• « Nos corps ne sont pas vos frontières »
    https://migreurop.org/article3611.html

    Du 3 au 9 août 2026, plusieurs membres du réseau Migreurop se sont rassemblé·es avec plus de 70 organisations au sein du “Village Migration” à Cotonou (Bénin), dans le cadre du Forum Social Mondial 2026. Des riches échanges lors de cette rencontre transnationale est né ce manifeste pour la #Liberté_de_circulation, initié et rédigé par des survivant·es des routes migratoires mortelles et travaillé collectivement. "Parce qu’on ne peut pas vraiment se considérer comme des survivant·es si on (…) #Actions_collectives

    / #Racisme, Liberté de circulation, #Business_migratoire, #Militarisation_des_frontières, #Frontex, #Externalisation, #Union_Européenne, #Union_Africaine

    https://migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/nos_corps_ne_sont_pas_vos_frontie_res_-_le_manifeste_de_cotonou_pour_la_l
    https://migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/our_bodies_are_not_your_borders_-_the_cotonou_manifesto_for_freedom_of_mo

  • ADN business : la face cachée des tests grand public | Documentaire | ARTE
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1gJGUatrpY

    Faux positifs, monétisation des données génétiques... Enquête sur les dessous du boom des tests ADN vendus par des entreprises privées, qui ont déjà attiré 50 millions d’utilisateurs dans le monde.

    Les Américaines #Ancestry ou #23andMe, l’Israélienne #MyHeritage… Depuis une vingtaine d’années, une kyrielle de start-up surfent sur la révolution du séquençage du génome pour proposer au grand public des kits de tests ADN personnels, disponibles en quelques clics sur Internet. Près de 50 millions de personnes dans le monde ont déjà succombé à leur promesse : découvrir, grâce à des gouttes de salive, les secrets que recèleraient nos gènes. Un marché aujourd’hui gigantesque, dont le chiffre d’affaires s’élève à 2 milliards de dollars par an. Si nombre d’utilisateurs, notamment aux États-Unis, y voient un simple moyen de connaître l’origine géographique de leurs ancêtres, de retrouver de lointains cousins ou d’identifier leur vulnérabilité génétique à telle ou telle pathologie, ces technologies – et le business qu’elles sous-tendent – posent des questions vertigineuses. Les résultats de ces tests sont-ils fiables ? Et surtout, que devient la précieuse manne de données génétiques et personnelles collectées par les entreprises ?

    Cette enquête le montre : derrière un habile discours marketing se cache un business opaque, scientifiquement et éthiquement hasardeux. Réalisés à la chaîne, les tests ADN à vocation médicale mènent à de fréquents faux positifs – à l’image de cet utilisateur auquel on a diagnostiqué à tort deux mutations gravissimes – et laissent dubitatifs les généticiens. Mais le danger majeur concerne l’inquiétante absence de protection des données personnelles, potentiellement revendues au bon vouloir des entreprises. En Nouvelle-Zélande, les assurances santé privées exigent désormais de leurs clients la divulgation des résultats des analyses, ouvrant la voie à une véritable discrimination génétique… Avec sa loi bioéthique, la France est aujourd’hui l’un des rares pays au monde à interdire ces tests « récréatifs » sur son territoire. S’appuyant sur des éclairages d’experts, chercheurs et avocats – mais aussi sur les édifiants témoignages de clients de ces entreprises –, ce documentaire révèle les dessous d’un marché florissant, s’interroge sur le futur de la médecine et souligne la fragilité de notre vie privée à l’ère numérique.

    ADN business : la face cachée des tests grand public
    Documentaire d’Olivier Toscer (France, 2024, 1h30mn)

    #arnaques #ADN #funfact #business_medical #Anne_Wojcicki #Angelina_Jolie #Islande #main_basse_sur_les_genes #donnees_personnelles #donnees_medicales #donnees_hyper_sensibles #capitalisme #soutirer_des_donnees #assurances #data

  • #AI still doesn’t work very well in #business, reckoning soon
    https://www.theregister.com/software/2026/03/17/ai-still-doesnt-work-very-well-in-business-reckoning-soon/5225758

    INTERVIEW #Enterprise organizations are still struggling to figure out how AI fits into their business, and that may be for the best because it will take time to understand any problems caused by AI-generated code and content.

    “No one knows right now what the right reference architectures or use cases are for their institution,” said Dorian Smiley, co-founder and #CTO of AI advisory service Codestrap, in an interview with The Register. “A lot of people are pretending that they know. But there’s no playbook to pull from.”

    Smiley and his co-founder, #CEO Connor Deeks, did time at global consultancy PwC and have set up their own shop to help shepherd organizations toward an AI strategy.

    They argue that companies chasing AI have gotten ahead of themselves.

    “From the large language model perspective, people aren’t really addressing the fallibility of the underlying text,” said Deeks.

    Deeks argues that if you built an AI system from first principles, it would look drastically different from what’s offered today. All the talk about the disappearance of software engineering and office work, he said, “we don’t subscribe to any of that.”

    He also contends that companies don’t want to believe that either. “For the most part, they don’t want to believe that everyone’s going to be fired and there’s not going to be anyone underneath them, particularly in the technology or information organizations inside these institutions,” he said.

    #IA

  • Comment la #privatisation de la gestion des #visas a profité à la société #VFS_Global, entre « services optionnels facturés » et soupçons de #corruption

    Pour désengorger les consulats, les démarches pour les visas ont été partiellement déléguées à quelques multinationales, dont le leader VFS Global. Une enquête internationale, à laquelle « Le Monde » a participé, montre que ce marché est devenu une #zone_grise hautement lucrative, au détriment des demandeurs.
    Depuis plus de dix ans, Joséphine (son prénom a été changé) s’occupe des démarches nécessaires pour obtenir un visa français pour sa mère, de nationalité sénégalaise. Elle sait bien que cette procédure relève du parcours du combattant. Au Sénégal, depuis 2014, les demandeurs ne se rendent même plus au consulat, mais dans les bureaux de VFS Global, une #multinationale chargée par les autorités françaises de réceptionner et de transmettre les demandes de visa. Y obtenir un rendez-vous est une véritable gageure et pour espérer en obtenir un, affirme la jeune femme, il faut souvent sortir le portefeuille. « C’était plus simple quand c’était le consulat qui gérait ça, c’était réglementé. Là, c’est celui qui paye le plus qui part », souffle Joséphine par téléphone.

    Depuis plus de vingt ans, la France – comme de nombreux autres pays – a choisi, dans un contexte budgétaire contraint, de sous-traiter la gestion des dossiers de visa et l’accueil des demandeurs. La société #VFS, basée aux #Emirats_arabes_unis et en #Suisse, s’est taillé la part du lion de ce nouveau #marché. Elle revendique des « pratiques éthiques et le développement durable » pour servir 71 gouvernements sous contrat.
    Une investigation menée par l’organisation à but non lucratif Lighthouse Reports, en collaboration avec 14 partenaires dont Le Monde, explore des recoins moins reluisants de cette industrie. Notre enquête montre comment VFS a profité de l’externalisation d’une fonction essentielle de l’Etat, en transformant des familles, des étudiants, des travailleurs ou de simples voyageurs en un marché captif et financièrement exploitable. Appuyée sur de nombreux rapports et documents obtenus auprès des autorités européennes dans le cadre du droit d’accès aux documents administratifs, ainsi que des dizaines d’entretiens et témoignages, elle souligne également d’importantes #défaillances structurelles ainsi que l’existence de pratiques corruptives au sein du groupe.

    « Salon premium »

    VFS est chargé de réceptionner les demandes de visa et d’acheminer les documents au #consulat ou à l’#ambassade, après avoir encaissé les #frais_de_dossier pour le compte de l’Etat. L’entreprise se targue ainsi d’« avoir traité efficacement » près de 145 millions de demandes entre 2017 et 2024. Si le nombre de demandes a crû de façon modérée, les #bénéfices ont explosé. Les comptes déposés au #Luxembourg par la holding financière du groupe montrent que les profits d’exploitation annuels de VFS ont plus que quadruplé, passant de 31 millions à 172 millions d’euros de bénéfices. Les revenus par demande ont bondi de 83 %.
    Une manne financière portée par les demandeurs de visa eux-mêmes. Le modèle d’#externalisation est en effet pensé par les gouvernements pour faire des économies. Le voyageur finance les frais du sous-traitant en plus du #prix du visa, car l’Etat ne rémunère pas le #prestataire. « Nous sommes conscients que cette externalisation rend les visas plus chers pour les demandeurs. Nous condamnons cette sélection par l’argent », s’agace Valérie Jacq, représentante syndicale au ministère des affaires étrangères français.

    Et pour cause, la croissance financière de VFS ne repose pas sur le volume des dossiers traités, mais bien plus sur la capacité de l’entreprise à facturer des « #services_à_valeur_ajoutée », ou « #VAS » dans le jargon du secteur : service de courrier et de numérisation, suivi de la procédure par SMS, horaires étendus d’ouverture des centres, aide pour remplir les demandes, ou encore « salon premium » d’attente, où des rafraîchissements sont servis « par un personnel dédié ».

    Ces « services optionnels » qui, selon la réclame de VFS, « visent à améliorer l’expérience client », lui permettent en effet de générer une très forte marge. Sur la base de reçus et factures communiqués par les autorités suédoises, issus d’un échantillon de plus de 2 100 demandes de visas pour la Suède déposés dans 16 pays, le géant des visas tire un tiers de ses recettes des services à valeur ajoutée. Parmi les options privilégiées, plus d’un demandeur sur deux opte pour les coûteux suivis par SMS. Un ancien employé nigérian de l’entreprise affirme, quant à lui, que les services de photocopie de VFS sont « très onéreux ». Ces tarifs, validés par l’Etat dans le cadre d’un contrat, sont bien plus élevés que ceux pratiqués sur le marché.

    Accélérer le traitement des dossiers

    Des employés de VFS, actuels et anciens, ont confirmé à Lighthouse Reports avoir subi des pressions pour vendre ces produits, depuis 2022 et l’arrivée au capital du fonds américain #Blackstone, qui a fixé des objectifs exigeants. Il est « infondé d’affirmer que l’accent a été davantage mis sur les ventes de VAS après l’investissement de Blackstone », répond VFS. La pratique n’est, en effet, pas nouvelle. Des anciens employés de VFS ont ainsi fait état de formations, dispensées depuis de nombreuses années, pour mieux « présenter les services haut de gamme », afin d’atteindre les objectifs mensuels fixés par la direction.

    Parmi les astuces utilisées, explique un agent de VFS, il suffit d’annoncer au guichet « le montant total, SMS et frais de livraison inclus, et la plupart des clients s’en contenteront » en payant une option sans s’en rendre compte. Ces services ont pourtant « vocation à répondre à un besoin exprimé par le demandeur », selon une source au ministère français des affaires étrangères, qui ajoute que de telles pratiques pourraient « entraîner des sanctions contractuelles ».

    Selon des rapports d’inspection obtenus par le consortium auprès de la Commission européenne, plusieurs Etats membres ont relevé une « pression excessive pour promouvoir [les] services complémentaires » de VFS et s’alarment que leur caractère optionnel ne soit « pas du tout clair ».

    Un agent du ministère des affaires étrangères français a ainsi confirmé à Lighthouse Reports que des prestataires de services tels que VFS laissent parfois entendre aux demandeurs que « payer plus leur permettra d’obtenir un visa », les amenant à choisir l’option « #salon_premium » pour obtenir un possible coupe-file.

    Ce phénomène a été par ailleurs clairement mis en évidence par la sénatrice de l’Orne Nathalie Goulet (Union des démocrates et indépendants). Lors de l’examen d’un rapport de 2025 sur la délivrance des visas, qu’elle a écrit avec le sénateur de Paris Rémi Féraud (Parti socialiste), elle assure que « le service “premium” sert parfois à déguiser d’une élégante façon un service davantage rémunéré pour accélérer le traitement du dossier ». Une pratique en violation claire avec le code des visas de l’Union européenne, qui interdit le « traitement inégal des demandeurs de visa ». Au Quai d’Orsay, une source diplomatique affirme pourtant que « tout est fait afin de ne pas permettre l’utilisation du service premium comme un #coupe-file ».

    « #Bots » et #fraude

    Si les prestations « premium » continuent pourtant de se vendre, c’est que les services de base ont été rendus impraticables par une pénurie organisée des rendez-vous. Le système de réservation de VFS est assiégé par des « bots », des programmes informatiques automatisés conçus par des officines externes, « déployant tous types de modes opératoires, y compris illégaux, pour capter un maximum de rendez-vous et les revendre », comme le déplore le rapport sénatorial. VFS assure « mettre en œuvre des mesures de sécurité rigoureuses » pour offrir « un accès équitable à tous les demandeurs ». De son côté, une source diplomatique a confirmé au Monde que cette problématique faisait « l’objet d’une priorité d’action », même si la « solution miracle n’existe pas ».

    Cette pénurie engendrée depuis l’extérieur crée, pour certains salariés de VFS, des opportunités d’argent facile. Ainsi, selon des employés actuels et anciens de la société, de l’Inde au Sénégal, certains ont été pris la main dans le sac, à vendre des créneaux de rendez-vous. De même, lors d’inspections, plusieurs Etats membres ont fait état de problèmes corruptifs impliquant le personnel de VFS, selon les rapports obtenus par Lighthouse Reports. « Dans certains centres, le taux de rotation du personnel est élevé, car des employés sont suspectés de #corruption ou de fraude », confirme un ancien agent chargé des visas au Quai d’Orsay. Une situation démentie par l’entreprise, qui assure que « les cas de comportements répréhensibles sont extrêmement rares compte tenu de la taille de l’entreprise ».

    Alors que VFS échoue à bloquer les « bots », la multinationale a lancé sa propre filiale de conciergerie de visas, #OneVasco, qui propose un « processus de demande simple et adapté aux voyageurs ». En clair, une alternative maison aux bots. Ses bureaux sont stratégiquement placés à côté des centres officiels de VFS, créant ainsi une confusion délibérée, dénoncée par plusieurs chancelleries européennes.

    La situation fait sourire Marc Esteve, professeur de science politique à l’University College de Londres : « Lorsqu’une même entreprise est responsable de la qualité d’un service de base et tire profit de la vente d’alternatives haut de gamme à ce service, elle est structurellement incitée à sous-investir dans le service basique », souligne-t-il.

    VFS assure que parmi ses clients « figurent des gouvernements soumis à certaines des exigences les plus strictes au monde en matière de conformité, de réglementation et de sécurité ». Des gouvernements captifs, qui ont acté l’impossible retour en arrière. Le sénateur Rémi Féraud confirme qu’« il ne serait pas possible de réinternaliser ce service, car les demandes de visa sont trop nombreuses, de sorte qu’il faudrait des centaines, voire des milliers, de fonctionnaires et d’agents publics supplémentaires ». Face au recours massif à ces entreprises privées, la Commission européenne va prochainement « lancer une étude approfondie », afin de prévenir les #abus du système.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2026/05/28/comment-la-privatisation-de-la-gestion-des-visas-a-profite-a-la-societe-vfs-
    #business #migrations #sous-traitance 

    via @freakonometrics
    ping @reka @karine4

    –-
    voir aussi :
    EU cashes in on €130m in rejected visa applications
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1061593

    • En Afrique, un juteux business autour des demandes de visas

      Son nom résonne dans une bonne partie de l’Afrique. VFS Global est une entreprise indienne très connue sur le continent : c’est à elle que de nombreuses ambassades à travers le monde ont confié le traitement de leurs demandes de visas. Pour faire simple, si vous êtes candidat au Sénégal pour un visa pour la France, ou en République démocratique du Congo pour la Chine, c’est #VFS qui traite votre demande de rendez-vous auprès des ambassades concernées. VFS Global a su en faire une affaire très lucrative, au point d’attirer dans son sillage des fraudeurs et de faire l’objet d’incompréhensions chez les demandeurs qui se plaignent de la complexité et du coût des procédures. Une enquête coordonnée par l’organisation de journalisme d’investigation Lighthouse Reports, en collaboration avec 14 médias dont RFI.

      Présente dans 168 pays et en contrat avec 71 gouvernements, VFS Global laisse le même goût d’amertume chez nombre de candidats aux visas dans le monde et en Afrique, pour qui l’accès au précieux sésame est devenu un parcours complexe et coûteux. « Je ne comprends pas tout le système », s’exclame Aliou, artiste-graffeur et entrepreneur sénégalais habitué des demandes de visa pour l’Europe. « Mais ce qui se passe avec les visas en Afrique, excusez le terme, c’est du grand n’importe quoi ! Pour moi, c’est de l’arnaque ! » La même colère et les mêmes mots reviennent chez de nombreux Africains interrogés dans le cadre de cette enquête.

      VFS Global (Visa Facilitation Services Global), majoritairement détenue par le fonds d’investissement américain Blackstone, a vu ses bénéfices opérationnels exploser de 31 à 171 millions d’euros entre 2017 et 2024. Un bond considérable alors que, sur la même période, le volume des demandes n’a augmenté que de 15 %, comme l’indiquent ses états financiers déposés au Luxembourg.

      VFS explique cette croissance fulgurante en partie par la vente de services dits à valeur ajoutée – des VAS –, tous payants, tels que l’envoi d’informations par SMS ou l’accès à un salon premium. C’est justement cette vente de services qui est placée au cœur de la stratégie commerciale de la société.
      Le business rémunérateur des services à valeur ajoutée

      L’enquête a permis de collecter des données à partir de reçus de demandes de visa provenant de plusieurs pays. Cet échantillon montre que les VAS pèsent pour 30 % du chiffre d’affaires de l’entreprise au niveau mondial. En Afrique du Sud et au Kenya, indiquent ces données, la vente de ces services englobe plus du tiers des revenus du VFS local, et plus du quart au Nigeria.

      En Afrique, du Sénégal au Nigeria en passant par le Kenya, de nombreux employés et ex-employés de l’entreprise ont indiqué avoir été spécialement formés à la vente de ces services. Contraints par les objectifs commerciaux de leur direction et motivés par des primes alléchantes, les agents ont expliqué qu’ils faisaient payer ces services aux demandeurs, sans toujours préciser qu’ils étaient optionnels et, surtout, qu’ils ne garantissaient pas l’obtention du visa.

      Au Sénégal, par exemple, un ex-salarié a déclaré de manière anonyme que le service de notification par SMS était présenté comme quasi-obligatoire. Il a fait part d’une « pression » subie pour vendre des VAS du type salon premium ou espace VIP. D’anciens employés de VFS au Kenya ont confié de leur côté qu’ils devaient systématiquement ajouter les frais de SMS et de courrier à la facture des demandeurs… qui ignoraient que ces VAS étaient facultatifs. Deux anciens membres du personnel ont précisé qu’ils percevaient également des commissions sur les ventes.

      Des rapports d’inspection issus de 22 pays de la zone Schengen et de la Commission européenne elle-même soulignent également une « pression excessive de VFS Global pour promouvoir ses services » et un flou entretenu par l’entreprise sur le caractère optionnel des VAS, comme l’attestent des rapports transmis par la Suède en 2025 et la République tchèque à la Commission en 2024.
      Agences parallèles illégales

      À ce système sont venus se greffer des réseaux parallèles extérieurs à VFS, organisés notamment par des employés ou d’ex-employés de l’entreprise. Par leur maîtrise du système de prise de rendez-vous chez VFS, ils montent des "agences" extérieures, illégales mais laissant croire qu’elles collaborent avec l’entreprise. Souvent représentées par des personnes postées autour des bureaux de VFS, ces agences frauduleuses promettent plein succès aux candidats au visa, désespérés par les rejets répétitifs de leurs demandes.

      Dakar, à quelques pas du centre de visa de VFS Sénégal. Salimata, en pleine démarches pour un visa pour la France, témoigne : « Tu essaies de trouver un rendez-vous à n’importe quel moment et il n’y en a pas. Donc il y a des agences (terme souvent utilisé par les fraudeurs, NDLR) qui s’en chargent pour toi et tu paies entre 75 000 et 200 000 francs CFA (entre 114 et 300 € environ). Et on n’est même pas sûr d’obtenir le visa, c’est juste pour avoir le rendez-vous. » Ce qui fait dire à Salimata qu’il existe « une complicité » entre gérants d’agences et employés de VFS « pour vendre des rendez-vous ».

      Dans le bureau VFS Global qui délivre des visas pour la Chine à Kinshasa, capitale de la République démocratique du Congo, l’enquête a pu prouver que cette complicité existe. Un journaliste participant à l’enquête s’est fait passer pour un demandeur de visa auprès d’une agence frauduleuse et a été mis en relation avec un employé du bureau VFS Global, qu’il a rencontré sur place. Ce dernier lui a réclamé 650 euros, soit plus du double du prix affiché pour le même visa.

      En juin 2025 au Kenya, face aux plaintes des usagers, VFS Global s’est inquiétée publiquement de l’augmentation du nombre de personnes se faisant frauduleusement passer pour des agents de l’entreprise. « Tous les créneaux de rendez-vous sont disponibles gratuitement sur notre site web officiel et sont attribués en fonction de nos prévisions des demandes de visa », a déclaré Stephen Kubasu, directeur général des opérations de l’entreprise. « Les demandeurs ne doivent en aucun cas payer des tiers pour obtenir un rendez-vous car ces affirmations sont mensongères. »

      Interrogée par écrit, dans le cadre de cette enquête, sur ces réseaux frauduleux qui opèrent à l’extérieur de l’entreprise, VFS Global a répondu mettre « activement en œuvre des mesures de sécurité robustes », tels que le mot de passe à usage unique et le CAPTCHA, pour protéger ses systèmes de prise de rendez-vous. Elle indique également avoir lancé la campagne #DoNotFallForFraud pour sensibiliser les demandeurs sur les escroqueries.

      Concernant les services optionnels, VFS Global rappelle « qu’ils sont élaborés en concertation avec les gouvernements », que ​​​​« les demandeurs sont clairement informés que ces services ne sont pas obligatoires » et qu’« ils n’influencent ni les décisions relatives aux visas ni les délais de traitement. »

      En somme, VFS ne fait rien d’illégal mais bénéficie d’un système restrictif mis en place par les Etats. C’est ce que résume Paul Hermelin, président du conseil d’administration de l’entreprise française CapGemini, spécialisée dans les services numériques. Dans son rapport Propositions pour une amélioration de la délivrance des visas publié en 2023, il qualifie la politique française des visas de « machine à mécontentement » du fait de l’obsession sécuritaire et migratoire de Paris.

      « Au Sénégal par exemple, sur 12 000 à 15 000 demandes, il y a un peu moins de 3 000 visas prévus pour les étudiants vers la France. Donc on fabrique près de 10 000 déçus, ça ne va pas du tout ! Avec un déficit de communication, on a une machine à mécontentement », analyse Paul Hermelin. « En France, on délivre généralement un visa d’un an. Si ça se passe bien, on passe à deux ans, puis trois… donc il fallait un nombre d’années incroyable pour arriver au visa de cinq ans. Il y a des hommes d’affaires qui vont et viennent entre Casablanca, Dakar et Paris, des professeurs d’université qui se déplacent pour des conférences, etc. Ce ne sont pas des migrants potentiels illégaux, donc pourquoi ne pas passer directement au visa de cinq ans ? »

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260608-en-afrique-un-juteux-business-autour-des-demandes-de-visas

  • Frontiera Albania. Come la deportazione si è fatta «modello». E chi ci guadagna

    Nei centri per migranti in Albania si consuma un esperimento brutale.

    Con questa inchiesta Luca Rondi sbugiarda la propaganda sull’accordo tra Roma e Tirana, svelando la cruda verità sulle strutture costate milioni di euro.

    Una detenzione offshore ispirata al modello australiano (e a tanti altri del passato), dove il diritto d’asilo e la dignità delle persone vengono sistematicamente calpestati.

    Lo raccontano il registro degli eventi critici -la scatola nera del Cpr di Gjadër-, la storia straziante di Hamid e di tante altre persone ridotte cinicamente a pedine elettorali.

    Il libro denuncia le conseguenze di uno spreco immane di denaro pubblico e una catastrofe umanitaria silenziosa.

    Il “modello Albania” diventa così lo specchio di un’Europa che celebra l’inizio dell’era delle deportazioni e rinnega se stessa.

    https://altreconomia.it/prodotto/frontiera-albania
    #livre #Albanie #modèle_albanie #return_hubs #Italie #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #déportation #business #coût #Gjadër #détention_administrative #rétention

    –-
    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’accord Italie-Albanie:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1043873

  • Unternehmensrecht : EU plant Wegwerffirmen
    https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/524362.unternehmensrecht-eu-plant-wegwerffirmen.html

    En 2027 l"UE metttra un nouveau type de société à disposition des fraudeurs. Les employés de ces entreprises, le fisc et les caisses sociales en paieront le prix.

    Jessica Reisner - »28. Regime« bedroht Mitbestimmung: gewerkschaftsnahe Böckler-Stiftung warnt vor Aushöhlung von Betriebsdemokratie durch neue »EU Inc.«, Juristen befürchten Mißbrauch durch Unternehmer

    Die EU-Kommission hat im März 2026 einen Verordnungsentwurf für die Schaffung einer neuen europäischen Gesellschaftsform für Unternehmen vorgelegt. Die »EU Inc.« soll ein Eckpfeiler des 28. Regimes werden. Mit »Regime« bezeichnet die Kommission in diesem Zusammenhang ein Rechtssystem. Mit der neuen Verordnung will die EU-Kommission einen zusätzlichen, optionalen Rechtsrahmen zu den bestehenden 27 nationalen Rechtssystemen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten schaffen. Das 28. Regime soll die 27 Rechtssysteme ergänzen und nicht ersetzen.

    Seitens der Bundesregierung wird der Vorschlag in der Ratsarbeitsgruppe Gesellschaftsrecht beraten, die federführend vom Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz wahrgenommen wird. Das bestätigte ein Regierungssprecher auf jW-Anfrage.

    Die neue Unternehmensform der EU Inc. soll eine vollständig digitale Gesellschaftsform mit beschränkter Haftung werden, die ohne Notar innerhalb von 48 Stunden online und für höchstens 100 Euro registriert werden kann. Mindestkapital ist nicht vorgesehen. Gründer können natürliche Personen und bereits bestehende Firmen sein. Die Unternehmungen nach diesem neuen Recht sollen EU-weite Aktienoptionspläne für Angestellte aufsetzen können, die erst bei Verkauf besteuert würden. Zusätzlich sind digitale Liquidations- und vereinfachte Insolvenzverfahren vorgesehen, die laut EU-Kommission »Neustarts« erleichtern sollen. Die Löschung einer solchen Firma soll innerhalb von nur drei Monaten möglich sein.

    Ziel ist laut EU-Kommission mit dem Konstrukt, Firmengründungen zu erleichtern und Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu stärken. Das Angebot richtet sich vordergründig an Startups und Scaleups. Damit sind Unternehmen gemeint, die die Gründungsphase hinter sich gelassen haben und nun schnell wachsen wollen. Letztlich kann aber jede Firma die neue Gesellschaftsform annehmen oder auf Basis der EU Inc. neue Holdings und Töchter gründen. Der Vorschlag stößt auf breite Kritik bei Gewerkschaften, der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer (BRAK) und der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft.
    EU-Abwärtsspirale

    Es gelten die jeweiligen Arbeits- und Steuergesetze im Land des Firmensitzes. Und den können die Gründer der EU Inc. innerhalb Europas frei wählen. Unternehmer und Gründer könnten so ihre Firma gezielt dort anmelden, wo es schwache Gesetze zum Schutz von Beschäftigten und Gewerkschaften und starke Einschränkungen beim Streikrecht gibt. In Europa dürften sich dafür augenblicklich Rumänien, Ungarn, Griechenland und Bulgarien empfehlen.

    Für in Deutschland tätige Angestellte werden deutsche Arbeitsgesetze gelten, unabhängig von der Frage, ob sie in einer EU Inc. mit Sitz im Ausland beschäftigt sind. Rechtsanwalt Marc André Gimmy vom Ausschuss Arbeitsrecht der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer befürchtet deshalb gegenüber jW nicht, dass damit der bisherige Gestaltungsspielraum im Arbeitsrecht für Unternehmer erweitert würde. Das schätzt die Bundesregierung ähnlich ein und teilte auf jW-Anfrage mit, dass der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über den 28. gesellschaftsrechtlichen Rahmen »EU Inc.« das Betriebsverfassungsrecht nicht schwächen wird.

    Allerdings bietet die geplante Unternehmensform großen Firmen, ähnlich wie die europäische Aktiengesellschaft Societas Europaea (SE), die Möglichkeit, eine paritätische Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat zu umgehen. Bereits aktuell, so kritisiert das Institut für Mitbestimmung und Unternehmensführung der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (I. M. U.) in einem Beitrag vom Mai 2026, unterlaufen rund 400 Unternehmen für etwa 2,4 Millionen Angestellte die Mitbestimmung in einem Aufsichtsrat per SE oder Konstrukten mit ausländischen Rechtsformen wie der niederländischen B. V. oder der irischen Ltd.

    Die Befürchtung des I. M. U. ist deshalb, dass große Konzerne die EU Inc. für eine weitere Deregulierung nutzen könnten. Denn selbst eine bestehende Mitbestimmung durch einen paritätisch besetzten Aufsichtsrat wäre, Stand jetzt, nicht geschützt, wenn sich existierende Unternehmen in eine EU Inc. umwandeln und ihren Registersitz ins Ausland verlegen.
    Entkopplung vom Firmesitz

    Findige »Gründer« könnten die Kombination aus digitaler Deregulierung und Entkopplung von Firmensitz und Wirtschaftstätigkeit für sich nutzen. Die niedrige Hürde, innerhalb von 48 Stunden für maximal 100 Euro und ohne verpflichtendes Mindestkapital eine Firma anmelden zu können, begünstigt unkontrollierte Registrierungen. Zumal es dafür weder einen realen Verwaltungssitz noch eine physische Betriebsstätte im gewählten Land braucht. Es reicht, wenn ein Mitglied der Geschäftsführung in der EU wohnt.

    Die Rechtsanwälte der BRAK bezweifeln in einem Positionspapier vom Mai 2026, dass eine sichere Identifizierung ohne einen Notar und allein durch Datenabgleich gewährleistet werden kann. Der Verzicht auf eine verpflichtende Aufklärung und die Sicherstellung einer ausgewogenen Vertragsgestaltung könnten, so warnt der Verband, zusätzlich zur Stolperfalle für schwächere Anteilseigner werden.

    Die Entkopplung von Firmensitz und Wirtschaftstätigkeit ist jetzt schon mit gravierenden Auswirkungen auf die Mitbestimmung in Deutschland möglich. Das zeigen zwei Urteile des Bundesarbeitsgerichts in Erfurt. Es entschied 2026 sowohl bei Malta Air am Berliner Flughafen BER als auch bezüglich mehrerer Lieferando-Standorte über deren Betriebsratsfähigkeit.

    Ein zentraler Aspekt beider Urteilsfindungen war die Frage, ob am Standort ausschließlich ausführende Tätigkeiten ausgeübt werden oder zusätzlich vor Ort anwesendes Führungspersonal Weisungen gibt. Tenor beider Urteile ist, dass Angestellte an Standorten, an denen ausschließlich ausführende Tätigkeiten verrichtet werden und keine Führungskräfte arbeiten, keinen Betriebsrat wählen können. Und zwar, weil sie keine eigenständige organisatorische Einheit bilden.

    Insofern bietet die neue Unternehmensform die Option, Angestellte in Deutschland zu beschäftigen, Betriebsratswahlen jedoch zu verhindern, indem das Führungspersonal den Betrieb aus dem Ausland steuert. Dafür bietet sich besonders Plattformarbeit an, bei der die Arbeitsaufträge per App erteilt werden.

    Fast Track durch Insolvenz

    Doch vor allem das vereinfachte ­Liquidations- und Insolvenzverfahren bieten ein Einfallstor, um Haftungsansprüche zu unterlaufen. Gläubiger müssten ihren Einspruch innerhalb von nur 30 Tagen nach Einleitung des Verfahrens einreichen.

    Das ist brisant, weil nach EU-Definition unter »innovative Startups, Scaleups und Unternehmen« Firmen mit bis zu 99 Beschäftigten fallen können. Eine Abwicklung von Unternehmen mit Beschäftigtenzahlen im oberen Bereich dieses Spektrums ist aber, so die BRAK, in der Regel eine äußerst komplexe Angelegenheit.

    Offene Haftungs- und Lohnansprüche drohen nach Ablauf dieser kurzen Frist unwiderruflich verlorenzugehen. Davor warnt die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft in einer Stellungnahme vom April 2026. Denn die schnelle Verlagerung der Verantwortung auf die Gläubigerseite hieße im schlimmsten Fall, dass Vertragspartner beständig das Insolvenzregister überprüfen müssten, um einen möglichen Fristablauf zu vermeiden. Doch welcher Geschäftspartner, welcher Angestellte macht das schon?

    Der Dachverband sieht in den geplanten Regelungen zum vereinfachten Insolvenzrecht der EU Inc. gar ein Investitionshemmnis. Das Geld kann einfach zu schnell weg sein. Die BRAK warnte im Mai 2026 ebenfalls ausdrücklich vor einer möglichen Aufweichung des Gläubigerschutzes. Der Verband der Rechtsanwälte sieht vor allem in einer ungeordneten Abwicklung ohne Begleitung durch einen Insolvenzverwalter ein Problem. Zumal zahlungsunfähige Unternehmer laut den Erfahrungen des Berufsstandes regelmäßig versuchen, der Insolvenzmasse noch Vermögenswerte zu entziehen.

    EU Inc. schon 2027 ?

    Welche Ländervertreter, Institutionen und vor allem Berater an der Entwicklung des Vorschlags zur EU Inc. beteiligt waren, ließ die EU-Kommission auf jW-Nachfrage offen. Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz (CDU) sagte im Mai 2026 in einer Rede beim Startupverband Deutschland, dass man das 28. Regime ermöglichen müsse. Das überrascht nicht. Wenngleich Deutschland kaum zu den Gewinnern des Modells zählen dürfte.

    Unternehmern geht der Entwurf indes längst nicht weit genug. Sie beklagen, dass Streitigkeiten immer noch vor den jeweiligen nationalen Gerichten verhandelt würden. Ein Delaware-Effekt, gemeint ist die Sogwirkung, die der kleine US-Bundesstaat durch die Kombination aus liberalem Gesellschaftsrecht und Senkung der Unternehmenssteuern auf Gründer und Betriebe entfaltete, könne so nicht erzeugt werden.

    Liefe es nach den Wünschen der EU-Kommission, würde die neue Vereinbarung noch im Jahr 2026 vom Rat, vom Parlament und im Trilog (EU-Kommission, -Rat und -Parlament) ausverhandelt, damit die neue Gesellschaftsform schon 2027 verfügbar ist. Bis dahin wird die Kommission aber viele Kritiker, nicht nur in Deutschland, überzeugen und bestenfalls nacharbeiten müssen. Nach jetzigem Stand wäre Jobsuchenden, Kunden und Dienstleistern wohl zu empfehlen, einen großen Bogen um Angebote von Unternehmen der Gesellschaftsform EU Inc. zu machen.

    #Europe #UE #économie #fraude #business

    • Ces fuites de données à répétition révèlent des vulnérabilités profondes de la société et de l’Etat en matière de sécurité numérique. Et pour cause : elles ne sont pas le fait de pirates d’élite, mais de hackeurs souvent jeunes, pas forcément très doués techniquement.
      C’est ce que soulignait la procureure Johanna Brousse après l’arrestation, le 25 avril, d’un mineur de 15 ans accusé d’avoir piraté l’ANTS. « [Cet adolescent]n’est pas un prodige. C’est un signal. La menace cyber se banalise.
      A nous, collectivement, d’élever notre niveau de cyber résilience », déclarait-elle sur le réseau social LinkedIn. Même constat du côté de la CNIL, pour laquelle les fuites obéissent souvent à un scénario identique, facile à déjouer. Ainsi, « près de 80 % des violations [de données] de grande ampleur » de 2024 ont été rendues possibles en raison de l’absence d’authentification multifacteur – un mécanisme de sécurité numérique qui oblige l’utilisateur à justifier son identité à l’aide d’au moins deux types d’authentification, par exemple en tapant un mot de passe sur ordinateur puis en entrant un code envoyé sur un téléphone.

      Tout va bien, cépalérusses ...

    • Pis surtout faut admirer l’exemple donné de celleux qui veulent faire la leçon

      déclarait-elle (la procureure Johanna Brousse) sur le réseau social LinkedIn

  • Processo Hydra

    «Milano è un contesto mafioso, né più né meno di come può esserlo la Calabria». Sono le parole della procuratrice aggiunta di Milano, Alessandra Cerreti, pronunciate durante la requisitoria al processo #Hydra. Ieri c’è stata la prima sentenza per una settantina di imputati che hanno scelto il rito abbreviato. Tra i condannati (#Mariano_Rosi, #Filippo_Crea, #Giuseppe_Fidanzati e altri), stando all’inchiesta della Procura di Milano ci sono figure di primo piano del crimine organizzato in Lombardia. L’inchiesta Hydra - che ha portato al processo - ha messo in luce “un sistema mafioso lombardo”, un’alleanza tra esponenti di ‘ndrangheta, cosa nostra e camorra. Un sistema per compiere dalle rapine alle truffe, dal riciclaggio di denaro alle intestazioni fittizie di beni, fino alle false fatturazioni, alle estorsioni. Tra i reati contestati c’è anche il traffico di droga e di armi. Pubblica ha ospitato lo storico Enzo Ciconte e il ricercatore dell’università Statale di Milano, Andrea Carnì, autore - insieme a Nando dalla Chiesa, sociologo, docente di Sociologia della criminalità organizzata alla Statale di Milano - di un fondamentale studio per la conoscenza del fenomeno mafioso in Lombardia dal titolo «Mafia ed economia. Il rischio criminale in Lombardia» (Futura Editrice, 2025).

    https://www.radiopopolare.it/puntata/popolare-pubblica/pubblica_13_01_2026_11_00
    #mafia #ndrangheta #Italie #Lombardie #Italie_du_Nord #concordat #entente #cosa_nostra #camorra #opération_Hydra #Hydra #procès #podcast #audio #Milan

    • Processo Hydra, ecco le condanne dell’abbreviato

      Poco dopo le 20:00 il Giudice per l’Udienza Preliminare Emanuele Mancini ha sciolto la camera di consiglio per il processo in abbreviato di 1° grado del Processo Hydra, scaturito dall’indagine omonima della Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia di Milano, condotta dai pm Alessandra Cerreti e Rosario Ferracane, coadiuvati dal procuratore Marcello Viola.

      Lo scorso 13 novembre, i pm avevano chiesto la condanna per 75 dei 78 imputati dell’abbreviato. Il giudice ha condannato x persone, ne ha assolte Y e ha rinviato a giudizio X persone delle 59 che avevano scelto il rito ordinario.
      Processo Hydra, cos’è

      Secondo la procura esisterebbe un “sistema mafioso lombardo“, frutto di un patto tra le tre principali organizzazioni mafiose del Paese (Cosa nostra, ‘ndrangheta e camorra).

      A differenza di quel che dicono diversi commentatori, quella del patto di collaborazione non è una novità: come abbiamo ricordato nella nostra memoria, già diversi collaboratori di giustizia ne hanno parlato in riferimento alla realtà criminale degli anni ’80 e ’90. All’epoca si spartivano i settori criminali, ora, essendo un attore oramai ben inserito nell’economia regionale, anche i settori economici “legali”.

      La novità è che la Procura ipotizza che sia nata un’associazione mafiosa a sé, autonoma dai tre sodalizi originari, una sorta di “super-mafia”. Per capire se la tesi è stata accolta, al di là delle condanne, bisognerà aspettare le motivazioni.
      Le condanne

      Complessivamente sono state 62 le condanne, con pene fino a 16 anni, 9 hanno patteggiato, 11 sono stati prosciolti in udienza preliminare (prima della requisitoria finale e della sentenza) e 45 sono stati rinviati a giudizio nel processo per rito ordinario, che inizierà il 19 marzo 2026, presso l’Aula Bunker di San Vittore.

      Le condanne più elevate, già al netto della riduzione di un terzo per la scelta del rito abbreviato, e comunque generalmente più basse delle richieste dell’accusa, sono 16 anni a Massimo Rosi, 14 a Filippo Crea, 12 a Giuseppe Fidanzati (candidati tutti a vent’anni dai pm), 14 a Bernardo Pace e 12 ai figli, 13 anni e quattro mesi a Giovanni Abilone, mentre tra i rinviati a giudizio sono Gioacchino Amico, Rosario Abilone e quel Paolo Errante Parrino parente (attraverso la moglie) di Matteo Messina Denaro.

      Gli imputati che nel corso del processo hanno scelto di diventare collaboratori di giustizia – William Cerbo, Francesco Bellusci e Saverio Pintaudi – si sono visti riconoscere la speciale attenuante e hanno avuto 4 anni e mezzo.
      I risarcimenti di parte civile

      Il giudice ha stabilito che i risarcimenti per le parti civili andranno stabiliti in un diverso procedimento civile, disponendo una provvisionale di 10mila euro ciascuno + 6mila euro per le spese legali.
      La dichiarazione di WikiMafia

      “Siamo soddisfatti per l’esito del processo, che dimostra ancora una volta come la Lombardia possa essere oramai annoverata tra le regioni a tradizionale presenza mafiosa“, afferma il Presidente e direttore dell’Enciclopedia, Pierpaolo Farina. “Ringraziamo la Procura per il lavoro svolto e il nostro Avvocato, Marco Griguolo, che oramai da cinque anni ci assiste nel costituirci parte civile nei principali processi di mafia in Lombardia, troppo spesso da soli, cosa che per fortuna in questo processo non è stato“.

      https://www.wikimafia.it/processo-hydra-abbreviato

    • #Sistema_criminale_integrato

      «Ormai non esiste più una ’ndrangheta, una mafia siciliana o pugliese, sono organizzazioni fluide che in accordo fra loro gestiscono affari diversi»

      (Procuratore DNA Federico Cafiero de Raho alla conclusione dell’operazione Galassia, 2018[1])

      L’espressione sistema criminale integrato definisce un legame tra organizzazioni criminali per raggiungere obiettivi comuni.

      https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistema_criminale_integrato
      #quarto_livello #stato_parallelo

    • Mafia ed economia. Il rischio criminale in Lombardia

      Quanto è presente il fenomeno mafioso in Lombardia? Qual è, più specificamente, il livello di infiltrazione della ’ndrangheta nella regione più popolosa, ricca e progredita d’Italia? Quale il suo grado di insediamento o – ancor più – di radicamento?

      https://www.futura-editrice.it/prodotto/mafia-ed-economia
      #économie

    • HYDRA: La Nuova Mafia del Nord Italia che unisce Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta e Camorra

      “Hydra” racconta la nascita dell’alleanza tra Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta e Camorra a Milano, il processo che sta riscrivendo la storia delle mafie in Italia e rivelando un sistema criminale nuovo, orizzontale e invisibile.

      Questo documentario ripercorre l’intera inchiesta Hydra, nata tra il 2020 e il 2023 grazie al lavoro del Nucleo Investigativo di Milano e #Varese e della Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia. Un’indagine che ha svelato 21 summit segreti, una rete mafiosa costruita tra Lombardia e Piemonte e un modello criminale dove Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta e Camorra collaborano stabilmente per gestire traffici di droga, riciclaggio, estorsioni, evasione fiscale, appalti, logistica e perfino circuiti finanziari paralleli.

      Il video analizza la struttura dell’alleanza, definita dai magistrati una “confederazione orizzontale”, senza un capo unico ma basata su capitali, rapporti personali e una cassa comune che finanziava affari, detenuti e famiglie dei boss. Raccontiamo le relazioni con il mondo imprenditoriale, gli intrecci con la politica locale, le conversazioni intercettate e i meccanismi di riciclaggio ricostruiti dai collaboratori.

      Hydra non è solo un processo, ma uno spartiacque: mostra come le mafie italiane non cerchino più territori da controllare con la violenza, ma mercati, denaro, relazioni politiche e imprenditoriali. Milano diventa così il laboratorio della nuova criminalità organizzata, un luogo dove i clan collaborano, investono, si infiltrano e si trasformano.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UK0UiEtavfw

      #alliance #marché #procès #summit #Dairago #Cinisello_Balsamo #Abbiategrasso #business #affaires #structure_confédérative_horizontale #horizontalité #Castelvetrano #armes #drogue #trafic_de_drogue #évasion_fiscale #trafic_d'armes #covid-19 #services_sanitaires #bâtiment #BTP #restauration #carburant #blanchissement_d'argent #Chinese_underground_bank #bacinella #caisse_commune #supermafia #mafiosità_immanente #intimidation #politique #Paolo_Errante_Parrino #Matteo_Messina_Denaro #zio_Paolo #Castelvetrano #41_bis

    • Hydra, prime condanne nel processo contro l’alleanza tra Cosa nostra, ’ndrangheta e camorra in Lombardia

      Il gup Emanuele Mancini ha condannato 62 degli 80 imputati a processo col rito abbreviato. Riconosciuta l’associazione mafiosa nei confronti di 24 persone. Undici le assoluzioni e 45 rinvii a giudizio. L’inchiesta della Dda di Milano e dei carabinieri aveva rivelato l’esistenza di un «sistema mafioso lombardo» che si spartiva gli affari illeciti

      Aggiornamento del 12 gennaio 2026: Arrivano le prime condanne per l’operazione Hydra, la grande inchiesta della Direzione distrettuale antimafia di Milano sul «sistema mafioso lombardo», l’organizzazione criminale composta da esponenti di ’ndrangheta, cosa nostra e camorra per spartirsi affari e controllo del territorio, esiste.

      Il giudice per le udienze preliminari del Tribunale di Milano, Emanuele Mancini, ha condannato 62 degli 80 imputati che avevano scelto di essere processati con il rito abbreviato, che dà diritto a uno sconto di un terzo della pena, e ha assolto 18 persone. Gli imputati erano accusati a vario titolo di associazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso, estorsione, traffico e spaccio di droga, tentata rapina, detenzione abusiva di armi, intestazione fittizia di beni, frode fiscale e omesso versamento delle imposte, riciclaggio e false fatture. L’accusa di associazione mafiosa è stata riconosciuta contro tutti i 24 imputati a cui era contestata. La pena più alta, 16 anni, è stata inflitta a Massimo Rosi, considerato esponente di vertice della ’ndrangheta e reggente della locale di ’ndrangheta di Legnano-Lonate Pozzolo.

      La decisione del gup è arrivata dopo sei ore di camera di consiglio. Undici persone che non hanno fatto richiesta di riti alternativi e sono state prosciolte in udienza preliminare. Nove i patteggiamenti e 45 gli imputati rinviati a giudizio. Il dispositivo, che ancora non è stato messo a disposizione dei legali, è stato letto a tarda sera nell’aula bunker del carcere di Opera dove si è recato il procuratore di Milano, Marcello Viola, per la sentenza.

      Il gup di Milano, Emanuele Mancini, «ha ritenuto che si è in presenza dell’operatività sul territorio lombardo di un’associazione costituita da singoli soggetti – alcuni dei quali già in passato ricondotti giudiziariamente alle cosiddette mafie storiche (cosa nostra, camorra, ’ndrangheta) e altri comunque collegati a tali soggetti – che ha esercitato la propria capacità intimidatoria determinando condizioni di assoggettamento e di omertà sulla collettività mediante il ricorso alla violenza e alla minaccia, gestendo l’attività di cessione delle sostanze stupefacenti (del tipo cocaina, hashish, marijuana) e inserendosi nella realtà economica locale con proprie società le cui attività erano finalizzate principalmente all’attività di riciclaggio di denaro proveniente da precedenti illeciti», hanno spiegato in una nota congiunta il presidente del tribunale di Milano, Fabio Roia, e la presidente dell’ufficio gip/gup, Ezia Maccora. A Milano – avevano sostenuto i pm nel corso della loro requisitoria l’11 novembre – ci sarebbe un «contesto mafioso» simile a quello calabrese, «né più né meno della Calabria».

      Qui di seguito, l’articolo sul procedimento

      *

      A Milano, nell’aula bunker del carcere di Opera, sono in corso le udienze preliminari del processo Hydra. È un processo importante, nato dall’inchiesta condotta dai carabinieri del Nucleo investigativo e coordinata dalla Direzione distrettuale antimafia (Dda) di Milano sulla presunta alleanza delle tre mafie – Cosa nostra, camorra e ‘ndrangheta – in Lombardia. Il quadro è innovativo. Secondo i sostituti procuratori Alessandra Cerreti e Rosario Ferracane – che hanno chiesto il processo per 143 persone – tra Milano e Varese c’era “una imponente e capillarmente strutturata associazione mafiosa (...) costituita da appartenenti alle tre diverse organizzazioni di stampo mafioso cosa nostra, ‘ndrangheta e camorra, avente struttura confederativa orizzontale, nell’ambito della quale i vertici di ciascuna delle tre componenti mafiose operano sullo stesso livello, contribuendo alla realizzazione di un sistema mafioso lombardo”.

      Tra tutti gli indagati, circa quaranta hanno richiesto al giudice per l’udienza preliminare (gup) Emanuele Mancini di accedere ai riti alternativi (come il patteggiamento o l’abbreviato, che permette lo sconto della pena per un terzo). Lo scorso 18 giugno il gup ha accettato la costituzione come parte civile nel processo di alcuni enti locali (il Comune di Milano, di Varese e di Legnano, la Regione Lombardia, la Città metropolitana di Milano), di Libera e di WikiMafia, ma anche del giornalista di Report Giorgio Mottola, minacciato da uno dei principali indagati, e dalla Rai, che potranno chiedere un risarcimento. Il cronista di Report e un altro privato cittadino sono le uniche due persone delle 13 individuate come persone offese, destinatarie di minacce e aggressioni, che hanno deciso di schierarsi nel processo.

      Il «sistema mafioso lombardo»

      In questo nuovo sodalizio, i presunti appartenenti alle tre storiche organizzazioni mafiose italiane non erano in rivalità tra di loro, ma alleati, con una “struttura confederativa orizzontale”, con i vertici posti “allo stesso livello”, come sostengono i pm. A farne parte sono – sempre secondo le ipotesi investigative – uomini legati a Cosa nostra, come la famiglia Fidanzati, originaria di Palermo ma da decenni stabilmente insediata a Milano; uomini della famiglia Rinzivillo, basati a Busto Arsizio e dintorni; del gruppo Maffei, originari di Catania; e mafiosi trapanesi, collegati al mandamento di Castelvetrano (guidato da Matteo Messina Denaro). Tra questi ultimi spicca il nome di Paolo Aurelio Errante Parrino, condannato più volte per associazione mafiosa e cugino acquisito di Matteo Messina Denaro.

      Ci sono poi uomini della ‘ndrangheta appartenenti alla locale di Legano-Lonate Pozzolo collegata alla locale di Cirò (Crotone), dominata dalla cosca Farao-Marincola; uomini della cosca Iamonte legata alla locale di Desio e collegata alla locale di Melito Porto Salvo (Reggio Calabria) e un uomo – Antonio Romeo – legato alle cosche di San Luca e al suo boss, Sebastiano Romeo detto “u staccu”. A rappresentare la camorra, uomini legati alla famiglia di Michele Senese, il boss che dalla Campania ha creato un suo feudo a Roma.

      I summit tra uomini di cosa nostra, ‘ndrangheta e camorra e le loro attività

      Nel corso delle indagini, i carabinieri di Milano e Varese hanno documentato molti incontri – ben ventuno – tra i rappresentanti delle diverse organizzazioni mafiose, a Dairago, Cinisello Balsamo, Abbiategrasso e zone limitrofe tra il 2020 e il 2021.

      Il “sistema mafioso lombardo” era attivo nei traffici di droga e di armi, nelle estorsioni, nel controllo del territorio per risolvere le controversie legate agli affari, illeciti o leciti. L’aspetto più rilevante riguarda gli affari imprenditoriali, finanziari, le truffe legate ad esempio all’ottenimento dei bonus, l’apertura di società con il solo scopo di evadere il fisco e riciclare i guadagni illeciti. Molti indagati avevano acquisito “direttamente e indirettamente la gestione e/o il controllo di attività economiche” nel settore della logistica, nell’edilizia, nel settore sanitario (con particolare riferimento alle forniture legate all’emergenza Covid, alle procedure di sanificazione, al servizio ambulanza per trasporto dializzati), e molti altri ambiti (e-commerce, ristorazione, noleggio auto, parcheggi aeroportuali, importazione di gasolio). Erano anche interessati ad acquisire “appalti pubblici e privati, anche attraverso l’attivazione di canali istituzionali opportunamente e preventivamente compulsati”.

      Nel corso dell’indagine, ai cinque pentiti che hanno reso dichiarazioni utili se n’è aggiunto uno nuovo, Saverio Pintaudi, indagato quale uomo vicino alla ‘ndrangheta con ruoli in molte società per reinvestire il denaro frutto delle attività illecite. Da marzo sta spiegando agli inquirenti in che modo i soldi sporchi vengano ripuliti attraverso società fittizie, prestanomi, fatture false e con la complicità di “banchieri” cinesi, imprenditori dotati di grandi disponibilità e contatti per riciclare con il sistema della Chinese underground bank.

      A dimostrare l’unione di questo nuovo sodalizio criminale c’era la “bacinella”, dove mettere i soldi per i detenuti o le esigenze degli associati. L’organizzazione “imponeva il versamento di somme di denaro nella cassa comune, destinate al sostentamento dei detenuti di ciascuna componente e pretese quale corrispettivo per l’assegnazione e/o agevolazione nella assegnazione di affari leciti o illeciti, in virtù della forza di intimidazione dell’intera associazione”, perché “i carcerati vanno mantenuti prima di ogni altra cosa a questo mondo”, e non importa la provenienza territoriale e la relativa organizzazione.

      Alcuni presunti appartenenti al sistema mafioso lombardo tenevano contatti con esponenti del mondo politico, istituzionale, imprenditoriale, bancario, “in modo da ottenerne favori, notizie riservate, erogazione di finanziamenti, rete di relazioni, tutti in grado di fornire un contributo rilevante al mantenimento in vita, al rafforzamento dell’organizzazione e ad aumentarne il prestigio”.

      Da alcune intercettazioni realizzate dai carabinieri nel corso dell’inchiesta emerge anche il sospetto che alcuni appartenenti all’organizzazione fossero in grado di condizionare “il libero esercizio del voto”: “Ci sono tutti i miei parenti, adesso maschi e femmine, siamo… abbiamo un bel pacchetto voti, perché posso portare o senatori in Europa, miei parenti – diceva uno degli indagati, Filippo Crea –. Poi abbiamo preso un partito, una lista civica”, fatta dalle sue cugine “tutte avvocatesse”. “Stiamo parlando di persone che hanno 4-500 (quattro, cinquecento) voti a testa”, aggiungeva.

      Il dilemma: supermafia o no?

      Una “supermafia”, una confederazione o altro? Sin da quando l’inchiesta Hydra è diventata pubblica, con l’arresto di 11 persone il 25 ottobre 2023, i magistrati hanno avuto vedute contrastanti.

      Per la procura esisteva “un accordo stabile e duraturo” tra le diverse componenti calabrese, siciliana e campana/romana, dimostrato da una serie di elementi come “l’apporto comune di capitali”, “la messa a disposizione di risorse umane, la costituzione di società” per uno scopo comune, fare profitto. Sarebbe “un sistema di tipo confederativo”. In altre parole: “Pur nel rispetto dei legami con le cosche d’origine, questa eterogenea associazione gode di propria organizzazione, di un proprio ed autonomo programma, di proprie regole e ritorsioni per chi le viola, di propri sodali che apertamente ne manifestano l’appartenenza e agisce in modo indipendente rispetto alle singole componenti”. Questo è il sistema mafioso lombardo.

      La valutazione del gip

      Il gip, che ha dovuto valutare le 153 richieste di arresto, ha fornito una valutazione molto diversa e così ha rigettato ben 142 richieste ritenendo che non ci fossero elementi per contestare il reato di associazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso (416 bis). Secondo lui, l’ipotesi investigativa di un gruppo composto dalle tre mafie, “un unicum nella storia giudiziaria” in Italia, non era stata “sufficientemente suffragata dagli elementi di prova raccolti” e in alcuni episodi non emergeva la “mafiosità”: il procedimento, “muovendo dal postulato che si tratta di soggetti appartenenti ad un sodalizio confederativo di stampo mafioso, ha avvolto qualsiasi attività, lecita o illecita che fosse, svolta dagli odierni indagati, in un mantello di cosiddetta mafiosità che è arduo scorgere nelle sue pieghe, se non in via intuitiva”, si legge in un passaggio dell’ordinanza. Su alcune contestazioni, “è del tutto assente la prova del fatto che gli odierni indagati si siano avvalsi della forza di intimidazione scaturente dal vincolo associativo, al fine di sbaragliare la concorrenza”. Di alcuni indagati, inoltre, per il giudice non erano emerse prove di affiliazione al “sistema mafioso lombardo” o alle mafie tradizionali: “Nella maggioranza dei casi, invero, si tratta di soggetti incensurati o che vantano precedenti per reati non connessi alle dinamiche di tipo mafioso”.

      In sostanza, “non vi è prova, quindi, che tra gli indagati di appartenere al sodalizio sia stata costituita un’organizzazione stabile, posta in essere allo scopo di realizzare un programma criminoso comune e protratto nel tempo, con una ripartizione di compiti tra gli assodati, ossia il vincolo associativo”, si legge nell’ordinanza di custodia cautelare.

      Invece “certamente emerge la presenza sul territorio milanese di soggetti che, vantando, per lo meno almeno alcuni di essi, rapporti qualificati con alcuni soggetti di sicura appartenenza mafiosa, sia pur accertata in altre regioni, commettono attività lecite, ma anche delittuose, soprattutto di tipo economico, in territorio lombardo”.
      Il ricorso della procura

      Alla bocciatura di molte richiesta, la pm Alessandra Cerreti ha replicato subito ricorrendo al tribunale del Riesame (anche detto tribunale delle Libertà) e sottolineato che “gli innumerevoli elementi investigativi” sono stati “incredibilmente parcellizzati e banalizzati dal giudicante”, aggiungendo, a differenza di quanto scritto dal giudice, di non aver “mai sostenuto trattarsi di una super associazione mafiosa (...) composta dalle 3 mafie italiane che si sarebbero consorziate sul territorio (addirittura nazionale)” o “mondiale”: “Né mai il pm ha parlato di ’egemonia’ sul territorio lombardo, come ha erroneamente ritenuto il giudicante, che ne ha escluso l’esistenza anche argomentando sulla mancata opposizione da parte di altre associazioni mafiose radicate sul territori”.

      Nelle 1121 pagine del ricorso, la Dda, guidata dal procuratore Marcello Viola e dall’aggiunta Alessandra Dolci, aveva precisato di non aver “mai sostenuto trattarsi di una super associazione mafiosa (...) composta dalle tre mafie”. Ovvero di una «federazione» autorizzata dall’alto. Il capo di imputazione sul punto, ha scritto la Dda, è «estremamente chiaro: trattasi di mere ’componenti’ delle tre tradizionali associazioni mafiose, operative sul territorio milanese, che si alleano strutturalmente tra loro per aumentare le possibilità di profitto» ed «evitare i conflitti».

      La decisione del Riesame

      Quasi un anno dopo, il tribunale del Riesame ha “riesaminato” (appunto) le misure cautelari disponendo gli arresti in carcere per 41 indagati e stabilendo che l’organizzazione va considerata come una nuova e unica associazione mafiosa composta da presunti affiliati alle tre mafie, come fosse un consorzio basato su un’alleanza. Si può ritenere, scriveva il presidente del Tribunale di Milano Fabio Roia in una nota, che “singoli soggetti anche appartenenti alle mafie cosiddette storiche abbiano costituito una associazione di stampo mafioso, non configurabile però né come una confederazione di mafie, né come una ‘supermafia’, avendo trasferito nel sodalizio orizzontale tutti i tratti genetici delle associazioni di appartenenza”.

      Nelle motivazioni il tribunale del Riesame parla di “mafiosità immanente” della nuova associazione in Lombardia e ritiene “ampiamente dimostrato che il sodalizio contestato abbia fatto effettivo, concreto, attuale e percepibile uso, anche con metodi violenti o minacciosi, della forza di intimidazione nella commissione di delitti come nella acquisizione del controllo e gestione di attività economiche, che sono propriamente gli ambiti di attività” che caratterizzano “la natura mafiosa”. L’uso “del metodo mafioso e il programma criminale” non lascia mai “dubbi sulla qualità propria dell’associazione”. Sulla base della giurisprudenza, “il sodalizio”, con “strutture e capitali comuni” e “partecipato” da persone “di diversa provenienza mafiosa”, si “connota indubbiamente in termini mafiosi”.

      Le decisioni del Tribunale delle libertà sono state poi confermate dalla Cassazione.

      Va anche aggiunto un dettaglio. Per saltare il vaglio del gip, la procura di Milano avrebbe voluto procedere con il fermo di 70 indagati nel 2023, ma le perplessità di alcune procure del Sud e la richiesta di un coordinamento da parte della Direzione nazionale antimafia hanno fatto cambiare i piani.
      La costituzione di Libera come parte civile

      Il 18 giugno scorso il gup Emanuele Mancini ha accolto la richiesta di costituzione di parte civile delle amministrazioni di Milano, Varese e Legnano, della Regione Lombardia e della Città metropolitana di Milano.

      Ha riconosciuto questa possibilità anche ad associazioni come WikiMafia e Libera, assistita dall’avvocato Giuseppe Rizzo. Si tratta di “un risultato importante”, in linea con altre iniziative simili di Libera in altri processi, che dà “un segnale di impegno e di responsabilità per tutta la società civile e responsabile a fronte dell’ipoteca criminale che l’alleanza tra le diverse organizzazioni mafiose determina sull’economia e sulla società in Lombardia”.

      Per l’organizzazione presieduta da don Luigi Ciotti “la presenza nel processo Hydra rappresenta un’occasione importante per fare crescere la sensibilità delle giovani generazioni nei riguardi di mafie e di corruzione, con il coinvolgimento di scuole e di università nel corso di un procedimento che per le sue dimensioni si annuncia di lunga durata”.

      https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2370-hydra_prime_condanne_contro_l_alleanza_tra_mafiosi_di_cos

  • #Mégabassines, #data_centers : « La guerre contre l’#eau s’est intensifiée »

    Dans le livre-enquête « Les Assoiffeurs », les journalistes Nicolas Celnik et Fabien Benoit montrent comment certains acteurs privés accaparent, avec la bénédiction de l’État, une ressource de plus en plus rare et de plus en plus polluée.

    DepuisDepuis dix ans, un tiers du territoire français subit des restrictions d’eau et le pays vit désormais au rythme d’épisodes de sécheresse toujours plus longs et plus intenses. Qui demain aura accès à l’eau ? De quelle qualité ? Depuis les années 1980, près de 14 000 captages d’eau potable ont dû fermer en raison de taux de pollution aux pesticides trop importants. Et le scandale de la contamination massive aux PFAS ne fait que commencer…

    À Sainte-Soline, les militants en lutte contre l’accaparement de l’eau par le modèle agricole productiviste ont reçu pour toute réponse du gouvernement un déluge de grenades.

    Dans une enquête fouillée, les journalistes Fabien Benoit et Nicolas Celnik montrent comment certains acteurs privés, des producteurs de maïs aux promoteurs de data centers, font main basse sur l’eau, avec la bénédiction de l’État.

    Les Assoiffeurs. Enquête sur ces entreprises qui accaparent notre eau (Les Liens qui libèrent, 2026) pointe comment certains comptent aussi capitaliser sur la raréfaction de la ressource et sur les inquiétudes concernant la santé. Entretien.

    « Mediapart » : La loi d’urgence agricole qui arrive à l’Assemblée nationale le 19 mai comporte un important volet sur l’eau. Une fois de plus, le gouvernement veut « sécuriser » l’accès à l’eau pour les agriculteurs et agricultrices irrigant·es, au détriment des autres usagers et usagères, en favorisant notamment la construction de mégabassines.

    Fabien Benoit : On a beaucoup parlé de guerre de l’eau, notamment autour des bassines. Pour nous, il y a surtout une guerre contre l’eau, c’est-à-dire contre cette ressource, pour l’accaparer, pour l’abîmer. Cette loi d’urgence agricole en est un nouvel épisode. Si on met d’ailleurs bout à bout la loi d’orientation agricole qui consacre l’intérêt majeur de l’agriculture, les arrêtés sécheresse qui exonèrent régulièrement les plus gros accapareurs de l’eau, et la révision de la directive-cadre eau européenne qui est sur la table…, on se rend compte que cette guerre contre l’eau s’est intensifiée, au détriment de sa qualité, de sa disponibilité.

    Nicolas Celnik : Il y a dans ce projet de loi deux articles qui entrent en résonance avec notre enquête : l’article 6, qui prévoit que le préfet puisse déroger aux schémas d’aménagement et de gestion des eaux (Sage) pour des projets d’ouvrage de stockage de l’eau, et l’article 5, qui rend facultative la consultation publique pour construire une bassine. Cela correspond à ce que le chercheur Sylvain Baron appelle la « préfectorialisation de la politique de l’eau ». C’est la volonté de donner aux préfets des moyens de contourner cette démocratie locale de l’eau, qui est certes imparfaite, mais qui reste une expérimentation démocratique vraiment intéressante. Là, on assiste à une « reverticalisation » des politiques de l’eau au nom des intérêts économiques.

    Vous montrez bien dans votre livre comment ceux que vous appelez les « assoiffeurs » parviennent à s’affranchir du droit commun pour faire main basse sur la ressource.

    N. C. : Nous avons cherché à comprendre les stratégies des grands acteurs économiques (agriculture, data centers, embouteilleurs…) qui s’assurent qu’ils bénéficieront de réserves d’eau, même dans des situations de tension sur la ressource. Leur travail de lobbying a été, effectivement, de normaliser des situations d’exception. Alors qu’il existe en France une hiérarchie des usages de l’eau qui priorise la santé humaine, puis les écosystèmes et enfin les enjeux économiques, être parvenu à imposer l’agriculture comme « d’intérêt général majeur » dans la loi inverse cette hiérarchie. On normalise le fait qu’en cas de sécheresse, l’activité économique vaut autant que la préservation de l’environnement. Une mégabassine est présumée dans la loi Duplomb d’intérêt général majeur.

    F. B. : Et quand on parle de « l’agriculture qui a besoin d’eau », il faut rappeler quelques ordres de grandeur. L’agriculture représente 60 % de la consommation d’eau douce en France, 92 % de cette eau-là va à l’agriculture irriguée. Et les surfaces irriguées en France, c’est 7 à 8 % des surfaces. Donc, 93 % du monde agricole n’a pas besoin de beaucoup d’eau. Ce n’est pas « l’agriculture » qui a besoin d’énormément d’eau mais un certain modèle agro-industriel qui produit de la céréale, dont en bout de chaîne 7 % environ sert finalement à l’alimentation humaine.

    Vous dites que c’est la répression des manifestant·es de Sainte-Soline contre les mégabassines qui vous a donné l’envie de faire ce livre. Pourquoi ?

    F. B. : L’usage extrême de la violence pour réprimer des militants qui défendaient l’eau comme un patrimoine commun, ce qui est inscrit dans la loi, nous a effectivement frappés. L’idée d’accaparement de l’eau était au cœur de cette mobilisation et cela nous a conduits à nous interroger sur les acteurs qui aujourd’hui accaparent cette ressource avec le soutien de l’État.

    N. C. : Concernant l’agriculture, c’était intéressant d’essayer d’enquêter sur le fonctionnement de ce petit monde du lobbying de la FNSEA. Le principal syndicat agricole a un groupe dédié spécialement au lobbying sur la production du maïs, et ce lobby a son propre lobby interne spécialement dédié à l’irrigation du maïs. Pourquoi ? Parce qu’on a besoin de beaucoup d’eau pour le maïs, et en particulier au pic de chaleur, parce que c’est une plante tropicale.

    Ils ont travaillé à diffuser l’idée, notamment dans les médias, qu’il fallait absolument stocker l’eau d’hiver pour l’été parce que sinon l’eau « partirait à la mer ». En fait, d’après les compréhensions du cycle de l’eau, il est au contraire important de laisser l’eau s’infiltrer dans la terre, être stockée dans des zones humides, comme l’expliquent les hydrogéologues. Le lobbying de la FNSEA a aussi consisté à faire travailler le concept de « souveraineté alimentaire », qui signifiait initialement la capacité de manger ce qu’on produit, et qui désigne à présent la capacité de choisir vers qui l’on exporte notre production. Au nom de la « souveraineté alimentaire », on soutient les producteurs de maïs qui exportent pour nourrir le bétail.

    Et vous montrez aussi comment désormais la transition écologique – avec le besoin d’électrifier les usages – sert aussi de prétexte à sécuriser l’accès à l’eau pour les industriels des semi-conducteurs ou des data centers.

    F. B. : Oui, parce qu’on a une transition écologique qui est carbo-réductionniste, c’est-à-dire qui s’intéresse uniquement aux émissions de CO2, en occultant tout le reste. Et, effectivement, l’électrification, comme le numérique, implique une course aux métaux, ce qui veut dire des besoins colossaux en eau.
    C’était important pour nous de déconstruire certaines idées reçues, notamment celle d’une « transition écologique et numérique ».

    Comme si, en soi, le numérique était synonyme de mieux-disant écologique. C’est absolument faux et c’est le fruit d’un récit, forgé depuis des décennies, pour nous faire croire que le numérique s’affranchirait de la matière et de la pression sur les écosystèmes.

    En réalité, depuis les mines, en passant par la production de semi-conducteurs, le fonctionnement des data centers, jusqu’à tous les appareils numériques qu’on a entre nos mains, on a un continuum qui demande beaucoup, beaucoup de matières premières et, à chacune des étapes, énormément d’eau. À un moment, ce n’est plus soutenable.

    Face à ce secteur-là qui est dans une croissance exponentielle, notamment en raison du développement de l’intelligence artificielle (IA), il y a une forme de gouffre hydrique qui se présente devant nous. Il faut se rappeler que le secteur des data centers, c’est 30 % de croissance par an. Aux États-Unis, on construit plus de data centers que de bureaux. Là, le côté systémique est intéressant, car qui pointe le bout de son nez dans cette équation-là ? Ce sont les acteurs industriels de l’eau, qui disent : « Vous n’y arrivez pas, mais on peut vous construire une usine de désalinisation, on peut produire de l’eau pour vous. »

    Effectivement, vous le montrez bien, plus la ressource en eau est dégradée, plus il y a un marché.

    N. C. : Oui, ce sont des sortes d’intérêts bien compris où le secteur des technologies de dépollution de l’eau devient l’acteur qui permet aux autres leur forme d’accaparement. Sans ces « solutions » de traitement de l’eau de plus en plus complexes et chères, on serait obligés de se demander justement comment on utilise l’eau, comment on se la partage. En somme, de questionner les usages de l’eau.

    Là-dessus, nous racontons comment des géants de l’eau comme Veolia, Suez et d’autres, qui faisaient leur business en distribuant l’eau dans les villes, ont été obligés de revoir leur modèle, prenant acte d’un mouvement de remunicipalisation (à la suite de nombreux scandales financiers notamment). Ils se présentent depuis une dizaine d’années comme des champions de la « transition écologique » et de la dépollution. D’après leurs déclarations aux investisseurs, leurs clients ne sont pourtant pas les usagers individuels, vous et moi, qui avons besoin d’eau pure au robinet : leurs principales cibles commerciales sont les infrastructures industrielles, comme les data centers ou les usines de semi-conducteurs, qui ont besoin d’eau très pure pour ne pas corroder leurs équipements, etc.

    Ces procédés sont aussi extrêmement énergivores et ont des effets délétères sur les écosystèmes. L’eau relève d’enjeux éminemment locaux. Ce qui est prélevé ici ne peut pas être compensé en remplissant une nappe à l’autre bout du pays. Et puis derrière, quid de tous les autres effets de l’extraction minière, sur la biodiversité, sur la destruction des terres arables qu’on utilise pour alimenter cette machine ?

    F. B. : Ce solutionnisme technologique est un autre nom pour le business as usual et la destruction du vivant. La réutilisation des eaux grises, qui semble être du bon sens, c’est une façon de ne pas questionner les usages, de les pérenniser, et c’est de l’eau qui n’est pas rendue aux milieux. Donc, cela portera atteinte à la bonne santé des écosystèmes.

    Et puis, on peut dérouler le même raisonnement sur la désalinisation, qui répond à la même logique, avec toujours des conséquences très lourdes d’un point de vue écologique. L’impensé, c’est celui des interdépendances. On ne peut pas traiter le sujet de l’eau isolément, sans traiter celui de la biodiversité, de la santé des milieux, de la santé humaine. Alors que dans le débat public, dans les discours politiques, le sujet a tendance à être traité de manière uniquement technique, comme une question de flux, de stocks. Les industriels de l’eau parlent de « produire de l’eau », comme si on pouvait en fabriquer de toutes pièces, ce qui est complètement inepte.

    L’eau en bouteille a historiquement construit son modèle économique sur celui de la santé. Les industriels ne voient pas d’un mauvais œil l’inquiétude grandir sur la qualité de l’eau.

    F. B. : Le risque avec l’eau en bouteille, deux mille fois plus énergivore que l’eau du robinet, c’est que cela devienne effectivement une réponse de marché à un problème public, qui est celui de la qualité de l’eau. Et en même temps, l’industrie de l’embouteillage a subi quand même des revers, des polémiques qui font que la pureté supposée des eaux en bouteille en a pris un coup. Un doute est en train de se diffuser autour des eaux en bouteille, avec, évidemment, le cas emblématique de Nestlé, mais pas uniquement.

    Et il y a tout ce qu’on ne veut pas voir quand on parle de qualité de l’eau au sens large, qu’il s’agisse de l’eau en bouteille ou du robinet. Il y a plein de choses qu’on ne tente pas de détecter. Sur la question des PFAS, c’est particulièrement interpellant. On se rend compte qu’on contrôle 20 PFAS depuis janvier 2026, alors que l’EPA américaine parle de 14 000 variétés de PFAS ou qu’une autre agence américaine évoque plutôt 2 millions. Il y aurait sans doute une panique morale totale si on commençait à essayer de détecter tout ça.

    N. C. : Face aux pollutions au PFAS, aux pesticides, on se dit : soit on boit de l’eau en bouteille, soit on « maxifiltre » l’eau qui va arriver au robinet. Et c’est ce qu’on voit en Île-de-France avec le projet du Syndicat des eaux de la région, qui est un projet à 1 milliard pour avoir de l’eau potable pour une partie des communes d’Île-de-France, dont Paris ne fait pas partie. Ce projet mise très majoritairement sur le traitement, alors qu’il serait entre cinq et dix fois moins cher de prévenir plutôt que guérir, d’après certaines études. La régie publique Eau de Paris, par exemple, a essayé de passer des pactes avec les agriculteurs pour avoir moins d’épandage de pesticides, donc ils peuvent se permettre de mettre en place des solutions de traitement moins coûteuses.

    Mais certains y trouvent leur compte. L’entreprise DuPont, qui est une grande émettrice de PFAS, est la même qui vend des membranes de filtration des PFAS pour potabiliser l’eau. Water Europe, qui est le lobby européen des entreprises de traitement de l’eau, dont Suez-Veolia et autres, demande à la Commission européenne 255 milliards sur cinq ans, juste pour investir dans ces technologies de traitement. Il y a un risque de système à deux vitesses, entre les grandes métropoles qui pourront investir dans ces systèmes très coûteux de dépollution de l’eau et des communautés de communes rurales pour lesquelles ce sera beaucoup trop cher.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/ecologie/080526/megabassines-data-centers-la-guerre-contre-l-eau-s-est-intensifiee
    #centres_de_données #guerre_de_l'eau #privatisation #rareté #pollution #sécheresse #eau_potable #pesticides #PFAS #Sainte-Soline #accaparement #guerre_contre_l’eau #agriculture #préfectorialisation #démocratie #démocratie_locale #reverticalisation #économie #intérêts_économiques #lobbying #santé #écosystèmes #intérêt_général_majeur #loi_Duplomb #irrigation #industrie_agro-alimentaire #répression #résistance #violence #FNSEA #maïs #cycle_de_l’eau #souveraineté_alimentaire #élevage #bétail #transition #numérique #matières_premières #IA #AI #intelligence_artificielle #data_centers #centres_de_données #dépollution #Veolia #Suez #business #remunicipalisation #municipalisation #semi-conducteurs #énergie #techno-solutionnisme #eaux_grises #désalinisation #interdépendances #biodiversité #eau_en_bouteille #Nestlé #qualité #qualité_de_l'eau #pesticides #business #DuPont #filtration #Water_Europe

    • Les Assoiffeurs. Enquête sur ces entreprises qui accaparent notre eau

      Le 25 mars 2023, à Sainte-Soline, un déluge de grenades s’abat sur les manifestants. Plusieurs personnes restent à terre. Deux tombent dans le coma. Marqués par cet épisode, Fabien Benoit et Nicolas Celnik se lancent dans une vaste investigation et découvrent que les mégabassines ne sont que l’arbre qui cache la forêt.

      Ils livrent ici les résultats de leur enquête, menée sur plus de deux ans, sur ces entreprises qui ont fait main basse sur l’eau, ces « assoiffeurs » qui ont privatisé ce bien commun et prévoient désormais de tirer profit de la pénurie qui s’annonce, avec le soutien de l’État.

      Cet ouvrage entend mettre à jour les stratégies et plans pensés par ces entreprises pour accroître encore leur emprise en faisant appel au solutionnisme technologique, qui nous enserre collectivement et nous empêche d’enclencher une véritable discussion politique et démocratique sur le partage de l’eau.

      Du lobbying en faveur des mégabassines aux efforts des grands acteurs du numérique pour masquer leur consommation d’eau, en passant par les manœuvres des producteurs de PFAS pour vendre des solutions dépolluantes à des prix exorbitants, ce livre-enquête révèle l’ampleur du dévoiement de la « démocratie de l’eau à la française », court-circuitée par des collusions politiques et jeux de pouvoir.

      https://www.editionslesliensquiliberent.fr/livre-Les_Assoiffeurs-9791020923691-1-1-0-1.html
      #livre

    • et Veolia c’est qui ? c’est Bolloré.
      Et quels sont les députés qui ont refusé de laisser les premiers m3 d’eau gratuits aux pauvres ? c’est les députés fachos, oups les nazis, oups les députés du parti fondé par des nazis.
      A Toulouse ils te collent du Eau-Toulouse-Metropole mais en fait derrière c’est Véolia Bolloré. Du Moudenc tout craché. Et l’eau est devenue plus cher l’été, tour de passe passe.

  • La Frontiera, ovunque. Centri d’Italia 2026

    823 minori soli nei Centri per adulti dal 2023 al 2025, mentre in accoglienza dedicata c’è posto
    Nessuna invasione, ma il Governo Meloni “programma” l’emergenza del sistema

    Assegnati porti lontani per gli sbarchi delle Ong senza che i centri al Sud siano sovraffollati

    Il sistema di accoglienza italiano riproduce ogni anno un’emergenza interna, voluta dalle scelte pubbliche, in assenza di arrivi da “invasione”. Gli accolti a fine 2024, 134.549 persone, sono lo 0,23% della popolazione residente. Grandi centri e sovraffollamento, crescita dei gestori profit, servizi per l’integrazione ridotti, aumento elevato della prima accoglienza, diminuzione dei controlli delle prefetture e mancata protezione del minore. Queste le conseguenze di uno stato “eccezionale” trasformato a regola, che penalizza i più vulnerabili, prima di tutto i minori stranieri non accompagnati. ActionAid, in collaborazione con Openpolis, ricostruisce quanto accade nei CAS-centri di accoglienza straordinaria, centri governativi di prima accoglienza e SAI-centri degli enti locali con il report “La Frontiera, ovunque. Centri d’Italia 2026”. Dati inediti ottenuti con oltre 70 procedure di richiesta a Ministeri e Prefetture*.

    “La quantità di Decreti e norme introdotte dal Governo Meloni in quattro anni ha trasformato l’accoglienza da tutela delle persone straniere in un mero dispositivo di filtro e contenimento. Il futuro è già qui: l’applicazione del Patto europeo su Asilo e migrazione, infatti, è già iniziata, e i dati lo mostrano inequivocabilmente. Tra il 2021 e il 2024 la capienza della prima accoglienza sale da 3.460 a 6.357 posti (+83,7%), e gli hotspot passano da 611 a 3.054 posti e da 3 a 11 strutture.
    Cresce il segmento che concentra identificazione, screening e smistamento. La frontiera si sposta dentro i confini nazionali dove le procedure su ammissibilità, priorità e trasferimenti si fanno più rapide, rendendo più instabile il passaggio da prima assistenza ad accoglienza effettiva. L’opacità è parte dell’approccio del governo, che rende meno visibili le conseguenze delle scelte amministrative sulla vita delle persone, e sottrae queste scelte al controllo parlamentare e della società civile” – dichiara Fabrizio Coresi, esperto Migrazioni ActionAid.

    L’emergenza programmata: sovraffollamento, aumento del for profit, centri e gestori sempre più grandi.Nel 2024 i CAS ospitano 96.738 persone, 71,9% del totale. Il SAI si ferma al 24,7% e la prima accoglienza al 3,4%. Non programmare equivale a predisporre le basi di un’emergenza costante in un sistema, privo di un assetto stabile, trasparente e controllabile. Il sovraffollamento, per esempio, impatta quasi esclusivamente sui CAS adulti. Su 6.024 strutture prefettizie attive nel 2024, 973 risultano oltre la capienza stabilita, 520 sono oltre il 120% e 13 hanno presenze pari al doppio della capienza. Parallelamente crescono i gestori for profit: il numero dei posti passa da 7.089 a 14.813 tra 2022 e 2024 (+109%). Insieme all’assenza di competenze e alla penetrazione nel mercato di soggetti con scopo di lucro, il rafforzamento dei centri medi e grandi (il 36,0% della capacità di accoglienza è concentrata in centri sopra i 50 posti) e il maggior peso dei grandi gestori (i primi dieci controllano il 19,1% dei posti totali), mostrano che si tende a premiare la riduzione di costi dovuta a grandi volumi e scarsi servizi. La Croce Rossa Italiana, con le sue articolazioni territoriali, gestisce 5.743 posti e Medihospes 5.233. Quest’ultimo soggetto cresce del 40,1% tra 2022 e 2024 e gestisce il 44,45% dell’accoglienza nella città metropolitana di Roma (il 54,61% per il solo Comune).

    I minori stranieri soli nei CAS adulti, simbolo di un fallimento. ActionAid ha per la prima volta monitorato gli effetti del Decreto-legge 133/2023 che introduce la possibilità eccezionale – in casi di comprovata emergenza – di introdurre minori sopra i 16 anni temporaneamente nei Centri per adulti. Su un campione di 29 prefetture (la totalità di quelle che ospitano Msna in Cas adulti a fine 2024), a fine novembre 2025 sono almeno 823 i ragazzi registrati dal 2023 in queste strutture, ma 138 di questi erano già in centri per adulti prima del varo della norma. La legge istituzionalizza così una prassi fino ad allora illegittima. Almeno 16 prefetture registrano permanenze oltre 90 giorni (tempo ordinario consentito dalla nuova norma), ma sono almeno 13 quelle che vanno oltre i 150 giorni, con picchi fino a 1.413 giorni. Una forma stabile di accoglienza impropria, priva di servizi educativi e abitativi adatti alla minore età. Ma tutto questo avviene in violazione della stessa norma: mentre si mandano i minori nei Cas per adulti, ci sono posti liberi nei circuiti loro dedicati nello stesso comune, provincia o regione. In 9 prefetture esistono infatti posti liberi nel comune, in 21 prefetture ve ne sono liberi almeno in provincia e in tutte le 29 esaminate esistono disponibilità in regione. Ad allarmare ancora di più è l’uscita dal sistema dell’accoglienza dei minori: abbandoni, allontanamenti e revoche (almeno 407) sono il segno più tangibile del fallimento della tutela dei più fragili. Altri indicatori del fallimento riguardano il sistema Sai. Nel segmento dedicato ai Msna, a fine novembre 2025, vi erano solo 43 posti liberi su 6.563 e, nello stesso momento (dal gennaio 2023), le richieste pendenti di inserimento arrivavano a 4.725. Nessun collegamento efficace tra sistemi, nessuna tutela effettiva.

    Le mancate ispezioni dei Centri. La debolezza dei controlli è evidente e preoccupante: secondo i dati ottenuti da ActionAid dal Ministero dell’Interno, nel 2024 si sono svolti 1.564 controlli (con sanzioni per i gestori pari a circa 677mila euro). Ci sono poli iper-monitorati come Napoli (100% delle strutture), Potenza 93,2%) e Caserta (il 95,6%) e grandi zone cieche come le Prefetture di Roma, Frosinone e Ravenna. Queste ultime sono le prime tre prefetture italiane per posti gestiti sulle 33 totali, dove non si registrano controlli nel 2024 (nel 2019 erano 13). Le ispezioni inoltre diminuiscono rispetto al passato: se nel 2019 era stato raggiunto il 40,5 per cento, nel 2024 le ispezioni riguardano solo il 19,1% delle strutture. In pratica, quattro centri su cinque non vengono controllati.

    Dal mare all’accoglienza. Il report dimostra anche come l’assegnazione di porti lontani voluta con il Decreto Piantedosi di inizio 2023 usi pretestuosamente il soccorso in mare come leva per la distribuzione territoriale e prolunghi il dispositivo della frontiera anche dentro il sistema ordinario d’accoglienza. Una scelta non giustificata da reali esigenze di sovraffollamento dei Centri al Sud. Emblematico il caso del 31 dicembre 2023, quando ad una Ong è stato assegnato un porto nel Lazio. Lo sbarco ha coinvolto 55 persone, tra cui 15 minori e 13 MSNA. Nello stesso giorno, lungo il corridoio Sud-Tirreno formato da Sicilia, Calabria, Campania e Lazio, risultavano 6.370 posti inutilizzati, pari a quasi 116 volte le persone sbarcate. Aumentano dunque gli sbarchi nei porti lontani (oltre un terzo delle persone soccorse da navi Ong vengono sbarcate al centro-nord) e il peso dei salvataggi delle Ong (oltre il 16% del totale), che, con la giustificazione inconsistente della distribuzione del carico dell’accoglienza, vengono allontanate dall’area SAR del Mediterraneo. Aumentano anche i minori soli: quando una quota elevata di persone minorenni viene fatta permanere più a lungo in mare e poi redistribuita verso territori lontani, cresce il rischio di collocamenti impropri, di rallentamento della tutela e di ulteriore frattura tra luogo del salvataggio, screening iniziale e presa in carico successiva.

    * In dettaglio: 40 istanze di accesso civico generalizzato ad altrettante Prefetture e oltre 20 tra istanze di riesame e richieste informali di chiarimento; 12 istanze di accesso civico e altrettante richieste di riesame al Ministero dell’Interno con il coinvolgimento del Dipartimento Libertà Civili e Immigrazione e del Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza – Polizia delle Frontiere, e del Servizio Centrale; un’istanza e relativo riesame rispettivamente al Ministero della Giustizia e alla Commissione Nazionale per l’Asilo.

    https://www.actionaid.it/press-area/frontiera-ovunque-centri-italia-2026
    #rapport #Italie #ActionAid #migrations #réfugiés #asile #urgence #accueil #frontière_partout #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #chiffres #statistiques #hotspots #pacte_migration_et_asile #frontière_mobile #urgence_programmée #CAS #SAI #privatisation #business #profit #Medihospes #Croix-Rouge #ports #débarquement

  • Japan Is Building a War Machine in the East China Sea
    https://jacobin.com/2026/04/japan-takaichi-military-us-china

    Les États Unis continuent la cinstruction d’une énirme force militaire internationale contre la Chine. LeJapone y fournit la proncipale contribution. Le gouvernement Takaichi Sanae préparel’augmentation du budget militaite à cinq pour cent du PIB et l’abandon officiel du pacifisme constitutionnel du pays.

    16.4.2026 by Gavan McCormack - Japan’s conservative leader, Takaichi Sanae, won a supermajority of seats in this ’s general election. Takaichi and her allies are using this position of strength to advance a dangerous militarist agenda as part of Washington’s anti-China front.

    Less than six months after her assumption of office as Japan’s 104th (and first female) prime minister, and two months since her rise was confirmed by a resounding victory in a national election, the grip of Takaichi Sanae on the levers of state is unchallenged, and her support level remains high.

    However, thoughtful and historically aware commentators are speculating that a fundamental transition of the state might be underway, one from “peace state” to “war state.” Looking back to the Konoe Fumimaro government of 1937, which in retrospect we can see as taking the steps that led to a catastrophic war four years later, they fear that Takaichi might be replaying that scenario.
    Supermajority

    On February 8, 2026, the Japanese people went to the polls for an election to the lower house of the National Diet. It was generally taken to be a test of the latest government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed in October 2025. With the party leader Takaichi enjoying support levels of around 70 percent, the election outcome was scarcely in doubt, but its scale still took many by surprise. Takaichi took the LDP from 198 seats (short of the 233 needed for a parliamentary majority) to 316 seats, giving the LDP a two-thirds supermajority.

    She confronted an opposition led by the mildly reformist Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), a new force formed through a merger of the former Constitutional Democratic Party and the neo-Buddhist Komeito, a long-standing coalition partner of the LDP. Having set out to increase its Diet strength, the CRA suffered instead a humiliating loss, dropping from 167 to forty-nine seats.

    In the long history of the LDP from its foundation in 1955, no leader had ever performed quite so brilliantly as Takaichi. She emerged from the election with political power greater even than her sometime mentor, Abe Shinzo. Her supermajority in the Diet meant that, unlike previous LDP governments, she could press confidently ahead with her rightist agenda, including steps for constitutional revision.

    However, this electoral victory did not necessarily reflect overwhelming national support. The 56 percent turnout was the fifth-lowest in the postwar era. In the single-member constituency seats, the LDP won 49 percent of votes cast, while in the regional party-list seats, it took just 37 percent. Such are the vagaries of the electoral system that the support of 28 percent of all those eligible to vote was sufficient to gain the party two-thirds of all seats.

    End of the “Peace State”?

    Eight decades have now passed since the collapse in 1945 of Japan’s Asia-Pacific community, the so-called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and the message that many Japanese people took from that catastrophe was clear. Under Article Nine of the constitution adopted in 1946, Japan pledged to renounce “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” adding that “land, sea, and air forces . . . will never be maintained.”

    Although periodic polls always show strong popular support for Article Nine, Japan did nevertheless over time build formidable land, sea, and air forces, evading the constitutional proscription by calling them “Self-Defense Forces” (SDF). The pacifist pledge, unrevised but steadily emptied of content, remains, but the 1946 aspiration to create a new kind of state, one resting on the “peace” principle, was largely forgotten. Over subsequent decades, the United States came to regret its recrafting of Japan as a “peace state” and began exerting pressure on it to revive and expand its military.

    The level of Japanese military spending rose steadily throughout the Cold War, though remaining for long within the self-imposed limit of 1 percent of GDP. The size of Japan’s economy meant that this was still a large amount in absolute terms. However, as GDP growth slowed, in 2022 the level doubled to 2 percent, with an overall target of 43 trillion yen (US$355 billion) for the five-year period from 2022 to 2027.

    Roughly on schedule to reach that target, military spending for the first time surpassed nine trillion yen ($58 billion) in 2025. Under Takaichi, we can expect further steady expansion. If we assume that Japan will be an early adopter of NATO’s target of 3.5 percent of GDP for military expenditure, the nine trillion would blow out to 24 trillion yen — roughly $140 billion. This is a staggering sum that would require drastic cuts to health, education, and welfare budgets. If it goes further by adopting NATO’s second target of 5 percent by 2035, which Donald Trump is believed to be demanding of Japan, the sums involved beggar the imagination.

    Eventually, and especially under the Abe Shinzo government in office from 2012 to 2020, Article Nine–based restrictions were swept aside, spending accelerated, and Japanese and US military forces were reinforced and integrated. After taking office in October 2025, Takaichi promised further, substantial increases in maritime and air defense (including long-range hypersonic missiles), along with a commitment to construction and deployment of a missile defense umbrella, to be known as a Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated, Enhanced, Littoral Defense (SHIELD) system.

    One of Takaichi’s closest advisers late in 2025 even questioned the commitment to “Three Nonnuclear Principles” — nonpossession, nonmanufacture, and nonadmission of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory — that the LDP government adopted in 1967. The prime minister herself is reported to agree and has been reviewing the “three nons” policy.

    Those who celebrated the Washington-Tokyo alliance as “the cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region” took it for granted that Japan would exercise “bold leadership” and that Japan’s forces would constitute a significant component reinforcing US global dominance. Over and under the East China Sea, battleships and aircraft carriers, missile and countermissile systems, fighter jets and submarines — not only Japanese and American, but also British, French, Australian, Canadian, and German — are stepping up their rehearsal of a possible future war between a US-led coalition of the willing and China.

    Under such conditions, it is unthinkable that Japan’s heavily armed forces could ever operate independently. They constitute in effect a “second US Army.”
    Okinawa

    A significant US military presence — approximately 26,000 US personnel, or half the total stationed in Japan — is positioned on Okinawa Island, where attention focuses on the hugely unpopular and still hotly contested Henoko base being built there by Japan for the US Marine Corps to replace the obsolescent Futenma. Meanwhile, Japan over the past decade has steadily expanded its own military presence on its lesser-known islands.

    Under strong US pressure, it has deployed, or is in the process of deploying, missile and countermissile units in a series of new and under-construction bases, decisively changing the character of the Ryukyu island chain that stretches from Kagoshima to Taiwan. The size and population of these islands range from Mage (area 8.5 square kilometers, population zero) to Okinawa itself (area 1,206 square kilometers, population 1.4 million). In geographical terms, a line drawn from Kagoshima City in western Japan to the northern shores of Taiwan passes through these islands. Japan and the United States appear to believe that, if or when the need arises, they can “bottle up” China and deny it access to the Pacific Ocean.

    Japan’s southwestern frontier islands of Mage and Yonaguni deserve particular attention. Mage in the north is closest to Kagoshima, while the sparsely populated Yonaguni in the south is just 110 kilometers from the coast of Taiwan. Mage, which is adjacent to the Japanese space industry island of Tanegashima, was initially chosen to house US carrier-based fighter jet takeoff and landing exercises.

    This gradually evolved into a project to accommodate all three of Japan’s military forces (Ground, Sea, and Air SDFs) together with unspecified numbers of their US counterparts. The project would be under the auspices of an arrangement that ensures ultimate Pentagon coordination, control, and command of Japanese military operations throughout the adjacent seas. From 2021, a six-thousand-strong workforce was mobilized to this remote island site, and the date for completion of the base construction works was moved forward to 2030.

    Yonaguni is close enough to Taiwan that on a clear day, its mountains can be seen. Occasional Taiwanese friendship missions have landed on Yonaguni beaches from motorized jet skis. The community split over the government’s commitment to install a major military installation on the island, although a February 2015 island referendum did not win enough support to block the plan. A site was chosen, and in March 2016, an initial 160-strong Ground SDF unit marched in.

    Mage and Yonaguni, both once renowned for the richness of their biodiversity, thus have become centers for the preparation and conduct of war. Military facilities of one kind or another soon followed on the other islands.

    Filling in the Blanks

    Throughout the Cold War decades, what distinguished the southwestern islands (other than Okinawa itself) was the absence of US military installations. Undefended, they posed no threat and were themselves unthreatened. Those who knew the islands in their premilitary base days — this author among them — remember them as idyllic.

    But to bureaucrats and SDF top brass in Tokyo, not to mention the Pentagon, the absence of such military forces gradually became of paramount concern in national defense doctrine. The raison d’être for these Okinawan islands became their positions as US-Japan bastions from which to project force in the service of the regional and global hegemonic project.

    The nominal reason for the militarization of the “first island chain” is to defend Taiwan in case of a “contingency.” This is the euphemistic sobriquet by which war over Taiwan between China and Taiwan has come to be contemplated since Abe Shinzo’s statement (repeated by Takaichi in 2025) that “a Taiwan contingency would be a Japan contingency.”

    The broader role assigned to the first island chain is to position US-Japan power in a place where it can contain a rising China in the region that has come to be known as the Indo-Pacific. The United States insists on its own “full-spectrum dominance,” meaning global economic, technological, and military hegemony. To the extent that it challenges (or appears to challenge) that prerogative, China “threatens” the US.

    A sane defense policy for a country such as Japan — or indeed for any country — would surely be one that attached highest importance to avoiding dispute and building cooperation, rather than striving to “win.” Any East Asian war today or tomorrow would be a missile war, involving naval and air power, and could conceivably become nuclear.

    Missile and antimissile units are now being installed on the southwestern islands, including four hundred “off the shelf” Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles for which Japan placed an order late in 2022. Such missiles are said to be capable of attacking forces within a 1,500-kilometer radius (including major centers in Russia, China, and North Korea).

    Regardless of who “wins” such a war, damage and devastation would be assured for all sides. Contemplating such catastrophe, Okinawans recall their sacrifice in the spring of 1945 in the final battle of the Pacific War, which took the lives of more than one-fourth of the Okinawan population.

    Japan’s authorities might issue an “alert” warning in case of conflict breaking out, as was done on the occasion of several recent North Korean missile launches. But in the 2020s, just as in 1945, there would simply be no time for the Okinawan civilians to withdraw to safety, and indeed nowhere for them to go.

    A Peace Community

    Ironically, the Okinawa now being militarized and readied for war with China has a five-hundred-year-long history of friendly interchange between the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Ming and Qing China dynasties. The Okinawan people do not share the militaristic Japanese Bushido ethic. There is no evidence of the Chinese resorting to violence in their relations with the Ryukyu authorities over the course of those centuries, and the exchanges are still remembered and celebrated in Naha today.

    In contrast, Okinawa’s incorporation into the modern Japanese state was accompanied with great violence, from the torture-induced assent by Ryukyu Kingdom elites to the absorption of the Ryukyu Kingdom and its territories into Japan in 1879. This was followed by violent attempts to crush the distinctive Okinawan language and identity and by the catastrophe of 1945, when Okinawa alone among Japanese territories suffered the horror of land war. The violence continues, with an ongoing assault from the contemporary Japanese state trying to break the Okinawan will for a nonmilitarized East China Sea community.

    Under successive prefectural governors, the realization has grown that in order to overcome the threat of war, it is necessary to shift the emphasis from preparing for war to creating peace. This author recalls discussions with former Okinawan governor Ōta Masahide, in office from 1990 to 1998, on the need to combat East China Sea militarist agendas by taking the initiative in building an East China Sea peace community.

    Unfortunately, that suggestion went nowhere — shortly after our conversation, an intense campaign by the national government drove Governor Ōta from office. Yet the urgency of taking such steps is so much greater now than it was during Ōta’s term of office.
    Dynamics of War

    However much Japan under Takaichi scrimps and shifts resources from social services to its military, the logic of the bottom line is inexorable. The Japan that as recently as 1994 accounted for 17.8 percent of global GDP has now shrunk to just 3.4 percent after a long period of economic stagnation.

    Meanwhile, China’s GDP, having been one-quarter of Japan’s in 1991, surpassed it in 2001 and quadrupled it in 2018. The gap has continued to widen since then. With the size of China’s economy now amounting to four times that of Japan’s and its share of world economic output, according to the CIA, a formidable 19 percent, the absurdity — not to speak of the criminality — of any US-Japan design to take down such a country is plain.

    Eighty years after suffering devastating defeat in war, Japan again stands at a crossroads, facing a choice — of which its citizens are largely unaware — over whether to maintain and consolidate the US-led global anti-China front or to commit to building a peaceful East Asian community of nations. With her supermajority in the lower house of the Diet, most observers anticipate that Takaichi will press ahead with her long-term dream of constitutional change, deleting or at least fundamentally revising Article Nine.

    The post–World War II Asia-Pacific settlement thus continues to morph from the 1947 declaration of peace toward a dynamic of war and war preparation. China, outraged by US-Japanese-led attempts to freeze it out of regional and global institutions, pours a high proportion of its formidable and rapidly growing resources into its military, reinforcing its presence in the East and South China Seas in particular.

    Meanwhile, Japan deploys tanks and missiles to its remote islands, conducts evacuation drills, and urges local residents to make contingency plans for war. The US Marine Corps “repurposes” its Okinawa-based units, facilitating their deployment to other islands and arming them with antiship missiles for use against Chinese shipping in the event of any Taiwan “contingency.”

    In October 2025, Takaichi had Donald Trump’s enthusiastic support as she ascended to high office in Tokyo. Once in office, she positioned herself as his faithful servant, committed to “making America great again.” One of her first tasks was to put together an enormous “aid” package worth $550 billion (approximately 80 trillion yen) to assist the Trump project and to further Japan’s clientelist incorporation into his emerging global order, opening the door for a “new golden era” (Trump’s words last October).

    Takaichi was the only leader of the old G7 who had no word of criticism of the joint US/Israeli war on Iran this year, and she alone seemed to have no compunction about issuing a grovelling public pledge to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Probably no one in the world could share the sentiment expressed by Takaichi on sitting beside the president in the Oval Office on March 19: “It is only you, Donald, who can bring peace and prosperity to the world.”

    In this scenario, Japan would be an unquestionable military superpower, number three in the world after the United States and China. Regional states with reason to know, fear, and remember Japanese militarism, Australia included, show little if any interest in Japanese constitutional matters. To the extent they are aware of it at all, they dismiss Article Nine as a quixotic survival from a bygone age. With the constitution steadily sidelined, Japan is already one of the world’s “great” military powers. Paradoxically, the more it builds up its “defenses,” trusting its destiny to the genocidal rogue superpower, the less secure it becomes.

    As the constitutional peace state of 1946 morphs into a military superpower, it is surely time that civic groups in Japan and Australia (and other Pacific Rim countries) joined to shift their governments from the war path and toward one of peaceful cooperation. If anything is to be done with Article Nine, it should be to restate, reinforce, and universalize the peace principle, not to delete or dilute it.

    #Japon #USA #Chine #armement #guerre #impérialusme #Bushido

  • Greenpeace-Studie : Öl-Konzerne kassieren täglich 21 Millionen Euro an Übergewinnen an der Zapfsäule

    Hamburg, 16. 3. 2026 - Mineralölkonzerne in Deutschland verdienen an den deutlich gestiegenen Spritpreisen seit Beginn des Irankriegs täglich 21 Millionen Euro. Das zeigt eine neue Studie des Energieexperten Steffen Bukold im Auftrag von Greenpeace. (https://act.gp/40zbeAf) Die Studie zeigt, dass die Preise an den Zapfsäulen weit stärker gestiegen sind als die zugrundeliegenden Rohölpreise. Die massiv ausgeweiteten Gewinnmargen bescheren der Branche hohe Übergewinne auf Kosten der Autofahrenden: Allein in Deutschland verdienen die Konzerne bei Diesel zusätzliche 17,9 Millionen Euro und bei Benzin 3,2 Millionen Euro - pro Tag.

    „Im Iran sterben Menschen, in Europa ächzen Millionen unter massiv gestiegenen Preisen und die Ölkonzerne stopfen sich an der Tankstelle die Taschen voll - das ist widerlich und muss sofort gestoppt werden. Die Bundesregierung muss diese Übergewinne abschöpfen und das Geld so investieren, dass wir künftig unabhängiger werden von fossilen Abzockern und Kriegsprofiteuren. Mit den 21 Millionen Euro an täglichen Extragewinnen der Konzerne könnte der Bund pro Tag 1300 kleine E-Autos verschenken.“ (Lena Donat, Greenpeace Verkehrsexpertin)

    Mit dem Betrag könnte die Bundesregierung alternativ jeden Tag 840 Haushalten eine Wärmepumpe inklusive Einbau, 35.000 Haushalten ein Balkonkraftwerk oder 27.700 Menschen ein kostenloses ÖPNV-Jahresticket schenken.

    Keinen plausiblen Grund für deutlicher gestiegene Dieselpreise

    Die Studie widerlegt das Argument der Branche, sie reiche lediglich Weltmarktpreise weiter. Da fast alle Raffinerien in Deutschland im Besitz derselben Konzerne sind, die auch die Tankstellennetze kontrollieren, besteht eine enorme Marktmacht. Besonders brisant: Heimische Raffinerien produzieren seit Jahren mehr Benzin, als Deutschland verbraucht – eine Abhängigkeit von verteuerten Importen, die den Preisanstieg rechtfertigen könnte, existiert hier faktisch nicht. Auch der in Deutschland verkaufte Diesel wird fast ausschließlich im Inland produziert.

    „Die schamlose Willkür der Konzerne zeigt sich bei den viel stärker gestiegenen Dieselpreisen besonders deutlich. Wenn im Grunde jeder Liter Diesel hier raffiniert wird, dann gibt es nur einen plausiblen Grund für die hohen Tankstellenpreise: Gier.“ (Lena Donat, Greenpeace Verkehrsexpertin)

    https://presseportal.greenpeace.de/263401-greenpeace-studie-ol-konzerne-kassieren-taglich-21-mi
    #compagnies_pétrolières #profits #guerre #business #pétrole #rapport #Greenpeace

    • Oil giants pocket extra €81m a day in EU. Here’s how much a windfall tax could cut your energy bill

      Oil companies in the EU are raking in an additional €81.4 million in profits everyday from soaring fuel prices, as experts call for an urgent windfall tax.

      EU governments are under mounting pressure to “urgently tax fossil fuel profits” to slash energy bills and speed-up investment in home-grown renewables.

      A new study from NGO Greenpeace found that oil giants in the EU are raking in an extra €81.4 million in profits every single day, as the war on Iran sends prices soaring. This works out at around €2.5 billion in additional profit for March alone.

      The EU has already warned that oil and gas prices will not go down anytime soon, even if the conflict in the Middle East comes to an end. Member states have since been told to outline measures to reduce oil and gas use, particularly in the transport sector.

      At the current rate of extra profits, the study found that governments could provide 60 million free monthly public transport passes every month, or give all 40 million people struggling to pay their energy bills in the EU €60 every month to bring down expenses.
      Which country would benefit the most from a windfall tax?

      According to Greenpeace, the highest total windfall profits in the EU, since the start of the Iran war, were in Germany, France, Spain and Italy.

      As the largest fuel market in the EU, Germany tops the list and shows an above-average expansion of profit margins in March for both diesel and petrol.

      The highest profit margin increase per litre of diesel was in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Austria, and for petrol it was in Germany, Austria, Spain and Denmark.

      “While people are dying in the Middle East and millions in Europe struggle with skyrocketing fuel prices, governments are letting oil companies line their pockets,” says Ariadna Rodrigo, Greenpeace EU’s political campaigner.

      “They need to urgently introduce higher taxes on all fossil fuel profits and use the money to cut people’s energy bills, deploy cheap, safe and home-grown renewables, and support communities impacted by climate breakdown.”
      Could the EU cut tax on renewables?

      The long term solution to cutting energy bills, which is already being demonstrated in Spain, is investing in homegrown renewables, leading to less reliance on imported fossil fuels. Inflated prices meant these cost the EU an extra €2.5 billion in the first 10 days of the Iran war.

      The short term solution, which governments could implement overnight, is to cut the tax that ordinary people pay.

      Last year, 28 per cent of the average European consumer’s electricity bill went on taxes and levies, according to the IEA.

      Many see this as particularly unfair because taxes on electricity are much higher than on fossil fuels - despite these being the leading cause of the climate and biodiversity crisis. In Spain, taxes on electricity were 4.2 times higher than those on fossil gas in 2025 while Germany’s were 3.2 times higher.

      With the five oil majors earning more than €88 billion in 2024, higher taxation would still leave them in the green.

      European governments are finding clever ways to cut tax on electricity

      Your electricity bill is made up of three parts: energy costs, network or grid fees and taxes. As Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe points out, every component of your bill “depends on policy choices made by governments”.

      Energy costs are what you pay for the electricity you actually use and are determined by many variable factors, such as wholesale electricity costs, time of day and weather conditions. Network or grid fees go towards maintaining the poles, wires and infrastructure that bring electricity into your home or business. While the taxes added to your bill are decided by governments.

      If the average home or business owner is paying less tax, governments will likely need to make up the shortfall. The solution, argues CAN Europe, is “rebalancing taxation away from electricity and toward fossil fuels”.

      Some governments have already successfully reduced electricity prices through tax changes. Germany, which has the highest electricity bills in Europe, managed to reduce annual bills by 16 per cent by taking a levy for renewables off electricity bills and onto general tax bills.

      Denmark came up with the clever solution of making electricity for heating cheaper, thereby rewarding home and business owners who installed heat pumps.

      “The Danish government considers that the tax exemption was in part responsible for the large increase in heat pump installations from 2019-2021 and in 2023,” according to a report from the NGO Regulatory Assistance Project.
      ’Start taxing companies that fuel the climate crisis’

      In response to the current energy crisis, caused by the effective closure of the Hormuz Strait and reduced Middle East energy exports, dozens of countries - including most of Europe - agreed to release a record amount of oil from their emergency reserves.

      Fanny Petitbon of environmental organisation 350.org argues that this is like putting a “band-aid on a gaping wound”.

      “If G7 countries are serious about stabilising the market, they need to stop protecting profits and start taxing companies that fuel the climate crisis,” she says.

      “Working people shouldn’t be paying the price while oil majors treat the war in the Middle East like a winning lottery ticket.”
      Do fossil fuel giants pass taxes onto consumers?

      It’s logical to worry that if fossil fuel giants, like Aramco and Gazprom, had reduced profits due to higher tax they would charge their customers more to make up for the shortfall - resulting in higher bills for consumers.

      But analysis from CAN Europe found this is unlikely to happen: “Economic evidence shows that profit taxes, unlike consumption taxes, are generally not passed on to consumers or other companies, as prices are driven primarily by fuel costs, market design and infrastructure constraints rather than corporate taxation. And there is no significant correlation between higher corporate taxes and higher electricity prices across EU countries.”

      Permanent windfall taxes are the answer

      During Europe’s last big energy shock, after the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022, the bloc introduced a ‘solidarity contribution’ - a temporary windfall tax on fossil fuel profits to help shield households and companies from inflationary energy prices. It raised €28bn, mostly used by EU member states to financially support energy consumers, particularly vulnerable households.

      Many climate-aligned organisations have called for this windfall tax to be brought back and made permanent, creating funds to drive the clean energy transition.

      “In the short term, cutting electricity taxes and introducing targeted support measures funded by taxing the excess profits being made by the fossil fuel industry can give people breathing space for now. But in the long run, fossil fuel profits should be taxed permanently which can be used for future proofing Europe’s energy system through investing in renewables, efficiency, grids and electrification,” says Seda Orhan, Head of Energy at CAN Europe.

      https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/18/give-people-breathing-space-how-european-governments-could-cut-energy-bill

  • Imbottigliati. Inchiesta sul mercato dell’acqua minerale che ci sommerge di plastica

    L’Italia detiene un primato paradossale: è il primo consumatore europeo di acqua in bottiglia, nonostante una rete pubblica sicura e controllata.

    “Imbottigliati” va oltre l’etichetta e svela i meccanismi di un business miliardario che ci lascia in un mare di Pet.

    Dalle concessioni pagate pochi centesimi all’oligopolio dei grandi marchi (otto gruppi controllano il 70% del mercato), l’inchiesta smonta il greenwashing e le promesse di purezza che si traducono in tonnellate di rifiuti.

    Perché i consumi continuano a crescere, malgrado borracce e campagne ambientali? Tra Pfas, plastic tax sospesa e diffidenza verso il rubinetto, questo libro mostra come ogni sorso sia una scelta politica: bene comune o merce?

    https://altreconomia.it/prodotto/imbottigliati
    #livre #plastique #eau #eau_en_bouteille #eau_minérale #Italie #PET #business #déchets #choix_politique

  • Bulgaria prigione d’Europa. Continua il “lavoro sporco” in vista del Patto migrazione e asilo

    Il Paese segue il modello ungherese basato su detenzione indiscriminata e respingimenti illegali, facendoli passare per “ingressi impediti” o “allontanamenti volontari”. La prassi repressiva non è più una sperimentazione. Reportage dal centro di detenzione per persone straniere di #Lyubimets, e da quello di “accoglienza” ad #Harmanli

    “Dopo aver passato il confine siamo stati per giorni nel bosco. Eravamo in sei e uno di noi stava male. Poi la polizia ci ha trovati e portati in caserma. Tutti tranne uno, respinto in Turchia”. L’uomo, un cittadino marocchino, racconta con calma a tre attivisti che cosa gli è successo nei giorni precedenti.

    Lo scambio avviene in un centro di detenzione per persone straniere a Lyubimets, una piccola città del Sud della Bulgaria, a 15 chilometri dal confine con la Grecia e a 30 dalla frontiera con la Turchia. Altri quattro connazionali lo ascoltano e annuiscono. Ad agosto 2025 il caldo è torrido e le temperature nella struttura sono elevate. Tutti indossano vestiti bianchi e ciabatte verdi, rotte e anche di tre taglie più piccole, consegnate loro all’arrivo nel posto in cui potrebbero essere rinchiusi in detenzione amministrativa per un tempo indefinito, dopo essere entrati irregolarmente in Bulgaria.

    In mano tengono sacchetti con generi alimentari portati dalle attiviste e attivisti italiani che, dopo controlli meticolosi, riescono a entrare nella struttura per incontrarli. Le visite si svolgono all’angolo dell’ingresso di uno degli edifici, sotto la stretta sorveglianza della polizia che difficilmente concede più di quindici minuti. L’interlocutore ha poco più di quarant’anni, gli altri tra i venti e i trenta: “Ora siamo detenuti qui, ma quando esco vorrei proseguire il mio viaggio”. “Verso Nord o verso Sud?”, risponde scherzando l’attivista. Lui sorride: “Nord”.

    Non sarà un viaggio facile. A giugno entra in vigore il nuovo Patto sulla migrazione e l’asilo che prevede un’accelerazione drastica delle procedure di asilo alle frontiere esterne dell’Ue. In attesa delle nuove norme, alcuni Paesi di frontiera stanno già forzando l’attuale sistema comune di asilo, anticipando di fatto il Patto. È successo all’Italia con i centri costruiti in Albania. Accade anche in Bulgaria, dove il trattenimento e i respingimenti sono da tempo al centro della strategia di repressione del fenomeno migratorio. Diverse organizzazioni denunciano come le procedure non rispettino gli standard. Eppure, nonostante regni l’arbitrarietà, il Paese non viene sanzionato dall’Ue, com’è stato per l’Ungheria di Viktor Orbán.

    La gestione delle migrazioni in Bulgaria si muove sul crinale tra legale e illegale, trattando casi simili in modo diverso perché gestiti in modo arbitrario. Oltre alla violazione del diritto d’asilo, queste politiche peggiorano molto le condizioni di vita delle persone: dal respingimento illegale ai problemi igienico-sanitari nei centri, fino alle violenze subite sia nelle zone di confine che nelle strutture del Paese.

    I centri di detenzione per persone migranti, chiamati “special home for temporary accommodation of foreigners” (Shtaf), sono due. Uno è proprio a Lyubimets, dove il filo spinato e alcune torri di controllo circondano la struttura che può arrivare a contenere fino a 660 persone. Ci entrano spesso attivisti e attiviste del Collettivo rotte balcaniche e No name kitchen, che da tempo lavorano sul campo.

    L’altro centro è a #Busmantsi, nella periferia Est di Sofia, e conta 400 posti. Sebbene concepiti come centri di pre-espulsione, gli Shtaf vengono utilizzati anche per la detenzione di persone migranti che non hanno presentato domanda di asilo nelle caserme di confine dove vengono portate per l’identificazione. Secondo l’organizzazione non governativa per i diritti umani Bulgarian Helsinski committee (Bhc) la ragione più comune delle domande di asilo tardive è la mancanza di servizi di interpretariato adeguati. In altre parole, di fronte alla polizia di frontiera i migranti non sarebbero in condizione di capire e quindi tutelare i propri diritti.

    Spesso i detenuti non conoscono il motivo del loro trattenimento e contattare un avvocato non è semplice perché dipende dal buon cuore del funzionario di turno. Il Comitato per la prevenzione della tortura del Consiglio d’Europa (Cpt), nel report sull’ispezione dei luoghi di detenzione per persone straniere in Bulgaria del 2024 ha riportato come, tra le autorità responsabili, sembra ci sia una presunta interpretazione errata delle norme. Infatti, nonostante la legge stabilisca che un richiedente asilo debba essere rilasciato entro sei giorni dall’avvio della sua domanda, la delegazione ha incontrato nei luoghi persone trattenute oltre il tempo prestabilito. Nel rapporto, infatti, si legge che “entrambi gli Shtaf ospitavano richiedenti asilo che vi si trovavano da più di sei giorni. Parte del personale sembrava interpretare la disposizione nel senso che il trasferimento fosse richiesto solo una volta approvata la domanda di asilo”.

    A Busmantsi è stato trattenuto per ben 19 mesi un uomo che chiamiamo Ali, di cui teniamo anonima l’identità per sicurezza. Il suo percorso migratorio è tortuoso, fatto di numerosi e continui tentativi, di cui molti finiti con respingimenti e detenzione. Dopo essere fuggito dalla Siria ha vissuto qualche anno in Turchia, prima di decidere di proseguire il suo viaggio verso l’Europa passando per la Bulgaria, dove è stato privato della libertà per oltre un anno e mezzo. Oggi vive in Olanda dove ha inoltrato una nuova domanda di asilo.

    Ogni giorno parla con la sua famiglia attraverso i social, dalla sua stanza in una struttura per l’accoglienza nei Paesi Bassi. La stessa dalla quale parla delle condizioni degradanti in cui ha vissuto a lungo in Bulgaria: “Eravamo 60 persone in una stanza. I materassi erano pieni di insetti e di notte non potevamo andare in bagno. Le persone erano costrette a fare i propri bisogni lì, in un angolo”.

    Prima del suo arresto Ali ha attraversato la frontiera tra Bulgaria e Turchia più volte. La rotta che ha percorso attraversa i boschi che ricoprono i monti Strandzha e Sakar, dove il confine è segnato da una recinzione lunga circa 200 chilometri. Una volta oltrepassata si è costretti a camminare nella foresta per giorni. È un luogo inospitale, soprattutto d’inverno, in cui si rischia la vita per congelamento oltre che per disidratazione o malnutrizione.

    Percorrendo in auto le lunghe strade nell’area vicina alla frontiera, costeggiate da alberi alti, non si incontrano molte altre macchine. La maggior parte dei mezzi in circolazione sono i Defender della polizia di frontiera bulgara: negli ultimi anni i controlli sono stati irrigiditi. In particolare dal 2025, anno in cui il Paese è entrato nell’area Schengen, l’area è pattugliata anche dagli agenti di Frontex. Se chi migra sopravvive al bosco, c’è il pericolo che venga fermato dalla polizia di frontiera e venga respinto illegalmente. Così è successo ad Ali tre volte, prima di riuscire a rimanere sul territorio bulgaro: “Ho camminato nel bosco per sette giorni, ero insieme ad altre 40 persone. Molti di noi sono stati arrestati e solo dopo giorni sono riuscito a scoprire che la mia famiglia era stata respinta”. Tuttora i suoi familiari sono bloccati in Turchia.

    “Le persone vengono respinte verso il Paese da cui sono entrati senza procedure formali di rimpatrio o riammissione”, spiega Iliana Savova, direttrice del programma legale per rifugiati e migranti del Bhc. Questa pratica, documentata da tempo, viene negata dal governo bulgaro che con un escamotage dialettico parla di “ingressi impediti”. Secondo i dati resi pubblici da Sofia, nel 2024 sarebbero stati 52.534. Nello stesso anno il Bhc ha registrato 43.282 casi di respingimenti illegali, dimostrando che quelli definiti come ingressi impediti coincidano nei numeri e quindi siano, in realtà, veri e propri pushback.

    Benché il flusso verso il Paese sia diminuito, il tasso degli arresti in Bulgaria è alto: “La percentuale di migranti irregolari arrestati al confine con la Turchia è aumentata del 41% (tra il 2023 e il 2024, ndr). Dal 2014, per dieci anni consecutivi, queste percentuali sono state basse […] poiché la maggior parte di coloro che cercavano di entrare è stata respinta”, sottolinea l’associazione, citando dati del ministero dell’interno bulgaro, a oggi tuttavia non disponibili.

    I dati sull’aumento degli arresti, se letti contestualmente alla diminuzione dei respingimenti, vanno delineando un diverso approccio da parte delle autorità bulgare in linea con la volontà di confinamento dei richiedenti asilo ai margini del continente. Proprio come sancito dal Patto migrazioni e asilo. Questa strategia spiegherebbe anche l’allargamento del centro di Lyubimets, che non troverebbe giustificazione nei numeri degli ingressi.

    Dopo la visita alle persone detenute, gli attivisti e le attiviste recuperano i propri documenti, lasciati ai funzionari prima dell’ingresso. L’enorme portone telecomandato si apre e, una volta usciti dallo Shtaf, la prima cosa che appare è una porta identica a quella appena lasciata alle spalle. Proprio lì, infatti, sta sorgendo un nuovo complesso, accanto a quello esistente. L’area è già avvolta dal muretto bianco e da più linee di filo spinato. Dall’altra parte del muro una dozzina di container sono pronti a ospitare oltre 500 persone, numero che quasi raddoppierebbe le cifre della struttura oggi attiva. Con l’entrata in vigore del Patto si capirà quanto un piccolo centro del Sud della Bulgaria potrà essere strategico nell’imporre le nuove politiche europee sui migranti.

    https://altreconomia.it/bulgaria-prigione-deuropa-continua-il-lavoro-sporco-in-vista-del-patto-
    #Bulgarie #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #refoulements #push-backs #rétention #détention_administrative #special_home_for_temporary_accommodation_of_foreigners (#Shtaf)

  • Che cosa c’entra l’Ice con il fiorente business della carcerazione privata negli Stati Uniti

    In un Paese con quasi due milioni di detenuti e il più alto tasso di incarcerazione al mondo, la gestione delle carceri e dei centri di reclusione è sempre più intrecciata alla violenta e mortale politica anti-immigrazione. Quali sono le aziende coinvolte e quali legami hanno con il potere politico? Continua “L’età dell’oro”, la finestra aperta sugli Usa a cura di Francesca Berardi

    (#paywall)

    https://altreconomia.it/che-cosa-centra-lice-con-il-fiorente-business-della-carcerazione-privat
    #Etats-Unis #ICE #business #migrations #détention_administrative #privatisation

  • Seven miles from Sofia, Bulgaria’s capital, this former military barracks houses hundreds of migrants.

    The smell of Busmantsi’s “special home for foreigners” is indescribable, but if you had to use words they would be some combination of stale urine, mildew, dried sweat and rot. Thirty people are packed into each cell, which guards lock at 10 p.m. and don’t open again until 7 a.m. The rooms do not contain toilets, so at night men urinate out the window. There is no running water, so those with flu or food poisoning vomit into plastic bags. Some men hang sheets around their beds in a gesture toward privacy, but in the corner is a camera, with its telltale red eye.

    Occasionally, a few of the men housed in this former military barracks seven miles from Bulgaria’s capitol, Sofia, are brought to a small room, where officials from the Bulgarian police and the European Union border police, called Frontex, are waiting. There are no lawyers present. The officials tell them they can leave if they sign an agreement to return to their home countries — Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. If they don’t, they will be locked up for a year and a half. At first, most refuse to sign, but it is hard to hold onto sanity in a Bulgarian cell when you have not committed a crime, so occasionally men sign, and a week or so later, they are gone. Those inside rarely hear from them again.

    Some, though, decide to hold out for the full 18 months, after which most will be released and allowed to remain in Bulgaria; many hope they’ll be able to move on from there. Hesham, a Syrian with honey brown hair and a shy smile who arrived last spring, was among 100 or so men who had chosen to wait. Just a few months earlier, he had been living in a town in southern Germany, learning the language and dreaming of returning to his job as a tailor. But when he arrived for an appointment at the local immigration office in Saxony-Anhalt last February, the police arrested him, detained him for weeks at the Munich airport, then deported him to Sofia.

    “I want to file a lawsuit against the prison here,” Hesham wrote me on WhatsApp in early June. “Do you know anything about this?”

    I began speaking with Hesham last May. We were connected by Astrid Schreiber, an advocate with the Munich Refugee Council, who met him in Munich’s detention complex. Soon I was texting with or speaking to a dozen detainees from Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Gaza and Syria, most of whom had been deported from Germany and other E.U. countries.

    One man wrote that German police raided his house in the middle of the night. He said that he fled but was chased by dogs and surrendered in a forest. “They grabbed me by the feet while my hands were tied, and they dragged me like an animal,” he said.

    Another man wrote: “They are threatening to deport me to Iraq. Here I have scabies and there is no treatment. The situation is very bad, beyond imagination.”

    No phones with cameras are allowed inside Busmantsi, which meant that most of the detainees did not have phones. Those who did shared them, sometimes charging a small fee for access. The detainees told me that they awoke each morning with rosy bedbug bites across their arms and legs. They tried spraying the dirty mattresses with local chemical products that promised to eradicate insects, but it never worked, or at least not for long. Three times a day, they filed to the cafeteria for colorless meals. Breakfast was white bread. A typical lunch was one chicken wing and some cabbage; dinner was boiled potatoes, bread, an apple. They were offered no education, Bulgarian language classes or any chance to earn money.

    Not long after I began texting with Hesham, my messages stopped going through. I also lost touch with two other men, an Algerian and an Iraqi, who had been deported from Germany. One detainee told me they had signed the papers to return to their home countries. Hesham, it turned out, was still inside. The prison guards had confiscated his phone, and I could now reach him only through an intermediary.

    Detention centers like the one where Hesham is held form a kind of demarcation line along the bloc’s external borders. There can be as many as 1,060 people locked up in Bulgaria’s two sites: Busmantsi, in Sofia, and Lyubimets, in the south. There are centers on the idyllic Greek islands Samos, Lesbos, Khíos, Leros and Kos, as well as on the tiny Italian island Lampedusa and the volcanic landmass of Sicily. These are difficult to visit and sealed off from the public. Unless you work there or know someone detained there, they are largely invisible. “Most tourists don’t even know there is a detention center,” Robert Nestler, a German asylum lawyer who frequently visits Kos, told me. “It is at the end of the world.”

    But if detention sites like Busmantsi sit at the margins of Europe geographically, they are increasingly central to the European Union’s immigration policies. Following the 2015 influx of 1.3 million refugees, mostly Syrians fleeing war, Brussels began to restrict migration, pushing border management and asylum processing to the bloc’s farthest edges. Billions of euros were also funneled to neighboring countries to prevent onward migration to the European Union, resulting in detention sites in Libya that are run by militias and mass deportations from Turkey. Now the most restrictive asylum policies in the bloc’s history are unfolding inside its borders. The Pact on Migration and Asylum, finalized by Brussels in 2024 and coming into full effect later this year, expands detention, including for children, and speeds up deportations.

    Western European countries are now capitalizing on an E.U. law that requires refugees to apply for asylum in the first country they enter; those who instead leave for another member country can be sent back to the E.U. nation where they first arrived. This regulation has long been controversial, says Catherine Woollard, the former director of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, because it places “huge responsibility on the countries at the borders.”

    Refugees deported to Bulgaria find themselves trapped in a country that does not want them. Bulgaria has low asylum-recognition rates and has lacked an official integration program for the past 13 years. Migrants have died on Bulgarian territory after authorities failed to prioritize their rescues: In December 2024, three Egyptian teenage boys froze to death in the snowy southern woods. Those who enter from Turkey are often assaulted by border guards and violently pushed back, as both Frontex and human rights organizations have documented. Nonetheless, Germany, one of the bloc’s wealthiest states, is on track to deport five times as many people to Bulgaria, its poorest, as it did in 2022.

    The conditions in Bulgaria’s detention sites and abuses along the border have been largely ignored by the European Union. Instead, Bulgaria has become a kind of testing ground for the future of European migration — a heavily patrolled border, fast deportations and policies that encourage, or even coerce, refugees to leave.

    I first entered Busmantsi in late August, along with an acquaintance who was visiting a Palestinian refugee from Gaza. As we approached in a taxi, two four-story concrete blocks loomed behind a high wall topped with barbed wire. It was easy to see how Busmantsi served as a stand-in for a West Virginia penitentiary in the 2009 Hollywood slasher “Wrong Turn 3: Left for Dead.” Near the gated entrance hung two signs highlighting six million euros in E.U. funding.

    We passed through two gates and entered a concrete courtyard. On the left was a smaller building managed by the State Agency for Refugees, which then housed people with pending asylum claims, including families with children. On the right was the Interior Ministry section, which typically holds those whose asylum claims have been denied. This is where Hesham was kept. At least a dozen men clustered around the windows, waving their hands frantically through the bars. “Hello!” they shouted. “How are you?”

    The Bulgarian government claims that Busmantsi has the capacity to hold 400 people, but it depends on how you define capacity. In the summer, a Turkish woman fleeing domestic violence was forced to stay in the male section for almost three months, sharing a bedroom and showers with 20 men. Time spent in the outdoor courtyard is restricted to 30 minutes a day, including for children. People with severe mental-health conditions are isolated.

    The center does not have translators, and the Bulgarian staff do not speak Arabic, Pashto, Dari or French; it falls on the detainees to translate for one another. When an Afghan man was locked in a room alone, the Arabic speakers on his floor struggled to communicate with him. Still, they pleaded with the guards to unlock his door so he could use the bathroom; some five days later, the guards complied. Another man arrived at Busmantsi with both legs amputated. The other detainees carried him around. (Site-visit reports from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have extensively documented conditions inside Busmantsi and refer to the center as “prisonlike.”)

    “What should I do?” Hisham wrote to me on WhatsApp when we first began chatting. “I can’t go to Syria because my house is completely destroyed.”

    It was not the first time Hesham had found himself locked up in Busmantsi. Through WhatsApp phone calls, legal documents and interviews with his sister and advocates, I pieced together how he ended up there three times in the space of two years.

    Hesham first entered Bulgaria in September 2023, when he was in his early 20s, crossing the southern land border from Turkey. Conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey worsened after the country agreed to seal its borders following a deal with the European Union that included six billion euros in aid. A decade earlier, at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, his father, a farmer who was not politically active, was arrested at a government checkpoint. He never returned home. A year into his absence, Hesham, then 14, left Damascus for Istanbul, where he lived for eight years. Two of Hesham’s sisters also fled Syria, one settling in Germany and the other in Oman. Hesham’s mother and younger brother remained behind.

    When Hesham arrived in Sofia, he went first to Tsar Simeon Street, locally referred to as Arab Street for the many Middle Eastern shops there, to purchase goods for his onward journey. Then the police arrived. They arrested Hesham for illegally entering the country and took him to Busmantsi. After a week, an NGO came with a translator and told him he could either request asylum or remain confined for 18 months. As an asylum seeker, he would be released from detention in a week or so. Hesham immediately applied. He needed to reach his older sister in Germany, whom he had not seen in 11 years.

    In preparation for his release, Hesham was asked to roll his fingers across the glassy surface of a portable biometric machine, which uploads fingerprints from every asylum seeker into an E.U. database called Eurodac. This allows a government in one country to check whether someone’s fingerprints were originally taken in another. The E.U.-wide system began in 2003 and has been rapidly expanding, part of a renewed effort to track asylum seekers and other migrants through biometrics.

    The authorities dropped Hesham at Vrazhdebna Camp, one of three open facilities in Sofia where asylum seekers receive a bed and meals as their claims are processed. Vrazhdebna means “hostile” in Bulgarian; the area surrounding the camp on the city outskirts bears the same name. Guards with guns patrol the inside. Here, as in facilities in Greece, residents have a curfew and cannot have visitors. “I’d go to Germany if I were you,” an employee told Hesham, who left the next day. Hesham traversed Serbia, the Czech Republic and Austria, entering Germany a few weeks later.

    After reaching Saxony-Anhalt, where his sister lives, Hesham went straight to the police and requested asylum. The officers confiscated his phone; he never got it back. Hesham was initially assigned to Halberstadt Camp, north of the Harz Mountain range, near his sister, who barely recognized the adult version of her brother. At dinner, she served plates of kibbe, stuffed zucchinis, rice with dumplings, food from their childhoods, while her 4-year-old daughter giggled and stared.

    Hesham threw himself into studying German. A local Amazon warehouse offered to hire him once his papers came through. A possible future took shape, though he dared not hold onto any one vision for too long. The memory of giving his fingerprints to the officials inside Busmantsi played on a loop. To quiet the fear of being sent back, he focused on his family. In a photo from those months of waiting, Hesham grins, holding his niece as she makes a peace sign with tiny fingers.

    Hesham had come to Germany at the wrong time. “We are limiting irregular migration to Germany,” the chancellor at the time, Olaf Scholz, told the magazine Der Spiegel a few months before Hesham arrived. “Too many people are coming,” he said, adding, “We have to deport people more often and faster.”

    After four months in Germany, Hesham received notice that he would be deported to Sofia. The police arrest refugees in the middle of the night so they cannot flee. Hesham spent several months couch-surfing with friends, hoping he could wait out the order. In January 2025, the police found him and put him on a commercial flight to Sofia. Once aboard, Hesham protested that he didn’t wish to return and the pilot refused to take off. The authorities released him, and Hesham went back into hiding. Two weeks later, when he went to renew his ID card at the local immigration office, the police were waiting. They did not let him pack a bag or pick up his belongings. After Hesham was captured, his sister cried for a week. She told her daughter that Hesham had gone on a long trip.

    Deportations are difficult for the German government to execute. They require an agreement with the receiving country, as well as infrastructure — detention facilities, extra police officers, arrangements with commercial airlines or private carriers — that the United States has built up over two decades. Deportations are humiliating and sometimes violent. Some men are subjected to airport strip and body-cavity searches. Deportees are sometimes handcuffed and shackled; some are restrained with belts. Pilots have at times refused to fly, as happened with Hesham, after realizing refugees are onboard against their will, resulting in 342 canceled flights in 2024 alone.

    When deporting refugees to other E.U. countries, German courts must consider appeals on several grounds: whether sending someone back would cause serious harm or lead to torture; whether the person has certain family ties in Germany or serious medical conditions. Refugees are often not deported to Greece, because mistreatment there has been well documented. Conditions in Bulgaria are less well known. “Almost all of them are sent back, regardless of what happened to them in Bulgaria,” says Stephan Reichel, who coordinates church asylum in Germany.

    In 2024, the German government submitted some 75,000 deportation requests to other E.U. countries, but little more than half were approved; only 5,740 individuals were deported within the bloc. Chancellor Frederich Merz has vowed to close that gap. Germany has poured millions of euros into building detention centers. Four deportation centers opened this year; one near the Polish border can house 250 people.

    The day of Hesham’s deportation in late February, the police came before the sun rose. The officials that day were respectful. He was not handcuffed. He was given food and water. In the end, there were only four other passengers, three Syrians and one Afghan, all men, flying to Sofia on a private plane. The shame colored everything. “It was one of the worst days of my life,” Hesham told me later.

    Upon arrival in Sofia, the Bulgarian authorities took Hesham to Busmantsi. It would be harder to leave this time. Bulgaria had long served as a transit country for refugees heading north, but it remained shut out of the full rights afforded E.U. members for failing to control immigration. So it began violently policing its borders. In 2025, after scaling up detention and tightening border security, it was finally admitted to the Schengen Area, which allows freedom of movement among member states. To assist its operations, the European Union has, over the past decade, granted the country hundreds of millions of euros for additional immigration control. Under the pact, Bulgaria has also received 90 million euros; the interior ministry is creating two new detention centers and expanding Busmantsi and Lyubimets.

    At Busmantsi, Hesham was informed that his asylum file was closed. Hesham lodged a new claim and after a month was transferred back to Vrazhdebna Camp. During his asylum interview, he suspected that his translator was not interpreting correctly, but he had no way to prove it, just a bad feeling. A rejection came two months later; it stated that Hesham had migrated for economic reasons. It was true that Hesham wanted, desperately, to start working, but his main reason for leaving Syria was fear for his safety. After Hesham’s father was abducted, his family’s house was bombed.

    Under Bulgarian law, you can appeal an asylum rejection twice. Hesham needed a lawyer to file an appeal within 14 days. At the time, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee had been contracted by international organizations and the Bulgarian government to provide legal aid to asylum seekers; a tall, thin man with glasses told Hesham he would process his paperwork. The committee does not give out private contact details for its lawyers, and all Hesham had was a generic email address. He did not even know the lawyer’s name. A few weeks later, some officials came to the camp and asked residents for their IDs. When they saw Hesham’s, they took his residency permit away and told him to report to the camp office. Inside, the officials locked the door. Then the police arrived. They arrested Hesham and drove him back to Busmantsi.

    A few days later, Hesham saw his lawyer by chance in a meeting room set aside for legal-aid consultations. “Why didn’t you file my appeal?” Hesham demanded. The man, Hesham told me, said “he forgot.” Hesham was in disbelief: “How can you call yourself a lawyer? How could you forget?” Hesham recalled that the man became agitated and began speaking in Bulgarian. Hesham walked out. (The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee denies any involvement in the case.)

    From his cell, Hesham searched for a private lawyer in Sofia. One wanted a minimum of 1,500 euros. He didn’t have the money. Hesham had only one friend in Sofia, a fellow Syrian who brought him some clean T-shirts and socks.

    After his deportation, Hesham appealed his case in Germany, but as time went on, it seemed unlikely a court would allow him to return. Schreiber, the advocate with the Munich Refugee Council, told me that the only person she knew who had been allowed back into Germany was an elderly Syrian woman receiving cancer treatment. Although a German court ruled the deportation illegal, she had to pay for her return flight.

    One of the hardest things for Hesham about life in Busmantsi was the waiting. He had nothing to fill his days and longed to return to his work as a tailor. As a boy, he spent hours after school in a Damascus factory, slicing shapes with an electric blade. Each fabric had a different feel. Hesham loved black velvet, with its density and plushness, the most. In Istanbul, he had designed suits and dresses, sharing the drawings with his sister. Now the future was a blank, dreamless space.

    He found it impossible to escape the almost casual violence that he and the men I spoke with regularly witnessed. One day, a group of guards dragged the Afghan man from solitary confinement and beat him with an iron rod. Another man was punched in the face. Detainees told me that the guards knew where there were missing surveillance cameras — near the laundry room, for instance — and assaulted people there. Last year, a Syrian man in his mid-30s named Ahmad was locked inside Busmantsi, even though he had a valid German residence permit, making it legal for him to travel. Ahmad, who suffers from psychosis, was put in solitary confinement. His sister told me that the guards beat him so brutally after he resisted his deportation that he could not walk for five days. (The Bulgarian Interior Ministry, which oversees the Migration Directorate that runs Busmantsi and other centers, declined to comment on individual cases, and the Migration Directorate did not respond to a request for comment.)

    Medical care inside Busmantsi is either inadequate or absent. In 2021, an 83-year-old Armenian woman was brought to Busmantsi; she died five hours later from heart failure. A review by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture found a pattern of factually inaccurate medical information. All the recorded vitals of detainees were the same. All the medical intake forms said “no complaints” and “language barriers.”

    The longer someone stayed inside Busmantsi, the more reality deteriorated. “People in the cell have told me I cry in my sleep,” Hesham said. Visits are limited to 30 minutes, but many inmates never had a visitor. Some of the people isolated for mental-health conditions had not arrived that way. Suicidal ideation is common in immigration detention facilities around the world, increasing in proportion to the length of time detained, but no one wanted to speak on the record for fear it would harm their chances of release.

    A week after I first visited Busmantsi, I arrived for my appointment with Hesham. I pushed the doorbell at the designated time, hearing a sharp chime on the other side. Some five minutes later, the door swung open into a courtyard surrounded by tall metal walls. This time I noticed the U.N. Refugee Agency registration sign that hung near the entrance. Under the list of rules was: “You do not have the right to choose the European country where you want to live and receive international protection.”

    I was ushered into a ground-floor room that functioned as a visitors’ center. At last, Hesham appeared. Dressed in an oversize purple T-shirt, with a few pimples on his cheeks and wispy facial hair, he could have been a sleep-deprived graduate student. A female guard eyed us from the corner. On the wall were Frontex posters. “Thinking of returning home?” read one, beneath which was a telephone number. “Returning home might be difficult, but a counselor can help you,” another read. From January to September 2025, Frontex sent its “return specialists” to conduct 744 meetings with detainees, a spokesman told me.

    Since Hesham and I first made contact, the guards had yanked him out of his cell three times and put him in the room where we were now sitting. Officials pressured him to return to Damascus, once kicking him in the leg, he said. The authorities slid across a document in Bulgarian and told him to sign. He declined. Tacked to a corkboard on the back wall was a Frontex notice on how to file a complaint.

    I asked if he had more to say about the detention conditions. “You’ve already seen it yourself,” Hesham said, gesturing to the room. He pressed his thumb to his lip as if quieting himself. “I don’t need to say anything more.” In the corner, the guard tilted her head and snapped a selfie.

    Under the European Union’s new migration pact, it has become easier for governments to detain asylum seekers, like holding anyone deemed a national security risk or a threat to public order. According to Diana Radoslavova, who founded the Center for Legal Aid — Voice in Bulgaria in 2009, this will only render the situations many refugees already find themselves in more precarious. One of her clients, Adbulrahman al-Khalidi, a Saudi human rights activist, entered Bulgaria seeking asylum. Though his case is still open, he has been held in Busmantsi for more than four years, well beyond the legal limit, because Bulgaria’s national security agency labeled him a threat. The authorities have bounced al-Khalidi between the refugee agency and the Interior Ministry section of the facility, threatening to deport him to Saudi Arabia. A Sofia court has ordered him released three times; each time, the Bulgarian government has refused. The Bulgarian ombudsman stated that it would be best if another European country, like France or Germany, gave al-Khalidi asylum. So far none has offered.

    When it comes to people like Hesham, the biggest question is the misuse of detention, Radoslavova said. The use of detention in the absence of active removal proceedings violates E.U. law, and under Bulgarian law, rejected asylum seekers can only be detained for the purpose of deportation for 18 months. But Bulgaria cannot force Syrians to return to their home countries, because it has no agreement with the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. “If you know that this person cannot be forcibly returned,” she said, “why do you detain them for 18 months?”

    Once people with rejected asylum claims are released from Busmantsi, they have no access to health care, subsidized housing or social services. Over the past year, Radoslavova has been contacted frequently by German advocates, dismayed to find that clients deported to Bulgaria are destitute. Families have difficulty enrolling their children in school or finding a place to live. When I asked the German Interior Ministry if it had considered halting deportations to Bulgaria because of conditions there, a spokeswoman referred me to the Bulgarian government.

    Daniel Mitov, Bulgaria’s interior minister, defended the lack of alternatives to detention. He told me that if asylum seekers were free, they would head north, and then other European countries would call and say: “Well, you have allowed these individuals to cross illegally through your territory. Now we’re going to get them back to you, and it’s your problem.” Mitov pointed out that the border between Bulgaria and Turkey was the second-busiest in the world, after the U.S.-Mexico border. The European Union has sent hundreds of Frontex police officers to assist local forces and piloted a new surveillance system with drones. Even the Americans, Mitov said, were helping the Bulgarian border police: The Interior Ministry coordinated its efforts with the U.S. Embassy and Washington. Bulgaria shares the biometrics of people who enter the country illegally with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the biometrics are run through databases at the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and Department of Defense. (The State Department spokesman in Sofia confirmed that the United States shares equipment, training and advice with Bulgaria, calling it a “close and effective relationship” on border operations).

    As for the conditions inside Busmantsi, Mitov blamed the refugees. “Quite often, the people who stay there do not appreciate the environment,” he remarked dryly. “You’re saying that people staying inside damage the facility?” I asked. “Yes,” he said. “The human traffickers are giving them advice to treat the facilities in ways that afterward they can complain.”

    Across the European Union, Ukrainians have been received very differently from Syrians, Afghans and others. In 2022, as Ukrainians fled Russian bombs, the Bulgarian government rented empty hotels along the Black Sea to house them. The bloc contributed money for private housing and language classes. Kiril Petkov, then the prime minister, explained the government’s logic: “These people are Europeans,” he told journalists. “These people are intelligent. They are educated people.” He added: “This is not the refugee wave we have been used to, people we were not sure about their identity, people with unclear pasts, who could even have been terrorists.”

    As the migration pact comes into full force this summer, countries will have even more flexibility in how they treat those seeking asylum. One provision relies on what is known as the legal fiction of “non-entry”: states can claim someone is not on European territory despite having crossed the border, creating liminal spaces where they can argue that E.U. law does not apply. Those interviewed and rejected for asylum in these borderlands are no longer guaranteed legal representation.

    In late October, Busmantsi guards notified Hesham and some 80 other detainees — mostly Syrian and Moroccan men — that they would be moved to the Lyubimets detention center, just 18 miles from the Turkish border. They did not tell them why. Hesham packed his few belongings and traveled three hours south by bus. A few days later, a delegation from the European Commission toured an almost empty Busmantsi to see if it met E.U. standards. Abdulrahman, who later requested to be transferred to Lyubimets, spoke with members of the mission, as Bulgarian officials hovered nearby.

    In Lyubimets, a vast facility that includes accommodation in metal shipping containers, the food was still inedible, but the room that Hesham shared with 20 men was cleaner. Hesham and the others were more isolated, though, because it was harder to receive visitors from Sofia. After two weeks, officials called Hesham into a room and told him they were offering 150 euros for him to return to Syria, promising another 700 euros upon arrival.

    Hesham refused. Every week, when his mother called, she begged him to come home, but he didn’t think Syria was a country he could live in yet. After the fall of the Assad regime, some prisoners were released, but there was no information about Hesham’s father, one of many men who were still missing.

    On Jan. 1, Hesham turned 27. As one day of confinement followed another, Hesham thought back to advice his father had given him, encouraging him to study. He was a feisty kid, not as interested in school as his sisters, who pursued degrees in law and chemistry. Hesham was sorry that he hadn’t yet lived up to his father’s vision. Maybe there was still time. If he could make it 11 more months, he would be free by his next birthday — but what that freedom would look like remained uncertain.

    https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/10/magazine/immigration-detention-europe-busmantsi-bulgaria.html
    #Bulgarie #migrations #réfugiés #enfermement #hébergement #baraques #Sofia #Busmantsi #renvois #expulsions
    via @fil

  • ‘Ndrangheta, mani delle cosche sulla sepoltura dei migranti: “Otto te li fai tu e 8 me li faccio io”. Poi li inumavano senza cassa di legno
    (ça date de 2019)

    Le imprese funerarie controllate dalle ’ndrine facevano cartello per spartirsi le commesse pubbliche. E l’ex consigliere regionale del Pd Giamborino e l’ex candidato dem alle politiche del 2018 Incarnato si muovono per fare affidare le gestione di un centro di accoglienza straordinaria a un imprenditore amico. Emerge anche questo dalle carte dell’inchiesta “Rinascita Scott” della procura di Catanzaro che il 19 dicembre ha portato all’arresto di 330 persone

    Le cosche avevano allungato i tentacoli sulla sepoltura dei migranti morti in mare. Le imprese funerarie controllate facevano cartello per spartirsi le commesse pubbliche e li seppellivano senza cassa per risparmiare sui costi. Emerge anche questo dalle carte dell’inchiesta “Rinascita Scott” della procura di Catanzaro che il 19 dicembre ha portato all’arresto di 330 persone.

    Le ‘ndrine con le mani nel settore delle sepolture avevano “fondato un vero e proprio business sui naufraghi morti“, annotano gli inquirenti. Un business in cui Orazio Lo Bianco la fa da padrone. E’ un pezzo grosso, tanto che quando a inizio 2017 il comune di Vibo Valentia indice una gara per seppellire le salme di 16 migranti, Lo Bianco sfrutta la forza di intimidazione derivante dalla propria appartenenza alla ‘ndrina locale e impedisce a un imprenditore funerario di Pizzo di partecipare alla gara e poi fa cartello, concorda cioè le offerte da presentare, con i colleghi intenzionati a partecipare: “A quello del Pizzo lo scacciato e gli ho detto tu vattene al Pizzo – dice intercettato Lo Bianco – Che qui i morti li facciamo noi! Gli ho detto io a Ceraso tu vuoi entrare? Si! Baldo tu vuoi entrare? Si!”. Il metodo è semplice: “Allora facciamo una cosa facciamo il prezzo uguale per tutti! Andiamo sopra e mettiamo tutti due mila euro!”. E poi partiva la spartizione: “Sedici morti! – spiega – Sedici morti erano! Otto te li fai tu ed otto me li faccio io!“.

    Il sistema è oliato e ne fanno parte elementi di spicco della criminalità locale. Rosario Pugliese, considerato dai pm ‘ndranghetista di alto rango, è suo socio occulto nella sua impresa individuale Le Stelle 1. Che faceva il bello e il cattivo tempo nei camposanti locali al punto da arrivare a seppellire nel cimitero di Bivona i cadaveri di due naufraghi sbarcati a Vibo Marina solo nell’involucro di zinco senza le casse di legno con l’aiuto di tre sodali: gli operai Francesco Paternò e Michele Lo Bianco eseguivano le operazioni di seppellimento e si adoperavano per impedire le operazioni di accertamento del mancato rispetto della commessa; e il custode del cimitero Antonio Fuoco chiudeva tutti e due gli occhi, “omettendo il controllo alle operazioni”. Il che però non impediva al cattivo odore di uscire dai loculi e di allarmare i residenti della zona, dalla cui segnalazione sono partite le indagini. Durante la riesumazione dei corpi era poi venuta fuori un’altra verità inquietante: almeno due cadaveri non erano stati inumati nei loculi assegnati.

    Il business è ampio e Lo Bianco ne gestisce una buona fetta. Titolare di una impresa individuale di edilizia artigiana, con la complicità di uno dei capi dei custodi dei cimiteri di Vibo Valentia “gestiva le cappelle e i loculi, organizzando un vero e proprio ‘mercato’ delle stesse” e tramite la sua ditta permetteva a diversi indagati di “ristrutturare le cappelle e i loculi di defunti di cui non ci sono più familiari superstiti, seppellendo nelle fosse comuni i resti delle ossa e rivendendole al prezzo di 50.000-60.000 euro“.

    I migranti però sono un business anche, e soprattutto, da vivi. E secondo gli inquirenti possono servire anche ad accrescere la credibilità di un politico in ambienti criminali. Pietro Giamborino, ex consigliere regionale del Pd, fiuta la possibilità e prova a sfruttarla. “Si metteva a disposizione con tutti i criminali”, ha raccontato il collaboratore di giustizia Andrea Mantella. Per gli inquirenti è legato al “sodalizio di Piscopio” di Vibo Valentia: “In qualità di partecipe – annota il gip – contribuiva concretamente alla realizzazione degli scopi dell’associazione”. Ma non solo: secondo i pm manteneva i contatti con i vertici “ottenendo a proprio vantaggio il voto elettorale procacciatogli da altri associati”. In cambio offriva o prometteva il “conseguimento di impieghi pubblici e privati”, manteneva i rapporti con le altre cosche e con i “colletti bianchi“, ovvero “professionisti, imprenditori, politici, appartenenti alla massoneria”. Si muoveva, cioè, in quella zona grigia in cui il mondo della politica e quello delle cosche si toccano e si mescolano. Accade quando un imprenditore di Catania si rivolge a lui per vedersi aggiustato un procedimento al Tar, e accade anche quando c’è da oliare un meccanismo utile a lucrare sui richiedenti asilo.

    Siamo agli inizi del 2018. Pino Cuomo, titolare della Gemes Srl e della P&P Group Srl, ha in mente di creare un centro di accoglienza straordinaria per richiedenti asilo nel comune di Paola attraverso un progetto di recupero dell’hotel Alahambra. Così chiede a Giamborino di attivarsi per”influenzare illecitamente” la procedura amministrativa in cambio di “somme di denaro non meglio quantificate”. L’ex consigliere si rivolge a Luigi Incarnato, che in quel periodo è candidato con il Pd alle elezioni politiche del 4 marzo. Incarnato, oggi segretario del Psi calabrese, si mette a disposizione in cambio di voti e il 28 febbraio porta i due dal sindaco della cittadina del cosentino, Roberto Perrotta. La mediazione è riuscita, l’incontro è avvenuto, la richiesta dell’imprenditore viene protocollata, però giorni dopo i soldi non si vedono. Così Giamborino batte cassa: “Mi stai preparando i gelati?”, domanda il politico all’imprenditore il 3 marzo, giorno prima delle elezioni. Una macchinazione che, per i pm, consente all’esponente del Pd di aumentare ” l’autorevolezza ed il prestigio” del sodalizio ‘ndranghetistico di Piscopio “specie nei rapporti con le consorterie rivali, anche per l’aspettativa di favoritismi da parte della pubblica amministrazione”. Il che vale a Giamborino, finito ai domiciliari, la contestazione dell’aggravante mafiosa.

    https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/12/21/ndrangheta-mani-delle-cosche-sulla-sepoltura-dei-migranti-otto-te-li-fai-tu-e-8-me-li-faccio-io-poi-li-inumavano-senza-cassa-di-legno/5628898
    #ndrangheta #mafia #sépolture #migrations #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #cimetière #pompes_funèbres #Rinascita_Scott #business #Orazio_Lo_Bianco #Calabre #Vibo_Valentia #inhumation #monopole #prix #Rosario_Pugliese #Le_Stelle_1 #Bivona #Francesco_Paternò #Michele_Lo_Bianco #Antonio_Fuoco #sodalizio_di_Piscopio #Vibo_Valentia #accueil #Gemes #P&P_Group #hotel_Alahambra #Paola #hébergement #logement #Pino_Cuomo #Luigi_Incarnato #Roberto_Perrotta

  • Greece a testing ground for smart surveillance technologies

    Europe is rapidly building an AI-ready smart-border regime — bankrolled by the EU, pushed by Germany and tested in Greece. Defense and security firms are among the biggest winners. Much of it is unfolding under the radar, with safeguards for people on the move lagging behind.

    Border guards patrolling Greece’s frontier with North Macedonia to prevent irregular crossings have long relied on an unusual early-warning system: the storks nesting on a bridge over the Axios River. When the birds suddenly scatter, officers know someone is likely moving in the bushes below – usually migrants trying to slip out of Greece and head toward Northern Europe. Soon, their role will be obsolete.

    Smart border technology, cameras and drones, will take their place – tireless, unblinking, and financed by Brussels. Greece plans to extend the high-tech surveillance model it built along the Evros land border with Turkey – designed to stop asylum seekers entering the European Union – to its northern frontier. The aim this time is to seal the exit routes used for secondary movement toward Western Europe.

    What is being planned here is part of a broader shift driven by Berlin, Brussels and Athens: Germany wants fewer arrivals, the EU is funding new technologies, and Greece has become the test bed for Europe’s AI-enabled border regime.

    This cross-border investigation by Solomon, Die Tageszeitung (Germany), SWI Swissinfo (Switzerland) and Inkstick Media (US) took us to eight countries – including on-the-ground reporting in seven – and involved interviews with more than two dozen officials, insiders and frontline officers. We also reviewed hundreds of pages of public and internal documents, freedom-of-information request responses, procurement records and technical documentation. Taken together, the findings show how Europe is rapidly building a smart border system, who profits from it, and what risks it creates. Among the key findings:

    - How Brussels’ efforts to seal the Balkan route, combined with Berlin’s demand to curb onward movement to Germany, are driving the expansion of Greece’s new border architecture;

    – Previously unpublished details about Greece’s plan to replicate the “Evros model” – the high-tech fence-and-sensor system along the Turkish land border – at its northern borders with North Macedonia and Albania;

    - How E-Surveillance, the EU-funded program backing Greece’s new automated border monitoring, reflects a wider European trend: powerful systems advancing with vague data rules and thin public oversight;

    - How defense giants, security firms, university labs and research institutions, backed by an influential Brussels lobby, profit from a new ecosystem of EU-funded border projects.

    Drones and AI at the border

    Last September, senior EU border officials attended an internal meeting to be briefed on innovation at the headquarters of Frontex, the EU border agency, in Warsaw. According to participants, a Frontex-tested drone surveillance network was presented. It featured vertical-take-off (V-BAT) drones hovering along the Bulgarian-Turkish border, transmitting real-time video to a command hub where the system alerted the police about migrant-crossing attempts and “criminal activities.”

    One of the contractors is Shield AI. The California-based company is run by a former Navy SEAL, Brandon Tseng. Tseng claimed that the 60-day pilot in Bulgaria – a country which, like Greece, is accused of systematically violating asylum seeker rights – significantly reduced irregular border crossings and crime, citing Bulgarian officials. Shield AI declined to answer questions about the system, its deployment, costs, or data use. Frontex confirmed in a written response that the pilot demonstrated a prevention effect “contributing to a visible reduction or temporary stop of criminal activities,” adding that the deployment had “comprehensive fundamental-rights safeguards” and that the preventive effect was “an indirect outcome.”

    Such pilots illustrate the agency’s strategy for deploying “next-generation European border surveillance capabilities” across the EU’s external frontiers – and how pilots can be hard to distinguish from operational deployments.

    Frontex has also created an internal AI Hub and an AI Roundtable to identify which of the agency’s AI systems could be classified as “high-risk” under the EU AI Act. According to the regulation, systems used in migration, asylum and border control management “affect persons who are often in particularly vulnerable positions” and should, “in no circumstances,” be used either to circumvent asylum seeker rights such as through surveillance-assisted pushbacks, in which people located with the help of drones and sensors are forced back across the border before they can apply for international protection.

    Frontex stated that it “does not operate or deploy high-risk AI systems.” Greece’s Hellenic Coast Guard also said it “does not operate artificial-intelligence systems” and that all procurements include data-protection clauses — even as it acknowledged using EU-provided “electronic platforms which have an AI mechanism.” The Coast Guard declined to specify which platforms it uses, citing the confidential nature of this information and the need to protect operations.

    The choice of words is not accidental, as authorities prefer to talk about “algorithms,” “automation” or “innovation,” says Dr. Niovi Vavoula, an Associate Professor and Chair in Cyber Policy at the University of Luxembourg. “They hide behind broader words to avoid scrutiny and to keep systems upgradeable without relabelling them as AI.”

    The European Commission has said that, contrary to deployed systems, research pilots remain outside the full legal framework — a distinction that Vavoula calls increasingly untenable. Pilots at live borders now closely resemble operations, yet are still shielded from full transparency, data protection impact assessments and public scrutiny. In her view, once such systems are tested on real people in uncontrolled, active operations (as in the Bulgaria pilot), “we are past the purely testing research phase” and any research exceptions “shouldn’t be applicable”.

    The Evros Model Goes North

    Such concerns are often dismissed at a time when migration has been reframed as a security threat across Europe. “Everything to do with borders is being more and more exempt from democratic oversight, accountability, transparency,” said Bram Vranken, a researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory, a Brussels-based watchdog tracking tech and defense lobbying.

    This new narrative is evident in the replication of the “Evros model” — the high-tech fence-and-sensor system Greece installed along its border with Turkey to spot and stop irregular migration, equipped with long-range cameras, thermal sensors, drones, and central command hubs.

    Under the EU’s €35.4 million“E-Surveillance” program, Greece is bringing the Evros system to its northern borders.

    Meeting minutes and technical and other documents reviewed for this investigation detail plans for Mobile Incident-Management Centers: 4×4 vehicles with thermal cameras, drones, and encrypted communications systems, operating alongside new fixed surveillance sites and feeding real-time alerts to regional and national command centers.

    Internal documents describe these units as “essential” for monitoring blind spots where “no other advanced electronic or automated surveillance systems” exist.

    Tender documents reviewed by our team include broad secrecy clauses and stiff penalties for disclosure – standard, officials say, for national security contracts. But the same documents are thin on key safeguards: for example, daytime footage has a 15-day deletion limit, but no such explicit rule exists for thermal images. Encryption and auditing requirements are exhaustive, while privacy and data protections for people caught in the system are not.

    Dr. Vavoula calls this a “second black box”: technical opacity layered with legal omissions.

    In Evros, the system has proven effective in deterring asylum seekers from reaching EU soil, according to Greek and EU officials, as shown in a previous Solomon investigation. Which is why Evros is now more of a blueprint than a test site: the same technology used to keep migrants out of Europe will be used to keep them inside Greece, limiting movement toward the Balkans and beyond.

    For years, Greece resisted EU pressure to bolster checks at its northern exits. After a scathing 2021 Schengen evaluation, the EU demanded upgrades. The new system is expected to be fully operational in 2027. Police sources briefed on the plans say the system will automate what once depended on human observation: a crossing detected on thermal camera, auto-tracked by drone, and relayed to a rapid-response unit.
    Ample funding and political pressure

    Greece’s northern frontier has long served as a quiet exit route for people trying to reach Western Europe via the Balkan corridor, and Greek policy was to tolerate the movement to a degree, seeing it as a way to ease pressure inside the country.

    Greece’s new rush to secure those exits is partly driven by German pressure, according to Greek migration and security officials involved in the deliberations. Berlin has taken one of Europe’s hardest lines on migration, tightening asylum rules and insisting on tougher border controls across the bloc.

    When Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, met Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in May 2025, the message was blunt: “Secondary migration from Greece to Germany must decrease. Returns must increase.” Germany received over 25,000 asylum applications in 2024 from people already recognized as refugees in Greece.

    Asked by this investigation whether the German Interior Ministry could confirm that it was putting pressure on Greece, the official line was: “The Federal Government supports measures that contribute to an effective protection of the EU’s external borders and the fight against inhumane smuggling.”

    A senior Greek official summed up the dynamics: “Brussels wants results. Berlin wants fewer arrivals. Athens delivers both – it is that simple.” The political pressure is palpable, driven by the fact that migration remains one of the top voter concerns across much of Europe.
    Smart border winners

    The EU money at stake is vast. For 2021-2027, Greece has over €1.5 billion in EU Home Affairs funding at its disposal. Greece’s border allocation (BMVI) is the largest in the EU. Its Home Affairs package is second only to Germany’s.

    Our investigation found that much of it is earmarked for surveillance and automation:

    – a unified maritime surveillance system using radars, cameras and patrol vessels;

    - new surveillance equipment;

    - encrypted police communications in border zones;

    - offshore patrol vessels with Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) drones;

    - €100 million to extend and equip the Evros fence.

    Greek officials say one of the goals is full coverage of the land border with Turkey through a mix of personnel and high-tech detection systems. Some 2,000 border guards are currently deployed there, assisted “by technology, equipment, the fence, which is an important means of deterrence,” said Michalis Chrisochoidis, Greece’s civil protection minister.

    Spending on high-tech deterrence dwarfs investment in search and rescue or services for asylum seekers. A Solomon investigation found that just €600,000 (or 0,07 percent) of total EU border management funding to Greece was earmarked for search and rescue. In October 2025 the Greek Migration Ministry decided to cut spending and benefits for asylum related services by a hefty 30 percent.

    Across the EU, member states plan to spend less than 0.04 percent of their border funds on assistance and protection for people on the move, funnelling nearly all resources into infrastructure and surveillance.
    A corporate windfall

    Defense and security companies are major beneficiaries of Europe’s border-security boom.

    Shield AI, the US company behind the Bulgaria pilot, sells its V-BAT drones not only to Greece but also to the Netherlands and the US Coast Guard and Navy.

    Israeli defense giants, long embedded in Europe’s border-security market, are also deeply involved. Israel’s Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems – the country’s biggest defense company – provide Heron and Hermes drones to Frontex and Greece, including for the monitoring of vessels departing Libya for Crete.

    In 2023, IAI acquired Greece’s Intracom Defense (IDE), embedding Israeli industry inside Greece’s defense ecosystem. Other Israeli companies — including Aeronautics and Rafael — supply UAVs, sensors and analytics to Greek and EU missions. Earlier investigations have documented the reach of Israeli-made surveillance tools in Europe’s border systems and in Greek refugee camps, with companies tied to Israel’s defense sector providing key software and hardware.

    Greek firms profit too. Construction giant GEK Terna helped extend the Evros fence; Space Hellas led a multi-million expansion of the Automated Border Surveillance System in Evros; And companies like ESA Security and Byte delivered the “smart” camp monitoring systems (Centaur and Hyperion).

    Behind the contracts is a powerful lobbying network in Brussels. A web of interlocking associations – including ASD (representing Europe’s aerospace, security and defense industries); EOS (the security-industry association); and ECSO (set up in 2016 as the European Commission’s cybersecurity public-private partner) – pushes for a tech-first agenda and more public money for security R&D. Industry figures often rotate across associations advising the Commission.
    The Great Tech Bazaar

    At a major defense expo in Athens last spring, the future of Europe’s border control was on full display: radar-fusion platforms, AI powered camera networks, “heat maps” predicting migration flows. Startups pitched tools that blur the line between civil and military tech – a trend encouraged by EU policy. Even the European Commission had a booth. Its Joint Research Centre is heavily involved in, among other things, migration-route forecasts.

    The line between civilian and military tech is increasingly blurred. Programs like the EU Defense Innovation Scheme bring start-ups, companies, research centers and universities into defense and policing supply chains, creating a pipeline where tools built for commercial use are quickly turned into surveillance products.

    One example is ROBORDER, an EU-funded project to build a “fully-functional autonomous border surveillance system.” Its consortium spanned major research institutions — including the center for Research and Technology Hellas, the University of Athens and a German R&D behemoth (the Fraunhofer Society) — as well as NATO and Greece’s Defense Ministry. The project’s results then fed into REACTION, the EU-funded AI border surveillance program coordinated by Greece’s Migration Ministry. Due by the end of 2025, it promises an “automated picture” of Greek land and sea borders for early warning and response.

    Beyond winning contracts, the real prize, according to experts, is data. Dr. Vavoula said migration has become “a primary testing ground” for harvesting mass amounts of personal data that can be used to train AI models predicting movements or “riskiness” — with huge potential for bias.
    EU “set on” AI

    The EU sets the technological direction, funds it, and expects member states to align. Greece has become one of the most enthusiastic adopters.

    The EU’s Integrated Border Management Strategy is backed by the €6.7 billion BMVI fund (2021–27), while Horizon Europe adds hundreds of millions for security and border-tech research.

    Greece is building its own AI-powered surveillance hub, THORAX – a nearly €49 million system fusing radar, drone, and sensor data from the army, police and coast guard, using machine learning to flag and deal with threats.

    In 2025, the Commission proposed tripling overall home-affairs funding to €81 billion for 2028–2034, including €15.4 billion for border management, €12 billion for migration and €11.9 billion for Frontex. One of the explicit goals is to “fully digitalise border control management” and modernise law-enforcement capacities.

    Lobbying has played a key role: Companies like Airbus, Thales, Leonardo and Indra lobbied for a unified security market and then won many of the resulting contracts.

    “The EU is set on the idea of imposing AI in border management,” said Theofanis Papadopoulos, head of Greece’s Managing Authority for Migration and Home Affairs Funds. “They make these calls, fully oriented toward AI and e-surveillance. They provide funding, launch calls with this very specific orientation and this gives reason for the Member States to move towards this direction.”

    Minutes from a meeting of the committee that oversees how Greece uses EU migration and home-affairs funds confirm it: a Hellenic Police official described an integrated surveillance system as “a requirement of the European Commission” for closing the northwest route and curbing secondary migration.

    Similar tools are already being tested outside the EU — including in Britain, where a Home Office pilot using facial-age estimation algorithms on asylum seekers, uncovered through freedom-of-information requests, has raised concerns about bias and reliability and the checkered track record of some of the companies involved.
    The Human Cost

    Hans Leijtens, the executive director of Frontex, has said cutting-edge technologies can “sav[e] lives that otherwise may have been lost.” The Commission has argued they will enhance efficiency while respecting fundamental rights.

    But on the ground, the record is troubling. In June 2023, an overcrowded fishing vessel carrying hundreds of migrants from Libya sank inside Greece’s search and rescue zone. The deadliest shipwreck in the Mediterranean in recent history unfolded in plain view of Europe’s surveillance systems — not for lack of sensors or aircraft, but amid what critics describe as a failure of political will. In a written response, the Hellenic Coast Guard insisted its primary mission is the protection of life at sea, noting that its crews have rescued more than 268,000 people in over 6,500 incidents.

    Rights groups warn that “technology contributes to the growing trend of human rights violations at borders,” and that drones and cameras frequently support pushbacks and abuse. “These tools are not trained to show compassion,” Dr. Vavoula cautions. At the border, she added, the rationale is deterrence, not protection.

    Safeguards remain minimal. Tender files for Greece’s E-surveillance program this investigation reviewed are detailed on technical requirements but vague on oversight, data retention, or remedies.

    Insiders described the paperwork involved in data protection impact assessments as box-ticking exercises.

    In 2024, Greece’s Data Protection Authority issued a record fine on the country’s Migration Ministry for deploying two EU-funded camp surveillance systems without proper safeguards – violations first exposed by Solomon journalists.

    Other EU projects show similar weaknesses. Nestor, a “next generation” pre-frontier surveillance system detecting movements well before people reach the EU’s borders, relied heavily on self-assessment, with an ethics board made up mostly of consortium members, according to documents reviewed for this investigation. The European Commission said that the project was evaluated by independent experts through the European Research Executive Agency.

    Stergios Aidinlis, associate professor of AI law at the University of Durham, argues that ethics and legal oversight in such programs can be “too formalistic” and warns about the potential conflicts of interest when governments or companies are the ones doing the oversight, as in the case of NESTOR, where the Athens-based, state-affiliated Center for Security Studies heads the ethics advisory board. The center declined to comment.

    From Warsaw’s conference rooms to the Evros riverbanks the same trend appears: systems are expanding faster than the safeguards meant to govern them. Across Europe, billions in public money are flowing into an increasingly automated border infrastructure. Oversight and projections, officials and experts acknowledge, have not kept pace.

    https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/greece-a-testing-ground-for-smart-surveillance-technologies
    #Grèce #surveillance #technologie #test #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #AI #IA #intelligence_artificielle #complexe_militaro-industriel #Evros #frontières #migrations #réfugiés #business #drones #Axios #Macédoine_du_Nord #externalisation #modèle_Evros #e-surveillance #Frontex #V-BAT #Shield_AI #Brandon_Tseng #murs #barrières_frontalières #route_des_Balkans #mouvements_secondaires #Israel’s_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Elbit_Systems #Heron #Hermes #Intracom_Defense (#IDE) #Aeronautics #Rafael #GEK_Terna #Space_Hellas #ESA_Security #Leonardo #Byte #Centaur #Hyperion #ASD #EOS #ECSO #vidéosurveillance #Defense_Innovation_Scheme #ROBORDER #Fraunhofer_Society #REACTION #Integrated_Border_Management_Strategy #Horizon_Europe #BMVI #THORAX #radar #Airbus #Thales #Indra #lobby

  • #Forlenza patteggia per la “gestione” del #Cpr di Milano. I suoi nuovi affari, intanto, sono altrove

    L’amministratore di fatto della #Martinina Srl, l’ente gestore del Centro di permanenza per il rimpatrio finito sotto la lente della Procura, ha patteggiato due anni e tre mesi. Era imputato per frode in pubbliche forniture e irregolarità nell’esecuzione del contratto. A processo anche a Potenza, l’imprenditore è attivo oggi nel commercio di materie prime, specie cacao, anche con una società costituita insieme a Ernesto Sica, volto noto della politica campana.

    Per le condizioni disumane all’interno del Centro di permanenza per il rimpatrio (Cpr) di Milano, Alessandro Forlenza, ex amministratore di fatto della Martinina Srl, ha patteggiato appena prima di Natale una pena di due anni e tre mesi di reclusione e una multa di appena duemila euro. L’imprenditore era imputato per turbativa d’asta e frode in pubbliche forniture per le irregolarità nell’aggiudicazione e poi nell’esecuzione dell’appalto da oltre quattro milioni di euro per la gestione della struttura. Come raccontato su Altreconomia la società per aggiudicarsi il bando aveva presentato documenti falsi, promettendo attività inverosimili.

    Il 21 dicembre il giudice Franco Cantù Rajnoldi ha dato il via libera all’accordo raggiunto tra il Pubblico ministero Paolo Storari e i legali della società -Antonio Ingroia ed Eolo Alessandro Magni-: Martinina Srl pagherà una multa di 30mila euro e avrà il divieto di esercizio di fare impresa per 20 mesi. Andrà a processo invece Consiglia Caruso, madre di Forlenza, amministratrice della società.

    Si conclude così un pezzo importante del processo al Cpr di Milano, lo stesso in cui, come descritto dalle 164 pagine curate dai sostituti Giovanna Cavalleri e Paolo Storari, il 13 dicembre 2023, i reclusi erano ridotti in condizioni disumane tra luoghi sudici, visite mediche negate e cibo scadente.

    In questi anni di processi giudiziari, però, l’attività imprenditoriale di Forlenza non si è conclusa. Tutt’altro. Impossibilitato dal partecipare ai bandi pubblici si è concentrato sul commercio internazionale. La società “Solina-Sahel Agri Sol”, parte del gruppo Deko, ha annunciato pochi mesi fa che la società Coranimo era stata incaricata di rappresentare il gruppo in Italia. “Per ogni richiesta o per discutere delle opportunità lavorative scrivere ad Alesandro Forlenza”, si leggeva sul sito. Sito che, a fine dicembre 2025, non è più raggiungibile: dalla brochure ancora reperibile online si legge che “il gruppo [societario] si impegna a portare i migliori prodotti agricoli del Sahel, dell’Africa occidentale e orientale sul mercato globale”.

    C’è un po’ di tutto: verdure, frutta, spezie, noccioline e poi caffè, tè e cacao. Proprio sul cacao sembra essersi mosso Forlenza che, nei mesi scorsi, avrebbe tentato di aprire un’attività in Costa d’Avorio dove anche la società Soliva dichiarava di avere una sede. Sui biglietti da visita l’imprenditore si presenta come “international commodity trader mandates facilitators” indicando una email con un dominio “coranimo.it” che risulta inesistente mentre la partita Iva risulta intestata a lui.

    Coranimo non è un nome nuovo nella galassia dell’imprenditore. È la stessa denominazione con cui in Italia l’imprenditore campano ha registrato una società a responsabilità limitata denominata “Edil Coranimo”. L’azienda con sede a Milano ha per oggetto lo “sviluppo di progetti immobiliari senza costruzione” sia in Italia sia all’estero. È stata costituita nel 2020 da Forlenza, sempre con la madre Consiglia Caruso che attualmente è l’amministratrice unica, di fronte al notaio Stefano Campanella.

    A inizio febbraio di quest’anno Forlenza, invece, si è trovato di fronte al notaio Gaetano Di Giovine con altri soci per dar vita alla “Gemma Italia Srls”: una società che ha per oggetto “la vendita e il commercio, sia all’ingrosso che al dettaglio di prodotti alimentari quali cacao, caffè e prodotti derivati”. Da statuto inoltre è previsto che potrà “partecipare ad altre società, anche all’estero, aventi oggetto analogo, affine o connesso al proprio”. Insomma, un cerchio che sembra chiudersi con le attività del gruppo “Solina-Sahel Agri Sol”, di cui le tracce online sono sparite.

    Tra i soci che hanno contribuito a far nascere la “Gemma Italia”, che sul portale del Registro delle imprese risulta a metà dicembre registrata come inattiva, c’è anche Ernesto Sica, candidato per le elezioni regionali 2025 in Campania a sostegno del viceministro degli Esteri Edmondo Cirielli (Fratelli d’Italia). Sica nel 2000 fu eletto sindaco ad appena 28 anni a Pontecagnano Faiano, in provincia di Salerno, diventando una figura di spicco prima del centrosinistra e poi nel centrodestra di Silvio Berlusconi.

    Proprio Pontecagnano è il Comune in cui ha sede la Martinina Srl e di cui è originaria anche Paola Cianciulli, moglie di Forlenza: entrambi sono a processo di fronte al Tribunale di Potenza per la gestione del Cpr di Palazzo San Gervasio dove dovranno rispondere delle accuse di frode in pubbliche forniture inerenti all’appalto. Forlenza anche per maltrattamenti. I processi vanno avanti, gli affari non si fermano.

    https://altreconomia.it/forlenza-patteggia-per-la-gestione-del-cpr-di-milano-i-suoi-nuovi-affar
    #détention_administrative #rétention #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #Italie
    #justice #procès #fraude #sous-traitance #privatisation #amende #Consiglia_Caruso #Solina-Sahel_Agri_Sol #Deko #Coranimo #Alessandro_Forlenza #Soliva #cacao #commerce_international #business #Edil_Coranimo #Gemma_Italia #Ernesto_Sica #Pontecagnano #Paola_Cianciulli #Palazzo_San_Gervasio

  • Nach Jahren des Stillstands: Berlin bekommt drei neue Busspuren
    https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/nach-jahren-des-stillstands-berlin-bekommt-drei-neue-busspuren-15045337

    Na geht doch. Jetzt fehlt nur noch die Freigabe aller Busspuren für Taxis.

    14.12.2025 von Jörn Hasselmann - In Mitte und Charlottenburg werden drei neue Busspuren eingerichtet. Das sagte BVG-Chef Henrik Falk dem Tagesspiegel. Vier weitere Busspuren werden vorbereitet.

    Berlin bekommt drei neue Busspuren, zusammen sind sie knapp einen Kilometer lang. BVG-Chef Henrik Falk sagte dem Tagesspiegel, dass die rechtliche Anordnung erfolgt sei. Die Markierungen würden aufgetragen, sobald das Wetter es zulässt, voraussichtlich im Frühjahr 2026. Alle drei Busspuren liegen im Westen der Stadt:

    Reichpietschufer zwischen Tiergartentunnel und Potsdamer Straße (etwa 250 Meter, Linie M29)
    Schillstraße zwischen Wichmannstraße und Kurfürstenstraße (150 Meter, M29, 100, 106, 187)
    Kurt-Schumacher-Damm zwischen Heckerdamm und Jakob-Kaiser-Platz (550 Meter, M21, X21, 109)

    Die Anordnungen gelten jeweils nur für eine Richtung. Am Kurt-Schumacher-Damm hat die Gegenrichtung bereits seit Jahren eine Busspur. An der Schillstraße wird gerade das neue Jahr-Hochhaus fertiggestellt. Jahrelang war die Straße wegen der Baustelle verengt, bald werden die Bauzäune abgebaut. Solange muss die BVG noch warten.

    Klage gegen die Busspur an der Clayallee

    Weitere vier Busspuren werden nach Falks Angaben „final vorbereitet“. Welche das sind, sagt die BVG nicht. Alle sieben Abschnitte sind zusammen zwei Kilometer lang. Zudem befinde sich eine Spur an der Clayallee in Zehlendorf derzeit in der Anhörung, heißt es.

    Die Clayallee hatte Schlagzeilen gemacht. Anwohner hatten gegen die Busspur geklagt und 2023 Recht bekommen. Begründung: Es seien nicht genügend Busse unterwegs. Seitdem können Anwohner zwischen Argentinischer Allee und Riemeisterstraße wieder gratis parken. Nun soll nur noch die zwischen Riemeisterstraße und Scharfestraße existierende (sehr kurze) Spur um 400 Meter verlängert werden bis Potsdamer Straße.

    Da sich mittlerweile die Rechtslage geändert hat, gibt es an der Clayallee jetzt den zweiten Versuch. Mitte 2024 war die Straßenverkehrsordnung geändert worden, Kommunen haben nun mehr Spielraum bei der Anordnung von Busspuren, Fahrradwegen und Tempo-30-Zonen.

    Zudem wurden in diesem Jahr 25 Ampeln mit Vorrangschaltungen für Busse ausgestattet. Teilweise sind es provisorische Anlagen, die bei längeren Bauarbeiten die bestehende Busbevorrechtigung aufrechterhalten sollen. Falk zufolge stehen weitere zehn Kreuzungen im kommenden Jahr auf dem Programm.

    Berlin hat gut 2000 Ampeln, von denen bislang 224 von Bussen und Straßenbahnen sowie 129 nur von Bahnen beeinflusst werden können. Die Fahrzeuge „melden“ sich automatisch an, wenn sie sich einer Ampel nähern. Die Ampel bleibt dann länger grün oder wird grün, damit der Bus möglichst ohne Halt passieren kann.

    An diesen 25 Ampeln haben Busse jetzt eine „Vorrangschaltung“

    Müllerstraße / Kameruner Straße
    Hohenzollerndamm / Seesener Straße / Rudolstädter Straße
    Schloßstraße, Höhe Hausnummer 96
    Leonorenstraße, Höhe Hausnummer 70, Rathaus
    Unter den Linden / Glinkastraße / Neustädtische Kirchstraße
    Machnower Straße / Schönower Straße
    Schorlemerallee / Englerallee / Spilstraße
    Alt-Biesdorf / Apollofalterallee
    Alt-Biesdorf / Am Brodersengarten
    Rosenthaler Straße / Gipsstraße / Weinmeisterstraße
    Sonnenallee / A100
    K.-Schumacher-Damm am U-Bahnhof Kurt-Schumacher-Platz
    Rudi-Dutschke-Straße / Markgrafenstraße
    Grabbeallee / Tschaikowskistraße [provisorisch]
    Siemensstraße / Leonorenstraße [prov.]
    Tempelhofer Damm / Albrechtstraße [prov.]
    Argentinische Allee / Fischerhüttenstraße [prov.]
    Kantstraße / Fasanenstraße [prov.]
    Seestraße / Müllerstraße [prov.]
    Seestraße / Indische Straße [prov.]
    Halskestraße / Siemensstraße / Albrechtstraße [prov.]
    Düppelstraße / Kieler Straße [prov.]
    Clayallee / Königin-Luise-Straße [prov.]
    Lindenstraße / Dammbrücke [prov.]
    Ruhlebener Straße / Grunewaldstraße [prov.]

    Wie berichtet, stehen auch zehn große Knotenpunkte an der Straßenbahn auf der Liste von Verkehrsverwaltung und BVG. Dies sind teilweise benachbarte Kreuzungen, auf denen mehrere Linien fahren oder besonders viel Verkehr ist. So zählen drei einzelne Ampeln im Straßenzug Berliner Straße/Potsdamer Straße zum Knoten „Zehlendorf Eiche“.

    Erst ein Projekt ist fertig: die Kreuzung Seestraße/Sylter Straße in Wedding. Hier ist die Wendeschleife der Straßenbahnlinien 50 und M13.

    Dies sind die Tram-Knoten auf der Vorrangliste

    Warschauer Straße / Rudolfstraße: M10
    Danziger Straße / Kniprodestraße: M10, 200
    Frankfurter Tor: M10
    Potsdamer Straße / Martin-Buber-Straße / Onkel-Tom-Straße: M48, X11, 101, 118
    Berliner Straße / Potsdamer Straße / Clayallee / Teltower Damm: M48, X11, 101, 118
    Berliner Straße / Seehofstraße: M48, X11, 101, 118
    Nettelbeckplatz / Reinickendorfer Straße / Gerichtstraße: M27
    Nettelbeckplatz / Pankstraße / Reinickendorfer Straße: M27
    Frankfurter Allee / Gürtelstraße / Möllendorffstraße: M13, 16
    Unter den Linden / Friedrichstraße: 100, 147, 300, N5, N6
    Unter den Linden / Glinkastraße / Neustädtische Kirchstraße: 100, 147, 300, N5, N6
    Seeburger Straße / Klosterstraße / Wilhelmstraße / Pichelsdorfer Straße: M36, M37, 134, 135, 137, 638, N34
    Wilhelmstraße / Pichelsdorfer Straße: M36, M37, 134, 135, 137, 638, N34

    BVG-Chef Falk lobte die Zusammenarbeit mit der Verkehrsverwaltung. Viermal pro Jahr sitzen die Verantwortlichen gemeinsam am Tisch. Vorrang haben Falks Angaben zufolge nun Projekte, die sich „wirklich schnell umsetzen“ lassen. In der Vergangenheit gab es immer lange Listen mit Wünschen, die überwiegend jedoch nie umgesetzt wurden.

    Das Durchschnittstempo von Bussen und Straßenbahnen ist in den vergangenen Jahren immer weiter gesunken. Seit 20 Jahren wird über neue Busspuren diskutiert, passiert ist fast nichts. Zuletzt wurden Spuren eher abgeschafft, zugunsten von Radspuren oder Parkplätzen.

    Die BVG kostet das Millionen. Im Unternehmen gibt es die Faustregel, dass ein um einen Kilometer pro Stunde verringertes Durchschnittstempo im Busnetz rund 100 und bei der Straßenbahn etwa 35 zusätzliche Fahrerinnen und Fahrer erfordert. Bekanntlich hat die BVG große Mühe, Fahrer zu finden. Wegen des Personalmangels sind bei Bus, Tram und U-Bahn in den vergangenen Jahren die Takte ausgedünnt worden.

    #Berlin #Verkehr #ÖPNV #BVG #Bus #Straßenbahn

  • American AI Arrives on Fortress Europe’s Borders. At What Cost ?

    Critics say emerging age estimation and surveillance technologies are putting human rights at risk.

    #Shield_AI’s headquarters are situated in a tall glass building along a wide boulevard in San Diego, a world away from where its tech, dreamed up in the sun-washed streets of California, has been tested above the Bulgarian forests. For asylum seekers trying to cross from Turkey to Bulgaria — and into the European Union — there is a good chance that in the future they may encounter one of the company’s surveillance drones.

    Shield AI was founded as a startup in 2015 by Andrew Reiter and brothers Ryan and Brandon Tseng. The company is now valued at around $5 billion. It claims that during its participation in a 60-day pilot at the border in August — coordinated with Frontex, the EU border agency — “both irregular border crossings and criminal activity” saw a “significant reduction” thanks to the use of its vertical-take-off (or V-BAT) drones. How this was achieved remains unclear. The drones include an onboard AI pilot that enables a fully autonomous flight even without GPS. Frontex agreed there had been a reduction in crossings, although neither Frontex nor Shield AI would say what the precise percentage is. Shield AI is active across Europe and has sold these drones to other EU states, including Greece and the Netherlands. The company also has a lucrative $198 million contract with the US Coast Guard announced in 2024.

    A new joint investigation by Inkstick, Solomon, Taz, and SWI Swiss Info reveals how new technology is rolled out across Europe to deter irregular migration and handle asylum claims, often with little scrutiny and thin safeguards, that can affect even underage refugees. It also shows how the EU is increasingly moving towards “smart” border control solutions, which either use or have the potential to use artificial intelligence — despite officials downplaying or hiding this trend behind less ominous terms like “algorithms.”

    The Bulgarian trial, according to two officials present at a closed-door meeting in Warsaw in September 2025, was part of an “Innovation” presentation. Featured on the screen was a drone-based surveillance network piloted under a Frontex contract. Assets tested included V-BAT drones that hovered along Bulgaria’s border with Turkey, streaming real-time video to a command center and flagging movements to operators.

    Bulgaria is among a number of European countries accused of systematically violating the rights of asylum seekers. Shield AI did not respond to requests for comment on the system, its deployment, costs, or data use. Frontex, in a written response, said that the “preventative” effect of the Bulgarian pilot was an “indirect outcome” and was conducted under a “research and innovation pilot, which includes comprehensive fundamental-rights safeguards.”

    The European Commission has said that research pilots remain outside of the full legal framework. Dr. Niovi Vavoula, an Associate Professor and Chair in Cyber Policy at the University of Luxembourg, told the investigation that such exceptions are merely semantic once these systems are tested on real people, “we are past the purely testing research phase.” She added that any research exceptions “shouldn’t be applicable.”

    From the beginning of people’s attempts to reach Europe, often aboard overpacked, flimsy vessels leaving from Libya, aerial assets sold by defense companies and deployed on behalf of European states and agencies buzz above their heads.

    Along the voyage, an array of Israeli tech could be monitoring their movements, from Israel’s IAI’s Heron surveillance drones leased to Frontex for Mediterranean patrols to Elbit Systems’ Hermes 900 drones (used in the skies of Gaza since 2014) used on unarmed EU maritime patrol missions. In 2025, Frontex renewed the IAI-made Heron 1 drone for another four years.

    If people make it to European soil alive — thousands do not — they frequently try to leave countries of first-arrival like Greece and reach wealthier nations such as Germany, where living conditions and prospects of employment seem better. In the reeds of northern Greece, according to border officials who spoke to the investigation, the movement of storks often gives away the positions of migrants hoping to do just this; soon a series of sophisticated tech will take over from nature’s watchmen.

    Public announcements, internal minutes, and technical documents reviewed by this investigation detail plans for the deployment of Mobile Incident-Management Centers (MIMCs) in the country’s northern border, the main exit route for migrants trying to reach Northern Europe. All-terrain vehicles will be equipped with thermal cameras, drones, and encrypted comms, working alongside new fixed surveillance structures feeding live video and alerts into central control hubs and command posts.

    For those who make it from southern Europe all the way to its tip in northern France and the beaches around the city of Calais, refugees might come into contact with even more American technology invested in monitoring their movements.

    Anduril Industries (one of several American defense companies borrowing its name from the Lord of the Rings franchise) has a role to play in monitoring asylum seekers being crammed onto smugglers’ overcrowded boats to cross the English Channel, the stretch of water between France and the southern coast of England and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Founded by Donald Trump supporter Palmer Luckey in 2017, Anduril is now valued at over $30.5 billion.

    In a recent investigation, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism laid bare the breadth of the company’s lobbying activities in the UK, including the hiring of at least 11 former defense ministry staff. Anduril has sold a number of “Sentry Towers” to the UK Home Office, similar to those along the US-Mexico border. The towers monitor migrant crossings and use the company’s “Lattice” AI system. They are shrouded in secrecy, with the British government often refusing to release precise details about their number, positions on the southeast coast, or contracts. Previous freedom of information requests filed by researchers have revealed the Home Office has paid over £16 million (around $21.2 million) for a three-year period for one of these contracts,

    Anduril’s expansion into Britain reflects a broader trend: US companies are increasingly supplying not only border hardware but also the AI tools that shape asylum decisions. This investigation has obtained the names of seven companies involved in a controversial trial run by the UK Home Office, which plans to use AI to estimate the age of newly arrived migrants. The Home Office claims that Facial Age Estimation AI, a process in which an individual’s age is determined by comparing their facial biometrics to a large dataset of faces with known ages, “offers a potentially rapid and simple means” to verify someone’s age.

    Molly Buckley from the Electronic Frontier Foundation said that the organization has concerns over the technology, including reports of its accuracy levels. “When used for age estimation, facial scanning is often inaccurate. It’s in the name: age estimation,” she said. Buckley explained that every form of face-scanning technology has an error rate, which means some adults will be deemed minors and vice versa, with limited options for recourse. “Age estimation is also discriminatory. Studies show face scans are more likely to err in estimating the age of people of color and women, which means that as a tool of age verification, these face scans will have an unfair disparate impact on the human rights of people seeking asylum.”

    Three of the seven companies involved in this trial are American, including Trust Stamp, a Georgia-based company that bills itself as an “AI-powered identity verification.” Trust Stamp had a controversial contract with ICE, which was terminated in 2022. Although no link was made public, the company had suffered a significant data breach of its migrant-tracking app used by ICE earlier in the year. Aware Inc and Paravision AI, both similarly headquartered in the US, have had their software used by multiple US government bodies, including the FBI and the US Air Force. None of those involved in the trial appear to have ever had their facial age estimation technology used on asylum seekers. Aware Inc, Paravision AI, and Trust Stamp did not respond to request for comment.

    The Home Office did not provide answers to a lengthy list of questions about whether a human-rights impact assessment had been completed, about which experts had been consulted, or about any further details of the implementation process. In a statement, it insisted that “robust age assessments are a vital tool in maintaining border security,” with a reported plan to integrate it into systems in 2026.

    Child protection advocates, meanwhile, say these assurances fall far short of addressing the lived consequences for young people misidentified by automated systems. Maddie Harris from the Humans for Rights Network said that “introducing facial age estimation does nothing to address this significant safeguarding issue of determining children to be adults and placing them in unsafe settings exposed to acute harm.” Harris added, “Our concerns include the ability for a child to consent to an AI age check, inherent racial bias and the data the tool will have access to reach its decision on a person’s age.”

    Harris questioned how such technology will adequately take into account “the complexities of human life, including long and traumatic journeys to the UK, and how our experiences manifest in our faces and bodies.”

    Age estimation is not the only area where American-made AI is being inserted into asylum decision-making. Foxglove, a nonprofit that litigates and advocates for “fairer tech,” shared its submission to the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights ​​and the Regulation of AI. The submission flags concerns about three AI tools used or tested by the Home Office, including the proposed facial age assessment as well as one to auto-summarize asylum interview transcript and another to condense and summarize country information for asylum decision-makers.

    The nonprofit says it has confirmed that the transcript-summarizing tool is based on San Francisco based OpenAI’s GPT-4. The tendency of such models to “hallucinate,” or to produce false but plausible results, is well documented, Foxglove said. In trials, from the Home Office’s own admission, 9% of summaries were reportedly so inaccurate or incomplete they were unusable.

    Foxglove’s Donald Campbell said it is “surprising” the Home Office calls that “a small proportion.” With tens of thousands of asylum claims a year, he explained, such an error rate could affect thousands of cases if scaled up.

    “It is hard to see how unleashing these dangerously unreliable tools on some of the most vulnerable people — including child refugees — is anything other than a recipe for disaster,” Campbell added. “At the very least, the Home Office should be providing a higher level of transparency and accountability, to ensure that errors and harms are rapidly identified. Instead it is refusing to release even minimal information on the risk assessments it has undertaken. This secrecy suggests the Home Office knows the tools come with significant, known risks, but is determined to push on regardless.”

    The EFF’s Buckley agreed. “By definition, asylum seekers have an increased need for privacy and protection. To force them to hand over their most sensitive data to UK authorities and AI companies as soon as they reach UK shores raises significant concerns. Where does that biometric data go, and who is it shared with? Can it be purchased, used by law enforcement, or stolen by bad actors — either in the UK or in the country they’re fleeing? Deploying this unreliable, discriminatory, and dangerous surveillance technology at the border just to save a few pounds creates massive risks to the human rights, safety, and well-being of asylum seekers.”

    The tendency to downplay or reframe AI use is mirrored in how authorities describe the role of the technology within decision-making processes. The UK Home Office, for example, has said that the trial of AI on age-contested children at the border will only be “assistive,” with the final decision making remaining in human hands.

    Estelle Pannatier from Algorithm Watch explained that “assistive” AI nonetheless comes with its own pitfalls. “We have observed that people who seek advice from algorithms can, over time, become more dependent on the system and less critical of it,” Pannatier explained. “Thus, a tool developed to assist in decision-making can, in practice, be used as an instrument for making decisions. In theory a human oversees the system … but that person relinquishes their supervisory responsibilities and decision-making authority to the algorithm. It is therefore essential that appropriate processes be put in place to reduce these ‘automation biases.’”

    Meanwhile, there is an apparent lack of transparency surrounding the AI technology being deployed at Europe’s borders. This investigation’s requests for precise details on the Bulgaria pilot were denied. Requests for UK performance reviews regarding Anduril’s Sentry Towers were denied, while the Home Office did not answer questions about whether a human rights impact assessment or a data protection impact assessment had been completed on the facial age estimation technology.

    These examples merely underpin a bigger problem, according to Bram Vranken, a researcher at the Brussels-based watchdog Corporate Europe Observatory. “Border management is being seen as crucial to national security and has become securitized. So, everything to do with borders is being more and more exempt from democratic oversight, accountability, [and] transparency.”

    As countries from Bulgaria to the United Kingdom increasingly rely on AI and other technology to conduct border enforcement, rights groups have become increasingly concerned. In a 2024 report, Amnesty International warned that “digitized interventions” on borders contribute to “weakening human rights protections for migrants and asylum seekers.” In 2023, the EuroMed Rights watchdog said the “use of new technologies is now firmly cemented in the EU’s border policies,” noting that they “underpin invasions of privacy, brutal violations of human rights” across Europe.

    Criticism or not, lucrative contracts for tech companies have continued to pile up. To Dr. Vavoula, the risks these multimillion dollar technologies pose are clear: “These tools are not trained to show compassion.”

    https://inkstickmedia.com/american-ai-arrives-on-fortress-europes-borders-at-what-cost

    #technologie #AI #intelligence_artificielle #IA #frontières #Europe #migrations #technologie #surveillance #Bulgarie #forêt #Andrew_Reiter #Brandon_Tseng #Ryan_Tseng #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #vertical-take-off #Frontex #V-BAT #drones #Grèce #Pays-Bas #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #Turquie #Heron #Israël #USA #Etats-Unis #Mobile_Incident-Management_Centers (#MIMCs) #Anduril_Industries #Manche #Palmer_Luckey #Sentry_Towers #Lattice #âge #biométrie #biométrie_faciale #Molly_Buckley #Electronic_Frontier_Foundation #Trust_Stamp #ICE #Aware_Inc #Paravision_AI

  • Schizzano i fatturati delle prime 100 aziende belliche del mondo. C’è anche #Leonardo

    Nel #2024 le più grandi aziende del comparto militare hanno registrato ricavi record pari a 679 miliardi di dollari a livello globale. A guidare la crescita sono le corporation statunitensi impegnate nello sviluppo di sottomarini nucleari e aerei da combattimento per il Pentagono. Così come quelle europee, coinvolte nel sostegno all’Ucraina e nel riarmo. Mentre le società israeliane stanno ancora traendo enormi profitti dall’aggressione contro la Striscia di Gaza. I dati del Sipri

    Le tensioni internazionali e la crescita delle spese militari spingono i fatturati delle principali aziende belliche. Secondo l’ultima analisi dell’Istituto internazionale di ricerche sulla pace di Stoccolma (Sipri) i ricavi combinati dei primi 100 produttori di armi a livello globale hanno infatti raggiunto il risultato record di 679 miliardi di dollari, un incremento del 5,9% rispetto all’anno precedente e del 26% nell’ultimo decennio.

    La crescita è dovuta principalmente alle aziende statunitensi (tra cui Lockheed Martin, produttore del caccia F-35) ed europee (tra cui l’italiana Leonardo, seconda in Europa) ma che si è osservata in tutte le regioni. “Lo scorso anno i ricavi globali derivanti dalla vendita di armi hanno raggiunto il livello più alto mai registrato dal Sipri, grazie alla forte domanda di cui hanno approfittato i produttori -ha spiegato Lorenzo Scarazzato, ricercatore del programma sulle spese militari e la produzione di armi del Sipri-. Sebbene le aziende abbiano potenziato la loro capacità produttiva, devono ancora affrontare una serie di sfide che potrebbero influire sui costi e sui tempi di consegna”.

    Tra le prime 100 aziende ben 77 hanno incrementato i loro ricavi dovuti alla vendita di armi ed equipaggiamenti militari, con 42 che hanno segnato un aumento superiore al 10%. Due di loro hanno addirittura più che raddoppiato questa cifra; si tratta di Czechoslovak group (proprietaria, tra le altre, anche di Fiocchi munizioni) che occupa la 46esima posizione con una crescita del 193% e SpaceX, fondata da Elon Musk. Quest’ultima ha segnato un incremento dei ricavi dovuto alle commesse militari del 103%, raggiungendo il 77esimo posto e facendo la sua comparsa per la prima volta nei maggiori produttori di armi. Per rispondere all’aumento della domanda almeno 38 aziende hanno espanso la produzione nel corso del 2024 tramite la creazione di nuove filiali e stabilimenti o sotto forma di acquisizioni.

    Il report del Sipri è dominato dalle aziende statunitensi, che occupano ben 39 posizioni. Una macchina bellica fattasi istituzione che nel 2024 ha segnato ricavi complessivi per 334 miliardi di dollari, poco meno della metà del valore globale, con un aumento del 3,8% rispetto al 2023. Ben quattro delle prime cinque aziende a livello globale battono bandiera statunitense: si tratta di Lockheed Martin, che ha registrato ricavi pari a 64,7 miliardi di dollari e un incremento del 3,2% rispetto al 2023, Rtx al secondo posto (43,6 miliardi, un aumento del 4,1%) e Northrop Grumman (terzo posto, 37,9 miliardi, + 3,3%). Chiude in quinta posizione General dynamics con ricavi pari a 33,6 miliardi e un aumento record dell’8,1%. Secondo il Sipri questa crescita è dovuta alla produzione dei sottomarini a propulsione nucleare di classe Columbia e Virginia, anche se nel 2024 sono cresciute le preoccupazioni per i persistenti superamenti dei costi e i ritardi di produzione che hanno interessato entrambi i programmi.

    Secondo i ricercatori, ritardi e superamenti del budget rappresentano un fenomeno endemico nell’industria bellica. Un esempio significativo riguarda i già citati sottomarini nucleari di classe Columbia che hanno registrato un superamento del costo stimato fino a 17 miliardi di dollari, con un ritardo di almeno 16 mesi nella produzione della prima imbarcazione. In modo simile la consegna di 110 aerei da combattimento F-35, prodotti da Lockheed Martin, ha subito un ritardo medio di 238 giorni per aeromobile e un aumento del budget che secondo le stime dello stesso dipartimento della Difesa (ora “della Guerra”) ammonta a 89,5 miliardi. Considerando anche i costi di manutenzione, l’intero “progetto F-35” è arrivato così a costare agli Stati Uniti 1.600 miliardi di dollari, contro i 1.100 stimati nel 2018. “I ritardi e l’aumento dei costi avranno inevitabilmente un impatto sulla pianificazione e sulla spesa militare degli Stati Uniti -ha fatto notare Xiao Liang, del gruppo di ricerca del Sipri-. Ciò potrebbe avere ripercussioni sugli sforzi del governo statunitense volti a ridurre la spesa militare eccessiva e migliorare l’efficienza del bilancio”.

    Delle 26 aziende produttrici di armi presenti nella “Top 100” con sede in Europa, 23 hanno registrato un aumento dei ricavi derivanti dalla vendita di armi: 151 miliardi di dollari, in aumento del 13%. Questo fenomeno è stato determinato dalla domanda derivante dalla guerra in Ucraina e dalla percezione di una minaccia da parte della Russia. A trarne i maggiori benefici è stata la già citata Czechoslovak group grazie alla produzione di proiettili d’artiglieria per l’esercito di Kiev.

    Per quanto riguarda l’Italia il fatturato nel settore degli armamenti delle due aziende presenti nella Top 100 -Leonardo Spa e Fincantieri Spa- ha raggiunto i 16,8 miliardi di dollari nel 2024, con un aumento del 9,1% rispetto all’anno precedente. Leonardo come detto si qualifica come la seconda azienda europea nel settore degli armamenti e ha aumentato il proprio fatturato bellico del 10%, raggiungendo i 13,8 miliardi di dollari. Nel 2024 la ex Finmeccanica ha costituito una joint venture con la società tedesca Rheinmetall per sviluppare un carro armato e un nuovo veicolo da combattimento della fanteria per le forze armate italiane. Ha inoltre avviato una seconda collaborazione con Bae Systems e diverse società giapponesi, tra cui Mitsubishi heavy industries e Mitsubishi electric corporation, per sviluppare un aereo da combattimento di sesta generazione.

    Anche per questa edizione del rapporto l’analisi relativa alla Russia incontra forti limitazioni data la mancanza di trasparenza sulle vendite e la produzione bellica. Le due aziende russe presenti nella Top 100, Rostec e United shipbuilding corporation, hanno aumentato i loro ricavi complessivi nel settore degli armamenti del 23%, raggiungendo i 31,2 miliardi di dollari, nonostante le sanzioni internazionali che hanno causato una carenza di componenti. La domanda interna sarebbe stata, infatti, sufficiente a compensare ampiamente il calo delle esportazioni. “Oltre alle sanzioni, le aziende belliche russe stanno affrontando una carenza di manodopera qualificata. Ciò potrebbe rallentare la produzione e limitare l’innovazione -ha precisato Diego Lopes da Silva ricercatore senior del Sipri-. Tuttavia, dobbiamo essere cauti nel fare tali previsioni, poiché l’industria degli armamenti russa ha dimostrato di essere resiliente durante la guerra in Ucraina, contrariamente alle aspettative”.

    Anche il Medio Oriente ha fatto segnare nuovi record. Per la prima volta, nove delle prime 100 aziende produttrici di armi hanno sede nella regione, con un fatturato complessivo pari a 31 miliardi di dollari e una crescita del 14%. In particolare, le tre società israeliane presenti nella classifica, Elbit systems, Israel aerospace industries e Rafael, hanno aumentato il loro fatturato complessivo del 16%, raggiungendo i 16,2 miliardi di dollari.

    “La crescente reazione negativa alle azioni di Israele a Gaza sembra aver avuto un impatto minimo sull’interesse per le armi israeliane -ha sottolineato Zubaida Karim del Sipri-. Molti Paesi hanno continuato a effettuare nuovi ordini presso le aziende israeliane nel 2024”. La crescita di queste società viene fatta risalire proprio all’aggressione militare contro Gaza e alla richiesta internazionale di equipaggiamento israeliano, in particolare per quanto riguarda i droni. Ad esempio, nel 2024 Elbit Systems ha riferito che il 65% del suo portafoglio ordini da 22,6 miliardi di dollari proveniva da contratti internazionali, compresi accordi con Paesi europei per droni a lungo raggio. I ricavi dell’azienda nel settore degli armamenti sono aumentati del 14% su base annua, raggiungendo i 6,3 miliardi di dollari. In particolare, Elbit si è aggiudicata nuovi contratti per oltre cinque miliardi dal ministero della Difesa israeliano dopo l’inizio dei bombardamenti contro Gaza nell’ottobre 2023. Risultati simili sono stati ottenuti da Israel aerospace industries con 5,2 miliardi di dollari da commesse militari, un aumento del 13% rispetto al 2023, e da Rafael con una crescita del 23% e 4,7 miliardi in ricavi.

    https://altreconomia.it/schizzano-i-fatturati-delle-prime-100-aziende-belliche-del-mondo-ce-anc

    #armes #industrie_de_l'armement #business #chiffres #statistiques #armée #monde #Lockheed_Martin #Czechoslovak_group #Fiocchi_munizioni #SpaceX #Elon_Musk #Rtx #Northrop_Grumman #General_dynamics #Rheinmetall #Finmeccanica #Bae_Systems #Mitsubishi_heavy_industries #Mitsubishi_electric_corporation #Rostec #United_shipbuilding_corporation
    #Sipri #rapport

  • Légaliser les crimes

    #Palantir CEO Says Making War Crimes Constitutional Would Be Good for #Business
    https://gizmodo.com/palantir-ceo-says-making-war-crimes-constitutional-would-be-good-for-busine

    At the New York Times’ DealBook Summit on Wednesday, Karp was asked about the worries over the unconstitutionality of the boat strikes.

    “Part of the reason why I like this questioning is the more constitutional you want to make it, the more precise you want to make it, the more you’re going to need my product,” Karp said. His reasoning is that if it’s constitutional, you would have to make 100% sure of the exact conditions it’s happening in, and in order to do that, the military would have to use Palantir’s technology, for which it pays roughly $10 billion under its current contract.

  • BVG und S-Bahn Linienübersicht mit Fähren
    https://www.bvg.de/de/verbindungen/linienuebersicht

    U- Bahn

    U-Bahn U1U1 S+U Warschauer Str.◄►U Uhlandstr.

    U-Bahn U2U2 S+U Pankow◄►U Ruhleben
    U-Bahn U3U3 S+U Warschauer Str.◄►U Krumme Lanke
    U-Bahn U4U4 U Nollendorfplatz◄►S+U Innsbrucker Platz
    U-Bahn U5U5 U Hönow◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    U-Bahn U6U6 U Kurt-Schumacher-Platz◄►U Alt-Mariendorf
    U-Bahn U7U7 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►U Rudow
    U-Bahn U8U8 S+U Wittenau◄►S+U Hermannstr.
    U-Bahn U9U9 U Osloer Str.◄►S+U Rathaus Steglitz

    S-Bahn

    S-Bahn S1S1 S Wannsee◄►S Oranienburg

    S-Bahn S2S2 S Blankenfelde◄►S Bernau
    S-Bahn S25S25 S Teltow Stadt◄►S Hennigsdorf
    S-Bahn S26S26 S Teltow Stadt◄►S Waidmannslust
    S-Bahn S3S3 S Erkner◄►S Spandau
    S-Bahn S41S41 S+U Gesundbrunnen►S+U Gesundbrunnen
    S-Bahn S42S42 S+U Gesundbrunnen►S+U Gesundbrunnen
    S-Bahn S45S45 Flughafen BER◄►S Südkreuz
    S-Bahn S46S46 S Königs Wusterhausen◄►S Westend
    S-Bahn S47S47 S Spindlersfeld◄►S+U Hermannstr.
    S-Bahn S5S5 S Strausberg Nord◄►S Westkreuz
    S-Bahn S7S7 S Ahrensfelde◄►S Potsdam Hbf
    S-Bahn S75S75 S Wartenberg◄►S+U Warschauer Str.
    S-Bahn S8S8 S Wildau◄►S Birkenwerder
    S-Bahn S85S85 S Grünau◄►S Frohnau
    S-Bahn S9S9 Flughafen BER◄►S Spandau

    Tram

    Tram M1M1 Schillerstr. oder Rosenthal Nord◄►Am Kupfergraben

    Tram M2M2 Heinersdorf◄►S+U Alexanderplatz/​Dircksenstr.
    Tram M4M4 Falkenberg oder Zingster Str.◄►S Hackescher Markt
    Tram M5M5 Zingster Str.◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Tram M6M6 Riesaer Str.◄►S Hackescher Markt
    Tram M8M8 Ahrensfelde/Stadtgrenze◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Tram M10M10 U Turmstr.◄►S+U Warschauer Str.
    Tram M13M13 Virchow-Klinikum◄►S Warschauer Str.
    Tram M17M17 Falkenberg◄►S Adlershof
    Tram 1212 Pasedagplatz◄►Am Kupfergraben
    Tram 1616 Ahrensfelde/Stadtgrenze◄►S+U Frankfurter Allee
    Tram 1818 Riesaer Str.◄►Virchowstr.
    Tram 2121 S+Alt-Schmöckwitz
    Gudrunstr.◄►S Schöneweide
    Tram 2727 Pasedagplatz◄►Mahlsdorf-Süd
    Tram 3737 S+U Lichtenberg/Gudrunstr.◄►S Schöneweide
    Tram 5050 Guyotstr.◄►Virchow-Klinikum
    Tram 6060 Haeckelstr.◄►Altes Wasserwerk
    Tram 6161 Bahnhofstr./​Lindenstr.◄►Rahnsdorf/​Waldschänke
    Tram 6262 S Köpenick◄►S Mahlsdorf
    Tram 6363 S Schöneweide/​Sterndamm◄►Krankenhaus Köpenick/​Südseite
    Tram 6767 S Schöneweide◄►Bahnhofstr./​Lindenstr.
    Tram 6868 Wendenschloß◄►Alt-Schmöckwitz

    Bus

    Bus M11M11 U Dahlem-Dorf◄►S Schöneweide

    Bus M19M19 S Grunewald◄►U Mehringdamm
    Bus M21M21 Rosenthal Nord◄►S+U Jungfernheide
    Bus M27M27 S+U Pankow◄►S+U Jungfernheide
    Bus M29M29 Roseneck◄►U Hermannplatz
    Bus M32M32 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Heidebergplan oder Dallgow-Döberitz, Havelpark oder Brunsbütteler Damm
    Bus M36M36 Am Omnibushof◄►U Haselhorst
    Bus M37M37 Waldkrankenhaus◄►Hahneberg
    Bus M41M41 Sonnenallee/​Baumschulenstr.◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Bus M43M43 U Berliner Str.◄►Tunnelstr.
    Bus M44M44 Gensweg oder Stuthirtenweg◄►S+U Hermannstr.
    Bus M45M45 Johannesstift◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus M46M46 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►U Britz-Süd
    Bus M48M48 Busseallee◄►U Anton-Wilhelm-Amo-Str.
    Bus M49M49 Heerstr./​Nennhauser Damm◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus M76M76 U Walther-Schreiber-Platz◄►S Lichtenrade
    Bus M77M77 U Alt-Mariendorf◄►Marienfelde, Waldsassener Str.
    Bus M82M82 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►Waldsassener Str.
    Bus M85M85 S Lichterfelde Süd◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Bus X7X7 U Rudow◄►Flughafen BER
    Bus X10X10 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►Teltow, Rammrath-Brücke oder S Teltow Stadt
    Bus X11X11 U Krumme Lanke◄►S Schöneweide
    Bus X21X21 Quickborner Str.◄►S+U Jungfernheide
    Bus X33X33 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Wilhelmsruher Damm
    Bus X34X34 Kaserne Hottengrund oder Gutsstr.◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus X36X36 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►S Hennigsdorf
    Bus X37X37 Falkensee, Bahnhof◄►U Ruhleben
    Bus X49X49 Im Spektefeld◄►U Wilmersdorfer Str./S Charlottenburg
    Bus X54X54 S+U Pankow◄►U Hellersdorf
    Bus X69X69 Köthener Str.◄►Müggelschlößchenweg
    Bus X71X71 U Alt-Mariendorf◄►Flughafen BER
    Bus X76X76 U Alt-Mariendorf◄►Nahariyastr.
    Bus X83X83 Königin-Luise-Str./​Clayallee◄►Nahmitzer Damm oder Nahariyastr.
    Bus 100100 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►S+U Alexanderplatz
    Bus 101101 U Turmstr.◄►Sachtlebenstr.
    Bus 106106 U Seestr.◄►Lindenhof
    Bus 107107 Hermann-Hesse-Str./Waldstr.◄►Schildow, Kirche oder Arkenberge
    Bus 108108 S+U Lichtenberg◄►Waldesruh, Mahlsdorfer Allee
    Bus 109109 Urban Tech Republic◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus 110110 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►U Oskar-Helene-Heim
    Bus 112112 S Nikolassee◄►Nahmitzer Damm
    Bus 114114 S Wannsee►S Wannsee
    Bus 115115 Lissabonallee◄►U Fehrbelliner Platz
    Bus 118118 Rathaus Zehlendorf◄►Steinstücken oder Potsdam, Stern-Center
    Bus 120120 Wilhelmsruher Damm◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Bus 122122 U Kurt-Schumacher-Platz◄►Titiseestr.
    Bus 123123 S+U Hauptbahnhof◄►Mäckeritzwiesen
    Bus 124124 Aubertstr.◄►Alt-Heiligensee
    Bus 125125 U Osloer Str.◄►Invalidensiedlung
    Bus 128128 U Kurt-Schumacher-Platz◄►U Osloer Str.
    Bus 130130 U Ruhleben◄►Waldkrankenhaus
    Bus 131131 U Ruhleben◄►Im Spektefeld/​Schulzentrum
    Bus 133133 Alt-Heiligensee◄►U Haselhorst
    Bus 134134 Wasserwerk Spandau◄►Hottengrund
    Bus 135135 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Alt-Kladow
    Bus 136136 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Tongaweg
    Bus 137137 Goldkäferweg◄►Reimerweg
    Bus 139139 Werderstr.◄►Schlosspark-Klinik
    Bus 140140 S+U Tempelhof◄►S Ostbahnhof
    Bus 142142 U Leopoldplatz◄►S Ostbahnhof
    Bus 143143 Brixplatz◄►Planetarium
    Bus 147147 S Ostbahnhof◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Bus 150150 U Osloer Str.◄►S Buch oder Hofzeichendamm
    Bus 154154 Aubertstr.◄►U Elsterwerdaer Platz
    Bus 155155 S+U Pankow◄►Fontanestr.
    Bus 156156 S Storkower Str.◄►Stadion Buschallee/​Hansastr.
    Bus 158158 Am Wasserturm (oder Michelangelostr.)◄►S Buch
    Bus 160160 Hasselwerderstr.◄►Siriusstr.
    Bus 161161 Schöneiche, Dorfaue◄►S Erkner/​ZOB
    Bus 162162 Müggelheimer Str./​Wendenschloßstr.◄►U Rudow
    Bus 163163 S Schöneweide◄►S Schönefeld
    Bus 164164 S Köpenick◄►S Schönefeld
    Bus 165165 U Märkisches Museum◄►Müggelschlößchenweg
    Bus 166166 S Schöneweide◄►U Boddinstr.
    Bus 168168 Alt-Schmöckwitz◄►Moßkopfring
    Bus 169169 U Elsterwerdaer Platz◄►Odernheimer Str. oder Alt-Müggelheim
    Bus 170170 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►Baumschulenstr./​Fähre
    Bus 171171 U Hermannplatz◄►S Schönefeld
    Bus 172172 U Rudow◄►S Lichtenrade
    Bus 175175 S Lichtenrade►S Lichtenrade
    Bus 179179 U Alt-Mariendorf◄►Gerlinger Str.
    Bus 181181 U Walther-Schreiber-Platz◄►Kielingerstr.
    Bus 184184 S Südkreuz oder S+U Tempelhof◄►Teltow, Warthestr. oder Saaleckplatz
    Bus 186186 S Grunewald◄►S Lichterfelde Süd
    Bus 187187 U Turmstr.◄►Lankwitz, Halbauer Weg
    Bus 188188 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►Appenzeller Str.
    Bus 190190 U Elsterwerdaer Platz◄►Innovationspark Wuhlheide
    Bus 191191 S Marzahn◄►S+U Wuhletal
    Bus 192192 S Friedrichsfelde Ost◄►S Marzahn
    Bus 194194 U Hermannplatz◄►Helene-Weigel-Platz
    Bus 195195 S Marzahn◄►Klinikum Kaulsdorf
    Bus 197197 S Mahlsdorf◄►Falkenberg oder Prerower Platz
    Bus 200200 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►Michelangelostr.
    Bus 204204 S Südkreuz◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus 215215 Elsterplatz◄►S+U Heidelberger Platz
    Bus 218218 S Messe Nord◄►Pfaueninsel
    Bus 220220 Hainbuchenstr.◄►U Alt-Tegel
    Bus 221221 Märkische Zeile oder Wilhelmsruher Damm◄►U Leopoldplatz
    Bus 222222 Tegelort◄►Alt-Lübars (oder Märkische Zeile)
    Bus 234234 Alt-Kladow►Alt-Kladow
    Bus 237237 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Isenburger Weg
    Bus 240240 S Ostbahnhof◄►S Storkower Str.
    Bus 245245 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►S+U Friedrichstr.
    Bus 246246 U Friedrich-Wilhelm-Platz◄►Forsthausallee
    Bus 247247 U Leopoldplatz◄►S Nordbahnhof
    Bus 248248 U Breitenbachplatz◄►S+U Alexanderplatz
    Bus 249249 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►Roseneck
    Bus 250250 U Franz-Neumann-Platz◄►Buchholzer Str.
    Bus 255255 Schwarzelfenweg◄►U Osloer Str.
    Bus 256256 Siedlung Wartenberg (oder Falkenberg)◄►Zentralfriedhof
    Bus 259259 Aubertstr.◄►Stadion Buschallee/​Hansastr.
    Bus 260260 S Adlershof◄►U Rudow
    Bus 263263 S Grünau◄►Flughafen BER
    Bus 265265 U Märkisches Museum◄►S Schöneweide
    Bus 269269 U Kaulsdorf-Nord◄►Müggelschlößchenweg
    Bus 271271 Zittauer Str.►Zittauer Str.
    Bus 275275 Kirchhainer Damm/​Stadtgrenze◄►Kirchhainer Damm/​Stadtgrenze
    Bus 277277 S+U Hermannstr.◄►Marienfelde, Stadtrandsiedlung
    Bus 282282 U Breitenbachplatz◄►Dardanellenweg
    Bus 283283 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►S Marienfelde
    Bus 284284 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►S Lichterfelde Süd
    Bus 285285 Waldfriedhof Dahlem◄►S+U Rathaus Steglitz
    Bus 291291 S Marzahn◄►S+U Wuhletal
    Bus 294294 Falkenberg◄►Gehrenseestr. oder Marzahner Str.
    Bus 296296 S+U Lichtenberg◄►S Karlshorst
    Bus 300300 Philharmonie◄►S+U Warschauer Str.
    Bus 309309 U Wilmersdorfer Str./​S Charlottenburg◄►Schlosspark-Klinik
    Bus 310310 U Wilmersdorfer Str./​S Charlottenburg◄►U Blissestr./​Uhlandstr.
    Bus 312312 S Nikolassee►S Nikolassee
    Bus 316316 S Wannsee◄►Glienicker Brücke
    Bus 318318 S Wannsee◄►Hahn-Meitner-Platz
    Bus 320320 U Paracelsus-Bad►Reinickendorf, Montanstr. > U Paracelsus-Bad
    Bus 322322 U Paracelsus-Bad◄►Titiseestr.
    Bus 324324 Alt-Heiligensee◄►Falkenplatz
    Bus 326326 S Hermsdorf►S Hermsdorf
    Bus 327327 U Leopoldplatz◄►S Schönholz
    Bus 334334 Waldschluchtpfad◄►Habichtswald
    Bus 337337 Falkenseer Chaussee/​Zeppelinstr.◄►S+U Rathaus Spandau
    Bus 347347 S Ostbahnhof◄►Tunnelstr.
    Bus 349349 S Grunewald►S Grunewald
    Bus 350350 Frundsbergstr.◄►Hofzeichendamm
    Bus 353353 Pölnitzweg◄►Campus Buch
    Bus 358358 S Blankenburg►S Blankenburg
    Bus 363363 S Grünau◄►Krankenhaus Hedwigshöhe
    Bus 365365 S Baumschulenweg►S Baumschulenweg
    Bus 369369 Müggelheim/​Dorf◄►Gosen, Eiche
    Bus 371371 U Rudow►U Rudow
    Bus 372372 U Rudow►U Rudow
    Bus 377377 S Plänterwald◄►S+U Hermannstr.
    Bus 380380 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►Saaleckplatz
    Bus 390390 S Ahrensfelde►S Ahrensfelde
    Bus 395395 S Mahlsdorf►Wodanstr.
    Bus 396396 S Nöldnerplatz◄►S Karlshorst
    Bus 398398 S Mahlsdorf◄►U Elsterwerdaer Platz
    Bus 399399 S Kaulsdorf►S Kaulsdorf
    Bus 638638 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Campus Jungfernsee
    Bus 744744 Gesundheitszentrum◄►S Schönefeld
    Bus 893893 S Zepernick◄►Prerower Platz
    Bus N1N1 S+U Warschauer Str.◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus N2N2 U Ruhleben◄►S+U Pankow
    Bus N3N3 U Wittenbergplatz◄►S Mexikoplatz
    Bus N5N5 S+U Hauptbahnhof◄►Riesaer Str.
    Bus N6N6 U Alt-Tegel◄►U Alt-Mariendorf
    Bus N7N7 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Flughafen BER
    Bus N7XN7X S+U Zoologischer Garten►Flughafen BER
    Bus N8N8 Wilhelmsruher Damm◄►S+U Hermannstr.
    Bus N9N9 U Osloer Str.◄►S+U Rathaus Steglitz
    Bus N10N10 S+U Zoologischer Garten◄►Sachtlebenstr.
    Bus N12N12 Zehlendorf Eiche►Zehlendorf Eiche
    Bus N18N18 Zehlendorf Eiche◄►S Nikolassee
    Bus N20N20 Hainbuchenstr.◄►S+U Hauptbahnhof
    Bus N22N22 Tegelort◄►Alt-Lübars
    Bus N23N23 Mäckeritzwiesen◄►U Rohrdamm
    Bus N24N24 Wilhelmsruher Damm◄►S Heiligensee
    Bus N25N25 S Tegel◄►Hermsdorfer Damm/​Berliner Str.
    Bus N26N26 U Seestr.◄►S+U Zoologischer Garten
    Bus N30N30 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Westerwaldstr.
    Bus N33N33 U Alt-Tegel◄►U Haselhorst
    Bus N34N34 S+U Rathaus Spandau◄►Gutsstr.
    Bus N35N35 Alt-Kladow►Alt-Kladow
    Bus N39N39 U Rohrdamm◄►Aalemannufer
    Bus N40N40 S+U Hauptbahnhof◄►S Karlshorst
    Bus N42N42 S Südkreuz◄►S+U Alexanderplatz
    Bus N43N43 U Theodor-Heuss-Platz West◄►U Berliner Str.
    Bus N50N50 U Tierpark◄►Französisch Buchholz Kirche
    Bus N52N52 U Osloer Str.◄►Grabbeallee/​Pastor-Niemöller-Pl.
    Bus N53N53 Pastor-Niemöller-Platz◄►Wilhelmsruher Damm
    Bus N56N56 U Magdalenenstr.►U Magdalenenstr.
    Bus N58N58 Prenzlauer Allee/​Ostseestr.◄►S Buch
    Bus N60N60 S+U Alexanderplatz◄►Flughafen BER
    Bus N61N61 S Rahnsdorf◄►Dämeritzstr.
    Bus N62N62 S+U Wuhletal◄►Wendenschloß
    Bus N63N63 Waltersdorfer Str/​Parchwitzer S.◄►Müggelschlößchenweg
    Bus N64N64 S+U Wuhletal◄►S Adlershof
    Bus N65N65 S+U Alexanderplatz◄►Rahnsdorf/​Waldschänke
    Bus N68N68 S Adlershof◄►Alt-Schmöckwitz
    Bus N69N69 Schloßplatz Köpenick◄►Odernheimer Str.
    Bus N70N70 Sonnenallee/​Baumschulenstr.◄►Baumschulenstr./​Köpenicker Landstr.
    Bus N77N77 S Plänterwald◄►U Alt-Mariendorf
    Bus N81N81 U Walther-Schreiber-Platz◄►Nahariyastr.
    Bus N84N84 S+U Tempelhof◄►Zehlendorf Eiche
    Bus N88N88 S+U Rathaus Steglitz◄►S Lichterfelde Süd
    Bus N91N91 S+U Wuhletal◄►Boschpoler Str.
    Bus N94N94 U Hermannplatz◄►U Magdalenenstr.
    Bus N95N95 S Mahlsdorf◄►Riesaer Str.
    Bus N96N96 S+U Wuhletal◄►S Mehrower Allee
    Bus N97N97 Prendener Str.◄►Barnimplatz

    Fähre

    Fähre F10F10 S Wannsee◄►Alt-Kladow

    Fähre F11F11 Wilhelmstrand◄►Baumschulenstr./​Fähre
    Fähre F12F12 Müggelbergallee◄►Wassersportallee
    Fähre F21F21 Krampenburg◄►Zum Seeblick
    Fähre F23F23 Müggelwerderweg◄►Kruggasse
    Fähre F24F24 Spreewiesen◄►Kruggasse

    #Berlin #ÖPNV #BVG #S-Bahn #Fähre #Bus #Straßenbahn