• Le #joli_rouge

    Le Joli Rouge est animé par la volonté de transmettre et de faire découvrir des #ouvrages autour de l’#anarchisme, du #féminisme ou de l’#éthique_animale.

    Ici, vous trouverez bientôt une boutique proposant différents ouvrages sur ces thèmes.
    Cette page propose des articles, textes et ouvrages diponibles gratuitement.

    https://lejolirouge.fr

    Interview à l’initiateur du site :
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNS46L4gcdo&feature=youtu.be

    #textes #documents #livres #database #base_de_données

  • Automated suspicion: The EU’s new travel surveillance initiatives

    This report examines how the EU is using new technologies to screen, profile and risk-assess travellers to the Schengen area, and the risks this poses to civil liberties and fundamental rights.

    By developing ‘interoperable’ biometric databases, introducing untested profiling tools, and using new ‘pre-crime’ watchlists, people visiting the EU from all over the world are being placed under a veil of suspicion in the name of enhancing security.

    Watch the animation below for an overview of the report. A laid-out version will be available shortly. You can read the press release here: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/july/eu-to-deploy-controversial-technologies-on-holidaymakers-and-business-tr

    –----

    Executive summary

    The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has raised the possibility of widespread surveillance and location tracking for the purpose of disease control, setting alarm bells ringing amongst privacy advocates and civil rights campaigners. However, EU institutions and governments have long been set on the path of more intensive personal data processing for the purpose of migration control, and these developments have in some cases passed almost entirely under the radar of the press and civil society organisations.

    This report examines, explains and critiques a number of large-scale EU information systems currently being planned or built that will significantly extend the collection and use of biometric and biographic data taken from visitors to the Schengen area, made up of 26 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In particular, it examines new systems being introduced to track, analyse and assess the potential security, immigration or public health risks posed by non-EU citizens who have to apply for either a short-stay visa or a travel authorisation – primarily the #Visa_Information_System (#VIS), which is being upgraded, and the #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS), which is currently under construction.

    The visa obligation has existed for years. The forthcoming travel authorisation obligation, which will cover citizens of non-EU states who do not require a visa, is new and will massively expand the amount of data the EU holds on non-citizens. It is the EU’s equivalent of the USA’s ESTA, Canada’s eTA and Australia’s ETA.[1] These schemes represent a form of “government permission to travel,” to borrow the words of Edward Hasbrouck,[2] and they rely on the extensive processing of personal data.

    Data will be gathered on travellers themselves as well as their families, education, occupation and criminal convictions. Fingerprints and photographs will be taken from all travellers, including from millions of children from the age of six onwards. This data will not just be used to assess an individual’s application, but to feed data mining and profiling algorithms. It will be stored in large-scale databases accessible to hundreds of thousands of individuals working for hundreds of different public authorities.

    Much of this data will also be used to feed an enormous new database holding the ‘identity data’ – fingerprints, photographs, names, nationalities and travel document data – of non-EU citizens. This system, the #Common_Identity_Repository (#CIR), is being introduced as part of the EU’s complex ‘interoperability’ initiative and aims to facilitate an increase in police identity checks within the EU. It will only hold the data of non-EU citizens and, with only weak anti-discrimination safeguards in the legislation, raises the risk of further entrenching racial profiling in police work.

    The remote monitoring and control of travellers is also being extended through the VIS upgrade and the introduction of ETIAS. Travel companies are already obliged to check, prior to an individual boarding a plane, coach or train, whether they have the visa required to enter the Schengen area. This obligation will be extended to include travel authorisations, with travel companies able to use the central databases of the VIS and ETIAS to verify whether a person’s paperwork is in order or not. When people arrive at the Schengen border, when they are within the Schengen area and long after they leave, their personal data will remain stored in these systems and be available for a multitude of further uses.

    These new systems and tools have been presented by EU institutions as necessary to keep EU citizens safe. However, the idea that more personal data gathering will automatically lead to greater security is a highly questionable claim, given that the authorities already have problems dealing with the data they hold now.

    Furthermore, a key part of the ‘interoperability’ agenda is the cross-matching and combination of data on tens of millions of people from a host of different databases. Given that the EU’s databases are already-known to be strewn with errors, this massively increases the risks of mistakes in decision making in a policy field – immigration – that already involves a high degree of discretion and which has profound implications for peoples’ lives.

    These new systems have been presented by their proponents as almost-inevitable technological developments. This is a misleading idea which masks the political and ethical judgments that lie behind the introduction of any new technology. It would be fairer to say that EU lawmakers have chosen to introduce unproven, experimental technologies – in particular, automated profiling – for use on non-EU citizens, who have no choice in the matter and are likely to face difficulties in exercising their rights.

    Finally, the introduction of new databases designed to hold data on tens of millions of non-citizens rests on the idea that our public authorities can be trusted to comply with the rules and will not abuse the new troves of data to which they are being given access. Granting access to more data to more people inevitably increases the risk of individual abuses. Furthermore, the last decade has seen numerous states across the EU turn their back on fundamental rights and democratic standards, with migrants frequently used as scapegoats for society’s ills. In a climate of increased xenophobia and social hostility to foreigners, it is extremely dangerous to assert that intrusive data-gathering will counterbalance a supposed threat posed by non-citizens.

    Almost all the legislation governing these systems has now been put in place. What remains is for them to be upgraded or constructed and put into use. Close attention should be paid by lawmakers, journalists, civil society organisations and others to see exactly how this is done. If all non-citizens are to be treated as potential risks and assessed, analysed, monitored and tracked accordingly, it may not be long before citizens come under the same veil of suspicion.

    https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives

    #vidéo:
    https://vimeo.com/437830786

    #suspects #suspicion #frontières #rapport #StateWatch #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
    #surveillance #profiling #database #base_de_données #données_personnelles #empreintes_digitales #enfants #agences_de_voyage #privatisation #interopérabilité

    ping @mobileborders @isskein @etraces @reka

  • Datenbank der im Sklavenhandel involvierten Schweizer

    Cooperaxion fördert die nachhaltige Entwicklung und den interkulturellen Austausch entlang der einstigen Sklavenhandelsrouten.

    Die Datenbank von Cooperaxion dokumentiert auf einzigartige Weise die Geschäfte der verschiedenen Schweizer Akteure während des transatlantischen Sklavenhandels des 17. bis 19. Jahrhunderts.
    Zur Zeit sind über 260 Datensätze veröffentlicht, bei weiteren stehen noch Recherchen an.

    Die Suchfunktion findet Stichwörter nach Name, Herkunftskanton, Tätigkeitsregion, Detailinformation oder dem Zeitraum.

    Sie können die Tabelle sortieren, indem Sie auf den entsprechenden Spaltentitel klicken.

    Mit dem Detail-Link gelangen Sie auf eine Seite mit ausführlichen Informationen zur Person oder (Personen-)Gruppe.

    Thematisch vertiefte Hintergrund-Informationen zur Rolle der Schweiz im transatlantischen Sklavenhandel und Kolonialismus finden Sie unter Dokumentation: https://cooperaxion.org/?lang=fr.

    https://www.cooperaxion.ch

    –—

    Avec des fiches pour chaque entrée, ici par exemple Auguste de Stael :

    #esclavage #commerce_triangulaire #Suisse #base_de_données #database #commerce_d'esclaves #histoire #liste

    –----

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la Suisse coloniale :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/868109

    ping @reka @cede

  • Applis de #traçage : #scénarios pour les non-spécialistes
    https://framablog.org/2020/04/24/applis-de-tracage-scenarios-pour-les-non-specialistes

    Un document de plus sur les dangers de l’application de traçage ? Nous n’allons pas reproduire ici les 13 pages documentées et augmentées de notes de référence d’une équipe de 14 spécialistes en #cryptographie : Xavier Bonnetain, University of Waterloo, Canada ; Anne Canteaut, … Lire la suite­­

    #Droits_numériques #Framaconfinement #Internet_et_société #Libertés_Numériques #Non_classé #Anonymat #Applications #base_de_données #COVID-19 #Informatique #Libertés #Malware #Securite #StopCovid #Surveillance #tracking

  • Impacts of COVID-19 on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Insights from the ground

    Delve has organized this dedicated COVID-19 space to share information and resources about the impacts on the ASM sector. The space will also profile initiatives by partners to assist small-scale miners and their communities during the pandemic. We are organizing an exploratory COVID-19 Working Group to further share information. The Working Group’s first meeting was convened on April 6th and will continue to share information on an ongoing basis.

    https://delvedatabase.org/about/news-and-events/impacts-of-covid-19-on-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining-insights-from

    #mines #covid-19 #coronavirus #artisanal_miner_or small-scale_miner (#ASM) #Orpaillage #database #base_de_données

    ping @albertocampiphoto @reka

  • Une appli de #traçage du COVID 19 qui échappe à Big Brother ?
    https://framablog.org/2020/04/12/une-appli-de-tracage-du-covid-9-qui-echappe-a-big-brother

    Ou plutôt pas de traçage du tout ? Oui bien sûr, ce serait sans doute la meilleure solution compte tenu des inévitables « glissements » que redoute comme nous Hubert Guillaud dans cet article. Mais à l’heure même où se profile l’appli gouvernementale, … Lire la suite­­

    #Droits_numériques #Internet_et_société #Non_classé #Santé #aléatoire #application #base_de_données #BD #BigBrother #Comic #COVID-19 #Hôpital #Sante #StopCovid #ViePrivee

  • Compte twitter Counting Dead Women

    UK women killed by men or where a man is the principal/primary suspect. Account run by @k_ingalasmith

    https://twitter.com/countdeadwomen
    #féminicide #données #UK #Angleterre #femmes #meurtres #violence_domestique #violences_sexuelles

    Le fil est tenu par une chercheuse, une sociologue de l’université de Durham, #Karen_Ingala_Smith, dont voici le site perso :

    https://kareningalasmith.com

    Et sa page institutionnelle :

    Since 2009, I have been Chief Executive of nia, an East London based charity providing services for women, girls and children who have experienced sexual and domestic violence. Under my leadership, nia has maintained an undaunted feminist commitment to ending male violence. During an unfavourable economic climate, I have built upon nia’s reputation for innovative and creative ways of responding to the needs of the women and children it serves to become a highly regarded organisation championing an integrated approach to addressing all forms of male violence. nia’s services include East London Rape Crisis; The Emma Project –a unique refuge for women who have experienced domestic and sexual violence; Daria House – a refuge for women who have been sexually exploited with a focus on supporting women who been exploited through their involvement in prostitution; the London Exiting and Advocacy Project supporting women to exit prostitution; and the recently launched Huggett Women’s Centre.

    https://www.dur.ac.uk/sociology/staff/profile/?id=13884

    –-------

    The #Femicide_Census

    The Femicide Census is a unique source of comprehensive information about women who have been killed in the UK and the men who have killed them.

    Men’s violence against women is a leading cause of the premature death for women globally but research in the UK and Europe is limited and unconnected. The Femicide Census significantly improves upon currently available data by providing detailed comparable data about femicides in the UK since 2009, including demographic and social factors and the methods men selected to kill women. By collating femicides, we can see that these killings are not isolated incidents, and many follow repeated patterns.

    Launched in 2015, The Femicide Census was founded by Karen Ingala Smith and Clarissa O’Callaghan with support from Freshfields, Deloitte and Women’s Aid (England). It was inspired by information collected by Karen and recorded in her blog Counting Dead Women. Since then, The Femicide Census has become established as a leading articulation of men’s fatal violence against women in the UK. We are now ready to take the Femicide Census into its next phase as an independent entity.

    https://kareningalasmith.com/the-femicide-census

    #recensement #chiffres #statistiques #données #base_de_données

    –---

    Karen Ingala Smith est citée ici, en lien avec le coronavirus/covid-19 :
    Domestic abuse killings ’more than double’ amid Covid-19 lockdown
    https://seenthis.net/messages/831467#message843842

  • Recensement de personnes tuées par la police ou à cause de son action : 2005-2015

    VICTIMES DE LA POLICE ( connus ) DEPUIS 2005 ( en France ) :

    2005 : 6 morts, 3 blessés grave ( connus ) :

    Janvier : Abou Bakari Tandia meurt des suites de sa garde-à-vue au commissariat de Courbevoie (92).

    7 Mars : Balé Traoré grièvement blessé à bout pourtant par un policier dans le quartier de la Goutte d’Or ( paris 18) alors qu’il n’avait lui même pas d’arme.

    Avril : Un jeune de 17 ans, tué lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Aubervilliers (93)

    Octobre : Samir Abbache 26 ans, tué à la prison de Mulhouse (68)

    Octobre : Zied 17 ans et Bouna 15 ans, poursuivis par la police et morts électrocutés dans un transformateur à Clichy-sous-Bois (93).

    Novembre : Eric Blaise retrouvé mort dans des circonstances suspectes au mitard à Fleury-Mérogis (91)

    Juillet 2005 : Aux Mureaux ( 78) un adolescent de 14 ans touché par un tir de flash ball perd un œil.

    2006 : 10 morts, 7 blessés :

    Janvier : Eric Mourier 28 ans, mort au mitard de la prison Saint-Joseph (69).

    Mars 2006 : 2 frères insultés et battus par des policiers chez eux devant leur mère à Cergy (95).

    Mai : Fethi Traoré 31 ans, poursuivit par la police il se noie dans la Marne (94).

    29 Mai : Komotine mère de famille, insultée gazée menottée et traînée par 4 policiers devant ses enfants et ses voisins à Montfermeil ( 93).

    Juin : Vilhelm Covaci 20 ans, noyé dans le canal de Saint Denis (93) lors d’une poursuite

    Daniel Moldovan a également sauté dans l’eau avant d’être interpellé et tabassé jusqu’à en perdre connaissance.

    Deux réfugiés poursuivis, écrasés sur une autoroute à Calais (32). [juin 06]

    Octobre : Clichy-sous-Bois un jeune de 16 ans touché au flash ball perd un œil.

    Novembre : Taoufik El-Amri noyé par hydrocution dans un canal de Nantes (44) après un contrôle de police.

    Décembre :Guillaume Perrot retrouvé noyé à Corbeil-Essonnes après avoir été laissé seul sur la berge de la Seine par des policiers.

    Août : Albertine Sow enceinte au moment des faits a été frappée au ventre et gazée par des policiers alors qu’elle était témoin de violences policières à paris.

    2007 : 19 morts, 2 blessés :

    Janvier : Jonathan 24 ans mort en tombant d’un toit en voulant échapper à la police à Montpellier (34).

    Fevrier : Raouf et Tina 15 et 17 ans, morts lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Saint-Fons, près de Lyon (69). [fév 07] 1 rescapé de 16 ans, Myriam Bahmed 17 ans tombe dans le coma.

    Louis Mendy 34 ans père de famille, tué d’une balle dans la tête par un policier à Toulon (83).

    Pierre visé à la tête et frappé par un flash-ball dans une manifestation lycéenne. Pierre a perdu l’œil droit le 27 novembre 2007 à Nantes.

    Mai : 1 jeune de 17 ans blessé par balle par un policier à Grigny (91)

    Juin : Un homme de 58 ans, mort dans la cellule de dégrisement du commissariat à Bordeaux (33).

    Lamine Dieng 25 ans, meurt dans un fourgon de police à Paris (75).

    Nelson 14 ans mort après avoir été fauché par une voiture de police sur un passage clouté à Marseille (13). [juin 07]

    Elmi Mohammed 23 ans, mort noyé dans la Saône après avoir été poursuivi par la police (69). [juin 07]

    Juillet : 1 homme de 40 ans, tué par balle par des policiers du Service régional des transports de la gare du Nord à Paris. [27 juillet 2007]

    Ait Brahim Moulay Mohamed 27 ans, mort par pendaison dans les douches du centre de rétention administrative de Bordeaux (33).

    Un homme de 37 ans, mort lors de sa garde-à-vue à Rouen (76).

    Septembre : Un homme de 48 ans, mort dans une cellule de dégrisement au commissariat de Dieppe (76).

    Une femme de 51 ans Chulan Liu « sans papiers » morte après un saut par la fenêtre à l’arrivée de la police, Paris (75) ( 25 septembre 07)

    Joseph RANDOLPH 42 ans, mort suite à son interpellation.

    (Paris, 8 septembre )

    Novembre : Larami et Mushin morts suite à une collision avec une voiture de police à Villiers-le-Bel (95).

    2008 : 11 morts et au moins 7 bléssés ( connus)

    Janvier : Lu Semedo Da Veiga 28 ans, mort à la prison de Fresnes (94) suite à un refus de soins.

    Reda Semmoudi defenestré par la police lors d’une perquisition à Noisy-le-Sec (93).

    Avril : Baba Traoré 29 ans mort noyé dans la Marne (94) suite à une poursuite par la police.

    Mai : Abdelakim Ajimi mort étouffé par plusieurs policiers à Grasse (06).

    Joseph Guerdner 27 ans tué de 7 balles dans le dos en fuyant menotté dans le Var (83).

    Lamba Soukouna 28 ans frappé à coup de crosse et de flash ball à la tête par un brigadier en présence de 3 autres « collègues » à Villepinte. [8 mai 2008] Lamba souffre de la drépanocytose, il a porté plainte.

    Juin : Mohamed 39 ans père de famille tué par balles à Corbeil-Essonnes (91). [19 juin08]

    Salem Essouli, mort par manque de soins au centre de rétention administrative de Vincennes (75).

    Août : Fakraddine Zarai Zarai 30 ans, mort par pendaison au radiateur de sa cellule dans la prison de Saint Quentin Fallavier à Lyon (69). [8 août 2008] A 2 semaines de sa libération.

    Septembre :Ilies 16 ans mort lors d’une poursuite par des policiers de la BAC de Romans sur Isére (Drôme). [29 septembre 2008]

    Octobre : Elvis Akpa mort suite à une chute du septième étage en tentant d’échapper à la police à Paris. [1er Octobre 2008]

    1 homme de 22 ans et 1 adolescent de 14 ans matraqué et blessé par un projectile de Taser par deux policiers pendant un contrôle d’identité à Montfermeil (93).[8 octobre 2008] Les deux frères bénéficieront de six jours d’ITT.

    Abdoulaye Fofana 20 ans tabassé dans le hall de son immeuble par 2 policiers à coups de matraque, tonfa et crosse de flash-ball, à Montfermeil(93). [14 octobre 2008]

    Novembre : Naguib Toubache 20 ans tué par la balle d’un gendarme à Montataire dans l’Oise (60). [28 nov 08]

    2009 : 6 morts, et au moins 5 bléssés graves (connus) :

    Septembre 2009 : Hakim Djellassi, âgé de 31 ans, est mort deux jours après son interpellation par la police à Lille à son hôtel.

    Mars : 1 homme de 29 ans tué par un policier au péage de Courtevroult lors d’une course poursuite à Bussy Saint-Georges (Seine-et-Marne).

    [7 mars 2009]

    Mai :Oussama Mouhtarim 21 ans plongé dans le coma après une interpellation en gare de Massy (92). [28 mai 09]

    Juin :ALI ZIRI 69 ans mort à la suite d’un contrôle policier à Argenteuil (92).[9 juin 2009]

    Arezki K. 61 ans battu par des policiers à Argenteuil (92). [9 juin 2009]

    Un étudiant de 25 ans à été touché par un tir de flash ball et a perdu son œil. (Toulouse, en mars )

    Un jeune à Neuilly-sur-Marne, en mai perd également son œil à la suite d’un tir de flash ball.

    Juillet : Joachim Gatti touché au visage par un tir de flash ball, il perd un œil.( Juillet 2009 à Montreuil )

    Mohammed Bemouna selon la justice mort par pendaison en garde à vue malgré qu’il n’y ai aucune traces de pendaisons sur le corps du jeune homme à Firminy dans la Loire (08/07/2009).

    Août : Yakou SANOGO 18 ans mort lors d’une course poursuite par la police à Bagnolet (93). [9 août 09]

    Mohamed Boukourou 41 ans mort dans un fourgon de police où il avait été conduit de force, à Valentigney (25). [12 nov. 2009]

    2010 : 9 morts et au moins 4 blessés ( connus) :

    Septembre : Lassana DIARRA mort en garde à vue dans un commissariat de la région parisienne. [2010]

    Avril : Philippe C. 35 ans dans le coma suite à une altercation avec un policier dans le commissariat du 18e arrondissement de Paris. [13 avril 2010]

    Mickaël Verrelle 29 ans Battu à Chambéry par un policier.

    Dans le coma.[23/24 avril 2010]

    Juillet : Karim BOUDOUDA 27 ans tué d’une balle dans la tête par la police à Grenoble. [16/07/2010]

    Luigi Duquenet 22 ans, tué par un gendarme dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi au cours d’une course-poursuite après avoir forcé un contrôle. En loir et cher. [16-17/07/2010]

    Le 8 Août 2010, a Mantes la jolie ( 78) un jeune de 17 ans se noie en tentant d’échapper à la police.

    Septembre : Anis Feninekh 28 ans tabassé par un policier à Juvisy.

    Octobre : un lycéen de Montreuil est touché par un tir de flash ball au visage, il perd un œil.

    Louis Klinger meurt lors de son interpellation par la police à Dijon.

    Novembre : Mamadou Marega meurt après s’être fait tapé et tazé par la police dans un immeuble à Colombes (92).

    Décembre : Mostefa Ziani résident d’un foyer de Marseille, est décédé lundi matin après avoir été victime d’un arrêt cardiaque dû a un tir de flash-ball d’un policier. (14 Décembre )

    2011 : Au moins 10 morts ( connus ) :

    Le 1er Janvier Steve 25 ans est tué par balle par la police en seine et marne.

    Le 23 Février à Lyon un jeune homme de 20 ans est abattu de 2 balles tirées par la police.

    13 avril 2011 : un homme de 43 ans, connu comme schizophrène, meurt à Angers après son interpellation Le parquet saisit l’IGPN.

    Le 5 juin Une fillette de neuf ans se trouve toujours dans le coma après avoir été grièvement blessée à la tête, lors d’affrontements dans le quartier sensible des Tarterêts, à Corbeil-Essonnes, dans l’Essonne.

    Les circonstances du drame restent pour l’heure contradictoires. Le père de la victime accusait dès lundi la police d’avoir blessé sa fille avec un flash ball.

    Le 25 juin un jeune homme de 25 ans souffrant apparemment de graves troubles psychiatriques, a été tué dans un échange de tirs avec des policiers près de Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis)

    Juillet 2011 : un jeune de Nanterre Mohamed est décédé après une chute de son deux roues alors que les policiers lui auraient tirés dessus au flash-bal. Cette chute a entraîné sa mort.

    Le 29 Août, Un jeune homme est décédé à Neuilly-sur-Seine (92) après une course poursuite en scooter avec la police.

    20 sept 2011 : une personne autiste de 48 ans interpellé en pleine crise à Marseille meurt d’un arrêt cardio-vasculaire. Le parquet saisit l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) et ouvre une enquête pour homicide involontaire.

    5 novembre : Paris st Lazare : Un homme meurt d’un infarctus suite à son interpellation violente.

    Le 27 Décembre à Clermont-Ferrand un jeune se tue en voiture parce qu’il est poursuivis par la police.

    2012 : Déjà 14 morts ( connus) et ( au moins ) 4 blessés grave (connus) :

    11 janvier 2012 : Aulnay-sous-Bois (Seine-Saint-Denis) :

    Abdel 25 ans meurt « d’une crise cardiaque » lors d’un contrôle.

    10 janvier 2012 : Clermont Ferrand : Wissam El-Yamni 30 ans, battu par la police, il tombe dans le coma et succombera de ses blessures 10 jours plus tard. La famille attend toujours une contre-expertise d’autopsie. Le corps n’a donc toujours pas pu être inhumé.

    11 Mars 2012 : Ivry : Ahamadou Maréga, 17 ans mort à la suite d’une poursuite par la police.

    27 Mars 2012 : Lyon : un homme, âgé de 39 ans, est mort des suites de ses blessures, il serait « tombé » d’une voiture de police.

    21 Avril 2012 : Noisy-le-sec ( 93) : Amine Bentounsi est tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans le dos.

    14 Mai Nantes : un garçon de 13 ans se noit afin d’échapper à la police.

    22 Mai : Massy Palaiseau : 2 jeunes en scooter sont

    percutés par la police, l’un est grièvement blessé, l’autre meurt.

    17 Mai : Cayenne : Un jeune de 17 ans meurt au commissariat.

    Dans la nuit du 5 au 6 Juin : Melun : Youssef Mahdi 24 ans

    est mort des suites de sa noyade dans la seine, alors qu’il

    voulait échapper à un contrôle de police.

    9 Juin : Villiers-le-Bel : 2 jeunes sont blessés dont l’un

    grièvement : Rodrigue 20 ans actuellement dans le coma. Ils ont été percutés par une voiture de la BAC, 5 ans après la mort de Lakhamy et Moushin percuté dans le même quartier par la police.

    12 Juin : Une femme de 62 ans meurt lors d’une perquisition de police à Bondy ( cité martin luther king) Elle aurait fait un malaise cardiaque.

    23 Juin : Un fillette de 18 mois et son père blessé par des policiers à La Verrière (Yvelines)

    26 Juin : Nabil, un jeune villefranchois de 26 ans a été tué, à Millau, par la balle d’un fonctionnaire de police appartenant à la BAC.

    18 Juillet : Un homme s’est noyé dans la Marne au Perreux-sur-Marne dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi alors qu’il tentait d’échapper à la police avec deux autres personnes soupçonnées d’avoir commis un vol.Le noyé est un homme de 35 ans « aux nombreux antécédents judiciaires », domicilié à Gentilly, également dans le Val-de-Marne, a précisé la même source. Auditionnée, sa mère « ne dépose pas plainte », a-t-elle ajouté.

    9 Juillet : Norredine 28 ans, originaire du Soudan, est mort dans le centre ville

    de Calais. Son corps a été sorti du canal à proximité de la

    sous-préfecture. Comme souvent, la police a refusé catégoriquement à la

    famille et aux proches l’accès au corps, et de rechercher les causes de la

    mort.

    2013 :

    13 Février : Marseille : Yassin Aïbeche Souilah 19 ans a été touché de plusieurs balles d’un policier ( qui n’était pas en service et qui aurait été « ivre ».)

    Yacine est mort à l’hôpital des suites de ses blessures, le jeudi 14 février à 7h du matin. Le policier serait en détention provisoire sous le chef d’inculpation d’homicide volontaire.

    28 Mars : Montigny-en-Gohelle ( 62) : Lahoucine Ait Omghar 26 ans tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans la poitrine.

    Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille a porté plainte.

    Novembre : Orléans : Loic Louise 21 ans est mort après avoir reçu une décharge de taser.

    Ouverte par le parquet d’Orléans, l’enquête est désormais terminée. Selon l’avocat de la famille Louise la mort du jeune homme résulte d’une utilisation prolongée du Taser. Le procureur souhaite rencontrer la famille pour donner les conclusions.

    2014 :

    20 decembre : Bertrand Nzohabonayo-tué par des policiers à Joué les tours

    1er Avril : Marseille : Morad , 16 ans defenestré par la police à Marseille

    29 juillet : Montgeron( 91 ) : Dorel Iosif Floare a été tué par un policier d’une balle dans le thorax.

    21 août : Abdelhak Gorafia, 51 ans est mort dans des conditions troubles lors de son transfert par la police française vers l’aéroport de Roissy Charles De Gaulle, en exécution d’un arrêté ministériel d’expulsion.

    « Il n’est pas mort naturellement mais s’est étouffé devant les policiers ou sous l’effet de leurs contraintes. Ce qui suppose des convulsions et une mort atroce. Comment peut-on ne pas porter secours à quelqu’un qui s’asphyxie ? »

    26 Août : Colmar : Houcine Bouras 23 ans, a été tué par un gendarme alors qu’il était menotté et dans un véhicule de police.

    « Violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner ». C’est sous ce chef d’inculpation que le procureur de la République de Colmar Bernard Lebeau a qualifié la responsabilité du gendarme. Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille réclame vérité et justice.

    5 Septembre : Paris : un homme de 34 ans est mort après que les policiers ait utilisé leur pistolet à impulsion électrique. ( pas de nom connu )

    17 Octobre : Toulouse : Timothée Lake 20 ans est abattu d’une balle dans le cœur par un policier de la BAC.

    La police plaide la légitime défense (…) mais l’enquête est loin d’être terminée.

    2 novembre : Tarn ( ZAD du testet ) : Rémy Fraisse, 21 ans mort après avoir reçu une grenade de la gendarmerie.

    16 janvier 2014, Abdoulaye Camara, 30 ans, mourrait dans le quartier de la Mare Rouge touché par plusieurs balles de deux policiers havrais.

    2015 :

    15 Février : Un jeune garçon de 14 ans, qui se trouvait au volant d’une voiture, s’est tué dimanche matin à Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme) en tentant d’échapper à un contrôle de police.

    CETTE « LISTE » n’est PAS « EXHAUSTIVE »

    Ce recensement est fait à partir de ce qui est diffusé dans la presse. Certaines histoires ont été confirmées par des familles de victimes,

    mais si aucuns témoins et proches/familles ne se manifestent ; les mémoires des victimes sont bafouées.

    Presque a chaque meurtre commis par la police, la victime est accablée, la plupart des enquêtes sont bâclées et amènent trop souvent à des conclusions de « légitime défense » pour les fonctionnaires …

    Nous nous devons de rétablir la vérité.

    La peine de mort a été abolie mais certaines vies reste à la merci de mercenaires de l’état.

    PAS DE JUSTICE PAS DE PAIX !

    N’hésitez pas à nous contacter pour nous signaler un oubli, une erreur (toutes nos excuses si c’est le cas) et/ou pour faire un témoignage.

    Contact mail : lalibrelucha@gmail.com

    VICTIMES DE LA POLICE ( connus ) DEPUIS 2005 ( en France ) :

    2005 : 6 morts, 3 blessés grave ( connus ) :

    Janvier : Abou Bakari Tandia meurt des suites de sa garde-à-vue au commissariat de Courbevoie (92).

    7 Mars : Balé Traoré grièvement blessé à bout pourtant par un policier dans le quartier de la Goutte d’Or ( paris 18) alors qu’il n’avait lui même pas d’arme.

    Avril : Un jeune de 17 ans, tué lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Aubervilliers (93)

    Octobre : Samir Abbache 26 ans, tué à la prison de Mulhouse (68)

    Octobre : Zied 17 ans et Bouna 15 ans, poursuivis par la police et morts électrocutés dans un transformateur à Clichy-sous-Bois (93).

    Novembre : Eric Blaise retrouvé mort dans des circonstances suspectes au mitard à Fleury-Mérogis (91)

    Juillet 2005 : Aux Mureaux ( 78) un adolescent de 14 ans touché par un tir de flash ball perd un œil.

    2006 : 10 morts, 7 blessés :

    Janvier : Eric Mourier 28 ans, mort au mitard de la prison Saint-Joseph (69).

    Mars 2006 : 2 frères insultés et battus par des policiers chez eux devant leur mère à Cergy (95).

    Mai : Fethi Traoré 31 ans, poursuivit par la police il se noie dans la Marne (94).

    29 Mai : Komotine mère de famille, insultée gazée menottée et traînée par 4 policiers devant ses enfants et ses voisins à Montfermeil ( 93).

    Juin : Vilhelm Covaci 20 ans, noyé dans le canal de Saint Denis (93) lors d’une poursuite

    Daniel Moldovan a également sauté dans l’eau avant d’être interpellé et tabassé jusqu’à en perdre connaissance.

    Deux réfugiés poursuivis, écrasés sur une autoroute à Calais (32). [juin 06]

    Octobre : Clichy-sous-Bois un jeune de 16 ans touché au flash ball perd un œil.

    Novembre : Taoufik El-Amri noyé par hydrocution dans un canal de Nantes (44) après un contrôle de police.

    Décembre :Guillaume Perrot retrouvé noyé à Corbeil-Essonnes après avoir été laissé seul sur la berge de la Seine par des policiers.

    Août : Albertine Sow enceinte au moment des faits a été frappée au ventre et gazée par des policiers alors qu’elle était témoin de violences policières à paris.

    2007 : 19 morts, 2 blessés :

    Janvier : Jonathan 24 ans mort en tombant d’un toit en voulant échapper à la police à Montpellier (34).

    Fevrier : Raouf et Tina 15 et 17 ans, morts lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Saint-Fons, près de Lyon (69). [fév 07] 1 rescapé de 16 ans, Myriam Bahmed 17 ans tombe dans le coma.

    Louis Mendy 34 ans père de famille, tué d’une balle dans la tête par un policier à Toulon (83).

    Pierre visé à la tête et frappé par un flash-ball dans une manifestation lycéenne. Pierre a perdu l’œil droit le 27 novembre 2007 à Nantes.

    Mai : 1 jeune de 17 ans blessé par balle par un policier à Grigny (91)

    Juin : Un homme de 58 ans, mort dans la cellule de dégrisement du commissariat à Bordeaux (33).

    Lamine Dieng 25 ans, meurt dans un fourgon de police à Paris (75).

    Nelson 14 ans mort après avoir été fauché par une voiture de police sur un passage clouté à Marseille (13). [juin 07]

    Elmi Mohammed 23 ans, mort noyé dans la Saône après avoir été poursuivi par la police (69). [juin 07]

    Juillet : 1 homme de 40 ans, tué par balle par des policiers du Service régional des transports de la gare du Nord à Paris. [27 juillet 2007]

    Ait Brahim Moulay Mohamed 27 ans, mort par pendaison dans les douches du centre de rétention administrative de Bordeaux (33).

    Un homme de 37 ans, mort lors de sa garde-à-vue à Rouen (76).

    Septembre : Un homme de 48 ans, mort dans une cellule de dégrisement au commissariat de Dieppe (76).

    Une femme de 51 ans Chulan Liu « sans papiers » morte après un saut par la fenêtre à l’arrivée de la police, Paris (75) ( 25 septembre 07)

    Joseph RANDOLPH 42 ans, mort suite à son interpellation.

    (Paris, 8 septembre )

    Novembre : Larami et Mushin morts suite à une collision avec une voiture de police à Villiers-le-Bel (95).

    2008 : 11 morts et au moins 7 bléssés ( connus)

    Janvier : Lu Semedo Da Veiga 28 ans, mort à la prison de Fresnes (94) suite à un refus de soins.

    Reda Semmoudi defenestré par la police lors d’une perquisition à Noisy-le-Sec (93).

    Avril : Baba Traoré 29 ans mort noyé dans la Marne (94) suite à une poursuite par la police.

    Mai : Abdelakim Ajimi mort étouffé par plusieurs policiers à Grasse (06).

    Joseph Guerdner 27 ans tué de 7 balles dans le dos en fuyant menotté dans le Var (83).

    Lamba Soukouna 28 ans frappé à coup de crosse et de flash ball à la tête par un brigadier en présence de 3 autres « collègues » à Villepinte. [8 mai 2008] Lamba souffre de la drépanocytose, il a porté plainte.

    Juin : Mohamed 39 ans père de famille tué par balles à Corbeil-Essonnes (91). [19 juin08]

    Salem Essouli, mort par manque de soins au centre de rétention administrative de Vincennes (75).

    Août : Fakraddine Zarai Zarai 30 ans, mort par pendaison au radiateur de sa cellule dans la prison de Saint Quentin Fallavier à Lyon (69). [8 août 2008] A 2 semaines de sa libération.

    Septembre :Ilies 16 ans mort lors d’une poursuite par des policiers de la BAC de Romans sur Isére (Drôme). [29 septembre 2008]

    Octobre : Elvis Akpa mort suite à une chute du septième étage en tentant d’échapper à la police à Paris. [1er Octobre 2008]

    1 homme de 22 ans et 1 adolescent de 14 ans matraqué et blessé par un projectile de Taser par deux policiers pendant un contrôle d’identité à Montfermeil (93).[8 octobre 2008] Les deux frères bénéficieront de six jours d’ITT.

    Abdoulaye Fofana 20 ans tabassé dans le hall de son immeuble par 2 policiers à coups de matraque, tonfa et crosse de flash-ball, à Montfermeil(93). [14 octobre 2008]

    Novembre : Naguib Toubache 20 ans tué par la balle d’un gendarme à Montataire dans l’Oise (60). [28 nov 08]

    2009 : 6 morts, et au moins 5 bléssés graves (connus) :

    Septembre 2009 : Hakim Djellassi, âgé de 31 ans, est mort deux jours après son interpellation par la police à Lille à son hôtel.

    Mars : 1 homme de 29 ans tué par un policier au péage de Courtevroult lors d’une course poursuite à Bussy Saint-Georges (Seine-et-Marne).

    [7 mars 2009]

    Mai :Oussama Mouhtarim 21 ans plongé dans le coma après une interpellation en gare de Massy (92). [28 mai 09]

    Juin :ALI ZIRI 69 ans mort à la suite d’un contrôle policier à Argenteuil (92).[9 juin 2009]

    Arezki K. 61 ans battu par des policiers à Argenteuil (92). [9 juin 2009]

    Un étudiant de 25 ans à été touché par un tir de flash ball et a perdu son œil. (Toulouse, en mars )

    Un jeune à Neuilly-sur-Marne, en mai perd également son œil à la suite d’un tir de flash ball.

    Juillet : Joachim Gatti touché au visage par un tir de flash ball, il perd un œil.( Juillet 2009 à Montreuil )

    Mohammed Bemouna selon la justice mort par pendaison en garde à vue malgré qu’il n’y ai aucune traces de pendaisons sur le corps du jeune homme à Firminy dans la Loire (08/07/2009).

    Août : Yakou SANOGO 18 ans mort lors d’une course poursuite par la police à Bagnolet (93). [9 août 09]

    Mohamed Boukourou 41 ans mort dans un fourgon de police où il avait été conduit de force, à Valentigney (25). [12 nov. 2009]

    2010 : 9 morts et au moins 4 blessés ( connus) :

    Septembre : Lassana DIARRA mort en garde à vue dans un commissariat de la région parisienne. [2010]

    Avril : Philippe C. 35 ans dans le coma suite à une altercation avec un policier dans le commissariat du 18e arrondissement de Paris. [13 avril 2010]

    Mickaël Verrelle 29 ans Battu à Chambéry par un policier.

    Dans le coma.[23/24 avril 2010]

    Juillet : Karim BOUDOUDA 27 ans tué d’une balle dans la tête par la police à Grenoble. [16/07/2010]

    Luigi Duquenet 22 ans, tué par un gendarme dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi au cours d’une course-poursuite après avoir forcé un contrôle. En loir et cher. [16-17/07/2010]

    Le 8 Août 2010, a Mantes la jolie ( 78) un jeune de 17 ans se noie en tentant d’échapper à la police.

    Septembre : Anis Feninekh 28 ans tabassé par un policier à Juvisy.

    Octobre : un lycéen de Montreuil est touché par un tir de flash ball au visage, il perd un œil.

    Louis Klinger meurt lors de son interpellation par la police à Dijon.

    Novembre : Mamadou Marega meurt après s’être fait tapé et tazé par la police dans un immeuble à Colombes (92).

    Décembre : Mostefa Ziani résident d’un foyer de Marseille, est décédé lundi matin après avoir été victime d’un arrêt cardiaque dû a un tir de flash-ball d’un policier. (14 Décembre )

    2011 : Au moins 10 morts ( connus ) :

    Le 1er Janvier Steve 25 ans est tué par balle par la police en seine et marne.

    Le 23 Février à Lyon un jeune homme de 20 ans est abattu de 2 balles tirées par la police.

    13 avril 2011 : un homme de 43 ans, connu comme schizophrène, meurt à Angers après son interpellation Le parquet saisit l’IGPN.

    Le 5 juin Une fillette de neuf ans se trouve toujours dans le coma après avoir été grièvement blessée à la tête, lors d’affrontements dans le quartier sensible des Tarterêts, à Corbeil-Essonnes, dans l’Essonne.

    Les circonstances du drame restent pour l’heure contradictoires. Le père de la victime accusait dès lundi la police d’avoir blessé sa fille avec un flash ball.

    Le 25 juin un jeune homme de 25 ans souffrant apparemment de graves troubles psychiatriques, a été tué dans un échange de tirs avec des policiers près de Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis)

    Juillet 2011 : un jeune de Nanterre Mohamed est décédé après une chute de son deux roues alors que les policiers lui auraient tirés dessus au flash-bal. Cette chute a entraîné sa mort.

    Le 29 Août, Un jeune homme est décédé à Neuilly-sur-Seine (92) après une course poursuite en scooter avec la police.

    20 sept 2011 : une personne autiste de 48 ans interpellé en pleine crise à Marseille meurt d’un arrêt cardio-vasculaire. Le parquet saisit l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) et ouvre une enquête pour homicide involontaire.

    5 novembre : Paris st Lazare : Un homme meurt d’un infarctus suite à son interpellation violente.

    Le 27 Décembre à Clermont-Ferrand un jeune se tue en voiture parce qu’il est poursuivis par la police.

    2012 : Déjà 14 morts ( connus) et ( au moins ) 4 blessés grave (connus) :

    11 janvier 2012 : Aulnay-sous-Bois (Seine-Saint-Denis) :

    Abdel 25 ans meurt « d’une crise cardiaque » lors d’un contrôle.

    10 janvier 2012 : Clermont Ferrand : Wissam El-Yamni 30 ans, battu par la police, il tombe dans le coma et succombera de ses blessures 10 jours plus tard. La famille attend toujours une contre-expertise d’autopsie. Le corps n’a donc toujours pas pu être inhumé.

    11 Mars 2012 : Ivry : Ahamadou Maréga, 17 ans mort à la suite d’une poursuite par la police.

    27 Mars 2012 : Lyon : un homme, âgé de 39 ans, est mort des suites de ses blessures, il serait « tombé » d’une voiture de police.

    21 Avril 2012 : Noisy-le-sec ( 93) : Amine Bentounsi est tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans le dos.

    14 Mai Nantes : un garçon de 13 ans se noit afin d’échapper à la police.

    22 Mai : Massy Palaiseau : 2 jeunes en scooter sont

    percutés par la police, l’un est grièvement blessé, l’autre meurt.

    17 Mai : Cayenne : Un jeune de 17 ans meurt au commissariat.

    Dans la nuit du 5 au 6 Juin : Melun : Youssef Mahdi 24 ans

    est mort des suites de sa noyade dans la seine, alors qu’il

    voulait échapper à un contrôle de police.

    9 Juin : Villiers-le-Bel : 2 jeunes sont blessés dont l’un

    grièvement : Rodrigue 20 ans actuellement dans le coma. Ils ont été percutés par une voiture de la BAC, 5 ans après la mort de Lakhamy et Moushin percuté dans le même quartier par la police.

    12 Juin : Une femme de 62 ans meurt lors d’une perquisition de police à Bondy ( cité martin luther king) Elle aurait fait un malaise cardiaque.

    23 Juin : Un fillette de 18 mois et son père blessé par des policiers à La Verrière (Yvelines)

    26 Juin : Nabil, un jeune villefranchois de 26 ans a été tué, à Millau, par la balle d’un fonctionnaire de police appartenant à la BAC.

    18 Juillet : Un homme s’est noyé dans la Marne au Perreux-sur-Marne dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi alors qu’il tentait d’échapper à la police avec deux autres personnes soupçonnées d’avoir commis un vol.Le noyé est un homme de 35 ans « aux nombreux antécédents judiciaires », domicilié à Gentilly, également dans le Val-de-Marne, a précisé la même source. Auditionnée, sa mère « ne dépose pas plainte », a-t-elle ajouté.

    9 Juillet : Norredine 28 ans, originaire du Soudan, est mort dans le centre ville

    de Calais. Son corps a été sorti du canal à proximité de la

    sous-préfecture. Comme souvent, la police a refusé catégoriquement à la

    famille et aux proches l’accès au corps, et de rechercher les causes de la

    mort.

    2013 :

    13 Février : Marseille : Yassin Aïbeche Souilah 19 ans a été touché de plusieurs balles d’un policier ( qui n’était pas en service et qui aurait été « ivre ».)

    Yacine est mort à l’hôpital des suites de ses blessures, le jeudi 14 février à 7h du matin. Le policier serait en détention provisoire sous le chef d’inculpation d’homicide volontaire.

    28 Mars : Montigny-en-Gohelle ( 62) : Lahoucine Ait Omghar 26 ans tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans la poitrine.

    Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille a porté plainte.

    Novembre : Orléans : Loic Louise 21 ans est mort après avoir reçu une décharge de taser.

    Ouverte par le parquet d’Orléans, l’enquête est désormais terminée. Selon l’avocat de la famille Louise la mort du jeune homme résulte d’une utilisation prolongée du Taser. Le procureur souhaite rencontrer la famille pour donner les conclusions.

    2014 :

    1er Avril : Marseille : Morad , 16 ans defenestré par la police à Marseille

    29 juillet : Montgeron( 91 ) : Dorel Iosif Floare a été tué par un policier d’une balle dans le thorax.

    21 août : Abdelhak Gorafia, 51 ans est mort dans des conditions troubles lors de son transfert par la police française vers l’aéroport de Roissy Charles De Gaulle, en exécution d’un arrêté ministériel d’expulsion.

    « Il n’est pas mort naturellement mais s’est étouffé devant les policiers ou sous l’effet de leurs contraintes. Ce qui suppose des convulsions et une mort atroce. Comment peut-on ne pas porter secours à quelqu’un qui s’asphyxie ? »

    26 Août : Colmar : Houcine Bouras 23 ans, a été tué par un gendarme alors qu’il était menotté et dans un véhicule de police.

    « Violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner ». C’est sous ce chef d’inculpation que le procureur de la République de Colmar Bernard Lebeau a qualifié la responsabilité du gendarme. Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille réclame vérité et justice.

    5 Septembre : Paris : un homme de 34 ans est mort après que les policiers ait utilisé leur pistolet à impulsion électrique. ( pas de nom connu )

    17 Octobre : Toulouse : Timothée Lake 20 ans est abattu d’une balle dans le cœur par un policier de la BAC.

    La police plaide la légitime défense (…) mais l’enquête est loin d’être terminée.

    2 novembre : Tarn ( ZAD du testet ) : Rémy Fraisse, 21 ans mort après avoir reçu une grenade de la gendarmerie.

    16 Décembre 2014 : ( le havre ) Abdoulaye Camara, 30 ans, meurt après avoir été touché par plusieurs balles de deux policiers havrais.

    20 decembre : Bertrand Nzohabonayo tué par plusieurs policiers à Joué les tours. Les circonstances de sa mort ne sont pas claire. Différentes versions s’oppose. La famille a porté plainte et lance un appel à témoins parce que « L’enquête menée par le parquet de Tours s’est cantonnée à prendre la version et les dépositions des policiers impliqués dans les évènements », a dénoncé l’avocat en appelant à la désignation rapide d’un juge d’instruction indépendant.

    ( *source : http://www.ledauphine.com/france-monde/2015/01/07/joue-les-tours-la-famille-de-bertrand-nzohabonayo-lance-un-appel-a-temoi )

    A lire : http://larotative.info/mort-de-bilal-nzohabonayo-a-joue-749.html

    2015 :

    15 Février : Un jeune garçon de 14 ans, qui se trouvait au volant d’une voiture, s’est tué dimanche matin à Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme) en tentant d’échapper à un contrôle de police.

    6 Mars : Un homme d’une trentaine d’année, Amadou Koumé meurt dans des circonstances suspectes au commissariat du 10eme arr. de Paris : “ Amadou Koumé était un père de famille de 33 ans, Saint-Quentinois (Aisne), d’origine sénégalaise. Il est décédé dans la nuit du 5 au 6 mars, dans le commissariat du 10e arrondissement de Paris. Sa soeur explique qu’il s’était installé à Paris en janvier, pour trouver du travail en tant qu’intérimaire.

    Les circonstances du drame sont encore floues. Une source policière indique qu’Amadou Koumé était « assez agité » et « sous l’emprise de l’alcool » au moment de l’arrestation. Il se serait rebellé et, pour le menotter, la police aurait appliquer une technique de strangulation.”

    « On ne sait pas comment il est mort », s’indigne la grande sœur d’Amadou Koumé, jointe par Francetv info. Nos confrères ajoutent : « Lorsqu’ils se sont rendus à l’Institut médico-légal, plusieurs membres de la famille du jeune homme se sont aperçus qu’il présentait une plaie au visage. Les parents d’Amadou ont été reçus trois jours après le drame dans les locaux de l’IGPN. Ils ont chargé leur avocat de déposer une plainte contre X pour violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner et abstention de porter assistance à une personne en péril. »

    Source : http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/picardie/2015/04/21/police-mort-du-saint-quentinois-amadou-koume-dans-un-co

    22 Avril : » Karim, 26 ans, a été fauché par un train, au Havre (Seine-Maritime), en début de soirée, mercredi 22 avril 2015, alors qu’il fuyait un contrôle d’identité. Karim ne voulait pas retourner en prison. Il a pris la fuite, suivi par les policiers. »

    ( source : http://www.normandie-actu.fr/mort-en-fuyant-la-police-au-havre-une-marche-blanche-pour-karim-26-an )

    28 Avril 2015 : Pierre Cayet, 54 ans meurt après avoir été violenté au commissariat de seine st denis ( 93).

    ( à lire : http://www.leparisien.fr/saint-denis-93200/saint-denis-enquete-apres-la-chute-mortelle-au-commissariat-28-04-2015-47 )

    - Medhi Bouhouta tué de 4 Balles dans la tête par un agent de la la bac à lyon le 3 septembre 2015 http://rebellyon.info/Mehdi-Bouhouta-28-ans-assassine-par-la

    Qui sera le prochain ?

    http://www.urgence-notre-police-assassine.fr/123663553

    #liste #datasource #assassinats #violences_policières #décès #morts #statistiques #France #police #recensement

    –-> Ces listes ont déjà été signalées à plusieurs reprises sur seenthis, mais je voulais la remettre avec « mes tags » pour partage avec des étudiant·es.

  • A quoi sert la gréve ?
    [part1] A faire un boulot de dingue que nos « patrons » ne nous demandent pas ;) Voir par exemple la base de données caféïnée par Maxime Reynié : MAINTIEN DE L’ORDRE

    Doctrine | Grenades | Lanceurs | Effectifs
    Tout comprendre sur le maintien de l’ordre
    http://maintiendelordre.fr

    Ce site a pour objectif d’apporter le plus d’informations possible sur le maintien de l’ordre français pour que tout le monde puisse s’y documenter et le comprendre facilement. Il sera régulièrement mis à jour pour apporter les dernières informations et modifications sur les éléments du maintien de l’ordre.

    Précisions de @Maxime_Reynie sur twitter :

    Ce n’est pas entièrement fini, il doit rester plusieurs coquilles me connaissant mais voilà, c’est un début ❤️
    On va dire que c’est une béta.
    Je compte aussi rajouter l’armement des polices municipales avec les lanceurs 44mm. Comment s’organise le maintien de l’ordre à Paris avec toutes les unités qu’on y retrouve. etc etc etc etc
    Pour ce qui est des coquilles je vous invite à me DM si vous en trouvez. <3 [ou mail sur le site, note]
    Dernière chose. Le site est lent, même très lent. J’ai pris l’hébergement le moins cher par défauts donc ça risque de ramer si vous êtes plus de 2.
    Pour le COUGAR, un équivalent plus petit existe me rappelle @akraland, ça sera corrigé asap
    /.../ Pour « sources et documents » c’est pas complet encore, je dois m’y retrouver dans les 9798678 pdf que j’ai stocké /.../

    https://twitter.com/Maxime_Reynie/status/1216355277416620037

    Bon par contre, contrairement à ce qu’il dit sur twitter, ça n’est pas un wikipedia, sa mise à jour dépend donc uniquement de lui et sa disponibilité !
    Un gros boulot donc qui vient esthétiquement compléter celui du collectif Desarmons-les https://desarmons.net qui est sans surprise sa première source ! Desarmons-les qui lance une initiative essentielle : une collecte transparente pour les mutilé-e-s : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/13/collecte-de-desarmons-les-pour-les-blesse-es-par-des-armes-de-police (je vais faire un billet à part pour plus de visibilité)

    #maintien_de_l'ordre #armes #armes_non_letales #armement #police #CRS #repression #violences_policieres #flashball #LBD #grenades #lacrymo #Maxime_Reynié

  • Base de données sur le rôle de la France
    dans le génocide des Tutsi

    http://francegenocidetutsi.org/index.html.fr

    But de cette base de données


    FgtDb comme France Genocide Tutsi Database est une base de données relative au rôle de la France dans le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

    Le génocide des Tutsi a été exécuté par des Rwandais. Mais nous formulons les hypothèses :

    1) Le génocide n’aurait pas eu lieu si la France n’était pas intervenue militairement au Rwanda, si elle n’avait pas fourni des armes et entraîné l’armée gouvernementale rwandaise, et si elle n’avait pas soutenu les politiciens et militaires rwandais qui depuis 1990 voulaient éliminer les Tutsi.

    2) Le coup d’État des 6-8 avril 1994, qui a coûté la vie au président Habyarimana, au Premier ministre Agathe Uwilingiyimana et à d’autres ministres et personnalités politiques n’aurait pu réussir qu’avec le soutien de la France par son ambassadeur à Kigali et sa représentation au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

    3) À tout moment du 7 avril au 18 juillet, la France aurait pu commander à ses alliés de cesser les massacres.

    Partis d’une démarche de citoyens français responsables, nous nous efforçons de tester ces hypothèses de manière aussi scientifique que possible en rassemblant des documents. Nous n’excluons pas a priori des documents qui vont à l’encontre de nos hypothèses, pourvu qu’ils rapportent des faits vérifiables.

    Sur ce site web http://francegenocidetutsi.org plus de 9.000 documents sont accessibles, triés par date, auteur, journal ou source. Un moteur de recherche permettant d’interroger suivant plusieurs critères et d’accéder à la fiche descriptive des documents est accessible ici
    Historique

    Ces documents ont été réunis depuis 2001 pour la rédaction du livre La France au coeur du génocide des Tutsi, publié en 2010 en quelques 300 exemplaires, épuisé depuis, mais restant déchargeable à l’adresse : http://francegenocidetutsi.org/FranceCoeurGenocideTutsi-IP.pdf

    L’idée initiale était de donner au lecteur du livre en format pdf de Adobe l’accès à une copie du document original en utilisant les pointeurs hypertextes pris en compte par Acrobat reader ou les logiciels équivalents.

    De là est née la conception d’une fiche descriptive des documents et la préoccupation de les étudier pour eux-mêmes dans un souci d’objectivité.

    Depuis de nouveaux documents ont été trouvés qui débordent maintenant de beaucoup la portée de ce livre. Le besoin de les publier comme preuve s’en est fait sentir.

    Cette base de données, commencée début 2013, existe sur un ordinateur. Elle répertorie environ 24.000 documents, 4.000 auteurs provenant de 700 journaux ou sources et d’une centaine de fonds d’archives.

    Il reste à faire une publication systématique des documents sur le web, ce qui est une exigence de chercheur mais qui est encore largement à faire. Les collaborations sont souhaitées.

    Avant avril 2016, ce site web était à l’adresse http://www.francerwandagenocide.org/documents

  • Innovations sociales en montagne

    Vous êtes sur la plateforme de l’innovation sociale en montagne.

    Vivre en montagne, c’est bien souvent vivre différemment. C’est s’attacher à des enjeux de climat, de relief, de mobilités, d’enclavement, de saisonnalité.
    Vivre en montagne, c’est faire face à des conditions qui peuvent aussi devenir des ressources spécifiques.
    Les territoires de montagne sont confrontés, peut-être plus fortement qu’ailleurs, à l’urgence de la transition écologique et sociétale.

    Les territoires de montagne sont autant de sociétés locales avec leurs aspirations et leurs besoins particuliers.
    La recherche d’une meilleure adaptation aux contraintes, d’une meilleure qualité de vie et d’une harmonie entre les populations et leur environnement nous conduisent à une quête d’innovations sociales.

    Ces innovations sociales renforcent la capacité à agir de tous les participants à la société locale, dans un souci de partenariat et d’intérêt général.

    Pour donner de la visibilité à ces projets qui donnent de l’espoir aux territoires de montagne, nous souhaitons, à travers cette plateforme, aider chacun à les connaître, à les comprendre et à les répercuter.

    Et une liste des #initiatives :
    https://ferme.yeswiki.net/InnovationsMontagne/?ListeInnov
    https://ferme.yeswiki.net/InnovationsMontagne/?PagePrincipale
    #innovation_sociale #innovations_sociales #montagne #plateforme #base_de_données #database #cartographie #visualisation

  • Bibliothèque numérique kurde

    The Kurdish Institute maintains the largest Kurdish Library in the Western World.

    This library contains over 10,000 monographs about the Kurds, in 25 languages, several tens of thousands of published documents, collections of reviews and newspapers, photographs, videos, post cards and posters, as well as audio archives and music recordings.

    This rich documentation fills over a third of the Institute’s premises as well as a substantial part of its warehouse, located in a Paris suburb. References to these monographs and the principal documents have been computerized.

    http://bnk.kurde.eu/?l=en
    #bibliothèque #database #base_de_données #catalogue #digitalisation #livres #Kurdes #Kurdistan #bibliothèque_numérique

    ping @isskein @reka
    via @wizo

  • World inequality database

    The World Inequality Database (WID.world) aims to provide open and convenient access to the most extensive available database on the historical evolution of the world distribution of income and wealth, both within countries and between countries.

    HISTORY OF WID.world

    During the past fifteen years, the renewed interest for the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality gave rise to a flourishing literature. In particular, a succession of studies has constructed top income share series for a large number of countries (see Thomas Piketty 2001, 2003, T. Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 2003, and the two multi-country volumes on top incomes edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and T. Piketty 2007, 2010; see also A. B. Atkinson et al. 2011 and Facundo Alvaredo et al. 2013 for surveys of this literature). These projects generated a large volume of data, intended as a research resource for further analysis, as well as a source to inform the public debate on income inequality. To a large extent, this literature follows the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets 1953, and A. B. Atkinson and Alan Harrison 1978, and extends it to many more countries and years.

    THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE (2011)

    The World Inequality Database was initially created as the The World Top Incomes Database (WTID) in January 2011 with the aim of providing convenient and free access to all the existing series. Thanks to the contribution of over a hundred researchers, the WTID expanded to include series on income inequality for more than thirty countries, spanning over most of the 20th and early 21st centuries, with over forty additional countries now under study.

    The key novelty has been to combine fiscal, survey and national accounts data in a systematic manner. This allowed us to compute longer and more reliable top income shares series than previous inequality databases (which generally rely on self-reported survey data, with large under-reporting problems at the top, and limited time span). These series had a large impact on the global inequality debate. In particular, by making it possible to compare over long periods of time and across countries the income shares captured by top income groups (e.g. the top 1%), they contributed to reveal new facts and refocus the discussion on rising inequality.

    In principle, all the top income share series respond to the same general methods: following the pioneering work of S. Kuznets (1953), they use income tax data, national accounts, and Pareto interpolation techniques to estimate the share of total income going to top income groups (typically the top decile and the top percentile). However, despite researchers’ best efforts, the units of observation, the income concepts, and also the Pareto interpolation techniques were never made fully homogeneous over time and across countries. Moreover, for the most part attention has been restricted to the top decile, rather than the entire distribution of income and wealth. These elements pointed to the need for a methodological re-examination and clarification.

    FROM THE WTID TO THE WID (2015)

    In December 2015, the WTID was subsumed into the WID, The World Wealth and Income Database. In addition to the WTID top income shares series, this first version of WID included an extended version of the historical database on the long-run evolution of aggregate wealth-income ratios and the changing structure of national wealth and national income first developed by T. Piketty and G. Zucman 2013, 2014 (see also T. Piketty, 2014, for an attempt to propose an interpretative historical synthesis on the basis of this new material and of the top income shares series). We changed the name of the database from WTID to WID in order to express the extension in scope and ambition of the database, as well as the new emphasis on both wealth and income.

    At the same time, over the last years the distribution of personal wealth has been receiving increasing attention after having been neglected for decades. The work on top income shares was recently extended to study the long run evolution of top wealth shares (see E. Saez and G. Zucman 2016, F. Alvaredo, A. Atkinson and S. Morelli 2017, and B. Garbinti, J. Goupille and T. Piketty 2016).

    FROM INCOME INEQUALITY TO WEALTH INEQUALITY

    One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital. Income from interest, from dividends, and from rents represents a minority of total personal income, but it is nonetheless significant, especially at the top of the distribution. The ratio of total personal wealth to total personal income has been rising. One consequence is that the role of inherited wealth – which declined for much of the twentieth century – has, in a number of countries, begun to acquire greater significance. In addition, there is extensive evidence – e.g. from billionaire rankings – suggesting that top global wealth holders have grown much faster than average and have therefore benefited from a substantial increase in their share.

    In order to produce reliable estimates of wealth inequality, it is becoming increasingly critical to combine different sources in a consistent manner, including income tax data (using the capitalization method) and inheritance tax data (using the mortality multiplier method), following the pioneering work of A. B. Atkinson and A. Harrison (1978). One also needs to introduce new sources such as global billionaire rankings, and to address novel issues such as cross-border assets and offshore wealth (G. Zucman, 2013, 2014). More generally, it is becoming more and more critical to measure the inequality of income and wealth from a global perspective, and not simply at the country level.

    THE WORLD INEQUALITY DATABASE (WID.WORLD) : A NEW WEBSITE, A NEW AMBITION (2017)

    In January 2017, with the objective of reaching yet a wider audience of researchers and general public, we released the first version of the more user-friendly website, WID.world, hosting the World Inequality Database.

    These changes come along with a new ambition. Thanks to the continuous cooperation of the WID.world Fellows, we pursue our efforts to expand the database into three major directions.

    First, we keep expanding the time coverage and the geographical coverage of the database, in particular to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. We also keep updating the database with new observations, as official bodies release the necessary information each year. Additionally, we will progressively include inequality series at the sub-national level whenever possible (series of top income shares for each state in the United States are already available, as well as for urban and rural China).

    Next, we plan to provide more series on wealth-income ratios and the distribution of wealth, and not only on income. Third, we aim to offer series on the entire distribution of income and wealth, from the bottom to the top, and not only for top shares.

    The overall long-run objective is to be able to produce Distributional National Accounts (DINA), that is, to provide annual estimates of the distribution of income and wealth using concepts of income and wealth that are consistent with the macroeconomic national accounts. This also includes the production of synthetic income and wealth micro-files, which will also be made available online.

    A LONG-TERM, CUMULATIVE, COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROCESS

    We should stress at the onset that our methods and series are and will always be imperfect, and subject to revision. We attempt to combine the different data sources available (in particular fiscal data, survey data and national accounts) in a more systematic way than what was done to date, but more progress is yet to come. We provide a detailed and explicit description of our methodology and sources, so that other users can contribute to their improvement. Our series and methods should be viewed from the perspective of a long-term, cumulative, collaborative research process.

    In this spirit, we also provide a new set of research tools for scholars, journalists, or any interested user in the production of their own inequality datasets. Our programs allow for the estimation of income and wealth distributions based on raw tabulated data, such as those provided by statisical agencies and tax administrations. They can also be used to combine distributions from different countries and produce representative synthetic files. The programs are based on generalized, non-parametric Pareto interpolation techniques. They can be run directly from our website with no prior technical knowledge. Users can also download and install our open-access R-language codes on their computers.


    https://wid.world
    #inégalités #données #base_de_données #statistiques #chiffres #monde #cartographie #visualisation
    signalé par @mobileborders

    #rapport 2018 :
    https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf
    ping @simplicissimus @reka @fil

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

  • A Calais, la frontière tue ! In Calais, the border kills !


    http://timeglider.com/timeline/65ecd96fa599a9c6

    –-----
    Deaths at the Calais Border

    Uncountable lives are wasted and suffer at the hands of the Calais border regime. There is no accurate count of how many people have died. This is a list of people known in Calais or from news reports.

    For sure there will have been more, their deaths ignored, the facts covered up or altogether unreported. Many already go unnamed, without vigils and protests, without families or friends to advocate on their behalf.

    But we will never let these deaths be silenced. We will not forgive and we will never forget.

    These borders kill! One death is too many!

    https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/deaths-at-the-calais-border

    #morts #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #Calais #France #frontières #Angleterre #UK #migrations #asile #réfugiés #base_de_données #database #liste #timeline #ligne_du_temps #mourir_dans_la_forteresse_Europe #visualisation #infographie #frise #frise_chronologique #time-line

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4

    • Un article de février 2018

      The deadly roads into Calais

      Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
      The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.

      He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.

      But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.

      Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.

      Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.

      The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.

      Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.

      The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”

      During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.

      The victims are often young men’

      For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.

      For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.

      Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.

      Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”

      Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”

      Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.

      “The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.

      Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”

      Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.

      Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”

      Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”

      Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”

      ’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’

      While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.

      During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”

      Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.

      A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”

      Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/190218/deadly-roads-calais

      –----

      En français :
      A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants
      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180218/calais-les-routes-de-la-mort-pour-les-migrants?page_article=1%20

    • Voir Calais et mourir

      Si, depuis quelques années, militants et chercheurs commencent à compter les morts sur les routes migratoires, ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’arc méditerranéen, négligeant la frontière franco-britannique que l’on pourrait qualifier de nasse calaisienne. Accords européens, traités bilatéraux et leurs corollaires sécuritaires font en effet de cette frontière un mur meurtrier. Et les migrants n’ont d’autre choix que de prendre toujours plus de risques pour le franchir… au péril de leur vie.

      Nawall Al Jende avait 26 ans. Elle était originaire de Nawa, une ville située à une trentaine de kilomètres de Deraa, dans le sud de la Syrie. Elle avait fui la guerre et laissé derrière elle son époux et deux de ses enfants. Avec son troisième enfant, Mohamed, âgé de 9 ans, et le frère de son mari, Oussama, son périple l’avait amenée à traverser neuf pays avant d’atteindre Calais. Sa sœur, Sawson, avait réalisé un parcours quasi similaire deux mois plus tôt et l’attendait de l’autre côté de la Manche. Nawall est décédée le 15 octobre 2015, après avoir été percutée par un taxi sur l’autoroute A16, alors qu’elle tentait de se glisser dans un camion afin de franchir la frontière franco-britannique. Comme sur les autres routes de l’exil, des personnes migrantes meurent à Calais et dans sa région. Depuis 1999, on estime qu’au moins 170 personnes sont décédées en tentant de franchir cet espace frontalier reliant la France à l’Angleterre.

      Pourquoi prêter attention aux personnes mortes en migration à la frontière franco-britannique ? Il n’existe pas de données officielles à ce sujet. Par conséquent, participer au travail de collecte d’informations contribue à documenter l’histoire du fait migratoire dans la région. En l’espace de quelques années, la question des exilés morts aux frontières s’est imposée dans le débat public. Elle a été d’abord portée, par des acteurs militants, à l’image des travaux réalisés par United for Intercultural Action, Fortress Europe ou encore Watch the Med. Puis, des journalistes se sont intéressés au sujet (The Migrants Files), ainsi que des chercheurs (Deaths at the Borders Database). Aujourd’hui, une institution officielle telle que l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) commence à recenser les personnes mortes en migration. Toutefois, dans ces différents relevés, la situation à la frontière franco-britannique est peu prise en compte, le focus étant davantage dirigé sur la mortalité aux portes de l’Europe, dans l’arc qui va des Iles Canaries à la mer Égée, en passant par le détroit de Gibraltar et le canal de Sicile. Par conséquent, travailler à la collecte d’informations sur les personnes mortes à Calais et dans la région répond à un réel besoin et rend visible une réalité méconnue.
      Redonner un nom aux morts

      Ce travail d’enquête ne veut pas s’en tenir au traitement simplement comptable ou anecdotique de la question des morts en migration. Il cherche, quand cela est possible, à redonner une identité et une histoire à ces « corps sans nom » ou à ces « noms sans histoire ». Tenter de reconstituer des récits de vie, (re)donner une dimension personnelle à chaque décès est un moyen d’éviter leur dilution dans ce qu’on nomme communément, de façon globalisante, les « drames de la migration ». Il s’agit également de rompre avec l’idée que cette hécatombe résulterait de la fatalité. Réduire ces tragédies à des accidents (accident de la route, noyade, etc.), à des violences ou des règlements de compte entre migrants est une façon d’occulter la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics dans une situation qui dure depuis plus de vingt ans dans le nord de la France. Au contraire, c’est bien l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique qui a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier. De même, considérer que les seules violences exercées à l’encontre des exilés sont dues aux « réseaux de passeurs » est une manière d’occulter celles qui sont liées aux conditions de vie et à l’absence de dispositifs d’accueil adaptés, au harcèlement policier et à la surenchère de dispositifs de surveillance de la frontière.

      On constate en effet que la majorité des décès sont liés aux tentatives de passage, qu’ils soient immédiats ou qu’ils surviennent des suites de blessures que ces tentatives occasionnent. Le long de la frontière franco-britannique, les exilés meurent principalement après avoir été percutés par un train sur le site d’Eurotunnel, renversés par un véhicule – parfois volontairement – sur un axe routier non loin d’un point de passage ou écrasés sous l’essieu d’un poids lourd. Et finalement, les « règlements de compte » ou les violences « inter ou intra-communautaires » se concluant par des morts restent des événements marginaux.

      La majeure partie des exilés tentent de passer la frontière cachés dans la remorque d’un camion ou en dessous. Cette méthode s’avère extrêmement dangereuse et les risques de mourir écrasé par le contenu de la marchandise, par suffocation ou en tombant du camion (en particulier une fois arrivé sur le territoire britannique) sont importants. On pense notamment aux 58 personnes migrantes de nationalité chinoise cachées dans un camion frigorifique et découvertes mortes par asphyxie à Douvres en juin 2000. Un événement qui fait terriblement écho à la tragédie survenue 15 ans plus tard en Autriche, quand 71 exilés syriens cachés dans un camion furent abandonnés sur le bord d’une autoroute par le conducteur et décédèrent par suffocation.

      Même si le phénomène reste minoritaire, on recense plusieurs cas de noyades. Si quelques-unes se sont produites à la suite de rixes ou afin d’échapper à des violences policières, la plupart sont survenues pendant des tentatives de franchissement de la frontière. On observe ainsi plusieurs cas désespérés, et finalement mortels, survenus lors de la traversée du détroit du Pas-de-Calais, par embarcation ou à la nage. Le 12 juin 2002, un exilé russe parti en canoë s’est noyé dans la Manche. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé et le camarade qui l’accompagnait est resté accroché pendant cinq heures à l’embarcation à la dérive avant d’être secouru. Le précieux travail d’investigation du journaliste norvégien Anders Fjellberg [1] a permis de retracer le parcours de deux exilés syriens, Mouaz Al Balkhi et Shadi Omar Kataf. Après plusieurs semaines passées entre les Jungles de Calais et de Grande-Synthe et une douzaine de tentatives de passage « classiques » ratées, les deux compatriotes optèrent pour une autre stratégie. Le 7 octobre 2014, ils se procurèrent une combinaison de plongée au magasin Décathlon de Calais. Leurs corps ont été retrouvés quelques semaines plus tard, l’un sur une plage de Norvège, l’autre sur une plage des Pays-Bas.
      Petits arrangements entre voisins

      Les modes de franchissement de la frontière évoluent en fonction de son niveau de sécurisation. Plus un point de passage est rendu inaccessible, plus il y a de prises de risque et plus ces tentatives impliquent le recours à un « tiers », le passeur. En septembre 2014, le ministre de l’intérieur français, Bernard Cazeneuve, signait avec son homologue britannique, Theresa May, un accord bilatéral « incluant une contribution britannique de 5 millions d’euros par an pendant trois ans » dont l’une des mesures principales visait à « renforcer la sécurité, à la fois autour du port et dans la zone portuaire [2] ». Cet accord visait à empêcher, d’une part, les tentatives d’intrusions collectives sur le site portuaire et, d’autre part, les incursions sur la rocade accédant au port, technique consistant à profiter des embouteillages pour se cacher dans la remorque d’un camion La mise en œuvre du versant « sécurisation » de cet accord a été confiée à l’entreprise Zaun, une firme britannique [3], et s’est déroulée en plusieurs étapes. Dans un premier temps, à partir d’octobre 2014, les barrières ont été doublées à l’intérieur du site portuaire. Puis, au printemps 2015, sur une distance de deux kilomètres le long de la rocade accédant à la zone portuaire, a été érigée une double clôture, l’une de 4 mètres de haut et l’autre d’un peu moins de 3 mètres, équipée d’une rampe d’accès incurvée pour éviter qu’on ne s’y s’agrippe, et surmontée d’un fil barbelé. Entre les deux clôtures, un espace de détection infrarouge a été installé. La mise en place de cet arsenal autour de la zone portuaire a obligé les exilés à se détourner du port pour trouver d’autres voies de passage, plus dangereuses, notamment celle du tunnel sous la Manche. Les conséquences ne se sont pas fait attendre : alors qu’aucun des 17 décès recensés en 2014 n’avait eu lieu sur le site d’Eurotunnel, on en comptait 15 sur les 25 enregistrés en 2015. Il serait difficile d’en conclure que plus on boucle la frontière franco-britannique, plus celle-ci devient meurtrière. En effet, l’augmentation significative du nombre de morts entre 2014 et 2015 s’explique aussi par celle du nombre d’exilés présents dans le Calaisis. Les militants locaux estiment qu’il a crû, en un an, de 1 500 à environ 5 000 personnes. Il est en revanche certain qu’à la multiplication des barrières et des dispositifs dissuasifs, se sont ajoutées les désastreuses conditions de vie des exilés, obligés de survivre dans une extrême précarité et dans un contexte de surpopulation croissante, tout en tentant d’échapper aux violences policières : un cocktail explosif qui les a poussés plus nombreux à prendre des risques pour espérer passer. En août 2015, un nouvel accord franco-britannique fut signé dans lequel les deux ministres reconnaissaient que « depuis la fin du mois de juin, en raison de la sécurisation du port, les migrants ont changé de stratégie, cherchant au péril de leur vie, à s’introduire au niveau des points d’entrée dans le tunnel sous la Manche ». Mais qu’imaginent-ils pour remédier à ce constat inquiétant ? Que « la France renforce l’actuel dispositif de sécurité et l’action de ses policiers et de ses gendarmes, grâce au déploiement d’unités mobiles additionnelles » et que le Royaume-Uni alloue des moyens supplémentaires pour « sécuriser le périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, grâce à un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux » tout en « [aidant] la société Eurotunnel à augmenter nettement ses effectifs en charge de la sécurité et de la protection du site [4] ». Ce qui s’est traduit par l’installation de 29 kilomètres de nouvelles barrières et le « renforcement » de 10 kilomètres déjà existants. Le paysage du site d’Eurotunnel a été radicalement bouleversé : 100 hectares ont été rasés afin de faciliter la surveillance et une partie de cette zone a été volontairement inondée « pour créer des obstacles naturels qui empêchent l’accès aux clôtures » [5].
      Fortification

      Cette séquence n’est finalement qu’une étape supplémentaire dans la longue histoire de la fortification de la frontière franco-britannique. Elle a commencé avec le code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code ISPS) régissant les zones portuaires fournissant des services internationaux et s’est prolongée, depuis le début des années 1990, par une succession d’accords bilatéraux. Alors que le protocole de Sangatte (1991) avait initié la mise en place de contrôles juxtaposés français et britanniques des deux côtés de la frontière, son protocole additionnel (2000) les a étendus aux principales gares du nord de la France et du sud de l’Angleterre.

      Au tournant des années 2000, la fortification de la frontière prend une autre dimension. Du côté du site portuaire, « en 2000, un premier programme de 6 millions d’euros est engagé pour clôturer une partie du port, installer un réseau de vidéo surveillance ainsi qu’un bâtiment spécifique au département sûreté ». Jusqu’alors, la zone portuaire n’était que très sommairement clôturée. « À partir de 2005, un deuxième programme d’investissement de 7 millions d’euros est engagé […] [permettant] de finaliser l’année suivante, un réseau de 48 caméras fixes et mobiles de vidéo surveillance [6]. » De son côté, Eurotunnel renforce la surveillance de son site à partir du printemps 2001 et bénéficie, en février 2002, du prêt d’un radar PMMW (système à détection thermique) de l’armée britannique. Tandis que la signature du traité du Touquet (2003) étend les dispositions relatives aux contrôles juxtaposés à tous les ports de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, « l’arrangement » franco-britannique de 2009 accentue le recours aux dispositifs de détection et crée un centre de coordination conjoint « chargé de recueillir et partager toutes les informations nécessaires au contrôle des biens et de personnes circulant entre la France et le Royaume-Uni » [7]. Les accords franco-britanniques de 2014 et 2015 sont venus compléter cet empilement de textes.

      Retracer de manière précise et tenter de cartographier l’évolution des dispositifs mis en place autour de la frontière franco-britannique n’est pas chose aisée. En effet, l’accès à l’information est relativement restreint, du fait notamment de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués (services de l’État, gestionnaires des sites portuaires et du tunnel, prestataires de sécurité privés, etc.) et du manque de transparence qui en résulte. Dans ses déclarations, le porte-parole d’Eurotunnel indique que « depuis l’apparition des clandestins [sic] dans le Calaisis, Eurotunnel a, au-delà de ses obligations contractuelles, investi massivement dans les moyens physiques (clôtures, éclairages, caméras, barrières infrarouges) et humains de protection du terminal de Coquelles : plus de 160 millions d’euros, dont 13 millions d’euros au premier semestre 2015 » [8]. Difficile d’évaluer finement ce que coûte cette surenchère. Cette question fait l’objet d’une bataille de communication, notamment entre l’État et Eurotunnel, le premier reprochant au second de ne pas en faire assez en matière de sûreté tandis que le second réclame toujours plus d’aides pour protéger le site. L’affaire, connue sous le nom de « contentieux de Sangatte », s’est d’ailleurs conclue devant les tribunaux en 2003 par une victoire d’Eurotunnel qui a obtenu de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne une indemnisation pour les investissements qu’il avait consentis à cet effet [9].

      Du coût humain, il n’en est bien entendu pas question. Aux morts recensées s’ajoutent celles qui n’ont pu l’être. Par manque de sources, car « il y a suffisamment à faire avec les vivants [10] » ou par oubli tout simplement. Et puis il y a les personnes blessées, « des jeunes aux mains et aux jambes lacérées par les barbelés qui entourent le site d’Eurotunnel […] ces clôtures [qui] déchiquettent la peau de manière anarchique [11] ». Mutilées ou accidentées, ces personnes n’entrent dans aucun décompte. Le 21 octobre 2001, dans La Voix du Nord, la journaliste Sophie Leroy titrait son article « Assez de mort aux frontières » [12] en reprenant l’un des slogans de la manifestation organisée à Calais par le collectif C’Sur [13] pour dénoncer cette frontière meurtrière. Quinze années plus tard, la liste des morts n’a cessé de s’allonger.

      https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article5426

  • #DHS to store tens of thousands of refugee biometric records from #UNHCR

    The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) began sharing records including fingerprints, iris scans, and facial biometrics of refugees it is recommending for resettlement consideration in the U.S. with the country’s Citizenship and Immigration Service (#USCIS), Nextgov reports.

    The UNHCR sends tens of thousands of profiles to federal agencies each year, according to the report, and the #Department_of_Homeland_Services (DHS) is retaining the data for all of them, including those who do not actually come to the U.S. The biometric data will be stored in the #IDENT_system, and #HART once it goes live.

    “Biometric verification guards against substitution of individuals or identity fraud in the resettlement process,” the USCIS privacy impact assessment for the program states. “Many refugees live for long periods in asylum countries, and the use of biometrics ensures that there is [an] unbroken continuity of identity over time and between different locations.”

    Nextgov notes that UNHCR stats show the USCIS reviewed close to 85,000 cases in 2018, and approved less than a quarter for admission to the U.S.

    “A centralized database of biometric data belonging to refugees, without appropriate controls, could really lead to surveillance of those refugees as well as potentially coercive forms of scrutiny,” Human Rights Watch Artificial Intelligence Researcher Amos Toh told Nextgov. “I think there needs to be a lot more clarity on … how this data is being shared and is being used.”

    Toh also referred to issues around consent for personal data-sharing in humanitarian contexts.

    https://www.biometricupdate.com/201908/dhs-to-store-tens-of-thousands-of-refugee-biometric-records-from-un
    #surveillance #données_biométriques #base_de_données #database #HCR #réfugiés #asile #migrations #biométrie #empreintes_digitales #biométrie_faciale #USA #Etats-Unis #réinstallation #humanitaire

    ping @etraces

    • Inside the HART of the DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management

      #OBIM says its efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security are robust and open.

      The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) operated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) was designed in 1994 and implemented in 1995. It was originally meant to perform a South-West border recidivist study, but has grown into the second largest biometric system in the world, next to Aadhaar, with 230 million unique identity records, plus access to millions more held by the FBI and Department of Defense, and 350,000 transactions on an average weekday.

      As the number of programs using IDENT has grown, the system’s roll and size have increased. As the importance of IDENT has grown, so have the warnings and criticism of the program. It is still not widely understood how it works, however, Patrick Nemeth, Director of OBIM’s Identity Operations Division told Biometric Update in an exclusive interview.

      “We don’t own the data, we’re the data stewards, and it was collected by somebody else who ultimately has the authority to change it or delete it,” Nemeth explains. While many government biometric databases around the world are not operated in this way, the arrangement is only the beginning of the complexity the system has evolved to accommodate.

      OBIM performs three basic functions, Nemeth says, with pretty much everything else done in service of them. It operates the automated matching system, which is IDENT, but will soon be the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART), performs manual examination and verification, and coordinates sharing with the owners of the data, which means setting rules for sharing data with agencies. Most government biometric data is centralized with OBIM to minimize duplication under the department’s privacy rule, and also to apply the maximum security and protection to sensitive information.

      As operators of the centralized biometric repository, OBIM takes on the responsibility of dealing with the security, privacy, and civil liberties implications of storing sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). It does so, in part, by applying Fair Information Practice principles to govern procedures for elements including transparency, accounting and auditing, and purpose specification.

      Other than specific databases run by law enforcement and the DoD, which it also coordinates sharing for, OBIM holds all of the U.S. government’s biometric data. It primarily serves DHS agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Citizenship and Immigration Services, as well as agencies like the Coast Guard for border entries. It performs a range of functions, including both verification and identification, and during periods when the system is less busy, such as overnight, it performs deduplication and checks latent prints found on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or in investigations of serious crimes by the FBI, according to Nemeth.

      This enormous expansion of both the system’s scale and mandate is why OBIM is now moving forward with the development of the new HART system. IDENT is becoming obsolete.

      “It’s been stretched and band-aided and added-to in every way that people can think of, but it just can’t go any further,” Nemeth says.

      HART will add a range of capabilities, including to use a fusion of fingerprint, iris, and facial recognition modalities to improve its matching accuracy. It will also expand the scale of the system, which is desperately needed.

      “At one point about five years ago they did a couple external studies and they told me that if we ever reached 300,000 transactions a day that we would see system slowness and if we ever reached 400,000 per day, we would see the blue screen of death,” Nemeth admits.

      IDENT currently process more than 400,000 transactions in a day on occasion, after remedial action was taken by OBIM to increase its capacity. It typically serves about 350,000 requests per weekday, and a little less on the weekend, returning yes or no answers for about 99.5 percent. Nemeth says he uses more than one thousand servers and other pieces of hardware to keep the system running with brute force. That is not an efficient way to operate, however, and the demand keeps increasing with each new biometric border trial, and any other program involving a use of government biometrics.

      Increasing capacity to meet the rapid growth in demand is the main motivation for the move to HART, which will be able to serve 720,000 daily fingerprint transactions when it goes live, and can be quickly scaled. It is being launched on AWS’ Government Cloud, but is designed to be cloud-agnostic. OBIM’s database is growing by about 20 million people per year, which is also accelerating, and as additional modalities become more valuable with the addition of fusion verification, its 3 million pairs of irises may also increase. The current database is twice as large as it was seven years ago, and Nemeth says the current projections are that it will double again in the next seven.

      Some future uses of HART are likely yet to be determined, but an example of the scale that may be needed can be understood by considering the possibility that all 3 million travelers per day who pass through U.S. airports may one day need to be biometrically verified.

      Tech systems from the nineties are also inherently not able to keep up with modern technology. The programming languages and architecture of IDENT are antiquated, and require an inefficient and frustrating process not just to add capabilities, but every time a statistic is requested for analytical purposes.

      “We have to figure out what our question is, send it to our contractors, they write the script, they run it, they send it back to us, and sometimes when we look at it, that wasn’t really the question, and you have to repeat the process,” Nemeth says.

      As the number of agencies and use cases for IDENT has grown, the number of questions from system users, like everything else, has increased. Switching to HART will increase the analytical capabilities and overall flexibility of the system, which is particularly important when considering some of the privacy and security issues related to operating the world’s second largest biometric matching system. IDENT currently uses a multi-layered filtering system to return only the specific information the requesting customer is entitled to.

      “What’s unique about IDENT is because of the wide breadth of Homeland Security missions — law enforcement, information, credentialing, national security – it has kind of a complicated filtering process that we call Data Access and Security Controls,” Nemeth says. “You only get to see what your agency is permitted by law to see, and what the owner of the data has said that you can see. It’s a rather complex dance we do to make sure that we respect the privacy, the reason the information was collected, the legal protections for certain protected classes, all of those things. When we provide you the information, if you’re not allowed to see it, you don’t even know that information exists.”

      Three layers of filters screen what accounts can see data for a subject, what information they are allowed to see and what should be redacted (such as criminal history, in some cases), and an activity filter, which is attached to information by the agency that submitted it. OBIM also addresses the rights of data subjects with an extensive process of consultations and privacy impact assessments for new operations.

      “Every time somebody comes up with a new mission area, or a new application of biometrics, before we can implement that, our own privacy people need to go through it and write a privacy threat assessment,” Nemeth says. “Then, potentially, if its significant enough, they have to amend the privacy impact. Then it goes to our higher headquarters at the National Protection and Programs Directorate where they have to agree, and then finally it goes to the Department’s Privacy Office, where they have to agree that its within the scope of what we’re allowed to do.”

      Some alternately goes through inter-agency Data Access Request Committee for approval, but every new capability desired by a client agency is put in place only after it has gone through many steps and assessments, providing answers about why it is needed and how it should be delivered.

      “There are a lot of constraints on us, which is good, because lots of energetic people come up with lots of ideas and sometimes we just need to slow down a little bit and make sure that we’re properly using that information and protecting it.”

      Not only are OBIM’s efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security robust, according to Nemeth, they are also open. HART will increase the privacy protection the department can provide, he says, for instance by increasing the number and functionality of filtering layers OBIM can apply to data. The combination of privacy protections which are concerted and improving along with willingness to talk about those protections makes Nemeth frustrated with allegations among some media and public advocacy groups that HART represents a surveillance overreach on the part of the government.

      “We’re not going to tell you how to break into our system, but we’ll tell you quite a bit about it,” Nemeth says. “The privacy impact assessments and the privacy threshold analysis are available on the DHS privacy web page, along with our system of record.”

      The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) warns that HART will include data collected from innocent people and questionable sources, and argues that it will provide the means for suppression of American’s rights and freedoms. Nemeth says he sympathizes with concerns over the possible erosion of privacy in digital society, and the desire to protect it. He contends that the EFF is not considering the years and painstaking processes that OBIM puts into balancing the rights of individuals to not have their data shared unnecessarily with the mandates of client agencies. He points to the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Council as an example of the intensive oversight and review that checks the potential for misuse of biometric data.

      “The arguments that the EFF is making they’ve made several times during the fifteen-year history of IDENT, whenever there’s a new issue of the authorizing SORN and PIA, so it’s not new,” Nemeth counters. “They’ve added the facial piece to it. Essentially, they are arguing that we will violate the law.”

      The scrutiny will likely intensify, with public awareness of biometric entry/exit growing as the program rolls out. In the meantime, the number of transactions served by HART will be increasing, and OBIM will be evaluating new procedures using its new biometric capabilities. The privacy impact assessments and other checks will continue, and OBIM will continue the work of helping U.S. government agencies identify people. Nemeth stresses that that work is critically important, even as it requires the kind of extensive evaluation and scrutiny it invites.

      “We don’t retain our highly talented staff because we pay them well,” he confesses. “We retain them because they love what they’re doing and they’re making a difference for the security of the country.”

      https://www.biometricupdate.com/201809/inside-the-hart-of-the-dhs-office-of-biometric-identity-management
      #identité_biométrique

  • #Panorama

    The PANORAMA of GREEK CENSUS DATA is an internet based application designed to take full advantage of the vast quantity of information contained in the last three censuses (1991-2001-2011) by giving the user the opportunity to:
    – effectively manage all variables contained in the census,
    – retrieve data for further statistical analysis in easily usable form
    – map census variables at multiple geographical levels.

    https://panorama.statistics.gr/en
    #database #base_de_données #statistiques #Grèce #recensement #chiffres

    ping @simplicissimus @fil @reka

  • Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera (#Emif)
    La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (Emif Norte), aporta elementos de análisis basados en información directa y confiable sobre la dinámica, la magnitud y características de los flujos migratorios de trabajadores mexicanos hacia Estados Unidos.

    La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Sur de México (Emif Sur), aporta elementos para medir y caracterizar flujos migratorios provenientes de Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador, que se desplazan a territorio mexicano y/o estadounidense, con el propósito de laborar en estos países.
    https://colef.mx/emif

    Le site en anglais:

    Background of the surveys

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Northern Border (EMIF Norte) began in 1993 as a collaboration project between El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the National Population Council, and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, to measure the size and characteristics of the flows of migrant workers between Mexico and the United States.

    Later, the survey became a fundamental statistical observatory for the study of Mexican migration and the most important conceptual and methodological precedent for another similar survey on the Mexican-Guatemalan border, The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Southern Border (EMIF Sur) carried out since 2004.

    Both surveys are managed by the following institutions: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the Secretariat of Government, the National Population Council, the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, Migration Policy Bureau of Secretariat of Government, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, and the National Council to Prevent Discrimination. And in 2015 the Secretariat of Social Development joined the project.
    General Objectives

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Northern Border: Increase understanding of the phenomena of labor migration flows at Mexico’s northern border with the United States, highlighting its characteristics, volume, and trends, and its effects on the labor market and its impact on both neighboring societies.

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Southern Border: Increase understanding of the flows of migrants who cross between Mexico and Guatemala in order to work in Mexico or the United States, along with the undocumented migrants that cross Mexican territory and are returned to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador by Mexican and U.S. immigration officials. Also, quantify the volume of migration flows and discover its main economic, social and demographic makeup, as well as the conditions and labor characteristics of the people who migrate.


    https://colef.mx/emif/eng/index.php

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #données #base_de_données #statistiques #chiffres #Mexique #USA #Etats-Unis

  • #Chansons contre la #guerre

    Chansons contre la guerre (#CCG) est un #recueil collectif de #paroles de chansons pacifistes et antimilitaristes de tous les temps et du monde entier, sous forme de #base_de_données. Les lecteurs et les collaborateurs peuvent donc contribuer librement à sa formation, à sa gestion et à son amélioration constante.

    https://www.antiwarsongs.org
    #paix #pacifisme #musique_et_politique
    ping @sinehebdo

    Signalé par @odilon, que je remercie, qui a partagé le texte de cette chanson italienne :
    Il singolare Maggio di #Tressa
    https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?lang=fr&id=59186
    #De_Soda_Sisters

    A écouté ici :
    https://twitter.com/m_causse/status/1112460766773473281

  • Big Deal Cancellation Tracking

    Large publishers have marketed bundles of journals at a discount off of aggregated list price since the late 1990’s. The value proposition for publishers is a guaranteed revenue stream at a high overall dollar value. The perceived benefit for the institutions has been access to a large volume of journal titles, at a lower per-title price than ala carte purchasing would afford. Over time, however, the actual value of these “big deals” has grown less clear. Publishers have often raised the price of the packages by 5-15%, far outpacing library budgets. This has been justified, in part, by the addition of a growing number of specialized journal titles, launched in quick succession. Libraries have found a growing chunk of their budgets allocated to servicing these big deals, as well as their ability to curate resources and build collections most appropriate for their communities severely hampered.

    What was once a no-fuss way to get a significant collection of journals at a discount off of list price has devolved into a restrictive agreement that limits financial and strategic flexibility. The “big deal” has often been compared to a cable or satellite TV package, an apt analogy insofar as the customer cannot choose to pass on content that is of no interest, with initial price breaks quickly giving way to locked-in increases. Much like the millions of consumers who have chosen to “cut the cord”, a growing number of libraries are electing to critically appraise these big deals by assessing their collections, the value for money they are receiving from these packages, and how they might more strategically spend their finite collections resources.

    https://sparcopen.org/our-work/big-deal-cancellation-tracking
    #édition_scientifique #université #savoir #résistance #liste #base_de_données #database

    Ici le tableau excel:


    https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1brXHnANwLBCHYo5b79hF6vGF63fdOCSOSiPxCScf0hc/edit#gid=0
    ping @reka @fil

  • Au #Mali, #Niger et #Sénégal, le marché de l’identité en plein essor

    De plus en plus d’États africains font appel à des entreprises étrangères, notamment françaises, pour fabriquer des #cartes_d’identité biométriques, qui servent aussi de #cartes_électorales sécurisées. Un projet soutenu par l’Europe qui y voit une occasion de mieux contrôler les flux migratoires.

    De plus en plus d’États africains font appel à des entreprises étrangères, notamment françaises, pour fabriquer des cartes d’identité biométriques, qui servent aussi de cartes électorales sécurisées. Un projet soutenu par l’Europe qui y voit une occasion de mieux contrôler les flux migratoires.

    Niger, Sénégal, Mali, de nos envoyés spéciaux.- Sur le continent africain, les États font de plus en plus souvent appel aux services d’entreprises étrangères spécialisées dans le domaine de l’état civil et leur confient la fabrication de cartes d’identité biométriques, qui sont aussi souvent utilisées comme cartes électorales.
    C’est par exemple le cas, au Mali, du groupe français #Idemia [nouveau nom, depuis 2017, de #OT-Morpho, né de la fusion des sociétés #Oberthur_Technologies (OT) et Morpho], du franco-néerlandais #Gemalto au Niger, et de la société malaisienne #Iris au Sénégal.
    Ce processus est appuyé par la Commission européenne, par le biais de son #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_pour_l’Afrique. Un partenariat dans lequel chacun trouve son intérêt : les chefs d’État ouest-africains entrevoient la tenue d’élections indiscutables, tandis que la diplomatie européenne touche du doigt le Graal du contrôle de l’immigration irrégulière en permettant l’accès direct à une base de données centralisée des citoyens subsahariens. Celle-ci permettrait aux États membres de l’Union européenne (UE) d’identifier et de renvoyer plus facilement les migrants irréguliers dans leur pays d’origine.
    Un projet « gagnant-gagnant » donc, pour lequel la Commission européenne pourra recevoir un retour sur investissement des 25 millions d’euros dépensés au Mali, et des 28 millions d’euros au Sénégal. Le projet devrait permettre de disposer d’un système d’information de l’état civil informatisé relié à une #base_de_données biométriques à même de sécuriser l’identité de la population et d’être exploitable par d’autres administrations utilisatrices.
    « Il y a une demande d’appui des autorités maliennes auprès de l’UE, qui considère qu’il y a un besoin. C’est une sorte d’interactivité : un état civil qui fonctionne bien va permettre à la population de bénéficier des services auxquels elle a droit. L’aspect contrôle des populations n’est que secondaire », assure Omar Merabet, conseiller du PDG de Civipol, agence française qui travaille, au Mali et au Sénégal, sur deux importants programmes d’état civil qui servent de base de données pour la biométrie électorale.
    Il résume : « La relation entre identité et sécurité est là : si on a un fichier sécurisé, on a une possibilité de traçabiliser la population – un idéal de politique. »
    Des militants de la société civile ouest-africaine s’interrogent néanmoins sur l’utilisation réelle des données personnelles collectées et sur le risque d’utilisation abusive par l’État ou des tiers. Cette préoccupation est également partagée par Omar Merabet : « On sait l’usage qu’en fait un pays donné aujourd’hui, mais qu’en sera-t-il demain ? C’est un problème essentiel car on va consacrer énormément de financements à centraliser ces données, pour la question de l’immigration par exemple, avoir des fichiers ultra précis, partagés avec les services… Il va y avoir de plus en plus de communication et donc de possibilités d’utiliser frauduleusement ces données. »

    « Nous pensons que nous n’avons pas assez de détails sur la question et que nous ne sommes pas bien informés par nos gouvernements, estime le juriste Djabel Magassa, porte-parole de Kouloubametre, site internet « d’initiative citoyenne d’évaluation et suivi des actions des gouvernants ». Quelles sont les garanties de la part de l’Union européenne que ces données ne seront pas utilisées à d’autres fins – par exemple, d’identifier des migrants en vue de leur expulsion par Frontex ? »

    L’hypothèse est balayée par l’État malien. « Au Mali existe une loi qui protège les données personnelles, ainsi que l’Autorité de protection des données à caractère individuel qui surveille l’utilisation des telles informations. Il n’est donc pas possible de donner ces données à un pays européen ou à une structure pour surveiller les migrants », affirme Fousseyni Diarra, directeur du Centre pour le traitement des données de l’état civil et président de la commission technique du Comité de pilotage des élections présidentielles qui ont eu lieu l’été dernier.

    En dépit des risques et des limites, la solution biométrique s’étend dans l’Afrique subsaharienne. Un nouveau front s’est ouvert au Niger, voisin du Mali.

    Au Niger, la France et l’Allemagne à la manœuvre

    « On est entourés de pays plongés dans la tourmente, comme le Mali, le Nigeria, la Libye et le Burkina Faso, explique Issaka Souna. Le Niger ne peut pas se permettre un processus électoral tendu. » Avocat et haut fonctionnaire des Nations unies, Souna a été nommé en octobre 2017 à la tête de la Commission électorale indépendante du Niger (CENI). Au cœur de son travail, la mise en place d’un fichier électoral biométrique.

    Après des années de pourparlers, le fichier biométrique a été intégré dans le nouveau code électoral. Pour Issaka Souna, la difficulté principale est l’absence d’un système d’état civil fiable : « Moins de 30 % de nos concitoyens possèdent une pièce d’identité. On a un territoire immense et une partie de la population est nomade : fournir presque dix millions de cartes électorales biométriques en moins d’un an sera une épreuve colossale. »

    Le premier test, ce seront les élections locales, reportées quatre fois depuis 2016 et prévues pour début 2020. Présidentielle et législatives sont prévues pour 2021. Mahamadou Issoufou sera alors arrivé au terme de son deuxième mandat et ne sera plus éligible.

    Ici, tout en étant le principal bailleur de fonds du Niger, l’Union européenne n’a pas financé la #biométrisation des élections. « Sans un état civil performant, cela n’a pas de sens, confie un fonctionnaire de Bruxelles, sous le couvert de l’anonymat. C’est comme acheter une Porsche là où on n’a même pas un chemin pour se promener. »

    Selon le fonctionnaire, « l’inscription d’un #fichier_biométrique dans la loi permet aux gouvernements de faire du #chantage à l’UE. Ils disent : “Si vous voulez des élections démocratiques, il faut financer la biométrie.” » Soit une dépense, pour créer le fichier, qui tournerait autour des 60 millions d’euros.

    Le fonctionnaire ajoute qu’au sein de la délégation européenne au Niger, « on a dû résister aux pressions des diplomates français et allemands qui voulaient qu’on finance cette biométrie ».
    Les pressions des groupes français

    Un document interne, obtenu par Mediapart, détaille le parcours de sélection de l’opérateur privé au Niger. En concurrence, quatre sociétés : #Gemalto, dont l’actionnaire majoritaire est la Banque publique d’investissement français, #Idemia, propriété de l’État français à 14 %, la société privée allemande #Dermalog, et #Lithotech, compagnie du géant sud-africain #Bidvest, liée à un fonds public de Johannesburg.

    Seuls les deux premiers, français, ont survécu au long processus de sélection – 17 jours de travail d’un comité technique, en octobre 2018 –, dont les résultats, pas encore proclamés après des mois, ont déjà provoqué quelques bouleversements : Dermalog, exclue de la sélection finale en raison de son mauvais score (32,5 points sur 100), aurait fait appel. Contactée, la société a refusé de commenter.

    Gemalto (déjà fortement sollicité sur le marché biométrique africain, notamment en #Algérie, #Bénin, #Burkina_Faso, #Comores, #Gabon et #Guinée-Conakry) a fini par l’emporter, avec 92 points sur 100 face aux 77 de Idemia, d’après l’évaluation technique. Le marché s’élève à 20 milliards de francs CFA (30,5 millions d’euros) sur 16 mois, d’après le président de la CENI Issaka Souna.

    Avant l’officialisation du contrat, le groupe français était à l’affût de la moindre mise en cause de ses activités : il a ainsi exigé la publication d’un droit de réponse dans le bi-hebdomadaire nigérien L’Événement. En cause : des informations « de nature à nuire à la bonne réputation du groupe », selon Gemalto. L’entreprise y conteste notamment l’existence d’une plainte pour corruption passive ou active d’agent étranger au Gabon. Plainte qui a pourtant bien été enregistrée à Paris.

    Le Sénégal, pionnier des cartes biométriques dans la région

    Contrairement au Mali et au Niger, le marché de la biométrie au Sénégal n’est pas dominé par une société française mais par le groupe malaisien #Iris_Corporation_Berhad. Premier pays de la région à avoir, en 2007, engagé le processus de biométrisation prévu par l’accord de la #CEDEAO – visant officiellement à faciliter la circulation des personnes dans l’espace régional –, le Sénégal a élu son président, le 24 février dernier, en utilisant des documents électoraux produits par le géant asiatique pour un montant de 50 milliards de francs CFA (environ 76 millions d’euros).

    Si, à quelques jours des élections du 24 février, le gouvernement a annoncé un taux de distribution des cartes biométriques de 97 %, la société traîne encore quelques casseroles.

    Lors des élections législatives de juillet 2017, de graves dysfonctionnements dans le processus de distribution des cartes ont empêché environ 800 000 personnes de voter. En 2007, le contrat de production de passeports biométriques, attribué déjà à Iris, a été suspendu et jugé, dans un rapport public de la Cour des comptes sénégalaise de 2009, « contraire à l’intérêt général » et « irrégulier » parce que trop coûteux et lent (118 milliards de francs CFA pour 10 millions de documents en vingt ans).

    L’expert informaticien et cyberactiviste sénégalais Cheick Fall, cofondateur de la Ligue africaine des web activistes pour la démocratie Africtivistes, parle d’#indépendance_numérique violée. « Le Sénégal a péché en allant confier le traitement de ces données à une entreprise étrangère. » Selon lui, il y aurait dans le pays toutes les compétences techniques et humaines pour confectionner la carte biométrique directement au Sénégal, « à un dixième du coût ».

    Pour lui, pas mal de questions se cachent dans cette petite carte. « Comment cette entreprise va-t-elle traiter nos informations ? Qui gère, qui collabore et qui a des intérêts avec elle ? Quels sont les contrats qui lient l’État avec cette société sur la confection mais aussi sur le traitement et la conservation des donnés sensibles ? » Une interrogation plus profonde sous-tend sa réflexion : « Aujourd’hui, on parle beaucoup des barrières, mais dans une société de plus en plus dématérialisée et fondée sur la citoyenneté digitale, qu’est-ce qu’une frontière ? »

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/050319/au-mali-niger-et-senegal-le-marche-de-l-identite-en-plein-essor?onglet=ful
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #biométrie #privatisation
    #contrôles_frontaliers #identification #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #UE #EU #big-data #surveillance_de_masse #traçabilité

    signalé par @pascaline via la mailing-list de Migreurop
    ping @karine4

    Ajouté à la métaliste externalisation :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749

  • New report exposes global reach of powerful governments who equip, finance and train other countries to spy on their populations

    Privacy International has today released a report that looks at how powerful governments are financing, training and equipping countries — including authoritarian regimes — with surveillance capabilities. The report warns that rather than increasing security, this is entrenching authoritarianism.

    Countries with powerful security agencies are spending literally billions to equip, finance, and train security and surveillance agencies around the world — including authoritarian regimes. This is resulting in entrenched authoritarianism, further facilitation of abuse against people, and diversion of resources from long-term development programmes.

    The report, titled ‘Teach ’em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance’ is available to download here.

    Examples from the report include:

    In 2001, the US spent $5.7 billion in security aid. In 2017 it spent over $20 billion [1]. In 2015, military and non-military security assistance in the US amounted to an estimated 35% of its entire foreign aid expenditure [2]. The report provides examples of how US Departments of State, Defense, and Justice all facilitate foreign countries’ surveillance capabilities, as well as an overview of how large arms companies have embedded themselves into such programmes, including at surveillance training bases in the US. Examples provided include how these agencies have provided communications intercept and other surveillance technology, how they fund wiretapping programmes, and how they train foreign spy agencies in surveillance techniques around the world.

    The EU and individual European countries are sponsoring surveillance globally. The EU is already spending billions developing border control and surveillance capabilities in foreign countries to deter migration to Europe. For example, the EU is supporting Sudan’s leader with tens of millions of Euros aimed at capacity building for border management. The EU is now looking to massively increase its expenditure aimed at building border control and surveillance capabilities globally under the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework, which will determine its budget for 2021–2027. Other EU projects include developing the surveillance capabilities of security agencies in Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere. European countries such as France, Germany, and the UK are sponsoring surveillance worldwide, for example, providing training and equipment to “Cyber Police Officers” in Ukraine, as well as to agencies in Saudi Arabia, and across Africa.

    Surveillance capabilities are also being supported by China’s government under the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and other efforts to expand into international markets. Chinese companies have reportedly supplied surveillance capabilities to Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador [3]. In Ecuador, China Electronics Corporation supplied a network of cameras — including some fitted with facial recognition capabilities — to the country’s 24 provinces, as well as a system to locate and identify mobile phones.

    Edin Omanovic, Privacy International’s Surveillance Programme Lead, said

    “The global rush to make sure that surveillance is as universal and pervasive as possible is as astonishing as it is disturbing. The breadth of institutions, countries, agencies, and arms companies that are involved shows how there is no real long-term policy or strategic thinking driving any of this. It’s a free-for-all, where capabilities developed by some of the world’s most powerful spy agencies are being thrown at anyone willing to serve their interests, including dictators and killers whose only goal is to cling to power.

    “If these ‘benefactor’ countries truly want to assist other countries to be secure and stable, they should build schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure, and promote democracy and human rights. This is what communities need for safety, security, and prosperity. What we don’t need is powerful and wealthy countries giving money to arms companies to build border control and surveillance infrastructure. This only serves the interests of those powerful, wealthy countries. As our report shows, instead of putting resources into long-term development solutions, such programmes further entrench authoritarianism and spur abuses around the world — the very things which cause insecurity in the first place.”

    https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/2161/press-release-new-report-exposes-global-reach-powerful-governm

    #surveillance #surveillance_de_masse #rapport

    Pour télécharger le rapport “Teach ’em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance”:
    https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/Teach-em-to-Phish-report.pdf

    ping @fil

    • China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise

      The Chinese authorities turned to a Massachusetts company and a prominent Yale researcher as they built an enormous system of surveillance and control.

      The authorities called it a free health check. Tahir Imin had his doubts.

      They drew blood from the 38-year-old Muslim, scanned his face, recorded his voice and took his fingerprints. They didn’t bother to check his heart or kidneys, and they rebuffed his request to see the results.

      “They said, ‘You don’t have the right to ask about this,’” Mr. Imin said. “‘If you want to ask more,’ they said, ‘you can go to the police.’”

      Mr. Imin was one of millions of people caught up in a vast Chinese campaign of surveillance and oppression. To give it teeth, the Chinese authorities are collecting DNA — and they got unlikely corporate and academic help from the United States to do it.

      China wants to make the country’s Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group, more subservient to the Communist Party. It has detained up to a million people in what China calls “re-education” camps, drawing condemnation from human rights groups and a threat of sanctions from the Trump administration.

      Collecting genetic material is a key part of China’s campaign, according to human rights groups and Uighur activists. They say a comprehensive DNA database could be used to chase down any Uighurs who resist conforming to the campaign.

      Police forces in the United States and elsewhere use genetic material from family members to find suspects and solve crimes. Chinese officials, who are building a broad nationwide database of DNA samples, have cited the crime-fighting benefits of China’s own genetic studies.

      To bolster their DNA capabilities, scientists affiliated with China’s police used equipment made by Thermo Fisher, a Massachusetts company. For comparison with Uighur DNA, they also relied on genetic material from people around the world that was provided by #Kenneth_Kidd, a prominent #Yale_University geneticist.

      On Wednesday, #Thermo_Fisher said it would no longer sell its equipment in Xinjiang, the part of China where the campaign to track Uighurs is mostly taking place. The company said separately in an earlier statement to The New York Times that it was working with American officials to figure out how its technology was being used.

      Dr. Kidd said he had been unaware of how his material and know-how were being used. He said he believed Chinese scientists were acting within scientific norms that require informed consent by DNA donors.

      China’s campaign poses a direct challenge to the scientific community and the way it makes cutting-edge knowledge publicly available. The campaign relies in part on public DNA databases and commercial technology, much of it made or managed in the United States. In turn, Chinese scientists have contributed Uighur DNA samples to a global database, potentially violating scientific norms of consent.

      Cooperation from the global scientific community “legitimizes this type of genetic surveillance,” said Mark Munsterhjelm, an assistant professor at the University of Windsor in Ontario who has closely tracked the use of American technology in Xinjiang.

      Swabbing Millions

      In Xinjiang, in northwestern China, the program was known as “#Physicals_for_All.”

      From 2016 to 2017, nearly 36 million people took part in it, according to Xinhua, China’s official news agency. The authorities collected DNA samples, images of irises and other personal data, according to Uighurs and human rights groups. It is unclear whether some residents participated more than once — Xinjiang has a population of about 24.5 million.

      In a statement, the Xinjiang government denied that it collects DNA samples as part of the free medical checkups. It said the DNA machines that were bought by the Xinjiang authorities were for “internal use.”

      China has for decades maintained an iron grip in Xinjiang. In recent years, it has blamed Uighurs for a series of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China, including a 2013 incident in which a driver struck two people in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

      In late 2016, the Communist Party embarked on a campaign to turn the Uighurs and other largely Muslim minority groups into loyal supporters. The government locked up hundreds of thousands of them in what it called job training camps, touted as a way to escape poverty, backwardness and radical Islam. It also began to take DNA samples.

      In at least some of the cases, people didn’t give up their genetic material voluntarily. To mobilize Uighurs for the free medical checkups, police and local cadres called or sent them text messages, telling them the checkups were required, according to Uighurs interviewed by The Times.

      “There was a pretty strong coercive element to it,” said Darren Byler, an anthropologist at the University of Washington who studies the plight of the Uighurs. “They had no choice.”

      Calling Dr. Kidd

      Kenneth Kidd first visited China in 1981 and remained curious about the country. So when he received an invitation in 2010 for an expenses-paid trip to visit Beijing, he said yes.

      Dr. Kidd is a major figure in the genetics field. The 77-year-old Yale professor has helped to make DNA evidence more acceptable in American courts.

      His Chinese hosts had their own background in law enforcement. They were scientists from the Ministry of Public Security — essentially, China’s police.

      During that trip, Dr. Kidd met Li Caixia, the chief forensic physician of the ministry’s Institute of Forensic Science. The relationship deepened. In December 2014, Dr. Li arrived at Dr. Kidd’s lab for an 11-month stint. She took some DNA samples back to China.

      “I had thought we were sharing samples for collaborative research,” said Dr. Kidd.

      Dr. Kidd is not the only prominent foreign geneticist to have worked with the Chinese authorities. Bruce Budowle, a professor at the University of North Texas, says in his online biography that he “has served or is serving” as a member of an academic committee at the ministry’s Institute of Forensic Science.

      Jeff Carlton, a university spokesman, said in a statement that Professor Budowle’s role with the ministry was “only symbolic in nature” and that he had “done no work on its behalf.”

      “Dr. Budowle and his team abhor the use of DNA technology to persecute ethnic or religious groups,” Mr. Carlton said in the statement. “Their work focuses on criminal investigations and combating human trafficking to serve humanity.”

      Dr. Kidd’s data became part of China’s DNA drive.

      In 2014, ministry researchers published a paper describing a way for scientists to tell one ethnic group from another. It cited, as an example, the ability to distinguish Uighurs from Indians. The authors said they used 40 DNA samples taken from Uighurs in China and samples from other ethnic groups from Dr. Kidd’s Yale lab.

      In patent applications filed in China in 2013 and 2017, ministry researchers described ways to sort people by ethnicity by screening their genetic makeup. They took genetic material from Uighurs and compared it with DNA from other ethnic groups. In the 2017 filing, researchers explained that their system would help in “inferring the geographical origin from the DNA of suspects at crime scenes.”

      For outside comparisons, they used DNA samples provided by Dr. Kidd’s lab, the 2017 filing said. They also used samples from the 1000 Genomes Project, a public catalog of genes from around the world.

      Paul Flicek, member of the steering committee of the 1000 Genomes Project, said that its data was unrestricted and that “there is no obvious problem” if it was being used as a way to determine where a DNA sample came from.

      The data flow also went the other way.

      Chinese government researchers contributed the data of 2,143 Uighurs to the Allele Frequency Database, an online search platform run by Dr. Kidd that was partly funded by the United States Department of Justice until last year. The database, known as Alfred, contains DNA data from more than 700 populations around the world.

      This sharing of data could violate scientific norms of informed consent because it is not clear whether the Uighurs volunteered their DNA samples to the Chinese authorities, said Arthur Caplan, the founding head of the division of medical ethics at New York University’s School of Medicine. He said that “no one should be in a database without express consent.”

      “Honestly, there’s been a kind of naïveté on the part of American scientists presuming that other people will follow the same rules and standards wherever they come from,” Dr. Caplan said.

      Dr. Kidd said he was “not particularly happy” that the ministry had cited him in its patents, saying his data shouldn’t be used in ways that could allow people or institutions to potentially profit from it. If the Chinese authorities used data they got from their earlier collaborations with him, he added, there is little he can do to stop them.

      He said he was unaware of the filings until he was contacted by The Times.

      Dr. Kidd also said he considered his collaboration with the ministry to be no different from his work with police and forensics labs elsewhere. He said governments should have access to data about minorities, not just the dominant ethnic group, in order to have an accurate picture of the whole population.

      As for the consent issue, he said the burden of meeting that standard lay with the Chinese researchers, though he said reports about what Uighurs are subjected to in China raised some difficult questions.

      “I would assume they had appropriate informed consent on the samples,” he said, “though I must say what I’ve been hearing in the news recently about the treatment of the Uighurs raises concerns.”
      Machine Learning

      In 2015, Dr. Kidd and Dr. Budowle spoke at a genomics conference in the Chinese city of Xi’an. It was underwritten in part by Thermo Fisher, a company that has come under intense criticism for its equipment sales in China, and Illumina, a San Diego company that makes gene sequencing instruments. Illumina did not respond to requests for comment.

      China is ramping up spending on health care and research. The Chinese market for gene-sequencing equipment and other technologies was worth $1 billion in 2017 and could more than double in five years, according to CCID Consulting, a research firm. But the Chinese market is loosely regulated, and it isn’t always clear where the equipment goes or to what uses it is put.

      Thermo Fisher sells everything from lab instruments to forensic DNA testing kits to DNA mapping machines, which help scientists decipher a person’s ethnicity and identify diseases to which he or she is particularly vulnerable. China accounted for 10 percent of Thermo Fisher’s $20.9 billion in revenue, according to the company’s 2017 annual report, and it employs nearly 5,000 people there.

      “Our greatest success story in emerging markets continues to be China,” it said in the report.

      China used Thermo Fisher’s equipment to map the genes of its people, according to five Ministry of Public Security patent filings.

      The company has also sold equipment directly to the authorities in Xinjiang, where the campaign to control the Uighurs has been most intense. At least some of the equipment was intended for use by the police, according to procurement documents. The authorities there said in the documents that the machines were important for DNA inspections in criminal cases and had “no substitutes in China.”

      In February 2013, six ministry researchers credited Thermo Fisher’s Applied Biosystems brand, as well as other companies, with helping to analyze the DNA samples of Han, Uighur and Tibetan people in China, according to a patent filing. The researchers said understanding how to differentiate between such DNA samples was necessary for fighting terrorism “because these cases were becoming more difficult to crack.”

      The researchers said they had obtained 95 Uighur DNA samples, some of which were given to them by the police. Other samples were provided by Uighurs voluntarily, they said.

      Thermo Fisher was criticized by Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, and others who asked the Commerce Department to prohibit American companies from selling technology to China that could be used for purposes of surveillance and tracking.

      On Wednesday, Thermo Fisher said it would stop selling its equipment in Xinjiang, a decision it said was “consistent with Thermo Fisher’s values, ethics code and policies.”

      “As the world leader in serving science, we recognize the importance of considering how our products and services are used — or may be used — by our customers,” it said.

      Human rights groups praised Thermo Fisher’s move. Still, they said, equipment and information flows into China should be better monitored, to make sure the authorities elsewhere don’t send them to Xinjiang.

      “It’s an important step, and one hopes that they apply the language in their own statement to commercial activity across China, and that other companies are assessing their sales and operations, especially in Xinjiang,” said Sophie Richardson, the China director of Human Rights Watch.

      American lawmakers and officials are taking a hard look at the situation in Xinjiang. The Trump administration is considering sanctions against Chinese officials and companies over China’s treatment of the Uighurs.

      China’s tracking campaign unnerved people like Tahir Hamut. In May 2017, the police in the city of Urumqi in Xinjiang drew the 49-year-old Uighur’s blood, took his fingerprints, recorded his voice and took a scan of his face. He was called back a month later for what he was told was a free health check at a local clinic.

      Mr. Hamut, a filmmaker who is now living in Virginia, said he saw between 20 to 40 Uighurs in line. He said it was absurd to think that such frightened people had consented to submit their DNA.

      “No one in this situation, not under this much pressure and facing such personal danger, would agree to give their blood samples for research,” Mr. Hamut said. “It’s just inconceivable.”

      https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html?action=click&module=MoreInSect
      #USA #Etats-Unis #ADN #DNA #Ouïghours #université #science #génétique #base_de_données

  • Dai dati biometrici alle motovedette : ecco il #business della frontiera

    La gestione delle frontiere europee è sempre di più un affare per le aziende private. Dai Fondi per la difesa a quelli per la cooperazione e la ricerca: l’Ue implementa le risorse per fermare i flussi.

    Sono 33 i miliardi che l’Europa ha intenzione di destinare dal 2021 al 2027 alla gestione del fenomeno migratorio e, in particolare, al controllo dei confini. La cifra, inserita nel #Mff, il #Multiannual_Financial_Framework (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A321%3AFIN), (ed ora in discussione tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio) rappresenta il budget complessivo Ue per la gestione delle frontiere esterne, dei flussi migratori e dei flussi di rifugiati. E viene notevolmente rafforzata rispetto al periodo precedente (2016-2020) quando i miliardi stanziati erano 12,4. Meno della metà.

    A questo capitolo di spesa contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi: dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna (che passa da 3,4 a 4,8 miliardi) a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare, che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, come accade già per le due missioni italiane in Libia e in Niger. Anche una parte dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e di quello per la Pace saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie militari per fermare i flussi in mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi proveniente dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale.

    Un grande business in cui rientrano anche i Fondi alla ricerca. La connessione tra gestione della migrazione, #lobby della sicurezza e il business delle imprese private è al centro di un’indagine di Arci nell’ambito del progetto #Externalisation_Policies_Watch, curato da Sara Prestianni. “Lo sforzo politico nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza - sottolinea Prestianni -. La dimensione europea della migrazione si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione in favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza, che ha una logica repressiva. Chi ne fa le spese sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e propri o business”. Tra gli aspetti più interessanti c’è l’utilizzo del Fondo alla ricerca Orizon 20-20 per ideare strumenti di controllo. “Qui si entra nel campo della biometria: l’obiettivo è dotare i paesi africani di tutto un sistema di raccolta di dati biometrici per fermare i flussi ma anche per creare un’enorme banca dati che faciliti le politiche di espulsione - continua Prestianni -. Questo ha creato un mercato, ci sono diverse imprese che hanno iniziato ad occuparsi del tema. Tra le aziende europee leader in questi appalti c’è la francese #Civipol, che ha il monopolio in vari paesi di questo processo. Ma l’interconnessione tra politici e lobby della sicurezza è risultata ancor più evidente al #Sre, #Research_on_Security_event, un incontro che si è svolto a Bruxelles a dicembre, su proposta della presidenza austriaca: seduti negli stessi panel c’erano rappresentanti della commissione europea, dell’Agenzia #Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza. Tutti annuivano sulla necessità di aprire un mercato europeo della frontiera, dove lotta alla sicurezza e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente”.

    In questo contesto, non è marginale il ruolo dell’Italia. “L’idea di combattere i traffici e tutelare i diritti nasce con #Tony_Blair, ma già allora l’obiettivo era impedire alle persone di arrivare in Europa - sottolinea Filippo Miraglia, vicepresidente di Arci -. Ed è quello a cui stiamo assistendo oggi in maniera sempre più sistematica. Un esempio è la vicenda delle #motovedette libiche, finanziate dall’Italia e su cui guadagnano aziende italianissime”. Il tema è anche al centro dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia di Gennaio (https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta), curata da Duccio Facchini. “L’idea era dare un nome, un volto, una ragione sociale, al modo in cui il ministero degli Interni traduce le strategie di contrasto e di lotta ai flussi di persone” spiega il giornalista. E così si scopre che della rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori, dati dall’Italia alla Tunisia, per il controllo della frontiera, si occupa in maniera esclusiva un’azienda di Rovigo, i #Cantieri_Navali_Vittoria: “Un soggetto senza concorrenti sul mercato, che riesce a vincere l’appalto anche per la rimessa in sicurezza delle motovedette fornite dal nostro paese alla Libia”, sottolinea Facchini.

    Motovedette fornite dall’Italia attraverso l’utilizzo del Fondo Africa: la questione è al centro di un ricorso al Tar presentato da Asgi (Associazione studi giuridici dell’immigrazione). “Il Fondo Africa di 200 milioni di euro viene istituito nel 2018 e il suo obiettivo è implementare le strategie di cooperazione con i maggiori paesi interessati dal fenomeno migratorio: dal #Niger alla LIbia, dalla Tunisia alla Costa d’Avorio - spiega l’avvocata Giulia Crescini -. Tra le attività finanziate con questo fondo c’è la dotazioni di strumentazioni per il controllo delle frontiere. Come Asgi abbiamo chiesto l’accesso agli atti del ministero degli Esteri per analizzare i provvedimenti e vedere come sono stati spesi questi soldi. In particolare, abbiamo notato l’utilizzo di due milioni di euro per la rimessa in efficienza delle motovedette fornite dall’Italia alla Libia - aggiunge -. Abbiamo quindi strutturato un ricorso, giuridicamente complicato, cercando di interloquire col giudice amministrativo, che deve verificare la legittimità dell’azione della Pubblica amministrazione. Qualche settimana fa abbiamo ricevuto la sentenza di rigetto in primo grado, e ora presenteremo l’appello. Ma studiando la sentenza ci siamo accorti che il giudice amministrativo è andato a verificare esattamente se fossero stati spesi bene o meno quei soldi - aggiunge Crescini -. Ed è andato così in profondità che ha scritto di fatto che non c’erano prove sufficienti che il soggetto destinatario stia facendo tortura e atti degradanti nei confronti dei migranti. Su questo punto lavoreremo per il ricorso. Per noi è chiaro che l’Italia oggi sta dando strumentazioni necessarie alla Libia per non sporcarsi le mani direttamente, ma c’è una responsabilità italiana anche se materialmente non è L’Italia a riportare indietro i migranti. Su questo punto stiamo agendo anche attraverso la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo”.

    http://www.redattoresociale.it/Notiziario/Articolo/620038/Dai-dati-biometrici-alle-motovedette-ecco-il-business-della-frontie

    #externalisation #frontières #UE #EU #Europe #Libye #Forteresse_européenne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #privatisation #argent #recherche #frontières_extérieures #coopération_militaire #sécurité_intérieure #fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique #technologie #militarisation_des_frontières #fonds_fiduciaire #développement #Horizon_2020 #biométrie #données #données_biométriques #base_de_données #database #expulsions #renvois #marché #marché_européen_de_la_frontière #complexe_militaro-industriel #Tunisie #Côte_d'Ivoire #Italie
    ping @isskein @albertocampiphoto

    • Gli affari lungo le frontiere. Inchiesta sugli appalti pubblici per il contrasto all’immigrazione “clandestina”

      In Tunisia, Libia, Niger, Egitto e non solo. Così lo Stato italiano tramite il ministero dell’Interno finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, idranti per “ordine pubblico”, formazione delle polizie e sistemi automatizzati di identificazione. Ecco per chi la frontiera rappresenta un buon affare.

      Uno dei luoghi chiave del “contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” che l’Italia conduce lungo le rotte africane non si trova a Tunisi, Niamey o Tripoli, ma è in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco. È ad Adria, poco distante dal Po, che ha sede “Cantiere Navale Vittoria”, un’azienda nata nel 1927 per iniziativa della famiglia Duò -ancora oggi proprietaria- specializzata in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare. Si tratta di uno dei partner strategici della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno, per una serie di commesse in Libia e Tunisia.

      La Direzione è il braccio del Viminale in tema di “gestione” dei flussi provenienti da quei Paesi ritenuti di “eccezionale rilevanza nella gestione della rotta del Mediterraneo centrale” (parole della Farnesina). Quella “rotta” conduce alle coste italiane: Libia e Tunisia, appunto, ma anche Niger e non solo. E quel “pezzo” del Viminale si occupa di tradurre in pratica le strategie governative. Come? Appaltando a imprese italiane attività diversissime tra loro per valore, fonti di finanziamento, tipologia e territori coinvolti. Un principio è comune: quello di dar forma al “contrasto”, sul nostro territorio o di frontiera. E per questi affidamenti ricorre più volte una formula: “Il fine che si intende perseguire è quello di collaborare con i Paesi terzi ai fini di contrastare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina”. Tra gli ultimi appalti aggiudicati a “Cantiere Navale Vittoria” (ottobre 2018) spicca la rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori “P350” da 34 metri, di proprietà della Guardia nazionale della Tunisia. Tramite gli atti della procedura di affidamento si possono ricostruire filiera e calendario.

      Facciamo un salto indietro al giugno 2017, quando i ministeri degli Esteri e dell’Interno italiani sottoscrivono un’“intesa tecnica” per prevedere azioni di “supporto tecnico” del Viminale stesso alle “competenti autorità tunisine”. Obiettivo: “Migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, inclusi la “lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. La spesa prevista -12 milioni di euro- dovrebbe essere coperta tramite il cosiddetto “Fondo Africa”, istituito sei mesi prima con legge di Stabilità e provvisto di una “dotazione finanziaria” di 200 milioni di euro. L’obiettivo dichiarato del Fondo è quello di “rilanciare il dialogo e la cooperazione con i Paesi africani d’importanza prioritaria per le rotte migratorie”. Le autorità di Tunisi hanno fretta, tanto che un mese dopo l’intesa tra i dicasteri chiedono all’Italia di provvedere subito alla “rimessa in efficienza” dei sei pattugliatori. Chi li ha costruiti, anni prima, è proprio l’azienda di Adria, e da Tunisi giunge la proposta di avvalersi proprio del suo “know how”. La richiesta è accolta. Trascorre poco più di un anno e nell’ottobre 2018 l’appalto viene aggiudicato al Cantiere per 6,3 milioni di euro. L’“attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, scrive la Direzione immigrazione e frontiere, è di “primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale, anche alla luce dei recenti sbarchi sulle coste italiane di migranti provenienti dalle acque territoriali tunisine”. I pattugliatori da “consegnare” risistemati alla Tunisia servono quindi a impedire o limitare gli arrivi via mare nel nostro Paese, che da gennaio a metà dicembre di 2018 sono stati 23.122 (di cui 12.976 dalla Libia), in netto calo rispetto ai 118.019 (105.986 dalla Libia) dello stesso periodo del 2017.


      A quel Paese di frontiera l’Italia non fornisce (o rimette in sesto) solamente navi. Nel luglio 2018, infatti, la Direzione del Viminale ha stipulato un contratto con la #Totani Company Srl (sede a Roma) per la fornitura di 50 veicoli #Mitsubishi 4×4 Pajero da “consegnare presso il porto di Tunisi”. Il percorso è simile a quello dei sei pattugliatori: “Considerata” l’intesa del giugno 2017 tra i ministeri italiani, “visto” il Fondo Africa, “considerata” la richiesta dei 50 mezzi da parte delle autorità nordafricane formulata nel corso di una riunione del “Comitato Italo-Tunisino”, “vista” la necessità di “definire nel più breve tempo possibile le procedure di acquisizione” per “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, eccetera. E così l’offerta economica di 1,6 milioni di euro della Totani è ritenuta congrua.

      Capita però che alcune gare vadano deserte. È successo per la fornitura di due “autoveicoli allestiti ‘idrante per ordine pubblico’” e per la relativa attività di formazione per 12 operatori della polizia tunisina (352mila euro la base d’asta). “Al fine di poter supportare il governo tunisino nell’ambito delle attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” è il passe-partout utilizzato anche per gli idranti, anche se sfugge l’impiego concreto. Seppur deserta, gli atti di questa gara sono interessanti per i passaggi elencati. Il tutto è partito da un incontro a Roma del febbraio 2018 tra l’allora ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti e l’omologo tunisino. “Sulla base” di questa riunione, la Direzione del Viminale “richiede” di provvedere alla commessa attraverso un “appunto” datato 27 aprile dello stesso anno che viene “decretato favorevolmente” dal “Sig. Capo della Polizia”, Franco Gabrielli. Alla gara (poi non aggiudicata) si presenta un solo concorrente, la “Brescia Antincendi International Srl”, che all’appuntamento con il ministero delega come “collaboratore” un ex militare in pensione, il tenente colonnello Virgilio D’Amata, cavaliere al merito della Repubblica Italiana. Ma è un nulla di fatto.

      A Tunisi vengono quindi consegnati navi, pick-up, (mancati) idranti ma anche motori fuoribordo per quasi 600mila euro. È del settembre 2018, infatti, un nuovo “avviso esplorativo” sottoscritto dal direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione -Massimo Bontempi- per la fornitura di “10 coppie di motori Yamaha 4 tempi da 300 CV di potenza” e altri 25 da 150 CV. Il tutto al dichiarato fine di “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”.

      Come per la Tunisia, anche in Libia il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel Fondo Africa. Parlamento non pervenuto

      Poi c’è la Libia, l’altro fronte strategico del “contrasto”. Come per la Tunisia, anche in questo contesto il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri di Esteri e Interno -Parlamento non pervenuto- “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel citato Fondo Africa. Una di queste, datata 4 agosto 2017, riguarda il “supporto tecnico del ministero dell’Interno italiano alle competenti autorità libiche per migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, inclusi la lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. L’“eventuale spesa prevista” è di 2,5 milioni di euro. Nel novembre 2017 se n’è aggiunta un’altra, rivolta a “programmi di formazione” dei libici del valore di 615mila euro circa (sempre tratti dal Fondo Africa). Quindi si parte dalle intese e poi si passa ai contratti.

      Scorrendo quelli firmati dalla Direzione immigrazione e polizia delle frontiere del Viminale tra 2017 e 2018, e che riguardano specificamente commesse a beneficio di Tripoli, il “fornitore” è sempre lo stesso: Cantiere Navale Vittoria. È l’azienda di Adria -che non ha risposto alle nostre domande- a occuparsi della rimessa in efficienza di svariate imbarcazioni (tre da 14 metri, due da 35 e una da 22) custodite a Biserta (in Tunisia) e “da restituire allo Stato della Libia”. Ma anche della formazione di 21 “operatori della polizia libica” per la loro “conduzione” o del trasporto di un’altra nave di 18 metri da Tripoli a Biserta. La somma degli appalti sfiora complessivamente i 3 milioni di euro. In alcuni casi, il Viminale dichiara di non avere alternative al cantiere veneto. Lo ha riconosciuto la Direzione in un decreto di affidamento urgente per la formazione di 22 “operatori di polizia libica” e la riconsegna di tre motovedette a fine 2017. Poiché Cantiere Navale Vittoria avrebbe un “patrimonio informativo peculiare”, qualunque ricerca di “soluzioni alternative” sarebbe “irragionevole”. Ecco perché in diverse “riunioni bilaterali di esperti” per la cooperazione tra Italia e Libia “in materia migratoria”, oltre alla delegazione libica (i vertici dell’Amministrazione generale per la sicurezza costiera del ministero dell’Interno) e quella italiana (tra cui l’allora direttore del Servizio immigrazione del Viminale, Vittorio Pisani), c’erano anche i rappresentanti di Cantiere Navale Vittoria.
      Se i concorrenti sono pochi, la fretta è tanta. In più di un appalto verso la Libia, infatti, la Direzione ha argomentato le procedure di “estrema urgenza” segnalando come “ulteriori indugi”, ad esempio “nella riconsegna delle imbarcazioni”, non solo “verrebbero a gravare ingiustificatamente sugli oneri di custodia […] ma potrebbero determinare difficoltà anche di tipo diplomatico con l’interlocutore libico”. È successo nell’estate 2018 anche per l’ultimo “avviso esplorativo” da quasi 1 milione di euro collegato a quattro training (di quattro settimane) destinati a cinque equipaggi “a bordo di due unità navali da 35 metri, un’unità navale da 22 metri e un’unità navale da 28 metri di proprietà libica”, “al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Lo scopo è fornire una “preparazione adeguata su ogni aspetto delle unità navali”. Della materia “diritti umani” non c’è traccia.

      Questa specifica iniziativa italiana deriva dal Memorandum d’Intesa con la Libia sottoscritto a Roma dal governo Gentiloni (Marco Minniti ministro dell’Interno), il 2 febbraio 2017. Il nostro Paese si era impegnato a “fornire supporto tecnico e tecnologico agli organismi libici incaricati della lotta contro l’immigrazione clandestina”. È da lì che i governi di Italia e Libia decidono di includere tra le attività di cooperazione anche l’erogazione dei corsi di addestramento sulle motovedette ancorate a Biserta.

      Ai primi di maggio del 2018, il Viminale decide di accelerare. C’è l’“urgenza di potenziare, attraverso la rimessa in efficienza delle imbarcazioni e l’erogazione di corsi di conduzione operativa, il capacity building della Guardia Costiera libica, al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Anche perché, aggiunge il ministero, “alla luce degli ultimi eventi di partenze di migranti dalle coste libiche”, “appare strettamente necessario ed urgente favorire il pieno ripristino dell’efficienza delle competenti Autorità dello Stato della Libia nell’erogazione dei servizi istituzionali”. E così a fine giugno 2018 viene pubblicato il bando: i destinatari sono “operatori della polizia libica” e non invece le guardie costiere. Il ministero ha dovuto però “rimodulare” in corsa l’imposto a base d’asta della gara (da 763mila a 993mila euro). Perché? Il capitolato degli oneri e il verbale di stima relativi al valore complessivo dell’intera procedura sarebbero risultati “non remunerativi” per l’unico operatore interessato: Cantiere Navale Vittoria Spa, che avrebbe comunicato “di non poter sottoscrivere un’offerta adeguata”.

      Le risorse per quest’ultimo appalto non arrivano dal Fondo Africa ma da uno dei sei progetti finanziati in Libia dall’Unione europea tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. Quello che ci riguarda in particolare s’intitola “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, del valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro. Mentre l’Ue è il principale finanziatore, chi deve implementarlo in loco, dal luglio 2017, è proprio il nostro ministero dell’Interno. Che è attivo in due aree della Libia: a Nord-Ovest, a Tripoli, a beneficio delle guardie costiere libiche (tramite la costituzione di un centro di coordinamento per le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso in mare e per la dichiarazione di un’area di ricerca e soccorso in mare autonoma), e una a Sud-Ovest, nella regione del Fezzan, nel distretto di Ghat, per incrementare la capacità di sorveglianza, “in particolare nelle aree di frontiera terrestre con il Niger, maggiormente colpita dall’attraversamento illegale”. È previsto inoltre un “progetto pilota” per istituire una sede operativa per circa 300 persone, ripristinando ed equipaggiando le esistenti strutture nella città di Talwawet, non lontano da Ghat, con tre avamposti da 20 persone l’uno.

      A un passo da lì c’è il Niger, l’altra tessera del mosaico. Alla metà di dicembre 2018, non risultano appalti in capo alla Direzione frontiere del Viminale, ma ciò non significa che il nostro Paese non sia attivo per supportare (anche) la gestione dei suoi confini. A metà 2017, infatti, l’Italia ha destinato 50 milioni di euro all’EU Trust Fund per “far fronte alle cause profonde della migrazione in Africa/Finestra Sahel e Lago Ciad”, con un’attenzione particolare al Niger. Si punta alla “creazione di nuove unità specializzate necessarie al controllo delle frontiere, di nuovi posti di frontiera fissa, o all’ammodernamento di quelli esistenti, di un nuovo centro di accoglienza per i migranti a Dirkou, nonché per la riattivazione della locale pista di atterraggio”. In più, dal 2018 è scesa sul campo la “Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger” (MISIN) che fa capo al ministero della Difesa e ha tra i suoi obiettivi quello di “concorrere alle attività di sorveglianza delle frontiere”. Il primo corso “per istruttori di ordine pubblico a favore della gendarmeria nigerina” si è concluso a metà ottobre 2018. Pochi mesi prima, a luglio, era stata sottoscritta un’altra “intesa tecnica” tra Esteri e Difesa per rimettere in efficienza e cedere dieci ambulanze e tre autobotti. Finalità? “Il controllo del territorio volto alla prevenzione e al contrasto ai traffici di esseri umani e al traffico di migranti, e per l’assistenza ai migranti nell’ambito delle attività di ricerca e soccorso”: 880mila euro circa. Il Niger è centrale: stando all’ultima programmazione dei Paesi e dei settori in cui sono previsti finanziamenti tramite il “Fondo Africa” (agosto 2018, fonte ministero degli Esteri), il Paese è davanti alla Libia (6 milioni contro 5 di importo massimo preventivato).

      Inabissatosi in Niger, il ministero dell’Interno riemerge in Egitto. Anche lì vigono “accordi internazionali diretti al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina” sostenuti dall’Italia. La loro traduzione interessa da vicino la succursale italiana della Hewlett-Packard (HP). Risale infatti a fine 2006 un contratto stipulato tra la multinazionale e la Direzione del Viminale “per la realizzazione di un Sistema automatizzato di identificazione delle impronte (AFIS) per lo Stato dell’Egitto”, finalizzato alle “esigenze di identificazione personale correlate alla immigrazione illegale”: oltre 5,2 milioni di euro per il periodo 2007-2012, cui se ne sono aggiunti ulteriori 1,8 milioni per la manutenzione ininterrotta fino al 2017 e quasi 500mila per l’ultima tranche, 2018-2019. HP non ha avversari -come riporta il Viminale- in forza di un “accordo in esclusiva” tra la Hewlett Packard Enterprise e la multinazionale della sicurezza informatica Gemalto “in relazione ai prodotti AFIS per lo Stato dell’Egitto”. Affari che non si possono discutere: “L’interruzione del citato servizio -sostiene la Direzione- è suscettibile di creare gravi problemi nell’attività di identificazione dei migranti e nel contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina, in un momento in cui tale attività è di primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale”. Oltre alla partnership con HP, il ministero dell’Interno si spende direttamente in Egitto. Di fronte alle “esigenze scaturenti dalle gravissimi crisi internazionali in vaste aree dell’Africa e dell’Asia” che avrebbero provocato “massicci esodi di persone e crescenti pressioni migratorie verso l’Europa”, la Direzione centrale immigrazione (i virgolettati sono suoi) si è fatta promotrice di una “proposta progettuale” chiamata “International Training at Egyptian Police Academy” (ITEPA). Questa prevede l’istituzione di un “centro di formazione internazionale” sui temi migratori per 360 funzionari di polizia e ufficiali di frontiera di ben 22 Paesi africani presso l’Accademia della polizia egiziana de Il Cairo. Il “protocollo tecnico” è stato siglato nel settembre 2017 tra il direttore dell’Accademia di polizia egiziana ed il direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere. Nel marzo 2018, il capo della Polizia Gabrielli è volato a Il Cairo per il lancio del progetto. “Il rispetto dei diritti umani -ha dichiarato in quella sede- è uno degli asset fondamentali”.

      “La legittimità, la finalità e la consistenza di una parte dei finanziamenti citati con le norme di diritto nazionale e internazionale sono stati studiati e in alcuni casi anche portati davanti alle autorità giudiziarie dai legali dell’Associazione studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi, asgi.it)”, spiega l’avvocato Giulia Crescini, parte del collegio dell’associazione che si è occupato della vicenda. “Quando abbiamo chiesto lo stato di implementazione dell’accordo internazionale Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017, il ministero dell’Interno ha opposto generiche motivazioni di pericolo alla sicurezza interna e alle relazioni internazionali, pertanto il ricorso dopo essere stato rigettato dal Tar Lazio è ora pendente davanti al Consiglio di Stato”. La trasparenza insegue la frontiera.

      –-----------------------------

      “LEONARDO” (FINMECCANICA) E GLI INTERESSI SULLE FRONTIERE

      In Tunisia, Libia, Egitto e Niger, l’azienda Leonardo (Finmeccanica) avrebbe in corso “attività promozionali per tecnologie di sicurezza e controllo del territorio”. Alla richiesta di dettagli, la società ha risposto di voler “rivitalizzare i progetti in sospeso e proporne altri, fornendo ai Governi sistemi e tecnologie all’avanguardia per la sicurezza dei Paesi”. Leonardo è già autorizzata a esportare materiale d’armamento in quei contesti, ma non a Tripoli. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, infatti, ha approvato la Risoluzione 2420 che estende l’embargo sulle armi nel Paese per un altro anno. “Nel prossimo futuro -fa sapere l’azienda di cui il ministero dell’Economia è principale azionista- il governo di accordo nazionale potrà richiedere delle esenzioni all’embargo ONU sulle armi, per combattere il terrorismo”. Alla domanda se Leonardo sia coinvolta o operativa nell’ambito di iniziative collegate al fondo fiduciario per l’Africa dell’Unione europea e in particolare al programma da 46 milioni di euro coordinato dal Viminale, in tema di frontiere libiche, l’azienda ha fatto sapere che “in passato” avrebbe “collaborato con le autorità libiche per lo sviluppo e implementazione di sistemi per il monitoraggio dei confini meridionali, nonché sistemi di sicurezza costiera per il controllo, la ricerca e il salvataggio in mare”. Attualmente la società starebbe “esplorando opportunità in ambito europeo volte allo sviluppo di un progetto per il controllo dei flussi migratori dall’Africa all’Europa, consistente in un sistema di sicurezza e sorveglianza costiero con centri di comando e controllo”.

      Export in Libia. Il “caso” Prodit

      Nei primi sei mesi del 2018, attraverso l’Autorità nazionale UAMA (Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali d’armamento), l’Italia ha autorizzato l’esportazione di “materiale d’armamento” verso la Libia per un valore di circa 4,8 milioni di euro. Nel 2017 questa cifra era zero. Si tratta, come impone la normativa in tema di embargo, di materiali “non letali”. L’ammontare è minimo se paragonato al totale delle licenze autorizzate a livello mondiale dall’Italia tra gennaio e giugno 2018 (3,2 miliardi di euro). Chi esporta è una singola azienda, l’unica iscritta al Registro Nazionale delle Imprese presso il Segretariato Generale del ministero della Difesa: Prodit Engineering Srl. In Libia non ha esportato armi ma un veicolo terrestre modificato come fuoristrada e materiali utilizzabili per sminamento.

      https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta

      #Leonardo #Finmeccanica #Egypte #Tunisie #identification #P350 #Brescia_Antincendi_International #Virgilio_D’Amata #Massimo_Bontempi #Yamaha #Minniti #Marco_Minniti #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_nella_Repubblica_del_Niger #MISIN #Hewlett-Packard #AFIS #International_Training_at_Egyptian_Police_Academy #ITEPA

    • "La frontiera è un buon affare": l’inchiesta sul contrasto del Viminale all’immigrazione «clandestina» a suon di appalti pubblici

      Dalla Tunisia alla Libia, dal Niger all’Egitto: così lo Stato italiano finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, formazione a suon di appalti pubblici. I documenti presentati a Roma dall’Arci.

      «Quando si parla di esternalizzazione della frontiera e di diritto di asilo bisogna innanzitutto individuare i Paesi maggiormente interessati da queste esternalizzazioni, capire quali sono i meccanismi che si vuole andare ad attaccare, creare un caso e prenderlo tempestivamente. Ma spesso per impugnare un atto ci vogliono 60 giorni, le tempistiche sono precise, e intraprendere azioni giudiziarie per tutelare i migranti diventa spesso molto difficile. Per questo ci appoggiamo all’Arci». A parlare è Giulia Crescini, avvocato dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, che insieme a Filippo Miraglia, responsabile immigrazione di ARCI, Sara Prestianni, coordinatrice del progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch, e Duccio Facchini, giornalista di Altreconomia, ha fatto il punto sugli appalti della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno e più in generale dei fondi europei ed italiani stanzianti per implementare le politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo delle frontiere in Africa.

      L’inchiesta. Duccio Facchini, presentando i dati dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia «La frontiera è un buon affare», ha illustrato i meccanismi di una vera e propria strategia che ha uno dei suoi punti d’origine in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco - dove ha sede una delle principale aziende specializzate in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare - e arriva a toccare Tripoli, Niamey o Il Cairo. Il filo rosso che lega gli affidamenti milionari è uno solo: fermare il flusso di persone dirette in Italia e in Europa. Anche utilizzando fondi destinati alla cooperazione e senza alcun vaglio parlamentare.

      Il Fondo Africa, istituito con la legge di bilancio 2017, art. 1 comma 621 per l’anno 2018, è pari a 200 milioni di euro, cifra che serve per attivare forme di collaborazione e cooperazione con i Paesi maggiormente interessati dal fenomeno della migrazione, anche se l’espressione in sé significa tutto e niente. «Questo fondo - ha spiegato Facchini in conferenza nella sede Arci lo scorso 6 febbraio - viene dato al ministero degli Affari esteri internazionali che individua quali sono questi Paesi: nello specifico il ministero ha indicato una sfilza di Paesi africani, dal Niger alla Libia alla Tunisia, passando per l’Egitto la Costa d’Avorio, indicando anche una serie di attività che possono essere finanziate con questi soldi. Tra queste c’è la dotazione di strumentazioni utili per il controllo della frontiera». Gli autori dell’inchiesta hanno chiesto al ministero l’elenco dei provvedimenti che sono stati messi in campo e per attivare questa protezione alla frontiera. «Siamo alla fine del 2017 e notiamo che tra questi ce n’è uno che stanzia 2 milioni e mezzo per la messa in opera di quattro motovedette. Da lì cominciamo a domandarci se in base alla normativa italiana è legittimo dare una strumentazione così specifica a delle autorità così notoriamente coinvolte nella tortura e nella violenza dei migranti. Quindi abbiamo strutturato un ricorso giuridicamente molto complicato per cercare di interloquire con il giudice amministrativo». Notoriamente il giudice amministrativo non è mai coinvolto in questioni relative al diritto di asilo - per capire: è il giudice degli appalti - ed è insomma colui che va a verificare se la pubblica amministrazione ha adempiuto bene al suo compito.

      l punto di partenza. «Il giudice amministrativo e la pubblica amministrazione – ha spiegato Giulia Crescini dell’Asgi - stanno sempre in un rapporto molto delicato fra loro perché la pubblica amministrazione ha un ambito di discrezionalità all’interno del quale il giudice non può mai entrare, quindi la PA ha dei limiti che vengono messi dalla legge e all’interno di quei limiti il ministero può decidere come spendere quei soldi. Secondo noi quei limiti sono superati, perché la legge non autorizza a rafforzare delle autorità che poi commettono crimini contro i migranti, riportando queste persone sulla terra ferma in una condizione di tortura, soprattutto nei centri di detenzione». I legati hanno dunque avviato questo ricorso, ricevendo, qualche settimana fa, la sentenza di rigetto di primo grado. La sentenza è stata pubblicata il 7 gennaio e da quel giorno a oggi i quattro avvocati hanno studiato le parole del giudice, chiedendo alle altre organizzazioni che avevano presentato insieme a loro il ricorso se avessero intenzione o meno di fare appello. «Studiando la sentenza - continua Crescini - ci siamo accorti di come. pur essendo un rigetto, non avesse poi un contenuto così negativo: il giudice amministrativo in realtà è andato a verificare effettivamente se la pubblica amministrazione avesse speso bene o meno questo soldi, cioè se avesse esercitato in modo corretto o scorretto la discrezionalità di cui sopra. Un fatto che non è affatto scontato. Il giudice amministrativo è andato in profondità, segnalando il fatto che non ci sono sufficienti prove di tortura nei confronti dei migranti da parte delle autorità. Dal punto di vista giuridico questo rappresenta una vittoria. Perché il giudice ha ristretto un ambito molto specifico su cui potremo lavorare davanti al Consiglio di Stato».

      La frontiera è un buon affare. L’inchiesta «La frontiera è un buon affare» rivela che lo sforzo politico che vede impegnate Italia e istituzioni europee nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce direttamente in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza.

      La dimensione europea della migrazione - si legge in un comunicato diffuso da Arci - si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione a favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza e alla repressione del fenomeno migratorio. La logica dell’esternalizzazione, diventata pilastro della strategia tanto europea quanto italiana di gestione delle frontiere, assume in questo modo, sempre più, una dimensione tecnologica e militare, assecondando le pressioni della lobby dell’industria della sicurezza per l’implementazione di questo mercato. L’uso dei fondi è guidato da una tendenza alla flessibilità con un conseguente e evidente rischio di opacità, conveniente per il rafforzamento di una politica securitaria della migrazione.

      Nel MFF - Multiannual Financial Framework - che definisce il budget europeo per un periodo di 7 anni e ora in discussione tripartita tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio - si evidenzia l’intento strategico al netto dei proclami e dei comizi della politica: la migrazione è affrontata principalmente dal punto di vista della gestione del fenomeno e del controllo delle frontiere con un incremento di fondi fino a 34 miliardi di euro per questo settore.

      A questo capitolo di spesa - si legge ancora nel comunicato - contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi, dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna - che passa dai 3,4 del 2014/20120 ai 4,8 miliardi del 2021/2027 e che può essere speso anche per la gestione esterna delle frontiere - a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, una tendenza che si palesa con evidenza nelle due missioni militari nostrane in Libia e Niger.

      Dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e quello per la Pace, una buona parte saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuova tecnologia militare, utilizzabili anche per la creazione di muri nel mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica anche per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi provenienti dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo centrale.

      Sulla pelle dei migranti. Chi ne fa le spese, spiegano gli autori dell’inchiesta, sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e proprio business. Questa connessione e interdipendenza tra politici e lobby della sicurezza, che sfiora a tutto gli effetti il conflitto di interessi, è risultata evidente nel corso del SRE «Research on security event» tenutosi a Bruxelles a fine dicembre su proposta della presidenza austriaca. Seduti negli stessi panel rappresentanti della commissione dell’Agenzia Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza, manifestavano interesse per un obbiettivo comune: la creazione di un mercato europeo della sicurezza dove lotta al terrorismo e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente

      «Il Governo Italiano si iscrive perfettamente nella logica europea, dalle missioni militari con una chiara missione di controllo delle frontiere in Niger e Libia al rinnovo del Fondo Africa, rifinanziato con 80 milioni per il 2018/2019, che condiziona le politiche di sviluppo a quelle d’immigrazione», dichiara ancora Arci. «Molti i dubbi che solleva questa deriva politica direttamente tradotta nell’uso dei fondi europei e nazionali: dalle tragiche conseguenze sulla sistematica violazione delle convenzione internazionali a una riflessione più ampia sull’opacità dell’uso dei fondi e del ruolo sempre più centrale dell’industria della sicurezza per cui la politica repressiva di chiusura sistematica delle frontiere non è altro che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire, dimenticandosi del costo in termine di vite umane di questa logica».

      https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2019/02/07/news/la_frontiera_e_un_buon_affare-218538251

    • Appalti sulle frontiere: 30 mezzi di terra alla Libia dall’Italia per fermare i migranti

      Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità di Tripoli nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per il “contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. Un appalto da 2,1 milioni di euro finanziato tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa”, nell’ambito del quale l’Italia accresce il proprio ruolo. Il tutto mentre l’immagine ostentata di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del Viminale

      Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità della Libia trenta nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. L’avviso esplorativo pubblicato dalla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il Viminale, risale al 5 marzo 2019 (scadenza per la presentazione della manifestazione d’interesse all’8 aprile di quest’anno).

      La fornitura riguarda 30 mezzi “Toyota Land Cruiser” (15 del modello GRJ76 Petrol e 15 del GRJ79 DC Petrol), in “versione tropicalizzata”, relativamente ai quali le autorità libiche, il 24 dicembre 2018, avrebbero esplicitato alla Direzione di Roma precise “specifiche tecniche”. Il Viminale la definisce una “richiesta di assistenza tecnica” proveniente da Tripoli per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. In forza di questa “strategia”, dunque, il governo italiano -in linea con i precedenti, come abbiamo raccontato a gennaio nell’inchiesta sugli “affari lungo le frontiere”– continua a equipaggiare le autorità del Paese Nord-africano per contrastare i flussi migratori. L’ammontare “massimo” degli ultimi due lotti (da 15 mezzi l’uno) è stimato in 2,1 milioni di euro.

      E così come è stato per la gara d’appalto da oltre 9,3 milioni di euro per la fornitura di 20 imbarcazioni destinate alla polizia libica, indetta dal Viminale a fine dicembre 2018, anche nel caso dei 30 mezzi Toyota le risorse arriveranno dal “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. In particolare, dal progetto implementato dal Viminale e intitolato “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, dal valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro e il cui “delegation agreement” risale a metà dicembre 2017 (governo Gentiloni, ministro competente Marco Minniti).

      Questo non è l’unico progetto finanziato tramite l’EU Trust Fund che vede il ministero dell’Interno italiano attivo nel continente africano. Alla citata “First Phase”, infatti, se ne sono affiancati nel tempo altri due. Uno è di stanza in Tunisia e Marocco (“Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region”), datato luglio 2018 e dal valore di 55 milioni di euro. L’altro progetto, di nuovo, ricade in Libia. Si tratta del “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – Second Phase”, risalente al 13 dicembre 2018, per un ammontare di altri 45 milioni di euro. Le finalità dichiarate nell’”Action Document” della seconda fase in Libia sono -tra le altre- quelle di “intensificare gli sforzi fatti”, “sviluppare nuove aree d’intervento”, “rafforzare le capacità delle autorità competenti che sorvegliano i confini marittimi e terrestri”, “l’acquisto di altre navi”, “l’implementazione della rete di comunicazione del Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre” di Tripoli, “la progettazione specifica di programmi per la neocostituita polizia del deserto”.

      La strategia di contrasto paga, sostiene la Commissione europea. “Gli sforzi dell’Ue e dell’Italia nel sostenere la Guardia costiera libica per migliorare la sua capacità operativa hanno raggiunto risultati significativi e tangibili nel 2018”, afferma nel lancio della “seconda fase”. Di “significativo e tangibile” c’è il crollo degli sbarchi sulle coste italiane, in particolare dalla Libia. Dati del Viminale alla mano, infatti, nel periodo compreso tra l’1 gennaio e il 7 marzo 2017 giunsero 15.843 persone, scese a 5.457 lo scorso anno e arrivate a 335 quest’anno. La frontiera è praticamente sigillata. Un “successo” che nasconde la tragedia dei campi di detenzione e sequestro libici dove migliaia di persone sono costrette a rimanere.

      È in questa cornice che giunge il nuovo “avviso” del Viminale dei 30 veicoli, pubblicato come detto il 5 marzo. Quello stesso giorno il vice-presidente del Consiglio e ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, ha incontrato a Roma il vicepremier libico Ahmed Maiteeq. Un “cordiale colloquio”, come recita il comunicato ministeriale, che avrebbe visto sul tavolo “i rapporti tra i due Paesi, in particolare su sicurezza, lotta al terrorismo, immigrazione e stabilizzazione politica della Libia”.

      Ma l’immagine ostentata dal governo Conte di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del ministero dell’Interno. Tra i quesiti presentati al Viminale da parte dei potenziali concorrenti al bando dei 20 battelli da destinare alla polizia libica, infatti, si trovano richieste esplicite di “misure atte a garantire la sicurezza dei propri operatori”. “Laddove si rendesse strettamente necessario effettuare interventi di garanzia richiesti in loco (Libia)”, gli operatori di mercato hanno chiesto alla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere “che tali prestazioni potranno essere organizzate a patto che le imbarcazioni si trovino in città (Tripoli, ndr) per garantire la sicurezza degli operatori inviati per tali prestazioni”. Il ministero dell’Interno conferma il quadro di instabilità del Paese: “Le condizioni di sicurezza in Libia devono essere attentamente valutate in ragione della contingenza al momento dell’esecuzione del contratto”, è la replica al quesito. “Appare di tutto evidenza che la sicurezza degli operatori non dovrà essere compromessa in relazione ai rischi antropici presenti all’interno dello Stato beneficiario della commessa”. Per gli operatori, non per i migranti in fuga.

      https://altreconomia.it/appalti-libia-frontiere-terra
      #Libye