• #ICARUS – Tracking animals from space

    With the help of the ICARUS satellite system initiated by #Martin_Wikelski it will be possible to observe even small animals constantly and around the world, an improvement over the simple marking of birds with rings. ICARUS, which is short for #International_Cooperation_for_Animal_Research_Using_Space, consists of an on-board computer and a large antenna attached to the #ISS space station that receives data from the animal’s sensors and then sends it back to earth for analysis. This data is not only available to researchers in Konstanz but to the entire scientific community worldwide. It ushers in a new era in both animal research and animal protection.

    ICARUS will make it possible to track animal migrations across all continents - in real time and 3-D. Furthermore, researchers will be able to collect data on the environment (like wind strength and direction) as well as on the distribution of virus strains with the help of these tagged animals and the ICARUS system. ICARUS will thus not only give us a better understanding of the interplay between animal migration and the global ecosystem, but it will also help us to predict natural disasters.

    https://www.campus.uni-konstanz.de/en/science/icarus-tracking-animals-from-space#slide-1

    –-----
    Animal Tracker #App

    Mit den Miniatursendern können die Wissenschaftler die Position der besenderten Tiere auf wenige Meter genau bestimmen. Sie wissen aber nur selten, was die Tiere an diesen Positionen machen. Fressen sie und wenn ja, was? Oder ruhen sie sich aus? Sind sie alleine, oder mit vielen Artgenossen? Gibt es Interaktionen zwischen den Tieren? Solche Beobachtungen sind für die Interpretation der Bewegungsdaten sehr wichtig.


    https://www.icarus.mpg.de/4331/animal-tracker-app

    –-> ielles cherchent des volontaires...
    https://www.campus.uni-konstanz.de/en/science/icarus-tracking-animals-from-space#slide-11

    #animaux #mobilité #mouvement #déplacement #base_de_données #satellite #migrations

  • Deportation Union: Rights, accountability and the EU’s push to increase forced removals

    Deportation Union provides a critical examination of recently-introduced and forthcoming EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. It focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex.

    There has long-been coordinated policy, legal and operational action on migration at EU level, and efforts to increase deportations have always been a part of this. However, since the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 there has been a rapid increase in new initiatives, the overall aim of which is to limit legal protections afforded to ‘deportable’ individuals at the same time as expanding the ability of national and EU authorities to track, detain and remove people with increasing efficiency.

    The measures and initiatives being introduced by the EU to scale up deportations will require massive public expenditure on technology, infrastructure and personnel; the strengthening and expansion of state and supranational agencies already-lacking in transparency and democratic accountability; and are likely to further undermine claims that the EU occupies the moral high ground in its treatment of migrants. Anyone wishing to question and challenge these developments will first need to understand them. This report attempts to go some way towards assisting with that task.


    https://www.statewatch.org/deportation-union-rights-accountability-and-the-eu-s-push-to-increase-fo
    #machine_à_expulser #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #UE #EU #rapport #union_européenne #renvois_forcés #rapport #Statewatch #Frontex #database #base_de_données #données_biométriques #Directive_Retour #return-opticon #Joint_return_operations (#JROs) #Collecting_return_operations #National_return_operations #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #European_Centre_for_Returns #statistiques #chiffres #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @etraces

  • Academic Sexual Misconduct Database

    The Academic Sexual Misconduct Database was initiated in February 2016. The compilation of these data and the creation of the database is done entirely through volunteer effort. This database includes public cases of academic sexual misconduct, including violation of relationship policies. All cases are based on publicly available documents or media reports, and only cases documented publicly can be included. For now, the database is limited to cases within the United States and its territories.

    The database is intended to serve as an Open Access (OA) resource.


    https://academic-sexual-misconduct-database.org/incidents

    #base_de_données #name_and_shame #name&shame #harcèlement_sexuel #harcèlement #université #liste #mee_too #facs #USA #Etats-Unis

    ping @_kg_

  • Le #joli_rouge

    Le Joli Rouge est animé par la volonté de transmettre et de faire découvrir des #ouvrages autour de l’#anarchisme, du #féminisme ou de l’#éthique_animale.

    Ici, vous trouverez bientôt une boutique proposant différents ouvrages sur ces thèmes.
    Cette page propose des articles, textes et ouvrages diponibles gratuitement.

    https://lejolirouge.fr

    Interview à l’initiateur du site :
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNS46L4gcdo&feature=youtu.be

    #textes #documents #livres #database #base_de_données

  • Automated suspicion: The EU’s new travel surveillance initiatives

    This report examines how the EU is using new technologies to screen, profile and risk-assess travellers to the Schengen area, and the risks this poses to civil liberties and fundamental rights.

    By developing ‘interoperable’ biometric databases, introducing untested profiling tools, and using new ‘pre-crime’ watchlists, people visiting the EU from all over the world are being placed under a veil of suspicion in the name of enhancing security.

    Watch the animation below for an overview of the report. A laid-out version will be available shortly. You can read the press release here: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/july/eu-to-deploy-controversial-technologies-on-holidaymakers-and-business-tr

    –----

    Executive summary

    The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has raised the possibility of widespread surveillance and location tracking for the purpose of disease control, setting alarm bells ringing amongst privacy advocates and civil rights campaigners. However, EU institutions and governments have long been set on the path of more intensive personal data processing for the purpose of migration control, and these developments have in some cases passed almost entirely under the radar of the press and civil society organisations.

    This report examines, explains and critiques a number of large-scale EU information systems currently being planned or built that will significantly extend the collection and use of biometric and biographic data taken from visitors to the Schengen area, made up of 26 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In particular, it examines new systems being introduced to track, analyse and assess the potential security, immigration or public health risks posed by non-EU citizens who have to apply for either a short-stay visa or a travel authorisation – primarily the #Visa_Information_System (#VIS), which is being upgraded, and the #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS), which is currently under construction.

    The visa obligation has existed for years. The forthcoming travel authorisation obligation, which will cover citizens of non-EU states who do not require a visa, is new and will massively expand the amount of data the EU holds on non-citizens. It is the EU’s equivalent of the USA’s ESTA, Canada’s eTA and Australia’s ETA.[1] These schemes represent a form of “government permission to travel,” to borrow the words of Edward Hasbrouck,[2] and they rely on the extensive processing of personal data.

    Data will be gathered on travellers themselves as well as their families, education, occupation and criminal convictions. Fingerprints and photographs will be taken from all travellers, including from millions of children from the age of six onwards. This data will not just be used to assess an individual’s application, but to feed data mining and profiling algorithms. It will be stored in large-scale databases accessible to hundreds of thousands of individuals working for hundreds of different public authorities.

    Much of this data will also be used to feed an enormous new database holding the ‘identity data’ – fingerprints, photographs, names, nationalities and travel document data – of non-EU citizens. This system, the #Common_Identity_Repository (#CIR), is being introduced as part of the EU’s complex ‘interoperability’ initiative and aims to facilitate an increase in police identity checks within the EU. It will only hold the data of non-EU citizens and, with only weak anti-discrimination safeguards in the legislation, raises the risk of further entrenching racial profiling in police work.

    The remote monitoring and control of travellers is also being extended through the VIS upgrade and the introduction of ETIAS. Travel companies are already obliged to check, prior to an individual boarding a plane, coach or train, whether they have the visa required to enter the Schengen area. This obligation will be extended to include travel authorisations, with travel companies able to use the central databases of the VIS and ETIAS to verify whether a person’s paperwork is in order or not. When people arrive at the Schengen border, when they are within the Schengen area and long after they leave, their personal data will remain stored in these systems and be available for a multitude of further uses.

    These new systems and tools have been presented by EU institutions as necessary to keep EU citizens safe. However, the idea that more personal data gathering will automatically lead to greater security is a highly questionable claim, given that the authorities already have problems dealing with the data they hold now.

    Furthermore, a key part of the ‘interoperability’ agenda is the cross-matching and combination of data on tens of millions of people from a host of different databases. Given that the EU’s databases are already-known to be strewn with errors, this massively increases the risks of mistakes in decision making in a policy field – immigration – that already involves a high degree of discretion and which has profound implications for peoples’ lives.

    These new systems have been presented by their proponents as almost-inevitable technological developments. This is a misleading idea which masks the political and ethical judgments that lie behind the introduction of any new technology. It would be fairer to say that EU lawmakers have chosen to introduce unproven, experimental technologies – in particular, automated profiling – for use on non-EU citizens, who have no choice in the matter and are likely to face difficulties in exercising their rights.

    Finally, the introduction of new databases designed to hold data on tens of millions of non-citizens rests on the idea that our public authorities can be trusted to comply with the rules and will not abuse the new troves of data to which they are being given access. Granting access to more data to more people inevitably increases the risk of individual abuses. Furthermore, the last decade has seen numerous states across the EU turn their back on fundamental rights and democratic standards, with migrants frequently used as scapegoats for society’s ills. In a climate of increased xenophobia and social hostility to foreigners, it is extremely dangerous to assert that intrusive data-gathering will counterbalance a supposed threat posed by non-citizens.

    Almost all the legislation governing these systems has now been put in place. What remains is for them to be upgraded or constructed and put into use. Close attention should be paid by lawmakers, journalists, civil society organisations and others to see exactly how this is done. If all non-citizens are to be treated as potential risks and assessed, analysed, monitored and tracked accordingly, it may not be long before citizens come under the same veil of suspicion.

    https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives

    #vidéo:
    https://vimeo.com/437830786

    #suspects #suspicion #frontières #rapport #StateWatch #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
    #surveillance #profiling #database #base_de_données #données_personnelles #empreintes_digitales #enfants #agences_de_voyage #privatisation #interopérabilité

    ping @mobileborders @isskein @etraces @reka

  • Datenbank der im Sklavenhandel involvierten Schweizer

    Cooperaxion fördert die nachhaltige Entwicklung und den interkulturellen Austausch entlang der einstigen Sklavenhandelsrouten.

    Die Datenbank von Cooperaxion dokumentiert auf einzigartige Weise die Geschäfte der verschiedenen Schweizer Akteure während des transatlantischen Sklavenhandels des 17. bis 19. Jahrhunderts.
    Zur Zeit sind über 260 Datensätze veröffentlicht, bei weiteren stehen noch Recherchen an.

    Die Suchfunktion findet Stichwörter nach Name, Herkunftskanton, Tätigkeitsregion, Detailinformation oder dem Zeitraum.

    Sie können die Tabelle sortieren, indem Sie auf den entsprechenden Spaltentitel klicken.

    Mit dem Detail-Link gelangen Sie auf eine Seite mit ausführlichen Informationen zur Person oder (Personen-)Gruppe.

    Thematisch vertiefte Hintergrund-Informationen zur Rolle der Schweiz im transatlantischen Sklavenhandel und Kolonialismus finden Sie unter Dokumentation: https://cooperaxion.org/?lang=fr.

    https://www.cooperaxion.ch

    –—

    Avec des fiches pour chaque entrée, ici par exemple Auguste de Stael :

    #esclavage #commerce_triangulaire #Suisse #base_de_données #database #commerce_d'esclaves #histoire #liste

    –----

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la Suisse coloniale :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/868109

    ping @reka @cede

  • Applis de #traçage : #scénarios pour les non-spécialistes
    https://framablog.org/2020/04/24/applis-de-tracage-scenarios-pour-les-non-specialistes

    Un document de plus sur les dangers de l’application de traçage ? Nous n’allons pas reproduire ici les 13 pages documentées et augmentées de notes de référence d’une équipe de 14 spécialistes en #cryptographie : Xavier Bonnetain, University of Waterloo, Canada ; Anne Canteaut, … Lire la suite­­

    #Droits_numériques #Framaconfinement #Internet_et_société #Libertés_Numériques #Non_classé #Anonymat #Applications #base_de_données #COVID-19 #Informatique #Libertés #Malware #Securite #StopCovid #Surveillance #tracking

  • Impacts of COVID-19 on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Insights from the ground

    Delve has organized this dedicated COVID-19 space to share information and resources about the impacts on the ASM sector. The space will also profile initiatives by partners to assist small-scale miners and their communities during the pandemic. We are organizing an exploratory COVID-19 Working Group to further share information. The Working Group’s first meeting was convened on April 6th and will continue to share information on an ongoing basis.

    https://delvedatabase.org/about/news-and-events/impacts-of-covid-19-on-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining-insights-from

    #mines #covid-19 #coronavirus #artisanal_miner_or small-scale_miner (#ASM) #Orpaillage #database #base_de_données

    ping @albertocampiphoto @reka

  • Une appli de #traçage du COVID 19 qui échappe à Big Brother ?
    https://framablog.org/2020/04/12/une-appli-de-tracage-du-covid-9-qui-echappe-a-big-brother

    Ou plutôt pas de traçage du tout ? Oui bien sûr, ce serait sans doute la meilleure solution compte tenu des inévitables « glissements » que redoute comme nous Hubert Guillaud dans cet article. Mais à l’heure même où se profile l’appli gouvernementale, … Lire la suite­­

    #Droits_numériques #Internet_et_société #Non_classé #Santé #aléatoire #application #base_de_données #BD #BigBrother #Comic #COVID-19 #Hôpital #Sante #StopCovid #ViePrivee

  • Compte twitter Counting Dead Women

    UK women killed by men or where a man is the principal/primary suspect. Account run by @k_ingalasmith

    https://twitter.com/countdeadwomen
    #féminicide #données #UK #Angleterre #femmes #meurtres #violence_domestique #violences_sexuelles

    Le fil est tenu par une chercheuse, une sociologue de l’université de Durham, #Karen_Ingala_Smith, dont voici le site perso :

    https://kareningalasmith.com

    Et sa page institutionnelle :

    Since 2009, I have been Chief Executive of nia, an East London based charity providing services for women, girls and children who have experienced sexual and domestic violence. Under my leadership, nia has maintained an undaunted feminist commitment to ending male violence. During an unfavourable economic climate, I have built upon nia’s reputation for innovative and creative ways of responding to the needs of the women and children it serves to become a highly regarded organisation championing an integrated approach to addressing all forms of male violence. nia’s services include East London Rape Crisis; The Emma Project –a unique refuge for women who have experienced domestic and sexual violence; Daria House – a refuge for women who have been sexually exploited with a focus on supporting women who been exploited through their involvement in prostitution; the London Exiting and Advocacy Project supporting women to exit prostitution; and the recently launched Huggett Women’s Centre.

    https://www.dur.ac.uk/sociology/staff/profile/?id=13884

    –-------

    The #Femicide_Census

    The Femicide Census is a unique source of comprehensive information about women who have been killed in the UK and the men who have killed them.

    Men’s violence against women is a leading cause of the premature death for women globally but research in the UK and Europe is limited and unconnected. The Femicide Census significantly improves upon currently available data by providing detailed comparable data about femicides in the UK since 2009, including demographic and social factors and the methods men selected to kill women. By collating femicides, we can see that these killings are not isolated incidents, and many follow repeated patterns.

    Launched in 2015, The Femicide Census was founded by Karen Ingala Smith and Clarissa O’Callaghan with support from Freshfields, Deloitte and Women’s Aid (England). It was inspired by information collected by Karen and recorded in her blog Counting Dead Women. Since then, The Femicide Census has become established as a leading articulation of men’s fatal violence against women in the UK. We are now ready to take the Femicide Census into its next phase as an independent entity.

    https://kareningalasmith.com/the-femicide-census

    #recensement #chiffres #statistiques #données #base_de_données

    –---

    Karen Ingala Smith est citée ici, en lien avec le coronavirus/covid-19 :
    Domestic abuse killings ’more than double’ amid Covid-19 lockdown
    https://seenthis.net/messages/831467#message843842

  • Recensement de personnes tuées par la police ou à cause de son action : 2005-2015

    VICTIMES DE LA POLICE ( connus ) DEPUIS 2005 ( en France ) :

    2005 : 6 morts, 3 blessés grave ( connus ) :

    Janvier : Abou Bakari Tandia meurt des suites de sa garde-à-vue au commissariat de Courbevoie (92).

    7 Mars : Balé Traoré grièvement blessé à bout pourtant par un policier dans le quartier de la Goutte d’Or ( paris 18) alors qu’il n’avait lui même pas d’arme.

    Avril : Un jeune de 17 ans, tué lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Aubervilliers (93)

    Octobre : Samir Abbache 26 ans, tué à la prison de Mulhouse (68)

    Octobre : Zied 17 ans et Bouna 15 ans, poursuivis par la police et morts électrocutés dans un transformateur à Clichy-sous-Bois (93).

    Novembre : Eric Blaise retrouvé mort dans des circonstances suspectes au mitard à Fleury-Mérogis (91)

    Juillet 2005 : Aux Mureaux ( 78) un adolescent de 14 ans touché par un tir de flash ball perd un œil.

    2006 : 10 morts, 7 blessés :

    Janvier : Eric Mourier 28 ans, mort au mitard de la prison Saint-Joseph (69).

    Mars 2006 : 2 frères insultés et battus par des policiers chez eux devant leur mère à Cergy (95).

    Mai : Fethi Traoré 31 ans, poursuivit par la police il se noie dans la Marne (94).

    29 Mai : Komotine mère de famille, insultée gazée menottée et traînée par 4 policiers devant ses enfants et ses voisins à Montfermeil ( 93).

    Juin : Vilhelm Covaci 20 ans, noyé dans le canal de Saint Denis (93) lors d’une poursuite

    Daniel Moldovan a également sauté dans l’eau avant d’être interpellé et tabassé jusqu’à en perdre connaissance.

    Deux réfugiés poursuivis, écrasés sur une autoroute à Calais (32). [juin 06]

    Octobre : Clichy-sous-Bois un jeune de 16 ans touché au flash ball perd un œil.

    Novembre : Taoufik El-Amri noyé par hydrocution dans un canal de Nantes (44) après un contrôle de police.

    Décembre :Guillaume Perrot retrouvé noyé à Corbeil-Essonnes après avoir été laissé seul sur la berge de la Seine par des policiers.

    Août : Albertine Sow enceinte au moment des faits a été frappée au ventre et gazée par des policiers alors qu’elle était témoin de violences policières à paris.

    2007 : 19 morts, 2 blessés :

    Janvier : Jonathan 24 ans mort en tombant d’un toit en voulant échapper à la police à Montpellier (34).

    Fevrier : Raouf et Tina 15 et 17 ans, morts lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Saint-Fons, près de Lyon (69). [fév 07] 1 rescapé de 16 ans, Myriam Bahmed 17 ans tombe dans le coma.

    Louis Mendy 34 ans père de famille, tué d’une balle dans la tête par un policier à Toulon (83).

    Pierre visé à la tête et frappé par un flash-ball dans une manifestation lycéenne. Pierre a perdu l’œil droit le 27 novembre 2007 à Nantes.

    Mai : 1 jeune de 17 ans blessé par balle par un policier à Grigny (91)

    Juin : Un homme de 58 ans, mort dans la cellule de dégrisement du commissariat à Bordeaux (33).

    Lamine Dieng 25 ans, meurt dans un fourgon de police à Paris (75).

    Nelson 14 ans mort après avoir été fauché par une voiture de police sur un passage clouté à Marseille (13). [juin 07]

    Elmi Mohammed 23 ans, mort noyé dans la Saône après avoir été poursuivi par la police (69). [juin 07]

    Juillet : 1 homme de 40 ans, tué par balle par des policiers du Service régional des transports de la gare du Nord à Paris. [27 juillet 2007]

    Ait Brahim Moulay Mohamed 27 ans, mort par pendaison dans les douches du centre de rétention administrative de Bordeaux (33).

    Un homme de 37 ans, mort lors de sa garde-à-vue à Rouen (76).

    Septembre : Un homme de 48 ans, mort dans une cellule de dégrisement au commissariat de Dieppe (76).

    Une femme de 51 ans Chulan Liu « sans papiers » morte après un saut par la fenêtre à l’arrivée de la police, Paris (75) ( 25 septembre 07)

    Joseph RANDOLPH 42 ans, mort suite à son interpellation.

    (Paris, 8 septembre )

    Novembre : Larami et Mushin morts suite à une collision avec une voiture de police à Villiers-le-Bel (95).

    2008 : 11 morts et au moins 7 bléssés ( connus)

    Janvier : Lu Semedo Da Veiga 28 ans, mort à la prison de Fresnes (94) suite à un refus de soins.

    Reda Semmoudi defenestré par la police lors d’une perquisition à Noisy-le-Sec (93).

    Avril : Baba Traoré 29 ans mort noyé dans la Marne (94) suite à une poursuite par la police.

    Mai : Abdelakim Ajimi mort étouffé par plusieurs policiers à Grasse (06).

    Joseph Guerdner 27 ans tué de 7 balles dans le dos en fuyant menotté dans le Var (83).

    Lamba Soukouna 28 ans frappé à coup de crosse et de flash ball à la tête par un brigadier en présence de 3 autres « collègues » à Villepinte. [8 mai 2008] Lamba souffre de la drépanocytose, il a porté plainte.

    Juin : Mohamed 39 ans père de famille tué par balles à Corbeil-Essonnes (91). [19 juin08]

    Salem Essouli, mort par manque de soins au centre de rétention administrative de Vincennes (75).

    Août : Fakraddine Zarai Zarai 30 ans, mort par pendaison au radiateur de sa cellule dans la prison de Saint Quentin Fallavier à Lyon (69). [8 août 2008] A 2 semaines de sa libération.

    Septembre :Ilies 16 ans mort lors d’une poursuite par des policiers de la BAC de Romans sur Isére (Drôme). [29 septembre 2008]

    Octobre : Elvis Akpa mort suite à une chute du septième étage en tentant d’échapper à la police à Paris. [1er Octobre 2008]

    1 homme de 22 ans et 1 adolescent de 14 ans matraqué et blessé par un projectile de Taser par deux policiers pendant un contrôle d’identité à Montfermeil (93).[8 octobre 2008] Les deux frères bénéficieront de six jours d’ITT.

    Abdoulaye Fofana 20 ans tabassé dans le hall de son immeuble par 2 policiers à coups de matraque, tonfa et crosse de flash-ball, à Montfermeil(93). [14 octobre 2008]

    Novembre : Naguib Toubache 20 ans tué par la balle d’un gendarme à Montataire dans l’Oise (60). [28 nov 08]

    2009 : 6 morts, et au moins 5 bléssés graves (connus) :

    Septembre 2009 : Hakim Djellassi, âgé de 31 ans, est mort deux jours après son interpellation par la police à Lille à son hôtel.

    Mars : 1 homme de 29 ans tué par un policier au péage de Courtevroult lors d’une course poursuite à Bussy Saint-Georges (Seine-et-Marne).

    [7 mars 2009]

    Mai :Oussama Mouhtarim 21 ans plongé dans le coma après une interpellation en gare de Massy (92). [28 mai 09]

    Juin :ALI ZIRI 69 ans mort à la suite d’un contrôle policier à Argenteuil (92).[9 juin 2009]

    Arezki K. 61 ans battu par des policiers à Argenteuil (92). [9 juin 2009]

    Un étudiant de 25 ans à été touché par un tir de flash ball et a perdu son œil. (Toulouse, en mars )

    Un jeune à Neuilly-sur-Marne, en mai perd également son œil à la suite d’un tir de flash ball.

    Juillet : Joachim Gatti touché au visage par un tir de flash ball, il perd un œil.( Juillet 2009 à Montreuil )

    Mohammed Bemouna selon la justice mort par pendaison en garde à vue malgré qu’il n’y ai aucune traces de pendaisons sur le corps du jeune homme à Firminy dans la Loire (08/07/2009).

    Août : Yakou SANOGO 18 ans mort lors d’une course poursuite par la police à Bagnolet (93). [9 août 09]

    Mohamed Boukourou 41 ans mort dans un fourgon de police où il avait été conduit de force, à Valentigney (25). [12 nov. 2009]

    2010 : 9 morts et au moins 4 blessés ( connus) :

    Septembre : Lassana DIARRA mort en garde à vue dans un commissariat de la région parisienne. [2010]

    Avril : Philippe C. 35 ans dans le coma suite à une altercation avec un policier dans le commissariat du 18e arrondissement de Paris. [13 avril 2010]

    Mickaël Verrelle 29 ans Battu à Chambéry par un policier.

    Dans le coma.[23/24 avril 2010]

    Juillet : Karim BOUDOUDA 27 ans tué d’une balle dans la tête par la police à Grenoble. [16/07/2010]

    Luigi Duquenet 22 ans, tué par un gendarme dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi au cours d’une course-poursuite après avoir forcé un contrôle. En loir et cher. [16-17/07/2010]

    Le 8 Août 2010, a Mantes la jolie ( 78) un jeune de 17 ans se noie en tentant d’échapper à la police.

    Septembre : Anis Feninekh 28 ans tabassé par un policier à Juvisy.

    Octobre : un lycéen de Montreuil est touché par un tir de flash ball au visage, il perd un œil.

    Louis Klinger meurt lors de son interpellation par la police à Dijon.

    Novembre : Mamadou Marega meurt après s’être fait tapé et tazé par la police dans un immeuble à Colombes (92).

    Décembre : Mostefa Ziani résident d’un foyer de Marseille, est décédé lundi matin après avoir été victime d’un arrêt cardiaque dû a un tir de flash-ball d’un policier. (14 Décembre )

    2011 : Au moins 10 morts ( connus ) :

    Le 1er Janvier Steve 25 ans est tué par balle par la police en seine et marne.

    Le 23 Février à Lyon un jeune homme de 20 ans est abattu de 2 balles tirées par la police.

    13 avril 2011 : un homme de 43 ans, connu comme schizophrène, meurt à Angers après son interpellation Le parquet saisit l’IGPN.

    Le 5 juin Une fillette de neuf ans se trouve toujours dans le coma après avoir été grièvement blessée à la tête, lors d’affrontements dans le quartier sensible des Tarterêts, à Corbeil-Essonnes, dans l’Essonne.

    Les circonstances du drame restent pour l’heure contradictoires. Le père de la victime accusait dès lundi la police d’avoir blessé sa fille avec un flash ball.

    Le 25 juin un jeune homme de 25 ans souffrant apparemment de graves troubles psychiatriques, a été tué dans un échange de tirs avec des policiers près de Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis)

    Juillet 2011 : un jeune de Nanterre Mohamed est décédé après une chute de son deux roues alors que les policiers lui auraient tirés dessus au flash-bal. Cette chute a entraîné sa mort.

    Le 29 Août, Un jeune homme est décédé à Neuilly-sur-Seine (92) après une course poursuite en scooter avec la police.

    20 sept 2011 : une personne autiste de 48 ans interpellé en pleine crise à Marseille meurt d’un arrêt cardio-vasculaire. Le parquet saisit l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) et ouvre une enquête pour homicide involontaire.

    5 novembre : Paris st Lazare : Un homme meurt d’un infarctus suite à son interpellation violente.

    Le 27 Décembre à Clermont-Ferrand un jeune se tue en voiture parce qu’il est poursuivis par la police.

    2012 : Déjà 14 morts ( connus) et ( au moins ) 4 blessés grave (connus) :

    11 janvier 2012 : Aulnay-sous-Bois (Seine-Saint-Denis) :

    Abdel 25 ans meurt « d’une crise cardiaque » lors d’un contrôle.

    10 janvier 2012 : Clermont Ferrand : Wissam El-Yamni 30 ans, battu par la police, il tombe dans le coma et succombera de ses blessures 10 jours plus tard. La famille attend toujours une contre-expertise d’autopsie. Le corps n’a donc toujours pas pu être inhumé.

    11 Mars 2012 : Ivry : Ahamadou Maréga, 17 ans mort à la suite d’une poursuite par la police.

    27 Mars 2012 : Lyon : un homme, âgé de 39 ans, est mort des suites de ses blessures, il serait « tombé » d’une voiture de police.

    21 Avril 2012 : Noisy-le-sec ( 93) : Amine Bentounsi est tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans le dos.

    14 Mai Nantes : un garçon de 13 ans se noit afin d’échapper à la police.

    22 Mai : Massy Palaiseau : 2 jeunes en scooter sont

    percutés par la police, l’un est grièvement blessé, l’autre meurt.

    17 Mai : Cayenne : Un jeune de 17 ans meurt au commissariat.

    Dans la nuit du 5 au 6 Juin : Melun : Youssef Mahdi 24 ans

    est mort des suites de sa noyade dans la seine, alors qu’il

    voulait échapper à un contrôle de police.

    9 Juin : Villiers-le-Bel : 2 jeunes sont blessés dont l’un

    grièvement : Rodrigue 20 ans actuellement dans le coma. Ils ont été percutés par une voiture de la BAC, 5 ans après la mort de Lakhamy et Moushin percuté dans le même quartier par la police.

    12 Juin : Une femme de 62 ans meurt lors d’une perquisition de police à Bondy ( cité martin luther king) Elle aurait fait un malaise cardiaque.

    23 Juin : Un fillette de 18 mois et son père blessé par des policiers à La Verrière (Yvelines)

    26 Juin : Nabil, un jeune villefranchois de 26 ans a été tué, à Millau, par la balle d’un fonctionnaire de police appartenant à la BAC.

    18 Juillet : Un homme s’est noyé dans la Marne au Perreux-sur-Marne dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi alors qu’il tentait d’échapper à la police avec deux autres personnes soupçonnées d’avoir commis un vol.Le noyé est un homme de 35 ans « aux nombreux antécédents judiciaires », domicilié à Gentilly, également dans le Val-de-Marne, a précisé la même source. Auditionnée, sa mère « ne dépose pas plainte », a-t-elle ajouté.

    9 Juillet : Norredine 28 ans, originaire du Soudan, est mort dans le centre ville

    de Calais. Son corps a été sorti du canal à proximité de la

    sous-préfecture. Comme souvent, la police a refusé catégoriquement à la

    famille et aux proches l’accès au corps, et de rechercher les causes de la

    mort.

    2013 :

    13 Février : Marseille : Yassin Aïbeche Souilah 19 ans a été touché de plusieurs balles d’un policier ( qui n’était pas en service et qui aurait été « ivre ».)

    Yacine est mort à l’hôpital des suites de ses blessures, le jeudi 14 février à 7h du matin. Le policier serait en détention provisoire sous le chef d’inculpation d’homicide volontaire.

    28 Mars : Montigny-en-Gohelle ( 62) : Lahoucine Ait Omghar 26 ans tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans la poitrine.

    Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille a porté plainte.

    Novembre : Orléans : Loic Louise 21 ans est mort après avoir reçu une décharge de taser.

    Ouverte par le parquet d’Orléans, l’enquête est désormais terminée. Selon l’avocat de la famille Louise la mort du jeune homme résulte d’une utilisation prolongée du Taser. Le procureur souhaite rencontrer la famille pour donner les conclusions.

    2014 :

    20 decembre : Bertrand Nzohabonayo-tué par des policiers à Joué les tours

    1er Avril : Marseille : Morad , 16 ans defenestré par la police à Marseille

    29 juillet : Montgeron( 91 ) : Dorel Iosif Floare a été tué par un policier d’une balle dans le thorax.

    21 août : Abdelhak Gorafia, 51 ans est mort dans des conditions troubles lors de son transfert par la police française vers l’aéroport de Roissy Charles De Gaulle, en exécution d’un arrêté ministériel d’expulsion.

    « Il n’est pas mort naturellement mais s’est étouffé devant les policiers ou sous l’effet de leurs contraintes. Ce qui suppose des convulsions et une mort atroce. Comment peut-on ne pas porter secours à quelqu’un qui s’asphyxie ? »

    26 Août : Colmar : Houcine Bouras 23 ans, a été tué par un gendarme alors qu’il était menotté et dans un véhicule de police.

    « Violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner ». C’est sous ce chef d’inculpation que le procureur de la République de Colmar Bernard Lebeau a qualifié la responsabilité du gendarme. Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille réclame vérité et justice.

    5 Septembre : Paris : un homme de 34 ans est mort après que les policiers ait utilisé leur pistolet à impulsion électrique. ( pas de nom connu )

    17 Octobre : Toulouse : Timothée Lake 20 ans est abattu d’une balle dans le cœur par un policier de la BAC.

    La police plaide la légitime défense (…) mais l’enquête est loin d’être terminée.

    2 novembre : Tarn ( ZAD du testet ) : Rémy Fraisse, 21 ans mort après avoir reçu une grenade de la gendarmerie.

    16 janvier 2014, Abdoulaye Camara, 30 ans, mourrait dans le quartier de la Mare Rouge touché par plusieurs balles de deux policiers havrais.

    2015 :

    15 Février : Un jeune garçon de 14 ans, qui se trouvait au volant d’une voiture, s’est tué dimanche matin à Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme) en tentant d’échapper à un contrôle de police.

    CETTE « LISTE » n’est PAS « EXHAUSTIVE »

    Ce recensement est fait à partir de ce qui est diffusé dans la presse. Certaines histoires ont été confirmées par des familles de victimes,

    mais si aucuns témoins et proches/familles ne se manifestent ; les mémoires des victimes sont bafouées.

    Presque a chaque meurtre commis par la police, la victime est accablée, la plupart des enquêtes sont bâclées et amènent trop souvent à des conclusions de « légitime défense » pour les fonctionnaires …

    Nous nous devons de rétablir la vérité.

    La peine de mort a été abolie mais certaines vies reste à la merci de mercenaires de l’état.

    PAS DE JUSTICE PAS DE PAIX !

    N’hésitez pas à nous contacter pour nous signaler un oubli, une erreur (toutes nos excuses si c’est le cas) et/ou pour faire un témoignage.

    Contact mail : lalibrelucha@gmail.com

    VICTIMES DE LA POLICE ( connus ) DEPUIS 2005 ( en France ) :

    2005 : 6 morts, 3 blessés grave ( connus ) :

    Janvier : Abou Bakari Tandia meurt des suites de sa garde-à-vue au commissariat de Courbevoie (92).

    7 Mars : Balé Traoré grièvement blessé à bout pourtant par un policier dans le quartier de la Goutte d’Or ( paris 18) alors qu’il n’avait lui même pas d’arme.

    Avril : Un jeune de 17 ans, tué lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Aubervilliers (93)

    Octobre : Samir Abbache 26 ans, tué à la prison de Mulhouse (68)

    Octobre : Zied 17 ans et Bouna 15 ans, poursuivis par la police et morts électrocutés dans un transformateur à Clichy-sous-Bois (93).

    Novembre : Eric Blaise retrouvé mort dans des circonstances suspectes au mitard à Fleury-Mérogis (91)

    Juillet 2005 : Aux Mureaux ( 78) un adolescent de 14 ans touché par un tir de flash ball perd un œil.

    2006 : 10 morts, 7 blessés :

    Janvier : Eric Mourier 28 ans, mort au mitard de la prison Saint-Joseph (69).

    Mars 2006 : 2 frères insultés et battus par des policiers chez eux devant leur mère à Cergy (95).

    Mai : Fethi Traoré 31 ans, poursuivit par la police il se noie dans la Marne (94).

    29 Mai : Komotine mère de famille, insultée gazée menottée et traînée par 4 policiers devant ses enfants et ses voisins à Montfermeil ( 93).

    Juin : Vilhelm Covaci 20 ans, noyé dans le canal de Saint Denis (93) lors d’une poursuite

    Daniel Moldovan a également sauté dans l’eau avant d’être interpellé et tabassé jusqu’à en perdre connaissance.

    Deux réfugiés poursuivis, écrasés sur une autoroute à Calais (32). [juin 06]

    Octobre : Clichy-sous-Bois un jeune de 16 ans touché au flash ball perd un œil.

    Novembre : Taoufik El-Amri noyé par hydrocution dans un canal de Nantes (44) après un contrôle de police.

    Décembre :Guillaume Perrot retrouvé noyé à Corbeil-Essonnes après avoir été laissé seul sur la berge de la Seine par des policiers.

    Août : Albertine Sow enceinte au moment des faits a été frappée au ventre et gazée par des policiers alors qu’elle était témoin de violences policières à paris.

    2007 : 19 morts, 2 blessés :

    Janvier : Jonathan 24 ans mort en tombant d’un toit en voulant échapper à la police à Montpellier (34).

    Fevrier : Raouf et Tina 15 et 17 ans, morts lors d’une poursuite par des policiers à Saint-Fons, près de Lyon (69). [fév 07] 1 rescapé de 16 ans, Myriam Bahmed 17 ans tombe dans le coma.

    Louis Mendy 34 ans père de famille, tué d’une balle dans la tête par un policier à Toulon (83).

    Pierre visé à la tête et frappé par un flash-ball dans une manifestation lycéenne. Pierre a perdu l’œil droit le 27 novembre 2007 à Nantes.

    Mai : 1 jeune de 17 ans blessé par balle par un policier à Grigny (91)

    Juin : Un homme de 58 ans, mort dans la cellule de dégrisement du commissariat à Bordeaux (33).

    Lamine Dieng 25 ans, meurt dans un fourgon de police à Paris (75).

    Nelson 14 ans mort après avoir été fauché par une voiture de police sur un passage clouté à Marseille (13). [juin 07]

    Elmi Mohammed 23 ans, mort noyé dans la Saône après avoir été poursuivi par la police (69). [juin 07]

    Juillet : 1 homme de 40 ans, tué par balle par des policiers du Service régional des transports de la gare du Nord à Paris. [27 juillet 2007]

    Ait Brahim Moulay Mohamed 27 ans, mort par pendaison dans les douches du centre de rétention administrative de Bordeaux (33).

    Un homme de 37 ans, mort lors de sa garde-à-vue à Rouen (76).

    Septembre : Un homme de 48 ans, mort dans une cellule de dégrisement au commissariat de Dieppe (76).

    Une femme de 51 ans Chulan Liu « sans papiers » morte après un saut par la fenêtre à l’arrivée de la police, Paris (75) ( 25 septembre 07)

    Joseph RANDOLPH 42 ans, mort suite à son interpellation.

    (Paris, 8 septembre )

    Novembre : Larami et Mushin morts suite à une collision avec une voiture de police à Villiers-le-Bel (95).

    2008 : 11 morts et au moins 7 bléssés ( connus)

    Janvier : Lu Semedo Da Veiga 28 ans, mort à la prison de Fresnes (94) suite à un refus de soins.

    Reda Semmoudi defenestré par la police lors d’une perquisition à Noisy-le-Sec (93).

    Avril : Baba Traoré 29 ans mort noyé dans la Marne (94) suite à une poursuite par la police.

    Mai : Abdelakim Ajimi mort étouffé par plusieurs policiers à Grasse (06).

    Joseph Guerdner 27 ans tué de 7 balles dans le dos en fuyant menotté dans le Var (83).

    Lamba Soukouna 28 ans frappé à coup de crosse et de flash ball à la tête par un brigadier en présence de 3 autres « collègues » à Villepinte. [8 mai 2008] Lamba souffre de la drépanocytose, il a porté plainte.

    Juin : Mohamed 39 ans père de famille tué par balles à Corbeil-Essonnes (91). [19 juin08]

    Salem Essouli, mort par manque de soins au centre de rétention administrative de Vincennes (75).

    Août : Fakraddine Zarai Zarai 30 ans, mort par pendaison au radiateur de sa cellule dans la prison de Saint Quentin Fallavier à Lyon (69). [8 août 2008] A 2 semaines de sa libération.

    Septembre :Ilies 16 ans mort lors d’une poursuite par des policiers de la BAC de Romans sur Isére (Drôme). [29 septembre 2008]

    Octobre : Elvis Akpa mort suite à une chute du septième étage en tentant d’échapper à la police à Paris. [1er Octobre 2008]

    1 homme de 22 ans et 1 adolescent de 14 ans matraqué et blessé par un projectile de Taser par deux policiers pendant un contrôle d’identité à Montfermeil (93).[8 octobre 2008] Les deux frères bénéficieront de six jours d’ITT.

    Abdoulaye Fofana 20 ans tabassé dans le hall de son immeuble par 2 policiers à coups de matraque, tonfa et crosse de flash-ball, à Montfermeil(93). [14 octobre 2008]

    Novembre : Naguib Toubache 20 ans tué par la balle d’un gendarme à Montataire dans l’Oise (60). [28 nov 08]

    2009 : 6 morts, et au moins 5 bléssés graves (connus) :

    Septembre 2009 : Hakim Djellassi, âgé de 31 ans, est mort deux jours après son interpellation par la police à Lille à son hôtel.

    Mars : 1 homme de 29 ans tué par un policier au péage de Courtevroult lors d’une course poursuite à Bussy Saint-Georges (Seine-et-Marne).

    [7 mars 2009]

    Mai :Oussama Mouhtarim 21 ans plongé dans le coma après une interpellation en gare de Massy (92). [28 mai 09]

    Juin :ALI ZIRI 69 ans mort à la suite d’un contrôle policier à Argenteuil (92).[9 juin 2009]

    Arezki K. 61 ans battu par des policiers à Argenteuil (92). [9 juin 2009]

    Un étudiant de 25 ans à été touché par un tir de flash ball et a perdu son œil. (Toulouse, en mars )

    Un jeune à Neuilly-sur-Marne, en mai perd également son œil à la suite d’un tir de flash ball.

    Juillet : Joachim Gatti touché au visage par un tir de flash ball, il perd un œil.( Juillet 2009 à Montreuil )

    Mohammed Bemouna selon la justice mort par pendaison en garde à vue malgré qu’il n’y ai aucune traces de pendaisons sur le corps du jeune homme à Firminy dans la Loire (08/07/2009).

    Août : Yakou SANOGO 18 ans mort lors d’une course poursuite par la police à Bagnolet (93). [9 août 09]

    Mohamed Boukourou 41 ans mort dans un fourgon de police où il avait été conduit de force, à Valentigney (25). [12 nov. 2009]

    2010 : 9 morts et au moins 4 blessés ( connus) :

    Septembre : Lassana DIARRA mort en garde à vue dans un commissariat de la région parisienne. [2010]

    Avril : Philippe C. 35 ans dans le coma suite à une altercation avec un policier dans le commissariat du 18e arrondissement de Paris. [13 avril 2010]

    Mickaël Verrelle 29 ans Battu à Chambéry par un policier.

    Dans le coma.[23/24 avril 2010]

    Juillet : Karim BOUDOUDA 27 ans tué d’une balle dans la tête par la police à Grenoble. [16/07/2010]

    Luigi Duquenet 22 ans, tué par un gendarme dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi au cours d’une course-poursuite après avoir forcé un contrôle. En loir et cher. [16-17/07/2010]

    Le 8 Août 2010, a Mantes la jolie ( 78) un jeune de 17 ans se noie en tentant d’échapper à la police.

    Septembre : Anis Feninekh 28 ans tabassé par un policier à Juvisy.

    Octobre : un lycéen de Montreuil est touché par un tir de flash ball au visage, il perd un œil.

    Louis Klinger meurt lors de son interpellation par la police à Dijon.

    Novembre : Mamadou Marega meurt après s’être fait tapé et tazé par la police dans un immeuble à Colombes (92).

    Décembre : Mostefa Ziani résident d’un foyer de Marseille, est décédé lundi matin après avoir été victime d’un arrêt cardiaque dû a un tir de flash-ball d’un policier. (14 Décembre )

    2011 : Au moins 10 morts ( connus ) :

    Le 1er Janvier Steve 25 ans est tué par balle par la police en seine et marne.

    Le 23 Février à Lyon un jeune homme de 20 ans est abattu de 2 balles tirées par la police.

    13 avril 2011 : un homme de 43 ans, connu comme schizophrène, meurt à Angers après son interpellation Le parquet saisit l’IGPN.

    Le 5 juin Une fillette de neuf ans se trouve toujours dans le coma après avoir été grièvement blessée à la tête, lors d’affrontements dans le quartier sensible des Tarterêts, à Corbeil-Essonnes, dans l’Essonne.

    Les circonstances du drame restent pour l’heure contradictoires. Le père de la victime accusait dès lundi la police d’avoir blessé sa fille avec un flash ball.

    Le 25 juin un jeune homme de 25 ans souffrant apparemment de graves troubles psychiatriques, a été tué dans un échange de tirs avec des policiers près de Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis)

    Juillet 2011 : un jeune de Nanterre Mohamed est décédé après une chute de son deux roues alors que les policiers lui auraient tirés dessus au flash-bal. Cette chute a entraîné sa mort.

    Le 29 Août, Un jeune homme est décédé à Neuilly-sur-Seine (92) après une course poursuite en scooter avec la police.

    20 sept 2011 : une personne autiste de 48 ans interpellé en pleine crise à Marseille meurt d’un arrêt cardio-vasculaire. Le parquet saisit l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) et ouvre une enquête pour homicide involontaire.

    5 novembre : Paris st Lazare : Un homme meurt d’un infarctus suite à son interpellation violente.

    Le 27 Décembre à Clermont-Ferrand un jeune se tue en voiture parce qu’il est poursuivis par la police.

    2012 : Déjà 14 morts ( connus) et ( au moins ) 4 blessés grave (connus) :

    11 janvier 2012 : Aulnay-sous-Bois (Seine-Saint-Denis) :

    Abdel 25 ans meurt « d’une crise cardiaque » lors d’un contrôle.

    10 janvier 2012 : Clermont Ferrand : Wissam El-Yamni 30 ans, battu par la police, il tombe dans le coma et succombera de ses blessures 10 jours plus tard. La famille attend toujours une contre-expertise d’autopsie. Le corps n’a donc toujours pas pu être inhumé.

    11 Mars 2012 : Ivry : Ahamadou Maréga, 17 ans mort à la suite d’une poursuite par la police.

    27 Mars 2012 : Lyon : un homme, âgé de 39 ans, est mort des suites de ses blessures, il serait « tombé » d’une voiture de police.

    21 Avril 2012 : Noisy-le-sec ( 93) : Amine Bentounsi est tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans le dos.

    14 Mai Nantes : un garçon de 13 ans se noit afin d’échapper à la police.

    22 Mai : Massy Palaiseau : 2 jeunes en scooter sont

    percutés par la police, l’un est grièvement blessé, l’autre meurt.

    17 Mai : Cayenne : Un jeune de 17 ans meurt au commissariat.

    Dans la nuit du 5 au 6 Juin : Melun : Youssef Mahdi 24 ans

    est mort des suites de sa noyade dans la seine, alors qu’il

    voulait échapper à un contrôle de police.

    9 Juin : Villiers-le-Bel : 2 jeunes sont blessés dont l’un

    grièvement : Rodrigue 20 ans actuellement dans le coma. Ils ont été percutés par une voiture de la BAC, 5 ans après la mort de Lakhamy et Moushin percuté dans le même quartier par la police.

    12 Juin : Une femme de 62 ans meurt lors d’une perquisition de police à Bondy ( cité martin luther king) Elle aurait fait un malaise cardiaque.

    23 Juin : Un fillette de 18 mois et son père blessé par des policiers à La Verrière (Yvelines)

    26 Juin : Nabil, un jeune villefranchois de 26 ans a été tué, à Millau, par la balle d’un fonctionnaire de police appartenant à la BAC.

    18 Juillet : Un homme s’est noyé dans la Marne au Perreux-sur-Marne dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi alors qu’il tentait d’échapper à la police avec deux autres personnes soupçonnées d’avoir commis un vol.Le noyé est un homme de 35 ans « aux nombreux antécédents judiciaires », domicilié à Gentilly, également dans le Val-de-Marne, a précisé la même source. Auditionnée, sa mère « ne dépose pas plainte », a-t-elle ajouté.

    9 Juillet : Norredine 28 ans, originaire du Soudan, est mort dans le centre ville

    de Calais. Son corps a été sorti du canal à proximité de la

    sous-préfecture. Comme souvent, la police a refusé catégoriquement à la

    famille et aux proches l’accès au corps, et de rechercher les causes de la

    mort.

    2013 :

    13 Février : Marseille : Yassin Aïbeche Souilah 19 ans a été touché de plusieurs balles d’un policier ( qui n’était pas en service et qui aurait été « ivre ».)

    Yacine est mort à l’hôpital des suites de ses blessures, le jeudi 14 février à 7h du matin. Le policier serait en détention provisoire sous le chef d’inculpation d’homicide volontaire.

    28 Mars : Montigny-en-Gohelle ( 62) : Lahoucine Ait Omghar 26 ans tué par un policier de plusieurs balles dans la poitrine.

    Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille a porté plainte.

    Novembre : Orléans : Loic Louise 21 ans est mort après avoir reçu une décharge de taser.

    Ouverte par le parquet d’Orléans, l’enquête est désormais terminée. Selon l’avocat de la famille Louise la mort du jeune homme résulte d’une utilisation prolongée du Taser. Le procureur souhaite rencontrer la famille pour donner les conclusions.

    2014 :

    1er Avril : Marseille : Morad , 16 ans defenestré par la police à Marseille

    29 juillet : Montgeron( 91 ) : Dorel Iosif Floare a été tué par un policier d’une balle dans le thorax.

    21 août : Abdelhak Gorafia, 51 ans est mort dans des conditions troubles lors de son transfert par la police française vers l’aéroport de Roissy Charles De Gaulle, en exécution d’un arrêté ministériel d’expulsion.

    « Il n’est pas mort naturellement mais s’est étouffé devant les policiers ou sous l’effet de leurs contraintes. Ce qui suppose des convulsions et une mort atroce. Comment peut-on ne pas porter secours à quelqu’un qui s’asphyxie ? »

    26 Août : Colmar : Houcine Bouras 23 ans, a été tué par un gendarme alors qu’il était menotté et dans un véhicule de police.

    « Violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner ». C’est sous ce chef d’inculpation que le procureur de la République de Colmar Bernard Lebeau a qualifié la responsabilité du gendarme. Une instruction a été ouverte. La famille réclame vérité et justice.

    5 Septembre : Paris : un homme de 34 ans est mort après que les policiers ait utilisé leur pistolet à impulsion électrique. ( pas de nom connu )

    17 Octobre : Toulouse : Timothée Lake 20 ans est abattu d’une balle dans le cœur par un policier de la BAC.

    La police plaide la légitime défense (…) mais l’enquête est loin d’être terminée.

    2 novembre : Tarn ( ZAD du testet ) : Rémy Fraisse, 21 ans mort après avoir reçu une grenade de la gendarmerie.

    16 Décembre 2014 : ( le havre ) Abdoulaye Camara, 30 ans, meurt après avoir été touché par plusieurs balles de deux policiers havrais.

    20 decembre : Bertrand Nzohabonayo tué par plusieurs policiers à Joué les tours. Les circonstances de sa mort ne sont pas claire. Différentes versions s’oppose. La famille a porté plainte et lance un appel à témoins parce que « L’enquête menée par le parquet de Tours s’est cantonnée à prendre la version et les dépositions des policiers impliqués dans les évènements », a dénoncé l’avocat en appelant à la désignation rapide d’un juge d’instruction indépendant.

    ( *source : http://www.ledauphine.com/france-monde/2015/01/07/joue-les-tours-la-famille-de-bertrand-nzohabonayo-lance-un-appel-a-temoi )

    A lire : http://larotative.info/mort-de-bilal-nzohabonayo-a-joue-749.html

    2015 :

    15 Février : Un jeune garçon de 14 ans, qui se trouvait au volant d’une voiture, s’est tué dimanche matin à Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme) en tentant d’échapper à un contrôle de police.

    6 Mars : Un homme d’une trentaine d’année, Amadou Koumé meurt dans des circonstances suspectes au commissariat du 10eme arr. de Paris : “ Amadou Koumé était un père de famille de 33 ans, Saint-Quentinois (Aisne), d’origine sénégalaise. Il est décédé dans la nuit du 5 au 6 mars, dans le commissariat du 10e arrondissement de Paris. Sa soeur explique qu’il s’était installé à Paris en janvier, pour trouver du travail en tant qu’intérimaire.

    Les circonstances du drame sont encore floues. Une source policière indique qu’Amadou Koumé était « assez agité » et « sous l’emprise de l’alcool » au moment de l’arrestation. Il se serait rebellé et, pour le menotter, la police aurait appliquer une technique de strangulation.”

    « On ne sait pas comment il est mort », s’indigne la grande sœur d’Amadou Koumé, jointe par Francetv info. Nos confrères ajoutent : « Lorsqu’ils se sont rendus à l’Institut médico-légal, plusieurs membres de la famille du jeune homme se sont aperçus qu’il présentait une plaie au visage. Les parents d’Amadou ont été reçus trois jours après le drame dans les locaux de l’IGPN. Ils ont chargé leur avocat de déposer une plainte contre X pour violences volontaires ayant entraîné la mort sans intention de la donner et abstention de porter assistance à une personne en péril. »

    Source : http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/picardie/2015/04/21/police-mort-du-saint-quentinois-amadou-koume-dans-un-co

    22 Avril : » Karim, 26 ans, a été fauché par un train, au Havre (Seine-Maritime), en début de soirée, mercredi 22 avril 2015, alors qu’il fuyait un contrôle d’identité. Karim ne voulait pas retourner en prison. Il a pris la fuite, suivi par les policiers. »

    ( source : http://www.normandie-actu.fr/mort-en-fuyant-la-police-au-havre-une-marche-blanche-pour-karim-26-an )

    28 Avril 2015 : Pierre Cayet, 54 ans meurt après avoir été violenté au commissariat de seine st denis ( 93).

    ( à lire : http://www.leparisien.fr/saint-denis-93200/saint-denis-enquete-apres-la-chute-mortelle-au-commissariat-28-04-2015-47 )

    - Medhi Bouhouta tué de 4 Balles dans la tête par un agent de la la bac à lyon le 3 septembre 2015 http://rebellyon.info/Mehdi-Bouhouta-28-ans-assassine-par-la

    Qui sera le prochain ?

    http://www.urgence-notre-police-assassine.fr/123663553

    #liste #datasource #assassinats #violences_policières #décès #morts #statistiques #France #police #recensement

    –-> Ces listes ont déjà été signalées à plusieurs reprises sur seenthis, mais je voulais la remettre avec « mes tags » pour partage avec des étudiant·es.

  • A quoi sert la gréve ?
    [part1] A faire un boulot de dingue que nos « patrons » ne nous demandent pas ;) Voir par exemple la base de données caféïnée par Maxime Reynié : MAINTIEN DE L’ORDRE

    Doctrine | Grenades | Lanceurs | Effectifs
    Tout comprendre sur le maintien de l’ordre
    http://maintiendelordre.fr

    Ce site a pour objectif d’apporter le plus d’informations possible sur le maintien de l’ordre français pour que tout le monde puisse s’y documenter et le comprendre facilement. Il sera régulièrement mis à jour pour apporter les dernières informations et modifications sur les éléments du maintien de l’ordre.

    Précisions de @Maxime_Reynie sur twitter :

    Ce n’est pas entièrement fini, il doit rester plusieurs coquilles me connaissant mais voilà, c’est un début ❤️
    On va dire que c’est une béta.
    Je compte aussi rajouter l’armement des polices municipales avec les lanceurs 44mm. Comment s’organise le maintien de l’ordre à Paris avec toutes les unités qu’on y retrouve. etc etc etc etc
    Pour ce qui est des coquilles je vous invite à me DM si vous en trouvez. <3 [ou mail sur le site, note]
    Dernière chose. Le site est lent, même très lent. J’ai pris l’hébergement le moins cher par défauts donc ça risque de ramer si vous êtes plus de 2.
    Pour le COUGAR, un équivalent plus petit existe me rappelle @akraland, ça sera corrigé asap
    /.../ Pour « sources et documents » c’est pas complet encore, je dois m’y retrouver dans les 9798678 pdf que j’ai stocké /.../

    https://twitter.com/Maxime_Reynie/status/1216355277416620037

    Bon par contre, contrairement à ce qu’il dit sur twitter, ça n’est pas un wikipedia, sa mise à jour dépend donc uniquement de lui et sa disponibilité !
    Un gros boulot donc qui vient esthétiquement compléter celui du collectif Desarmons-les https://desarmons.net qui est sans surprise sa première source ! Desarmons-les qui lance une initiative essentielle : une collecte transparente pour les mutilé-e-s : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/13/collecte-de-desarmons-les-pour-les-blesse-es-par-des-armes-de-police (je vais faire un billet à part pour plus de visibilité)

    #maintien_de_l'ordre #armes #armes_non_letales #armement #police #CRS #repression #violences_policieres #flashball #LBD #grenades #lacrymo #Maxime_Reynié

  • Base de données sur le rôle de la France
    dans le génocide des Tutsi

    http://francegenocidetutsi.org/index.html.fr

    But de cette base de données


    FgtDb comme France Genocide Tutsi Database est une base de données relative au rôle de la France dans le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

    Le génocide des Tutsi a été exécuté par des Rwandais. Mais nous formulons les hypothèses :

    1) Le génocide n’aurait pas eu lieu si la France n’était pas intervenue militairement au Rwanda, si elle n’avait pas fourni des armes et entraîné l’armée gouvernementale rwandaise, et si elle n’avait pas soutenu les politiciens et militaires rwandais qui depuis 1990 voulaient éliminer les Tutsi.

    2) Le coup d’État des 6-8 avril 1994, qui a coûté la vie au président Habyarimana, au Premier ministre Agathe Uwilingiyimana et à d’autres ministres et personnalités politiques n’aurait pu réussir qu’avec le soutien de la France par son ambassadeur à Kigali et sa représentation au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

    3) À tout moment du 7 avril au 18 juillet, la France aurait pu commander à ses alliés de cesser les massacres.

    Partis d’une démarche de citoyens français responsables, nous nous efforçons de tester ces hypothèses de manière aussi scientifique que possible en rassemblant des documents. Nous n’excluons pas a priori des documents qui vont à l’encontre de nos hypothèses, pourvu qu’ils rapportent des faits vérifiables.

    Sur ce site web http://francegenocidetutsi.org plus de 9.000 documents sont accessibles, triés par date, auteur, journal ou source. Un moteur de recherche permettant d’interroger suivant plusieurs critères et d’accéder à la fiche descriptive des documents est accessible ici
    Historique

    Ces documents ont été réunis depuis 2001 pour la rédaction du livre La France au coeur du génocide des Tutsi, publié en 2010 en quelques 300 exemplaires, épuisé depuis, mais restant déchargeable à l’adresse : http://francegenocidetutsi.org/FranceCoeurGenocideTutsi-IP.pdf

    L’idée initiale était de donner au lecteur du livre en format pdf de Adobe l’accès à une copie du document original en utilisant les pointeurs hypertextes pris en compte par Acrobat reader ou les logiciels équivalents.

    De là est née la conception d’une fiche descriptive des documents et la préoccupation de les étudier pour eux-mêmes dans un souci d’objectivité.

    Depuis de nouveaux documents ont été trouvés qui débordent maintenant de beaucoup la portée de ce livre. Le besoin de les publier comme preuve s’en est fait sentir.

    Cette base de données, commencée début 2013, existe sur un ordinateur. Elle répertorie environ 24.000 documents, 4.000 auteurs provenant de 700 journaux ou sources et d’une centaine de fonds d’archives.

    Il reste à faire une publication systématique des documents sur le web, ce qui est une exigence de chercheur mais qui est encore largement à faire. Les collaborations sont souhaitées.

    Avant avril 2016, ce site web était à l’adresse http://www.francerwandagenocide.org/documents

  • Innovations sociales en montagne

    Vous êtes sur la plateforme de l’innovation sociale en montagne.

    Vivre en montagne, c’est bien souvent vivre différemment. C’est s’attacher à des enjeux de climat, de relief, de mobilités, d’enclavement, de saisonnalité.
    Vivre en montagne, c’est faire face à des conditions qui peuvent aussi devenir des ressources spécifiques.
    Les territoires de montagne sont confrontés, peut-être plus fortement qu’ailleurs, à l’urgence de la transition écologique et sociétale.

    Les territoires de montagne sont autant de sociétés locales avec leurs aspirations et leurs besoins particuliers.
    La recherche d’une meilleure adaptation aux contraintes, d’une meilleure qualité de vie et d’une harmonie entre les populations et leur environnement nous conduisent à une quête d’innovations sociales.

    Ces innovations sociales renforcent la capacité à agir de tous les participants à la société locale, dans un souci de partenariat et d’intérêt général.

    Pour donner de la visibilité à ces projets qui donnent de l’espoir aux territoires de montagne, nous souhaitons, à travers cette plateforme, aider chacun à les connaître, à les comprendre et à les répercuter.

    Et une liste des #initiatives :
    https://ferme.yeswiki.net/InnovationsMontagne/?ListeInnov
    https://ferme.yeswiki.net/InnovationsMontagne/?PagePrincipale
    #innovation_sociale #innovations_sociales #montagne #plateforme #base_de_données #database #cartographie #visualisation

  • Bibliothèque numérique kurde

    The Kurdish Institute maintains the largest Kurdish Library in the Western World.

    This library contains over 10,000 monographs about the Kurds, in 25 languages, several tens of thousands of published documents, collections of reviews and newspapers, photographs, videos, post cards and posters, as well as audio archives and music recordings.

    This rich documentation fills over a third of the Institute’s premises as well as a substantial part of its warehouse, located in a Paris suburb. References to these monographs and the principal documents have been computerized.

    http://bnk.kurde.eu/?l=en
    #bibliothèque #database #base_de_données #catalogue #digitalisation #livres #Kurdes #Kurdistan #bibliothèque_numérique

    ping @isskein @reka
    via @wizo

  • World inequality database

    The World Inequality Database (WID.world) aims to provide open and convenient access to the most extensive available database on the historical evolution of the world distribution of income and wealth, both within countries and between countries.

    HISTORY OF WID.world

    During the past fifteen years, the renewed interest for the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality gave rise to a flourishing literature. In particular, a succession of studies has constructed top income share series for a large number of countries (see Thomas Piketty 2001, 2003, T. Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 2003, and the two multi-country volumes on top incomes edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and T. Piketty 2007, 2010; see also A. B. Atkinson et al. 2011 and Facundo Alvaredo et al. 2013 for surveys of this literature). These projects generated a large volume of data, intended as a research resource for further analysis, as well as a source to inform the public debate on income inequality. To a large extent, this literature follows the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets 1953, and A. B. Atkinson and Alan Harrison 1978, and extends it to many more countries and years.

    THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE (2011)

    The World Inequality Database was initially created as the The World Top Incomes Database (WTID) in January 2011 with the aim of providing convenient and free access to all the existing series. Thanks to the contribution of over a hundred researchers, the WTID expanded to include series on income inequality for more than thirty countries, spanning over most of the 20th and early 21st centuries, with over forty additional countries now under study.

    The key novelty has been to combine fiscal, survey and national accounts data in a systematic manner. This allowed us to compute longer and more reliable top income shares series than previous inequality databases (which generally rely on self-reported survey data, with large under-reporting problems at the top, and limited time span). These series had a large impact on the global inequality debate. In particular, by making it possible to compare over long periods of time and across countries the income shares captured by top income groups (e.g. the top 1%), they contributed to reveal new facts and refocus the discussion on rising inequality.

    In principle, all the top income share series respond to the same general methods: following the pioneering work of S. Kuznets (1953), they use income tax data, national accounts, and Pareto interpolation techniques to estimate the share of total income going to top income groups (typically the top decile and the top percentile). However, despite researchers’ best efforts, the units of observation, the income concepts, and also the Pareto interpolation techniques were never made fully homogeneous over time and across countries. Moreover, for the most part attention has been restricted to the top decile, rather than the entire distribution of income and wealth. These elements pointed to the need for a methodological re-examination and clarification.

    FROM THE WTID TO THE WID (2015)

    In December 2015, the WTID was subsumed into the WID, The World Wealth and Income Database. In addition to the WTID top income shares series, this first version of WID included an extended version of the historical database on the long-run evolution of aggregate wealth-income ratios and the changing structure of national wealth and national income first developed by T. Piketty and G. Zucman 2013, 2014 (see also T. Piketty, 2014, for an attempt to propose an interpretative historical synthesis on the basis of this new material and of the top income shares series). We changed the name of the database from WTID to WID in order to express the extension in scope and ambition of the database, as well as the new emphasis on both wealth and income.

    At the same time, over the last years the distribution of personal wealth has been receiving increasing attention after having been neglected for decades. The work on top income shares was recently extended to study the long run evolution of top wealth shares (see E. Saez and G. Zucman 2016, F. Alvaredo, A. Atkinson and S. Morelli 2017, and B. Garbinti, J. Goupille and T. Piketty 2016).

    FROM INCOME INEQUALITY TO WEALTH INEQUALITY

    One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital. Income from interest, from dividends, and from rents represents a minority of total personal income, but it is nonetheless significant, especially at the top of the distribution. The ratio of total personal wealth to total personal income has been rising. One consequence is that the role of inherited wealth – which declined for much of the twentieth century – has, in a number of countries, begun to acquire greater significance. In addition, there is extensive evidence – e.g. from billionaire rankings – suggesting that top global wealth holders have grown much faster than average and have therefore benefited from a substantial increase in their share.

    In order to produce reliable estimates of wealth inequality, it is becoming increasingly critical to combine different sources in a consistent manner, including income tax data (using the capitalization method) and inheritance tax data (using the mortality multiplier method), following the pioneering work of A. B. Atkinson and A. Harrison (1978). One also needs to introduce new sources such as global billionaire rankings, and to address novel issues such as cross-border assets and offshore wealth (G. Zucman, 2013, 2014). More generally, it is becoming more and more critical to measure the inequality of income and wealth from a global perspective, and not simply at the country level.

    THE WORLD INEQUALITY DATABASE (WID.WORLD) : A NEW WEBSITE, A NEW AMBITION (2017)

    In January 2017, with the objective of reaching yet a wider audience of researchers and general public, we released the first version of the more user-friendly website, WID.world, hosting the World Inequality Database.

    These changes come along with a new ambition. Thanks to the continuous cooperation of the WID.world Fellows, we pursue our efforts to expand the database into three major directions.

    First, we keep expanding the time coverage and the geographical coverage of the database, in particular to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. We also keep updating the database with new observations, as official bodies release the necessary information each year. Additionally, we will progressively include inequality series at the sub-national level whenever possible (series of top income shares for each state in the United States are already available, as well as for urban and rural China).

    Next, we plan to provide more series on wealth-income ratios and the distribution of wealth, and not only on income. Third, we aim to offer series on the entire distribution of income and wealth, from the bottom to the top, and not only for top shares.

    The overall long-run objective is to be able to produce Distributional National Accounts (DINA), that is, to provide annual estimates of the distribution of income and wealth using concepts of income and wealth that are consistent with the macroeconomic national accounts. This also includes the production of synthetic income and wealth micro-files, which will also be made available online.

    A LONG-TERM, CUMULATIVE, COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROCESS

    We should stress at the onset that our methods and series are and will always be imperfect, and subject to revision. We attempt to combine the different data sources available (in particular fiscal data, survey data and national accounts) in a more systematic way than what was done to date, but more progress is yet to come. We provide a detailed and explicit description of our methodology and sources, so that other users can contribute to their improvement. Our series and methods should be viewed from the perspective of a long-term, cumulative, collaborative research process.

    In this spirit, we also provide a new set of research tools for scholars, journalists, or any interested user in the production of their own inequality datasets. Our programs allow for the estimation of income and wealth distributions based on raw tabulated data, such as those provided by statisical agencies and tax administrations. They can also be used to combine distributions from different countries and produce representative synthetic files. The programs are based on generalized, non-parametric Pareto interpolation techniques. They can be run directly from our website with no prior technical knowledge. Users can also download and install our open-access R-language codes on their computers.


    https://wid.world
    #inégalités #données #base_de_données #statistiques #chiffres #monde #cartographie #visualisation
    signalé par @mobileborders

    #rapport 2018 :
    https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf
    ping @simplicissimus @reka @fil

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

  • A Calais, la frontière tue ! In Calais, the border kills !


    http://timeglider.com/timeline/65ecd96fa599a9c6

    –-----
    Deaths at the Calais Border

    Uncountable lives are wasted and suffer at the hands of the Calais border regime. There is no accurate count of how many people have died. This is a list of people known in Calais or from news reports.

    For sure there will have been more, their deaths ignored, the facts covered up or altogether unreported. Many already go unnamed, without vigils and protests, without families or friends to advocate on their behalf.

    But we will never let these deaths be silenced. We will not forgive and we will never forget.

    These borders kill! One death is too many!

    https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/deaths-at-the-calais-border

    #morts #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #Calais #France #frontières #Angleterre #UK #migrations #asile #réfugiés #base_de_données #database #liste #timeline #ligne_du_temps #mourir_dans_la_forteresse_Europe #visualisation #infographie #frise #frise_chronologique #time-line #chronologie

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4

    • Un article de février 2018

      The deadly roads into Calais

      Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
      The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.

      He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.

      But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.

      Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.

      Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.

      The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.

      Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.

      The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”

      During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.

      The victims are often young men’

      For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.

      For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.

      Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.

      Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”

      Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”

      Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.

      “The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.

      Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”

      Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.

      Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”

      Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”

      Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”

      ’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’

      While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.

      During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”

      Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.

      A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”

      Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/190218/deadly-roads-calais

      –----

      En français :
      A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants
      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180218/calais-les-routes-de-la-mort-pour-les-migrants?page_article=1%20

    • Voir Calais et mourir

      Si, depuis quelques années, militants et chercheurs commencent à compter les morts sur les routes migratoires, ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’arc méditerranéen, négligeant la frontière franco-britannique que l’on pourrait qualifier de nasse calaisienne. Accords européens, traités bilatéraux et leurs corollaires sécuritaires font en effet de cette frontière un mur meurtrier. Et les migrants n’ont d’autre choix que de prendre toujours plus de risques pour le franchir… au péril de leur vie.

      Nawall Al Jende avait 26 ans. Elle était originaire de Nawa, une ville située à une trentaine de kilomètres de Deraa, dans le sud de la Syrie. Elle avait fui la guerre et laissé derrière elle son époux et deux de ses enfants. Avec son troisième enfant, Mohamed, âgé de 9 ans, et le frère de son mari, Oussama, son périple l’avait amenée à traverser neuf pays avant d’atteindre Calais. Sa sœur, Sawson, avait réalisé un parcours quasi similaire deux mois plus tôt et l’attendait de l’autre côté de la Manche. Nawall est décédée le 15 octobre 2015, après avoir été percutée par un taxi sur l’autoroute A16, alors qu’elle tentait de se glisser dans un camion afin de franchir la frontière franco-britannique. Comme sur les autres routes de l’exil, des personnes migrantes meurent à Calais et dans sa région. Depuis 1999, on estime qu’au moins 170 personnes sont décédées en tentant de franchir cet espace frontalier reliant la France à l’Angleterre.

      Pourquoi prêter attention aux personnes mortes en migration à la frontière franco-britannique ? Il n’existe pas de données officielles à ce sujet. Par conséquent, participer au travail de collecte d’informations contribue à documenter l’histoire du fait migratoire dans la région. En l’espace de quelques années, la question des exilés morts aux frontières s’est imposée dans le débat public. Elle a été d’abord portée, par des acteurs militants, à l’image des travaux réalisés par United for Intercultural Action, Fortress Europe ou encore Watch the Med. Puis, des journalistes se sont intéressés au sujet (The Migrants Files), ainsi que des chercheurs (Deaths at the Borders Database). Aujourd’hui, une institution officielle telle que l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) commence à recenser les personnes mortes en migration. Toutefois, dans ces différents relevés, la situation à la frontière franco-britannique est peu prise en compte, le focus étant davantage dirigé sur la mortalité aux portes de l’Europe, dans l’arc qui va des Iles Canaries à la mer Égée, en passant par le détroit de Gibraltar et le canal de Sicile. Par conséquent, travailler à la collecte d’informations sur les personnes mortes à Calais et dans la région répond à un réel besoin et rend visible une réalité méconnue.
      Redonner un nom aux morts

      Ce travail d’enquête ne veut pas s’en tenir au traitement simplement comptable ou anecdotique de la question des morts en migration. Il cherche, quand cela est possible, à redonner une identité et une histoire à ces « corps sans nom » ou à ces « noms sans histoire ». Tenter de reconstituer des récits de vie, (re)donner une dimension personnelle à chaque décès est un moyen d’éviter leur dilution dans ce qu’on nomme communément, de façon globalisante, les « drames de la migration ». Il s’agit également de rompre avec l’idée que cette hécatombe résulterait de la fatalité. Réduire ces tragédies à des accidents (accident de la route, noyade, etc.), à des violences ou des règlements de compte entre migrants est une façon d’occulter la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics dans une situation qui dure depuis plus de vingt ans dans le nord de la France. Au contraire, c’est bien l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique qui a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier. De même, considérer que les seules violences exercées à l’encontre des exilés sont dues aux « réseaux de passeurs » est une manière d’occulter celles qui sont liées aux conditions de vie et à l’absence de dispositifs d’accueil adaptés, au harcèlement policier et à la surenchère de dispositifs de surveillance de la frontière.

      On constate en effet que la majorité des décès sont liés aux tentatives de passage, qu’ils soient immédiats ou qu’ils surviennent des suites de blessures que ces tentatives occasionnent. Le long de la frontière franco-britannique, les exilés meurent principalement après avoir été percutés par un train sur le site d’Eurotunnel, renversés par un véhicule – parfois volontairement – sur un axe routier non loin d’un point de passage ou écrasés sous l’essieu d’un poids lourd. Et finalement, les « règlements de compte » ou les violences « inter ou intra-communautaires » se concluant par des morts restent des événements marginaux.

      La majeure partie des exilés tentent de passer la frontière cachés dans la remorque d’un camion ou en dessous. Cette méthode s’avère extrêmement dangereuse et les risques de mourir écrasé par le contenu de la marchandise, par suffocation ou en tombant du camion (en particulier une fois arrivé sur le territoire britannique) sont importants. On pense notamment aux 58 personnes migrantes de nationalité chinoise cachées dans un camion frigorifique et découvertes mortes par asphyxie à Douvres en juin 2000. Un événement qui fait terriblement écho à la tragédie survenue 15 ans plus tard en Autriche, quand 71 exilés syriens cachés dans un camion furent abandonnés sur le bord d’une autoroute par le conducteur et décédèrent par suffocation.

      Même si le phénomène reste minoritaire, on recense plusieurs cas de noyades. Si quelques-unes se sont produites à la suite de rixes ou afin d’échapper à des violences policières, la plupart sont survenues pendant des tentatives de franchissement de la frontière. On observe ainsi plusieurs cas désespérés, et finalement mortels, survenus lors de la traversée du détroit du Pas-de-Calais, par embarcation ou à la nage. Le 12 juin 2002, un exilé russe parti en canoë s’est noyé dans la Manche. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé et le camarade qui l’accompagnait est resté accroché pendant cinq heures à l’embarcation à la dérive avant d’être secouru. Le précieux travail d’investigation du journaliste norvégien Anders Fjellberg [1] a permis de retracer le parcours de deux exilés syriens, Mouaz Al Balkhi et Shadi Omar Kataf. Après plusieurs semaines passées entre les Jungles de Calais et de Grande-Synthe et une douzaine de tentatives de passage « classiques » ratées, les deux compatriotes optèrent pour une autre stratégie. Le 7 octobre 2014, ils se procurèrent une combinaison de plongée au magasin Décathlon de Calais. Leurs corps ont été retrouvés quelques semaines plus tard, l’un sur une plage de Norvège, l’autre sur une plage des Pays-Bas.
      Petits arrangements entre voisins

      Les modes de franchissement de la frontière évoluent en fonction de son niveau de sécurisation. Plus un point de passage est rendu inaccessible, plus il y a de prises de risque et plus ces tentatives impliquent le recours à un « tiers », le passeur. En septembre 2014, le ministre de l’intérieur français, Bernard Cazeneuve, signait avec son homologue britannique, Theresa May, un accord bilatéral « incluant une contribution britannique de 5 millions d’euros par an pendant trois ans » dont l’une des mesures principales visait à « renforcer la sécurité, à la fois autour du port et dans la zone portuaire [2] ». Cet accord visait à empêcher, d’une part, les tentatives d’intrusions collectives sur le site portuaire et, d’autre part, les incursions sur la rocade accédant au port, technique consistant à profiter des embouteillages pour se cacher dans la remorque d’un camion La mise en œuvre du versant « sécurisation » de cet accord a été confiée à l’entreprise Zaun, une firme britannique [3], et s’est déroulée en plusieurs étapes. Dans un premier temps, à partir d’octobre 2014, les barrières ont été doublées à l’intérieur du site portuaire. Puis, au printemps 2015, sur une distance de deux kilomètres le long de la rocade accédant à la zone portuaire, a été érigée une double clôture, l’une de 4 mètres de haut et l’autre d’un peu moins de 3 mètres, équipée d’une rampe d’accès incurvée pour éviter qu’on ne s’y s’agrippe, et surmontée d’un fil barbelé. Entre les deux clôtures, un espace de détection infrarouge a été installé. La mise en place de cet arsenal autour de la zone portuaire a obligé les exilés à se détourner du port pour trouver d’autres voies de passage, plus dangereuses, notamment celle du tunnel sous la Manche. Les conséquences ne se sont pas fait attendre : alors qu’aucun des 17 décès recensés en 2014 n’avait eu lieu sur le site d’Eurotunnel, on en comptait 15 sur les 25 enregistrés en 2015. Il serait difficile d’en conclure que plus on boucle la frontière franco-britannique, plus celle-ci devient meurtrière. En effet, l’augmentation significative du nombre de morts entre 2014 et 2015 s’explique aussi par celle du nombre d’exilés présents dans le Calaisis. Les militants locaux estiment qu’il a crû, en un an, de 1 500 à environ 5 000 personnes. Il est en revanche certain qu’à la multiplication des barrières et des dispositifs dissuasifs, se sont ajoutées les désastreuses conditions de vie des exilés, obligés de survivre dans une extrême précarité et dans un contexte de surpopulation croissante, tout en tentant d’échapper aux violences policières : un cocktail explosif qui les a poussés plus nombreux à prendre des risques pour espérer passer. En août 2015, un nouvel accord franco-britannique fut signé dans lequel les deux ministres reconnaissaient que « depuis la fin du mois de juin, en raison de la sécurisation du port, les migrants ont changé de stratégie, cherchant au péril de leur vie, à s’introduire au niveau des points d’entrée dans le tunnel sous la Manche ». Mais qu’imaginent-ils pour remédier à ce constat inquiétant ? Que « la France renforce l’actuel dispositif de sécurité et l’action de ses policiers et de ses gendarmes, grâce au déploiement d’unités mobiles additionnelles » et que le Royaume-Uni alloue des moyens supplémentaires pour « sécuriser le périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, grâce à un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux » tout en « [aidant] la société Eurotunnel à augmenter nettement ses effectifs en charge de la sécurité et de la protection du site [4] ». Ce qui s’est traduit par l’installation de 29 kilomètres de nouvelles barrières et le « renforcement » de 10 kilomètres déjà existants. Le paysage du site d’Eurotunnel a été radicalement bouleversé : 100 hectares ont été rasés afin de faciliter la surveillance et une partie de cette zone a été volontairement inondée « pour créer des obstacles naturels qui empêchent l’accès aux clôtures » [5].
      Fortification

      Cette séquence n’est finalement qu’une étape supplémentaire dans la longue histoire de la fortification de la frontière franco-britannique. Elle a commencé avec le code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code ISPS) régissant les zones portuaires fournissant des services internationaux et s’est prolongée, depuis le début des années 1990, par une succession d’accords bilatéraux. Alors que le protocole de Sangatte (1991) avait initié la mise en place de contrôles juxtaposés français et britanniques des deux côtés de la frontière, son protocole additionnel (2000) les a étendus aux principales gares du nord de la France et du sud de l’Angleterre.

      Au tournant des années 2000, la fortification de la frontière prend une autre dimension. Du côté du site portuaire, « en 2000, un premier programme de 6 millions d’euros est engagé pour clôturer une partie du port, installer un réseau de vidéo surveillance ainsi qu’un bâtiment spécifique au département sûreté ». Jusqu’alors, la zone portuaire n’était que très sommairement clôturée. « À partir de 2005, un deuxième programme d’investissement de 7 millions d’euros est engagé […] [permettant] de finaliser l’année suivante, un réseau de 48 caméras fixes et mobiles de vidéo surveillance [6]. » De son côté, Eurotunnel renforce la surveillance de son site à partir du printemps 2001 et bénéficie, en février 2002, du prêt d’un radar PMMW (système à détection thermique) de l’armée britannique. Tandis que la signature du traité du Touquet (2003) étend les dispositions relatives aux contrôles juxtaposés à tous les ports de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, « l’arrangement » franco-britannique de 2009 accentue le recours aux dispositifs de détection et crée un centre de coordination conjoint « chargé de recueillir et partager toutes les informations nécessaires au contrôle des biens et de personnes circulant entre la France et le Royaume-Uni » [7]. Les accords franco-britanniques de 2014 et 2015 sont venus compléter cet empilement de textes.

      Retracer de manière précise et tenter de cartographier l’évolution des dispositifs mis en place autour de la frontière franco-britannique n’est pas chose aisée. En effet, l’accès à l’information est relativement restreint, du fait notamment de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués (services de l’État, gestionnaires des sites portuaires et du tunnel, prestataires de sécurité privés, etc.) et du manque de transparence qui en résulte. Dans ses déclarations, le porte-parole d’Eurotunnel indique que « depuis l’apparition des clandestins [sic] dans le Calaisis, Eurotunnel a, au-delà de ses obligations contractuelles, investi massivement dans les moyens physiques (clôtures, éclairages, caméras, barrières infrarouges) et humains de protection du terminal de Coquelles : plus de 160 millions d’euros, dont 13 millions d’euros au premier semestre 2015 » [8]. Difficile d’évaluer finement ce que coûte cette surenchère. Cette question fait l’objet d’une bataille de communication, notamment entre l’État et Eurotunnel, le premier reprochant au second de ne pas en faire assez en matière de sûreté tandis que le second réclame toujours plus d’aides pour protéger le site. L’affaire, connue sous le nom de « contentieux de Sangatte », s’est d’ailleurs conclue devant les tribunaux en 2003 par une victoire d’Eurotunnel qui a obtenu de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne une indemnisation pour les investissements qu’il avait consentis à cet effet [9].

      Du coût humain, il n’en est bien entendu pas question. Aux morts recensées s’ajoutent celles qui n’ont pu l’être. Par manque de sources, car « il y a suffisamment à faire avec les vivants [10] » ou par oubli tout simplement. Et puis il y a les personnes blessées, « des jeunes aux mains et aux jambes lacérées par les barbelés qui entourent le site d’Eurotunnel […] ces clôtures [qui] déchiquettent la peau de manière anarchique [11] ». Mutilées ou accidentées, ces personnes n’entrent dans aucun décompte. Le 21 octobre 2001, dans La Voix du Nord, la journaliste Sophie Leroy titrait son article « Assez de mort aux frontières » [12] en reprenant l’un des slogans de la manifestation organisée à Calais par le collectif C’Sur [13] pour dénoncer cette frontière meurtrière. Quinze années plus tard, la liste des morts n’a cessé de s’allonger.

      https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article5426

  • #DHS to store tens of thousands of refugee biometric records from #UNHCR

    The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) began sharing records including fingerprints, iris scans, and facial biometrics of refugees it is recommending for resettlement consideration in the U.S. with the country’s Citizenship and Immigration Service (#USCIS), Nextgov reports.

    The UNHCR sends tens of thousands of profiles to federal agencies each year, according to the report, and the #Department_of_Homeland_Services (DHS) is retaining the data for all of them, including those who do not actually come to the U.S. The biometric data will be stored in the #IDENT_system, and #HART once it goes live.

    “Biometric verification guards against substitution of individuals or identity fraud in the resettlement process,” the USCIS privacy impact assessment for the program states. “Many refugees live for long periods in asylum countries, and the use of biometrics ensures that there is [an] unbroken continuity of identity over time and between different locations.”

    Nextgov notes that UNHCR stats show the USCIS reviewed close to 85,000 cases in 2018, and approved less than a quarter for admission to the U.S.

    “A centralized database of biometric data belonging to refugees, without appropriate controls, could really lead to surveillance of those refugees as well as potentially coercive forms of scrutiny,” Human Rights Watch Artificial Intelligence Researcher Amos Toh told Nextgov. “I think there needs to be a lot more clarity on … how this data is being shared and is being used.”

    Toh also referred to issues around consent for personal data-sharing in humanitarian contexts.

    https://www.biometricupdate.com/201908/dhs-to-store-tens-of-thousands-of-refugee-biometric-records-from-un
    #surveillance #données_biométriques #base_de_données #database #HCR #réfugiés #asile #migrations #biométrie #empreintes_digitales #biométrie_faciale #USA #Etats-Unis #réinstallation #humanitaire

    ping @etraces

    • Inside the HART of the DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management

      #OBIM says its efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security are robust and open.

      The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) operated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) was designed in 1994 and implemented in 1995. It was originally meant to perform a South-West border recidivist study, but has grown into the second largest biometric system in the world, next to Aadhaar, with 230 million unique identity records, plus access to millions more held by the FBI and Department of Defense, and 350,000 transactions on an average weekday.

      As the number of programs using IDENT has grown, the system’s roll and size have increased. As the importance of IDENT has grown, so have the warnings and criticism of the program. It is still not widely understood how it works, however, Patrick Nemeth, Director of OBIM’s Identity Operations Division told Biometric Update in an exclusive interview.

      “We don’t own the data, we’re the data stewards, and it was collected by somebody else who ultimately has the authority to change it or delete it,” Nemeth explains. While many government biometric databases around the world are not operated in this way, the arrangement is only the beginning of the complexity the system has evolved to accommodate.

      OBIM performs three basic functions, Nemeth says, with pretty much everything else done in service of them. It operates the automated matching system, which is IDENT, but will soon be the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART), performs manual examination and verification, and coordinates sharing with the owners of the data, which means setting rules for sharing data with agencies. Most government biometric data is centralized with OBIM to minimize duplication under the department’s privacy rule, and also to apply the maximum security and protection to sensitive information.

      As operators of the centralized biometric repository, OBIM takes on the responsibility of dealing with the security, privacy, and civil liberties implications of storing sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). It does so, in part, by applying Fair Information Practice principles to govern procedures for elements including transparency, accounting and auditing, and purpose specification.

      Other than specific databases run by law enforcement and the DoD, which it also coordinates sharing for, OBIM holds all of the U.S. government’s biometric data. It primarily serves DHS agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Citizenship and Immigration Services, as well as agencies like the Coast Guard for border entries. It performs a range of functions, including both verification and identification, and during periods when the system is less busy, such as overnight, it performs deduplication and checks latent prints found on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or in investigations of serious crimes by the FBI, according to Nemeth.

      This enormous expansion of both the system’s scale and mandate is why OBIM is now moving forward with the development of the new HART system. IDENT is becoming obsolete.

      “It’s been stretched and band-aided and added-to in every way that people can think of, but it just can’t go any further,” Nemeth says.

      HART will add a range of capabilities, including to use a fusion of fingerprint, iris, and facial recognition modalities to improve its matching accuracy. It will also expand the scale of the system, which is desperately needed.

      “At one point about five years ago they did a couple external studies and they told me that if we ever reached 300,000 transactions a day that we would see system slowness and if we ever reached 400,000 per day, we would see the blue screen of death,” Nemeth admits.

      IDENT currently process more than 400,000 transactions in a day on occasion, after remedial action was taken by OBIM to increase its capacity. It typically serves about 350,000 requests per weekday, and a little less on the weekend, returning yes or no answers for about 99.5 percent. Nemeth says he uses more than one thousand servers and other pieces of hardware to keep the system running with brute force. That is not an efficient way to operate, however, and the demand keeps increasing with each new biometric border trial, and any other program involving a use of government biometrics.

      Increasing capacity to meet the rapid growth in demand is the main motivation for the move to HART, which will be able to serve 720,000 daily fingerprint transactions when it goes live, and can be quickly scaled. It is being launched on AWS’ Government Cloud, but is designed to be cloud-agnostic. OBIM’s database is growing by about 20 million people per year, which is also accelerating, and as additional modalities become more valuable with the addition of fusion verification, its 3 million pairs of irises may also increase. The current database is twice as large as it was seven years ago, and Nemeth says the current projections are that it will double again in the next seven.

      Some future uses of HART are likely yet to be determined, but an example of the scale that may be needed can be understood by considering the possibility that all 3 million travelers per day who pass through U.S. airports may one day need to be biometrically verified.

      Tech systems from the nineties are also inherently not able to keep up with modern technology. The programming languages and architecture of IDENT are antiquated, and require an inefficient and frustrating process not just to add capabilities, but every time a statistic is requested for analytical purposes.

      “We have to figure out what our question is, send it to our contractors, they write the script, they run it, they send it back to us, and sometimes when we look at it, that wasn’t really the question, and you have to repeat the process,” Nemeth says.

      As the number of agencies and use cases for IDENT has grown, the number of questions from system users, like everything else, has increased. Switching to HART will increase the analytical capabilities and overall flexibility of the system, which is particularly important when considering some of the privacy and security issues related to operating the world’s second largest biometric matching system. IDENT currently uses a multi-layered filtering system to return only the specific information the requesting customer is entitled to.

      “What’s unique about IDENT is because of the wide breadth of Homeland Security missions — law enforcement, information, credentialing, national security – it has kind of a complicated filtering process that we call Data Access and Security Controls,” Nemeth says. “You only get to see what your agency is permitted by law to see, and what the owner of the data has said that you can see. It’s a rather complex dance we do to make sure that we respect the privacy, the reason the information was collected, the legal protections for certain protected classes, all of those things. When we provide you the information, if you’re not allowed to see it, you don’t even know that information exists.”

      Three layers of filters screen what accounts can see data for a subject, what information they are allowed to see and what should be redacted (such as criminal history, in some cases), and an activity filter, which is attached to information by the agency that submitted it. OBIM also addresses the rights of data subjects with an extensive process of consultations and privacy impact assessments for new operations.

      “Every time somebody comes up with a new mission area, or a new application of biometrics, before we can implement that, our own privacy people need to go through it and write a privacy threat assessment,” Nemeth says. “Then, potentially, if its significant enough, they have to amend the privacy impact. Then it goes to our higher headquarters at the National Protection and Programs Directorate where they have to agree, and then finally it goes to the Department’s Privacy Office, where they have to agree that its within the scope of what we’re allowed to do.”

      Some alternately goes through inter-agency Data Access Request Committee for approval, but every new capability desired by a client agency is put in place only after it has gone through many steps and assessments, providing answers about why it is needed and how it should be delivered.

      “There are a lot of constraints on us, which is good, because lots of energetic people come up with lots of ideas and sometimes we just need to slow down a little bit and make sure that we’re properly using that information and protecting it.”

      Not only are OBIM’s efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security robust, according to Nemeth, they are also open. HART will increase the privacy protection the department can provide, he says, for instance by increasing the number and functionality of filtering layers OBIM can apply to data. The combination of privacy protections which are concerted and improving along with willingness to talk about those protections makes Nemeth frustrated with allegations among some media and public advocacy groups that HART represents a surveillance overreach on the part of the government.

      “We’re not going to tell you how to break into our system, but we’ll tell you quite a bit about it,” Nemeth says. “The privacy impact assessments and the privacy threshold analysis are available on the DHS privacy web page, along with our system of record.”

      The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) warns that HART will include data collected from innocent people and questionable sources, and argues that it will provide the means for suppression of American’s rights and freedoms. Nemeth says he sympathizes with concerns over the possible erosion of privacy in digital society, and the desire to protect it. He contends that the EFF is not considering the years and painstaking processes that OBIM puts into balancing the rights of individuals to not have their data shared unnecessarily with the mandates of client agencies. He points to the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Council as an example of the intensive oversight and review that checks the potential for misuse of biometric data.

      “The arguments that the EFF is making they’ve made several times during the fifteen-year history of IDENT, whenever there’s a new issue of the authorizing SORN and PIA, so it’s not new,” Nemeth counters. “They’ve added the facial piece to it. Essentially, they are arguing that we will violate the law.”

      The scrutiny will likely intensify, with public awareness of biometric entry/exit growing as the program rolls out. In the meantime, the number of transactions served by HART will be increasing, and OBIM will be evaluating new procedures using its new biometric capabilities. The privacy impact assessments and other checks will continue, and OBIM will continue the work of helping U.S. government agencies identify people. Nemeth stresses that that work is critically important, even as it requires the kind of extensive evaluation and scrutiny it invites.

      “We don’t retain our highly talented staff because we pay them well,” he confesses. “We retain them because they love what they’re doing and they’re making a difference for the security of the country.”

      https://www.biometricupdate.com/201809/inside-the-hart-of-the-dhs-office-of-biometric-identity-management
      #identité_biométrique

  • #Panorama

    The PANORAMA of GREEK CENSUS DATA is an internet based application designed to take full advantage of the vast quantity of information contained in the last three censuses (1991-2001-2011) by giving the user the opportunity to:
    – effectively manage all variables contained in the census,
    – retrieve data for further statistical analysis in easily usable form
    – map census variables at multiple geographical levels.

    https://panorama.statistics.gr/en
    #database #base_de_données #statistiques #Grèce #recensement #chiffres

    ping @simplicissimus @fil @reka

  • Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera (#Emif)
    La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (Emif Norte), aporta elementos de análisis basados en información directa y confiable sobre la dinámica, la magnitud y características de los flujos migratorios de trabajadores mexicanos hacia Estados Unidos.

    La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Sur de México (Emif Sur), aporta elementos para medir y caracterizar flujos migratorios provenientes de Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador, que se desplazan a territorio mexicano y/o estadounidense, con el propósito de laborar en estos países.
    https://colef.mx/emif

    Le site en anglais:

    Background of the surveys

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Northern Border (EMIF Norte) began in 1993 as a collaboration project between El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the National Population Council, and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, to measure the size and characteristics of the flows of migrant workers between Mexico and the United States.

    Later, the survey became a fundamental statistical observatory for the study of Mexican migration and the most important conceptual and methodological precedent for another similar survey on the Mexican-Guatemalan border, The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Southern Border (EMIF Sur) carried out since 2004.

    Both surveys are managed by the following institutions: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the Secretariat of Government, the National Population Council, the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, Migration Policy Bureau of Secretariat of Government, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, and the National Council to Prevent Discrimination. And in 2015 the Secretariat of Social Development joined the project.
    General Objectives

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Northern Border: Increase understanding of the phenomena of labor migration flows at Mexico’s northern border with the United States, highlighting its characteristics, volume, and trends, and its effects on the labor market and its impact on both neighboring societies.

    The Survey of Migration at Mexico´s Southern Border: Increase understanding of the flows of migrants who cross between Mexico and Guatemala in order to work in Mexico or the United States, along with the undocumented migrants that cross Mexican territory and are returned to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador by Mexican and U.S. immigration officials. Also, quantify the volume of migration flows and discover its main economic, social and demographic makeup, as well as the conditions and labor characteristics of the people who migrate.


    https://colef.mx/emif/eng/index.php

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #données #base_de_données #statistiques #chiffres #Mexique #USA #Etats-Unis

  • #Chansons contre la #guerre

    Chansons contre la guerre (#CCG) est un #recueil collectif de #paroles de chansons pacifistes et antimilitaristes de tous les temps et du monde entier, sous forme de #base_de_données. Les lecteurs et les collaborateurs peuvent donc contribuer librement à sa formation, à sa gestion et à son amélioration constante.

    https://www.antiwarsongs.org
    #paix #pacifisme #musique_et_politique
    ping @sinehebdo

    Signalé par @odilon, que je remercie, qui a partagé le texte de cette chanson italienne :
    Il singolare Maggio di #Tressa
    https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?lang=fr&id=59186
    #De_Soda_Sisters

    A écouté ici :
    https://twitter.com/m_causse/status/1112460766773473281