• Gaspacho de pied de brocoli
    https://cuisine-libre.fr/gaspacho-de-pied-de-brocoli

    Après avoir utilisé les fleurettes dans une autre recette, épluchez bien le pied de #Brocoli pour enlever les parties dures et fibreuses. Coupez en tranches de ½ cm d’épaisseur pour qu’il cuise plus vite. Dans une casserole, couvrir les brocolis d’eau. Ajouter une gousse d’ail pelée et une pincée de sel. Cuire 20 min à feu moyen jusqu’à ce que les brocolis soient bien tendres. Laisser refroidir. Quand la préparation est froide ajouter une cuillère à soupe de concentré de tomates, une cuillère à soupe… Brocoli, #Gaspachos / #Végétarien, #Sans œuf, #Sans gluten, Végétalien (vegan), #Sans lactose, #Sans viande, #Bouilli

    #Végétalien_vegan_

  • Another terror attack on local communities by Okomu Oil Palm Plantation Plc
    https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/29694

    Report by Chief Ajele Sunday, Fiyewei (Spokesman) of Okomu Kingdom

    The case of Okomu Kingdom playing host to Okomu Oil Palm Plantation Plc has brought in its wake a myriad of problems; environmental despoliation, obnoxious act against the indigent population, excruciating poverty, unemployment, human rights violation, forceful eviction and imminent extermination of Okomu Kingdom and her people. The government of Edo State share joint responsibilities for these negative situation. Since they negotiated a contract that was faulty from the beginning and cannot be implemented without violating the rights of the Community people. Hence the company often boasts that it has a certificate of occupancy, therefore it can go on and on to destroy without any liability.

    Giving this background, this report aims to make public the dire situation the people of Okomu Kingdom are facing in the hand of Okomu Oil Palm Plantation Plc (OOPC).

    Just recently on the 20th of May 2020 another village Ijaw-Gbene in Okomu Kingdom was burnt down by the management of OOPC, lead by Mr Kingsley Adeyemi a security attached to OOPC.

    #industrie_palmiste #Nigeria #terres

  • Every house a sanctuary. Fighting displacement on all fronts in #Sunset_Park, #Brooklyn

    The right to housing has been a key focus for both immigrant rights and anti-gentrification activists in the United States. In this update, I highlight the ways in which these come together in the neighborhood of Sunset Park, Brooklyn, New York. In 2019, the neighborhood was specifically targeted in a series of raids by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement resulting in a rapid mobilization of existing anti-gentrification networks to protect those vulnerable. I argue that this mobilization and its success highlights contradictions in liberal, pro-immigrant rights discourses that ignore the increasing threat of gentrification in “sanctuary cities.” Recognizing and exploiting this contradiction provides a way forward for thinking about secure housing as a requirement for sanctuary.


    https://radicalhousingjournal.org/2020/every-house-a-sanctuary
    #sanctuary_city #logement #gentrification #résistance #luttes #migrations #villes-refuge #refuge #droit_au_logement #USA #convergence_des_luttes #Etats-Unis

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • #Homothérapies, #conversion_forcée

    Électrochocs, lobotomies frontales, « thérapies » hormonales… : dans les années 1970, aux États-Unis, la #dépsychiatrisation de l’homosexualité met progressivement fin à ces pratiques médicales inhumaines, tout en donnant naissance à des mouvements religieux qui prétendent « guérir » ce qu’elles considèrent comme un péché, une déviance inacceptable. Depuis, les plus actives de ces associations – les évangéliques d’Exodus ou les catholiques de Courage – ont essaimé sur tous les continents, à travers une logique de franchises. Bénéficiant d’une confortable notoriété aux États-Unis ou dans l’ultracatholique Pologne, ces réseaux œuvrent en toute discrétion en France et en Allemagne. Mais si les méthodes diffèrent, l’objectif reste identique : convertir les personnes homosexuelles à l’hétérosexualité ou, à défaut, les pousser à la continence. Comme Deb, fille d’évangélistes de l’Arkansas ouvertement homophobes, Jean-Michel Dunand, aujourd’hui animateur d’une communauté œcuménique homosensible et transgenre, a subi de traumatisantes séances d’exorcisme. De son côté, la Polonaise Ewa a été ballottée de messes de guérison en consultations chez un sexologue adepte des décharges électriques. Rongés par la honte et la culpabilité, tous ont souffert de séquelles psychiques graves : haine de soi, alcoolisme, dépression, tentation du suicide…

    Étayée par le travail de deux jeunes journalistes, dont l’un s’est infiltré dans des mouvements français – des rencontres façon Alcooliques anonymes de Courage aux séminaires estivaux de Torrents de vie, avec transes collectives au menu –, cette enquête sur les « thérapies de conversion » donne la parole à des victimes de cinq pays. Leurs témoignages, à la fois rares et bouleversants, mettent en lumière les conséquences dévastatrices de pratiques qui s’apparentent à des dérives sectaires. « Nous avons affaire à une espèce de psychothérapie sauvage qui peut amener à la destruction de la personnalité », affirme ainsi Serge Blisko, ancien président de la #Miviludes (Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires). En mars 2018, le Parlement européen a voté une résolution appelant les États membres à interdire ces prétendues thérapies. Jusqu’à maintenant, seul Malte a légiféré sur le sujet.


    https://boutique.arte.tv/detail/homotherapies_conversion_forcee
    #film #film_documentaire #documentaire
    #homophobie #LGBT #thérapie #église #Eglise #douleur #souffrance #rejet #choix #déviance #guérison #sexualité #genre #Exodus #thérapies_de_conversion #fondamentalisme_chrétien #maladie #Eglise_catholique #Eglise_évangélique #catholicisme #Les_Béatitudes #douleur #confession #communion_Béthanie #lobotomie #déviance #éradication #foi #Alan_Chambers #Desert_Streams #Living_Waters #Richard_Cohen #Alfie's_home #Journey_into_manhood #virilité #Brothers_Road #courage #Wüstenstrom #Günter_Baum #Torrents_de_vie #Andrew_Comiskey #masculinité #communauté_de_l'Emmanuel #David_et_Jonathan #homosexualité_transitionnelle #homosexualité_structurelle #homosexualité_accoutumance #pornographie #méthode_aversive #médecine #Bible #pêché #Père_Marek_Dziewiecki #compassion #culpabilité #haine #culpabilité_douce #violence #mépris #continence #résistance_à_la_tentation #tentation #responsabilité #vulnérabilité #instrumentalisation #exorcisme #démon #Gero_Winkelmann #violence_familiale #manipulation #secte #dérive_sectaire #dépression #business #honte #peur #suicide #justice #Darlen_Bogle

  • Sept thèses féministes sur le Covid-19 et la reproduction sociale – ACTA
    https://acta.zone/sept-theses-feministes-sur-le-covid-19-et-la-reproduction-sociale

    Cette pandémie, et la réponse qu’y donne la classe dirigeante, illustre de manière claire et tragique l’idée qui est au cœur de la théorie de la reproduction sociale : la production de la vie se plie aux exigences du profit.

    La capacité du capitalisme à produire son propre flux vital – le profit – dépend de la « production » quotidienne de travailleurs. Autrement dit, elle dépend du processus de création de la vie qu’il ne contrôle ou ne domine pas entièrement ni directement. Dans le même temps, la logique de l’accumulation exige de maintenir au plus bas tant les salaires que les impôts qui soutiennent la production et la préservation de la vie. Il s’agit là de la contradiction majeure qui est au cœur du capitalisme : il dénigre et sous-évalue précisément celles et ceux qui produisent la vraie richesse sociale : les infirmier·e·s et les autres personnels de santé, les ouvrier·e·s agricoles, les ouvrier·e·s des usines alimentaires, les employé·e·s des supermarchés et les livreur·se·s, les collecteur·trice·s de déchets, les enseignants·e·, celles et ceux qui s’occupent des enfants ou des personnes âgées. Ce sont les travailleuses1 racialisées, féminisées, que le capitalisme humilie et stigmatise en leur imposant des salaires bas et des conditions de travail souvent dangereuses. Pourtant, la pandémie actuelle montre clairement que notre société ne peut tout simplement pas survivre sans elles. La société ne peut pas non plus survivre avec des sociétés pharmaceutiques qui se font concurrence pour les profits et qui exploitent notre droit à rester en vie. Et il est évident que la « main invisible du marché » ne pourra pas créer et gérer l’infrastructure sanitaire planétaire dont la pandémie actuelle montre bien que l’humanité a besoin.

    #reproduction_sociale #féminisme #marxisme #féminisme_marxiste #Bhattacharya #Bromberg #Dimitrakaki #Farris #Ferguson #HM #covid_19

  • The Woman in Black

    The last judicial duel in France hinged on whether a woman could be believed.

    On a freezing December day in 1386, at an old priory in Paris that today is a museum of science and technology—a temple of human reason—an eager crowd of thousands gathered to watch two knights fight a duel to the death with lance and sword and dagger. A beautiful young noblewoman, dressed all in black and exposed to the crowd’s stares, anxiously awaited the outcome. The trial by combat would decide whether she had told the truth—and thus whether she would live or die. Like today, sexual assault and rape often went unpunished and even unreported in the Middle Ages. But a public accusation of rape, at the time a capital offense and often a cause for scandalous rumors endangering the honor of those involved, could have grave consequences for both accuser and accused, especially among the nobility.

    Marguerite de Carrouges, descended from an old and wealthy Norman family, had claimed that in January of that year she had been attacked and raped at her mother-in-law’s château by a squire (the rank below knighthood) named Jacques Le Gris, aided by one of his closest companions, one Adam Louvel. Marguerite’s father, Robert de Thibouville, had once betrayed the king of France, and some may have wondered whether this “traitor’s daughter” was in fact telling the truth.

    Marguerite’s husband, Sir Jean de Carrouges, a reputedly jealous and violent man—whose once close friendship with Le Gris had soured in recent years amid court rivalry and a protracted dispute over land—was traveling at the time of the alleged crime. But when he returned a few days later and heard his wife’s story, he angrily brought charges against Le Gris in the court of Count Pierre of Alençon, overlord to both men. Le Gris was the count’s favorite and his administrative right hand. A large and powerful man, Le Gris was well educated and very wealthy, though from an only recently ennobled family. He also had a reputation as a seducer—or worse. But the count, infuriated by the accusation against his favorite, declared at a legal hearing that Marguerite “must have dreamed it” and summarily dismissed the charges, ordering that “no further questions ever be raised about it.”

    Carrouges, without whom his wife could not even bring a case, resolutely rode off to Paris to appeal for justice to the king. A 1306 royal decree based on ancient precedent allowed the duel as a last resort for nobles involved in capital cases—e.g., murder, treason, and rape—but by now judicial duels were extremely rare. That July, at the old royal palace on the Île de la Cité, the knight formally challenged the squire, throwing down the gauntlet, as witnessed by the young Charles VI, many other royals, and the magistrates of the Parlement of Paris, the nation’s highest court.

    The challenge did not lead directly to a duel, however, but marked the start of a formal investigation by the Parlement, which would authorize a duel only if unable to reach a verdict on the basis of the available evidence. Over the next several months, famous lawyers were hired, witnesses were summoned, and testimony was gathered. Marguerite herself—now pregnant, perhaps as a result of the rape—came to Paris and testified in great detail about the alleged attack by Le Gris and his accomplice. “I fought him so desperately,” she claimed, “that he shouted to Louvel to come back and help him. They pinned me down and stuffed a capucium [a hood] over my mouth to silence me. I thought I was going to suffocate, and soon I couldn’t fight them anymore. Le Gris raped me.”

    Le Gris countered with a detailed alibi for not just the day in question but the entire week, calling numerous witnesses to establish his whereabouts in or near another town some twenty-five miles away. Le Gris’ attorney, the highly respected Jean Le Coq, kept notes in Latin that still survive, allowing us a glimpse into attorney-client discussions. Le Coq seems to have had some doubts about his client’s truthfulness, while admitting that this was the thorniest of “he said, she said” cases. Despite the lady’s many oaths, and those of the squire, he confided to his journal, “No one really knew the truth of the matter.”

    Photograph of Northern League leader Umberto Bossi smoking in his car, by Pier Marco Tacca, 2006.

    Northern League leader Umberto Bossi smoking in his car, Pavia, Italy, 2006. Photograph by Pier Marco Tacca. © Pier Marco Tacca / Getty Images.

    The Parlement ultimately failed to reach a verdict, and in September it officially ordered a trial by combat, where—in theory—God would assure a just outcome. If Carrouges won the duel, the couple would go free, their claims vindicated. But if Marguerite’s husband and champion lost, thus “proving” her accusation to be false, she too would be put to death. And not just any death. In accord with ancient tradition, she would be burned alive as a false accuser.

    By now the case had become a cause célèbre. The entire royal court was gossiping about the rape, the trial, and the likelihood of a duel. Beyond the court the dispute was being spoken of “as far as the most distant parts of the kingdom,” according to the chronicler Jean Frois­sart. News back then traveled, archival research has shown, at the rate of an average day’s journey by horseback: about thirty miles per day. Word of the scandalous affair spread far and wide via merchants, soldiers, itinerant clergy, and others who carried the latest tidings along the rutted roads to far-flung towns and villages.

    The mortal combat, set for December 29, promised to be the season’s highlight in the capital, as thousands of Parisians flocked to see it, and the young king and his court took their places in colorful viewing stands set up alongside the field at the monastery of Saint-Martin-des-Champs. Froissart portrays Marguerite, who had recently given birth to a son, praying to the Virgin as she anxiously awaits her fate. “I do not know,” he adds in a poignant aside, “for I never spoke with her, whether she had not often regretted having gone so far with the matter that she and her husband were in such grave danger—and then finally there was nothing for it but to await the outcome.”

    After many preliminary ceremonies decreed by tradition (an arms inspection, a series of solemn oaths, the requisite dubbing of Le Gris as a knight to make the combatants equal in rank, etc.), the duel began as a joust on horseback, with lances. The two combatants “sat their horses very prettily,” writes Froissart, “for both were skilled in arms. And the lords of France delighted to see it, for they had come to watch the two men fight.” Besides the resolution to a deadlocked legal case, the duel also provided eagerly anticipated blood sport for the nobility.

    After dismounting, Carrouges and Le Gris fought on foot with swords, “both very valiantly.” But Le Gris managed to get within Carrouges’ defenses and wound him in the thigh. “All who loved him were in a great fright,” adds the chronicler in what is the narrative equivalent of a cinematic reaction shot.

    Although now losing blood, Carrouges mounted a daring counterattack and “fought on so stoutly” that he managed to throw his opponent to the ground. Other accounts provide more technical detail, even suggesting that Le Gris slipped on his opponent’s blood. Froissart says simply that Carrouges “felled” his opponent and, “thrusting his sword into his body, killed him on the spot.”

    With the duel concluded, Froissart continues, “Jacques Le Gris’ body was delivered to the executioner of Paris, who dragged it to Montfaucon and hung it there.” For months afterward, at the great stone gibbet on the infamous hilltop outside the city’s northern gates, this grisly sight greeted any townsman or traveler passing by. The moral was plain: Le Gris rose in the world and then suddenly fell, he dominated but finally was vanquished, he committed a crime in secret and was publicly exposed. In the end the city expelled the contagion, and the body politic was cleansed.

    T
    he contest between Carrouges and Le Gris would turn out to be the last judicial duel sanctioned by the Parlement of Paris. In the six centuries after the quarrel ended, however, the moral that was to be derived from it changed considerably. Many skeptics—including chroniclers, historians, partisans, and even historical novelists—have cast doubt on the official verdict. Some have echoed Count Pierre’s dismissive decree, saying that Marguerite made it all up, perhaps to cover up an affair with another man. Some have suggested that her husband forced the story out of her to avenge himself on Le Gris, his former friend turned rival at court. And some, invoking the most popular theory, acknowledge the rape but say that Marguerite mistakenly accused the wrong man, an “honest” but tragic error that robbed Le Gris of his life, fortune, and good name.

    The theory of mistaken identity ultimately derives from two sources that began circulating more than a decade after the duel. The earlier of the two is the Saint-Denis Chronicle, an official royal history by the monk Michel Pintoin probably written around 1400. It states that Le Gris’ innocence “was later recognized by all, for a man condemned to death by the law confessed to having committed the heinous crime. When the lady learned this and realized that the error was her fault, she retreated to a convent after her husband’s death, vowing perpetual chastity.”

    It is one thing to slander, another to accuse.
    —Marcus Tullius Cicero, 56 BC

    A similar report with a significant difference of detail appears in Jean Juvénal des Ursins’ Histoire de Charles VI, written no earlier than the 1420s and perhaps closer to 1430. Born in 1388, two years after the fatal duel, Juvénal, a bishop, wrote at an even greater remove in time and may have been influenced by Pintoin’s account. He likewise claims that Marguerite had been deceived about her attacker’s identity, although the supposed “truth” comes out under rather different circumstances: “Later it was discovered that [Le Gris] had not really done it, but that it had been done by another, who died of illness in his bed and, at the moment of death, confessed before others that he had done the deed.”

    One ground for skepticism about these two reports—apart from their priestly sources, notoriously suspicious of women—is that each tells a substantially different story. One identifies the supposed felon as a condemned man about to be executed, the other as a sick man on his deathbed. And one includes the lady’s penitential retreat to a convent, while the other omits this finale. Furthermore, neither report has ever been independently corroborated, although the existence of two such reports, despite their differing details, may have allowed each to vouch for the other in the minds of those eager to believe them.

    The earlier, more detailed account of the supposed confession, in Pintoin’s chronicle, not only differs from the other but also diverges sharply from Marguerite’s official testimony before the Parlement in ways that make its scenario clearly impossible. According to Pintoin, Marguerite and her assailant dined together before the attack, and it was while showing him to his room for the night that he assaulted her. These details are wholly at odds with Marguerite’s court testimony about her assailant’s daytime visit, whose timing (if not its specific allegations) was corroborated by her mother-in-law’s departure that morning and her return a few hours later that same day. In his alibi, Le Gris himself cited the narrow window of time available for his alleged visit, strictly during daylight hours. And even if the assailant, as Pintoin claims, had actually (and contra the actual testimony) made his visit late in the day, it’s wholly unlikely that Marguerite, who must have been very familiar with her husband’s complaints against the squire, would have offered a meal and overnight lodging to her husband’s rival (or to a man she mistook for the same), especially during her husband’s absence.

    Centuries later the story of the “innocent” Le Gris falsely accused and forced to defend himself in a barbaric and unjust trial by combat was further popularized by Enlightenment thinkers. Diderot’s Encyclopédie and Voltaire’s Histoire du Parlement de Paris used the 1386 affair to denounce the supposed ignorance and cruelty of the Middle Ages. By the early nineteenth century, the notion that it all had been a case of mistaken identity was firmly established, as typified in an 1824 retelling by Norman historian and politician Louis Du Bois, who “explains” the supposed miscarriage of justice by speculating that the actual rapist “was a squire who doubtless bore some resemblance to the unfortunate Le Gris.”

    The mistaken-identity theory was also embraced abroad, as by American historian Henry Charles Lea, who in his influential 1866 study of medieval law, Superstition and Force, stated as a matter of fact that “Le Gris was subsequently proved innocent by the deathbed confession of the real offender.” Lea even faulted Froissart for having omitted any mention of the confession.

    Man with the Moneybag and Flatterers, by Pieter Brueghel the Younger, c. 1592. © HIP / Art Resource, NY.

    Man with the Moneybag and Flatterers, by Pieter Brueghel the Younger, c. 1592. © HIP / Art Resource, NY.

    A century and more after the philosophes had popularized the theory, it solidified as hard fact in authoritative encyclopedias. In an entry on duels, the Grand dictionnaire universel (1866–77), overseen by respected editor Pierre Larousse, describes the 1386 affair as “one of the most remarkable” in history, claiming that the wide belief in its injustice helped to bring the custom of trial by combat to a speedy end. The article offers a garbled, error-strewn version where, “in 1385,” Le Gris was accused of attacking the lady “by night,” with “his face masked,” as she awaited her husband’s return from the Holy Land. After the fatal duel, the “truth” comes out: “Sometime later, a criminal on the point of atoning for his other crimes confessed that he was guilty of the odious act of which Le Gris had been accused. This cruel error moved the Parlement to systematically reject all appeals for the duel…This was the end of judicial combat.”

    A similar story is retailed by the famed eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1910–11), which likewise gives the erroneous date of 1385 and has the rapist attacking the lady by night, although here “in the guise of her husband” as she awaits his return from the Crusades—an implausible bed trick recalling the story of Martin Guerre. The denouement, too, echoes the Grande dictionnaire: “Not long after, a criminal arrested for some other offense confessed himself to be the author of the outrage. No institution could long survive so open a confutation, and it was annulled by the Parlement.”

    Popular historical fiction abetted the theory of mistaken identity, exploiting its shock effect. An elaborate example appeared in 1829, just a few years after Du Bois’ conjecture that the accused squire had been mistaken for a look-alike, in L’historial du jongleur, an anonymous collection of “medieval” tales. The forty-page story “Le jugement de Dieu” begins with throngs of excited, gossiping Parisians arriving at Saint-Martin’s field to watch the long-awaited duel. As might be expected, the deadly trial by combat before the huge crowd of spectators unfolds with genuine drama and suspense. But then, just moments after Carrouges has killed Le Gris on the battlefield, a dusty courier rides up with the astounding news that another man has confessed to the crime—news that is now too late to save the innocent Le Gris. What sets this version apart, besides its unusual length, is how quickly the judicial “error” on the battlefield is revealed by the sudden arrival of the “truth.” Rather than a belated discovery taking many years—as in the chronicles—it’s just a matter of minutes from Le Gris’ death to the “proof” of his innocence.

    A
    part from the dubious, sketchy, and inconsistent reports in the two chronicles, no external evidence for this hazy legend has ever been offered in support of the oft-told tale of a last-minute confession by the “true” culprit. It’s strange that so many authorities seem to have been untroubled by the obvious factual errors in these reports, their mutual inconsistencies, or the lack of any corroborating evidence. If there are reasons for believing in the possibility of Le Gris’ innocence, the doubtful story of a belated confession by another man certainly is not and never has been one of them.

    Despite the claims of naysayers and novelizers, Marguerite’s testimony suggests that she was almost certainly not mistaken about the identity of her attackers. That testimony takes up nearly a thousand words of Latin in the Parlement’s official summary of the case, preserved today at the Archives Nationales, on the Right Bank, in the Marais, a short walk from the old priory where the battle unfolded on that cold winter day.

    Marguerite testified repeatedly under oath that on a certain day in January 1386—Thursday the eighteenth—she was attacked by the two men, Le Gris and Louvel. This happened, she said, in the morning hours at the modest château of her widowed mother-in-law, Nicole de Carrouges, on a remote Normandy estate known as Capomesnil, about twelve miles southwest of Lisieux. At the time of the attack, Jean de Carrouges was away on a trip to Paris from which he would return a few days later. Nicole, in whose care Jean had left his wife, was also absent for part of the day in question, having been called away on legal business to the nearby abbey town of Saint-Pierre. Marguerite claimed that Nicole took with her nearly all of the household servants, including a maidservant whom Jean had specifically instructed never to leave Marguerite’s side, thus leaving Marguerite “virtually alone.”

    Marguerite also testified that Adam Louvel was the first to arrive at the château, and that he began his visit by urging her to ask her husband to extend the term of an outstanding loan for one hundred gold francs. Louvel then added a greeting from Jacques Le Gris, who he said “greatly admired her” and was eager to speak with her. Marguerite replied that she had no wish to speak with Le Gris, and that Louvel should stop his overtures at once.

    The Murder of Patrona Halil and His Fellow Rebels, by Jean Baptiste Vanmour, c. 1730. Rijksmuseum.

    At this point Le Gris himself suddenly entered the château’s hall (aulam, probably referring to the main chamber or “great hall” where guests were typically received). Greeting Marguerite, he declared that she was “the lady of all the land,” that he loved her the most and would do anything for her. When Marguerite told Le Gris that he must not speak to her in this way, he seized her by the hand, forced her to sit down beside him on a bench, and told her that he knew all about her husband’s recent money troubles, offering to pay her well. When Marguerite adamantly refused his offer, saying she had no wish for his money, the violence escalated.

    The two men seized her by the arms and legs, she testified, and dragged her up a nearby stairway, while she struggled and shouted for help. Forced into an upstairs bedroom, she tried to escape by running through a door at the other end of the room but was blocked from doing so by Le Gris. The squire then threw her onto a bed but could not hold her down without help from Louvel, who rushed back into the room on Le Gris’ orders to help his friend subdue and finally rape Marguerite. She continued shouting for help, she says, until silenced by Le Gris’ hood.

    As noted in the 1850s by the Norman historian Alfred de Caix, one of the few to credit her story, Marguerite’s testimony is impressively “circumstantial and detailed.” Certain details in her account raise serious problems for the mistaken-identity theory. In particular, Marguerite testified that she saw both men in the light of day, that Louvel specifically mentioned Le Gris by name before the latter appeared shortly afterward, and that she spoke with both men at some length before they attacked her. Marguerite’s claim that Louvel mentioned Le Gris by name is especially telling, for it is hard to fit this detail into a plausible scenario in which she is genuinely mistaken, as many have claimed she was, about the identity of her assailants, particularly Le Gris.

    In his own defense, Le Gris claimed that Nicole had found nothing amiss upon her return and didn’t believe her daughter-in-law’s later allegations. In court, he also claimed to have seen Marguerite only twice in his entire life: during the Parlement’s official inquiry, and also “not less than two years earlier” at a social gathering at the home of a mutual friend, Jean Crespin, where Carrouges and Le Gris apparently put aside their recent quarrels and Carrouges ordered his wife to kiss Le Gris as a sign of renewed friendship.

    So the mistaken-identity theory has in its favor Marguerite’s relative unfamiliarity with Le Gris’ physical appearance at the time of the alleged rape in January 1386, over a year after Marguerite had first met and seen Le Gris at Crespin’s. Still, the theory cannot plausibly account for Louvel’s having named Le Gris while in conversation with Marguerite. Louvel’s naming of Le Gris just prior to the squire’s own arrival would seem to put Le Gris indisputably there—unless Marguerite’s story was a deliberate fabrication.

    It’s also significant that the Parlement of Paris found Marguerite’s story credible enough to vacate Count Pierre’s official exoneration of Le Gris and to authorize the rare judicial duel, whose official purpose, however doubtful the procedure may seem today, was to determine the truth in cases where witness testimony and other evidence was insufficient for reaching a verdict. Marguerite’s story must have seemed at least plausible to the magistrates who ordered the duel, something the Parlement had not done for over thirty years in a rape case.

    I
    f the mistaken-identity theory is wrong, that forces us back onto the sharp horns of a dilemma: Was Marguerite lying, or was she telling the truth? The view that Marguerite was lying—a conjecture unsupported by any evidence, apart from Le Gris’ dubious alibi—holds either that she concocted the rape story herself, perhaps to cover an adultery, or that it was extorted from her by her opportunistic husband in order to avenge himself on his rival. The latter explanation is the very one that Le Gris put forward in his own defense, and it has been echoed by at least one modern historian as recently as 1992. In his book Tales of the Marriage Bed from Medieval France, R.C. Famiglietti claimed that Carrouges, after learning that Marguerite had been raped, “resolved to turn the rape to his advantage” and “forced his wife to agree to accuse Jacques of having been the man who raped her.” In this view, Marguerite accused the wrong man not in honest error but in knowing collusion (or fearful compliance) with her husband. And her court testimony is reduced to nothing more than her husband’s “script”—as Famiglietti calls it—for destroying his hated rival.

    A bad reputation is easy to come by, painful to bear, and difficult to clear.
    —Hesiod, 700 BC

    The fly in this ointment is another aspect of Marguerite’s testimony that has not been given due attention—namely, the inclusion of Adam Louvel in the criminal charges. Given the absence of any witnesses in her own favor, Marguerite’s accusations against Louvel were a gratuitous and risky addition to her testimony if her story of the attack and rape was indeed a deliberate lie. The more complicated her story, the more vulnerable it was to challenge; including Adam Louvel in the charges simply added to her burden of proof. Only Le Gris’ alibi survives in the court records, but if Louvel had separate witnesses who placed him elsewhere at the time of the crime, their testimony would have exonerated Le Gris as well, just as Le Gris’ alibi would have helped exonerate Louvel. Two separate alibis are harder to disprove than one. And two suspects are harder to convict than one, unless they can be turned against each other. Yet Adam Louvel reportedly confessed to nothing, not even under torture. But if Marguerite’s story is true and Le Gris was guilty as charged, why did the squire increase his risk of being found out by bringing an accomplice in the first place?

    This tangled and still-controversial case leaves many tantalizing questions, not least of all why Jacques Le Gris did it, if indeed he did. And if the Parlement of Paris could not establish even the basic facts, there’s little chance of our discovering hidden motives all of these centuries later. But the doubts greeting Marguerite’s scandalous story, the initial rejection of her claims in court, and the shadow cast over her reputation by the later chronicle accounts are not so different from the skepticism and prejudice faced by more recent victims of sexual assault. Much as Le Gris is said to have silenced Marguerite with his hood, a legion of clerics, historians, and partisans managed to muffle and stifle her story with vague rumors and inconsistent reports that have shrouded the matter almost to the present day.

    Yet the case does reveal the way in which scandal, as a cousin to the word slander (both derive from the Old French escandle), ultimately resides in the spoken or written word, whether in the gossip of neighbors or the hearsay of the chronicler. Historical scandals, much like the contemporary ones filling our tabloids, news sites, and now-ubiquitous Facebook feeds, are built on a widely shared sense of certainty about “what really happened”—a feeling that often belies the elusive truth. While some touched by scandal may resurrect their lives and reputations, others never will: what happened, or is said to have happened, may follow them even through the pages of history.

    #viol #culture_du_viol #violophilie #duel #metoo #historicisation

    Il y a une église de Sainte Marguerite de Carrouges en normandie

    • Ben, je croyais que le dernier duel judiciaire en France était celui opposant M. de Jarnac à Lachâtaigneraye, le 10 juillet 1547.

      D’ailleurs, WP dit bien,…

      Duel judiciaire — Wikipédia
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duel_judiciaire

      En France, l’un des tout derniers duels judiciaires autorisés a lieu fin décembre 1386, à Paris, ordonné par la chambre des seigneurs du parlement de Paris et approuvé par Charles VI.
      […]
      Le dernier duel à être autorisé publiquement a lieu le 10 juillet 1547 au château de Saint-Germain-en-Laye : il oppose Guy Chabot de Jarnac à François de Vivonne, à la suite d’une demande de Jarnac au roi Henri II de pouvoir venger son honneur.

    • Pas étonnant que l’histoire de France et wikipédia l’ai oublié vu que ca concerne une femme.
      du coup j’ajoute #invisibilisation et wikipédia dit "un des derniers" du coup c’est pas le dernier, c’est seulement le dernier qui compte car il n’implique aucune femme.

      Ah mais c’est pire que ca ! J’avais pas fini de lire "Des siècles plus tard, l’histoire des « innocents » Le Gris faussement accusés et forcés de se défendre dans un procès barbare et injuste au combat a été davantage popularisée par les penseurs des Lumières. L’Encyclopédie de Diderot et l’Histoire du Parlement de Paris de Voltaire se sont servis de l’affaire de 1386 pour dénoncer l’ignorance et la cruauté supposées du Moyen Âge." - (je vais chercher ca )

    • Mais si le mari et le champion de Marguerite perdaient, prouvant ainsi que son accusation était fausse, elle aussi serait mise à mort. Et pas n’importe quelle mort. Conformément à la tradition ancienne, elle serait brûlée vive en tant que fausse accusatrice.

      @simplicissimus pendant que tu passe par ici. Je cherche depuis un moment une histoire que j’avais entendu dans une conf écouté sur la chaine youtube de la cour de cassassions qui mentionnant un certain Othon (1er ? )qui rendait la justice dans une histoire impliquant le viol de l’épouse du plaignant et s’étant tromper il avait fait punir sa propre épouse en réparation. Est-ce que ca te dit quelquechose ? Dans mes recherches pour étayé cette histoire j’ai fait choux blancs.

    • Au-delà des apparences : Jean Froissart et l’affaire de la dame de Carrouges
      https://journals.openedition.org/crm/13079
      Il y a quand même une fiche wiki sur ce duel
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duel_Carrouges-Legris
      Et comme d’hab « Une autre école émet l’hypothèse que Jacques Legris était innocent. Les éléments de preuve apportés par le comte d’Alençon semblent crédibles[interprétation personnelle]. » Cette affirmation non sourcée n’est pas supprimé car on y valide la culture du viol.

      –—
      Louis de Carbonnières. La procédure devant la chambre criminelle du parlement de Paris au XIVe siècle [compte-rendu]

      https://www.persee.fr/doc/bec_0373-6237_2007_num_165_1_463497_t10_0221_0000_3

    • Mais si l’histoire de Marguerite est vraie et que Le Gris a été reconnu coupable, pourquoi l’écuyer a-t-il accru son risque d’être découvert en faisant appel à un complice ?

      Celle ci est bien typique du point de vue masculin de l’historien ! La réponse est d’une simplicité déconcertante et il le dit lui même au début. En 1380 comme en 2020 tu peu violer peindard même en bande tu risque pas grand chose.
      « Comme aujourd’hui, les agressions sexuelles et les viols sont souvent restés impunis et même non signalés au Moyen Âge. »
      et « L’histoire de Marguerite a dû sembler au moins plausible aux magistrats qui ont ordonné le duel, ce que le Parlement n’avait pas fait depuis plus de trente ans dans une affaire de viol. » et « Mais si le mari et le champion de Marguerite perdaient, prouvant ainsi que son accusation était fausse, elle aussi serait mise à mort. Et pas n’importe quelle mort. Conformément à la tradition ancienne, elle serait brûlée vive en tant que fausse accusatrice. » ce qui est tout de même bien pire que de mourrir dans un duel ! Mais l’historien se demande comment le violeur à pris le risque de violer avec son pote et trouve que c’est en faveur du violeur ...

      #male_gaze

    • Pour l’église Saint Marguerite de Carrouges c’est pas que cette femme violée ai été cannonisé (les curés font parti de ceux qui l’accusent de mentir) mais le village de Sainte Marguerite avait pour seigneur un Carrouges (probablement de la même famille que cette femme).

    • Centuries later the story of the “innocent” Le Gris falsely accused and forced to defend himself in a barbaric and unjust trial by combat was further popularized by Enlightenment thinkers. Diderot’s Encyclopédie and Voltaire’s Histoire du Parlement de Paris used the 1386 affair to denounce the supposed ignorance and cruelty of the Middle Ages.

      « Le duel entre Carrouges et Legris est très documenté, il est notamment mentionné par Brantôme, Diderot et d’autres. Ce duel est souvent cité en exemple comme l’illustration d’une injustice profonde : Voltaire s’en sert ainsi pour faire du jugement de Dieu une injustice. »
      http://cornucopia16.com/blog/2014/01/20/compte-rendu-de-la-septieme-seance-de-chorea

      #déni

    • Cinq siècles durant, les descendants de Le Gris dénoncèrent ce jugement de Dieu comme une erreur judiciaire.

      Ce jugement de Dieu fut le dernier autorisé en France. Il y eu bien des demandes de procès par combat soumises au Parlement de Paris mais aucune ne put déboucher sur un duel de Jugement de Dieu et plus aucun duel n’opposa des nobles en mettant en jeu le salut de leur âme immortelle.

      Comment fabrique t-on une légende ? :

      Jean Froissard, le chroniqueur qui écrivit vers 1390 affirme que le roi et la foule se réjouirent de l’issue du duel mais l’avocat de Le Gris affirme que les avis étaient très partagés.
      La chronique de Saint Denis, compilation en latin datant de 10 à 15 ans après le duel, affirme que Marguerite avait eu tort mais avait été de bonne foi et qu’un criminel avait avoué le crime par la suite.
      Autour de 1430, Jean Juvenal des Ursins répéta ce récit dans sa chronique française en mettant en scène, à la place du criminel, un mourant sur son lit.

      La légende de l’accusation fausse, du châtiment injuste et de la révélation tardive eut la vie dure.

      Marguerite avait juré avoir vu Le Gris et Adam Louvel en pleine lumière, parlé un certain temps avec eux avant d’être attaquée. Mais surtout Marguerite avait mis en cause deux hommes ce qui rend invraisemblable la confession tardive d’un seul coupable. De plus, l’hypothèse du mensonge de Marguerite, avec ou sans la contrainte de Carrouges, se heurte à l’inclusion d’Adam Louvel dans l’accusation. C’était ajouter un risque supplémentaire, une histoire plus compliquée.

      Cette idée que Marguerite aurait accusé de bonne foi un innocent pour s’apercevoir ensuite de son erreur est un mythe construit par une société chevaleresque troublée par les doutes jamais ôtés sur la culpabilité ou l’innocence des trois acteurs.

      Et cette légende qui innocente tout le monde survécut :
      Elle est mentionnée dans l’Encyclopédie de Diderot et D’Alembert (1767) où il est dit que Le Gris fut condamné à tort et un criminel découvert ensuite.
      De la même façon, elle est citée par Voltaire. Embarassed
      Louis Du Bois, en 1824, dans son récit de l’histoire normande, répète la légende en précisant que Marguerite avait confondu un homme très ressemblant avec Le Gris et qu’elle se fit ensuite religieuse par désespoir.
      En 1848, Auguste Le Prevost publie une histoire de Saint Martin du Tilleul ayant appartenu au père de Marguerite. Lui, affirme que Marguerite disait juste, que Le Gris était coupable et il constate que depuis le Moyen-Age, sa culpabilité a été souvent remise en cause car la cour du roi Charles VI était favorable à Le Gris, hostile à Marguerite et il déplore que les historiens contemporains suivent cette pente en rappelant que l’indignation d’une femme avait peu de poids dans cette cour du Moyen-Age et qu’avait été rappelée par Le Gris la traîtrise du père de Marguerite, Robert de Thibouville. Le Prevost rappelle alors les notes de Jean le Coq : « après avoir exposé avec une grande loyauté les arguments dans les 2 sens, c’est contre son client qu’il fait pencher la balance ».

      A l’inverse,vers 1890, F. Le Grix White, qui se disait descendant de Le Gris, conteste certains détails de la chronique de Froissart mais croit dans les aveux d’un autre homme.

      Malgré l’insistance d’Auguste Le Prevost qui incite à relire les sources premières, la 11ème édition de l’Encyclopedia Britannica (1910) transforme le récit comme un duel ayant fait perdre toute foi dans le Jugement de Dieu : un certain Legris accusé par la femme de Carrouges de s’être introduit chez elle, en se faisant passer pour son mari dont elle attendait le retour des croisades, la viola. Le Parlement de Paris ordonna un duel où Le Gris vaincu fut pendu puis, peu après, un criminel accusé pour un autre crime, avoua être l’auteur du viol et la décision fut annulée par le Parlement. (!!!)

      Dans les années 1970, la même Encyclopedia Britannica relate le même récit mais en précisant que Marguerite fut « séduite ».
      Finalement, ce récit disparaît de la 15ème édition de l’Encyclopedia Britannica mais sans aucun rectificatif.

      http://lebaldeversailles.forum-actif.eu/t2388-le-dernier-jugement-de-dieu

      « Et cette légende qui innocente tout le monde survécut »
      Non la légende n’innocente pas tout le monde, elle innocente tout le monde avec un pénis. Et elle fait de Marguerite de Carrouges une menteuse adultère puisque du viol il y eu un enfant...

    • Je t’ai pas fournis beaucoup d’éléments faut dire. Otton 1er c’est probablement pas la période la mieux documenté
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otton_Ier_(empereur_du_Saint-Empire)
      Il a eu deux femmes Otton (mais c’etait peut etre des hommes car wikipédia les indique comme conjoint au masculin)
      Édith d’Angleterre (1) - on sais juste qu’elle est morte brutalement et qu’il en était peiné
      Adélaïde de Bourgogne (2) - morte après son époux en 999

      ca va pas etre facile de trouvé cette histoire car wikipédia dit :
      « La justice reste une prérogative royale mais Otton n’a pas de cour suprême pour l’aider dans cette tâche. Elle est rendue par oral. »

      trouvé au passage = les femmes de l’an mille
      https://books.google.fr/books?id=c8dXDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT267&lpg=PT267&dq=edith+d%27angleterre+mort+o

    • Ah j’ai trouvé c’etait Othon III pas Othon Ier !

      Le théologien augustinien Jan van Haeght, chargé de trouver un thème adéquat, choisit la légende de la justice de l’empereur Otton III. Suivant cette légende, Otton III fit décapiter un comte, faussement accusé de tentative de séduction par l’impératrice, après qu’elle eut elle-même tenté en vain de conquérir celui-ci. Avant l’exécution, la comtesse promit à son époux de prouver son innocence en subissant l’épreuve du feu. C’est ainsi qu’après la décollation, elle démontra que l’accusation était fausse en tenant en main, sans se brûler, une barre de fer incandescente. Convaincu par ce jugement de Dieu, Otton III condamna sa propre épouse au bûcher. En allant jusqu’à la sacrifier, il se comporta en juge intègre.

      https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/justice-of-emperor-otto-iii-beheading-of-the-innocent-count-and-ordeal-by-fire-dirk-bouts/5AGtQbEd3j5HnA?hl=fr
      https://lh3.ggpht.com/Ght-fZiu57y-n5cQ8Qmlki5r6zXj82BgngQQZur8xKCUJqS2Brbjd0tXaMMV=s1200


      Dirk Bouts, La justice de l’empereur Otton III : Le supplice du comte innocent et L’épreuve du feu
      Dirk Boutscirca 1473-1475

      pour l’icono de Bouts voire ici
      http://kerdonis.fr/ZBOUTS01
      et sur cette page il y a le supplice de Saint Érasme aussi c’est mon martyre préféré !

      Mon souvenir avait déformé l’histoire, ici il est aussi question de viol, ou tentative de viol (qu’on appel séduction chez les historiens) et donc on retrouve cette fois la condamnation à laquelle Marguerite de Carrouges à échappé... parce que l’épouse du violeur à résisté à la torture...

    • oui, #brava @mad_meg !
      la recherche, c’est comme le vélo, ça s’apprend en allant ; plus on en fait, plus on trouve ;-)

      sinon, les tentatives de séduction faussement dénoncées par de viles manipulatrices, ça ne nous rajeunit pas ! Au moins Joseph et la femme de Putiphar dans la Genèse, mais ça ne m’étonnerait pas qu’il y en ait des versions encore antérieures.

      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_et_la_femme_de_Putiphar

    • Il me résistais depuis longtemps ce teuton d’Othon !
      Pour la femme sans nom de Putiphar, ca doit être aussi vieux que la culture du viol. Les femmes mentent toujours et le viol ca n’existe pas. Même au XXIeme on donne aux violeurs des Césars et des prix Renaudot pour les félicité.

      et pour l’antériorité du viol de Mme Putiphare il y a le conte des deux frères
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conte_des_deux_fr%C3%A8res

      Le soir venu Bata mène le bétail à l’étable et Anubis rentre chez lui auprès de sa femme. Mais la maison est plongée dans le noir. La lumière est éteinte et le repas du soir n’est pas préparé. Dans la crainte d’une dénonciation, l’épouse qui a été prise de désir, dans sa panique, s’est enduite de graisse et de suif pour faire croire qu’elle a été battue. La femme dit à Anubis que Bata a voulu la séduire mais que devant son refus, il l’a battue. Elle ajoute que si Anubis permet à Bata de continuer à vivre, elle se tuera avant que ce dernier ne s’en prenne à elle.

      –-

      Le Conte des deux frères est une histoire égyptienne qui date du règne de Séthi II, qui régna au XIIe siècle avant notre ère à la XIXe dynastie (Nouvel Empire). L’histoire est consignée dans le papyrus d’Orbiney, actuellement conservé au British Museum qui l’a acquis en 1857.

      Plus vieux il y aura peut etre des tablettes akkadiennes mais pour aller plus loin dans le temps ca va etre difficile sans la machine de H.G.Wells

    • J’y ai repensé et il y a peut etre la chaste Suzanne mais elle à pas subit de viol, plutot une agression sexuelle car pour le viol en fait si la femme survie c’est qu’elle est coupable de mentir.
      Et les peintres s’en sont donné à cœur joie niveau culture du viol aussi sur ce motif
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suzanne_et_les_Vieillards

      cc @antoine1 et @touti peut être que tout ceci vous intéressera.

    • Un film a été réalisé d’après cette histoire

      Le Dernier Duel s’appuie sur une structure redoutablement efficace. Co-écrit par Ben Affleck, Matt Damon et Nicole Holofcener, le film est divisé en trois chapitres, racontant trois versions de la même affaire. Chaque partie a sa spécificité, mais les faits de base sont les mêmes : Marguerite raconte à son mari avoir été violée par Legris. Outré, Carrouges demande à affronter Legris en duel. Si l’accusé ressort vainqueur, il sera innocenté et Marguerite sera brûlée vive pour faux témoignage. Pour laver son propre honneur, le mari risque donc… la vie de sa femme.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/936295#message936325

    • Je ne connaissais pas ce passage de la bible
      Livre des juges chapitre 19

      https://www.aelf.org/bible/Jg/19

      15 Ils firent un détour pour passer la nuit à Guibéa. Le lévite entra, s’assit sur la place, mais personne ne lui offrit l’hospitalité pour la nuit.

      16 Voici qu’un vieillard, le soir venu, rentrait de son travail des champs. Il était originaire de la montagne d’Éphraïm, mais il résidait à Guibéa, dont les habitants étaient Benjaminites.

      17 Levant les yeux, il remarqua le voyageur sur la place de la ville. Il lui demanda : « Où vas-tu, et d’où viens-tu ? »

      18 L’homme lui répondit : « Partis de Bethléem de Juda, nous faisons route vers l’arrière-pays de la montagne d’Éphraïm. C’est de là que je suis originaire. Je me suis rendu à Bethléem de Juda et je retourne dans ma maison. Personne ne m’a offert l’hospitalité.

      19 Pourtant, nous avons de la paille et du fourrage pour nos ânes ; j’ai aussi du pain et du vin pour moi, pour ta servante et pour le jeune homme qui accompagne tes serviteurs. Nous ne manquons de rien ! »

      20 Le vieillard dit alors : « Sois en paix ; laisse-moi pourvoir à tous tes besoins, mais ne passe pas la nuit sur la place. »

      21 Il le fit entrer dans sa maison et donna du fourrage aux ânes. Les voyageurs se lavèrent les pieds, ils mangèrent et ils burent.

      22 Pendant qu’ils se restauraient, des hommes de la ville, de vrais vauriens, cernèrent la maison. Ils frappèrent à coups redoublés contre la porte et dirent au vieillard, propriétaire de la maison : « Fais sortir l’homme qui est entré chez toi pour que nous le connaissions ! »

      23 Le propriétaire de la maison alla au-devant d’eux et leur dit : « Non, mes frères, non, ne faites pas le mal ! Après que cet homme a été reçu dans ma maison, ne commettez pas cette infamie !

      24 Voici ma fille, qui est vierge ; je vais la faire sortir. Abusez d’elle ! Faites avec elle ce qui vous semblera bon, mais ne commettez pas contre cet homme un acte infâme. »

      25 Les hommes de la ville ne voulurent pas l’écouter. Alors, le lévite saisit sa concubine et la leur amena dehors. Ils s’unirent à elle et s’en amusèrent toute la nuit, jusqu’au matin. Quand vint l’aurore, ils la relâchèrent.

      26 Comme le matin approchait, la femme s’en vint tomber à l’entrée de la maison de l’homme chez qui était son mari, et elle resta là jusqu’à ce qu’il fît jour.

      27 Au petit matin, son mari se leva, ouvrit la porte de la maison, sortit pour reprendre sa route. Voici que sa concubine gisait à l’entrée de la maison, les mains sur le seuil !

      28 « Lève-toi, lui dit-il, et partons ! » Il n’obtint pas de réponse. Il la mit sur son âne, partit et rentra chez lui.

      29 Une fois arrivé dans sa maison, il prit un couteau, saisit sa concubine, la dépeça, membre après membre, en douze morceaux, qu’il envoya dans tout le territoire d’Israël.

      30 Quiconque voyait cela disait : « Jamais ne s’est fait, jamais ne s’est vu un crime aussi affreux, depuis le jour où les fils d’Israël sont montés du pays d’Égypte jusqu’à ce jour ! » Le lévite avait donné cet ordre à ses messagers : « Vous parlerez ainsi à tous les hommes d’Israël : “Un crime aussi affreux a-t-il jamais été commis depuis le jour où les fils d’Israël sont montés du pays d’Égypte jusqu’à ce jour ? Réfléchissez, tenez conseil, prononcez-vous !” »

      On a vraiment l’impression qu’on parle du bétail ici. C’est bon pour dieu de faire violer sa femme à sa place, tant qu’elle est bien crevé après.

  • Mozilla : Firefox-Nutzer in den USA bekommen alle DoH - Golem.de
    https://diasp.eu/p/10498221

    Mozilla: Firefox-Nutzer in den USA bekommen alle DoH - Golem.de

    Nach vielen Experimenten und monatelangen Verzögerungen wird Mozilla das Protokoll DNS over HTTPS (DoH) für alle US-Nutzer von Firefox ausrollen. Der Anbieter will seinen Mozilla: Firefox-Nutzer in den USA bekommen alle DoH - Golem.de #Firefox #Browser #Cloudflare #DNS #Mozilla #Server #Internet #OpenSource

  • #Aéroport de #Montpellier : un #arbre planté tous les 1000 nouveaux passagers ! | Métropolitain
    https://actu.fr/occitanie/montpellier_34172/aeroport-montpellier-arbre-plante-tous-1000-nouveaux-passagers_31628913.html
    #lol #foutage_de_geule #brouillard

    Mais pour revenir à l’ordre du jour, sur ce petit geste écologique (incarné par un plan d’olivier qu’il remettra à chacun des invités présents lors de cette présentation), le principe est simple : 1000 passagers de plus = 1 arbre planté. « Evidemment, l’Aéroport Montpellier Méditerranée ne proposera que des essences méditerranéennes et/ou adaptées à nos sols et climats, et ne se fournira que chez des pépiniéristes de proximité », précise l’AMM.

  • Apple et un fournisseur condamnés à payer 1,1 milliard de dollars pour violation de brevets
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/01/30/apple-et-broadcom-condamnes-a-payer-1-1-milliard-de-dollars-pour-violation-d

    L’Institut de technologie de Californie affirme que les produits Apple, comme les iPhone, tablettes iPad ou ordinateurs Mac, renferment des composants électroniques fabriqués par Broadcom qu’il accusait d’avoir enfreint ses brevets. Les sociétés Apple et Broadcom ont été condamnées mercredi 29 janvier à Los Angeles à verser 1,1 milliard de dollars (environ un milliard d’euros) d’indemnités à l’Institut de technologie de Californie pour avoir enfreint plusieurs brevets déposés par l’université sur la (...)

    #Broadcom #WiFi #procès #brevet #lutte

  • China flight systems jammed by pig farm’s African swine fever defences | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3042991/china-flight-systems-jammed-pig-farms-african-swine-fever

    Reports of criminal gangs using drones to spread infection led to installation of jamming device

    Unauthorised equipment interfered with navigation systems of planes flying overhead

    A Chinese pig farm’s attempt to ward off drones – said to be spreading African swine fever – jammed the navigation systems of a number of planes flying overhead.

    The farm, in northeastern China, was ordered last month to turn in an unauthorised anti-drone device installed to prevent criminal gangs dropping items infected with the disease, according to online news portal Thepaper.cn.

    The device came to light after a series of flights to and from Harbin airport complained about losing GPS signals while flying over Zhaozhou county in Heilongjiang in late October. In some cases, the ADS-B tracking technology – which determines an aircraft’s position via satellite navigation – failed.

    C’est pas de la #sf

  • Violences, femmes et handicap - petit guide pour agir

    Face au sujet de violence sexualisée contre une jeune fille autiste j’aimerais partager les informations potentiellement utiles pour d’autres personnes face à un cas pareil.

    Brochure d’explication

    Cet outil a été pensé pour des personnes présentant des troubles de la communication sociale. Il s’adresse cependant à tout public. Composé de pictogrammes, il comporte des informations simplifiées pour une facilité de compréhension. Une notice d’utilisation de la brochure suggère des parcours éducatifs et des pistes de travail à destination des familles et des professionne.le.s car l’éducation à la vie affective et sexuelle est le premier moyen de prévenir les agressions et les violences sexuelles.

    –-> https://femmesautistesfrancophones.com/2019/03/02/mon-corps-moi-et-les-autres-prevention-des-violences-sex

    Numéros d’urgence/conseil

    Le 3919 - Violences Femmes Info

    Numéro d’écoute national destiné aux femmes victimes de violences, à leur entourage et aux professionnels concernés. Appel anonyme et gratuit 7 jours sur 7, de 9h à 22h du lundi au vendredi et de 9h à 18h les samedi, dimanche et jours fériés.

    –-> http://www.solidaritefemmes.org/appeler-le-3919

    –-> seulement disponible depuis le territoire francais ; l’équivalent allemand :

    Das Hilfetelefon – Beratung und Hilfe für Frauen

    Herzlich willkommen! Das Hilfetelefon „Gewalt gegen Frauen“ ist ein bundesweites Beratungsangebot für Frauen, die Gewalt erlebt haben oder noch erleben. Unter der Nummer 08000 116 016 und via Online-Beratung unterstützen wir Betroffene aller Nationalitäten, mit und ohne Behinderung – 365 Tage im Jahr, rund um die Uhr. Auch Angehörige, Freundinnen und Freunde sowie Fachkräfte beraten wir anonym und kostenfrei.

    https://www.hilfetelefon.de

    –-> Donc si vous n’êtes plus dans le pays dont s’est deroulée la violence et vous ne pouvez pas appeller le numéro d’urgence national c’est une possibilité d’appeller un numéro d’urgence de votre pays de résidence (les numéros d’urgence sont souvent limités au territoire national).

    01 40 47 06 06 - FDFA

    « Femmes pour le Dire, Femmes pour Agir ».

    Cette association réunit en priorité des femmes en situation de handicap, quelle que soit leur singularité, mais aussi des hommes en situation de handicap et des femmes et des hommes valides partageant les mêmes objectifs.

    Le but de notre association est de lutter contre la double discrimination qu’entraîne le fait d’être femme et handicapée.
    Nous voulons crier haut et fort que nous sommes des femmes et des citoyennes avant d’être « handicapées ».

    Vous allez trouver dans ces pages le panorama de nos activités ; des nouvelles des droits des femmes ; des documents-ressources pour stimuler notre réflexion et notre action…
    Soyez les bienvenu.es !

    –-> http://fdfa.fr/association

    Loi francaise/déclaration à la police

    Information de l’association AFFA

    Bonjour,
    Nous vous rappelons que si vous êtes témoins, c’est votre devoir de citoyen de dénoncer les faits. La non dénonciation d’un crime est punie par la loi Article 434-3 du code pénal
    « Le fait, pour quiconque ayant connaissance de privations, de mauvais traitements ou d’agressions ou atteintes sexuelles infligés à un mineur ou à une personne qui n’est pas en mesure de se protéger en raison de son âge, d’une maladie, d’une infirmité, d’une déficience physique ou psychique ou d’un état de grossesse, de ne pas en informer les autorités judiciaires ou administratives ou de continuer à ne pas informer ces autorités tant que ces infractions n’ont pas cessé est puni de trois ans d’emprisonnement et de 45 000 euros d’amende. »

    Voici un lien pour vous aider dans votre démarche.
    https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/Infos-pratiques/Signalement-des-violences-sexuelles-et-sexistes

    –-> https://femmesautistesfrancophones.com

    –-> Attention, les lois différent énormément selon les pays, donc aussi les conseils du personnel qui repond aux numéros d’urgence.

    Réflexion personnelle/conseils/idées pour personnes qui essaient d’agir
    – Aussi la confrontation indirecte avec la violence sexualisée est lourde, prenez soin de vous, partagez les sentiments, réfléchissez ensemble avec d’autres personnes, demandez des conseils aux professionel.les (les numéros d’urgence sont aussi là pour les témoins, la famille, les ami.es).
    – N’agissez pas contre la volonté de la victime (même si la loi francaise cela rend très difficile dans certaines cas ; en fait le contraire de la loi allemande - mais quelle loi est plus utile ? Une « personne qui n’est pas en mesure de se protéger en raison de son âge, d’une maladie, d’une infirmité, d’une déficience physique ou psychique ou d’un état de grossesse », a-t-elle ne plus le droit à sa volonté en France ? Mais donc en Allemagne, sont les profils mentionnés capable de juger leur situation ? ... ).
    – Réfléchissez à votre motivation d’aider et serez conscientes que tout effort n’a pas toujours d’impact.
    – Pour finir une chanson d’ESTELLE MEYER Pour Toutes Mes Soeurs :

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shX5t1llkd8

    #violence #violence_sexuelle #violence_sexualisée #handicap #femmes #autisme #brochure #numéro_d'urgence #AFFA #FDFA #loi #police #témoin #France #Allemagne #agir

  • Nouveautés
    http://anarlivres.free.fr/pages/nouveau.html#Ferrer2

    La condamnation à mort et l’exécution du pédagogue libertaire espagnol Francisco Ferrer (biographie) le 13 octobre 1909, poursuivi par la vindicte de l’Eglise et du pouvoir, a suscité la publication de nombreuses brochures dont certaines sont accessibles au visionnage ou au téléchargement. Dans le cadre de la campagne internationale de soutien, Les Hommes du jour lui consacrèrent, le 18 septembre 1909, un numéro (Gallica) sous la plume de Flax (pseudonyme de Victor Méric [Wikipédia]). Le Comité d’organisation de la manifestation Ferrer publia très tôt A la mémoire de Ferrer (PDF), discours du Dr Barot « prononcé le dimanche 31 octobre 1909 à l’issue de la manifestation organisée à Angers ». Parmi les premières brochures parues en français, on peut également citer La Vérité sur l’affaire Ferrer (PDF, visio), écrite par A. Bertrand (pseudo de G. Pernet, lire notice du Dictionnaire des militants anarchistes) et éditée par Les Temps nouveaux avec une couverture illustrée de Luce. Mais aussi, sous la responsabilité du Comité de défense des victimes de la répression espagnole, Francisco Ferrer. Un martyr des prêtres. Sa vie, son œuvre (Gallica). En 1934, le Groupe de propagande par la brochure commet une Brochure mensuelle titré Francisco Ferrer anarchiste. Elle contient divers articles du pédagogue parus dans La Huelga General, puis dans Le Réveil de Genève [Gallica]. Francisco Galceran Ferrer fut le défenseur de Ferrer et le libraire et essayiste anarchiste Hem Day (biographie) soutint qu’il l’avait choisi comme avocat pour la similitude de nom. C’est lui qui édita son Plaidoyer pour Francisco Ferrer (PDF, visio). Aux éditions Pensée et Action qu’il avait fondées, il publia également dans les années 1960 : Essai de bibliographie sur l’œuvre de Francisco Ferrer (PDF, visio), Francisco Ferrer. L’Homme, la Escula moderne, ses idées, son idéal… (PDF, visio) et F. Ferrer, sa vie, son œuvre (PDF, visio). Sans oublier le Francisco Ferrer de Maurice Dommanget (PDF, visio) et, de Karl Schneider, Francisco Ferrer et la pédagogie antiautoritaire (PDF, visio) publié par le groupe libertaire Proudhon de Besançon. D’autres s’emparèrent de Francisco Ferrer pour servir les intérêts réactionnaires et cléricaux comme Renou de La Bourdonnerie avec son Ferrer martyr de la libre-pensée (Gallica), « conférence faite à Nantes en avril 1911, aux membres de la Ligue antijuive et antimaçonnique de la Loire-Inférieure ». Ou tel Alphonse-Marie Lugan qui, en 1921, avec morgue et mépris pour le fils de paysan, vit en lui Un précurseur du bolchevisme (Gallica).

    #anarchisme #Eglise #Espagne #brochures

  • « On a frôlé la catastrophe sanitaire » : les services pédiatriques d’Ile-de-France au bord de la rupture, François Béguin
    https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/12/12/les-services-pediatriques-sous-pression-en-ile-de-france_6022560_3224.html

    Par manque de lits de réanimation, 22 enfants ont dû être transférés hors de la région francilienne cet automne.

    Personnels infirmiers manquants, lits de réanimation ou d’hospitalisation fermés… Cette année, l’épidémie hivernale de bronchiolite met à rude épreuve les services pédiatriques des hôpitaux un peu partout en France. Si des difficultés sont signalées à Bordeaux ou à Marseille, c’est en Ile-de-France qu’elles sont le plus visibles. Entre le 17 octobre et le 2 décembre, vingt-deux enfants – pour la plupart des nourrissons âgés de moins d’un an – ont dû être transférés hors de la région, à Rouen, Amiens, Caen ou Reims, faute de lits de réanimation pédiatrique disponibles.

    Ce nombre est exceptionnel : l’hiver dernier, il n’y avait eu que trois transferts. Les années précédentes, entre zéro et quatre. « On a frôlé la catastrophe sanitaire, si l’épidémie avait été plus intense, il y aurait certainement eu des morts », estime un chef de service sous le couvert de l’anonymat.
    A l’origine de cette situation, une pénurie d’infirmiers qui empêche la direction de l’Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP) de pourvoir une quarantaine de postes et la contraint à ne pas rouvrir au début de l’hiver une partie des lits dits « de soins critiques » destinés aux enfants et traditionnellement fermés l’été. Le 4 décembre, au plus fort de la crise, « il manquait 22 lits de ce type par rapport à ce qui devrait être ouvert en hiver », explique Noëlla Lodé, la représentante des cinq services mobiles d’urgence et de réanimation (SMUR) pédiatriques en Ile-de-France.

    Quinze lits ont été rouverts depuis, annonce jeudi 12 décembre, François Crémieux, le directeur général adjoint de l’AP-HP, qui assure que le groupe hospitalier « a mobilisé tous les moyens possibles en termes de ressources humaines » pour parvenir à pourvoir les postes infirmiers manquants, des postes « hyperspécialisés, nécessitant des temps de formation de deux à trois mois ».

    « Des difficultés à trouver une place »
    Au-delà de la gêne pour les familles des nourrissons concernés, cette crise a mis sous pression tous les services pédiatriques de la région. « Certains soirs, quand on prenait la garde, on savait qu’il n’y avait plus de lit de réa pour toute l’Ile-de-France, raconte Simon Escoda, le chef des services d’urgences pédiatriques de l’hôpital Delafontaine, à Saint-Denis. Sachant cette grande pénurie, on a gardé sur site des enfants qui avaient des marqueurs de sévérité significatifs qu’on aurait largement transférés dans d’autres situations. C’est un glissement de tâche contraint et forcé. Quant aux dix-huit transferts pour insuffisance respiratoire que nous avons dû faire, nous avons quasiment à chaque fois eu des difficultés à trouver une place. »
    Conséquence : « beaucoup d’énergie » consacrée à la recherche d’une place et à la surveillance du nourrisson, au détriment des autres tâches, entraînant « un retard des soins courants ». En novembre, la durée moyenne d’attente des consultations le soir aux urgences pédiatriques de Delafontaine était ainsi d’environ cinq heures, soit plus que l’hiver précédent. « Cette mise en tension permanente entraîne le système au bord de la rupture », déplore Laurent Dupic, réanimateur pédiatrique à l’hôpital Necker, qui évoque le « stress permanent » des soignants à qui il est demandé de « faire entrer et sortir très rapidement » les bébés hospitalisés, pour libérer des lits.

    Au-delà des services de « soins critiques » de l’AP-HP, plusieurs chefs de service de pédiatrie racontent souffrir d’un fort turn-over de leurs équipes soignantes, ainsi que des arrêts maladie non remplacés. « Les infirmières s’auto-remplacent, s’épuisent et finissent par craquer », raconte Simon Escoda, à Saint-Denis. « Les services sont exsangues, les gens ne veulent plus travailler dans ces conditions-là et s’en vont », résume Vincent Gajdos, chef de service à l’hôpital Antoine-Béclère, à Clamart (Hauts-de-Seine).

    « Il va il y avoir une catastrophe »
    Dans un témoignage saisissant relayé par le Collectif interhôpitaux, le chef de service de pédiatrie d’un établissement francilien décrit la difficulté de gérer l’épidémie avec une équipe composée d’un tiers de jeunes infirmières, dont certaines tout juste sorties d’école. « Je vous laisse deviner [leur] réaction face à un bébé de 3 ou 4 kg qui suffoque brutalement à cause de sa bronchiolite et qu’il faut intuber rapidement et brancher à un respirateur en attendant l’arrivée du SAMU pédiatrique qui est bloqué avec le transfert d’un autre patient ailleurs », écrit-il, estimant ne plus travailler « dans des conditions de sécurité, ni pour les patients, ni pour les soignants, ni pour nous autres, médecins ».
    Plusieurs chefs de service interrogés disent leur crainte d’un accident. « Si on reste comme ça, il va il y avoir une catastrophe, un enfant qui va mourir dans le camion d’un SMUR, dans un centre hospitalier ou pire, en salle d’attente. C’est la hantise de tout le monde », raconte l’un d’eux.
    Alertée sur cette situation de crise, la ministre de la santé, Agnès Buzyn, a diligenté le 4 décembre une mission « flash » de l’Inspection générale des affaires sociales (IGAS) afin qu’elle fasse rapidement des « préconisations de court et de moyen terme pour résorber les tensions et optimiser la couverture des besoins » en lien avec le pic épidémique hivernal en Ile-de-France.

    Une décision mal reçue par une partie des chefs de service de l’hôpital Necker qui ont envoyé une lettre à la ministre – dont des extraits ont été publiés par Libération – pour faire valoir leur « profonde incompréhension » face au déclenchement d’une telle procédure alors que, selon eux, l’actuelle épidémie ne fait que révéler « les insuffisances d’une structuration hospitalière à bout de souffle ».
    La crise pourrait désormais prendre une tournure plus politique. Lors d’une réunion surprise, vendredi 6 décembre, avec les seuls chefs de service de l’hôpital Necker – l’établissement où elle exerçait auparavant – Mme Buzyn aurait directement mis en cause, selon les témoignages de plusieurs participants, la mauvaise anticipation de l’épidémie par la direction de l’AP-HP. Une mise en cause qui donnera un relief particulier aux conclusions des inspecteurs de l’IGAS, attendues d’ici au 19 janvier.

    #hôpital #soin #enfance #barbares

    • La maternité du CHU de Nantes saturée, Yan Gauchard
      https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/12/12/la-maternite-du-chu-de-nantes-saturee_6022624_3224.html

      Saturé, le service de maternité a transféré cette année plus de 100 femmes sur le point d’accoucher vers d’autres établissements, parfois en urgence.

      Le diagnostic ne souffre aucune contestation : la maternité du CHU de Nantes (Loire-Atlantique) est saturée. Configuré pour assurer 3 800 accouchements, le service pourrait, pour la première fois de son existence, frôler les 4 500 naissances à l’issue de l’exercice 2019, selon Sylvie Moisan, du syndicat FO.
      A la fin du mois de septembre, on dénombrait plus de cent parturientes transférées, parfois en urgence, vers d’autres établissements, publics comme privés. « Il y a des risques avérés pour les mamans, leurs bébés, et le personnel », dénonce Mme Moisan.

      Conditions de sécurité
      Interpellée le 26 septembre par les syndicats, Laurence Halna, directrice des soins au sein du pôle « femme, enfant, adolescent » du CHU, a livré ce constat accablant : « Notre objectif, c’est d’accoucher les femmes dans des conditions maximales de sécurité. Aujourd’hui, ce n’est pas le cas. »
      Dans un do­cument interne que Le Monde a consulté, Luc-Olivier Machon, directeur des ressources humaines, confirme la situation de « surchauffe » et partage le constat que le service n’est « plus dimensionné par rapport à l’activité enregistrée ».
      « A la question : est-ce que l’on peut continuer comme cela indéfiniment, la réponse est clairement : non », précise M. Machon.

      « On a des professionnelles épuisées, qui dépassent largement les quatorze heures par jour. »
      Dans ce même document, Marie, sage-femme, fait part de la « détresse » du personnel, et parle « d’équipes en souffrance ».« On a des professionnelles épuisées, qui dépassent largement les quatorze heures par jour », relève Roland ­Jaguenet, de la CGT (majoritaire).

      « Dans le vestiaire, dit Marie, on se prépare à aller en garde comme pour aller au front. » La dégradation des conditions de travail, observe la sage-femme, a commencé il y a deux ans. « Depuis 2017, chaque mois est un nouveau record. Là, on arrive au maximum de notre capacité. On a eu un été difficile, on s’est retrouvé face à une vague qu’on n’a pas pu contenir. »
      Une cellule de crise a été activée pour tenter de réguler les flux de patientes. Et la direction a expérimenté l’ouverture d’une unité éphémère de dix lits en secteur pédiatrique durant l’été. « C’était du bricolage, fustige M. Jaguenet. L’accueil des proches a été limité de façon drastique, et les agents ont couru dans tous les sens. »

      « Parfois, on se fait peur »
      Arrivée aux urgences du CHU « après avoir perdu les eaux », Marie Robinet, 23 ans, a été orientée, « après deux heures d’attente dans les couloirs », vers une clinique :
      « Je pensais que j’allais être invitée à monter dans une ambulance, prise en charge par du personnel habilité. Mais non : les agents ont désigné ma mère et mon petit ami, et ont dit : “Vous avez un véhicule, vous pouvez vous y rendre par vous-mêmes.” Vous n’allez pas accoucher dans la demi-heure qui suit… »
      La jeune femme décrit « une situation hyperstressante », et juge les conditions de son transfert « irresponsables », interrogeant : « Que serait-il arrivé si cela s’était mal passé ? »
      « Parfois, on se fait peur, énonce Marie, sage-femme. On apprend que la femme a accouché juste à son arrivée… C’est dur aussi en termes relationnels : il faut négocier avec les gens, les familles, les maternités. »
      La direction a créé, à la rentrée, douze postes pérennes, ainsi qu’un poste d’assistante sociale pour traiter la problématique des patientes en grande précarité. L’établissement, analyse M. Machon, est victime de son succès du fait de la qualité des soins dispensés, et de son haut niveau de prise en charge.
      Futur CHU
      Pour sortir de la crise, la direction prévoit de mettre en place, à compter du premier semestre 2020, un dispositif de formalisation des inscriptions, permettant, au besoin, d’aiguiller les patientes vers une maternité publique coopérant au sein du groupement hospitalier de territoire (Ancenis, Châteaubriant, Saint-Nazaire), ou des cliniques.
      « À partir du moment où l’on voit poindre de réels soucis de sécurité ou que l’on recourt à des transferts tardifs dans des conditions plutôt désastreuses pour la parturiente, il apparaît préférable d’anticiper l’afflux des patientes », justifie un cadre.
      La CGT doute du calibrage du futur CHU qui doit surgir de terre à l’horizon 2026, sur l’île de Nantes, au terme de 953 millions d’euros de travaux. Et ce, même si deux salles de naissance supplémentaires sont prévues dans la maternité. Les agents redoutent que les sorties précoces (moins de soixante-douze heures d’hospitalisation) se multiplient. « Sincèrement, je ne vois pas comment on peut en faire davantage », avertit une sage-femme.

      #maternité

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • Living without the modern browser (https://an3223.github.io/Living-...
    https://diasp.eu/p/9342322

    Living without the modern browser

    HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20401105 Posted by skilled (karma: 2474) Post stats: Points: 108 - Comments: 114 - 2019-07-10T12:01:23Z

    #HackerNews #browser #living #modern #the #without HackerNewsBot debug: Calculated post rank: 110 - Loop: 178 - Rank min: 100 - Author rank: 27

  • Comment le black-out de 1977 à #New-York a fait exploser le #hip-hop

    3 700 personnes sous les verrous, 1 616 boutiques saccagées, 550 policiers blessés, 1037 incendies, et une révolution culturelle majeure.

    https://www.vice.com/fr/article/rk8dx9/black-out-1977-new-york-avenement-hip-hop

    South Bronx, 1973 : la naissance du hip-hop

    Au début des années 70, déserté par les Blancs et rongé par le chômage, la violence et la drogue, ce ghetto noir de New York voit l’émergence d’une nouvelle culture urbaine et contestataire, entre musique rap, breakdance et graffitis.

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/metronomique/south-bronx-1973-la-naissance-du-hip-hop-r

    https://media.radiofrance-podcast.net/podcast09/16999-21.07.2018-ITEMA_21748825-0.mp3

    Du #Bronx au terrain vague de la Chapelle, le hip hop arrive en France

    Historiquement, le hip-hop est apparu il y a plus d’une trentaine d’années en France, et, approximativement quarante aux États-Unis. Cette culture n’a jamais bénéficié d’autant de succès et de visibilité, en France, que de nos jours. Pourtant son transfert culturel n’est pas allé de soi.

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-fabrique-de-l-histoire/musiques-noires-24

    https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/cruiser-production/static/culture/sons/2014/03/s12/NET_FC_30e4d930-4cc8-4d51-ac6a-6f844d532023.mp3

    #musique