#base_de_données

En quarante-trois ans, 676 morts à la suite d’#interventions_policières ou du fait d’un agent des forces de l’ordre

►https://bastamag.net/webdocs/police
#base_de_données

Je recense ici toutes les #statistiques sur les assassinats policiers, principalement en #France mais aussi dans d’autres pays :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/601177

#Violence_policière #Violences_policières #brutalité_policière #Assassinats_policiers

https://i.imgur.com/uNyTxXF.png

ping @albertocampiphoto

#génocide #France #tutsi #Rwanda #base_de_données #database

Et en #Hongrie...

Hongrie : des #tirs de sommation pour dissuader des dizaines de migrants à la frontière avec la #Serbie

►https://seenthis.net/messages/823626

Accès direct à la carte des projets : ▻https://ferme.yeswiki.net/InnovationsMontagne/?CarteInnov
(bizarre : tous les projets sont dans les Préalpes... rien dans les massifs centraux des Alpes du Nord ou du Sud ???)

En français :
►https://wid.world/fr/accueil

A rajouter à la recension des travaux sur la corrélation entre #inégalités et #problèmes_sociaux ici :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/765806

Un article de février 2018

The deadly roads into Calais

Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.

He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.

But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.

Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.

Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.

The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.

Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.

The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”

During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.

The victims are often young men’

For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.

For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.

Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.

Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”

Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”

Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.

“The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.

Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”

Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.

Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”

Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”

Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”

’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’

While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.

During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”

Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.

A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”

Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/190218/deadly-roads-calais

–----

En français :
A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180218/calais-les-routes-de-la-mort-pour-les-migrants?page_article=1%20

Inside the HART of the DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management

#OBIM says its efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security are robust and open.

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The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) operated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) was designed in 1994 and implemented in 1995. It was originally meant to perform a South-West border recidivist study, but has grown into the second largest biometric system in the world, next to Aadhaar, with 230 million unique identity records, plus access to millions more held by the FBI and Department of Defense, and 350,000 transactions on an average weekday.

As the number of programs using IDENT has grown, the system’s roll and size have increased. As the importance of IDENT has grown, so have the warnings and criticism of the program. It is still not widely understood how it works, however, Patrick Nemeth, Director of OBIM’s Identity Operations Division told Biometric Update in an exclusive interview.

“We don’t own the data, we’re the data stewards, and it was collected by somebody else who ultimately has the authority to change it or delete it,” Nemeth explains. While many government biometric databases around the world are not operated in this way, the arrangement is only the beginning of the complexity the system has evolved to accommodate.

OBIM performs three basic functions, Nemeth says, with pretty much everything else done in service of them. It operates the automated matching system, which is IDENT, but will soon be the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART), performs manual examination and verification, and coordinates sharing with the owners of the data, which means setting rules for sharing data with agencies. Most government biometric data is centralized with OBIM to minimize duplication under the department’s privacy rule, and also to apply the maximum security and protection to sensitive information.

As operators of the centralized biometric repository, OBIM takes on the responsibility of dealing with the security, privacy, and civil liberties implications of storing sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). It does so, in part, by applying Fair Information Practice principles to govern procedures for elements including transparency, accounting and auditing, and purpose specification.

Other than specific databases run by law enforcement and the DoD, which it also coordinates sharing for, OBIM holds all of the U.S. government’s biometric data. It primarily serves DHS agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Citizenship and Immigration Services, as well as agencies like the Coast Guard for border entries. It performs a range of functions, including both verification and identification, and during periods when the system is less busy, such as overnight, it performs deduplication and checks latent prints found on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or in investigations of serious crimes by the FBI, according to Nemeth.

This enormous expansion of both the system’s scale and mandate is why OBIM is now moving forward with the development of the new HART system. IDENT is becoming obsolete.

“It’s been stretched and band-aided and added-to in every way that people can think of, but it just can’t go any further,” Nemeth says.

HART will add a range of capabilities, including to use a fusion of fingerprint, iris, and facial recognition modalities to improve its matching accuracy. It will also expand the scale of the system, which is desperately needed.

“At one point about five years ago they did a couple external studies and they told me that if we ever reached 300,000 transactions a day that we would see system slowness and if we ever reached 400,000 per day, we would see the blue screen of death,” Nemeth admits.

IDENT currently process more than 400,000 transactions in a day on occasion, after remedial action was taken by OBIM to increase its capacity. It typically serves about 350,000 requests per weekday, and a little less on the weekend, returning yes or no answers for about 99.5 percent. Nemeth says he uses more than one thousand servers and other pieces of hardware to keep the system running with brute force. That is not an efficient way to operate, however, and the demand keeps increasing with each new biometric border trial, and any other program involving a use of government biometrics.

Increasing capacity to meet the rapid growth in demand is the main motivation for the move to HART, which will be able to serve 720,000 daily fingerprint transactions when it goes live, and can be quickly scaled. It is being launched on AWS’ Government Cloud, but is designed to be cloud-agnostic. OBIM’s database is growing by about 20 million people per year, which is also accelerating, and as additional modalities become more valuable with the addition of fusion verification, its 3 million pairs of irises may also increase. The current database is twice as large as it was seven years ago, and Nemeth says the current projections are that it will double again in the next seven.

Some future uses of HART are likely yet to be determined, but an example of the scale that may be needed can be understood by considering the possibility that all 3 million travelers per day who pass through U.S. airports may one day need to be biometrically verified.

Tech systems from the nineties are also inherently not able to keep up with modern technology. The programming languages and architecture of IDENT are antiquated, and require an inefficient and frustrating process not just to add capabilities, but every time a statistic is requested for analytical purposes.

“We have to figure out what our question is, send it to our contractors, they write the script, they run it, they send it back to us, and sometimes when we look at it, that wasn’t really the question, and you have to repeat the process,” Nemeth says.

As the number of agencies and use cases for IDENT has grown, the number of questions from system users, like everything else, has increased. Switching to HART will increase the analytical capabilities and overall flexibility of the system, which is particularly important when considering some of the privacy and security issues related to operating the world’s second largest biometric matching system. IDENT currently uses a multi-layered filtering system to return only the specific information the requesting customer is entitled to.

“What’s unique about IDENT is because of the wide breadth of Homeland Security missions — law enforcement, information, credentialing, national security – it has kind of a complicated filtering process that we call Data Access and Security Controls,” Nemeth says. “You only get to see what your agency is permitted by law to see, and what the owner of the data has said that you can see. It’s a rather complex dance we do to make sure that we respect the privacy, the reason the information was collected, the legal protections for certain protected classes, all of those things. When we provide you the information, if you’re not allowed to see it, you don’t even know that information exists.”

Three layers of filters screen what accounts can see data for a subject, what information they are allowed to see and what should be redacted (such as criminal history, in some cases), and an activity filter, which is attached to information by the agency that submitted it. OBIM also addresses the rights of data subjects with an extensive process of consultations and privacy impact assessments for new operations.

“Every time somebody comes up with a new mission area, or a new application of biometrics, before we can implement that, our own privacy people need to go through it and write a privacy threat assessment,” Nemeth says. “Then, potentially, if its significant enough, they have to amend the privacy impact. Then it goes to our higher headquarters at the National Protection and Programs Directorate where they have to agree, and then finally it goes to the Department’s Privacy Office, where they have to agree that its within the scope of what we’re allowed to do.”

Some alternately goes through inter-agency Data Access Request Committee for approval, but every new capability desired by a client agency is put in place only after it has gone through many steps and assessments, providing answers about why it is needed and how it should be delivered.

“There are a lot of constraints on us, which is good, because lots of energetic people come up with lots of ideas and sometimes we just need to slow down a little bit and make sure that we’re properly using that information and protecting it.”

Not only are OBIM’s efforts to protect biometric data privacy and security robust, according to Nemeth, they are also open. HART will increase the privacy protection the department can provide, he says, for instance by increasing the number and functionality of filtering layers OBIM can apply to data. The combination of privacy protections which are concerted and improving along with willingness to talk about those protections makes Nemeth frustrated with allegations among some media and public advocacy groups that HART represents a surveillance overreach on the part of the government.

“We’re not going to tell you how to break into our system, but we’ll tell you quite a bit about it,” Nemeth says. “The privacy impact assessments and the privacy threshold analysis are available on the DHS privacy web page, along with our system of record.”

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) warns that HART will include data collected from innocent people and questionable sources, and argues that it will provide the means for suppression of American’s rights and freedoms. Nemeth says he sympathizes with concerns over the possible erosion of privacy in digital society, and the desire to protect it. He contends that the EFF is not considering the years and painstaking processes that OBIM puts into balancing the rights of individuals to not have their data shared unnecessarily with the mandates of client agencies. He points to the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Council as an example of the intensive oversight and review that checks the potential for misuse of biometric data.

“The arguments that the EFF is making they’ve made several times during the fifteen-year history of IDENT, whenever there’s a new issue of the authorizing SORN and PIA, so it’s not new,” Nemeth counters. “They’ve added the facial piece to it. Essentially, they are arguing that we will violate the law.”

The scrutiny will likely intensify, with public awareness of biometric entry/exit growing as the program rolls out. In the meantime, the number of transactions served by HART will be increasing, and OBIM will be evaluating new procedures using its new biometric capabilities. The privacy impact assessments and other checks will continue, and OBIM will continue the work of helping U.S. government agencies identify people. Nemeth stresses that that work is critically important, even as it requires the kind of extensive evaluation and scrutiny it invites.

“We don’t retain our highly talented staff because we pay them well,” he confesses. “We retain them because they love what they’re doing and they’re making a difference for the security of the country.”

▻https://www.biometricupdate.com/201809/inside-the-hart-of-the-dhs-office-of-biometric-identity-management
#identité_biométrique

@val_k avait commencé une liste ici aussi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/734716

China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise

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The Chinese authorities turned to a Massachusetts company and a prominent Yale researcher as they built an enormous system of surveillance and control.

The authorities called it a free health check. Tahir Imin had his doubts.

They drew blood from the 38-year-old Muslim, scanned his face, recorded his voice and took his fingerprints. They didn’t bother to check his heart or kidneys, and they rebuffed his request to see the results.

“They said, ‘You don’t have the right to ask about this,’” Mr. Imin said. “‘If you want to ask more,’ they said, ‘you can go to the police.’”

Mr. Imin was one of millions of people caught up in a vast Chinese campaign of surveillance and oppression. To give it teeth, the Chinese authorities are collecting DNA — and they got unlikely corporate and academic help from the United States to do it.

China wants to make the country’s Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group, more subservient to the Communist Party. It has detained up to a million people in what China calls “re-education” camps, drawing condemnation from human rights groups and a threat of sanctions from the Trump administration.

Collecting genetic material is a key part of China’s campaign, according to human rights groups and Uighur activists. They say a comprehensive DNA database could be used to chase down any Uighurs who resist conforming to the campaign.

Police forces in the United States and elsewhere use genetic material from family members to find suspects and solve crimes. Chinese officials, who are building a broad nationwide database of DNA samples, have cited the crime-fighting benefits of China’s own genetic studies.

To bolster their DNA capabilities, scientists affiliated with China’s police used equipment made by Thermo Fisher, a Massachusetts company. For comparison with Uighur DNA, they also relied on genetic material from people around the world that was provided by #Kenneth_Kidd, a prominent #Yale_University geneticist.

On Wednesday, #Thermo_Fisher said it would no longer sell its equipment in Xinjiang, the part of China where the campaign to track Uighurs is mostly taking place. The company said separately in an earlier statement to The New York Times that it was working with American officials to figure out how its technology was being used.

Dr. Kidd said he had been unaware of how his material and know-how were being used. He said he believed Chinese scientists were acting within scientific norms that require informed consent by DNA donors.

China’s campaign poses a direct challenge to the scientific community and the way it makes cutting-edge knowledge publicly available. The campaign relies in part on public DNA databases and commercial technology, much of it made or managed in the United States. In turn, Chinese scientists have contributed Uighur DNA samples to a global database, potentially violating scientific norms of consent.

Cooperation from the global scientific community “legitimizes this type of genetic surveillance,” said Mark Munsterhjelm, an assistant professor at the University of Windsor in Ontario who has closely tracked the use of American technology in Xinjiang.

Swabbing Millions

In Xinjiang, in northwestern China, the program was known as “#Physicals_for_All.”

From 2016 to 2017, nearly 36 million people took part in it, according to Xinhua, China’s official news agency. The authorities collected DNA samples, images of irises and other personal data, according to Uighurs and human rights groups. It is unclear whether some residents participated more than once — Xinjiang has a population of about 24.5 million.

In a statement, the Xinjiang government denied that it collects DNA samples as part of the free medical checkups. It said the DNA machines that were bought by the Xinjiang authorities were for “internal use.”

China has for decades maintained an iron grip in Xinjiang. In recent years, it has blamed Uighurs for a series of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China, including a 2013 incident in which a driver struck two people in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

In late 2016, the Communist Party embarked on a campaign to turn the Uighurs and other largely Muslim minority groups into loyal supporters. The government locked up hundreds of thousands of them in what it called job training camps, touted as a way to escape poverty, backwardness and radical Islam. It also began to take DNA samples.

In at least some of the cases, people didn’t give up their genetic material voluntarily. To mobilize Uighurs for the free medical checkups, police and local cadres called or sent them text messages, telling them the checkups were required, according to Uighurs interviewed by The Times.

“There was a pretty strong coercive element to it,” said Darren Byler, an anthropologist at the University of Washington who studies the plight of the Uighurs. “They had no choice.”

Calling Dr. Kidd

Kenneth Kidd first visited China in 1981 and remained curious about the country. So when he received an invitation in 2010 for an expenses-paid trip to visit Beijing, he said yes.

Dr. Kidd is a major figure in the genetics field. The 77-year-old Yale professor has helped to make DNA evidence more acceptable in American courts.

His Chinese hosts had their own background in law enforcement. They were scientists from the Ministry of Public Security — essentially, China’s police.

During that trip, Dr. Kidd met Li Caixia, the chief forensic physician of the ministry’s Institute of Forensic Science. The relationship deepened. In December 2014, Dr. Li arrived at Dr. Kidd’s lab for an 11-month stint. She took some DNA samples back to China.

“I had thought we were sharing samples for collaborative research,” said Dr. Kidd.

Dr. Kidd is not the only prominent foreign geneticist to have worked with the Chinese authorities. Bruce Budowle, a professor at the University of North Texas, says in his online biography that he “has served or is serving” as a member of an academic committee at the ministry’s Institute of Forensic Science.

Jeff Carlton, a university spokesman, said in a statement that Professor Budowle’s role with the ministry was “only symbolic in nature” and that he had “done no work on its behalf.”

“Dr. Budowle and his team abhor the use of DNA technology to persecute ethnic or religious groups,” Mr. Carlton said in the statement. “Their work focuses on criminal investigations and combating human trafficking to serve humanity.”

Dr. Kidd’s data became part of China’s DNA drive.

In 2014, ministry researchers published a paper describing a way for scientists to tell one ethnic group from another. It cited, as an example, the ability to distinguish Uighurs from Indians. The authors said they used 40 DNA samples taken from Uighurs in China and samples from other ethnic groups from Dr. Kidd’s Yale lab.

In patent applications filed in China in 2013 and 2017, ministry researchers described ways to sort people by ethnicity by screening their genetic makeup. They took genetic material from Uighurs and compared it with DNA from other ethnic groups. In the 2017 filing, researchers explained that their system would help in “inferring the geographical origin from the DNA of suspects at crime scenes.”

For outside comparisons, they used DNA samples provided by Dr. Kidd’s lab, the 2017 filing said. They also used samples from the 1000 Genomes Project, a public catalog of genes from around the world.

Paul Flicek, member of the steering committee of the 1000 Genomes Project, said that its data was unrestricted and that “there is no obvious problem” if it was being used as a way to determine where a DNA sample came from.

The data flow also went the other way.

Chinese government researchers contributed the data of 2,143 Uighurs to the Allele Frequency Database, an online search platform run by Dr. Kidd that was partly funded by the United States Department of Justice until last year. The database, known as Alfred, contains DNA data from more than 700 populations around the world.

This sharing of data could violate scientific norms of informed consent because it is not clear whether the Uighurs volunteered their DNA samples to the Chinese authorities, said Arthur Caplan, the founding head of the division of medical ethics at New York University’s School of Medicine. He said that “no one should be in a database without express consent.”

“Honestly, there’s been a kind of naïveté on the part of American scientists presuming that other people will follow the same rules and standards wherever they come from,” Dr. Caplan said.

Dr. Kidd said he was “not particularly happy” that the ministry had cited him in its patents, saying his data shouldn’t be used in ways that could allow people or institutions to potentially profit from it. If the Chinese authorities used data they got from their earlier collaborations with him, he added, there is little he can do to stop them.

He said he was unaware of the filings until he was contacted by The Times.

Dr. Kidd also said he considered his collaboration with the ministry to be no different from his work with police and forensics labs elsewhere. He said governments should have access to data about minorities, not just the dominant ethnic group, in order to have an accurate picture of the whole population.

As for the consent issue, he said the burden of meeting that standard lay with the Chinese researchers, though he said reports about what Uighurs are subjected to in China raised some difficult questions.

“I would assume they had appropriate informed consent on the samples,” he said, “though I must say what I’ve been hearing in the news recently about the treatment of the Uighurs raises concerns.”
Machine Learning

In 2015, Dr. Kidd and Dr. Budowle spoke at a genomics conference in the Chinese city of Xi’an. It was underwritten in part by Thermo Fisher, a company that has come under intense criticism for its equipment sales in China, and Illumina, a San Diego company that makes gene sequencing instruments. Illumina did not respond to requests for comment.

China is ramping up spending on health care and research. The Chinese market for gene-sequencing equipment and other technologies was worth $1 billion in 2017 and could more than double in five years, according to CCID Consulting, a research firm. But the Chinese market is loosely regulated, and it isn’t always clear where the equipment goes or to what uses it is put.

Thermo Fisher sells everything from lab instruments to forensic DNA testing kits to DNA mapping machines, which help scientists decipher a person’s ethnicity and identify diseases to which he or she is particularly vulnerable. China accounted for 10 percent of Thermo Fisher’s $20.9 billion in revenue, according to the company’s 2017 annual report, and it employs nearly 5,000 people there.

“Our greatest success story in emerging markets continues to be China,” it said in the report.

China used Thermo Fisher’s equipment to map the genes of its people, according to five Ministry of Public Security patent filings.

The company has also sold equipment directly to the authorities in Xinjiang, where the campaign to control the Uighurs has been most intense. At least some of the equipment was intended for use by the police, according to procurement documents. The authorities there said in the documents that the machines were important for DNA inspections in criminal cases and had “no substitutes in China.”

In February 2013, six ministry researchers credited Thermo Fisher’s Applied Biosystems brand, as well as other companies, with helping to analyze the DNA samples of Han, Uighur and Tibetan people in China, according to a patent filing. The researchers said understanding how to differentiate between such DNA samples was necessary for fighting terrorism “because these cases were becoming more difficult to crack.”

The researchers said they had obtained 95 Uighur DNA samples, some of which were given to them by the police. Other samples were provided by Uighurs voluntarily, they said.

Thermo Fisher was criticized by Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, and others who asked the Commerce Department to prohibit American companies from selling technology to China that could be used for purposes of surveillance and tracking.

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On Wednesday, Thermo Fisher said it would stop selling its equipment in Xinjiang, a decision it said was “consistent with Thermo Fisher’s values, ethics code and policies.”

“As the world leader in serving science, we recognize the importance of considering how our products and services are used — or may be used — by our customers,” it said.

Human rights groups praised Thermo Fisher’s move. Still, they said, equipment and information flows into China should be better monitored, to make sure the authorities elsewhere don’t send them to Xinjiang.

“It’s an important step, and one hopes that they apply the language in their own statement to commercial activity across China, and that other companies are assessing their sales and operations, especially in Xinjiang,” said Sophie Richardson, the China director of Human Rights Watch.

American lawmakers and officials are taking a hard look at the situation in Xinjiang. The Trump administration is considering sanctions against Chinese officials and companies over China’s treatment of the Uighurs.

China’s tracking campaign unnerved people like Tahir Hamut. In May 2017, the police in the city of Urumqi in Xinjiang drew the 49-year-old Uighur’s blood, took his fingerprints, recorded his voice and took a scan of his face. He was called back a month later for what he was told was a free health check at a local clinic.

Mr. Hamut, a filmmaker who is now living in Virginia, said he saw between 20 to 40 Uighurs in line. He said it was absurd to think that such frightened people had consented to submit their DNA.

“No one in this situation, not under this much pressure and facing such personal danger, would agree to give their blood samples for research,” Mr. Hamut said. “It’s just inconceivable.”

▻https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html?action=click&module=MoreInSect
#USA #Etats-Unis #ADN #DNA #Ouïghours #université #science #génétique #base_de_données

Gli affari lungo le frontiere. Inchiesta sugli appalti pubblici per il contrasto all’immigrazione “clandestina”

In Tunisia, Libia, Niger, Egitto e non solo. Così lo Stato italiano tramite il ministero dell’Interno finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, idranti per “ordine pubblico”, formazione delle polizie e sistemi automatizzati di identificazione. Ecco per chi la frontiera rappresenta un buon affare.

Uno dei luoghi chiave del “contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” che l’Italia conduce lungo le rotte africane non si trova a Tunisi, Niamey o Tripoli, ma è in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco. È ad Adria, poco distante dal Po, che ha sede “Cantiere Navale Vittoria”, un’azienda nata nel 1927 per iniziativa della famiglia Duò -ancora oggi proprietaria- specializzata in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare. Si tratta di uno dei partner strategici della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno, per una serie di commesse in Libia e Tunisia.

La Direzione è il braccio del Viminale in tema di “gestione” dei flussi provenienti da quei Paesi ritenuti di “eccezionale rilevanza nella gestione della rotta del Mediterraneo centrale” (parole della Farnesina). Quella “rotta” conduce alle coste italiane: Libia e Tunisia, appunto, ma anche Niger e non solo. E quel “pezzo” del Viminale si occupa di tradurre in pratica le strategie governative. Come? Appaltando a imprese italiane attività diversissime tra loro per valore, fonti di finanziamento, tipologia e territori coinvolti. Un principio è comune: quello di dar forma al “contrasto”, sul nostro territorio o di frontiera. E per questi affidamenti ricorre più volte una formula: “Il fine che si intende perseguire è quello di collaborare con i Paesi terzi ai fini di contrastare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina”. Tra gli ultimi appalti aggiudicati a “Cantiere Navale Vittoria” (ottobre 2018) spicca la rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori “P350” da 34 metri, di proprietà della Guardia nazionale della Tunisia. Tramite gli atti della procedura di affidamento si possono ricostruire filiera e calendario.

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Facciamo un salto indietro al giugno 2017, quando i ministeri degli Esteri e dell’Interno italiani sottoscrivono un’“intesa tecnica” per prevedere azioni di “supporto tecnico” del Viminale stesso alle “competenti autorità tunisine”. Obiettivo: “Migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, inclusi la “lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. La spesa prevista -12 milioni di euro- dovrebbe essere coperta tramite il cosiddetto “Fondo Africa”, istituito sei mesi prima con legge di Stabilità e provvisto di una “dotazione finanziaria” di 200 milioni di euro. L’obiettivo dichiarato del Fondo è quello di “rilanciare il dialogo e la cooperazione con i Paesi africani d’importanza prioritaria per le rotte migratorie”. Le autorità di Tunisi hanno fretta, tanto che un mese dopo l’intesa tra i dicasteri chiedono all’Italia di provvedere subito alla “rimessa in efficienza” dei sei pattugliatori. Chi li ha costruiti, anni prima, è proprio l’azienda di Adria, e da Tunisi giunge la proposta di avvalersi proprio del suo “know how”. La richiesta è accolta. Trascorre poco più di un anno e nell’ottobre 2018 l’appalto viene aggiudicato al Cantiere per 6,3 milioni di euro. L’“attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, scrive la Direzione immigrazione e frontiere, è di “primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale, anche alla luce dei recenti sbarchi sulle coste italiane di migranti provenienti dalle acque territoriali tunisine”. I pattugliatori da “consegnare” risistemati alla Tunisia servono quindi a impedire o limitare gli arrivi via mare nel nostro Paese, che da gennaio a metà dicembre di 2018 sono stati 23.122 (di cui 12.976 dalla Libia), in netto calo rispetto ai 118.019 (105.986 dalla Libia) dello stesso periodo del 2017.

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A quel Paese di frontiera l’Italia non fornisce (o rimette in sesto) solamente navi. Nel luglio 2018, infatti, la Direzione del Viminale ha stipulato un contratto con la #Totani Company Srl (sede a Roma) per la fornitura di 50 veicoli #Mitsubishi 4×4 Pajero da “consegnare presso il porto di Tunisi”. Il percorso è simile a quello dei sei pattugliatori: “Considerata” l’intesa del giugno 2017 tra i ministeri italiani, “visto” il Fondo Africa, “considerata” la richiesta dei 50 mezzi da parte delle autorità nordafricane formulata nel corso di una riunione del “Comitato Italo-Tunisino”, “vista” la necessità di “definire nel più breve tempo possibile le procedure di acquisizione” per “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, eccetera. E così l’offerta economica di 1,6 milioni di euro della Totani è ritenuta congrua.

Capita però che alcune gare vadano deserte. È successo per la fornitura di due “autoveicoli allestiti ‘idrante per ordine pubblico’” e per la relativa attività di formazione per 12 operatori della polizia tunisina (352mila euro la base d’asta). “Al fine di poter supportare il governo tunisino nell’ambito delle attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” è il passe-partout utilizzato anche per gli idranti, anche se sfugge l’impiego concreto. Seppur deserta, gli atti di questa gara sono interessanti per i passaggi elencati. Il tutto è partito da un incontro a Roma del febbraio 2018 tra l’allora ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti e l’omologo tunisino. “Sulla base” di questa riunione, la Direzione del Viminale “richiede” di provvedere alla commessa attraverso un “appunto” datato 27 aprile dello stesso anno che viene “decretato favorevolmente” dal “Sig. Capo della Polizia”, Franco Gabrielli. Alla gara (poi non aggiudicata) si presenta un solo concorrente, la “Brescia Antincendi International Srl”, che all’appuntamento con il ministero delega come “collaboratore” un ex militare in pensione, il tenente colonnello Virgilio D’Amata, cavaliere al merito della Repubblica Italiana. Ma è un nulla di fatto.

A Tunisi vengono quindi consegnati navi, pick-up, (mancati) idranti ma anche motori fuoribordo per quasi 600mila euro. È del settembre 2018, infatti, un nuovo “avviso esplorativo” sottoscritto dal direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione -Massimo Bontempi- per la fornitura di “10 coppie di motori Yamaha 4 tempi da 300 CV di potenza” e altri 25 da 150 CV. Il tutto al dichiarato fine di “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”.

Come per la Tunisia, anche in Libia il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel Fondo Africa. Parlamento non pervenuto

Poi c’è la Libia, l’altro fronte strategico del “contrasto”. Come per la Tunisia, anche in questo contesto il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri di Esteri e Interno -Parlamento non pervenuto- “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel citato Fondo Africa. Una di queste, datata 4 agosto 2017, riguarda il “supporto tecnico del ministero dell’Interno italiano alle competenti autorità libiche per migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, inclusi la lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. L’“eventuale spesa prevista” è di 2,5 milioni di euro. Nel novembre 2017 se n’è aggiunta un’altra, rivolta a “programmi di formazione” dei libici del valore di 615mila euro circa (sempre tratti dal Fondo Africa). Quindi si parte dalle intese e poi si passa ai contratti.

Scorrendo quelli firmati dalla Direzione immigrazione e polizia delle frontiere del Viminale tra 2017 e 2018, e che riguardano specificamente commesse a beneficio di Tripoli, il “fornitore” è sempre lo stesso: Cantiere Navale Vittoria. È l’azienda di Adria -che non ha risposto alle nostre domande- a occuparsi della rimessa in efficienza di svariate imbarcazioni (tre da 14 metri, due da 35 e una da 22) custodite a Biserta (in Tunisia) e “da restituire allo Stato della Libia”. Ma anche della formazione di 21 “operatori della polizia libica” per la loro “conduzione” o del trasporto di un’altra nave di 18 metri da Tripoli a Biserta. La somma degli appalti sfiora complessivamente i 3 milioni di euro. In alcuni casi, il Viminale dichiara di non avere alternative al cantiere veneto. Lo ha riconosciuto la Direzione in un decreto di affidamento urgente per la formazione di 22 “operatori di polizia libica” e la riconsegna di tre motovedette a fine 2017. Poiché Cantiere Navale Vittoria avrebbe un “patrimonio informativo peculiare”, qualunque ricerca di “soluzioni alternative” sarebbe “irragionevole”. Ecco perché in diverse “riunioni bilaterali di esperti” per la cooperazione tra Italia e Libia “in materia migratoria”, oltre alla delegazione libica (i vertici dell’Amministrazione generale per la sicurezza costiera del ministero dell’Interno) e quella italiana (tra cui l’allora direttore del Servizio immigrazione del Viminale, Vittorio Pisani), c’erano anche i rappresentanti di Cantiere Navale Vittoria.
Se i concorrenti sono pochi, la fretta è tanta. In più di un appalto verso la Libia, infatti, la Direzione ha argomentato le procedure di “estrema urgenza” segnalando come “ulteriori indugi”, ad esempio “nella riconsegna delle imbarcazioni”, non solo “verrebbero a gravare ingiustificatamente sugli oneri di custodia […] ma potrebbero determinare difficoltà anche di tipo diplomatico con l’interlocutore libico”. È successo nell’estate 2018 anche per l’ultimo “avviso esplorativo” da quasi 1 milione di euro collegato a quattro training (di quattro settimane) destinati a cinque equipaggi “a bordo di due unità navali da 35 metri, un’unità navale da 22 metri e un’unità navale da 28 metri di proprietà libica”, “al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Lo scopo è fornire una “preparazione adeguata su ogni aspetto delle unità navali”. Della materia “diritti umani” non c’è traccia.

Questa specifica iniziativa italiana deriva dal Memorandum d’Intesa con la Libia sottoscritto a Roma dal governo Gentiloni (Marco Minniti ministro dell’Interno), il 2 febbraio 2017. Il nostro Paese si era impegnato a “fornire supporto tecnico e tecnologico agli organismi libici incaricati della lotta contro l’immigrazione clandestina”. È da lì che i governi di Italia e Libia decidono di includere tra le attività di cooperazione anche l’erogazione dei corsi di addestramento sulle motovedette ancorate a Biserta.

Ai primi di maggio del 2018, il Viminale decide di accelerare. C’è l’“urgenza di potenziare, attraverso la rimessa in efficienza delle imbarcazioni e l’erogazione di corsi di conduzione operativa, il capacity building della Guardia Costiera libica, al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Anche perché, aggiunge il ministero, “alla luce degli ultimi eventi di partenze di migranti dalle coste libiche”, “appare strettamente necessario ed urgente favorire il pieno ripristino dell’efficienza delle competenti Autorità dello Stato della Libia nell’erogazione dei servizi istituzionali”. E così a fine giugno 2018 viene pubblicato il bando: i destinatari sono “operatori della polizia libica” e non invece le guardie costiere. Il ministero ha dovuto però “rimodulare” in corsa l’imposto a base d’asta della gara (da 763mila a 993mila euro). Perché? Il capitolato degli oneri e il verbale di stima relativi al valore complessivo dell’intera procedura sarebbero risultati “non remunerativi” per l’unico operatore interessato: Cantiere Navale Vittoria Spa, che avrebbe comunicato “di non poter sottoscrivere un’offerta adeguata”.

Le risorse per quest’ultimo appalto non arrivano dal Fondo Africa ma da uno dei sei progetti finanziati in Libia dall’Unione europea tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. Quello che ci riguarda in particolare s’intitola “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, del valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro. Mentre l’Ue è il principale finanziatore, chi deve implementarlo in loco, dal luglio 2017, è proprio il nostro ministero dell’Interno. Che è attivo in due aree della Libia: a Nord-Ovest, a Tripoli, a beneficio delle guardie costiere libiche (tramite la costituzione di un centro di coordinamento per le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso in mare e per la dichiarazione di un’area di ricerca e soccorso in mare autonoma), e una a Sud-Ovest, nella regione del Fezzan, nel distretto di Ghat, per incrementare la capacità di sorveglianza, “in particolare nelle aree di frontiera terrestre con il Niger, maggiormente colpita dall’attraversamento illegale”. È previsto inoltre un “progetto pilota” per istituire una sede operativa per circa 300 persone, ripristinando ed equipaggiando le esistenti strutture nella città di Talwawet, non lontano da Ghat, con tre avamposti da 20 persone l’uno.

A un passo da lì c’è il Niger, l’altra tessera del mosaico. Alla metà di dicembre 2018, non risultano appalti in capo alla Direzione frontiere del Viminale, ma ciò non significa che il nostro Paese non sia attivo per supportare (anche) la gestione dei suoi confini. A metà 2017, infatti, l’Italia ha destinato 50 milioni di euro all’EU Trust Fund per “far fronte alle cause profonde della migrazione in Africa/Finestra Sahel e Lago Ciad”, con un’attenzione particolare al Niger. Si punta alla “creazione di nuove unità specializzate necessarie al controllo delle frontiere, di nuovi posti di frontiera fissa, o all’ammodernamento di quelli esistenti, di un nuovo centro di accoglienza per i migranti a Dirkou, nonché per la riattivazione della locale pista di atterraggio”. In più, dal 2018 è scesa sul campo la “Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger” (MISIN) che fa capo al ministero della Difesa e ha tra i suoi obiettivi quello di “concorrere alle attività di sorveglianza delle frontiere”. Il primo corso “per istruttori di ordine pubblico a favore della gendarmeria nigerina” si è concluso a metà ottobre 2018. Pochi mesi prima, a luglio, era stata sottoscritta un’altra “intesa tecnica” tra Esteri e Difesa per rimettere in efficienza e cedere dieci ambulanze e tre autobotti. Finalità? “Il controllo del territorio volto alla prevenzione e al contrasto ai traffici di esseri umani e al traffico di migranti, e per l’assistenza ai migranti nell’ambito delle attività di ricerca e soccorso”: 880mila euro circa. Il Niger è centrale: stando all’ultima programmazione dei Paesi e dei settori in cui sono previsti finanziamenti tramite il “Fondo Africa” (agosto 2018, fonte ministero degli Esteri), il Paese è davanti alla Libia (6 milioni contro 5 di importo massimo preventivato).

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Inabissatosi in Niger, il ministero dell’Interno riemerge in Egitto. Anche lì vigono “accordi internazionali diretti al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina” sostenuti dall’Italia. La loro traduzione interessa da vicino la succursale italiana della Hewlett-Packard (HP). Risale infatti a fine 2006 un contratto stipulato tra la multinazionale e la Direzione del Viminale “per la realizzazione di un Sistema automatizzato di identificazione delle impronte (AFIS) per lo Stato dell’Egitto”, finalizzato alle “esigenze di identificazione personale correlate alla immigrazione illegale”: oltre 5,2 milioni di euro per il periodo 2007-2012, cui se ne sono aggiunti ulteriori 1,8 milioni per la manutenzione ininterrotta fino al 2017 e quasi 500mila per l’ultima tranche, 2018-2019. HP non ha avversari -come riporta il Viminale- in forza di un “accordo in esclusiva” tra la Hewlett Packard Enterprise e la multinazionale della sicurezza informatica Gemalto “in relazione ai prodotti AFIS per lo Stato dell’Egitto”. Affari che non si possono discutere: “L’interruzione del citato servizio -sostiene la Direzione- è suscettibile di creare gravi problemi nell’attività di identificazione dei migranti e nel contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina, in un momento in cui tale attività è di primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale”. Oltre alla partnership con HP, il ministero dell’Interno si spende direttamente in Egitto. Di fronte alle “esigenze scaturenti dalle gravissimi crisi internazionali in vaste aree dell’Africa e dell’Asia” che avrebbero provocato “massicci esodi di persone e crescenti pressioni migratorie verso l’Europa”, la Direzione centrale immigrazione (i virgolettati sono suoi) si è fatta promotrice di una “proposta progettuale” chiamata “International Training at Egyptian Police Academy” (ITEPA). Questa prevede l’istituzione di un “centro di formazione internazionale” sui temi migratori per 360 funzionari di polizia e ufficiali di frontiera di ben 22 Paesi africani presso l’Accademia della polizia egiziana de Il Cairo. Il “protocollo tecnico” è stato siglato nel settembre 2017 tra il direttore dell’Accademia di polizia egiziana ed il direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere. Nel marzo 2018, il capo della Polizia Gabrielli è volato a Il Cairo per il lancio del progetto. “Il rispetto dei diritti umani -ha dichiarato in quella sede- è uno degli asset fondamentali”.

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“La legittimità, la finalità e la consistenza di una parte dei finanziamenti citati con le norme di diritto nazionale e internazionale sono stati studiati e in alcuni casi anche portati davanti alle autorità giudiziarie dai legali dell’Associazione studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi, asgi.it)”, spiega l’avvocato Giulia Crescini, parte del collegio dell’associazione che si è occupato della vicenda. “Quando abbiamo chiesto lo stato di implementazione dell’accordo internazionale Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017, il ministero dell’Interno ha opposto generiche motivazioni di pericolo alla sicurezza interna e alle relazioni internazionali, pertanto il ricorso dopo essere stato rigettato dal Tar Lazio è ora pendente davanti al Consiglio di Stato”. La trasparenza insegue la frontiera.

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“LEONARDO” (FINMECCANICA) E GLI INTERESSI SULLE FRONTIERE

In Tunisia, Libia, Egitto e Niger, l’azienda Leonardo (Finmeccanica) avrebbe in corso “attività promozionali per tecnologie di sicurezza e controllo del territorio”. Alla richiesta di dettagli, la società ha risposto di voler “rivitalizzare i progetti in sospeso e proporne altri, fornendo ai Governi sistemi e tecnologie all’avanguardia per la sicurezza dei Paesi”. Leonardo è già autorizzata a esportare materiale d’armamento in quei contesti, ma non a Tripoli. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, infatti, ha approvato la Risoluzione 2420 che estende l’embargo sulle armi nel Paese per un altro anno. “Nel prossimo futuro -fa sapere l’azienda di cui il ministero dell’Economia è principale azionista- il governo di accordo nazionale potrà richiedere delle esenzioni all’embargo ONU sulle armi, per combattere il terrorismo”. Alla domanda se Leonardo sia coinvolta o operativa nell’ambito di iniziative collegate al fondo fiduciario per l’Africa dell’Unione europea e in particolare al programma da 46 milioni di euro coordinato dal Viminale, in tema di frontiere libiche, l’azienda ha fatto sapere che “in passato” avrebbe “collaborato con le autorità libiche per lo sviluppo e implementazione di sistemi per il monitoraggio dei confini meridionali, nonché sistemi di sicurezza costiera per il controllo, la ricerca e il salvataggio in mare”. Attualmente la società starebbe “esplorando opportunità in ambito europeo volte allo sviluppo di un progetto per il controllo dei flussi migratori dall’Africa all’Europa, consistente in un sistema di sicurezza e sorveglianza costiero con centri di comando e controllo”.

Export in Libia. Il “caso” Prodit

Nei primi sei mesi del 2018, attraverso l’Autorità nazionale UAMA (Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali d’armamento), l’Italia ha autorizzato l’esportazione di “materiale d’armamento” verso la Libia per un valore di circa 4,8 milioni di euro. Nel 2017 questa cifra era zero. Si tratta, come impone la normativa in tema di embargo, di materiali “non letali”. L’ammontare è minimo se paragonato al totale delle licenze autorizzate a livello mondiale dall’Italia tra gennaio e giugno 2018 (3,2 miliardi di euro). Chi esporta è una singola azienda, l’unica iscritta al Registro Nazionale delle Imprese presso il Segretariato Generale del ministero della Difesa: Prodit Engineering Srl. In Libia non ha esportato armi ma un veicolo terrestre modificato come fuoristrada e materiali utilizzabili per sminamento.

►https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta

#Leonardo #Finmeccanica #Egypte #Tunisie #identification #P350 #Brescia_Antincendi_International #Virgilio_D’Amata #Massimo_Bontempi #Yamaha #Minniti #Marco_Minniti #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_nella_Repubblica_del_Niger #MISIN #Hewlett-Packard #AFIS #International_Training_at_Egyptian_Police_Academy #ITEPA

v. la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749

"La frontiera è un buon affare": l’inchiesta sul contrasto del Viminale all’immigrazione «clandestina» a suon di appalti pubblici

Dalla Tunisia alla Libia, dal Niger all’Egitto: così lo Stato italiano finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, formazione a suon di appalti pubblici. I documenti presentati a Roma dall’Arci.

«Quando si parla di esternalizzazione della frontiera e di diritto di asilo bisogna innanzitutto individuare i Paesi maggiormente interessati da queste esternalizzazioni, capire quali sono i meccanismi che si vuole andare ad attaccare, creare un caso e prenderlo tempestivamente. Ma spesso per impugnare un atto ci vogliono 60 giorni, le tempistiche sono precise, e intraprendere azioni giudiziarie per tutelare i migranti diventa spesso molto difficile. Per questo ci appoggiamo all’Arci». A parlare è Giulia Crescini, avvocato dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, che insieme a Filippo Miraglia, responsabile immigrazione di ARCI, Sara Prestianni, coordinatrice del progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch, e Duccio Facchini, giornalista di Altreconomia, ha fatto il punto sugli appalti della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno e più in generale dei fondi europei ed italiani stanzianti per implementare le politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo delle frontiere in Africa.

L’inchiesta. Duccio Facchini, presentando i dati dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia «La frontiera è un buon affare», ha illustrato i meccanismi di una vera e propria strategia che ha uno dei suoi punti d’origine in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco - dove ha sede una delle principale aziende specializzate in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare - e arriva a toccare Tripoli, Niamey o Il Cairo. Il filo rosso che lega gli affidamenti milionari è uno solo: fermare il flusso di persone dirette in Italia e in Europa. Anche utilizzando fondi destinati alla cooperazione e senza alcun vaglio parlamentare.

Il Fondo Africa, istituito con la legge di bilancio 2017, art. 1 comma 621 per l’anno 2018, è pari a 200 milioni di euro, cifra che serve per attivare forme di collaborazione e cooperazione con i Paesi maggiormente interessati dal fenomeno della migrazione, anche se l’espressione in sé significa tutto e niente. «Questo fondo - ha spiegato Facchini in conferenza nella sede Arci lo scorso 6 febbraio - viene dato al ministero degli Affari esteri internazionali che individua quali sono questi Paesi: nello specifico il ministero ha indicato una sfilza di Paesi africani, dal Niger alla Libia alla Tunisia, passando per l’Egitto la Costa d’Avorio, indicando anche una serie di attività che possono essere finanziate con questi soldi. Tra queste c’è la dotazione di strumentazioni utili per il controllo della frontiera». Gli autori dell’inchiesta hanno chiesto al ministero l’elenco dei provvedimenti che sono stati messi in campo e per attivare questa protezione alla frontiera. «Siamo alla fine del 2017 e notiamo che tra questi ce n’è uno che stanzia 2 milioni e mezzo per la messa in opera di quattro motovedette. Da lì cominciamo a domandarci se in base alla normativa italiana è legittimo dare una strumentazione così specifica a delle autorità così notoriamente coinvolte nella tortura e nella violenza dei migranti. Quindi abbiamo strutturato un ricorso giuridicamente molto complicato per cercare di interloquire con il giudice amministrativo». Notoriamente il giudice amministrativo non è mai coinvolto in questioni relative al diritto di asilo - per capire: è il giudice degli appalti - ed è insomma colui che va a verificare se la pubblica amministrazione ha adempiuto bene al suo compito.

l punto di partenza. «Il giudice amministrativo e la pubblica amministrazione – ha spiegato Giulia Crescini dell’Asgi - stanno sempre in un rapporto molto delicato fra loro perché la pubblica amministrazione ha un ambito di discrezionalità all’interno del quale il giudice non può mai entrare, quindi la PA ha dei limiti che vengono messi dalla legge e all’interno di quei limiti il ministero può decidere come spendere quei soldi. Secondo noi quei limiti sono superati, perché la legge non autorizza a rafforzare delle autorità che poi commettono crimini contro i migranti, riportando queste persone sulla terra ferma in una condizione di tortura, soprattutto nei centri di detenzione». I legati hanno dunque avviato questo ricorso, ricevendo, qualche settimana fa, la sentenza di rigetto di primo grado. La sentenza è stata pubblicata il 7 gennaio e da quel giorno a oggi i quattro avvocati hanno studiato le parole del giudice, chiedendo alle altre organizzazioni che avevano presentato insieme a loro il ricorso se avessero intenzione o meno di fare appello. «Studiando la sentenza - continua Crescini - ci siamo accorti di come. pur essendo un rigetto, non avesse poi un contenuto così negativo: il giudice amministrativo in realtà è andato a verificare effettivamente se la pubblica amministrazione avesse speso bene o meno questo soldi, cioè se avesse esercitato in modo corretto o scorretto la discrezionalità di cui sopra. Un fatto che non è affatto scontato. Il giudice amministrativo è andato in profondità, segnalando il fatto che non ci sono sufficienti prove di tortura nei confronti dei migranti da parte delle autorità. Dal punto di vista giuridico questo rappresenta una vittoria. Perché il giudice ha ristretto un ambito molto specifico su cui potremo lavorare davanti al Consiglio di Stato».

La frontiera è un buon affare. L’inchiesta «La frontiera è un buon affare» rivela che lo sforzo politico che vede impegnate Italia e istituzioni europee nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce direttamente in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza.

La dimensione europea della migrazione - si legge in un comunicato diffuso da Arci - si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione a favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza e alla repressione del fenomeno migratorio. La logica dell’esternalizzazione, diventata pilastro della strategia tanto europea quanto italiana di gestione delle frontiere, assume in questo modo, sempre più, una dimensione tecnologica e militare, assecondando le pressioni della lobby dell’industria della sicurezza per l’implementazione di questo mercato. L’uso dei fondi è guidato da una tendenza alla flessibilità con un conseguente e evidente rischio di opacità, conveniente per il rafforzamento di una politica securitaria della migrazione.

Nel MFF - Multiannual Financial Framework - che definisce il budget europeo per un periodo di 7 anni e ora in discussione tripartita tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio - si evidenzia l’intento strategico al netto dei proclami e dei comizi della politica: la migrazione è affrontata principalmente dal punto di vista della gestione del fenomeno e del controllo delle frontiere con un incremento di fondi fino a 34 miliardi di euro per questo settore.

A questo capitolo di spesa - si legge ancora nel comunicato - contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi, dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna - che passa dai 3,4 del 2014/20120 ai 4,8 miliardi del 2021/2027 e che può essere speso anche per la gestione esterna delle frontiere - a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, una tendenza che si palesa con evidenza nelle due missioni militari nostrane in Libia e Niger.

Dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e quello per la Pace, una buona parte saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuova tecnologia militare, utilizzabili anche per la creazione di muri nel mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica anche per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi provenienti dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo centrale.

Sulla pelle dei migranti. Chi ne fa le spese, spiegano gli autori dell’inchiesta, sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e proprio business. Questa connessione e interdipendenza tra politici e lobby della sicurezza, che sfiora a tutto gli effetti il conflitto di interessi, è risultata evidente nel corso del SRE «Research on security event» tenutosi a Bruxelles a fine dicembre su proposta della presidenza austriaca. Seduti negli stessi panel rappresentanti della commissione dell’Agenzia Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza, manifestavano interesse per un obbiettivo comune: la creazione di un mercato europeo della sicurezza dove lotta al terrorismo e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente

«Il Governo Italiano si iscrive perfettamente nella logica europea, dalle missioni militari con una chiara missione di controllo delle frontiere in Niger e Libia al rinnovo del Fondo Africa, rifinanziato con 80 milioni per il 2018/2019, che condiziona le politiche di sviluppo a quelle d’immigrazione», dichiara ancora Arci. «Molti i dubbi che solleva questa deriva politica direttamente tradotta nell’uso dei fondi europei e nazionali: dalle tragiche conseguenze sulla sistematica violazione delle convenzione internazionali a una riflessione più ampia sull’opacità dell’uso dei fondi e del ruolo sempre più centrale dell’industria della sicurezza per cui la politica repressiva di chiusura sistematica delle frontiere non è altro che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire, dimenticandosi del costo in termine di vite umane di questa logica».

▻https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2019/02/07/news/la_frontiera_e_un_buon_affare-218538251

Appalti sulle frontiere: 30 mezzi di terra alla Libia dall’Italia per fermare i migranti

Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità di Tripoli nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per il “contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. Un appalto da 2,1 milioni di euro finanziato tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa”, nell’ambito del quale l’Italia accresce il proprio ruolo. Il tutto mentre l’immagine ostentata di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del Viminale

https://altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2019/03/sharara_security_forces_on_patrol_in_2015-770x500.jpg

Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità della Libia trenta nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. L’avviso esplorativo pubblicato dalla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il Viminale, risale al 5 marzo 2019 (scadenza per la presentazione della manifestazione d’interesse all’8 aprile di quest’anno).

La fornitura riguarda 30 mezzi “Toyota Land Cruiser” (15 del modello GRJ76 Petrol e 15 del GRJ79 DC Petrol), in “versione tropicalizzata”, relativamente ai quali le autorità libiche, il 24 dicembre 2018, avrebbero esplicitato alla Direzione di Roma precise “specifiche tecniche”. Il Viminale la definisce una “richiesta di assistenza tecnica” proveniente da Tripoli per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. In forza di questa “strategia”, dunque, il governo italiano -in linea con i precedenti, come abbiamo raccontato a gennaio nell’inchiesta sugli “affari lungo le frontiere”– continua a equipaggiare le autorità del Paese Nord-africano per contrastare i flussi migratori. L’ammontare “massimo” degli ultimi due lotti (da 15 mezzi l’uno) è stimato in 2,1 milioni di euro.

E così come è stato per la gara d’appalto da oltre 9,3 milioni di euro per la fornitura di 20 imbarcazioni destinate alla polizia libica, indetta dal Viminale a fine dicembre 2018, anche nel caso dei 30 mezzi Toyota le risorse arriveranno dal “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. In particolare, dal progetto implementato dal Viminale e intitolato “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, dal valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro e il cui “delegation agreement” risale a metà dicembre 2017 (governo Gentiloni, ministro competente Marco Minniti).

Questo non è l’unico progetto finanziato tramite l’EU Trust Fund che vede il ministero dell’Interno italiano attivo nel continente africano. Alla citata “First Phase”, infatti, se ne sono affiancati nel tempo altri due. Uno è di stanza in Tunisia e Marocco (“Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region”), datato luglio 2018 e dal valore di 55 milioni di euro. L’altro progetto, di nuovo, ricade in Libia. Si tratta del “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – Second Phase”, risalente al 13 dicembre 2018, per un ammontare di altri 45 milioni di euro. Le finalità dichiarate nell’”Action Document” della seconda fase in Libia sono -tra le altre- quelle di “intensificare gli sforzi fatti”, “sviluppare nuove aree d’intervento”, “rafforzare le capacità delle autorità competenti che sorvegliano i confini marittimi e terrestri”, “l’acquisto di altre navi”, “l’implementazione della rete di comunicazione del Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre” di Tripoli, “la progettazione specifica di programmi per la neocostituita polizia del deserto”.

La strategia di contrasto paga, sostiene la Commissione europea. “Gli sforzi dell’Ue e dell’Italia nel sostenere la Guardia costiera libica per migliorare la sua capacità operativa hanno raggiunto risultati significativi e tangibili nel 2018”, afferma nel lancio della “seconda fase”. Di “significativo e tangibile” c’è il crollo degli sbarchi sulle coste italiane, in particolare dalla Libia. Dati del Viminale alla mano, infatti, nel periodo compreso tra l’1 gennaio e il 7 marzo 2017 giunsero 15.843 persone, scese a 5.457 lo scorso anno e arrivate a 335 quest’anno. La frontiera è praticamente sigillata. Un “successo” che nasconde la tragedia dei campi di detenzione e sequestro libici dove migliaia di persone sono costrette a rimanere.

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È in questa cornice che giunge il nuovo “avviso” del Viminale dei 30 veicoli, pubblicato come detto il 5 marzo. Quello stesso giorno il vice-presidente del Consiglio e ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, ha incontrato a Roma il vicepremier libico Ahmed Maiteeq. Un “cordiale colloquio”, come recita il comunicato ministeriale, che avrebbe visto sul tavolo “i rapporti tra i due Paesi, in particolare su sicurezza, lotta al terrorismo, immigrazione e stabilizzazione politica della Libia”.

https://altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2019/03/salvini_vicepremier_libico_04-768x480.jpg

Ma l’immagine ostentata dal governo Conte di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del ministero dell’Interno. Tra i quesiti presentati al Viminale da parte dei potenziali concorrenti al bando dei 20 battelli da destinare alla polizia libica, infatti, si trovano richieste esplicite di “misure atte a garantire la sicurezza dei propri operatori”. “Laddove si rendesse strettamente necessario effettuare interventi di garanzia richiesti in loco (Libia)”, gli operatori di mercato hanno chiesto alla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere “che tali prestazioni potranno essere organizzate a patto che le imbarcazioni si trovino in città (Tripoli, ndr) per garantire la sicurezza degli operatori inviati per tali prestazioni”. Il ministero dell’Interno conferma il quadro di instabilità del Paese: “Le condizioni di sicurezza in Libia devono essere attentamente valutate in ragione della contingenza al momento dell’esecuzione del contratto”, è la replica al quesito. “Appare di tutto evidenza che la sicurezza degli operatori non dovrà essere compromessa in relazione ai rischi antropici presenti all’interno dello Stato beneficiario della commessa”. Per gli operatori, non per i migranti in fuga.

►https://altreconomia.it/appalti-libia-frontiere-terra
#Libye

A donde van los desaparecidos

De 2006 a 2016 fueron descubiertos casi 2 mil entierros ilegales donde criminales desaparecieron personas. En esta investigación documentamos más fosas clandestinas que las que el gobierno reconoce: una fosa cada dos días.

▻https://adondevanlosdesaparecidos.org
Avec une #carte:
▻https://data.adondevanlosdesaparecidos.org
#cartographie #cartographie_critique #cartographie_radicale #base_de_données #statistiques

“Si tan sólo me hubieran dejado tocar su cráneo”: Saberes forenses de las madres de desaparecidos

Las madres son especialistas en el conocimiento del cuerpo de sus hijos e hijas, en sus historias médicas y en sus prácticas cotidianas, que forman parte de lo que las ciencias forenses denominan la información antemortem.

https://i2.wp.com/adondevanlosdesaparecidos.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Rastreadorasmapa.jpg?w=900&ssl=1#.jpg https://i0.wp.com/adondevanlosdesaparecidos.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Rastreadoras1.jpg?w=900&ssl=1#.jpg

ping @reka @fil

je suis tres surpris par un point mentionne plusieurs fois : il faut que la recherche sur la sante, le rechauffement climatique, etc, bref, tout ce qui a « un vrai impact » soit ouvert, parce qu’il y a des vrais problemes, et donc il faut du monde pour y participer.... Mais je n’ai pas entendu grand chose sur la recherche fondamentale... Je ne sais pas si ca tient du fait que la recherche fondamentale etant moins « remuneratrice », le probleme est moins flagrant... Mais ca me met mal a l’aise cette separation entre « les vrais problemes de la vie » et les questions fondamentales qui n’interessent pas grand monde....

Témoignage de #Elisabeth_Vallet sur twitter :

Sooooo. Let me make sure I get that right...
1) I apply for and obtain a research grant
2) i provide the raw data
3) I write the paper
4) the publisher gets it for free And.... And I can pay for open access . But they provide with a toolkit so I can also promote the journal.

https://i.imgur.com/M7s7uD7.png

The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era

The consolidation of the scientific publishing industry has been the topic of much debate within and outside the scientific community, especially in relation to major publishers’ high profit margins. However, the share of scientific output published in the journals of these major publishers, as well as its evolution over time and across various disciplines, has not yet been analyzed. This paper provides such analysis, based on 45 million documents indexed in the Web of Science over the period 1973-2013. It shows that in both natural and medical sciences (NMS) and social sciences and humanities (SSH), Reed-Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, and Taylor & Francis increased their share of the published output, especially since the advent of the digital era (mid-1990s). Combined, the top five most prolific publishers account for more than 50% of all papers published in 2013. Disciplines of the social sciences have the highest level of concentration (70% of papers from the top five publishers), while the humanities have remained relatively independent (20% from top five publishers). NMS disciplines are in between, mainly because of the strength of their scientific societies, such as the ACS in chemistry or APS in physics. The paper also examines the migration of journals between small and big publishing houses and explores the effect of publisher change on citation impact. It concludes with a discussion on the economics of scholarly publishing.

▻https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0127502

L’accès ouvert, un espoir qui donne le vertige…

Les années 2018 et 2019 marquent une étape importante dans la politique scientifique de l’accès ouvert. Avec #Horizon_2020, l’Europe a annoncé l’obligation d’assurer le libre accès aux publications issues des projets de recherche qu’elle finance. En septembre 2018 #cOALition_S, un consortium européen d’établissements de financement de la recherche (l’ANR pour la France), soutenu par la commission européenne et l’ERC, publie les 10 principes de son Plan S. L’objectif est clairement désigné : “d’ici 2020, les publications scientifiques résultant de recherches financées par des subventions publiques accordées par les conseils de recherche et organismes de financement nationaux et européens participants doivent être publiées dans des journaux Open Access conformes ou sur des plates-formes Open Access conformes.”

Le problème est que l’expression « #open_access » peut recouvrir des modèles économiques très différents : le “#green_open_access” (auto-archivage par l’auteur de ses travaux), le “#gold_open_access”, avec toute l’ambiguïté qu’il comporte puisque pour Couperin, il inclut aussi bien les articles dans des revues à comité de lecture en accès ouvert pour les lecteurs, payé par les auteurs avec des APC (Article processing charges) que le modèle Freemium OpenEdition, sans coût pour les auteurs ou encore les revues intégralement en accès ouvert[i]. C’est la raison pour laquelle a été introduit un nouvel intitulé dans les modèles celui de la voie “#diamant” ou “#platine” en opposition précisément à la voie “dorée” de plus en plus identifiée comme la voie de l’auteur/payeur (#APC).

Alors que l’objectif ne concerne à ce stade que les articles scientifiques et non les ouvrages, chapitres d’ouvrages etc., les dissensions s’affichent au grand jour et dans les médias. Pour nombre de chercheurs, le Plan S de l’Union européenne ne va pas assez loin. Ils n’hésitent pas à dénoncer ouvertement les pratiques “anticoncurrentielles” d’Elsevier en saisissant la Direction générale de la commission européenne[ii]. La maison d’édition s’est en effet engagée depuis plusieurs années dans le « tout accès ouvert »[iii]. Il faut traduire ce que signifie ce « gold open access » ainsi promu : si les lecteurs ont accès aux articles gratuitement, les auteurs paient pour être publiés des APC (« author processing charges ») dont le montant, variable, engendre des profits inédits.

De l’autre côté, logiquement, des associations d’éditeurs et les sociétés commerciales d’édition scientifique se sont élevées contre ce plan qui semble menacer leurs intérêts. Ils ont été soutenus par au moins 1700 chercheurs qui ont signé une Lettre ouverte[iv] lancée le 28 novembre à l’Union européenne contre le plan S. En France, d’autres ont publié en octobre 2018 une tribune dans Le Monde[v] contre ce même plan, non sans quelques confusions tellement la complexité du paysage est savamment entretenue, avec des arguments plus recevables qu’on ne l’aurait pensé. Qui croire ?

Le Consortium national des bibliothèques françaises Couperin[vi] nous apporte une information utile sur les APC sur le site d’OpenAPC qui ont été versées aux éditeurs commerciaux en 2017, par chacun des 39 grands établissements de recherche enquêtés. Au total, 4 660 887 euros ont été dépensés par ces établissements pour publier 2635 articles, soit environ 1769 euros par article[vii]. Cela vient s’ajouter aux abonnements aux bouquets de revues et aux accès aux bases de données bibliométriques (Scopus d’Elsevier, WOS de Clarivate) dont les coûts, négociés, ne sont pas publiés.

On mesure le bénéfice que les éditeurs retirent pour chaque article en comparant ces montants avec ceux estimés pour traiter un article dans l’alternative Freemium. A Cybergeo , en incluant les coûts d’un ingénieur CNRS qui encadre l’activité de la revue, du temps moyen investi par les évaluateurs, les correcteurs bénévoles et l’éditeur, ainsi que les coûts de la maintenance de la plateforme éditoriale, nous sommes parvenus à un coût moyen de 650 euros pour un article… Si Cybergeo appliquait le coût moyen des APC, elle en retirerait un revenu de près de 100 000 euros/an !

https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/3413/files/2019/04/openAPC-500x368.jpg

Le plus extraordinaire dans ces calculs est que ni les APC ni cette dernière estimation “frugale” de 650 euros/article ne prennent en compte la vraie valeur ajoutée des articles, les savoir et savoir-faire scientifiques dépensés par les auteurs et par les évaluateurs. Voilà qui devrait confirmer, s’il en était encore besoin, que la “production scientifique” est bien une activité qui ne peut décidément se réduire aux “modèles économiques” de notre système capitaliste, fût-il avancé…

L’exigence de mise en ligne des articles en accès ouvert financés sur des fonds publics s’est donc institutionnalisée, mais on peut se demander si, loin d’alléger les charges pour la recherche publique, cette obligation ne serait pas en train d’ouvrir un nouveau gouffre de dépenses sans aucun espoir de retour sur investissement. Les bénéfices colossaux et sans risques de l’édition scientifique continuent d’aller aux actionnaires. Et le rachat en 2017 par Elsevier (RELX Group) de Bepress la plate-forme d’archives ouvertes, créée en 1999 sous le nom de Berkeley Electronic Press par deux universitaires américains de l’université de Berkeley, pour un montant estimé de 100 millions d’euros, n’est pas non plus pour nous rassurer sur le devenir du “green open access” (archives ouvertes) dans ce contexte.

▻https://cybergeo.hypotheses.org/462

Open APC

The #Open_APC initiative releases datasets on fees paid for Open Access journal articles by universities and research institutions under an Open Database License.

▻https://treemaps.intact-project.org
#database #base_de_données #prix #statistiques #chiffres #visualisation

Pour savoir combien paient les institutions universitaires...

https://i.imgur.com/IQlju82.png

12 millions d’EUR pour UCL selon ce tableau !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Communiqué de presse : L’#Académie_des_sciences soutient l’accès gratuit et universel aux #publications_scientifiques

Le 4 juillet 2018, le ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation a publié un plan national pour la science ouverte, dans lequel « la France s’engage pour que les résultats de la recherche scientifique soient ouverts à tous, chercheurs, entreprises et citoyens, sans entrave, sans délai, sans paiement ». Le 4 septembre 2018, onze agences de financement européennes ont annoncé un « Plan cOAlition S(cience) » indiquant que dès 2020, les publications issues de recherches financées sur fonds publics devront obligatoirement être mises en accès ouvert.

En 2011, 2014, 2016 et 2017, l’Académie des sciences a déjà publié des avis mentionnant la nécessité de faciliter l’accès aux publications (voir ci-dessous « En savoir plus »). Elle soutient les principes généraux de ces plans et recommande la prise en charge des frais de publications au niveau des agences de financement et des institutions de recherche. Toutefois, la mise en place concrète de ces mesures imposera au préalable des changements profonds dans les modes de publication. L’Académie des sciences attire l’attention sur le fait que ces changements dans des délais aussi courts doivent tenir compte des spécificités des divers champs disciplinaires et de la nécessaire adhésion à ces objectifs de la communauté scientifique. De nombreux chercheurs rendent déjà publiques les versions préliminaires de leurs articles sur des plates-formes ouvertes dédiées comme HAL (Hyper Articles en Ligne).

Il est important de noter que le processus d’accès ouvert des publications ne doit pas conduire à une réduction du processus d’expertise qui assure la qualité des articles effectivement acceptés pour publication. Sans une évaluation sérieuse des publications par des experts compétents, une perte de confiance dans les journaux scientifiques serait à craindre.

Un groupe de l’Académie des sciences travaille actuellement sur les questions soulevées par la science ouverte et un colloque sera organisé sur ce thème le 2 avril 2019 pour en débattre.

https://www.academie-sciences.fr/images/accueil/scienceouverte_031018.jpg

Lancement de la fondation #DOAB : vers un #label européen pour les livres académiques en accès ouvert

OpenEdition et OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Network, fondation implantée aux Pays-Bas) créent la fondation DOAB (Directory of Open Access Books). Cette fondation permettra de renforcer le rôle du DOAB, index mondial de référence répertoriant les ouvrages académiques en accès ouvert, et ce, notamment dans le cadre de la stratégie européenne pour le projet d’infrastructure OPERAS (Open access in the European research area through scholarly communication).

https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2/files/2019/05/doab.png

Depuis plusieurs années les pratiques de publication en accès ouvert se multiplient en Europe du fait d’une plus grande maturité des dispositifs (archives ouvertes, plateformes de publication) et de la généralisation de politiques coordonnées au niveau des États, des financeurs de la recherche et de la Commission européenne. Ce développement du libre accès s’accompagne d’une multiplication des initiatives et des publications dont la qualité n’est pas toujours contrôlée.

En 2003, l’Université de Lundt a créé le Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). Devenu une référence mondiale, le DOAJ garantit la qualité technique et éditoriale des revues en accès ouvert qui y sont indexées.

En 2012 la fondation OAPEN a créé l’équivalent du DOAJ pour les livres : le Directory of Open Access Books (DOAB). Ce répertoire garantit que les livres qui y sont indexés sont des livres de recherche académique (évalués par les pairs) et en accès ouvert. Le DOAB s’adresse aux lecteurs, aux bibliothèques mais aussi aux financeurs de la recherche qui souhaitent que les critères de qualité des publications en accès ouvert soient garantis et certifiés. Il indexe aujourd’hui plus de 16 500 livres en accès ouvert provenant de 315 éditeurs du monde entier.

En Europe, les plateformes OAPEN et OpenEdition Books structurent largement le paysage par leur étendue internationale et leur masse critique. Leur alliance constitue un événement majeur dans le champ de la science ouverte autour de la labellisation des ouvrages.

Via la fondation DOAB, le partenariat entre OpenEdition et OAPEN permettra d’asseoir la légitimité et d’étendre l’ampleur du DOAB en Europe et dans le monde, en garantissant qu’il reflète et prenne en compte la variété des pratiques académiques dans les différents pays européens en particulier. Les deux partenaires collaborent déjà au développement technique du DOAB grâce au projet HIRMEOS financé par l’Union Européenne dans le cadre de son programme Horizon 2020.
La création de la fondation est une des actions du Plan national pour la science ouverte adopté en 2018 par la ministre française de la Recherche, Frédérique Vidal.

OpenEdition et OAPEN forment avec d’autres partenaires le noyau dur d’un projet de construction d’une infrastructure européenne sur leur domaine de compétence : OPERAS – Open access in the European research area through scholarly communication. Avec un consortium de 40 partenaires en provenance de 16 pays européens, OPERAS vise à proposer une offre de services stables et durables au niveau européen dont le DOAB est une part essentielle.

Selon Eelco Ferwerda, directeur d’OAPEN : « Le DOAB est devenu une ressource essentielle pour les livres en accès ouvert et nous nous en réjouissons. Je tiens à remercier Lars Bjørnshauge pour son aide dans le développement du service et Salam Baker Shanawa de Sempertool pour avoir fourni la plateforme et soutenu son fonctionnement. Notre collaboration avec OpenEdition a été très précieuse dans l’élaboration du DOAB. Nous espérons à présent atteindre un niveau optimal d’assurance qualité et de transparence ».

Marie Pellen, directrice d’OpenEdition déclare : « L’engagement d’OpenEdition à soutenir le développement du DOAB est l’un des premiers résultats concrets du Plan national français pour la science ouverte adopté par la ministre de la Recherche, Frédérique Vidal. Grâce au soutien conjoint du CNRS et d’Aix-Marseille Université, nous sommes heureux de participer activement à une plateforme internationale cruciale pour les sciences humaines et sociales ».

Pour Pierre Mounier, directeur adjoint d’OpenEdition et coordinateur d’OPERAS : « La création de la Fondation DOAB est une occasion unique de développer une infrastructure ouverte dans le domaine de la publication scientifique, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’effort européen d’OPERAS, pour mettre en œuvre des pratiques scientifiques ouvertes dans les sciences humaines et sociales ».
OpenEdition

OpenEdition rassemble quatre plateformes de ressources électronique en sciences humaines et sociales : OpenEdition Books (7 000 livres au catalogue), OpenEdition Journals (500 revues en ligne), Hypothèses (3 000 carnets de recherche), Calenda (40 000 événements publiés). Depuis 2015, OpenEdition est le représentant du DOAB dans la francophonie.

Les principales missions d’OpenEdition sont le développement de l’édition électronique en libre accès, la diffusion des usages et compétences liées à l’édition électronique, la recherche et l’innovation autour des méthodes de valorisation et de recherche d’information induites par le numérique.
OAPEN

La Fondation Open Access Publishing in European Networks (OAPEN) propose une offre de dépôt et de diffusion de monographies scientifiques en libre accès via l’OAPEN Library et le Directory of Open Access Books (DOAB).

OpenEdition et OAPEN sont partenaires pour un programme d’interopérabilité sur leur catalogue respectif et une mutualisation des offres faites par chacun des partenaires aux éditeurs.

▻https://leo.hypotheses.org/15553

About #Plan_S

Plan S is an initiative for Open Access publishing that was launched in September 2018. The plan is supported by cOAlition S, an international consortium of research funders. Plan S requires that, from 2020, scientific publications that result from research funded by public grants must be published in compliant Open Access journals or platforms.

▻https://www.coalition-s.org

Les #rébellions pour le libre accès aux articles scientifiques

Les partisans du libre accès arriveront-ils à créer une brèche définitive dans le lucratif marché de l’édition savante ?

C’est plus fort que moi : chaque fois que je lis une nouvelle sur l’oligopole de l’édition scientifique, je soupire de découragement. Comment, en 2018, peut-on encore tolérer que la diffusion des découvertes soit tributaire d’une poignée d’entreprises qui engrangent des milliards de dollars en exploitant le labeur des scientifiques ?

D’une main, cette industrie demande aux chercheurs de lui fournir des articles et d’en assurer la révision de façon bénévole ; de l’autre main, elle étrangle les bibliothèques universitaires en leur réclamant des sommes exorbitantes pour s’abonner aux périodiques savants. C’est sans compter le modèle très coûteux des revues « hybrides », une parade ingénieuse des éditeurs qui, sans sacrifier leurs profits, se donnent l’apparence de souscrire au libre accès − un mouvement qui prône depuis 30 ans la diffusion gratuite, immédiate et permanente des publications scientifiques.

En effet, les journaux hybrides reçoivent un double revenu : l’abonnement et des « frais de publication supplémentaires » versés par les chercheurs qui veulent mettre leurs articles en libre accès. Autrement, leurs travaux restent derrière un mur payant, inaccessibles au public qui les a pourtant financés, en tout ou en partie, par l’entremise de ses impôts. Les grands éditeurs comme Elsevier, Springer Nature et Wiley ont ainsi pris en otage la science, dont le système entier repose sur la nécessité de publier.

Au printemps dernier, on a assisté à une rebuffade similaire quand plus de 3 300 chercheurs en intelligence artificielle, dont Yoshua Bengio, de l’Université de Montréal, se sont engagés à ne pas participer à la nouvelle revue payante Nature Machine Intelligence.

Un consortium universitaire allemand, Projekt DEAL, a tenté d’ébranler les colonnes du temple. Depuis deux ans, ses membres négocient avec Elsevier pour mettre fin au modèle traditionnel des abonnements négociés à la pièce, derrière des portes closes. Collectivement, les membres de Projekt DEAL veulent payer pour rendre accessibles, à travers le monde, tous les articles dont le premier auteur est rattaché à un établissement allemand. En échange, ils auraient accès à tous les contenus en ligne de l’éditeur. L’entente devrait obligatoirement être publique.

Évidemment, cela abaisserait les prix des abonnements. Pour l’instant, Elsevier refuse toute concession et a même retiré l’accès à ses revues à des milliers de chercheurs allemands l’été dernier. La tactique pourrait toutefois se révéler vaine. Pour obtenir des articles, les chercheurs peuvent toujours demander un coup de main à leurs collègues d’autres pays, recourir à des outils gratuits comme Unpaywall qui fouillent le Web pour trouver une version en libre accès ou encore s’en remettre à Sci-Hub, un site pirate qui contourne les murs payants.

Mais plus que la perte de ses clients, c’est l’exode de ses « fournisseurs » qui écorcherait à vif Elsevier. Déjà, des scientifiques allemands ont juré qu’ils ne contribueraient plus à son catalogue de publications – qui contient pourtant des titres prestigieux comme The Lancet et Cell.

Au printemps dernier, on a assisté à une rebuffade similaire quand plus de 3300 chercheurs en intelligence artificielle, dont Yoshua Bengio, de l’Université de Montréal, se sont engagés à ne pas participer à la nouvelle revue payante Nature Machine Intelligence. Partisans du libre accès, ils la considèrent comme « un pas en arrière » pour l’avenir de leur discipline.

Et puis il y a le « plan S » : début septembre, 11 organismes subventionnaires européens ont annoncé que, à partir de 2020, ils ne financeront que les scientifiques promettant de diffuser leurs résultats dans des revues en libre accès. Le plan S exclurait d’office environ 85 % des journaux savants, y compris Nature et Science.

Ces petites rébellions déboucheront-elles sur une véritable révolution de l’édition scientifique ? Difficile à dire, mais c’est suffisant pour passer du découragement à l’espoir.

▻https://www.quebecscience.qc.ca/edito/rebellions-libre-acces-articles-scientifiques

Résistances individuelles, chercheur·es qui déclarent de réviser des articles :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/791699

Tiré de :
Global Gender Gap Report 2017

Gender parity is fundamental to whether and how economies and societies thrive. Ensuring the full development and appropriate deployment of half of the world’s total talent pool has a vast bearing on the growth, competitiveness and future-readiness of economies and businesses worldwide. This year’s edition of the report dives into the dynamics of gender gaps across industry talent pools and occupations. The Global Gender Gap Report benchmarks 144 countries on their progress towards gender parity across four thematic dimensions: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment.

▻http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2017

#statistiques #2017 #chiffres #rapport #base_de_données

Un bon article de #Matteo_Villa qui résume ces questions, paru en septembre 2018 :

Outsourcing European Border Control : Recent Trends in Departures, Deaths and Search and Rescue Activities in the Central Mediterranean

In our previous blog post ‘Border Deaths in the Mediterranean: what we can learn from the latest data?’ on Border Criminologies (March 2017) we discussed the existing data sources on Mediterranean Sea migration and provided an analysis of key patterns and trends. We found that Search and Rescue (SAR) has little or no effect on the number of arrivals, and it is rather the absence of SAR that leads to more deaths. These results, which are in line with other research, were covered by various European media outlets and also resulted in a peer reviewed publication in Sociology (also available as a free preprint).

These findings covered the period until December 2016. Since then, however, the context of European border policy has changed considerably:

Through a mix of political pressure, financial incentives and military assistance, the EU has tried to induce transit countries in the Sahel to close their borders to Europe-bound migrants. According to European parliament president Tajani, this resulted in a 95% drop in crossings through Niger, a key transition point for migrants on the way to Libya, although it cannot be excluded that migrants are taking different, more dangerous routes in order to reach Northern African countries (either via Niger or through Algeria).
From the beginning of 2017 onwards, the Italian government backed by the EU has increasingly cooperated with Libyan authorities to block depatures in exchange for financial and logistical support. The UN-backed government in Libya in turn, has allegedly forged deals with a number of militias.
Increased European support for the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), resulting in an increase in interceptions and the declaration of a Libyan SAR zone.
Increasing legal and political attacks on NGOs engaged in SAR have culminated in Italy’s decision to declare its ports to be “closed” to NGO vessels and (temporarily) to EU rescue ships in June 2018.

Each of these developments can be seen as part of a broader strategy to close the European borders by externalizing border control to third countries, a practice that was tried earlier with Turkey, and to relax commitments enshrined in international law, such as search and rescue at sea and non refoulement.

In view of these recent developments, we document estimated trends in arrivals, deaths, mortality rates and rescue activities covering the most recent period, between January 2016 and July 2018. In doing so, we strongly rely on detailed statistical analyses conducted by the Italian research institute ISPI. Our analyses are based on publicly available data from the IOM and the UNHCR for arrivals and interceptions, and IOM’s Missing Migrants Project for deaths. It is important to note that recorded deaths are a lower bound estimate of the actual death toll, because some deaths are likely to remain unreported. We provide an extensive discussion of data sources, data quality and challenges for their interpretation in our academic article on the issue. Since most of the above developments relate to the situation in Libya, we focus on migrants departing from that country. Libya is also the only Northern African country where interceptions at sea by the Coast Guard are independently monitored by both IOM and UNHCR personnel at disembarkation points.

Although each of these individual developments have been reported elsewhere, together they paint a picture of Europe’s resolve to close its external borders and deter irregular migration, regardless of the (human) cost.

Trend #1: A sharp drop in departures

Figure 1 plots trends in the number of migrants departing irregularly from Libya by sea since January 2016. Until mid-2017, migrant departures show a remarkably regular seasonal pattern, with around 20,000 departures during the summer months. As of July 2017, however, the number of arrivals dropped dramatically, and it has stayed at comparatively low levels up to the present. The decrease in arrivals occurred after alleged ’deals’ between Libyan authorities and the militias in Western Libya that control the smuggling networks, and a few months after the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Italy and Libya. Convergent diplomatic action induced some militias to switch from smuggling to preventing departures. Other factors, such as the activity of the LCG, private and public SAR providers, or dynamics in the rate of dead and missing along the route, are relevant per se but appear to play no significant role in the decrease in arrivals to Europe. Europe’s efforts to block migrants passing though transit countries may have played a role as well, but evidence is still too sparse to be reliably assessed.

https://i.imgur.com/tSIapPB.png

Trend #2: An increased risk of interception by the Libyan Coast Guard

The Libyan Coast Guard plays a pivotal role in Europe’s strategy of externalizing migration control to third countries. A report by Human Rights Watch suggests that in recent months “the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (IMRCC) has routinized a practice, tested since at least May 2017, of transferring responsibility to Libyan coast guard forces in international waters even when there are other, better-equipped vessels, including its own patrol boats or Italian navy vessels, closer to the scene.” This practice has been termed ’refoulement by proxy’ because the LCG is financed, equipped and instructed by the Italian and European authorities, as described in this recent investigative report. Migrants who are forcibly returned to Libya are imprisoned in detention centres for indefinite periods, and they face systematic violence—including torture and rape—as has been documented in numerous reports.

The new Italian government intensified and formalized the policy of transferring responsibility to the LCG. Since June, it has instructed ships undertaking rescues in the Libyan SAR zone to refer all emergency calls to the Libyan authorities, who will then arrange their interception and pull-back to Libya. The declarations that Italian ports are “closed” to NGO ships are also part of this strategy, as their operations are considered to interfere with LCG interceptions. In late July, this practice resulted in the first instance of a non-Libyan vessel, the Asso Ventotto, being instructed to coordinate with the Tripoli Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). The ship ultimately disembarked the rescued persons on Libyan territory and thus effectively engaged in refoulement and collective expulsion of migrants.

The practice of outsourcing European border control to the Libyan Coast Guard has brought about a sharp increase in its activity: by the end of July 2018, the LCG had intercepted 12,490 migrants at sea compared to 8,851 during the same period in the previous year, which amounts to a 41% increase. In combination with the drop in departures, this policy has resulted in a rapid increase in the risk of interception. To illustrate this fact, in July 2017 just 6% of migrants leaving Libya by sea ended up being caught and brought back, while almost 94% made it to Europe. In July 2018, instead, 71% of migrants leaving Libya’s shores were intercepted and brought back, while just 24% arrived safely in a European country (see Figure 2).

https://i.imgur.com/aSqawCY.png

Trend #3: An increase in the absolute and relative mortality rate between mid-June and July 2018

In this section, we look at trends in absolute mortality (the number of dead and missing people at sea) and relative mortality (the risk of crossing) of migrants departing from Libya. In particular, we analyse the widely reported spike in deaths that occurred in late June 2018, after virtually all SAR NGOs had been prevented from operating as a result of policies introduced by the new Italian Minister of Interior Salvini from the far-right Lega and the continued denial by the Maltese authorities to offer Valetta as a port of entry. On June 10, Italy unilaterally decided to declare its ports to be “closed” to NGO rescue ships, as well as (temporarily) to commercial and EU vessels carrying rescued migrants. Also Malta tightened its position on rescue activities and cracked down on two SAR NGOs in early July. Since then, rescue operations close to the Libyan coast have been almost entirely delegated to the LCG.

First, we look at trends in the absolute mortality rate. Figure 3 shows a reduction in the monthly number of deaths since July 2017, commensurate with the reduction in the number of departures described above. For example, 20 deaths were recorded in April 2018, and 11 in May (Figure 3). In June, however, an estimated 451 migrants died on their way from Libya to Europe—of which 370 between 16 and 30 June. It is important to note that these deaths occurred during a time when departures were comparatively low. As a result, the risk of crossing has increased from 2.8% in the previous months to a staggering 7% since mid-June 2018 (Figure 4). These findings are also robust to using different time frames for the pre-NGO absence period, including the entire period since the drop of arrivals in July 2017 until the NGO ban. Whereas relative mortality has fluctuated in recent years, 7% constitute an extraordinary spike.

https://i.imgur.com/EOV2ysu.png https://i.imgur.com/sJrXODU.png

Figure 5 maps shipwreck events occurring between 16 June and 31 July 2018 with at least estimated 15 dead or missing persons, using geocoded data provided by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project. While the precise location of each shipwreck is only an estimate, as “precise locations are not often known” (as explained in the “Methodology” section of the Missing Migrants Project), such estimates do provide an indication of where such shipwrecks have taken place. In particular, IOM data shows that shipwrecks between 16 June and 31 July took place well within 50 nautical miles from Libya’s shores, an area which used to be patrolled by either the LCG or NGO vessels. Yet, during the time when deaths spiked, only two NGO vessels had been operating, and only discontinuously.

https://i.imgur.com/5LLUMdY.png

These observations are reminiscent of what happened in 2015, when the withdrawal of competent SAR providers (the Italian mission Mare Nostrum) similarly created the conditions for avoidable loss of life. Although these findings are based on a relatively short time period, they are suggestive of the risk of leaving the Libyan SAR zone to the operations of the LCG alone. Continuous monitoring of the situation remains of utmost importance.

Conclusion

In combination, the three trends described above highlight the harsh realities of recent European migration policies, which seek to limit irregular migration regardless of the moral, legal and humanitarian consequences. The current European obsession with reducing migration at all costs is even less comprehensible when considering that arrivals decreased drastically prior to the most recent escalation of rhetoric and externalization of migration control. Arrivals to Italy in the first half of 2018 were down by 79% compared to the same time frame in 2017. Although increasingly inhumane policies are often cloaked in a rhetoric about reducing deaths at sea, it is important to remember that those who are prevented from crossing or forcibly returned are generally not safe but remain subject to precarious and often lethal conditions in countries of transit. Rather than providing a sustainable response to the complex challenges involved in irregular migration, Europe has outsourced the management of its migration ’problem’ to countries like Libya and Niger, where violence and death often remains hidden from the public view.

▻https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/09/outsourcing

Arrivées en Europe via la Méditerranée :
2018 :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705781
Arrivées en Europe toute frontière confondue :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/739902
–-> attention, c’est les « crossings »... rappelez-vous de la question des doubles/triples contages des passages :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705957

Pour #2016 #2017 et #2018, chiffres de Matteo Villa :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/768142
database : ▻https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ncHxOHIx4ptt4YFXgGi9TIbwd53HaR3oFbrfBm67ak4/edit#gid=0
#base_de_données #database

En #Italie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/748940
(y compris #2017 et #2016)
#MNA #nationalité #ports

2017 :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/667569

Les #raisons de la baisse des arrivées en Europe, en lien avec la politique d’externalisation en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/676632

Départs de Libye (ou non-départs car refoulements et interceptions par les gardes-côtes libyens) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/719759
–-> à mettre en lien avec les politiques d’#externalisation en Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705401

Et le tout à mettre en lien avec les statistiques sur les #morts et #naufrages en Méditerranée .

2019 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/768142#message780348

2018 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705934
#mourir_en_mer #décès #mortalité

#2014 #2015 #2016 #2017 (et estimations 2018) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/732058

Arrivées par la #Méditerranée en #2019 :
Europe : plus de 21.000 migrants et réfugiés arrivés par la Méditerranée depuis janvier

Selon l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les migrations (OIM ), les arrivées de migrants en Méditerranée ont dépassé le seuil des 21.000, ce qui constitue une baisse d’environ un tiers par rapport aux 32.070 arrivés au cours de la même période l’an dernier.

Ce sont exactement 21.301 migrants et réfugiés qui sont entrés en Europe par voie maritime à la date du 29 mai. Les arrivées en Espagne et en Grèce représentent 85% du total des arrivées, le reste des migrants et réfugiés de cette année ont pris la direction de l’Italie, de Malte et de Chypre.

La Grèce a désormais surpassé l’Espagne au titre de première destination des migrants et des réfugiés rejoignant l’Europe via la Méditerranée. Selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), le nombre total d’arrivées par mer cette année est de 10.200 dont 2.483 arrivées signalées entre le 1er et le 29 mai dernier.

Le Bureau de l’OIM en Grèce a indiqué mercredi dernier que les garde-côtes helléniques ont confirmé que pendant plus de 48 heures entre le 28 et le 29 mai, il y eu sept incidents nécessitant des opérations de recherche et sauvetage au large des îles de Lesbos, Leros, Samos, Symi Kos et le port d’Alexandroupolis. Ils ont ainsi sauvé 191 migrants qui ont été transférés par la suite dans les ports respectifs grecs.

De plus, à la date du 30 avril, ce sont 3.497 migrants qui ont réussi à atteindre la Grèce via sa frontière terrestre avec la Turquie.
519 décès de migrants, dont plus de la moitié sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale

L’Espagne reste la deuxième porte d’entrée des réfugiés en Méditerranée, avec 7.876 arrivées dont 1.160 hommes, femmes et enfants pour le seul mois de mai. Sur la même période l’an dernier, Madrid a comptabilisé 8.150 migrants et réfugiés ayant réussi à franchir la route de la Méditerranée occidentale. En outre, plus de 2.100 ont atteint l’Espagne via sa frontière terrestre avec le Maroc.

Par ailleurs, l’OIM rappelle que les arrivées ont considérablement baissé en Italie où seuls 1.561 migrants ont réussi à franchir les côtes siciliennes.

Mais la route de la Méditerranée centrale (Italie et Malte) reste tout de même la plus meurtrière avec 321 décès, soit plus de la moitié du total de migrants et réfugiés ayant péri en tentant d’atteindre l’Europe. Les décès enregistrés sur les trois principales routes de la mer Méditerranée pendant près de cinq mois en 2019 s’élèvent à 519 personnes, soit un quart de moins que les 662 décès confirmés au cours de la même période en 2018.

A cet égard, l’OIM rappelle que dans l’ouest de la Méditerranée, l’organisation non gouvernementale Alarme Phone a signalé qu’un jeune Camerounais avait disparu le 21 mai dernier. Selon les témoignages des huit survivants qui l’accompagnaient, il serait tombé en mer avant que leur navire ne soit intercepté par la marine marocaine. Son corps n’a pas été retrouvé.

En Méditerranée centrale, des migrants interceptés et renvoyés en Libye le 23 mai ont également indiqué aux équipes de l’OIM que cinq hommes s’étaient noyés au cours de leur voyage. « Aucun autre détail concernant l’identité, le pays d’origine ou d’autres informations personnelles concernant les disparus n’est disponible », a souligné l’OIM dans une note à la presse.

▻https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/05/1044671