• The juridicialization of planning in #Bogotá

      Are judges the new planners? In our first episode of “Sur-Urbano”, we discuss Sergio Montero, Luisa Sotomayor and Natalia Ángel Cabo’s recent article “Mobilizing Legal Expertise In and Against Cities: Urban Planning Amidst Increased Legal Action in Bogotá”. The authors note that there has been a rise in legal action around urban policy and planning in Colombia, which means that legal experts and judges often end up dictating things that used to be within the realm of planners – social housing, transport corridors, and public space.

      We talk to Sergio Montero, an Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning and Development at the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, associate editor of the journal Regional Studies and director of LabNa (Laboratorio de Narrativas Urbanas).

      https://open.spotify.com/episode/0goUA6BV5woVevuOrgGBKL
      #Bogota #Colombie

  • Nécro (techno) logie : le transhumain Grichka Bogdanov n’a pas survécu au #Covid

    Mort de Grichka Bogdanoff : son frère Igor lui aussi hospitalisé - Gala
    https://www.gala.fr/l_actu/news_de_stars/mort-de-grichka-bogdanoff-son-frere-igor-lui-aussi-hospitalise_483713

    Le sort s’acharne sur les emblématiques présentateurs de l’émission de science-fiction « Temps X ». Alors que Grichka Bogdanoff a été emporté par le Covid-19, ce mardi 28 décembre, son frère Igor a été hospitalisé le même jour. Selon des informations du Monde, que Gala est en mesure de confirmer, l’animateur a été admis dans le même service que son frère décédé au sein de l’hôpital George-Pompidou « pour des raisons identiques ».

    Igor et Grichka Bogdanoff n’étaient pas vaccinés « contre le Covid-19 » a rapporté une source proche des deux frères au quotidien du soir. Une information que la famille de Grichka Bogdanoff se refuse de commenter. « La famille ne souhaite pas communiquer au-delà du texte transmis à l’AFP », a-t-elle déclaré dans un communiqué en réponse aux informations du Monde.

    Le sort s’acharne ...
    Gala, la presse spécialisée dans les « sortilèges ». Toute la communauté éducative de Poudlard est en deuil.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yn_uHvb5vPQ

  • Les enjeux de l’alimentation en eau potable des villes

    Mathilde Resch et Émilie Lavie
    Les enjeux de l’alimentation en eau potable des villes
    Introduction
    Issues associated with drinking water supply in cities
    Introduction
    –-
    Sandrine Petit, Marie-Hélène Vergote et Emmanuel Dumont
    #Dijon, « ville sur la Saône ». Frontières urbaines, #réseaux_d’eau_potable et territoires de la #ressource en eau

    –-

    Sébastien Hardy et Jérémy Robert
    Entre grand système et #alternatives d’#approvisionnement en eau à #Lima et  #La_Paz
    –-

    Ismaël Maazaz
    Hydraulic bricolages : coexisting water supply and access regimes in #N’Djamena, #Chad
    –-

    Xavier May, Pauline Bacquaert, Jean-Michel Decroly, Léa de Guiran, Chloé Deligne, Pierre Lannoy et Valentina Marziali
    Formes, facteurs et importance de la #vulnérabilité_hydrique dans une métropole européenne. Le cas de #Bruxelles

    –-

    Angela Osorio
    La #gestion_communautaire de l’eau dans les #páramos de #Bogota (#Colombie). Le cas du réseau #Piedra_Parada y #Cerrito_blanco

    –-

    Audrey Vincent et Philippe Fleury
    Reconquérir la #qualité de l’eau potable par le développement de l’#agriculture_biologique et de systèmes alimentaires dédiés. Le cas de la #vallée_de_la_Vanne et de la ville de #Paris

    https://journals.openedition.org/echogeo/22090
    #revue #eau #eau_potable #villes #alimentation #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #TRUST #master_TRUST

  • Bogotá (Colombie) : expulsions à Soacha et près de la prison La Modelo
    https://fr.squat.net/2021/10/11/bogota-colombie-expulsions-a-soacha-et-pres-de-la-prison-la-modelo

    Tôt dans la matinée du mercredi 6 octobre, à Soacha, banieue sud-ouest de Bogotá, une centaine de familles ont été délogées par la police dans le secteur San Luis. Ces logements avaient été auto-construits par leurs habitant·e·s. Interrogée par Canal 1, Geraldine, une jeune expulsée ce matin-là, a déclaré : “ça fait trois ans qu’on vit […]

    #Bogotá #Colombie #émeutes #expulsion

  • La #bicyclette, petite reine de la ville | CNRS Le journal
    https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/la-bicyclette-petite-reine-de-la-ville

    Mondial, le développement du #vélo ne touche pas que les villes occidentales, comme une idée reçue pourrait nous inciter à le penser. À #Bogota, une mégapole de 9 millions d’habitants, le vélo a la cote. « La culture du vélo y est très forte et les premières banalisations des grands axes en “ciclovia”, voies réservées aux vélos le dimanche, remontent aux années 1970 », raconte Vincent Gouëset5, professeur de géographie à l’université de Rennes 2.

    Bien que la ville soit entourée par des cimes qui atteignent de plus de 3 000 mètres, 80 % de la population vit sur des sites plats – notamment à l’ouest où se concentrent une partie des quartiers populaires. Là où ça monte, certains habitants ont mis en place des systèmes ingénieux : ils descendent en vélo et remontent en taxis pirates qui transportent le cycliste et le deux-roues. La ville ne compte pas moins de 634 kilomètres de pistes dont 84 km ajoutés suite à la crise sanitaire.

    L’intérêt du modèle colombien est qu’il contredit plusieurs tendances ou préjugés. En Europe et singulièrement en France, le vélo reste l’apanage d’une population plutôt aisée. Les milieux populaires « les plus contraints en termes d’horaires de travail » et dont les zones d’habitation sont éloignées des lieux de travail y ont peu recours. À Bogota au contraire, comme dans l’ensemble de l’Amérique latine, le vélo est assimilé à « un transport du pauvre ». Mais des maires charismatiques et modernistes ont, en assurant sa promotion, cassé cette image. Par ailleurs, et ce n’est pas accessoire, le vélo est tout simplement populaire : avec six Colombiens dans sa dernière édition, le Tour de France est un événement sportif et médiatique majeur dans ce pays où les Herrera, Quintana et autres Bernal sont des vedettes nationales.

    Côté usagers, « l’argument écolo ressort très peu des enquêtes », souligne Vincent Gouëset. De nombreux Bogotains plébiscitent le vélo parce que c’est un mode de transport facile à utiliser, très bon marché, et parce qu’il leur permet de s’affranchir des embouteillages monstrueux qui sont la plaie de cette ville (et de beaucoup d’autres). Il permet aussi aux femmes (25 % des cyclistes) d’éviter de subir des attouchements dans les #transports_publics.

  • Bogotá (Colombie) : l’expulsion d’une zone du district d’Usaquén se termine en affrontements
    https://fr.squat.net/2021/08/28/bogota-colombie-expulsion-d-une-zone-du-district-d-usaquen

    Mardi 17 août 2021, dans le quartier Santa Cecilia Baja du district d’Usaquén, au nord de la capitale colombienne, une zone considérée par la Ville comme étant à « risque d’effondrement » (riesgo de colapso), faite de logements auto-construits par les habitant·e·s, a été la cible d’une opération d’expulsion, sans relogement. Les habitant·e·s visé·e·s ont dû penser […]

    #Vidéos #Amériques #Bogotá #Colombie #émeutes #expulsion

  • Bogotá (Colombie) : nouvelles #émeutes dans le district de Suba en solidarité avec la ZAD expulsée de Tibabuyes
    https://fr.squat.net/2021/08/16/bogota-colombie-nouvelles-emeutes-dans-le-district-de-suba

    Dans la soirée puis la nuit du 11 au 12 août, des émeutes ont eu lieu à nouveau dans le district de Suba, à Bogotá. Elles ont démarré lors d’une #manifestation de solidarité avec la #ZAD_de_la_zone_humide_de_Tibabuyes, expulsée deux jours avant (voir ici). Le cortège de tête, appelé là-bas « Primera […]

    #Vidéos #Amériques #Bogotá #Colombie
    https://fr.squat.net/wp-content/uploads/fr/2021/08/2021-08-11_Bogota_Suba-tropeles.mkv

  • Bogotá (Colombie) : #expulsion d’une ZAD dans le district de Suba
    https://fr.squat.net/2021/08/10/bogota-colombie-expulsion-dune-zad-dans-le-district-de-suba

    En novembre 2020, une sorte de ZAD s’est mise en place pour protéger les zones humides de Tibabuyes, dans le district de Suba, à Bogotá. Ce territoire, plus grande zone humide de la capitale colombienne,est menacé par des travaux visant à prolonger l’aqueduc de Bogotá. Ce lundi 9 août 2021, la police est arrivée en […]

    #Amériques #Bogotá #Colombie #émeutes

  • The Struggle at Turkey’s Boğaziçi University. Attacks on higher education tighten the grip of the AKP’s hegemonic project

    Late at night on January 1, 2021, by presidential decree, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed new rectors to five universities in Turkey. One was Professor Melih Bulu, who became rector of the prestigious Boğaziçi University. This liberal and pluralist institution hosts dissident students and faculty, including many connected to Academics for Peace, an association that demands a peaceful resolution to Turkey’s war on the Kurds. Constituents of Boğaziçi immediately rejected this fait accompli as illegitimate, and began to protest. On January 4, police attacked hundreds of students: an image of Boğaziçi’s gates locked with handcuffs went viral.

    To this day, the campus remains under heavy police surveillance as the AKP and associated dominant social groups use both consent and coercion to impose their ways on social and political life. This process, called hegemony, plays out in the education sector today.

    Melih Bulu was unwelcome at Boğaziçi University for many reasons. A dean and a rector at two other universities, in 2015, he ran in the general elections as a candidate from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP.) In the first few days of his appointment at Boğaziçi, Bulu was credibly accused of plagiarizing his doctoral dissertation. Dismissing the charges as forgetfulness in using quotation marks, he tried to win students over by claiming that he supports LGBT rights – only to close down the LGBTI+ Studies student club as one of his first executive decisions.

    Since the day of Bulu’s appointment, students and faculty members at Boğaziçi have been protesting him, as well as the anti-democratic intervention in the university’s internal operations by President Erdoğan. The Boğaziçi resistance, however, is more than a struggle over the future of one university: it is a much larger struggle for academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and democracy in an increasingly authoritarian Turkey.

    Students and faculty have mobilized creative protests despite the likelihood of a further crackdown. On March 1, over 70 Boğaziçi faculty members applied to the Council of State, demanding the reversal of Bulu’s appointment as it violates the Constitution and the law. By the end of March, more than 800 protesters around Turkey had been taken into custody. Twenty-nine are now under extended house arrest, while six remain in pretrial detention. Faculty members continue to turn their backs on the rectorship every day, and students are boycotting the first six days of the new semester to honor six friends in detention.

    This is clearly an assault on academic and political freedom. But the Boğaziçi resistance also sheds light on why the Erdoğan government may be courting controversy with the nation’s public universities – and why this particular university has taken center stage in the struggle for democracy in Turkey.

    The AKP is a culturally conservative and economically center-right party that has been in power since 2002. The first few years of the Erdoğan government saw democratic advances: lifting of the ban on headscarves in public institutions and an end to military interference in politics. Over the course of two decades in power, however, the AKP has ruled through authoritarian and neoliberal governance.

    These events are neither new nor confined to the education sector. It is only one leg of the AKP’s ongoing political project to transform both state and society. This involves reconstituting higher education to mirror the AKP’s control of state institutions, governance structures, civil society, and the media. The AKP has seized control of the judiciary, parliament, the military, and the police. It has criminalized all opposition. It has imprisoned, purged, or silenced journalists, teachers, academics, lawyers, and others. It has bought off the media. It has removed democratically-elected mayors in the Kurdish southeast and appointed new ones.

    This has all taken place legally, through the constitutional amendments of 2010 and 2017, and the laws by decree that were issued during the two-year state of emergency between 2016 and 2018.

    But the infringement on institutional autonomy and academic freedom is older than the current regime. The Council of Higher Education (YÖK), established after the 1980 military coup, was established to curb the autonomy of universities by controlling university structures, their governance, staff, and intellectual output. Between 1992 and 2016, candidates for a rectorship were voted on first by university departments and faculty before being nominated for appointment by the YÖK. But after a law by decree was issued under emergency rule in 2016, the YÖK was put in charge of appointing rectors. Since 2018, President Erdoğan appoints them.

    The government, its media, and the President used their usual combination of divide-and-conquer techniques on the protesters in a bid to cordon them off from support by the population at large. Boğaziçi students and faculty members, as well as other students and supporters of the protests were characterized first as “elitist,” then as “LGBT deviants,” then “disrespectful of national sensibilities,” and then as “terrorists.”

    The inclusive politics that the Boğaziçi resistance showcased prompted Erdoğan to resort to even more populist tactics, to remind the nation that “lesbians and the like” (“lezbiyen mezbiyen”) should not be listened to, and that “the pillar of the family is the mother,” falling back on the age old conservative “our customs and values!” rhetoric. More broadly, these instances lay bare the differences between the kind of politics that the AKP and the student movement adhere to, suggesting the type of politics – inclusive, diverse, intersectional – that is well-positioned to burst through the cracks of the current system.

    The regime, unable to legitimize its appointed rector at Boğaziçi, seems poised to empty out the university and appoint loyalist deans and staff by using forms of clientelism that are common to AKP rule. Two new faculties were established on February 6. On March 1, Bulu appointed his vice-rector Professor Naci Inci, a physicist, as the director of the Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences. Re-staffing Boğaziçi will ease the process of governing the university, leaving the structure of the institution (if not its procedures) intact, and maintaining the appearance of legitimacy.

    Why is establishing ironclad control of universities necessary to the AKP? Because institutions of higher education mold individuals into citizens, workers, social and political beings. By exerting control over education, the AKP is not only demolishing public space but also ensuring the reproduction of “acceptable” citizens and publics who consent to these practices. At the same time, through establishing its control over education, the AKP is attempting to overturn the decline in support from the youth, as well as the educated and professional classes and re-establish what it calls the “national and religious” youth.

    Universities are also an economic and political project for the AKP: they are money-making, personnel-providing, vote-generating machines. Universities, many of poor quality, have popped up all over Turkey since the party came to power. Erecting a faculty building in a small town or city employs a lot of people. It also provides hope for social mobility, and attaches that hope to voting for the AKP.

    This process cannot be separated from the transformation of universities into institutions that provide a workforce, and where only profitable, depoliticized professions have value. This is the essence of what we mean by a neoliberal transformation of education. The decline and defunding of social sciences and humanities departments is discernible both in and outside of Turkey. Subjects that create space for studying economic, social, and political systems, promise to create politically engaged, critical individuals. It should, then, not come as a surprise that Melih Bulu, once appointed, declared that his mission and vision for Boğaziçi was, instead, to boost the university’s “sectoral cooperation, entrepreneurship, innovation ecosystem,” and put it in in the Times Higher Education (THE) and the QS first 100 rankings.

    Students of Boğaziçi have since made it clear, as one banner read, that they do not want a corporation but a university.

    Nevertheless, political encroachment into higher education continues. In its 19th year of rule, as it loses legitimacy and struggles to generate consent, the AKP increases coercion by repressing dissent everywhere. Higher education is no exception: trade unions, professional associations, political parties, publishing houses, and media outlets have been targeted too.

    These attacks on the university and academic freedom are yet another step by the AKP towards establishing authority over what little space remains for public debate and free expression. Indeed, the boundaries of the state, the government, and the public are already blurred in Turkey. When Bulu stated, in reaction to mounting pressure for his resignation, “touching me would mean touching the state” Erdoğan agreed: if the protesters “had the guts,” he said, they would ask him to resign.

    This conflation of Bulu’s authority with that of Erdoğan and the Turkish state reveals the stakes of the Boğaziçi resistance. Protesters denying the appointed “trustee” (“kayyum”) rector’s legitimacy at Boğaziçi also deny legitimacy to all kayyums in the Kurdish southeast. Refusing to accept Bulu’s appointment at Boğaziçi is also a refusal to accept the AKP’s anti-democratic politics. Reclaiming LGBTI+ identity also reclaims Muslim women’s rights. Freedom to establish or join a student club is a matter of freedom of assembly and expression.

    The students’ bold and incisive open letter to President Erdoğan eloquently expresses these entanglements and the intersectionality of their politics. Placing their struggle at Boğaziçi University within workers’ and minorities’ struggles, and within struggles against injustice, sexism and gender inequality, and the targeting of their fellow friends and professors, university students sum up what this resistance stands for. Their example should illuminate a way forward for an international left politics that commits to democracy and justice for all.

    For recent developments, follow bogazicidireniyor on Instagram and use the hashtags #bogazicidireniyor, #KabulEtmiyoruzVazgeçmiyoruz, #WeDoNotAcceptWeDoNotGiveUp, #WeWillNotLookDown and @unibogazici_en on Twitter.

    #Turquie #université #Bogazici #Boğaziçi #ESR #université_du_Bosphore #attaques #recteurs #Erdogan #Melih_Bulu #AKP #hégémonie #résistance #liberté_académique #contrôle #YÖK #autonomie #homophobie #Naci_Inci #répression #nationalisme #kayyum #légitimité #démocratie #justice

    ping @isskein

    • Open letter to President from Boğaziçi University students

      Amid ongoing protests against the appointed rector of Boğaziçi University, Erdoğan has issued a Presidential decree to open two new faculties at the university. The Boğaziçi Solidarity has addressed an open letter to the President.

      –—

      Amid the ongoing protests against the appointment of Prof. Melih Bulu as a new rector to Boğaziçi University by President and ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a new Presidential decree has been published in the Official Gazette, foreseeing the establishment of Law and Communication faculties at the university.

      While the appointed rector has welcomed the news on his social media account, the Boğaziçi Solidarity platform, on behalf of the Boğaziçi University students protesting the appointment of Melih Bulu, has addressed an open letter to the 12th President of Turkey on social media.

      Under the hashtags #YüreğimizYetiyor (We have the guts), referring to a statement by Erdoğan, and #FakülteyiSarayaKur (Establish the faculty at the palace), students have addressed the following letter:
      Reasons underlying the protests

      "Previously, we responded to Melih Bulu with the poem ’Satirical Attempts on a Provocateur.’ It is pleasing to see that you have acknowledged yourself to be the person responsible, and responded accordingly.

      "Up until today, you have demanded secret meetings with us via the Turkey Youth and Education Service Foundation (TÜRGEV).

      "Now, you are trying to start an argument against us through the media. We do not like go-betweens, we prefer speaking outright and explicitly to all. We hope that you will proceed accordingly.

      "First, let us remind you of our demands and of the reasons underlying our protests:

      "You appointed a trustee rector to our university with utter disregard for the students and faculty. Is what you did legal? Yes, as you like to mention every chance you get, but it is not legitimate. This appointment makes anyone who has even the tiniest sense of justice revolt with indignation.

      "To top it off, you open faculties and appoint deans with an overnight presidential order on a Friday night, in order to intimidate the whole institution with all its students, teachers and laborers.

      "Your attempts to pack our university with your own political militants is the symptom of the political crisis that you have fallen into.

      "Victims of your crisis grow in number with every passing day!
      Constitutional rights

      "We use our constitutional rights to make people from all segments of society aware of the injustices we are subjected to.

      "These are our demands:

      All our friends who have been arrested or detained in this period must be released immediately!
      All campaigns to defame and disenfranchise LGBTI+s and all other targeted groups must end!
      All government-appointed trustees, starting with Melih Bulu, who instigated all these arrests, detentions, scapegoating campaigns, and threats, must resign!
      In universities, democratic rectorate elections must be held with the participation of all constituents of the university!

      ’Don’t mistake us for those who obey you’

      "You uttered a sentence starting with ’If they have the guts...’ in your statement. Is it a constitutional right to call for the resignation of the president? YES! Since when is the use of a constitutional right a matter of courage?

      "Do not mistake us for those who obey you unconditionally. You are not a sultan, and we are not your subjects.

      "But since you mentioned courage, we shall also respond to that briefly.

      "We have no immunities! You, however, are the one who has been storming around, hiding behind your legal and political immunity for the last 19 years.

      "The Interior Minister is spreading lies to play on religious sensitivities. We say that we will not practice self-censorship.

      "You call LGBTI+s deviants, we state that LGBTI+ rights are human rights.

      "Members of your party kicked miners in Soma. We actively stood in solidarity with the mine workers, and we will continue to do so.

      "You unlawfully keep the Co-Chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) imprisoned, alongside journalists and union members.

      "We declare that we stand united with those who fearlessly speak the truth, and we are against all government-appointed trustees.

      "You make crowds boo Berkin Elvan’s mother in rallies. We declare that we stand with Berkin Elvan.

      "You target and attack Ayşe Buğra, without even mentioning her name, saying ’Osman Kavala ’s wife is among these provocateurs’.

      “In a vulgar manner, you restate the sexist fallacy that the only significant feature of a woman is her husband. We state that ’Ayşe Buğra is a dignified professor and an esteemed academic’. We say that ’We will take any charge against her as a charge against us’.
      ”(We know very well that you will file dozens of lawsuits against this letter on the grounds that it praises crime and criminals or insulting the president, but we also know that we will never give up on speaking the truth!)
      ’Why would we call on you to resign?’

      "Since you lack the power necessary to keep the trustee-rector you have appointed in the office, you resort to petty tricks like opening new faculties and appointing sham personnel, which does not appear to be an act of courage. That is why we disregard your words about courage.

      "We are aware that Bogaziçi University is not Turkey’s most significant institution, nor is the appointment of Melih Bulu Turkey’s most significant problem.

      "Regarding the demand for your resignation, we would not consider calling for your resignation based on this issue. YOU ASK WHY?

      "If you were ever going to resign,

      "You would have resigned when Brant Dink was slaughtered!

      "You would have resigned when 34 Kurds were killed in the Roboski massacre. You would have resigned when 301 miners were murdered in Soma! You would have resigned after the Çorlu train derailment!

      "You would have resigned in the face of the livelihood problems of thousands of citizens, who were left unemployed or could not find a job, and especially in face of the decree-law (KHK) purgees!

      "You would have assumed responsibility for the economic policies which condemned the people to poverty, instead of sacrificing your son-in-law.

      "The examples are plenty, but you have never resigned.

      "You preferred to present yourself as naively deceived, instead of, in your own words, ’having the guts’. So now why would we call on you to resign?

      "As long as Melih Bulu sits on that seat, we will continue our protest by strengthening our struggle, with all those who join the resistance. Whether or not you do what must be done is your own business. We stand with those who are robbed of their democratic rights and freedoms.

      “With hopes that you realize that you cannot silence the oppressed of these lands by shouting and threatening from arenas and podiums.”

      What happened?

      Prof. Melih Bulu has been appointed as the President of Boğaziçi University in a Presidential Decree issued on January 1. The appointment of Bulu has sparked harsh criticisms among both the students and academics of the university as well as in the academic community.

      Appointed to Boğaziçi, one of the most prestigious universities in Turkey, from outside its community, Bulu was a candidate for nomination to run in the Parliamentary elections in 2015 for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is chaired by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

      The students and several students’ clubs of the university have been campaigning on social media under the hashtag #kayyımrektöristemiyoruz (We don’t want a trustee university president).

      The call of the students was also supported by the faculty members of the university, who released a joint statement on January 3.

      “An academic outside Bogazici University community was appointed as rector (university president), which is a practice introduced for the first time after the 1980s military tutelage,” read their statement.

      Amid harsh criticisms of students and faculty members, Prof. Bulu has shared a message on his Twitter account, welcoming his appointment to the position, saying, “We are all in the same boat.”

      The students protested the appointment of Bulu in front of the South Campus of the university in İstanbul on January 4. However, the police intervened into the protest with pepper gas and plastic bullets.

      Next day, it was reported that there were detention warrants against 28 people for “violating the law on meetings and demonstrations” and “resisting the officer on duty.” Later in the day, 22 of them were detained.

      40 people in total were detained over the protests. All of the detained were released on January 7 and 8, 2021.

      The protests of students and faculty members at the South Campus of Boğaziçi University have been going on since January 4.

      On February 1, police stormed the South Campus and intervened into the students’ protests. Earlier in the day, the students gathered in front of the campus for the protest. Police hindered the protest while also preventing the students inside the South Campus from joining their friends outside.

      With the 51 students taken into custody inside the campus in the evening, the number of detained increased to 159. In a statement released by the İstanbul Governor’s Office in the early morning hours on February 2, it was announced that 98 students were released from detention.

      On February 2, Boğaziçi University students gathered in Kadıköy Rıhtım for another protest, which was attacked by the police with plastic bullets and tear gas. 134 people were taken into custody by the police. Two of the protesters were arrested by the court afterwards.
      About Melih Bulu

      Prof. Melih Bulu was appointed as the President of Haliç University on January 17, 2020. In office in this foundation university for less than a year, he has been appointed as the President of Boğaziçi University.

      He was a Dean and University President at the İstinye University from 2016 to 2019. Between the years of 2010 and 2016, he was the Head of the Business Management Department of İstanbul Şehir University’s Business Management and Management Science Faculty.

      He was the General Coordinator of International Competitiveness Research Institute (URAK), an NGO working on economic competitiveness of cities and countries, from the year 2017 to 2019. Since 2011, he has been the Executive Board member of the İstanbul Electric-Electronic Machinery and Informatics Exporters R&D Market.

      In 2002, he founded the Sarıyer District Organization of the ruling AKP in İstanbul. In 2015, he was a candidate for nomination to run in the Parliamentary elections from the AKP in the first election district in İstanbul.

      He studied Industrial Engineering at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara in 1992. He did his MBA and PhD at Boğaziçi University’s Department of Management.

      https://bianet.org/english/education/238843-open-letter-to-president-from-bogazici-university-students
      #lettre_ouverte

  • ’Cleaner and greener’: Covid-19 prompts world’s cities to free public space of cars | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/cleaner-and-greener-covid-19-prompts-worlds-cities-to-free-public-space
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/929dbc8ba8e3812479e7012eb7efe84b20d8c18f/0_336_5111_3067/master/5111.jpg

    Around the world, from Dublin to Sydney, cities are being radically reshaped in favour of cyclists and pedestrians as empty streets give authorities the opportunity to implement and accelerate large-scale projects.

    Cycling advocates and environmental activists are urging governments to ensure the revival is long-term and lasts beyond the pandemic, for fear of a pushback by the car lobby.

    Many Parisians are being offered €50 toward getting old bikes repaired as part of the French capital’s €20m (£18m) planvélo to encourage the use of bicycles.

    Those supporting the new push for bike travel point to recent studies, one of which showed the average journey by vehicle in Paris to is 2.5 miles – a comfortable distance by bike for most – and another indicating that the lack of exhaust fumes during lockdown has dramatically improved air quality in the city.

    The city’s mayor, Anne Hidalgo, had made persuading people to abandon private cars in favour of bikes one of the pillars of her political programme even before she was elected mayor in 2014. Despite the car lobby’s hopes that motorised vehicles can reclaim the city once the virus is under control, Hidalgo has said it is out of the question for the city to return to the pre-coronavirus traffic jams and vehicle pollution.

    Reporting team: Helena Smith in Athens, Shaun Walker in Budapest, Kim Willsher in Paris, Rory Carroll in Dublin, Angela Giuffrida in Rome, Joe Parkin Daniels in Bogotá and Michael Safi in Amman #ville #vélo #urban_matters #Athènes #Budapest #Paris #Dublin #Rome #Bogota #Amman

  • Cinema Sepolto

    Un canale youtube che pubblica delle perle cinematrofiche INTROVABILI!

    ;-) Téléchargez les films avant qu’ils ne ferment la chaîne ! ;-)

    https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCRE5HCTI4kktLmmCO8C5CVw

    La libertà è il paradiso (Sergei Bodrov, URSS, 1989)
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JcVj_SEf3JE

    Il mistero della tartaruga bianca (Yvonne Mackay, Nuova Zelanda, 1985)
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAekIFi9WRI

    Baby gang (Salvatore Piscicelli, Italia, 1992)
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E4vR43PoxbE

    Tokio: divisione criminale (Shinji Murayama, Giappone, 1962) con Tetsuro Tanba
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iVmTlGvgQdk

    Pianta un albero, costruisci una casa (Juraj Jakubisko, Cecoslovacchia, 1980)
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLdsELbefD4

    #film #cinema @reka @cdb_77

  • When Memory is Confined : Politics of Commemoration on #Avenida_26, Bogotá

    After more than five decades of conflict, the Colombian capital, Bogotá, is undergoing processes not just of regeneration, but also of commemoration. The decision to create spaces of memory along one particular road in the city, Avenida 26, has highlighted the stark differences between neighborhoods on either side of its congested lanes—and runs the risk of reinforcing existing segregation.

    Bogotá, Colombia, is a socially divided city in a post-conflict country marked by clashing spatial and cultural cleavages. Over the last 20 years, institutional investments have concentrated on the renewal of the city center in order to boost Bogotá’s image. At the same time, the end of the Colombian conflict has led to the proliferation of a politics of memory in the city. The politics of memory, driven by the pedagogical imperative of “never again” (Bilbija and Payne 2011), expose the difficult task of imagining spaces as contemplative and as sites of reconciliation through their portrayal of past events in the conflict (Jelin 2002).

    The street known as Avenida 26 (Figure 1)—at the center of my four-months-long fieldwork—is a key space for analysis of the city’s regeneration programs and politics of memory. The case of Avenida 26 demonstrates the tensions between urban development and memory-making. It reveals how institution-led production of “spaces of memory” (Huyssen 2003), as cultural spaces dedicated to commemoration and remembrance, also play a crucial role in the process of gentrification and the exclusionary dynamics in the city. Sites of national memory on Avenida 26 reflect strategic plans to build a protective barrier from urban violence and conflicts for the city’s middle class while at the same time further marginalizing low-income residents. These are the same residents who are often most directly touched by the conflict and for whom the politics of memory are officially dedicated.

    Segregated memory, between two Avenidas

    “That [a museum] is like for kids who are studying […], it’s not for everyone, for example, for me […] why should I go to a museum, what for? All these museums, what for? […] For me, my museums are my flowers,” said Catalina, a flower seller, in a half-sarcastic, half-bitter tone. [1]

    Catalina is referring to the future National Museum of Memory of Colombia, which is slated to open in 2021 as a space for reflection over the Colombian conflict. [2] The museum will be built on Avenida 26, where Catalina’s flower stand is located. As she speaks, her voice almost fades into the roar of traffic. The street is one of Bogotá’s main thoroughfares. It is nearly 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) long and as wide as a highway. It is one of the most congested streets in the city (Figure 2).

    Avenida 26 is central to Bogotá’s politics of memory. In 2012, the Center for Memory, Peace and Reconciliation, or CMPyR (Centro de Memoria, Paz y Reconciliación; Figure 3), opened next to the city’s central cemetery, where florists and candle sellers have their stands. Public art on the street [3] portrays the Colombian conflict. In 2014, the municipality renamed the section of Avenida 26 that hosts these cultural initiatives Eje de la Paz y la Memoria, or “Axis of Peace and Memory.” In 2016, a new park, Parque del Renacimiento (“Park of the Rebirth”), was opened.

    As a highly congested major thoroughfare, Avenida 26 does not correspond to conventional spaces of memory. Many institutional representatives define it as an empty space or a “blank slate.”

    “It’s like a corridor: when you cross it in some way you are inhabiting a place that is not a place where one would stop to contemplate […] that is to say it is a non-place,” a member of IDARTES (a body which promotes public art initiatives on the streets of Bogotá) said.

    The imaginary of Avenida 26 as a non-place among public officials reveals their uncomfortable awareness that Avenida 26 is an extremely segregated—and at times violent—place. The renamed section of the avenue—the “Eje de la Paz y la Memoria”—divides two very distinct neighborhoods: the middle-income neighborhood of Teusaquillo on one side, and the deprived and extremely precarious neighborhood of Santa Fe on the other. It would seem that the urban violence that characterizes the avenue would make it unsuitable for commemorative practices, yet officials have focused significant public resources in creating cultural institutions of public memory along this route.

    “The side that is in Teusaquillo is cool, I have friends working with screen printing, who have a cultural center, there is the graffiti […]. In front of the cemetery [on the Santa Fe side], it’s very ugly, people steal and at night there are many homeless people […], I really prefer not to be there,” said Santiago, a skater and graffiti artist, capturing the geographical imagination of the street as a divided space.

    In this context, the siting of the CMPyR and the future Museum of Memory, as well as ancillary museum initiatives, on Avenida 26 is not unintentional or strictly about memory. They represent selective investments on one side of the street in the middle-class neighborhood of Teusaquillo, and not on the Santa Fe side. The siting of these projects on Avenida 26 is not due to the relevance of this place for commemorative purposes, but instead acts as a revitalization strategy that encloses the more economically viable neighborhood through cultural projects as a means of shielding this neighborhood from the poverty and urban violence on the other side of Avenida 26. A member of the current CMPyR administration mentioned this selective use of the street when sharing his unease over being located to what he perceives as the “wrong” side of the street: “We work looking at that side [pointing to the Teusaquillo side], or we go to the mayor’s office, but we don’t go over there [the Santa Fe side]. […] One is always between two parallel worlds. Let’s say that, among ourselves, we know that on the other [Santa Fe] side there is the jungle.”

    In this scenario, Avenida 26 acts as a true frontier between two neighborhoods that memory professionals deem to be incompatible. Indeed, cultural actors and memory professionals seem to identify two different Avenidas: one apt to welcome initiatives and spaces of memory; the other inaccessible due to urban violence.
    Enclosed spaces, incompatible languages

    The consequences of this enclosure are detrimental to the low-income communities on the Santa Fe side of the street. Gates and security guards around the CMPyR contribute to a significant securitization of this area. Candle and flower sellers on the Santa Fe side, who work informally, face increased policing, disrupting their business and limiting their ability to develop a regular clientele.

    The marginalization and exclusion of these residents is even more evident symbolically. Interviewees on the Santa Fe side of the street are mostly uninformed of the activities of politics of memory—for example, they often confuse the CMPyR with a monument. They are also limited by a linguistic barrier. For example, memory, a common word in public art projects (Figure 4) and part of the title of the CMPyR—is an unfamiliar concept to many of these residents. The vocabulary employed by memory professionals reinforces a social and symbolic barrier among actors sharing the same space. This, in turn, contributes to the general indifference of many people in Santa Fe toward spaces of memory, and often results in explicit opposition to politics of memory on the street.

    A kiosk owner near the Parque del Renacimiento expressed her rejection of the politics of memory through her concerns about the present and her children’s future, “I’m not interested in who is buried there, why he died, why it’s called memory […] I want my children to be well, [I want to know] what time my daughter gets home, because if she is late then what happened to her? […] How can I be interested in this bullshit?”

    Avenida 26 is not a blank slate. It is a “lived space” made of uses and practices that politics of memory dismiss (Lefebvre 1974; de Certeau 1990). These regeneration plans ignore residents’ use of space and relation to memory by relying on cultural tools and a language that excludes them from participation. Avenida 26 highlights the necessity to think of spaces of memory as urban spaces whose function extends beyond their commemorative role (Till 2012). This case demonstrates how the appropriation or rejection of spaces of memory is dependent on urban dynamics—social inequalities, spatial segregation, and access to resources—influencing both the appropriation of spaces of memory and the possibility that a sense of belonging among local actors may flourish (Palermo and Ponzini 2014).

    Finally, the role played by the imperative of “never again” in gentrification and displacement is far from being an exclusively Colombian phenomenon. Across the globe, cities are increasingly taking a stance over episodes of the past at a national scale and publicly displaying it for collective engagement (as in post-apartheid Johannesburg, or in post-9/11 New York, among others). Academic and policymaking literature needs to deepen our understanding of the intricacy of these dynamics and the problematic cultural undertakings in such processes. If remembering is indeed a right as well as a duty, “walking down memory lane” should represent an exercise of citizenship and not the rationalization of social and spatial segregation.

    https://www.metropolitiques.eu/When-Memory-is-Confined-Politics-of-Commemoration-on-Avenida-26-Bogo

    #mémoire #Bogotá #Colombie #commémoration #mémoriel #divided_city #villes #géographie_urbaine #ségrégation #post-conflict #réconciliation #never_again #plus_jamais_ça #violence_urbaine #National_Museum_of_Memory_of_Colombia (CMPyR) #musée #contested_city #guerre_civile #non-lieu #Teusaquillo #Santa_Fe #violence_urbaine #art #frontières_urbaines #fractures_urbaines #gentrification #citoyenneté

    –---

    Toponymie :

    In 2014, the municipality renamed the section of Avenida 26 that hosts these cultural initiatives #Eje_de_la_Paz_y_la_Memoria, or “Axis of Peace and Memory.” In 2016, a new park, #Parque_del_Renacimiento (“Park of the Rebirth”), was opened.

    #toponymie_politique

    ping @cede @karine4

    ping @albertocampiphoto @reka

  • Cities must act

    40,000 people are currently trapped on the Aegean islands, forced to live in overcrowded camps with limited medical services and inadequate sanitation.

    #Glasgow, sign this petition from @ActMust
    @ScotlandMustAct
    demanding relocation from the islands.

    https://twitter.com/scotrefcouncil/status/1253348493332267009

    #Ecosse #UK #villes-refuge #Glasgow #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Grèce #relocalisation #pétition

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur les villes-refuge :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • #CitiesMustAct (qui fait partie de la #campagne #EuropeMustAct)

      #CitiesMustAct is a bold new campaign asking the citizens, councils and mayors of European towns and cities to pledge their support for the immediate relocation of asylum seekers on the Greek islands.

      In our previous campaigns we pushed for change on the EU level. From our interaction with EU leaders we have learned that they are hesitant or even unable to act because they believe that there is no broad support for helping refugees among European citizens. Let’s prove them wrong!

      On the 30th of March, the Mayor and citizens of Berlin pledged to take in 1,500 refugees. Now we are asking cities and towns across Europe to join Berlin in offering sanctuary to refugees in overcrowded camps on the Greek mainland and islands.

      As COVID-19 threatens a health crisis in densely overcrowded camps, we must act now to relieve pressure on these horrendous camps.

      Whilst cities may not have the legislative power to directly relocate refugees themselves, #CitiesMustAct will send a powerful message of citizen solidarity that governments and the EU can’t ignore!

      Join us in spreading the #CitiesMustAct campaign across Europe - join us today!


      http://www.europemustact.org/citiesmustact

    • Cities lobby EU to offer shelter to migrant children from Greece

      #Amsterdam, #Barcelona and #Leipzig among cities calling for action to ease humanitarian crisis

      Ten European cities have pledged shelter to unaccompanied migrant children living in desperate conditions on Greek island camps or near the Turkish border.

      Amsterdam, Barcelona and Leipzig are among the cities that have written to European Union leaders, saying they are ready to offer a home to vulnerable children to ease what they call a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis in Greece.

      “We can provide these children with what they now so urgently need: to get out of there, to have a home, to be safe, to have access to medical care and to be looked after by dedicated people,” the letter states.

      But the cities can only make good on their pledge if national governments agree. Seven of the 10 local government signatories to the letter are in countries that have not volunteered to take in children under a relocation effort launched by the European commission in March.

      #Rutger_Groot_Wassink, Amsterdam’s deputy mayor for social affairs, said it was disappointing the Dutch government had declined to join the EU relocation scheme. He believes Dutch cities could house 500 children, with “30-35, maybe 40 children” being brought to Amsterdam.

      “It’s not that we can send a plane in and pick them up, because you need the permission of the national government. But we feel we are putting pressure on our national government, which has been reluctant to move on this issue,” he said.

      The Dutch government – a four-party liberal-centre-right coalition – has so far declined to join the EU relocation effort, despite requests by Groot Wassink, who is a member of the Green party.

      “It might have something to do with the political situation in the Netherlands, where there is a huge debate on refugees and migrants and the national government doesn’t want to be seen as refugee-friendly. From the perspective of some of the parties they feel that they do enough. They say they are helping Greece and of course there is help for Greece.”

      If the Dutch government lifted its opposition, Groot Wassink said transfers could happen fairly quickly, despite coronavirus restrictions. “If there is a will it can be done even pretty soon,” he said.

      Ten EU countries – Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg and Lithuania – have pledged to take in at least 1,600 lone children from the Greek islands, just under a third of the 5,500 unaccompanied minors estimated to be in Greece.

      So far, only a small number have been relocated: 12 to Luxembourg and 47 to Germany.

      The municipal intervention chimes with comments from the German Social Democrat MEP Brigit Sippel, who said earlier this month that she knew of “cities and German Länder who are ready … tomorrow, to do more”. The MEP said Germany’s federal government was moving too slowly and described the initial transfer of 47 children as “ridiculous”.

      Amsterdam, with Utrecht, organised the initiative through the Eurocities network, which brings together more than 140 of the continent’s largest municipalities, including 20 UK cities. The UK’s home secretary, Priti Patel, has refused calls to take in lone children from the Greek islands.

      Groot Wassink said solidarity went beyond the EU’s borders. He said: “You [the UK] are still part of Europe.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/cities-lobby-eu-to-offer-shelter-to-migrant-children-from-greece
      #Barcelone #îles #vulnérabilité #enfants #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés

    • Migrants and mayors are the unsung heroes of COVID-19. Here’s why

      - Some of the most pragmatic responses to COVID-19 have come from mayors and governors.
      - The skills and resourcefulness of refugees and migrants are also helping in the fight against the virus.
      - It’s time for international leaders to start following suit.

      In every crisis it is the poor, sick, disabled, homeless and displaced who suffer the most. The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception. Migrants and refugees, people who shed one life in search for another, are among the most at risk. This is because they are often confined to sub-standard and overcrowded homes, have limited access to information or services, lack the financial reserves to ride out isolation and face the burden of social stigma.

      Emergencies often bring out the best and the worst in societies. Some of the most enlightened responses are coming from the world’s governors and mayors. Local leaders and community groups from cities as diverse as #Atlanta, #Mogadishu (https://twitter.com/cantoobo/status/1245051780787994624?s=12) and #Sao_Paulo (https://www.docdroid.net/kSmLieL/covid19-pmsao-paulo-city-april01-pdf) are setting-up dedicated websites for migrants, emergency care and food distribution facilities, and even portable hand-washing stations for refugees and internally displaced people. Their actions stand in glaring contrast to national decision-makers, some of whom are looking for scapegoats.

      Mayors and city officials are also leading the charge when it comes to recovery. Global cities from #Bogotá (https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/migrantes-en-epoca-de-coronavirus-en-bogota-se-avecina-una-crisis-478062) to #Barcelona (https://reliefweb.int/report/spain/barcelonas-show-solidarity-time-covid-19) are introducing measures to mitigate the devastating economic damages wrought by the lockdown. Some of them are neutralizing predatory landlords by placing moratoriums on rent hikes and evictions. Others are distributing food through schools and to people’s doorsteps as well as providing cash assistance to all residents, regardless of their immigration status.

      Cities were already in a tight spot before COVID-19. Many were facing serious deficits and tight budgets, and were routinely asked to do ‘more with less’. With lockdowns extended in many parts of the world, municipalities will need rapid financial support. This is especially true for lower-income cities in Africa, South Asia and Latin America where migrants, refugees and other vulnerable groups risk severe hunger and even starvation. They also risk being targeted if they try and flee. International aid donors will need to find ways to direct resources to cities and allow them sizeable discretion in how those funds are used.

      Philanthropic groups and city networks around the world are rapidly expanding their efforts to protect and assist migrants and refugees. Take the case of the #Open_Society_Foundations, which is ramping up assistance to New York City, Budapest and Milan to help them battle the pandemic while bolstering safety nets for the most marginal populations. Meanwhile, the #Clara_Lionel_and_Shawn_Carter_Foundations in the US have committed millions in grants to support undocumented workers in Los Angeles and New York (https://variety-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/variety.com/2020/music/news/rihanna-jay-z-foundations-donate-million-coronavirus-relief-1203550018/amp). And inter-city coalitions, like the #US_Conference_of-Mayors (https://www.usmayors.org/issues/covid-19) and #Eurocities (http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/documents/EUROCITIES-reaction-to-the-Covid-19-emergency-WSPO-BN9CHB), are also helping local authorities with practical advice about how to strengthen preparedness and response.

      The truth is that migrants and refugees are one of the most under-recognized assets in the fight against crises, including COVID-19. They are survivors. They frequently bring specialized skills to the table, including expertise in medicine, nursing, engineering and education. Some governments are catching on to this. Take the case of Portugal, which recently changed its national policies to grant all migrants and asylum seekers living there permanent residency, thus providing access to health services, social safety nets and the right to work. The city of #Buenos_Aires (https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/coronavirus-municipios-provincia-buenos-aires-sumaran-medicos-nid234657) authorized Venezuelan migrants with professional medical degrees to work in the Argentinean healthcare system. #New_York (https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-20210-continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating), #New_Jersey (https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/20200401b.shtml) and others have cleared the way for immigrant doctors without US licenses to provide patient care during the current pandemic.

      There are several steps municipal governments, businesses and non-governmental organizations should take to minimize the impacts of COVID-19 on migrants and displaced people. For one, they need to clearly account for them in their response and recovery plans, including ensuring free access to healthy food and cash assistance. Next, they could strengthen migrant associations and allow qualified professionals to join the fight against infectious disease outbreaks. What is more, they could ensure access to basic services like housing, electricity, healthcare and education - and information about how to access them in multiple languages - as Portugal has done.

      Mayors are on the frontline of supporting migrants and refugees, often in the face of resistance from national authorities. Consider the experience of Los Angeles’s mayor, #Eric_Garcetti (https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-garcetti-relief-businesses-immigrants), who recently called on the US Congress to provide rapid relief to roughly 2.5 million undocumented immigrants in California. Or the mayor of Uganda’s capital #Kampala, #Erias_Lukwago (https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Opposition-gives-out-food-to-poor-despite-Museveni-ban/688334-5518340-hd23s8/index.html), who has resorted to distributing food himself to poor urban residents despite bans from the central government. At the same time, #Milan ’s mayor, #Giuseppe_Sala (https://www.corriere.it/economia/finanza/20_aprile_13/sala-sindaci-europei-alla-crisi-si-risponde-piu-solidarieta-attenzione-citt), wrote to the European Union to urgently request access to financial aid. These three mayors also lead the #Mayors_Migration_Council, a city coalition established to influence international migration policy and share resources (https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/d/e/2PACX-1vRqMtCR8xBONCjntcDmiKv0m4-omNzJxkEB2X2gMZ_uqLeiiQv-m2Pb9aZq4AlDvw/pub) with local leaders around the world.

      The truth is that refugees, asylum seekers and displaced people are not sitting idly by; in some cases they are the unsung heroes of the pandemic response. Far from being victims, migrants and displaced people reflect the best of what humanity has to offer. Despite countless adversities and untold suffering, they are often the first to step up and confront imminent threats, even giving their lives (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/world/europe/coronavirus-doctors-immigrants.html) in the process. The least we can all do is protect them and remove the obstacles in the way of letting them participate in pandemic response and recovery. Mayors have got this; it’s now time for national and international decision-makers to follow suit.

      https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/migrants-and-mayors-are-the-unsung-heroes-of-covid-19-heres-why
      #Mogadisho

      signalé par @thomas_lacroix

    • *Bologna: il Consiglio comunale per la regolarizzazione dei

      migranti irregolari*
      Il Consiglio Comunale di Bologna oggi ha approvato, con 18 voti favorevoli e 6 contrari, un ordine del giorno per ottenere un provvedimento di regolarizzazione dei migranti attualmente soggiornanti in territorio italiano in condizione di irregolarità originaria o sopravvenuta, con la massima tempestività, data l’emergenza sanitaria in corso.

      L’ordine del giorno è stato presentato dal consigliere Federico Martelloni (Coalizione civica) e firmato dai consiglieri Clancy (Coalizione civica), Frascaroli (Città comune), Palumbo (gruppo misto-Nessuno resti indietro), Errani, Persiano, Campaniello, Mazzoni, Li Calzi, Colombo (Partito Democratico), Bugani, Piazza, Foresti (Movimento 5 stelle). Ecco il testo :

      “Il Consiglio Comunale di Bologna, a fronte dello stato di emergenza sanitaria da Covid-19 in corso e delle misure assunte dal Governo nazionale e dalle Giunte locali per contrastarne la diffusione e limitarne l’impatto sulla popolazione attualmente presente sul territorio. Ritenuto che non trova spazio nell’odierno dibattito pubblico, segnato dalla predetta emergenza, l’esigenza di assumere provvedimenti che sanino la posizione dei migranti che soggiornano irregolarmente nel nostro Paese, tema oggetto dell’ordine del giorno votato il 23 dicembre 2019 dalla Camera dei Deputati in sede di approvazione della legge di bilancio, adottato col fine di produrre molteplici benefici per la collettività , a partire dal fatto che: a) si offrirebbe l’opportunità di vivere e lavorare legalmente nel nostro Paese a chi già si trova sul territorio ma che , senza titolo di soggiorno , è spesso costretto per sopravvivere a rivolgersi ai circuiti illeciti ; b) si andrebbe incontro ai tanti datori di lavoro che , bisognosi di personale, non possono assumere persone senza documenti , anche se già formati, e ricorrono al lavoro in nero ; c) si avrebbero maggiore contezza – e conseguentemente controllo – delle presenze sui nostri territori di alcune centinaia di migliaia di persone di cui poco o nulla si sa , e, conseguentemente, maggiore sicurezza per tutti.

      Dato atto chetale esigenza è stata ribadita, alla vigilia della dichiarazione dello stato di pandemia, dalla ministra dell’interno Lamorgese in data 15 gennaio 2020, in Risposta a interrogazione orale, confermando che “L’intenzione del Governo e del Ministero dell’Interno è quella di valutare le questioni poste all’ordine del giorno che richiamavo in premessa, nel quadro più generale di una complessiva rivisitazione delle diverse disposizioni che incidono sulle politiche migratorie e sulla condizione dello straniero in Italia” (resoconto stenografico della seduta della Camera dei Deputati del 15 gennaio 2020, pag. 22).Tenuto conto che il tema della regolarizzazione degli stranieri irregolarmente soggiornanti diventa ancor più rilevante e urgente nella contingenza che ci troviamo ad attraversare, come giustamente rimarcato nell’Appello per la sanatoria dei migranti irregolari al tempo dei Covid-19, elaborato e sottoscritto da centinaia di associazioni (visibile al seguente indirizzo: https://www.meltingpot.org/Appello-per-la-sanatoria-dei-migranti-irregolari-ai-tempi.html#nb1), atteso che alle buone ragioni della sanatoria si aggiungono , oggi, anche le esigenze di tutela della salute collettiva, compresa quella delle centinaia di migliaia di migranti privi del permesso di soggiorno, che non hanno accesso alla sanità pubblica. Considerato che l’Appello richiamato al punto che precede giustamente sottolinea che il migrante irregolare:-non è ovviamente iscritto al Sistema Sanitario Nazionale e di conseguenza non dispone di un medico di base, avendo diritto alle sole prestazioni sanitarie urgenti ;-non si rivolge alle strutture sanitarie nei casi di malattia lieve, mentre, nei casi più gravi non ha alternativa al presentarsi al pronto soccorso , il che contrasterebbe con tutti i protocolli adottati per contenere la diffusione del virus. – è costretto a soluzioni abitative di fortuna , in ambienti spesso degradati e insalubri, condivisi con altre persone .Considerato,in definitiva,che i soggetti “invisibili” sono per molti aspetti più esposti al contagio del virus e più di altri rischiano di subirne le conseguenze sia sanitarie, per la plausibile mancanza di un intervento tempestivo, sia sociali, per lo stigma cui rischiano di essere sottoposti a causa di responsabilità e inefficienze non loro ascrivibili .Assunto che iniziative di tal fatta sono all’ordine del giorno anche in altri paesi dell’Unione, avendo il governo del Portogallo già approvato una sanatoria per l’immediata regolarizzazione di tutti i migranti in attesa di permesso di soggiorno che avessero presentato domanda alla data di dichiarazione dell’emergenza Coronavirus, per consentirne l’accesso al sistema sanitario nazionale, all’apertura di conti correnti bancari; alle misure economiche straordinarie di protezione per persone e famiglie in condizioni di fragilità ; alla regolarizzazione dei rapporti di lavoro .Condivide l’urgenza di intercettare centinaia di migliaia di persone attualmente prive di un regolare permesso di soggiorno, per contenere il loro rischio di contrarre il virus; perché possano con tranquillità usufruire dei servizi della sanità pubblica nel caso di sintomatologia sospetta; perché non diventino loro malgrado veicolo di trasmissione del virus, con tutte le nefaste conseguenze che possono derivarne nei territori, incluso il territorio di Bologna.

      Invita il Sindaco e la Giunta a dare massima diffusione, anche attraverso i canali di comunicazione istituzionale, agli appelli e alle iniziative finalizzate ad ottenere un provvedimento di regolarizzazione dei migranti attualmente soggiornanti in territorio italiano in condizione d’irregolarità originaria o sopravvenuta .a farsi promotore, in tutte le sedi istituzionali, a partire dall’ANCI, delle iniziative volte a ottenere l’adozione di un provvedimento di regolarizzazione ed emersione degli stranieri irregolarmente soggiornanti, con la massima tempestività richiesta dell’emergenza sanitaria oggi in corso.

      https://www.pressenza.com/it/2020/04/bologna-il-consiglio-comunale-per-la-regolarizzazione-dei-migranti-irrego
      #Bologne #régularisation

  • En #Colombie, des #leaders_sociaux tombent sous les balles par centaines
    https://lemediapresse.fr/international/en-colombie-des-leaders-sociaux-tombent-sous-les-balles-par-centaines

    Les assassinats de ces paysans, activistes et militants hantent le premier anniversaire du gouvernement droitier d’Iván #Duque, opposé à l’accord de paix entre l’ex-guérilla des #FARC et l’État.

    #International #Amérique_du_Sud #Amérique_Latine #bogota #Guérilla #Marxisme #marxiste #Révolution

  • 2.3 million Venezuelans now live abroad

    More than 7% of Venezuela’s population has fled the country since 2014, according to the UN. That is the equivalent of the US losing the whole population of Florida in four years (plus another 100,000 people, give or take).

    The departing 2.3 million Venezuelans have mainly gone to neighboring Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, putting tremendous pressure on those countries. “This is building to a crisis moment that we’ve seen in other parts of the world, particularly in the Mediterranean,” a spokesman for the UN’s International Organization for Migration said recently.

    This week, Peru made it a bit harder for Venezuelans to get in. The small town of Aguas Verdes has seen as many as 3,000 people a day cross the border; most of the 400,000 Venezuelans in Peru arrived in the last year. So Peru now requires a valid passport. Until now, ID cards were all that was needed.

    Ecuador tried to do the same thing but a judge said that such a move violated freedom-of-movement rules agreed to when Ecuador joined the Andean Community. Ecuador says 4,000 people a day have been crossing the border, a total of 500,000 so far. It has now created what it calls a “humanitarian corridor” by laying on buses to take Venezuelans across Ecuador, from the Colombian border to the Peruvian border.

    Brazil’s Amazon border crossing in the state of Roraima with Venezuela gets 500 people a day. It was briefly shut down earlier this month—but that, too, was overturned by a court order.

    Venezuela is suffering from severe food shortages—the UN said more than 1 million of those who had fled since 2014 are malnourished—and hyperinflation. Things could still get worse, which is really saying something for a place where prices are doubling every 26 days. The UN estimated earlier this year that 5,000 were leaving Venezuela every day; at that rate, a further 800,000 people could leave before the end of the year (paywall).

    A Gallup survey from March showed that 53% of young Venezuelans want to move abroad permanently. And all this was before an alleged drone attack on president Nicolas Maduro earlier this month made the political situation even more tense, the country’s opposition-led National Assembly said that the annual inflation rate reached 83,000% in July, and the chaotic introduction of a new currency.

    https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/venezuela-has-lost-2-3-million-people-and-it-could-get-even-worse
    #Venezuela #asile #migrations #réfugiés #cartographie #visualisation #réfugiés_vénézuéliens

    Sur ce sujet, voir aussi cette longue compilation initiée en juin 2017 :
    http://seen.li/d26k

    • Venezuela. L’Amérique latine cherche une solution à sa plus grande #crise_migratoire

      Les réunions de crise sur l’immigration ne sont pas l’apanage de l’Europe : treize pays latino-américains sont réunis depuis lundi à Quito pour tenter de trouver des solutions communes au casse-tête migratoire provoqué par l’#exode_massif des Vénézuéliens.


      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/venezuela-lamerique-latine-cherche-une-solution-sa-plus-grand

    • Bataille de #chiffres et guerre d’images autour de la « #crise migratoire » vénézuélienne

      L’émigration massive qui touche actuellement le Venezuela est une réalité. Mais il ne faut pas confondre cette réalité et les défis humanitaires qu’elle pose avec son instrumentalisation, tant par le pouvoir vénézuélien pour se faire passer pour la victime d’un machination que par ses « ennemis » qui entendent se débarrasser d’un gouvernement qu’ils considèrent comme autoritaire et source d’instabilité dans la région. Etat des lieux d’une crise très polarisée.

      C’est un véritable scoop que nous a offert le président vénézuélien le 3 septembre dernier. Alors que son gouvernement est avare en données sur les sujets sensibles, Nicolas Maduro a chiffré pour la première fois le nombre de Vénézuéliens ayant émigré depuis deux ans à 600 000. Un chiffre vérifiable, a-t-il assuré, sans toutefois donner plus de détails.

      Ce chiffre, le premier plus ou moins officiel dans un pays où il n’y a plus de statistiques migratoires, contraste avec celui délivré par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés (HCR). Selon ces deux organisations, 2,3 millions de Vénézuéliens vivraient à l’étranger, soit 7,2% des habitants sur un total de 31,8 millions. Pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise ! D’autres diasporas sont relativement bien plus nombreuses. Ce qui impressionne, c’est la croissance exponentielle de cette émigration sur un très court laps de temps : 1,6 million auraient quitté le pays depuis 2015 seulement. Une vague de départs qui s’est accélérée ces derniers mois et affectent inégalement de nombreux pays de la région.
      Le pouvoir vénézuélien, par la voix de sa vice-présidente, a accusé des fonctionnaires de l’ONU de gonfler les chiffres d’un « flux migratoire normal » (sic) pour justifier une « intervention humanitaire », synonyme de déstabilisation. D’autres sources estiment quant à elles qu’ils pourraient être près de quatre millions à avoir fui le pays.

      https://www.cncd.be/Bataille-de-chiffres-et-guerre-d
      #statistiques #guerre_des_chiffres

    • La formulation est tout de même étrange pour une ONG… : pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise, de même l’utilisation du mot ennemis avec guillemets. Au passage, le même pourcentage – pas si énorme …– appliqué à la population française donnerait 4,5 millions de personnes quittant la France, dont les deux tiers, soit 3 millions de personnes, au cours des deux dernières années.

      Ceci dit, pour ne pas qu’ils tombent… d’inanition, le Programme alimentaire mondial (agence de l’ONU) a besoin de sous pour nourrir les vénézuéliens qui entrent en Colombie.

      ONU necesita fondos para seguir atendiendo a emigrantes venezolanos
      http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/onu-necesita-fondos-para-seguir-atendiendo-emigrantes-venezolanos_25311

      El Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), el principal brazo humanitario de Naciones Unidas, informó que necesita 22 millones de dólares suplementarios para atender a los venezolanos que entran a Colombia.

      «Cuando las familias inmigrantes llegan a los centros de recepción reciben alimentos calientes y pueden quedarse de tres a cinco días, pero luego tienen que irse para que otros recién llegados puedan ser atendidos», dijo el portavoz del PMA, Herve Verhoosel.
      […]
      La falta de alimentos se convierte en el principal problema para quienes atraviesan a diario la frontera entre Venezuela y Colombia, que cuenta con siete puntos de pasaje oficiales y más de un centenar informales, con más de 50% de inmigrantes que entran a Colombia por estos últimos.

      El PMA ha proporcionado ayuda alimentaria de emergencia a más de 60.000 venezolanos en los departamentos fronterizos de Arauca, La Guajira y el Norte de Santander, en Colombia, y más recientemente ha empezado también a operar en el departamento de Nariño, que tiene frontera con Ecuador.
      […]
      De acuerdo con evaluaciones recientes efectuadas por el PMA entre inmigrantes en Colombia, 80% de ellos sufren de inseguridad alimentaria.

    • Migrants du Venezuela vers la Colombie : « ni xénophobie, ni fermeture des frontières », assure le nouveau président colombien

      Le nouveau président colombien, entré en fonction depuis hier (lundi 8 octobre 2018), ne veut pas céder à la tentation d’une fermeture de la frontière avec le Venezuela.


      https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/martinique/migrants-du-venezuela-colombie-xenophobie-fermeture-frontieres-a
      #fermeture_des_frontières #ouverture_des_frontières

    • Fleeing hardship at home, Venezuelan migrants struggle abroad, too

      Every few minutes, the reeds along the #Tachira_River rustle.

      Smugglers, in ever growing numbers, emerge with a ragtag group of Venezuelan migrants – men struggling under tattered suitcases, women hugging bundles in blankets and schoolchildren carrying backpacks. They step across rocks, wade into the muddy stream and cross illegally into Colombia.

      This is the new migration from Venezuela.

      For years, as conditions worsened in the Andean nation’s ongoing economic meltdown, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans – those who could afford to – fled by airplane and bus to other countries far and near, remaking their lives as legal immigrants.

      Now, hyperinflation, daily power cuts and worsening food shortages are prompting those with far fewer resources to flee, braving harsh geography, criminal handlers and increasingly restrictive immigration laws to try their luck just about anywhere.

      In recent weeks, Reuters spoke with dozens of Venezuelan migrants traversing their country’s Western border to seek a better life in Colombia and beyond. Few had more than the equivalent of a handful of dollars with them.

      “It was terrible, but I needed to cross,” said Dario Leal, 30, recounting his journey from the coastal state of Sucre, where he worked in a bakery that paid about $2 per month.

      At the border, he paid smugglers nearly three times that to get across and then prepared, with about $3 left, to walk the 500 km (311 miles) to Bogota, Colombia’s capital. The smugglers, in turn, paid a fee to Colombian crime gangs who allow them to operate, according to police, locals and smugglers themselves.

      As many as 1.9 million Venezuelans have emigrated since 2015, according to the United Nations. Combined with those who preceded them, a total of 2.6 million are believed to have left the oil-rich country. Ninety percent of recent departures, the U.N. says, remain in South America.

      The exodus, one of the biggest mass migrations ever on the continent, is weighing on neighbors. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which once welcomed Venezuelan migrants, recently tightened entry requirements. Police now conduct raids to detain the undocumented.

      In early October, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Colombia’s foreign minister, said as many as four million Venezuelans could be in the country by 2021, costing national coffers as much as $9 billion. “The magnitude of this challenge,” he said, “our country has never seen.”

      In Brazil, which also borders Venezuela, the government deployed troops and financing to manage the crush and treat sick, hungry and pregnant migrants. In Ecuador and Peru, workers say that Venezuelan labor lowers wages and that criminals are hiding among honest migrants.

      “There are too many of them,” said Antonio Mamani, a clothing vendor in Peru, who recently watched police fill a bus with undocumented Venezuelans near Lima.
      “WE NEED TO GO”

      By migrating illegally, migrants expose themselves to criminal networks who control prostitution, drug trafficking and other rackets. In August, Colombian investigators discovered 23 undocumented Venezuelans forced into prostitution and living in basements in the colonial city of Cartagena.

      While most migrants are avoiding such straits, no shortage of other hardship awaits – from homelessness, to unemployment, to the cold reception many get as they sleep in public squares, peddle sweets and throng already overburdened hospitals.

      Still, most press on, many on foot.

      Some join compatriots in Brazil and Colombia. Others, having spent what money they had, are walking vast regions, like Colombia’s cold Andean passes and sweltering tropical lowlands, in treks toward distant capitals, like Quito or Lima.

      Johana Narvaez, a 36-year-old mother of four, told Reuters her family left after business stalled at their small car repair shop in the rural state of Trujillo. Extra income she made selling food on the street withered because cash is scarce in a country where annual inflation, according to the opposition-led Congress, recently reached nearly 500,000 percent.

      “We can’t stay here,” she told her husband, Jairo Sulbaran, in August, after they ran out of food and survived on corn patties provided by friends. “Even on foot, we must go.” Sulbaran begged and sold old tires until they could afford bus tickets to the border.

      Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has chided migrants, warning of the hazards of migration and that emigres will end up “cleaning toilets.” He has even offered free flights back to some in a program called “Return to the Homeland,” which state television covers daily.

      Most migration, however, remains in the other direction.

      Until recently, Venezuelans could enter many South American countries with just their national identity cards. But some are toughening rules, requiring a passport or additional documentation.

      Even a passport is elusive in Venezuela.

      Paper shortages and a dysfunctional bureaucracy make the document nearly impossible to obtain, many migrants argue. Several told Reuters they waited two years in vain after applying, while a half-dozen others said they were asked for as much as $2000 in bribes by corrupt clerks to secure one.

      Maduro’s government in July said it would restructure Venezuela’s passport agency to root out “bureaucracy and corruption.” The Information Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
      “VENEZUELA WILL END UP EMPTY”

      Many of those crossing into Colombia pay “arrastradores,” or “draggers,” to smuggle them along hundreds of trails. Five of the smugglers, all young men, told Reuters business is booming.

      “Venezuela will end up empty,” said Maikel, a 17-year-old Venezuelan smuggler, scratches across his face from traversing the bushy trails. Maikel, who declined to give his surname, said he lost count of how many migrants he has helped cross.

      Colombia, too, struggles to count illegal entries. Before the government tightened restrictions earlier this year, Colombia issued “border cards” that let holders crisscross at will. Now, Colombia says it detects about 3,000 false border cards at entry points daily.

      Despite tougher patrols along the porous, 2,200-km border, officials say it is impossible to secure outright. “It’s like trying to empty the ocean with a bucket,” said Mauricio Franco, a municipal official in charge of security in Cucuta, a nearby city.

      And it’s not just a matter of rounding up undocumented travelers.

      Powerful criminal groups, long in control of contraband commerce across the border, are now getting their cut of human traffic. Javier Barrera, a colonel in charge of police in Cucuta, said the Gulf Clan and Los Rastrojos, notorious syndicates that operate nationwide, are both involved.

      During a recent Reuters visit to several illegal crossings, Venezuelans carried cardboard, limes and car batteries as barter instead of using the bolivar, their near-worthless currency.

      Migrants pay as much as about $16 for the passage. Maikel, the arrastrador, said smugglers then pay gang operatives about $3 per migrant.

      For his crossing, Leal, the baker, carried a torn backpack and small duffel bag. His 2015 Venezuelan ID shows a healthier and happier man – before Leal began skimping on breakfast and dinner because he couldn’t afford them.

      He rested under a tree, but fretted about Colombian police. “I’m scared because the “migra” comes around,” he said, using the same term Mexican and Central American migrants use for border police in the United States.

      It doesn’t get easier as migrants move on.

      Even if relatives wired money, transfer agencies require a legally stamped passport to collect it. Bus companies are rejecting undocumented passengers to avoid fines for carrying them. A few companies risk it, but charge a premium of as much as 20 percent, according to several bus clerks near the border.

      The Sulbaran family walked and hitched some 1200 km to the Andean town of Santiago, where they have relatives. The father toured garages, but found no work.

      “People said no, others were scared,” said Narvaez, the mother. “Some Venezuelans come to Colombia to do bad things. They think we’re all like that.”

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-insight/fleeing-hardship-at-home-venezuelan-migrants-struggle-abroad-too-idUSKCN1MP

      Avec ce commentaire de #Reece_Jones:

      People continue to flee Venezuela, now often resorting to #smugglers as immigration restrictions have increased

      #passeurs #fermeture_des_frontières

    • ’No more camps,’ Colombia tells Venezuelans not to settle in tent city

      Francis Montano sits on a cold pavement with her three children, all their worldly possessions stuffed into plastic bags, as she pleads to be let into a new camp for Venezuelan migrants in the Colombian capital, Bogota.

      Behind Montano, smoke snakes from woodfires set amid the bright yellow tents which are now home to hundreds of Venezuelans, erected on a former soccer pitch in a middle-class residential area in the west of the city.

      The penniless migrants, some of the millions who have fled Venezuela’s economic and social crisis, have been here more than a week, forced by city authorities to vacate a makeshift slum of plastic tarps a few miles away.

      The tent city is the first of its kind in Bogota. While authorities have established camps at the Venezuelan border, they have resisted doing so in Colombia’s interior, wary of encouraging migrants to settle instead of moving to neighboring countries or returning home.

      Its gates are guarded by police and officials from the mayor’s office and only those registered from the old slum are allowed access.

      “We’ll have to sleep on the street again, under a bridge,” said Montano, 22, whose children are all under seven years old. “I just want a roof for my kids at night.”

      According to the United Nations, an estimated 3 million Venezuelans have fled as their oil-rich country has sunk into crisis under President Nicolas Maduro. Critics accuse the Socialist leader of ravaging the economy through state interventions while clamping down on political opponents.

      The exodus - driven by violence, hyperinflation and shortages of food and medicines - amounts to one in 12 of the population, placing strain on neighboring countries, already struggling with poverty.

      Colombia, which has borne the brunt of the migration crisis, estimates it is sheltering 1 million Venezuelans, with some 3,000 arriving daily. The government says their total numbers could swell to 4 million by 2021, costing it nearly $9 billion a year.

      Municipal authorities in Bogota say the camp will provide shelter for 422 migrants through Christmas. Then in mid January, it will be dismantled in the hope jobs and new lodgings have been found.


      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-colombia/no-more-camps-colombia-tells-venezuelans-not-to-settle-in-tent-city-idUSKCN

      #camps #camps_de_réfugiés #tentes #Bogotá #Bogotà

    • Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America

      As more than 3 million Venezuelans have fled a rapidly collapsing economy, severe food and medical shortages, and political strife, neighboring countries—the primary recipients of these migrants—have responded with creativity and pragmatism. This policy brief explores how governments in South America, Central America, and Mexico have navigated decisions about whether and how to facilitate their entry and residence. It also examines challenges on the horizon as few Venezuelans will be able to return home any time soon.

      Across Latin America, national legal frameworks are generally open to migration, but few immigration systems have been built to manage movement on this scale and at this pace. For example, while many countries in the region have a broad definition of who is a refugee—criteria many Venezuelans fit—only Mexico has applied it in considering Venezuelans’ asylum cases. Most other Latin American countries have instead opted to use existing visa categories or migration agreements to ensure that many Venezuelans are able to enter legally, and some have run temporary programs to regularize the status of those already in the country.

      Looking to the long term, there is a need to decide what will happen when temporary statuses begin to expire. And with the crisis in Venezuela and the emigration it has spurred ongoing, there are projections that as many as 5.4 million Venezuelans may be abroad by the end of 2019. Some governments have taken steps to limit future Venezuelan arrivals, and some receiving communities have expressed frustration at the strain put on local service providers and resources. To avoid widespread backlash and to facilitate the smooth integration of Venezuelans into local communities, policymakers must tackle questions ranging from the provision of permanent status to access to public services and labor markets. Done well, this could be an opportunity to update government processes and strengthen public services in ways that benefit both newcomers and long-term residents.

      https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan-migrants-latin-america

    • Venezuela: Millions at risk, at home and abroad

      Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and is not engulfed in war. Yet its people have been fleeing on a scale and at a rate comparable in recent memory only to Syrians at the height of the civil war and the Rohingya from Myanmar.

      As chronicled by much of our reporting collected below, some three to four million people have escaped the economic meltdown since 2015 and tried to start afresh in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This exodus has placed enormous pressure on the region; several governments have started making it tougher for migrants to enter and find jobs.

      The many millions more who have stayed in Venezuela face an acute humanitarian crisis denied by their own government: pervasive hunger, the resurgence of disease, an absence of basic medicines, and renewed political uncertainty.

      President Nicolás Maduro has cast aside outside offers of aid, framing them as preludes to a foreign invasion and presenting accusations that the United States is once again interfering in Latin America.

      Meanwhile, the opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, has invited in assistance from the US and elsewhere.

      As aid becomes increasingly politicised, some international aid agencies have chosen to sit on the sidelines rather than risk their neutrality. Others run secretive and limited operations inside Venezuela that fly under the media radar.

      Local aid agencies, and others, have had to learn to adapt fast and fill the gaps as the Venezuelan people grow hungrier and sicker.

      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2019/02/21/venezuela-millions-risk-home-and-abroad
      #cartographie #visualisation

    • Leaving Home Through a Darkened Border

      I’m sitting on the edge of a boat on the shore of the Grita river, a few kilometers from the Unión bridge. The border between San Antonio del Tachira (Venezuela) and Cucuta (Colombia), one of the most active in Latin America, is tense, dark and uneasy. I got there on a bus from Merida, at around 4:00 a.m., and people were commenting, between WhatsApp messages and audios, that Maduro had opened the border, closed precisely the last time I went through in a violent haze.

      Minutes after I got off the bus, I could see hundreds standing in an impossible queue for the Venezuelan immigration office, at Boca de Grita. Coyotes waited on motorbikes, telling people how much cheaper and faster it’d be if they paid to cross through the side trail. I approached the first motorbike I saw, paid 7,000 Colombian pesos (a little over $2) and sleepily made my way through the wet, muddy paths down to the river.
      Challenge 1: From Merida to the border

      Fuel shortages multiplied the bus fares to the border in less than a month; the few buses that can still make the trip are already malfunctioning. The lonely, dark roads are hunting grounds for pirates, who throw rocks at car windows or set up spikes on the pavement to blow tires. Kidnapping or robberies follow.

      The bus I was in stopped several times when the driver saw a particularly dark path ahead. He waited for the remaining drivers traveling that night to join him and create a small fleet, more difficult to attack. The criminals are after what travelers carry: U.S. dollars, Colombian pesos, Peruvian soles, gold, jewelry (which Venezuelans trade at the border for food or medicine, or a ride to Peru or Chile). “It’s a bad sign to find a checkpoint without soldiers,” the co-driver said, as he got off to stretch his legs. “We’ll stop here because it’s safe; we’ll get robbed up ahead.” Beyond the headlights, the road was lost in dusk. This trip usually takes five hours, but this time it took seven, with all the stops and checkpoints along the way.
      Challenge 2: Across the river from Venezuela to Colombia

      Reaching the river, I noticed how things had changed since the last time I visited. There was no trace of the bottles with smuggled fuel, barrels, guards or even containers over the boats. In fact, there weren’t even that many boats, just the one, small and light, pushed by a man with a wooden stick through muddy waters. I was the only passenger.

      The paracos (Colombian paramilitaries) were in a good mood. Their logic is simple: if Maduro opened the border, lots of people would try to cross, but since many couldn’t go through the bridge due to the expensive bribes demanded by the Venezuelan National Guard and immigration agents, this would be a good day for trafficking.

      The shortage of fuel in states like Tachira, Merida and Zulia destroyed their smuggling of incredibly cheap Venezuelan fuel to Colombia, and controlling the irregular crossings is now the most lucrative business. Guerrillas and paracos have been at it for a while, but now Venezuelan pro-Maduro colectivos, deployed in Tachira in February to repress protests, took over the human trafficking with gunfire, imposing a new criminal dynamic where, unlike Colombian paramilitaries, they assault and rob Venezuelan migrants.

      A woman arrives on a motorbike almost half an hour after me, and comes aboard. “Up there, they’re charging people with large suitcases between 15,000 and 20,000 pesos. It’s going to be really hard to cross today. People will grow tired, and eventually they’ll come here. They’re scared because they’ve heard stories, but everything’s faster here.”

      Her reasoning is that of someone who has grown accustomed to human trafficking, who uses these crossings every day. Perhaps she’s missing the fact that, in such a critical situation as Venezuela’s in 2019, most people can no longer pay to cross illegally and, if they have some money, they’d rather use it to bribe their way through the bridge. The binational Unión bridge, 60 km from Cucuta, isn’t that violent, making it the preferred road for families, pregnant women and the elderly.

      Coyotes get three more people on the boat, the boatman sails into the river, turns on the rudimentary diesel engine and, in a few minutes, we’re on the other side. It’s not dawn yet and I’m certain this is going to be a very long day.

      “I hope they remove those containers from the border,” an old man coming from Trujillo with a prescription for insulin tells me. “I’m sure they’ve started already.” After the failed attempt to deliver humanitarian aid in February, the crossing through the bridges was restricted to all pedestrians and only in a few exceptions a medical patient could be let through (after paying the bribe). The rest still languishes on the Colombian side.
      Challenge 3: Joining the Cucuta crowd

      I finally reach Cucuta and six hours later, mid-afternoon, I meet with American journalist Joshua Collins at the Simón Bolívar bridge. According to local news, about 70,000 people are crossing it this Saturday alone.

      The difference with what I saw last time, reporting the Venezuela Live Aid concert, is astounding: the mass of Venezuelans lifts a cloud that covers everything with a yellowish, dirty and pale nimbus. The scorching desert sunlight makes everyone bow their heads while they push each other, crossing from one side to the other. There’s a stagnant, bitter smell in the air, a kind of musk made of filth, moisture and sweat.

      Joshua points to 20 children running barefoot and shirtless after cabs and vehicles. “Those kids wait here every day for people who want to cross in or out with packs of food and merchandise. They load it all on their shoulders with straps on around their heads.” These children, who should be in school or playing with their friends, are the most active carriers nowadays, working for paramilitaries and colectivos.

      The market (where you can buy and sell whatever you can think of) seems relegated to the background: what most people want right now is to cross, buy food and return before nightfall. The crowd writhes and merges. People shout and fight, frustrated, angry and ashamed. The Colombian police tries to help, but people move how they can, where they can. It’s unstoppable.

      The deepening of the complex humanitarian crisis in the west, plus the permanent shortage of gasoline, have impoverished migrants to a dangerous degree of vulnerability. Those who simply want to reach the border face obstacles like the absence of safe transportation and well-defined enemies, such as the human trafficking networks or the pro-Maduro criminal gangs controlling the roads now. The fear of armed violence in irregular crossings and the oppressive tendencies of the people controlling them, as well as the growing xenophobia of neighboring countries towards refugees, should be making many migrants wonder whether traveling on foot is a good idea at all.

      Although the border’s now open, the regime’s walls grow thicker for the poor. This might translate into new internal migrations within Venezuela toward areas less affected by the collapse of services, such as Caracas or the eastern part of the country, and perhaps the emergence of poor and illegal settlements in those forgotten lands where neither Maduro’s regime, nor Iván Duque’s government hold any jurisdiction.

      For now, who knows what’s going to happen? The sun sets over the border and a dense cloud of dust covers all of us.

      https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/06/11/leaving-home-through-a-darkened-border

  • La “guerra del carbone”, al confine tra Polonia e Repubblica Ceca

    La centrale elettrica e la miniera di #Turów, in Polonia, sorgono in mezzo alle case del comune di #Bogatynia. Ma le conseguenze sull’ambiente si fanno sentire anche nel Paese vicino. Fino al 2019 la miniera sarà assicurata dall’Italiana #Generali. Che oggi, durante l’assemblea dei soci, ha visto la presenza di un gruppo di “azionisti critici”


    https://altreconomia.it/carbone-polonia-repubblica-ceca
    #charbon #Pologne #République_Tchèque #mines #énergie #centrale_électrique #environnement #pollution
    via @albertocampiphoto

  • La libertà passa dai capelli

    Colombia tra pace e guerriglia, ma Colombia anche tra passato e futuro, tra tradizione e creatività. Il tutto, da 10 anni, a Bogotà.

    Un gruppo di donne ha fatto del taglio dei capelli uno strumento di cambiamento sociale, in un contesto di guerra. Lo ha fatto nel centro storico di #Bogotà e l’esprienza dura ormai da dieci anni.

    Formatasi nel campo della pubblicità, #Melissa_Paerez ha cominciato a tagliare i capelli agli amici quasi per gioco, durante un soggiorno linguistico a Londra. E col tempo quel gioco è diventato la sua passione e il suo mestiere. Di ritorno a Bogotà, nel 2008 ha così aperto un salone nel centro storico, la Candelaria, dove per principio le parrucchiere sono artiste e non devono avere alcuna formazione specifica.

    Forbici alla mano, senza specchi né modelli, le giovani donne della «Peluqueria» trasformano le teste dei clienti in piccole opere d’arte, con l’obiettivo di spingerli ad uscire dalla logica paralizzante della guerra. In Colombia, la cultura è d’altronde sempre stata un’arma di resistenza per una parte della popolazione e oggi Bogotà è considerata tra le città più creative dell’America latina.

    Ad oltre un anno dalla firma degli accordi di pace, la Colombia non ha però ancora voltato la pagina del conflitto. Se le FARC hanno effettivamente deposto le armi, i negoziati con l’altra principale guerriglia - l’ELN (Esercito di liberazione nazionale) - sono in fase di stallo, e diversi gruppi eredi del paramilitarismo continuano a seminare sangue e terrore. Nei soli mesi di gennaio e febbraio sono stati assassinati oltre 40 difensori dei diritti umani. Un livello di violenza che ricorda gli anni bui del conflitto, con l’aggravante che oggi poco o nulla si sa sugli autori di questi crimini e sulle loro motivazioni.

    L’accordo di pace con le FARC è inoltre appeso a un filo. Da un lato perché il governo non ha ancora implementato alcuni dei punti centrali dell’intesa, come la riforma agraria che permetterebbe alle vittime di recuperare le proprie terre o le misure di reinserimento sociale previste per gli ex guerriglieri. Dall’altro perché, dopo le legislative dell’11 marzo, il 27 maggio si terranno le elezioni presidenziali e se a vincere sarà la destra vicina all’ex presidente Alvaro Uribe, l’accordo potrebbe essere rivisto al ribasso, con il rischio che parte delle FARC decida di riprendere le armi.

    https://www.rsi.ch/news/oltre-la-news/La-libert%C3%A0-passa-dai-capelli-10236176.html
    #cheveux #Colombie #femmes #liberté

    Un reportage audio de @stesummi

  • Merci du signalement, ton #Bug peut attendre…
    https://framablog.org/2018/03/26/merci-du-signalement-ton-bug-peut-attendre

    Magnus Manske est un développeur inconnu du grand public, on lui doit pourtant des contributions nombreuses et décisives pour le développement initial de #Wikipédia, sa #maintenance continue et son ingénierie, au point que les wikipédiens célèbrent chaque 25 janvier le … Lire la suite­­

    #Libres_Logiciels #Libres_Services #bénévole #Bogue #Code #Developpement #Libre #problème

  • Serbia: ero straniero e mi avete accolto

    In Serbia risiedono quasi 8.000 tra rifugiati, richiedenti asilo e migranti. Di questi circa 4.000 sono ospitati in 18 centri tra i quali quello di #Bogovadja. Il racconto di una volontaria italiana che vi lavora dal mese di luglio

    https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Serbia/Serbia-ero-straniero-e-mi-avete-accolto-183430
    #Serbie #migrations #réfugiés #asile

    • Effectivement, d’après ton article le problème du phishing ne semble pas vraiment au niveau des URLs... :

      Mais le problème n’est pas dans l’existence d’homographes. Il est dans le fait que ce problème n’a rien à voir avec le hameçonnage. Je reçois beaucoup de rapports de hameçonnage au bureau et aucun ne dépend jamais d’homographes. La plupart du temps, le hameçonneur ne fait aucun effort pour que l’URL soit vraisemblable : il utilise un nom comme durand.monfai.net, voire une adresse IP. Et pour cause, très peu d’utilisateurs vérifient la barre d’adresse de leur navigateur, ne serait-ce que parce qu’ils ne comprennent pas ce qu’elle contient et qu’ils n’ont eu aucune formation sur les noms de domaines. Le hameçonneur, escroc rationnel, ne se fatigue donc pas.

  • The protocol-relative URL - Paul Irish
    https://www.paulirish.com/2010/the-protocol-relative-url

    L’astuce pour requeter des ressources hors domaine depuis un site en httpS
    <img src=’//domain.com/img/logo.png’>
    et
    .omgomg { background : url(//domain.net/image.gif) ;}

    #https #astuce #ressource_externe

    #bogue_seenthis : mettre le code src=//domain.com/img/logo.png avec l’URL entre guillemets doubles provoque son remplacement en https: //seenthis.net///domain.com/img/logo.png