo del Bengala. Per le autorità questa mossa sarebbe necessaria a causa del «disperato sovraffollamento» nei campi di Cox’s Bazar, una città al confine con la ex-Birmania, che ora ospita oltre 700 mila sfollati. Ma la scelta della nuova collocazione ha sollevato una serie di preoccupazioni per la salute e la sicurezza dei Rohingya che verranno trasferiti.

      Rohinghya in Bangladesh: l’isola in mezzo al nulla

      Yanghee Lee, relatore speciale delle Nazioni Unite sulla situazione dei diritti umani in Myanmar, che ha visitato l’isola nel gennaio 2019, ha espresso seri dubbi e preoccupazioni sul fatto che «l’isola sia davvero abitabile». Bhasan Char, infatti, è soggetta frequentemente ad inondazioni e cicloni. Lee ha anche avvertito che «un trasferimento mal pianificato e senza il consenso degli stessi rifugiati, creerebbe una nuova crisi per i Rohingya».

      Il governo di Dacca ha spiegato che tutte le ricollocazioni a Bhasan Char saranno rigorosamente volontarie e che oltre 7 mila rifugiati hanno già accettato di trasferirsi. Non sappiamo, però, se questi Rohingya siano effettivamente consapevoli dell’isolamento e della pericolosità del contesto in cui andranno a vivere. L’isola, infatti, è a ore di navigazione dalla terraferma e le condizioni del mare non sono delle migliori. Durante il periodo dei monsoni i pochi residenti sono bloccati in mezzo alle acque per lunghi periodi.

      Rohingya a rischio sussistenza

      Sebbene le autorità abbiano migliorato le infrastrutture a Bhasan Char, per cercare di contrastare i rischi di inondazioni e costruito più di 1.400 edifici per ospitare gli sfollati, l’isola non ha un adeguato sistema di agricoltura e le attività commerciali sono quasi inesistenti. Inoltre vanno aggiunte le difficoltà per quanto riguarda l’istruzione e la sanità. Problematiche già presenti nei campi di Cox’s Bazar, che nei mesi scorsi avevano anche lanciato l’allarme del radicalismo islamico.

      Nell’ultimo periodo, infatti, nelle strutture dove hanno trovato rifugio i Rohingya scappati dal Myanmar sono proliferate centinaia di scuole coraniche gestite da Hefazat-e-Islam, un gruppo estremista locale fondato nel 2010, che in passato ha organizzato numerose proteste di piazza. Questa organizzazione, finanziata da alcuni Paesi del Golfo, ha di fatto riempito il vuoto educativo imposto da Dacca, che ha vietato alla minoranza musulmana di frequentare gli istituti locali.

      Chi sono i Rohingya e perché sono perseguitati

      I Rohingya sono un popolo invisibile. Di fede musulmana, dall’ottavo secolo vivono nel Nord-Ovest del Myanmar, ma non vengono considerati ufficialmente un’etnia dal governo. Proprio per questo non hanno alcun diritto e la maggior parte di loro non ha cittadinanza nel paese guidato dal premio Nobel per la pace Aung San Suu Kyi. Senza il diritto di avere cure mediche e istruzione, non possono possedere nulla e non possono avere più di due figli.

      Si è tornato a parlare della loro drammatica situazione nell’agosto di due anni fa, a causa delle persecuzioni dei militari birmani, che li hanno costretti ad un esodo nel vicino Bangladesh. Le poche testimonianze di prima mano arrivate in quei giorni del 2017 parlavano di brutalità inaudite e quotidiane: centinaia di morti, stupri, mine, sparizioni, villaggi dati alle fiamme e torture.

      Rohingya: il difficile ritorno in Myanmar

      Negli ultimi due anni, il governo del Myanmar ha negato la sua colpevolezza per le atrocità commesse e ha vietato alle organizzazioni e agli osservatori internazionali, incluso il relatore speciale delle Nazioni Unite Lee, di accedere nello stato Rakhine, dove la maggior parte dei Rohingya viveva prima dello spargimento di sangue del 2017.

      Proprio per queste ragioni, un ritorno in sicurezza in patria per la popolazione musulmana sembra, per ora, molto difficile. Lo stesso Lee, a settembre, ha dichiarato che il Paese della Suu Kyi «non ha fatto nulla per smantellare il sistema di violenza e persecuzione contro i Rohingya».

      https://www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2019/10/31/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-perseguitati

  • Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017

    A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.

    The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.

    See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)

    It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:

    “guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”

    The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).

    The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.

    The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.

    The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):

    "For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."

    At the same time:

    “The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”

    Those return operations included Frontex’s:

    “first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
    #Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans

    • EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations

      The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.

      The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:

      “The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”

      The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.

      When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.

      Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.

      The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:

      “The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”

      European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):

      “- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
      - More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
      - Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries

      New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”

      See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)

      The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm

  • Bangladeshis being killed 20km inside India, says BGB chief

    Border Guard Bangladesh director general major general Md Shafeenul Islam on Wednesday said Bangladeshi people were being killed 20 kilometres inside India and he condemned those incidents as ‘killings’ in the name of fighting petty crimes while refusing to accept the conventional category — ‘border killing.’
    Border Guard Bangladesh chief came up with a new definition at a programme held at the border force headquarters in Peelkhana during the inaugural ceremony of a Data Centre.
    The BGB chief went on to add, ‘Human life is very important whether it is our citizen or theirs. Our force is cognizant of human rights. No killing is acceptable to us.’
    ‘But the term border killing is a misnomer. It implies that the killing has taken place on the border,’ the BGB chief told the reporters and hastened to ask, ‘Can we term these murders “border killings” when they take place 15 to 20 kilometres inside [Indian] border?’
    He pointed out to the journalist that a spade should be called a spade and termed every murder as ‘killing.’ He further said that it is killing in the name of fighting ‘petty crimes’.
    If the killing took place within 200 yards of the border or on the no man’s land it could be termed as border killing, he argued.
    Asked whether he had any statistics on such killings inside the Indian territory or in areas proximal to the border, he said this year eight Bangladeshis were killed so far.
    BGB chief took issue with such incidents. ‘Why do members of Indian Border Security Force are killing Bangladeshis instead of arresting them. Bangladeshi people were getting killed when the Indian force were supposed to use non-lethal weapons instead of lethal ones,’ he added.
    The BSF troops join the rank from various regions across India including Kashmir, and they need more time to become sensitised to the people living near the border areas. They easily become ‘trigger-happy’ when Bangladeshis are involved, said the BGB chief.
    Last year, he said border killing was reported until October. It increased slightly during the winter.
    ‘Due to the fog in winter, the illegal trespassing usually increases. People cross the border even by cutting the barbed wire fences,’ said BGB chief.
    He said they have intensified their vigilance along the western frontier so that none can cross the border.
    ‘We are arresting people every day when they set out to cross the border,’ he added.
    According to the Border Guard chief, they have now a digital surveillance system in place on Putkhali border to check the border crime while another surveillance system was under trial on Tekhnaf border.
    They have started getting benefits of the surveillance systems, he said, adding, ‘We expect that human trafficking and smuggling will reduce in the border regions.’
    He said their troops were facing extreme hardship to protect the borders. ‘We can give better protection of borders once we will have border road that are yet to be constructed,’ he said, adding, ‘There are many border outposts which need seven days to reach.’
    Binoy Krishna Mallik, executive director of Rights Jessore, said it doesn’t matter how far the place of incident is from the border, it is important whether it is related to the border or border forces. These are nothing but border killings,’ he told New Age.
    As of February 3, 2019, the Indian Border Security Force shot dead seven Bangladeshi in less than five weeks along the Bangladesh-India border.
    According to Ain o Salish Kendra six Bangladeshis were shot dead by BSF along border in January, four of them on the Thakurgaon frontier and one each on Nilphamari and Rajshahi border.
    In 2018, ‘trigger-happy’ BSF killed 14 Bangladeshis, according to the Kendra.
    According to Odhikar, at least 1,144 Bangladeshi were killed by the Indian border force between 2001 and 2018. Bangladesh and India share a border of 2,429 miles.

    http://www.newagebd.net/article/64063/bangladeshis-being-killed-20km-inside-india-says-bgb-chief
    #meurtres_aux_frontières #frontières #mobile_borders #frontières_mobiles #décès #mort #murs #barrières_frontalières #Bangladesh #Inde #zone_frontalière

    –-> et la question sur les #mots :

    ‘But the term border killing is a misnomer. It implies that the killing has taken place on the border,’ the BGB chief told the reporters and hastened to ask, ‘Can we term these murders “border killings” when they take place 15 to 20 kilometres inside [Indian] border?’

    #terminologie #vocabulaire

  • Heurts et malheurs des ouvriers du textile au Bengladesh Vincent de Féligonde - 17 Janvier 2019 - Radio RCF
    https://rcf.fr/la-matinale/heurts-et-malheurs-des-ouvriers-du-textile-au-bengladesh

    Les ateliers textiles du Bangladesh, qui produisent des vêtements pour nombre de marques occidentales, ont licencié hier des centaines d’ouvriers…

    Oui Stéphanie. Le début de l’année a été marqué au Bangladesh par des débrayages et manifestations pour réclamer des hausses de salaires, qui n’avaient pas cru depuis 2013. Le salaire minimum était alors passé de l’équivalent de 28 à 58 euros par mois. Cette semaine, ils ont obtenu une nouvelle augmentation de 50%, pour atteindre 83 euros. Mais les ouvriers intermédiaires se plaignent de n’avoir eu, eux, qu’une augmentation dérisoire au regard de l’augmentation du coût de la vie, notamment celui du logement. 

    Le puissant syndicat des patrons du secteur a averti qu’en cas de poursuite des manifestations, il pourrait fermer l’ensemble des usines textiles du pays pour une durée indéterminée. Et de nombreux employés venus reprendre le travail hier ont réalisé qu’ils étaient congédiés. Au moins 750 d’une usine de la banlieue industrielle de la capitale, Dacca, ont découvert leur nom et leur photo sur des listes de personnes renvoyées qui avaient été placardées devant les locaux de leur employeur. Certains affirment que s’ils créent des problèmes, on les fera disparaître.

    Ça fait froid dans le dos. Est-ce habituel ?
    Malheureusement oui. Au Bangladesh, beaucoup de députés sont propriétaires d’usines de confection. Il est difficile et dangereux pour les ouvriers de s’organiser. Les ateliers de de confection se trouvent sous la surveillance d’une « police industrielle » qui arrête régulièrement les meneurs. Mardi 8 janvier, un ouvrier a été tué et 50 ont été blessés au cours d’une manifestation.

    Qu’est-ce que représente le secteur textile dans le pays ?
    Depuis une quinzaine d’années, le Bangladesh a largement profité de la mondialisation de l’industrie de la confection. Il est devenu le deuxième fournisseur de vêtements au monde, derrière la Chine. Ses usines fournissent les plus grandes enseignes comme H & M, Zara ou Auchan. Plus de 4 millions de salariés travaillent dans les 5 000 usines ou ateliers que compte le pays. Et les produits textiles représentent 80% des exportations du pays. Mais cette croissance, basée sur les bas salaires, s’est faite au prix de conditions de travail inhumaines. Les ateliers ne comportent pas toujours de sortie de secours en cas d’incendie, ou sont construits sans respect des normes.

    D’où l’accident du Rana Plaza…
    Oui Stéphanie. Le 24 avril 2013, l’effondrement d’un immeuble abritant des ateliers textiles, avait causé la mort de 1 134 personnes et fait plus de 2000 blessés. L’immeuble avait auparavant été surélevé sans permis de construire et la direction de l’usine avait refusé l’évacuation malgré les signes de faiblesse que montrait le bâtiment.

    Les choses ont-elles changé ?
    Oui. Les grandes chaines de distribution, qui faisaient semblant de ne pas connaître les fournisseurs de leurs sous-traitants, n’ont pas pu se cacher quand on a retrouvé des vêtements avec leurs étiquettes dans les ruines du Rana Plaza. Un fond d’indemnisation des victimes a été constitué. Des syndicats ont été créés, ainsi qu’un un corps d’inspecteurs, qui vérifie les conditions de sécurité des bâtiments, et peut exiger la fermeture temporaire, le temps que des travaux soient faits.

    C’est bien…
    Oui mais ce n’est pas gagné : une usine qui avait ainsi été fermée a porté l’affaire en justice, et a gagné en septembre dernier devant la Cour suprême. Elle a décidé que le bureau coordonnant les inspections devrait être expulsé du pays… La mesure n’a pas été exécutée mais pourrait intervenir d’un jour à l’autre.

     #bangladesh #textile #rana_plaza #esclavage #responsabilité_sociale_des_entreprises #conditions_de_travail #travail #auchan #zara #h&m #carrefour . . ..

  • Battues, torturées, violées… les domestiques bangladaises fuient le cauchemar saoudien | Middle East Eye

    https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/battues-tortur-es-viol-es-les-domestiques-bangladaises-fuient-le-cauc

    DACCA – Une foule attend à l’extérieur du terminal des arrivées de l’aéroport international Shah Jalal tandis que des dizaines de chauffeurs de taxi font la queue en attendant des clients.

    Alors que les passagers quittent le hall des arrivées transportant des TV à écran plat ou d’énormes paquets recouverts de film plastique, une cohorte de mendiants cherche à attirer l’attention des passants.

    Un groupe de femmes apparaît dans ce flux humain ininterrompu. Vêtues d’habits colorés, elles tirent leurs valises et cherchent leurs proches.

    Parmi elles, Khaleda Akhter, 28 ans, vient de passer plusieurs mois dans un refuge tenu par des Bangladais en Arabie saoudite et souhaite désespérément voir ses deux enfants. Tenant un exemplaire du Coran contre sa poitrine, elle cherche la sortie du hall des arrivées et se dirige vers les doubles portes. Au départ, ses pas sont lents et réguliers : elle mesure ce qui a changé depuis qu’elle a quitté le #Bangladesh, il y a un an.

    #arabie_saoudite

  • Le #Bangladesh, un exemple de #migration climatique - Le Courrier
    https://lecourrier.ch/2018/09/18/le-bangladesh-un-exemple-de-migration-climatique

    Pour faire face aux crises climatique et alimentaire, le gouvernement promeut des entreprises privées du secteur agro-alimentaire, plus d’investissements dans les #semences, des fertilisants et des équipements, en adoptant des semences hybrides et en imposant les #OGM au nom de la #sécurité_alimentaire. Le Bangladesh a déjà lancé la première culture d’OGM Brinjal en 2014. Une pomme de terre OGM est dans les tuyaux et le gouvernement a annoncé en 2018 des plans pour la commercialisation du premier riz génétiquement modifié Golden Rice. Ceci plutôt que protéger les paysans et encourager la petite #agriculture agro-écologique.

    La stratégie de la #Banque_mondiale et d’autres bailleurs de fonds internationaux pour la « sécurité alimentaire » gérée par les entreprises est risquée pour l’agriculture dans le contexte du changement climatique. Leur intérêt véritable, derrière cette politique, est de permettre aux entreprises transnationales de semences et d’#agrochimie d’accéder aux marchés agricoles du Bangladesh. Par conséquent, il est important de promouvoir les droits des paysans à des semences et d’autonomiser les communautés afin qu’elles puissent protéger leur propre mode de subsistance. Promouvoir la #souveraineté_alimentaire est la meilleure alternative pour la #politique_agricole actuelle au Bangladesh.

    #mafia #agrobusiness #climat

  • Photographe du jour.
    Shahidul Alam est appréhendé depuis le 5 août 2018 sous l’inculpation de « diffusion de propagande et de fausses informations contre le gouvernement du Bangladesh. »
    https://www.thedailystar.net/tags/photographer-shahidul-alam
    Shahidul Alam n’a pas seulement pour ambition de transformer la photographie, il est aussi pour transformer le monde. Il réclame avec passion un vrai gouvernement mondial, un gouvernement de la majorité des peuples, en lieu et place de la domination des superpuissances. Je suis d’accord avec lui, si ce n’est la majorité des choses qu’il peut dire. Son livre My Journey as a Witness, est rageur, intentionnellement provocateur. Il contient des images chargées de sens et beaucoup sont belles. C’est surtout un livre qui doit être lu.


    #photographe_du_jour #Shahidul_Alam #freeshahidulalam #bangladesh

    • Is India Creating Its Own Rohingya ?

      Echoes of the majoritarian rhetoric preceding the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya can be heard in India as four million, mostly Bengali-origin Muslims, have been effectively turned stateless.

      On July 30, four million residents of the Indian state of Assam were effectively stripped of their nationality after their names were excluded from the recently formed National Register of Citizens.

      Indian authorities claim to have initiated and executed the process to identify illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, which shares several hundred miles of its border with Assam, but it has exacerbated fears of a witch hunt against the Bengali-origin Muslim minority in the state.

      Assam is the most populous of India’s northeastern states. As part of a labyrinthine bureaucratic exercise, 32.9 million people and 65 million documents were screened over five years at a cost of $178 million to ascertain which residents of Assam are citizens. The bureaucrats running the National Register of Citizens accepted 28.9 million claims to Indian citizenship and rejected four million.

      The idea of such screening to determine citizenship goes back to the aftermath of the 1947 Partition of British India into India and Pakistan. A register of citizens set up in Assam in 1951 was never effectively implemented. Twenty-four years after the Partition, the mostly Bengali Eastern Pakistan seceded from Western Pakistan with Indian military help, and Bangladesh was formed on March 24, 1971. The brutal war that accompanied the formation of Bangladesh had sent millions of refugees into the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal.

      Politics over illegal migration from Bangladesh into Assam has been a potent force in the politics of the state for decades. In 2008, an Assam-based NGO approached the Supreme Court of India claiming that 4.1 million illegal immigrants had been registered as voters in the state. In 2014, the Supreme Court ordered the federal government to update the National Register of Citizens.

      The updated list defines as Indian citizens the residents of Assam who were present in the state before March 25, 1971, and their direct descendants. In keeping with this criterion, the N.R.C. asked for certain legal documents to be submitted as proof of citizenship — including the voter lists for all Indian elections up to 1971.

      People born after 1971 could submit documents that link them to parents or grandparents who possessed the primary documents. So each person going through the process had to show a link to a name on the 1951 register and the only two voter lists — those of 1965-66 and 1970-71 — that were ever made public.

      Such criteria, applied across India, left a good percentage of its citizens stateless. Front pages of Indian newspapers have been carrying accounts detailing the absurdities in the list — a 6-year-old who has been left out even though his twin is on the list, a 72-year-old woman who is the only one in her family to be left off, a 13-year-old boy whose parents and sisters are on the list but he is not.

      The Supreme Court, which had ordered the process underlying the National Register of Citizens, has now directed that no action should be initiated against those left out and that a procedure should be set up for dealing with claims and objections. A final list is expected at the end of an appeal process. And it is not clear what transpires at the end of that process, which is expected to be long and harrowing. So far six overcrowded jails doubling as detention centers in Assam house 1,000 “foreigners,” and the Indian government has approved building of a new detention center that can house 3,000 more.

      The N.R.C. may well have set in motion a process that has uncanny parallels with what took place in Myanmar, which also shares a border with Bangladesh. In 1982, a Burmese citizenship law stripped a million Rohingya of the rights they had had since the country’s independence in 1948.

      The Rohingya, like a huge number of those affected by the N.R.C. in Assam, are Muslims of Bengali ethnicity. The denial of citizenship, loss of rights and continued hostility against the Rohingya in Myanmar eventually led to the brutal violence and ethnic cleansing of the past few years. The excuses that majoritarian nationalists made in the context of the Rohingya in Myanmar — that outsiders don’t understand the complexity of the problem and don’t appreciate the anxieties and fears of the ethnic majority — are being repeated in Assam.

      Throughout the 20th century, the fear of being reduced to a minority has repeatedly been invoked to consolidate an ethnic Assamese identity. If at one time it focuses on the number of Bengalis in the state, at another time it focuses on the number of Muslims in the state, ignoring the fact that the majority of the Muslims are Assamese rather than Bengali.

      Ethnic hostilities were most exaggerated when they provided a path to power. Between 1979 and 1985, Assamese ethnonationalist student politicians led a fierce campaign to remove “foreigners” from the state and have their names deleted from voter lists. They contested elections in 1985 and formed the state government in Assam. In the 1980s, the targets were Bengali-origin Muslims and Hindus.

      This began to change with the rise of the Hindu nationalists in India, who worked to frame the Bengali-origin immigrants as two distinct categories: the Bengali-origin Hindus, whom they described as seeking refuge in India from Muslim-majority Bangladesh, and the Bengali-origin Muslims, whom they see as dangerous foreigners who have illegally infiltrated Indian Territory.

      The N.R.C. embodies both the ethnic prejudices of the Assamese majority against those of Bengali origin and the widespread hostility toward Muslims in India. India’s governing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party has been quick to seize on the political opportunity provided by the release of the list. The B.J.P. sees India as the natural home of the Hindus.

      Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a long history of using rhetoric about Pakistan and Bangladesh to allude to Muslims as a threat. In keeping with the same rhetoric, Mr. Modi’s confidante and the president of the B.J.P., Amit Shah, has insisted that his party is committed to implementing the N.R.C. because it is about the “national security, the security of borders and the citizens of this country.”

      India has nowhere to keep the four million people declared stateless if it does not let them continue living their lives. The Indian government has already assured Bangladesh, which is already struggling with the influx of 750,000 Rohingya from Myanmar, that there will be no deportations as a result of the N.R.C. process.

      Most of people declared stateless are likely to be barred from voting as well. While the Indian election commission has declared that their removal from the voter’s list will not be automatic, in effect once their citizenship comes into question, they lose their right to vote.

      Apart from removing a huge number of voters who were likely to vote against the B.J.P., the party has already shown that as Mr. Modi struggles on the economic front, the N.R.C. will be a handy tool to consolidate Hindu voters in Assam — the majority of the people rendered stateless are Muslims — and the rest of the country going into the general elections in the summer of 2019.


      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/india-citizenship-assam-modi-rohingyas.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&cl
      #islam #musulmans #génocide #nettoyage_ethnique

    • s’en remettre à des avantages obtenus par la démographie confessionelle ne représente pas un suplément éthique , c’est peu dire en restant correct . dans le cas Ismael faruqui verdict la remise en question de la cour suprème en est la caricature pesante . C’est totalement inique de dénier aux protestataires montrés sur la photo du nyt le droit de contester ce qu’ils contestent , c’est terriblement biasé !

  • Le cuir végétal
    Xenius | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/079431-004-A/xenius

    Une designer de l’école des arts appliqués de Schwäbisch Gmünd travaille ainsi sur un matériau proche du #cuir, composé de pelures de fruits. Les présentateurs de « Xenius » se glissent dans la peau d’un « tanneur de fruits » et épluchent ananas, melons et pamplemousses. De nombreuses solutions alternatives existent déjà. Mais que valent-elles réellement ?

    #cuir_végétal et aussi #Bangladesh #pollution #tannage

  • Rana Plaza : des associations interpellent le quai d’Orsay après leur plainte contre Auchan
    https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/rana-plaza-associations-interpellent-quai-orsay-apres-l

    Cinq ans après la catastrophe du Rana Plaza au Bangladesh, trois associations ont interpellé mardi le Quai d’Orsay lui réclamant des informations sur l’avancée de l’enquête après le dépôt de leur plainte contre Auchan pour « pratiques commerciales trompeuses ».

    Le 10 juin 2015, les associations Sherpa, Peuples Solidaires et Collectif Ethique sur l’étiquette ont déposé une plainte devant le tribunal de grande instance de #Lille contre ce géant de la distribution.
    https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/2014/04/24/plainte-contre-auchan-apres-la-catastrophe-du-rana-plaz

    « Le juge d’instruction en charge du dossier a envoyé une commission rogatoire internationale demandant une enquête sur place, qui devait être transmise par la voie diplomatique au Bangladesh », ont affirmé ces associations dans un communiqué.

    « La France doit donner l’exemple »
    Mais « cette volonté du juge d’avancer dans le dossier semble être bloquée au niveau du Ministère des affaires étrangères », ont-elles avancé. Toutefois, selon le Quai d’Orsay, « les autorités françaises coopèrent activement avec les autorités judiciaires et procèdent notamment aux transmissions requises par le magistrat instructeur » afin de « contribuer à la manifestation de la vérité après cet épouvantable drame ».

    « La France doit donner l’exemple dans la lutte contre l’impunité des #multinationales, et soutenir la justice dans la recherche de la vérité », _ ont estimé les associations. Ces mêmes organisations avaient déjà déposé une plainte en avril 2014, qui a donné lieu à une enquête préliminaire, mais le dossier avait été classé sans suite en janvier 2015. Elles ont donc décider de se constituer partie civile afin de porter l’affaire devant un juge d’instruction.

    L’effondrement du #Rana_Plaza, un immeuble abritant des ateliers de confection, situé à Dacca, au #Bangladesh, avait provoqué la mort de 1.138 ouvriers textiles et blessé plus de 2.000 autres en 2013. Cette catastrophe avait mis en lumière les conditions de sécurité déplorables dans les ateliers.

    Après la tragédie, ONG et syndicats avaient dénoncé l’attitude de 29 chaînes de distribution, dont #Auchan, soupçonnées d’avoir sous-traité leur production à un moment ou à un autre au Rana Plaza.

    #mulliez

  • Climate change impacting fish reproduction in the Sundarbans: Study
    https://india.mongabay.com/2018/04/12/climate-change-impacting-fish-reproduction-in-the-sundarbans-study

    Some of West Bengal’s most-loved fish may go off the menu, thanks to climate change in the Sundarbans.

    A team of researchers that is mapping biological sensitivity of certain fish species to climate change says increasing salinity and temperature in the Sundarbans estuary is messing up their reproductive behaviour and may also likely alter their abundance, factors that could wipe them out one day, they warn.

    Spanning 10,000 square km along the coast of India and #Bangladesh, the Sundarbans represent the largest expanse of contiguous mangrove forests in the world. This globally significant ecosystem is situated in the Bay of Bengal, within the delta of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers.

    The Indian Sundarbans archipelago acts as the “nursery” for nearly 90 percent of the aquatic species of eastern coast of India. It is the top producer of fish and prawn, with both districts (South and North- 24 Parganas) combined producing roughly 31 percent of the total inland fish/prawn production of West Bengal, a state iconic for its fish-eating habits. Sundarbans also satiates 15 to 20 percent of the state capital Kolkata’s fish requirement.

    #Inde #mangrove #reproduction #salinité #climat

  • How a Remote Iranian Port Could Heighten China-India Tensions - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-10/india-s-grip-on-strategic-port-loosens-as-iran-turns-to-china

    The shift makes sense for #Iran, which wants to ensure #Chabahar is an economic success. But it could be a strategic loss for #India, which opposes #China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean and is already worried that Gwadar could one day be used as a military base — along with other China-backed ports from #Myanmar to #Bangladesh to #Sri_Lanka.