• Chine : le poison jaune - ARTE Reportage | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/087017-000-A/chine-le-poison-jaune


    Personne ne sait qui paye pour les activités des adeptes du Falun Gong. Pourtant la secte poursuit des activités dont l’ampleur dépasse de loin ce qui serait faisable sur base de volontariat et de dons individuels. Le reportage apporte quelques éléments clé à la compréhension du géant du marché des religions asiatique sans tomber dans le piège des sujets de propagande préférés par les obscurantistes.

    Disponible du 17/05/2019 au 21/12/2021

    Fondée en 1992 par Li Honghzi, un fonctionnaire chinois formé, dans sa jeunesse, par des maîtres bouddhistes et taoïstes, la discipline combine gymnastique et méditation, spiritualité et rigueur morale, autour de trois principes cardinaux : vérité, compassion, tolérance. Les premières années, le Parti Communiste Chinois loue ses vertus et laisse le mouvement prospérer partout en Chine.

    Ouvriers, étudiants, membres de l’armée populaire de libération ou du parti communiste chinois, Falun Gong séduit toute la société chinoise. Ses adeptes se comptent par millions, au point de dépasser numériquement les membres du PCC... un concurrent idéologique perçu comme une menace par le président chinois Jiang, qui lance alors une vaste campagne de diabolisation. Sous le coup d’un mandat d’arrêt en 1998, son fondateur, Li Honghzi, trouve refuge aux Etats-Unis.

    Le 25 avril 1999, 10 000 pratiquants de Falun Gong demandent la reconnaissance de leur mouvement en se regroupant dans le quartier gouvernemental de Zhongnanhai, à Pékin. Les autorités chinoises décident alors « d’éliminer » Falun Gong, qualifiée de « secte maléfique ». Hors-la-loi depuis 20 ans, les millions d’adeptes de Falun Gong font désormais face à la puissante machine répressive chinoise.

    Réalisation : François Reinhardt

    #Chine #politique #religion #Falun_Gong

    • Qu’est-ce Falun Gong

      Palmer David. La doctrine de Li Hongzhi [Le Falun Gong, entre sectarisme et salut universel]. In : Perspectives chinoises,n°64, 2001. pp. 14-24 ;
      https://www.persee.fr/doc/perch_1021-9013_2001_num_64_1_2604

      Le monde selon Falun Gong

      Certaines sectes dites du « Lotus Blanc » sont liées à des rébellions contre le pouvoir impérial, telles que les révoltes de Xu Hongru (1622), de Wang Lun (fin du XVIIIe siècle) et des Huit Trigrammes (1813) ; de ce fait, les sectes populaires ont souvent été victimes d’une dure répression.

      L’eschatologie sectaire est reprise par Li Hongzhi qui annonce que nous sommes dans la « période de la fin du Dharma » prophétisée par le Bouddha Sakyamuni, période qui s’accompagne d’une corruption morale sans précédent dans l’histoire. « Actuellement, l’univers subit un grand changement. Chaque fois que ce changement se produit, toute la vie dans l’univers se trouve dans un état d’extinction. [...] Toutes les caractéristiques et matières qui existaient dans l’univers explosent, et la plupart sont exterminés. [...]

      Un nouvel univers est alors créé par des Grands Illuminés d’un niveau extrêmement, extrêmement élevé... ». Ces extinctions suivent un phénomène cyclique qui se produit à chaque fois que la civilisation atteint un niveau de développement scientifique dépassant son niveau moral.

      Selon Li Hongzhi, il y a des centaines de milliers, voire de millions d’années, des civilisations au niveau matériel, technologique et artistique extrêmement avancé existèrent. Ce sont elles qui ont fabriqué la lune, ainsi que les pyramides, qui n’ont rien à voir avec l’Egypte. La morale de ces civilisations s’étant perdue, les « Eveillés » décidèrent de les exterminer. « En fait, c’est une culture préhistorique qui s’est engloutie au fond de la mer. Par la suite, la terre a connu des changements, il y a eu plusieurs déplacements de plaques continentales, [et les pyramides] ont refait surface ». Lors de l’apocalypse, toutes les sciences et techniques disparaissent, et la poignée de survivants doivent recommencer l’histoire de l’humanité à l’âge de pierre. La terre aurait ainsi déjà connu 81 exterminations de ce type.

      Une partie des vivants, humains ou autres, sont épargnés de l’apocalypse et envoyés sur d’autres planètes. Ces extra-terrestres veulent maintenant revenir sur terre. Leur arme : la science moderne, à l’aide de laquelle ils s’infiltrent dans les esprits des hommes. « Je vous le dis, le développement de la société actuelle est entièrement produit et contrôlé par des extra-terrestres ». La science est une religion avec son clergé de licenciés, de maîtres, de docteurs, de post-docto- rants et de directeurs de recherche.

      Mais contrairement aux religions transmises par les dieux, c’est une religion transmise aux hommes par les extra-terrestres afin de les contrôler. Ces extra-terrestres veulent faire des expériences sur les hommes et les enlèvent pour en faire des animaux domestiques sur leur planète. Ils se sont aperçus que l’homme possède un corps parfait, et veulent donc se l’approprier. En s’infiltrant dans les corps des hommes à travers la science, ils veulent se substituer à eux. Ils injectent leurs ’choses’ dans les molécules et cellules des humains, afin qu’ils deviennent esclaves des ordinateurs et des machines, jusqu’à ce qu’ils soient remplacés par les extra-terrestres.

      « Pourquoi les ordinateurs se développent-ils si vite ? Comment se fait-il que le cerveau humain soit soudain si actif ? C’est l’effet de la manipulation de la pensée humaine par les extra-terrestres. Ces derniers ont assigné un numéro de série à chaque humain capable d’utiliser un ordinateur ».

      Ce que cette religion apporte à ses fidèles

      Le Falun Gong assimila non seulement les choses propres à Monsieur Li Hongzhi et l’essence d’une, deux, voire plusieurs écoles, mais en réalité, [Li Hongzhi] détient toutes sortes de pouvoirs prodigieux de l’univers ; autrement dit l’essence de ces écoles se cristallise toute entière chez Monsieur Li Hongzhi ».

      Et alors ?

      La Force de Li Hongzhi est transmise à travers son livre, le Zhuan Falun, un livre « omnipotent », dont chaque mot contient une multitude de bouddhas, de taos, de dieux et de corps dharmiques de Li Hongzhi, qui apportent l’illumination au lecteur. Chaque fois que l’adepte lit le livre, son niveau de compréhension progresse vers un niveau supérieur, et il trouve des vérités nouvelles qui lui avaient échappé la fois précédente — révélations qui, pourtant, ne représentent qu’une petite fraction des connaissances du Maître.

      « Le Zhuan Falun a fortement secoué les milieux scientifiques et technologiques du monde entier ! » : il dévoile et explique des mystères auparavant jamais révélés à l’humanité. Les dieux supérieurs disent : « Tu as donné aux hommes une échelle vers le Ciel — Zhuan Falun ».

      Cela me rappelle le modèle d’affaires d’un ex-collègue qui disait : tous les matins un imbécile se lève, il suffit de le trouver pour faire fortune . Bien sûr son idée impliquait de transformer cet exploit en exercice quotidien afin de créer une armée de niais à son service.

      J’ai du mal à croire que de telles fantasmes soient prises pour autre chose que l’inspiration d’un scénario de film ésothérique.

      Le cinquième élément / bande d’annonce
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rzmiE-pESk

      The Fifth Element / Official Trailer
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5vSg2DA3CI

      On note que l’élément ésothérique du film de Besson est mis en avant dans la bande d’annonce de langue anglaise alors que la publicité francaise montre uniquement le côté film d’action au décor futuriste.

      Pour le momement j’ai l’impression que le Falun Gong est la version chinoise de la Scientologie. Je comprend qu’à travers les dimensions typiquement chinoises du phénomène le danger qu’il constitue est nettement plus important que la menace de la Scientoogie pour nos sociétés.

      Après être arrivè à cette conclusion je me penche sur ce texte :

      Résolution du Parlement européen du 12 décembre 2013 sur le prélèvement d’organes en Chine (2013/2981(RSP))
      http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0603+0+DOC+XML+V0//FR&language=FR

      #cinéma #idéologie #sciences_fiction #sectes #apocalypse

  • Étude du microbiote d’hommes et de femmes, d’âges divers, et provenant du Royaume Uni, des États-Unis, de Colombie et de Chine...

    Age- and sex-dependent patterns of gut microbial diversity in human adults
    de la Cuesta-Zuluaga J, Kelley ST, Chen Y, Escobar JS, Mueller NT, Ley RE, McDonald D, Huang S, Swafford AD, Knight R, Thackray VG.
    mSystems 4:e00261-19 (2019)
    https://doi.org/10.1128/mSystems.00261-19.


    De haut en bas : Etats-Unis, Royaume Uni, Colombie, Chine

    Plein de choses dans cet article, mais ce qui m’a intéressé pour Seenthis c’est que le microbiote est systématiquement différent avec l’âge, et pour les hommes que pour les femmes, dans tous les pays... sauf en Chine !

    Or on sait par ailleurs que le microbiote de chacun est affecté (entre autres) par ce qu’on mange. Ca m’a donc rappelé nos discussions autour de « pourquoi les femmes sont plus petites que les hommes », et de l’hypothèse qu’on nourrissait moins les femmes que les hommes depuis longtemps... Peut-être pas en Chine ?

    #Science #Microbiote #Chine #intestins #bactéries
    #Femmes #dimorphisme_sexuel #dimorphisme_temporel #alimentation

    Et du coup, à ajouter à la compilation #archéologie et #sexisme :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/633249

    • En Chine il n’y aurais pas de différence d’alimentation selon le sexe... Ca me semble pas crédible. On peu se demander comment les states chinoises ont été obtenus et si elles sont fiables non ?
      Si la Chine correspond au graphique du bas, il y a pas vraiment différence ni selon les sexes ni selon les ages, à par les premières années. Est-ce que ca serait pas causé par une quantité de données plus importante en Chine qui aplanie les résultats ?

    • On pourrait peut-être croiser les informations du microbiote de nos ancêtres avec celles supposées de leurs sexes pour voir si on (re)trouve une corrélation ?

      Cospeciation of gut microbiota with hominids
      Andrew H. Moeller, Alejandro Caro-Quintero, Deus Mjungu, Alexander V. Georgiev, Elizabeth V. Lonsdorf, Martin N. Muller, Anne E. Pusey, Martine Peeters, Beatrice H. Hahn, Howard Ochman
      Science 353:380-382 (2016)
      https://seenthis.net/messages/511593

  • Le plus grand porte-conteneurs du monde prend la mer à Tianjin 10 Juillet 2018 - French.xinhuanet.com
    http://french.xinhuanet.com/2019-07/08/c_138209629.htm

    TIANJIN, 8 juillet (Xinhua) — Le MSC Gulsun, le plus grand porte-conteneurs du monde en termes de capacité de transport, a pris la mer depuis la ville portuaire de Tianjin, dans le nord de la Chine, lundi, en direction du nord-ouest de l’Europe.

    Avec une charge maximale de 224.986,4 tonnes, le MSC Gulsun est capable de transporter 23 756 EVP (ou équivalents vingt pieds), selon Jonathan Zhu, directeur général de Greater China de la MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, l’exploitant du navire.

    Le navire mesure 399,9 mètres de long et 61,5 mètres de large, et doit arriver dans le nord-ouest de l’Europe avant de passer par divers ports, dont Qingdao, Shanghai, Algésiras, Dantzig, Kaliningrad et Rotterdam.

    Le navire a été construit par Samsung Heavy Industries, la filiale de construction navale de Samsung Group de la République de Corée.

    #containeurs #containers #transport_maritime #mer #commerce_mondial #route_de_la_soie ou route de la pollution ? #chine #europe

  • Internetzensur - China blockiert deutsche Medien
    https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/internetzensur-china-blockiert-deutsche-medien.2907.de.html?dram:art

    Derzeit sind zahlreiche deutsche Online-Seiten von China aus nicht zu erreichen. Darunter sind beispielsweise „Spiegel Online“, die Angebote der „Tagesschau“, der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“, der „Süddeutschen Zeitung“ sowie des ZDF. Betroffen davon sind vor allem Menschen in China, die der deutschen Sprache mächtig sind.

    „Selbst wenn das vielleicht nur wenige Menschen betrifft, ist das natürlich auch symbolisch, dass China hier freie Presse aus dem Ausland sperrt“, sagte ARD-Korrespondent Markus Pfalzgraf im Deutschlandfunk.
    Kaum Berichte über Proteste in Hongkong

    Deutlich gravierender sei es, dass China schon länger den Zugriff auf englischsprachige Seiten verhindert, etwa von der BBC oder der „New York Times“. Das sorge auch dafür, dass es auf dem chinesischen Festland im Moment auf offiziellem Wege nur wenige Informationen über die Proteste in Hongkong gibt.

    Es sei vorstellbar, dass die chinesische Regierung die Seiten sperre, um sicherzugehen, „dass das nicht aufs Festland überschwappt, sondern dass da alles ungestört von kritischer Berichterstattung weitergehen kann“, so Pfalzgraf.

    „Kampf um die Deutungshoheit“

    Chinesische Medien versuchten, die Vorgänge in Hongkong klein zu halten. Wenn sie überhaupt berichten, warnen sie laut Pfalzgraf vor Gewalt und verurteilen die Proteste. „Das zeigt vielleicht so ein bisschen, dass hier der Kampf um die Deutungshoheit schon längst begonnen hat“, sagte Pfalzgraf. Eine offizielle Begründung für die Sperren gebe es aber nicht.

    Unterdessen sei es in Hongkong selbst nach wie vor möglich, an Informationen zu kommen und ungestört zu berichten. Im Vergleich zum chinesischen Festland gebe es dort „beinahe paradiesische Bedingungen“ mit einer blühenden Zivilgesellschaft und ausreichend Interviewpartnern, die sich offen äußern.

    #Chine #Hongkong

  • Designerin Yang Liu - Mit Strichmännchen über Kulturgrenzen hinweg
    https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/designerin-yang-liu-mit-strichmaennchen-ueber-kulturgrenzen.97

    Ihr großer Erfolg ist ein Buch fast ohne Worte: Die Kommunikationsdesignerin Yang Liu nutzt Bilder und Symbole, um zu informieren – auch über kulturelle Unterschiede, die sie auf ihrem Lebensweg von Peking via Paderborn nach Berlin beobachtet hat.

    Am Anfang stand eine kleine Lüge. „Meine Eltern meinten, in Deutschland müsse man nicht zur Schule gehen“, erinnert sich Yang Liu, die in ihrer Heimatstadt Peking eine eher aufmüpfige Schülerin war, „dann dachte ich: Was für ein tolles Land, da muss ich hin.“
    „Im Privatleben eher chinesisch“

    Und so kam die 13jährige Yang Liu 1990 aus Chinas Hauptstadt nach Paderborn, wo ihr Vater als Austausch-Ingenieur arbeitete. Doch auch in Ostwestfalen musste sie zur Schule, und dort lernte sie in Windeseile Deutsch. Mit 17 hatte sie einen Studienplatz für Kommunikationsdesign an der Hochschule der Künste Berlin ergattert. Heute lehrt sie das Fach als Professorin an der BTK – Hochschule für Gestaltung in Berlin und betreibt ein eigenes Design-Büro. Wieviel China steckt nach dieser Erfolgsgeschichte noch in Yang Liu?

    „Ich fühle mich immer als eine Mischung von deutsch, chinesisch und allen anderen Orten, wo ich war. Ich denke, im Privatleben bin ich eher chinesisch, im Berufsleben oder auch anderen Situationen, die man als Erwachsener erlernt hat, bin ich definitiv mehr deutsch.“

    Source: http://www.daybyday.press/article6699.html

    #Chine #Allemagne #design #communication

  • La Chine choisit les voitures à hydrogène Etienne Henri - 18 juin 2019 - opportunites-technos
    https://opportunites-technos.com/la-chine-choisit-les-voitures-a-hydrogene

    Nous avons vu hier que Pékin a porté un coup dur à l’industrie automobile, constructeurs chinois en tête, en réduisant drastiquement (jusqu’à 67 %) les subventions accordées aux particuliers pour l’achat d’un véhicule électrique à batterie.

    Le timing de cette annonce peut rendre perplexe alors que les constructeurs locaux ont fait état pour la première fois d’un recul des ventes en 2018 – une première depuis 1990. La surprise a été totale pour les analystes occidentaux habitués aux politiques de relance contracycliques.

    Pourquoi Pékin met-elle ainsi les bâtons dans les roues de sa propre industrie à un moment où la croissance de la demande intérieure marque le pas ? Tout simplement pour obliger les acteurs de la filière à rationaliser leurs pratiques et se préparer à l’après lithium.

    Vers une vraie concurrence
    Des années de subventions massives ont, certes, permis de faire de la Chine le premier marché mondial pour les véhicules électriques, mais elles ont également empêché l’émergence d’une saine concurrence.

    En coupant le robinet des subventions, Pékin force les constructeurs à se battre sur les prix et à différencier leurs offres. Il ne fait nul doute que, parmi les 486 constructeurs de voitures électriques homologués au dernier recensement en Chine, nombre d’entre eux seront rachetés ou disparaîtront à court terme.

    Avec la fin programmée des subventions dès l’année prochaine (selon le South China Morning Post), les constructeurs n’ont plus que quelques mois pour rendre la commercialisation de leurs modèles au lithium rentable.

    L’hydrogène en ligne de mire
    Ne pensez pas que la Chine abandonne pour autant son habituel dirigisme pour convertir son économie au libéralisme débridé. Les subventions existent encore, elles iront toutefois vers un mode de stockage d’énergie censé remplacer les batteries au lithium : l’hydrogène.

    Selon les autorités, ce basculement des subventions aurait été décidé l’année dernière par le premier ministre Li Keqiang lors d’une visite de Toyota au Japon, durant laquelle il aurait vu un démonstrateur de véhicule à hydrogène capable de parcourir 650 km entre deux recharges.

    Mi-avril, le journal d’Etat China Daily apportait plus d’informations sur les objectifs du gouvernement : 5 000 véhicules à hydrogène en circulation l’année prochaine, 50 000 en 2025, et un million en 2030.

    Un pari à prendre au sérieux
    Les politiques volontaristes peuvent faire sourire sur le Vieux Continent, où les objectifs industriels (que ce soit à l’échelle de l’Hexagone ou de l’Europe) sont systématiquement manqués.

    Il suffit cependant de regarder l’évolution des ventes chinoises de véhicules électriques à batterie (de 200 000 en 2015 à plus d’un million en 2018) pour constater à quel point le marché intérieur répond aux subventions étatiques.

    Aujourd’hui, les spécialistes s’accordent à dire que l’essor des véhicules à hydrogène est gêné, en Occident, par les questions de sécurité et par l’absence d’un réseau de distribution efficace. Ces deux sujets pouvant facilement être écartés dans le cadre d’une politique volontariste, il est tout à fait possible que Pékin parvienne à ses fins et fasse rouler son million de véhicules d’ici une grosse dizaine d’années.

    L’hydrogène sera-t-elle la 5G de l’automobile ?
    Un déploiement massif de véhicules à hydrogène dans l’empire du Milieu pourrait s’avérer très dangereux pour les constructeurs occidentaux. Si la démocratisation des véhicules au lithium s’est avérée relativement indolore, c’est parce que la Chine partait avec un retard technologique conséquent dans la course aux NEV. En finançant massivement la R&D sur la voiture à hydrogène alors que l’Europe et les Etats-Unis se gargarisent encore de la lente adoption des véhicules au lithium,

    Pékin donne à ses champions une longueur d’avance.
    Il est donc tout à fait possible que nous assistions dans quelques années à l’arrivée inattendue de véhicules à hydrogène estampillés BYD ou BAIC chez nos concessionnaires. Rappelons-nous à quel point la Prius de Toyota avait ridiculisé les modèles électriques français lors de sa commercialisation en France !

    Plus que l’automobile particulière, c’est toute l’industrie du transport qui pourrait être bouleversée par le développement d’une filière hydrogène rentable. Le transport par camion pourrait enfin adopter une motorisation propre sans devoir sacrifier à l’autonomie (batterie). Plus ambitieux encore : le transport aérien, aujourd’hui impossible à convertir à la propulsion électrique du fait de la trop faible densité énergétique des batteries au lithium, pourrait grâce à l’hydrogène tourner définitivement le dos au kérosène et régler ainsi enfin la question de son empreinte carbone.

    #Chine #subventions #voiture_à_hydrogène #énergie #batteries #environnement #automobiles #camions #avions #Toyota

  • Portrait d’un imposteur, charlatan, facho, stipendié par la CIA, belliciste et misogyne (j’en oublie). Théophraste R. - 30 Juin 2019 - LGS
    https://www.legrandsoir.info/portrait-d-un-imposteur-charlatan-facho-stipendie-par-la-cia-bellicist

    Eduqué par un précepteur nazi envoyé au Tibet par Hitler, il a été jusqu’en 1959 le chef d’une théocratie si féroce que « son peuple » martyr, avec une espérance de vie de 37,5 ans, était en danger de disparition.

    En avril 1999, il a lancé un appel au gouvernement britannique afin qu’il libère l’ex-dictateur fasciste chilien Augusto Pinochet, arrêté au cours d’une visite en Angleterre (1).

    Il était l’ami du gourou japonais https://www.legrandsoir.info/le-dalai-lama-vient-de-perdre-un-ami.html de la secte Aum, Shoko Asahara qui le sponsorisait et qui a défrayé la chronique de l’horreur en faisant gazer au sarin des passagers du métro de Tokyo le 20 mars 1995.

    Il est subventionné depuis 1959 par la CIA. En 1998, son représentant à Washington a avoué : «  C’est un secret dévoilé, nous ne le contestons pas.  »

    Le 27 juin 2019, il s’est exprimé à la BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48772175 sur l’immigration en Europe, qu’il souhaite limitée, faute de quoi «  l’Europe pourrait devenir « musulmane ou africaine  ». Elargissant le slogan de nos fascistes («  La France au Français !  ») il a déclaré «  Europe is for Europeans  ».
    Le « chef » si peu spirituel d’une frange minoritaire des bouddhistes envisage de se réincarner en femme, mais «  il faudra qu’elle soit attirante  ». Il n’a pas dit : «  je ne me vois pas en boudin  », mais on l’a entendu.

    Despote, #charlatan, #facho, stipendié par la CIA, belliciste (partisan de la guerre en Irak et en Afghanistan), misogyne, tel est l’individu que notre site dénonce depuis des années dans de nombreux articles (2) quand la classe politico-médiatique se prosterne devant lui.

    Théophraste R. Auteur du pamphlet (que j’hésite à publier) : «  Le dalaï lama est un sale con  ».

    Notes. 
(1) Pendant les 25 années d’emprisonnement de Nelson Mandela, il s’est tu. C’est pourquoi, malgré ses efforts, et contrairement à Raul Castro, il n’a pas été autorisé à assister aux funérailles du leader Sud-Africain en décembre 2013.

    (2) Voir aussi le livre : « Dalaï lama pas si zen », de Maxime Vivas (Editions Max Milo, 2011).

    #dalaï_lama #misogynie #tibet #chine #religion #bouddhisme #femmes #politique #histoire #censure #manipulation #asile #asie #Nelson_Mandela #théocratie #augusto_pinochet #europe #migrations #emmanuel_macron #macron Curieux que #brigitte_macron, ne figure pas sur la photographie, ce devait être une demande de sa #sainteté pour qui les #femmes sont des . . . .

  • Surveillance-savvy Hong Kong protesters go digitally dark
    https://news.yahoo.com/surveillance-savvy-hong-kong-protesters-digitally-dark-003014805.html

    Hong Kong’s tech-savvy protesters are going digitally dark as they try to avoid surveillance and potential future prosecutions, disabling location tracking on their phones, buying train tickets with cash and purging their social media conversations.

    Police used rubber bullets and tear gas to break up crowds opposed to a China extradition law on Wednesday, in the worst unrest the city has witnessed in decades.

    Many of those on the streets are predominantly young and have grown up in a digital world, but they are all too aware of the dangers of surveillance and leaving online footprints.

    Ben, a masked office worker at the protests, said he feared the extradition law would have a devastating impact on freedoms.

    “Even if we’re not doing anything drastic — as simple as saying something online about China — because of such surveillance they might catch us,” the 25-year-old said.

    This week groups of demonstrators donned masks, goggles, helmets and caps — both to protect themselves against tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets, and also to make it harder for them to be identified.

    Many said they turned off their location tracking on their phones and beefed up their digital privacy settings before joining protests, or deleted conversations and photos on social media and messaging apps after they left the demonstrations.

    There were unusually long lines at ticket machines in the city underground metro stations as protesters used cash to buy tickets rather than tap-in with the city’s ubiquitous Octopus cards — whose movements can be more easily tracked.

    In a city where WhatsApp is usually king, protesters have embraced the encrypted messaging app Telegram in recent days, believing it offers better cyber protection and also because it allows larger groups to co-ordinate.

    On Thursday Telegram announced it had been the target of a major cyber attack, with most junk requests coming from China. The company’s CEO linked the attack to the city’s ongoing political unrest.

    Anxieties have been symbolised in a profile picture that was being used by many opponents of the bill: a wilting depiction of Hong Kong’s black-and-white bauhinia flower.

    But protesters have become increasingly nervous that using the picture online could attract attention from authorities, and have taken it down.

    “This reflects the terror Hong Kong citizens feel towards this government,” said a woman surnamed Yau, 29, who works in education.

    A protester surnamed Heung told AFP that many people immediately deleted “evidence showing you were present”.

    The demonstrators who spoke with AFP only provided their first or last names due to the subject’s sensitivity, and all wore at least masks.

    Heung, 27, had returned to the area where the protests had taken place to join the clean-up, and she put a post on Facebook calling for helpers. But she was afraid even a call for volunteers would link her to the protests.

    “Maybe I’ll delete the post tonight,” she said. “I don’t want to become one of their suspects.”

    – ’It would become like Xinjiang’ -

    While Hong Kongers have free speech and do not encounter the surveillance saturation on the mainland, sliding freedoms and a resurgent Beijing is fuelling anxieties and fears.

    Recent prosecutions of protest leaders have also used video and digital data to help win convictions.

    Bruce Lui, a senior journalism lecturer at Hong Kong Baptist University, said awareness around security has increased, particularly with China’s “all-pervasive” surveillance technology and wide use of facial recognition and other tracking methods.

    “In recent years national security has become an urgent issue for Hong Kong relating to China. Hong Kong laws may have limitations, but China only needs to use national security to surpass (them),” he said.

    The city was rattled in recent years by the disappearance of several booksellers who resurfaced in China facing charges — and the alleged rendition of billionaire businessman Xiao Jianhua in 2017.

    Critics say the extradition law, if passed, would allow these cases to be carried out openly and legally.

    “One month ago, things were still calm in Hong Kong,” said Ben, the office worker.

    “But in an instant, it has become this. Who knows if it would become like Xinjiang the day after tomorrow, because things can change so quickly,” he added, referring to an autonomous region tightly ruled by Beijing.

    In precarious times, many are holding onto core values.

    “We’re trying to do better with our privacy settings. But we still consider ourselves Hong Kong people, not Chinese, so we still think we have a right to speak out,” said Yau.

    #Chine #Hongkong

  • The Tiananmen Square massacre, 30 years on - World Socialist Web Site
    https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/06/08/tian-j08.html

    By Peter Symonds, 8 June 2019 - Thirty years have passed since heavily-armed Chinese troops, backed by tanks, moved through the suburbs of Beijing on the night of June 3–4, 1989, killing hundreds, probably thousands, of unarmed civilians. The military forces overwhelmed makeshift barricades with brute force as they made their way to Tiananmen Square—the site of weeks of mass protests by students and workers.

    Those barbaric events, which demonstrated the willingness of the Stalinist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime to do anything to stay in power, have gone down in history as the Tiananmen Square massacre. Yet most of deaths during that murderous assault were of workers who courageously tried to halt the progress of troops to central Beijing. Estimates vary, but up to 7,000 were killed and 20,000 wounded.

    Moreover, in the reign of terror that followed throughout China it was the workers who received the harshest penalties, including lengthy jail terms and death sentences. Around 40,000 people were arrested just in June and July, mostly members of Workers Autonomous Federations that had sprung up in the course of the protests.
    Protesters in Tiananmen Square

    What is commonly depicted as the crushing of student protesters was in fact a wave of repression directed overwhelmingly against a mass movement of the working class. What had begun in April as student protests calling for democratic reforms had swelled into the millions as workers joined the demonstrations by mid-May, making their own class demands.

    The Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation was established on April 20 with a handful of workers and rapidly expanded to become a major organising centre by mid-May. On May 17, up to two million people marched through the centre of Beijing, the majority being workers and their families under the banners of their work units or enterprises. Reflecting the impact of events in Beijing, Workers Autonomous Federations were established in a host of major cities, including Changsha, Shaoyang, Xiangtan, Hengyang and Yueyang.

    While moderate student leaders were intent on pressing the CCP bureaucracy for concessions on democratic rights, workers were animated by concerns over deteriorating living standards, soaring inflation and a wave of sackings and closures. The regime’s embrace of the capitalist market since the 1970s had led to widening social inequality and rampant bureaucratic corruption and profiteering. Workers were bitterly hostile to the accumulation of privileges and wealth by the top CCP leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin, Chen Yun and their family members, and were contemptuous of their claims to be communist and socialist.

    A statement by workers issued on May 25 expressed the rebellious currents in the working class. “Our nation was created by the struggle and labour of we workers and all other mental and manual labourers. We are the rightful masters of this nation. We must be heard in national affairs. We must not allow this small band of degenerate scum of the nation and the working class to usurp our name and suppress the students, murder democracy and trample human rights.” [1]

    Premier Zhao Ziyang had been sympathetic to the demands of student leaders and had counselled making small concessions to calls for basic democratic rights. However, no compromise was possible with the working class, whose unrest threatened the very existence of the regime. As the protest movement rapidly grew in size and confidence, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping removed his ally Zhao as premier, installed hardline Li Peng in his place and ordered the military to violently suppress the protests in Beijing and nationally.
    The crisis of Stalinism

    The resort to such extreme measures was bound up with the profound crisis of Stalinism, not only in China but internationally. In response to deepening economic and social crises, a turn was underway in China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union toward the dismantling of centralised bureaucratic planning mechanisms, encouragement of private enterprise and establishment of market mechanisms.

    After assuming the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his keynote policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness and transparency) that laid the framework for greater autonomy for enterprises outside the central planning mechanisms and, under the guise of democratic reform, sought to establish a base of social support for the regime among the petty bourgeoisie.

    Gorbachev’s pro-market restructuring also encouraged the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe in their plans for capitalist restoration, making desperate bids to resolve their mounting economic and political crises. These processes dramatically accelerated as Gorbachev signaled that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily to prop up its Soviet bloc allies, as it had done in Hungary in 1956 to crush the workers’ uprising and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to end liberal reforms. In December 1987, he announced the withdrawal of 500,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.

    In a very short period of time, during 1989–90, the Stalinist bureaucracies in one Eastern European country after another moved to restore capitalism, dismantling what remained of nationalised property relations and centralised planning.

    In Poland, talks between the government and opposition Solidarity leaders resulted in a deal in April 1989 to hold limited elections. This paved the way for the installation in August of Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister. He unleashed sweeping pro-market restructuring.

    Similar negotiations in Hungary, where the processes of pro-market restructuring were already advanced, led to a new constitution in August 1989. Multi-party elections in May 1990 resulted in a government that junked what remained of centralised planning and carried out wholesale privatisation.

    Amid a mounting economic and political crisis, Gorbachev visited Berlin in October 1989 to urge the East German government to accelerate pro-market reforms. Erich Honecker resigned as leader two weeks later. On November 9, the government announced the end of all border restrictions and Berlin citizens tore down the hated Berlin Wall. Before the end of the month, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl unveiled a plan to integrate East Germany with capitalist West Germany—a process that was completed by October 1990.

    The collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria quickly followed. By the end of 1990, governments throughout Eastern Europe were giving full rein to the plunder of state-owned property, an influx of foreign capital and the dismantling of social services, leading to a precipitous deterioration in living standards.

    Gorbachev’s policies in the Soviet Union gave rise to intense pressures within the Stalinist bureaucracy and the emerging layer of entrepreneurs for a far speedier dismantling of all fetters on private ownership and market relations. This found expression in the installation of Boris Yeltsin in July 1991 and the implementation of pro-market “shock therapy.” In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved.

    The break-up of the Soviet Union and collapse of the Stalinist states in Eastern Europe led to an orgy of triumphalism in the capitalist media proclaiming the end of socialism. Pundits, politicians and academics, who had foreseen nothing and could explain nothing, exulted over the triumph of the market, even going so far as to pronounce the end of history. In other words, capitalism supposedly represented the highest and final stage of human development. A new period of peace, prosperity and democracy would dawn, they all declared.

    The International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), based on the analysis made by Leon Trotsky of Stalinism, had rejected the universal adulation of Gorbachev and warned that his policies were rapidly leading to the dismantling of the gains of the first workers’ state. Its perspectives resolution entitled “The World Capitalist Crisis and the Tasks of the Fourth International,” published in August 1988, made clear that the breakdown of the Soviet Union was not a product of socialism, but rather of Stalinism and its reactionary autarchic conception of “socialism in one country”:

    The very real crisis of the Soviet economy is rooted in its enforced isolation from the resources of the world market and the international division of labour. There are only two ways this crisis can be tackled. The way proposed by Gorbachev involves the dismantling of state industry, the renunciation of the planning principle, and the abandonment of the state monopoly on foreign trade, i.e., the reintegration of the Soviet Union into the structure of world capitalism. The alternative to this reactionary solution requires the smashing of imperialism’s domination over the world economy by linking up the Soviet and international working class in a revolutionary offensive aimed at extending the planned economy into the European, North American and Asian citadels of capitalism. [2]

    In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ICFI identified the root cause of the crisis of Stalinism in the processes of the globalisation of production that had been underway since the late 1970s, which had undermined all programs based on national economic regulation. While the crisis of Stalinism was the most immediate and acute expression, these same processes lay behind the international embrace of pro-market restructuring by Social Democratic and Labour parties, and trade unions, and their abandonment of any defence of the social rights of the working class.
    Capitalist restoration in China

    The events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had a profound impact in China, where processes of capitalist restoration had been underway since the 1970s. The CCP’s decision in June 1989 to use the military to brutally suppress the working class was in no small measure conditioned by its longstanding fear of a repetition in China of the mass strike movement in Poland in 1980–81 that led to the formation of the Solidarity trade union.

    China specialist Maurice Meisner explained that the involvement of masses of workers in the protests in Tiananmen Square on May 17 “did much to rekindle the ‘Polish fear’ among Party leaders, their decade-old obsession about the rise of a Solidarity-type alliance between workers and intellectuals in opposition to the Communist state. And that fear, in turn, contributed to their fateful decision to impose martial law.” [3]

    While Deng Xiaoping recognised the affinity of Gorbachev’s perestroika with the policies that he had already enacted, he did not embrace the political liberalisation of glasnost, fearing it would undermine the foundations of the CCP regime. When Gorbachev visited Beijing in mid-May 1989 to cement closer Sino-Soviet ties, the Chinese leadership kept him closeted from public view, anxious that his presence would give further impetus to the protests in Tiananmen Square. The rapid collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe only heightened the determination of the CCP bureaucracy to suppress any opposition.

    The roots of the crisis in China lay in the outcome of the 1949 Chinese revolution. The monumental events that brought the Chinese Communist Party to power ended more than a century of imperialist oppression that had mired the country of more than 500 million in squalor and backwardness. It expressed the aspirations of the vast majority of the population for economic security, basic democratic and social rights, and a decent standard of living. Decades of political upheaval and a war against Japanese imperialism from 1937 to 1945 had ravaged the country and left an estimated 14 million Chinese soldiers and civilians dead.

    Like the Soviet bureaucracy, however, the new CCP apparatus was based on the reactionary nationalist program of “socialism in one country,” which was a repudiation of socialist internationalism and Leon Trotsky’s theory of Permanent Revolution which underpinned the October Revolution in Russia in 1917.

    As a result, the course of the revolution and the subsequent evolution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclaimed by Mao Zedong in 1949 was distorted and deformed by Stalinism, which dominated the CCP in the wake of Stalin’s betrayal of the Second Chinese Revolution of 1925–27. Stalin subordinated the very young CCP to the bourgeois nationalist Kuomintang, resulting in crushing blows to the Chinese Communists and working class in April 1927, and again in May 1927. CCP leaders and members who supported Trotsky’s analysis of the tragedy were expelled.

    In the wake of the 1949 Chinese Revolution, the pragmatic, nationalist ideology of Maoism led China rapidly into a blind alley. Mao’s perspective of a “New Democracy” sought to maintain a bloc with the national bourgeoisie, but the CCP government was driven, under conditions of the Korean War and the internal sabotage by bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements, to go further than intended. By 1956, virtually every aspect of the economy was nationalised and subject to bureaucratic planning along the lines of the Soviet Union, but the working class had no say through its own democratic organs.

    The organic hostility of the Maoist regime to the working class was expressed in its repression of Chinese Trotskyists, all of whom were jailed in 1952 amid the rising resistance by workers. As with the Eastern European states, the Fourth International characterised China as a deformed workers’ state, a highly conditional formula that placed the emphasis on the deformed, bureaucratic character of the regime.

    The national autarky of “socialism in one country” generated worsening economic and social turmoil, and crises for which the CCP bureaucracy had no solution, leading to bitter internal factional warfare. Mao’s fanciful scheme for a peasant socialist society, which underpinned his “Great Leap Forward,” ended in economic catastrophe and mass starvation. His factional opponents, led by Liu Shaoqi, followed the Soviet model of bureaucratic planning with its emphasis on heavy industry, but this provided no alternative.

    The economic crisis was greatly worsened by the 1961–63 split with the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisers, as the two Stalinist regimes advanced their conflicting national interests. In a last desperate bid to oust his rivals, Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which rapidly span out of his control, leading to confused and convulsive social struggles that threatened the very existence of the regime. Mao turned to the military to suppress workers who had taken literally his edict to “Bombard the Headquarters,” resulting in mass strikes in Shanghai and the formation of an independent Shanghai People’s Commune in 1967.

    Incapable of resolving the immense economic and social problems wracking the country, and facing a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, the CCP bureaucracy forged an anti-Soviet alliance with US imperialism that laid the basis for China’s integration into global capitalism. While Deng Xiaoping is generally credited with initiating market reforms, Mao’s rapprochement with US President Richard Nixon in 1972 was the essential political and diplomatic pre-condition for foreign investment and increased trade with the West.

    The process of “opening and reform” went hand-in-hand with the imposition of strict discipline and emphasis on boosting production in workplaces. Maurice Meissner noted: “Factory managers dismissed during the Cultural Revolution were restored to their former posts, accompanied by calls to strengthen managerial authority, labour discipline, and factory rules and regulations—and to struggle against ‘anarchism’ and ‘ultra-leftism.’ There were dramatic increases in foreign trade and in imports of foreign technology. Veteran party leaders attacked during the Cultural Revolution were ‘rehabilitated’ at an increasingly rapid pace; by 1973, it has been noted, ‘the pre-Cultural Revolution cadres were running the government ministries.” [4]

    From 1969 to 1975, the value of foreign trade increased from $US4 billion to $14 billion per annum. From the end of 1972 until mid-1975, China imported whole industrial plants, valued at $2.8 billion, mainly from Japan and western Europe.

    Deng Xiaoping who had been ostracised during the Cultural Revolution as the “No 2 capitalist roader,” was rehabilitated, appointed a vice premier of the state council under Zhou Enlai. Deng led the Chinese delegation to a special session of the UN in 1974 where he declared that the “socialist bloc” no longer existed and China was part of the Third World. In the factional power struggle that followed Mao’s death in 1976, Deng emerged as the dominant figure in the Stalinist bureaucracy. He embraced US imperialism ever more closely, formalising diplomatic relations in 1979, launching a border war against neighbouring Vietnam, and defending US allies such as the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.

    From 1978, Deng greatly accelerated the “reform and opening” pro-market reforms. Four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in 1979 in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, where foreign entrepreneurs and joint ventures produced goods for export and enjoyed tax breaks and other concessions. A similar system was later implemented in key port cities such as Shanghai. In the countryside, the collectivised communes were dismantled and restrictions removed on the operation of private enterprises. Prices for agricultural produce were lifted. In the cities, moves were made to transform thousands of state-owned enterprises into profit-making corporations. Private enterprises were permitted, the market was increasingly allowed to determine prices for consumer goods, and a “labour market” was initiated, allowing the hiring and firing of workers.

    The pro-market reforms led to the rapid rise of social inequality. Millions of former peasants were left landless and forced to seek employment in the cities. In the SEZs, where the capitalist market was given free rein, corruption and criminal activity was rampant, including smuggling, bribery and the theft of state-owned property. The sons and daughters of the top party leaders took full advantage of their political connections to establish their own business empires. With the lifting of price restrictions, inflation rocketed to 18.5 percent in 1988, to which the regime responded by drastically reducing credit and re-imposing import restrictions. Hundreds of thousands of workers lost their jobs, as private enterprises reduced their workforces or closed down altogether. Unemployment, the loss of job security, as well as skyrocketing prices, combined with disgust at the corruption and enrichment of CCP bureaucrats, fueled the social unrest that erupted in the mass protests by workers the following year.
    Capitalist restoration following Tiananmen Square

    In the aftermath of the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square and the police dragnet throughout the country, the factional battle inside the CCP leadership sharpened in the next three years over Deng’s program of capitalist restoration. In ordering the troops against workers and students, Deng had removed his chief ally in pro-market restructuring, Zhao Ziyang, as premier. Former Shanghai party leader Jiang Zemin was installed as a compromise choice to the top post of CCP secretary general. The initiative shifted to the so-called hardliners—Li Peng and Chen Yun, who, in criticising Zhao, were also criticising Deng’s policies.

    However, in advocating restrictions on market relations, Li and Chen based their policies on the status quo ante and the nationalist perspective of “socialism in country,” which had already proven to be a dead-end. They were looking toward the Soviet Union, even as the deformed workers’ states in Eastern Europe were collapsing and Gorbachev’s policies were undermining centralised planning and nationalised property relations. Their so-called “Soviet faction” represented sections of the Chinese bureaucracy whose power and privileges resided in their control of key sections of state-owned industry and the central apparatus in Beijing.

    At the Fifth Plenum in November 1989, Li delivered the main report, based on the recommendations of a revived State Planning Commission. The adopted plan called for cutting inflation to 10 percent in 1990 and economic growth to 5 percent by maintaining tight controls on credit and balancing the national budget. Rural industries would not be allowed to compete with state-owned enterprises. While keeping the SEZs and “open door” policy in place, the new restrictions hit rural and provincial industries, particularly in the south of the country.

    While Deng no longer held any official party or state position, he still retained considerable political clout, especially in the southern provinces where the new profit-making industries were concentrated. Deng had sided with the hardliners in opposing any political liberalisation and, above all, supported the 1989 military crackdown, but he was adamant that the restrictions on private enterprises and foreign investment had to be completely dismantled.

    The snowballing crisis in the Soviet Union brought matters to a head. An attempted Stalinist putsch in August 1991 to oust Gorbachev and Yeltsin and wind back their program of pro-market restructuring ended in dismal failure. China scholar Michael Marti explained: “This one event changed the thinking about the political equation within the Chinese leadership, including that of Deng Xiaoping. The failure of the Soviet Red Army to support the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its bid to regain control threw the CCP into a panic. The Chinese leadership feared that a precedent had been established.” [5]

    The factional battle lines were drawn. While the “Soviet faction” began to call into question the entire agenda of pro-market reforms, including the establishment of the SEZs, Deng insisted that the levels of economic growth were too low to maintain employment and social stability. “If the economy cannot be boosted over a long time,” he told a meeting of party elders as far back as late 1989, “it [the government] will lose people’s support at home and will be oppressed and bullied by other nations. The continuation of this situation will lead to the collapse of the Communist Party.” [6]

    Deng was also concerned that the crisis in the Soviet Union, following the collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, would greatly change geo-political relations. Not only had Deng’s strategy sought to balance between the US and the Soviet Union, but his economic policies depended on a large influx of foreign investment, which could potentially shift to exploiting new opportunities opening up in the former Soviet republics.

    Along with provincial leaders in the southern provinces, Deng counted on the support of People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The generals had been shocked by the way in which US imperialism and its allies had deployed hi-tech weaponry in the 1990–91 Gulf War to rapidly destroy the Iraqi military. Their conclusion was that China had to invest heavily in modernising the PLA and only Deng’s policies could transform the economy and produce the growth needed to supply that investment.

    Deng set out on his “Southern tour” in January–February 1992, just 20 days after the formal liquidation of the Soviet Union in December 1991, accompanied by top generals, the state security chief Qiao Shi and party elder Bo Yibo. As he visited the SEZs and southern cities, he declared that there would be no reversal of economic policies in the face of the Soviet collapse. Dismissing concerns about growing social inequality, he is said to have declared: “Let some people get rich first.”

    In a showdown with Chen Yun in Shanghai, Deng reportedly shouted: “Any leader who cannot boost the economy should leave office.” Openly backing capitalist restoration, he declared: “We should absorb more foreign capital and more foreign-advanced experiences and technologies, and set up more foreign-invested enterprises. Do not fear when others say we are practicing capitalism. Capitalism in nothing fearsome.” [7]

    Deng prevailed, opening the door for wholesale capitalist restoration that transformed the whole country into a giant free trade zone for the exploitation of cheap Chinese labour. The crocodile tears shed by Western politicians over the Tiananmen Square massacre were rapidly cast aside as foreign investors recognised that the police-state regime in Beijing was willing to use any method, no matter how brutal, to discipline the working class. In 1993, the CCP proclaimed that its objective was a “socialist market economy,” giving a threadbare “socialist” disguise to its embrace of capitalism.

    In 1994, the CCP formally established a “labour market,” by legitimising the sale and purchase of labour power. State-owned enterprises were corporatised into companies run for profit. The unprofitable ones were restructured or shut down. The better equipped, in sectors not designated as strategic, were sold off or converted into subsidiaries of foreign transnationals. A small number were preserved as state-owned “national flagships.”

    Between 1996 and 2005, the number of employees in state- and collective-owned enterprises halved, from 144 million to 73 million workers. Along with guaranteed life-time employment, the “iron rice bowl” of cradle-to-grave services was also dismantled. Essential services that had previously been provided by state-owned enterprises—childcare, education, health care and pensions—were now left to individual workers.
    Chinese capitalism today

    The restoration of capitalism in China over the past 30 years has only exacerbated the underlying social tensions within Chinese society and compounded the political and geo-political dilemmas confronting the CCP apparatus.

    The extraordinary economic expansion of China to become the world’s second largest economy has rested, in the first place, on the immense gains of the 1949 Revolution that unified China for the first time in decades, created an educated and skilled workforce, and developed basic industries and essential infrastructure. The flood of foreign investment into the country transformed China into the sweatshop of the world and produced a massive 11-fold increase in the economy between 1992 and 2010. This rapid growth, however, did not reflect an inherent strength of the Chinese economy, but rather its role in the world economy, dependent on foreign investment and technology.

    The imperialist powers, above all the United States, were more than willing to exploit cheap Chinese labour as long as China’s economic expansion did not challenge their own established geo-political interests. However, the vast quantity of raw materials and energy that Chinese industries require from around the world have increasingly brought it into conflict with the US and other major powers, in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and internationally. Moreover, as China has sought to create its own hi-tech “national champions” such as Huawei and ZTE, the US, under the Trump administration, has declared economic war on Beijing, not just in matters of trade. It has openly opposed Chinese plans to develop and expand hi-tech industries and to more closely link Eurasia to China through massive infrastructure projects under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

    The delusion promoted by CCP leaders that China could, through a “peaceful rise,” become a world power on a parity with the US has been shattered. China’s expansion has brought it into conflict with the global imperialist order dominated by the United States. Under Obama and now Trump, the US has begun using all means at its disposal to ensure its continued global hegemony. Trump’s economic war goes hand-in-hand with a military build-up in the Indo-Pacific, escalating naval provocations in the South China Sea, under the guise of “freedom of navigation operations, and more open preparations for a war between the two nuclear-armed powers.

    The CCP leadership has no answer to the mounting danger of war, other than desperately seeking an accommodation with imperialism, while engaging in a frenetic arms race that can only end in catastrophe for the working class in China and internationally. Capitalist restoration, far from strengthening China’s capacity to counter the US, has greatly weakened it. The regime is organically incapable of making any appeal to the international working class, as that would inevitably lead to social struggles by the working class at home.

    Having abandoned even its previous nominal commitment to socialism and internationalism, the CCP has increasing relied on whipping up Chinese nationalism to try to create a social base in layers of the middle class. There is nothing progressive about Chinese chauvinism and patriotism, which divides Chinese workers from their class brothers and sisters internationally, and within China from non-Han Chinese minorities. Its repressive measures against Uighurs, Tibetans and other ethnic groups have provided an opening that the US is seeking to exploit. Under the bogus banner of “human rights,” Washington is promoting separatist groups as part of its ambition to fracture and subordinate China to its interests.

    Thirty years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the CCP leadership is terrified of a renewal of working-class opposition, the first stirrings of which have been seen in the more numerous reports of workers’ strikes and protests, and, significantly over the past year, in a turn by a layer of university students to assist workers in their struggles. Since 1989, the working class in China has vastly expanded to an estimated 400 million and as a proportion of the population. One indicator is the growth of the country’s urban population from just 26.4 percent of the total in 1990, to 58.5 percent in 2017.

    The CCP leadership boasts of having lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, using the UN’s very austere measures of poverty. Such benchmarks ignore the many factors that are fueling discontent among workers, including the common practice of late or unpaid wages, unhealthy and dangerous factory conditions, harsh corporate disciplinary practices, and the lack of basic social rights for tens of millions of internal migrants in the cities. All of these oppressive conditions are monitored and policed by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which functions as an arm of the CCP bureaucracy in workplaces.

    Capitalist restoration has produced a dramatic rise in social inequality: from one of the most equal societies in the world, China has become one of the most unequal countries. It is home to more dollar billionaires than any other country except the United States. While Chinese workers struggle to survive on the minimum wage of $370 a month, the wealthiest individual, Tencent chairman Pony Ma, has a personal fortune of almost $40 billion. These super-rich oligarchs, who in many cases have built their fortunes through naked corruption and the looting of state-owned property, are represented in the Chinese Communist Party and sit on powerful advisory bodies.

    The gulf between the super-rich and the vast majority of the workers and the poor is generating huge social tensions that, sooner rather than later, will explode on a scale that will eclipse the rebellion by workers and students 30 years ago. The lesson drawn by the Stalinist leadership from the 1989 events was that it had to suppress, through all available means, any expression of opposition that could become the focus of a broader movement against the regime. Incapable of meeting the pressing social needs of the majority of the population, the CCP has vastly expanded its police-state apparatus, now spending more each year on its internal security forces than it does on external defence.

    The working class must also draw the necessary political lessons from the defeat of that movement in 1989, which was rapidly assuming revolutionary dimensions. What was lacking was not determination, audacity and courage, nor numbers, which were rapidly swelling across China, but the essential problem facing the international working class in the 20th century—the absence of revolutionary leadership.

    James Cogan summed up the issue in his analysis “Ten years since the Tiananmen Square massacre,” stating:

    Inexperienced politically and lacking a political perspective outside of opposition to the existing regime, the workers’ leaders advanced no alternative to, and deferred to, the student bodies. The workers of China knew in their life experience what they were against—Stalinism and capitalism—but they were not able to articulate any perspective for an alternative social order.

    Decades of domination by Stalinism and the active suppression of genuine Marxism in China meant there was no revolutionary socialist, that is, Trotskyist, tendency in the working class. No organisation within the country could spontaneously advance the program that was implicit in the actions and sentiments of the Chinese working class—a political revolution to overthrow the Stalinist regime and introduce major reforms into the economy for the benefit of the working class. [8]

    The essential political task of building a Trotskyist leadership in the Chinese working class as a section of the International Committee of the Fourth International remains. None of the oppositional tendencies that emerged out of the 1989 protests offer a viable political perspective for the working class. Advocates of independent trade unions such as Han Dongfang, who was prominent in the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation in 1989, have underscored the political bankruptcy of syndicalism by lurching to the right and into the arms of US trade union apparatus, in other words of US imperialism.

    A layer of youth, intellectuals and workers have turned to Maoism, and its banal “revolutionary” slogans, for answers. Capitalist restoration in China, however, was not a break from Maoism. It flowed organically out of the dead-end of “socialism in one country.” Maoism could aptly be termed Stalinism with Chinese characteristics, with its hostility to the working class, its emphasis on subjective will, and above all its putrid nationalism. It is diametrically opposed to genuine Marxism, that is the perspective of socialist internationalism, which alone was upheld by the Trotskyist movement, including the Chinese Trotskyists.

    The establishment of a genuinely revolutionary party in China, as part of the ICFI, requires the assimilation of the essential strategic experiences of the international working class, of which the Chinese revolutions of the 20th century are a critical component. The CCP leaders are petrified that workers and youth will begin to work over the lessons of history. They attempt to censor and black out any knowledge and discussion of the events of 1989, and continue to perpetrate the lies of Stalinism about the course of the 20th century.

    The crucial political lessons of the protracted struggle of Trotskyism against Stalinism are embedded in the program, perspective and documents of the International Committee of the Fourth International. Workers and youth should make a serious study of the political issues involved, beginning with the documents of the ICFI on the Tiananmen Square massacre, republished this week on the World Socialist Web Site. We urge you to contact the International Committee of the Fourth International, which is the first step toward forging a Trotskyist leadership in the Chinese working class.

    Footnotes:

    [1] Cited in “Workers in the Tiananmen protests: The politics of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation,” by Andrew G. Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, first published in the Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No 29, January 1993.

    [2] The World Capitalist Crisis and the Tasks of the Fourth International: Perspectives Resolution of the International Committee of the Fourth International, August 1988, Labor Publications, pp.30–31.

    [3] Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, The Free Press, Third edition, 1999, p.508.

    [4] ibid, p.389.

    [5] Michael Marti, China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution, Brassey’s Inc, 2002, pp.47–48.

    [6] Cited in John Chan, “Twenty years since Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern tour’—Part 1”, 26 November 2012.

    [7] Cited in John Chan, “Twenty years since Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern tour’—Part 2”, 27 November 2012.

    [8] James Cogan, “Ten years since the Tiananmen Square massacre: Political lessons for the working class,” 4 June 1999.

    #Chine #4689

  • Cobra (Chinese band) - Wikipedia
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_(Chinese_band)


    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUn3aJ1kN-Y

    Cobra (眼镜蛇乐队 Yanjingshe yuedui) was an all-female rock band from Beijing, China. The band formed in 1989, becoming the first all-female rock band in mainland China. With only one album out, they disbanded in the late 1990s. Their style was a gloomy, bluesy type of hard rock with slight touches of new wave and alternative metal. Cobra was very popular in the beginning of their career.

    Group members include Yang Ying, Yu Jin, Wang Xiaofang, and Xiao Nan. They have played at CBGB in New York City.

    Discography
    1994 - First released as Hypocrisy (Germany 1994, USA 1996) republished as Yanjingshe (China 1996)
    2000 - Cobra - Yangjingshe II (China)

    https://web.archive.org/web/20050521082042/http://www.niubi.com/cobra
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sXOjP7zsgg

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdY2LEY7O6w&list=PL9maXLmfUbuY7GIiCFrcULKcZk1jTsufJ

    #Chine #musique #femmes

  • 崔健 一无所有: Nothing to My Name, by Cui Jian - A Decent Chinese Rock Song | East Asia Student
    https://eastasiastudent.net/china/mandarin/cui-jian-nothing-to-my-name

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqMMe7Mw38Q

    Early in my quest to find Mandarin music that I like (I’m a big Led Zeppelin fan), I came across 崔健 and his most famous song 一无所有: “Nothing to My Name” (also known as “I Have Nothing”). I’ve been meaning to write about it for a while.

    The style isn’t completely my cup of tea - it’s a slightly cheesy, classic rock ballad - but it’s a whole lot better than the kind of Mandarin music I tend to hear on the radio here.
    Cultural context

    一无所有 was first performed in 1984, and five years later became an anthem for the student protesters in Tiananmen Square, where 崔健 performed it live. You know rock is doing something right when it gets wrapped up with politics. Now the song is an emblem for the roots of Chinese rock; it set the ball rolling.

    It’s extremely well-known in China (it’s got its own Wikipedia article - 维基百科”) in Chinese and even English). You can listen to or download 一无所有 here (but only from mainland China), and there are numerous versions on YouTube. You can also buy the MP3.
    一无所有 lyrics translation

    I’ve translated the lyrics for 一无所有 into English here purely for explanation. The translation here is for understanding the song in Chinese, not for singing it in English.

    我曾经问个不休 Wǒ céngjīng wèn gè bùxiū I have asked endlessly,

    你何时跟我走 nǐ héshí gēn wǒ zǒu when will you go with me?

    可你却总是笑我,一无所有 Kě nǐ què zǒng shì xiào wǒ, yīwúsuǒyǒu But you always laugh at me, for having nothing to my name.

    我要给你我的追求 Wǒ yào gěi nǐ wǒ de zhuīqiú I want to give you my dreams [goals] ,

    还有我的自由 hái yǒu wǒ de zìyóu and my freedom,

    可你却总是笑我,一无所有 kě nǐ què zǒng shì xiào wǒ, yīwúsuǒyǒu but you always laugh at me, for having nothing.

    噢……你何时跟我走 Ō……nǐ héshí gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! When will you go with me?

    噢……你何时跟我走 Ō……nǐ héshí gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! When will you go with me?

    [drums come in fully]

    脚下这地在走 Jiǎoxià zhè de zài zǒu The ground beneath my feet is moving,

    身边那水在流 shēnbiān nà shuǐ zài liú the water by my side is flowing,

    可你却总是笑我,一无所有 Kě nǐ què zǒng shì xiào wǒ, yīwúsuǒyǒu but you always laugh at me, for having nothing.

    为何你总笑个没够 Wèihé nǐ zǒng xiào gè méi gòu Why is your laughter never enough? [Why does your laughter never end?]

    为何我总要追求 Wèihé wǒ zǒng yào zhuīqiú Why do I always have to chase you?

    难道在你面前 Nándào zài nǐ miànqián Could it be that in front of you

    我永远是一无所有 wǒ yǒngyuǎn shì yīwúsuǒyǒu I forever have nothing to my name.

    噢……你何时跟我走 Ō……nǐ héshí gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! When will you go with me?

    噢……你何时跟我走 Ō……nǐ héshí gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! When will you go with me?

    [instrumental solo]

    告诉你我等了很久 Gàosu nǐ wǒ děngle hěnjiǔ I tell you I’ve waited a long time,

    告诉你我最后的要求 gàosu nǐ wǒ zuìhòu de yāoqiú I give you my final request,

    我要抓起你的双手 wǒ yào zhuā qǐ nǐ de shuāng shǒu I want to take your hands,

    你这就跟我走 nǐ zhè jiù gēn wǒ zǒu and then you’ll go with me.

    这时你的手在颤抖 Zhèshí nǐ de shǒu zài chàndǒu This time your hands are trembling,

    这时你的泪在流 zhèshí nǐ de lèi zài liú this time your tears are flowing.

    莫非你是在告诉我 Mòfēi nǐ shì zài gàosu wǒ Could it be that you’re telling me,

    你爱我一无所有 nǐ ài wǒ yīwúsuǒyǒu you love me with nothing to me name?

    噢……你这就跟我走 Ō……nǐ zhè jiù gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! Now you will go with me!

    噢……你这就跟我走 Ō……nǐ zhè jiù gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! Now you will go with me!

    [instrumental solo]

    噢……你这就跟我走 Ō……nǐ zhè jiù gēn wǒ zǒu Oh! Now you will go with me!

    [repeats final chorus for some time…]

    #Chine #musique #rock #4698

  • MoA - Tian An Men Square - What Really Happened (Updated)
    https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/06/tiananmen-square-do-the-media-say-what-really-happened.html

    June 04, 2019
    Tian An Men Square - What Really Happened (Updated)

    Since 1989 the western media write anniversary pieces on the June 4 removal of protesters from the Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The view seems always quite one sided and stereotyped with a brutal military that suppresses peaceful protests.

    That is not the full picture. Thanks to Wikileaks we have a few situation reports from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing at that time. They describe a different scene than the one western media paint to this day.

    Ten thousands of people, mostly students, occupied the square for six weeks. They protested over the political and personal consequences of Mao’s chaotic Cultural Revolution which had upset the whole country. The liberalization and changeover to a more capitalist model under Deng Xiopings had yet to show its success and was fought by the hardliners in the Communist Party.

    The more liberal side of the government negotiated with the protesters but no agreement was found. The hardliners in the party pressed for the protest removal. When the government finally tried to move the protesters out of the very prominent square they resisted.

    On June 3 the government moved troops towards the city center of Beijing. But the military convoys were held up. Some came under attack. The U.S. embassy reported that soldiers were taken as hostages:

    TENSION MOUNTED THROUGHOUT THE AFTERNOON AS BEIJING RESIDENTS VENTED THEIR ANGER BY HARASSING MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL AND ATTACKING THEIR VEHICLES. STUDENTS DISPLAYED CAPTURED WEAPONS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES, INCLUDING IN FRONT OF THE ZHONGNANHAI LEADERSHIP COMPOUND. AN EFFORT TO FREE STILL CAPTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL OR TO CLEAR THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO ZHONGNANHAI MAY HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE OF A LIMITED TEAR GAS ATTACK IN THAT AREA AROUND 1500 HOURS LOCAL.

    There are some gruesome pictures of the government side casualties of these events.

    Another cable from June 3 notes:

    THE TROOPS HAVE OBVIOUSLY NOT YET BEEN GIVEN ORDERS PERMITTING THEM TO USE FORCE. THEIR LARGE NUMBERS, THE FACT THAT THEY ARE HELMETED, AND THE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS THEY ARE CARRYING SUGGEST THAT THE FORCE OPTION IS REAL.

    In the early morning of June 4 the military finally reached the city center and tried to push the crowd out of Tiananmen Square:

    STUDENTS SET DEBRIS THROWN ATOP AT LEAST ONE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND LIT THE DEBRIS, ACCORDING TO EMBOFF NEAR THE SCENE. ABC REPORTED THAT ONE OTHER ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER IS AFLAME. AT LEAST ONE BUS WAS ALSO BURNING, ACCORDING TO ABC NEWS REPORTERS ON THE SQUARE AT 0120. THE EYEWITNESSES REPORTED THAT TROOPS AND RIOT POLICE WERE ON THE SOUTHERN END OF THE SQUARE AND TROOPS WERE MOVING TO THE SQUARE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY.

    The soldiers responded as all soldiers do when they see that their comrades get barbecued:

    THERE HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN INDISCRIMINATE GUNFIRE BY THE TROOPS ON THE SQUARE. WE CAN HEAR GUNFIRE FROM THE EMBASSY AND JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. EYEWITNESSES REPORT TEAR GAS ON THE SQUARE, FLARES BEING FIRED ABOVE IT, AND TRACERS BEING FIRED OVER IT.

    Most of the violence was not in the square, which was already quite empty at that time, but in the streets around it. The soldiers tried to push the crowd away without using their weapons:

    THE SITUATION IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY IS VERY CONFUSED. POLOFFS AT THE BEIJING HOTEL REPORTED THAT TROOPS ARE PUSHING A LARGE CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS EAST ON CHANGANJIE. ALTHOUGH THESE TROOPS APPEAR NOT TO BE FIRING ON THE CROWD, POLOFFS REPORT FIRING BEHIND THE TROOPS COMING FROM THE SQUARE.

    With the Square finally cleared the student protest movement ebbed away.

    Update (June 5)

    Peter Lee, aka Chinahand, was there on the ground. He just published his eyewitness account written down at that time.

    Western secret services smuggled some 800 of the leaders of their failed ’color revolution’ out of the country, reported the Financial Times:

    Many went first to France, but most travelled on to the US for scholarships at Ivy League universities.

    The extraction missions, aided by MI6, the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service, and the CIA, according to many accounts, had scrambler devices, infrared signallers, night-vision goggles and weapons.

    bigger

    /End of Update

    It is unclear how many people died during the incident. The numbers vary between dozens to several hundred. There is no evidence that the higher numbers are correct. It also not known how many of the casualties were soldiers, or how many were violent protesters or innocent bystanders.

    The New York Times uses the 30th anniversary of the June 4 incidents to again promote a scene that is interpreted as successful civil resistance.

    bigger

    He has become a global symbol of freedom and defiance, immortalized in photos, television shows, posters and T-shirts.

    But three decades after the Chinese Army crushed demonstrations centered on Tiananmen Square, “Tank Man” — the person who boldly confronted a convoy of tanks barreling down a Beijing avenue — is as much a mystery as ever.

    But was the man really some hero? It is not known what the the man really wanted or if he was even part of the protests:

    According to the man who took the photo, AP photographer Jeff Widener, the photo dates from June 5 the day after the Tiananmen Square incident. The tanks were headed away from, and not towards, the Square. They were blocked not by a student but by a man with a shopping bag crossing the street who had chosen to play chicken with the departing tanks. The lead tank had gone out its way to avoid causing him injury.

    The longer video of the tank hold up (turn off the ghastly music) shows that the man talked with the tank commander who makes no attempt to force him away. The scene ends after two minutes when some civilian passersby finally tell the man to move along. The NYT also writes:

    But more recently, the government has worked to eliminate the memory of Tank Man, censoring images of him online and punishing those who have evoked him.
    ...
    As a result of the government’s campaign, many people in China, especially younger Chinese, do not recognize his image.

    To which Carl Zha, who currently travels in China and speaks the language, responds:

    Carl Zha @CarlZha - 15:23 utc - 4 Jun 2019

    For the record, Everyone in China know about what happened on June 4th, 1989. Chinese gov remind them every year by cranking up censorship to 11 around anniversary. Idk Western reporters who claim people in China don’t know are just esp stupid/clueless or deliberately misleading

    In fact that applies to China reporting in general. I just don’t know whether Western China reporters are that stupid/clueless or deliberately misleading. I used to think people can’t be that stupid but I am constantly surprised...

    and

    Carl Zha @CarlZha - 15:42 utc - 4 Jun 2019

    This Image was shared in one of the Wechat group I was in today. Yes, everyone understood the reference

    bigger

    Carl recommends the two part movie The Gate To Heavenly Peace (vid) as the best documentary of the Tiananmen Square protests. It explores the political and social background of the incident and includes many original voices and scenes.

    Posted by b on June 4, 2019 at 03:00 PM

    #Chine #4689

  • June 4 immunized China against turmoil - Global Times
    https://web.archive.org/web/20190603132822/http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1152903.shtml

    Cet article n’est plus disponible (404) sous son URL d’origine http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1152903.shtml depuis le 5.6.2019 19:39. Il est donc resté en ligne pendant 2 jours et 10 heures.

    Source:Global Times Published: 2019/6/3 13:09:54

    June 4 marks the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government have determined the nature of the incident. Chinese society has also made a comprehensive summary of it. Dropping the incident thereafter has been aimed at helping the country leave the shadow behind, avoid disputes, and help all Chinese people face the future.

    We consider such practice a political success, although some people have criticized it from the perspective of news governance. Merely afflicting China once, the incident has not become a long-term nightmare for the country. Neither has the incident’s anniversary ever been placed in the teeth of the storm. It has become a faded historical event, rather than an actual entanglement.

    The Chinese government’s control of the incident in 1989 has been a watershed marking the differences between China and former Eastern European socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Since the incident, China has successfully become the world’s second largest economy, with rapid improvement of people’s living standards. The policy of avoiding arguing has served as a contributor to the country’s economic take-off.

    Today’s China obviously has no political conditions to suddenly reproduce the riot of 30 years ago. Chinese society, including its intellectual elite, is now far more mature than it was in 1989. In those years, China’s reform was carried out prior to those of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. China was completely inexperienced, with an intellectual circle filled with idealism. Chinese society today has seen enough of the political tragedies that occurred in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and some Arab countries.

    Having become politically mature, we now understand the significance of the country’s continuous development through evolutions instead of revolutions. We are also aware of the difficulties and complexity at the practical level.

    As a vaccination for the Chinese society, the Tiananmen incident will greatly increase China’s immunity against any major political turmoil in the future.

    We have noticed that every year around June 4, certain forces outside the Chinese mainland stir up public opinion and attack China. Such forces consist of two groups of people: student leaders and dissidents who fled abroad after 1989, and Western politicians and media outlets.

    The first group’s understanding of the incident remains fixed in 1989. They refuse to correct their understanding of China’s development and the changes that the world has been through. Their interests have been decoupled from the Chinese people and have merged with anti-China forces outside China. Their attitude toward the incident cannot represent those of today’s Chinese public.

    Western politicians’ discussions of the incident are mainly influenced by their countries’ relations with China. Due to the deterioration of China-US ties, US officials have launched fierce attacks against China that have focused on the incident since last year. But Chinese people are clear that those officials are not genuinely concerned about Chinese human rights, but are making use of the incident as a diplomatic tool to challenge China.

    However, all these noises will have no real impact on Chinese society. The actions of the external forces are completely in vain.

    RELATED ARTICLES:

    Speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue by Gen. Wei Fenghe, State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, PRC

    #Chine #4689

  • The New York Times and its Uyghur “activist” - World Socialist Web Site
    https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/05/09/uygh-m09.html

    9 May 2019 - The New York Times has furnished a case study of the way in which it functions as the conduit for the utterly hypocritical “human rights” campaigns fashioned by the CIA and the State Department to prosecute the predatory interests of US imperialism.

    While turning a blind eye to the gross abuses of democratic rights by allies such as Saudi Arabia, the US has brazenly used “human rights” for decades as the pretext for wars, diplomatic intrigues and regime-change. The media is completely integrated into these operations.

    Another “human rights” campaign is now underway. The New York Times is part of the mounting chorus of condemnation of China over its treatment of the Turkic-speaking, Muslim Uyghur minority in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang.

    In an article on May 4 entitled “In push for trade deal, Trump administration shelves sanctions over China’s crackdown on Uyghurs,” the New York Times joined in criticism of the White House, particularly by the Democrats, for failing to impose punitive measures on Beijing.

    The strident denunciations of China involve unsubstantiated allegations that it is detaining millions of Uyghurs without charge or trial in what Beijing terms vocational training camps.

    The New York Times reported, without qualification, the lurid claims of US officials, such as Assistant Secretary of Defence Randall Schriver, who last Friday condemned “the mass imprisonment of Chinese Muslims in concentration camps” and boosted the commonly cited figure of up to a million to “up to three million” in detention. No evidence has been presented for either claim.

    The repression of the Uyghurs is completely bound up with the far broader oppression of the working class by the Chinese capitalist elites and the Chinese Communist Party regime that defends their interests. The US campaign on the Uyghurs, however, has nothing to do with securing the democratic rights of workers, but is aimed at stirring up reactionary separatist sentiment.

    The US has longstanding ties to right-wing separatist organisations based on Chinese minorities—Tibetans as well as the Uyghurs—that it helped create, fund and in some cases arm. As the US, first under President Obama and now Trump, has escalated its diplomatic, economic and military confrontation with China, the “human rights” of Uyghurs has been increasingly brought to the fore.

    Washington’s aim, at the very least, is to foment separatist opposition in Xinjiang, which is a crucial source of Chinese energy and raw materials as well as being pivotal to its key Belt and Road Initiative to integrate China more closely with Eurasia. Such unrest would not only weaken China but could lead to a bloody war and the fracturing of the country. Uyghur separatists, who trained in the US network of Islamist terrorist groups in Syria, openly told Radio Free Asia last year of their intention to return to China to wage an armed insurgency.

    The New York Times is completely in tune with the aims behind these intrigues—a fact that is confirmed by its promotion of Uyghur “activist” Rushan Abbas.

    Last weekend’s article highlighted Abbas as the organiser of a tiny demonstration in Washington to “pressure Treasury Department officials to take action against Chinese officials involved in the Xinjiang abuses.” She told the newspaper that the Uyghur issue should be included as part of the current US-China trade talks, and declared: “They are facing indoctrination, brainwashing and the elimination of their values as Muslims.”

    An article “Uyghur Americans speak against China’s internment camps” on October 18 last year cited her remarks at the right-wing think tank, the Hudson Institute, where she “spoke out” about the detention of her aunt and sister. As reported in the article: “I hope the Chinese ambassador here reads this,” she said, wiping away tears. “I will not stop. I will be everywhere and speak on this at every event from now on.”

    Presented with a tearful woman speaking about her family members, very few readers would have the slightest inkling of Abbas’s background, about which the New York Times quite deliberately says nothing. Abbas is a highly connected political operator with long standing ties to the Pentagon, the State Department and US intelligence agencies at the highest level as well as top Republican Party politicians. She is a key figure in the Uyghur organisations that the US has supported and funded.

    Currently, Abbas is Director of Business Development in ISI Consultants, which offers to assist “US companies to grow their businesses in Middle East and African markets.” Her credentials, according to the company website, include “over 15 years of experience in global business development, strategic business analysis, business consultancy and government affairs throughout the Middle East, Africa, CIS regions, Europe, Asia, Australia, North America and Latin America.”

    The website also notes: “She also has extensive experience working with US government agencies, including Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Justice, and various US intelligence agencies.” As “an active campaigner for human rights,” she “works closely with members of the US Senate, Congressional Committees, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, the US Department of State and several other US government departments and agencies.”

    This brief summary makes clear that Abbas is well connected in the highest levels of the state apparatus and in political circles. It also underscores the very close ties between the Uyghur organisations, in which she and her family members are prominent, and the US intelligence and security agencies.

    A more extensive article and interview with Abbas appeared in the May 2019 edition of the magazine Bitter Winter, which is published by the Italian-based Center for Studies on New Religions. The magazine focuses on “religious liberty and human rights in China” and is part of a conservative, right-wing network in Europe and the United States. The journalist who interviewed Abbas, Marco Respinti, is a senior fellow at the Russell Kirk Centre for Cultural Renewal, and a board member of the Centre for European Renewal—both conservative think tanks.

    The article explains that Abbas was a student activist at Xinjiang University during the 1989 protests by students and workers against the oppressive Beijing regime, but left China prior to the brutal June 4 military crackdown that killed thousands in the capital and throughout the country. At the university, she collaborated with Dolkun Isa and “has worked closely with him ever since.”

    Dolkun Isa is currently president of the World Uyghur Congress, established in 2004 as an umbrella group for a plethora of Uyghur organisations. It receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy—which is one of the fronts used by the CIA and the US State Department for fomenting opposition to Washington’s rivals, including so-called colour revolutions, around the world.

    Isa was the subject of an Interpol red notice after China accused him of having connections to the armed separatist group, the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation, a claim he denied. East Turkestan is the name given to Xinjiang by Uyghur separatists to denote its historic connections to Turkey. None of the Western countries in which he traveled moved to detain him and the red notice was subsequently removed, no doubt under pressure from Washington.

    Bitter Winter explained that after moving to the US, Abbas cofounded the first Uyghur organisation in the United States in 1993—the California-based Tengritagh Overseas Students and Scholars Association. She also played a key role in the formation of the Uyghur American Association in 1998, which receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Last year its Uyghur Human Rights Project was awarded two NED grants totaling $320,000. Her brother Rishat Abbas was the association’s first vice-chairman and is currently the honorary chairman of the Uyghur Academy based in Turkey.

    When the US Congress funded a Uyghur language service for the Washington-based Radio Free Asia, Abbas became its first reporter and news anchor, broadcasting daily to China. Radio Free Asia, like its counterpart Radio Free Europe, began its existence in the 1950s as a CIA conduit for anti-communist propaganda. It was later transferred to the US Information Agency, then the US State Department and before being incorporated as an “independent,” government-funded body. Its essential purpose as a vehicle for US disinformation and lies has not changed, however.

    In a particularly revealing passage, Bitter Winter explained: “From 2002–2003, Ms. Abbas supported Operation Enduring Freedom as a language specialist at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” In the course of the interview with the magazine, Abbas attempted to explain away her involvement with the notorious prison camp by saying that she was simply acting on behalf of 22 Uyghurs who were wrongfully detained and ultimately released—after being imprisoned for between four to 11 years!

    Given the denunciations of Chinese detention camps, one might expect that Abbas would have something critical to say about Guantanamo Bay, where inmates are held indefinitely without charge or trial and in many cases tortured. However, she makes no criticism of the prison or its procedures, nor for that matter of Operation Enduring Freedom—the illegal US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq that resulted in the deaths of a million civilians.

    It is clear why. Abbas is plugged into to the very top levels of the US state apparatus and political establishment in Washington. Her stints with Radio Free Asia and at Guantanamo Bay are undoubtedly not the only times that she has been directly on the payroll.

    As Bitter Winter continued: “She has frequently briefed members of the US Congress and officials at the State Department on the human rights situation of the Uyghur people, and their history and culture, and arranged testimonies before Congressional committees and Human Rights Commissions.

    “She provided her expertise to other federal and military agencies as well, and in 2007 she assisted during a meeting between then-President George W. Bush and Rebiya Kadeer, the world-famous moral leader of the Uyghurs, in Prague. Later that year she also briefed then First Lady Laura Bush in the White House on the Human Rights situation in Xinjiang.”

    It should be noted, Rebiya Kadeer is the “the world-famous moral leader of the Uyghurs,” only in the eyes of the CIA and the US State Department who have assiduously promoted her, and of the US-funded Uyghur organisations. She was one of the wealthiest businesswomen in China who attended the National People’s Congress before her husband left for the US and began broadcasting for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America. She subsequently fled China to the US and has served as president both of the World Uyghur Congress and the American Uyghur Association.

    The fact that Russan Abbas is repeatedly being featured in the New York Times is an indication that she is also being groomed to play a leading role in the mounting US propaganda offensive against China over the persecution of the Uyghurs. It is also a telling indictment of the New York Times which opens its pages to her without informing its readers of her background. Like Abbas, the paper of record is also plugged into the state apparatus and its intelligence agencies.

    #Chine #Xinjiang_Weiwuer_zizhiqu #USA #impérialisme #services_secretes

    新疆維吾爾自治區 / 新疆维吾尔自治区, Xīnjiāng Wéiwú’ěr zìzhìqū, englisch Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

  • How China remakes its cultural imports from the West | Aeon Essays
    https://aeon.co/essays/how-china-remakes-its-cultural-imports-from-the-west

    Re-made in China
    From Marxism to hip hop, China’s appropriations from the West show that globalisation makes the world bumpy, not flat

    The dominant image of China in the West is of a closed, dark place; a country where what reigns supreme is an authoritarianism based on an ancient imperial past that today’s leaders claim to have renounced, while simultaneously extolling China’s 5,000-year history. It’s not a wholly false perception, but the notion of China as a fortress state, impervious to foreign influence, is something of a smokescreen. So too – as the opposite but equally flawed assumption goes – is the perception of China as forever on the brink of being Westernised by the liberalising forces of globalisation and the free market, as if, whenever the fortress gates are opened, the country were barely capable of withstanding the influx of ‘contaminating’ or ‘corrupting’ ideas. This idea of China received a powerful boost from Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ fantasy that the civilised world would converge around liberal democratic norms, leading many Western observers to believe that China’s economic boom and flirtation with freemarket forces was both inevitable, and would transform it completely.

    In reality, China’s longstanding suspicion of foreign influence has not prevented the government or the people from becoming remarkably adept at marshalling the flow of overseas cultural touchstones into the country’s borders, remoulding them into something that isn’t entirely Chinese, but is also totally different from its original form.

    Western readers will likely appreciate that China is modernising, becoming more tightly entwined with international fashions and lifestyles, while also maintaining its distinctiveness, particularly in political terms. Still, the specific ways that new sorts of personal freedoms and patterns of consumption coexist with continued – indeed, ramped-up – authoritarianism can be baffling. Consider, for example, Kentucky Fried Chicken. With nearly 6,000 branches in China, KFC is by far the most successful foreign fast-food brand. Fried chicken appeals from Chicago to Shanghai, while the friendly elderly patriarch icon resonates with Confucian traditions, hence the proliferation of Chinese-looking Colonel Sanders knock-offs locally.

    But while KFC stays out of politics in the West, in China it recently launched an advertising campaign to celebrate 40 years of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform, using Chinese icons such as the pop singer Lu Han to promote KFC’s appreciation of the government’s economic record. In the inland urban centre of Changsha, where Mao Zedong spent much of his youth, KFC rebranded an entire branch in honour of another homegrown hero, Lei Feng, a Communist martyr. The Lei Feng KFC is flanked by commemorative statues, decorated with his portraits, and plays a looped soundtrack of his Communist poetry.

    Like authoritarian leaders everywhere, China’s are anxious about the population’s interaction with foreign ideas, and the state tries to police this closely, adapting cultural imports to fit national and regional needs. Still, the various ways that the government, villagers and city dwellers of different social classes and generations handle these mutations demonstrate that Chinese concepts of national identity are much more flexible than first impressions suggest. Appreciating this is especially important now, as tensions between China and the United States rise. A strident form of Chinese nationalism is gaining ground. Meanwhile, across the Pacific, influential figures in Washington, DC are dusting off Samuel Huntington’s dangerous and misleading notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’, which first gained traction in 1989, after the end of the Cold War, and is predicated on parts of the world being utterly distinctive rather than porous and continually influencing one another.

    This year marks the centenary of the May Fourth movement – an anti-autocratic, anti-imperialist student-led struggle that erupted in Beijing on 4 May 1919 and spread to other cities, just as the European philosophy of Marxism was attracting the interest of young Chinese in thrall to the Bolsheviks’ triumph in Russia. May Fourth activists helped to found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921, and called for an end to traditional notions of Confucianism, claiming that China should look to foreign ideas – liberal democracy, science, anarchism and anti-imperialist revolution – if the country was to succeed.

    One May Fourth veteran was Mao Zedong. In what later turned out to be a typical example of China turning a foreign idea on its head, from the mid-1920s on, and in the face of Karl Marx’s belief that peasants were reactionary by nature, Mao claimed that the CCP’s best hope lay in unleashing the radical fervour of poor villagers. This partial Sinification during the Party’s rise was followed by a different sort, under Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping. When allowing a greater role for market forces in China, Deng declared an age of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.

    Today, China’s leadership is bent on making Marxism popular with young people once again. Marx’s 200th birthday saw the propaganda department release a romantic cartoon, with anime elements, celebrating his life as a dashing young man. Meanwhile, real-life student Marxists, who in the past year have staged protests about the rights of factory workers in Shenzhen, have been arrested and disappeared. They are guilty of challenging the ruling party’s orthodoxy, the details of which, though always described as ‘Marxist’, are continually shifting. CCP leaders have, for example, long promoted mass movements and celebrated class struggle, but in recent decades, especially under the order-obsessed Xi Jinping (a self-professed fan of both Marx and Confucius) the orthodox line downplays class struggle and emphasises themes of ‘harmony’ linked to Confucianism – the very ideology that Mao’s cohort sought to banish by embracing Marxism.

    The treatment of this particular imported idea is especially fraught in the anniversary year of the massacre of 4 June 1989. Perhaps the CCP has noted the similarity of the recently detained student Marxists to the activists of 30 years ago and the May Fourth heroes of 1919? A common misconception about the 1989 protestors is that they were just as anti-Communist as their eastern European counterparts who brought down the Berlin Wall. In fact, they sought not to topple the CCP but see it return to its avowed roots.

    The international literature on Mao’s rise to power, and the Communist state he led from 1949 to 1976, offers many examples of the same all-or-nothing understandings of Chinese culture in play. Karl Wittfogel’s essay ‘The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China’ (1951) ticks off all the ways that the CCP ‘follows Soviet procedure’ and accepted ‘ideas and directives’ from Moscow; while in The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (1992), the US foreign correspondent Harrison Salisbury presents the first two major leaders of the People’s Republic of China as espousing new ideas while stepping into a distinctively Chinese imperial model with roots in practices going back millennia. Salisbury’s take updated the notion that, when raiders from north of the Great Wall, such as the Manchu founders of the Qing, conquered China, they simply assumed the trappings and rituals of previous Chinese dynasties. In reality, the story of both Qing times and the post-1949 era are much more complicated.

    Recent scholarly work on China’s last dynasty – such as The Manchu Way (2002) by Mark Elliott at Harvard, and works discussed in the essay ‘The New Qing History’ (2004) by Joanna Waley-Cohen at New York University – argues that Manchu influences reshaped politics below the Great Wall. When the Qing’s founders took control from the ethnically Han Chinese Ming Dynasty that preceded them, they brought features of the northeastern frontier culture with them, while integrating themselves into a pre-existing political system. The result was a mixed system of rulership, symbolised, for example, by the Manchu and Chinese languages each having political roles. Similarly, in recent years, ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ has made China a place where Western cultural products get ingested and spat out in mutated forms. Now, as in the Qing era, Chinese culture is more the result of transmuted foreign ideas mixed with local strains than the nationalistic leadership, with its warnings of Western culture’s pulling power, cares to recognise.

    Even so, these days the popularity of Western influences, not least Western festivals in China still generates heated debates online. In a local variant on the sorts of culture wars that Americans have grown used to in recent years, defenders of Confucian ways tend to argue – as did a group of 10 conservative scholars from different universities in a joint letter from 2010 – that celebrating holidays such as Christmas, even in secular ways, threaten ‘Chinese values’, and that ‘traditional rituals’ need to be protected. Urban 20-somethings and older cosmopolitan-minded intellectuals who have spent time abroad counter that young Chinese people celebrating Christmas and Valentine’s Day is nothing to worry about. It is possible, they say, to enjoy Santa Claus – who in China is curiously portrayed playing a saxophone – while also respecting indigenous traditions. These might include honouring familial ancestors on Qingming – a spring day set aside for sweeping graves as a filial act – and celebrating the country’s political milestones, such as the 1 July anniversary of the CCP’s founding.

    What these debaters mistakenly take for granted is that the line between types of holidays is clear: Western festivals in one category, and Chinese ones in the other. The reality is murkier, and more interesting.

    International Women’s Day has been marked across the globe each year on 8 March, and in China since 1922, arriving from a place that is not quite East but also not quite West: Russia. The Soviet Union adopted the holiday (which originated in America) as a celebration of women’s labour rights and, originally, both the CCP and the Nationalist Party celebrated 8 March in China in the Soviet tradition. But when the anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek became leader of the Nationalist Party, after the death of its more progressive founder Sun Yat-sen in 1925, he reconfigured the group’s handling of the holiday.

    During the Civil War era (1945-49) the Nationalists and the CCP would hold competing 8 March celebrations in cities such as Shanghai. Chiang’s side devoted the day to honouring mujiao (mother’s teaching), a traditional notion of women in the home to raise children to be filial, while the CCP, now under Mao’s leadership, continued to stress themes of equality. Once the PRC was founded in 1949, 8 March was installed as a regular part of the political calendar, and celebrated only in CCP style across the mainland. All this fit in with Mao’s quote that ‘women hold up half the sky’ and his lifelong dislike of Confucian notions of women’s separate and subordinate roles within the family system. Mao’s first published essays included a newspaper series about how badly women fared in traditional family structures, and one of the first legal reforms his government introduced after taking power in 1949 was a New Marriage Law that made husbands and wives equal in matters such as divorce.

    By the late 20th century, things shifted again. The post-Mao CCP began to view Confucian ideals as compatible with, rather than antithetical to, communism, and Women’s Day celebrations underwent another iteration. Decade by decade, 8 March editorials in official publications and state-sponsored rituals put more emphasis on traditional values, and gave less attention to ideas of gender equality, to the point that CCP celebrations now have much more in common with the Nationalist ones of the 1940s than the respective Communist ones. Modern-day feminists have recently attempted to re-inject a radical angle into 8 March, and refocus it on feminist struggle, but their move has been treated as subverting the holiday’s purpose, and the activists involved have sometimes been arrested and accused of Western bourgeois feminist ideas, despite in some ways trying to return the holiday to what it meant in earlier periods of Chinese history.

    The result is that 8 March remains a major calendar date in China, even if Mao would barely recognise how it is celebrated. Women get no credit for holding up half the sky, but they do get half a day off work, and many companies organise special perks such as spa days or afternoon teas for their female staff. Businesses flock to the marketing opportunity: one chain of pizza restaurants in Beijing this year offered women a 50 per cent discount – only on salads. The idea is to put women on an old-fashioned pedestal, and sometimes it is referred to as ‘Goddess Day’, further removing it from its roots in struggles for rights. It should by now be clear that irrespective of whether we look at fast food, ideology, festivals or pop culture, the cultural transmission of something ‘foreign’ into China is a contested and nuanced process. But it is the specificity of the process that needs examining if we are to truly understand globalisation.

    Thomas Friedman’s New York Times columns and bestselling books have probably done more than any other to promote the misleading idea of a culturally flattened-out world. Friedman often refers to the Big Mac as a flat-world symbol – a Big Mac is a Big Mac is a Big Mac, wherever it shows up. But, in China, the growing popularity of McDonald’s tells another story.

    There are now more than 2,000 Golden Arches across China, mainly in the cities and clustered along the prosperous east coast. Many outlets offer localised menu items that would seem bizarre to an average American: burgers made with mantou, a Chinese steamed bread, or deserts made with red-bean paste, a popular Chinese delicacy that many foreigners baulk at. However, McDonald’s in China is protean in other ways. In urban hubs such as Beijing and Shanghai, McDonald’s offers an affordable snack for the white-collar worker: a double cheeseburger costs 23 RMB ($3.33/£2.61). It is not a place to get a whole meal, as it is in the West, nor does it have the same plebeian fast-food connotations.

    In smaller cities, McDonald’s represents a higher level of sophistication than in the capital. Not only is the price point more unrealistic, but the American branding is also more exotic (‘Who eats a whole meal with their hands?’ ask Chinese people moving to the city when they see their first McDonald’s). It is also aspirational, in a climate where imported goods are seen as a luxury, and sometimes an oddity. Ordering up an occasional Filet-o-Fish in a blasé manner can, for young Chinese professionals in Suzhou, be a marker of urbane sophistication, just as ordering a cappuccino once was for office workers in Southampton. In university areas, McDonald’s takes on another meaning altogether: a romantic date spot for young lovers. None of these identities can be ascribed to McDonald’s in the West.

    In a country as large and diverse as China, perhaps it is unsurprising that McDonald’s has a range of meanings. But the judicious and fragmentary Sinification, as determined by the brand executives, compared with the organic, consumer-led mutations across the country, highlights the differing, sometimes competing cultural forces at play in China. Any US brand trying to do business in a country plagued with anxiety about Western ideas has to grapple with this fraught local environment.

    During the nonviolent protests in and around Tiananmen Square in 1989, one way that the government justified using armed troops was to claim that some ‘black hand’ intellectuals (such as the future Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo) had infected impressionable youths with the virus of dangerous Western liberal ideas. It was feared that those students in turn would spread this disease to other social groups, creating the conditions for a ‘counterrevolutionary’ riot that could send the country spiralling into chaos. Today, the CCP acts on this suspicion by trying to control which materials get into the country, sometimes banning things outright, sometimes doctoring whatever does enter to reflect Party values and ‘traditional’ Chinese mores. For example, Bohemian Rhapsody (2018) was one of 34 foreign films allowed to be released in China this year, only with all of its LGBT content excised. Last year, The Shape of Water (2017) was photoshopped by the censors, adding a black dress to Sally Hawkins’s nude form to preserve her modesty.

    China is not alone in censoring foreign media in the name of sexual mores; and while liberal Westerners might disapprove of such prudishness, it is at least comprehensible in the Western framework of how art is consumed in different parts of the world. But this understanding does not tell the whole story because, in China, it is not just that Western culture has to be tempered for a domestic audience: it is that cultural imports are re-appropriated from their original meanings by both top-down and bottom-up forces, giving them a new life of their own.

    Consider Peppa Pig. These days, the animated piglet is probably more recognisable in China than in her home country, the UK. For the uninitiated, Peppa’s cartoon exploits have been broadcast as five-minute animations for British pre-schoolers since 2004. In one typical episode, Peppa, her little brother and their pig parents fly a kite in the park: that is the full extent of the plot. In 2015, Peppa arrived in China and was particularly popular among small children trying to learn English. Season Five of her adventures has been viewed more than 14 billion times in China.

    Yet Peppa took on a new life that her British creators and Chinese broadcasters could never have predicted. She became a cult icon among millennials, some of whom sported temporary Peppa tattoos, leading the state-run Global Times newspaper to denounce her as ‘an unexpected cultural icon of shehuiren [slang for ‘gangster’] subculture in China’. No sooner was Peppa co-opted by China’s youth than she disappeared from the videosharing platform Douyin. Merely by dint of attracting the wrong audience, she became a pariah of ‘gangster values’, which would surprise anyone in Britain familiar with the original show. Of course, the crackdown only boosted her fame. Merchandise, often now ironically depicting her as an actual gangster, soared in popularity. Not least, parents still wanted her to teach their children English.

    Unable to stymie the tide of Peppa fandom, the government allowed Alibaba Pictures to co-produce a feature-length Peppa Pig movie, released this year to celebrate the Year of the Pig. The trailer is instructive: it features a rural grandfather who makes a Peppa Pig toy to bring to his grandson in the city at Chinese New Year. It might as well be a trailer for traditional Chinese values, with its filial piety and journeys from the rural to the urban. Shedding her gangster trappings, Peppa has been reborn as an emblem of a Chinese ideal – and of the government’s determination to take charge of cultural flows.

    Nor has China’s anxiety about gangsters abated. In early 2018, censors banned ‘actors with tattoos’ and ‘hip-hop culture’ from being broadcast, referring to it as ‘tasteless, vulgar and obscene’. The hip-hop ban surprised many fans, as the most popular television show of 2017 was The Rap of China, a reality TV contest made by the videostreaming company iQiyi, and viewed 1.3 billion times in its first month alone. Chinese hip hop has long been a thriving subculture, but The Rap of China brought the genre mainstream for the first time, in a manner that veteran rappers decried as sanitised and inauthentic. Meanwhile, the censors prickled at what they saw as the inherently oppositional ethos of rap, and the show’s stars were reprimanded for previous work that celebrated drugs or misogyny.

    Today, Chinese hip hop is one of the country’s most notable cultural exports. The ban seems to have loosened, even if the most famous stars are nowhere near as ubiquitous as they were in 2017. The New Yorker in 2018 profiled Higher Brothers, the most famous Chinese rap band, whose style is indebted to the genre’s Western hip-hop origins, but whose lyrics focus on uniquely Chinese concerns in songs such as WeChat and Made in China.

    Though they might not seem like natural bedfellows, there are similarities between Marxism and hip hop’s roads into China. Both were foreign ideas that garnered a domestic fandom, while also inspiring a local, homegrown movement that turned the concept into something unique. Just as the CCP promotes Marx with one hand and crushes Marxists with the other, on The Rap of China – a show now obliged to be government-friendly to avoid another ban – last year’s winner was the Uyghur rapper Aire, who hails from a region where the CCP is erasing expressions of ethnic identity via a repressive network of extra-judicial internment camps thought to contain more than 1 million inmates. Thus, foreign culture is permitted, but can be broadcast to the masses only within a tightly controlled government framework while, across the country, grassroots Marxists and underground rappers continue to interpret the ideas on their own terms.

    There is no single blueprint for how China will process a Western import. Even products that seem concrete, such as Oscar-winning films, can end up re-purposed by government regulators or the organic forces of fandom. For several decades after China began its period of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, many Westerners felt confident that Chinese identity would be remade by the forces of globalisation and the free market, with Fukuyama and Friedman’s visions complementing statements such as Bill Clinton’s assertion that the CCP’s attempts to control the internet are like trying to ‘nail jello’ to the wall.

    In particular, there was a belief that globalisation would take North American culture global. To a certain extent it has – Western products and entertainments are commonplace in China today. But to fully understand this phenomenon and what it reveals about China, that culture must be closely observed. Just as Chinese immigrant culture in the US has become a synthesis of east meets west, the import of foreign culture into China leads to novelties that are truly multicultural creations.

    The tension between the domestic and the foreign is not abstract, nor confined purely to the cultural realm. During a Q&A session following a recent event at Harvard commemorating the 30th anniversary of the 1989 massacres, a Chinese exchange student made clear his feeling that the CCP had been right to stop the struggle in its tracks. In his view, even though the protesters insisted that they were patriots trying to make their country’s leaders live up to their professed ideals, what their movement was actually trying to do was make China just like the US.

    This young man had made a decision to come to the West to study. He had doubtless grown up like many of his peers reading Harry Potter novels and watching US sitcoms such as The Big Bang Theory. Yet none of this prevented him from being, as his question revealed, a CCP loyalist and Chinese nationalist. Despite the pancultural character of his own life experiences, he was unwilling to accept that those who took to the streets in 1989 wanted China to be more democratic without becoming just like any other foreign place. For him, the imaginative borders of China’s cultural space should and could be fixed. For him, challenging the ruling party’s orthodoxy was tantamount to looking to convert the country wholesale to the ways of another land. And yet, had he a living elderly grandmother, she would have seen Marxism-Leninism transform from a dangerously exotic import into a strand of Chinese tradition, and witnessed the CCP shift from endorsing rowdy anti-Confucian mass movements to celebrating Confucius as a patron saint of social harmony.

    The Tiananmen protesters of 1989 sang both The Internationale, a socialist anthem they’d learned in school, and also Nothing to My Name by the anti-conformist rocker Cui Jian. They presented petitions to the authorities in a manner reminiscent of traditional appeals to emperors, yet carried banners quoting American slogans (‘We Shall Overcome’, ‘Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death!’). They spoke of their struggle as a ‘New May Fourth Movement’ and also as an effort to push Deng Xiaoping to be more like the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev. This mixing and matching, and in the process moving to an uncharted course, was something other Chinese generations had done. It is a testament to the power of the stringent patriotic propaganda introduced post-1989, in hopes of avoiding a repetition of the mass upheaval of that year, that the young Chinese man at Harvard could not think of the Tiananmen protesters this way – despite himself belonging to this long line of mix-and-match generations, and likely having an even more eclectic collection of songs on his smartphone than his 20something predecessors might have had on their cassette tapes.

    –---

    Amy Hawkins

    is a freelance journalist based in Beijing. Her work has appeared in The Guardian, The Financial Times and Wired, among others.

    Jeffrey Wasserstrom

    is chancellor’s professor in history at the University of California, Irvine. He is a specialist in modern Chinese history with a strong interest in connecting China’s past to its present and placing both into global perspective. His books include Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai (1991), Global Shanghai, 1850-2010 (2009), China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know (2010), co-authored with Maura Cunningham, and Eight Juxtapositions: China through Imperfect Analogies from Mark Twain to Manchukuo (2016).

    #Chine #4689

  • Via polare della Seta. Le mosse della Cina

    Il tunnel da record sotto il baltico, i giacimenti minerari in groenlandia e il controllo dello spazio aereo NATO. Le strategie per sfruttare i mari artici liberati dai ghiacci.

    Le prime prenotazioni on line, 50 euro l’una, sono state vendute subito dopo l’annuncio ufficiale: il più lungo #tunnel sottomarino del mondo (100 km) sarà scavato dal 2020 sul fondo del Mar Baltico, fra la capitale estone #Tallinn e quella finlandese, #Helsinki. Lo scaveranno e pagheranno quasi tutto i cinesi: quindici miliardi di euro, più 100 milioni offerti da un’impresa saudita. L’investimento a oltre 6.300 chilometri da Pechino non è lontano dalla loro «Via della Seta marittimo-terrestre», che dovrebbe collegare circa sessanta Paesi di tre Continenti. Uno dei suoi tratti vitali sarà la «Via polare della Seta», che sfrutterà i mari artici sempre più liberi dai ghiacci grazie al riscaldamento del clima.

    La Via polare della Seta

    Oggi, da Shanghai a Rotterdam attraverso la rotta tradizionale del canale di Suez, bisogna navigare per 48-50 giorni. Con la Via polare si scende a 33. Accorcerà di una settimana anche il passaggio che unisce Atlantico e Pacifico costeggiando Groenlandia, Canada e Alaska, rispetto alla rotta attraverso il canale di Panama. Navi cinesi hanno già collaudato entrambe le rotte. A fine maggio, il vice primo ministro russo Maxim Akimov ha annunciato che anche Mosca potrebbe unirsi al progetto di Pechino. La Cina è pronta a fare il suo gioco: da una parte marcare la sua presenza commerciale, politica e militare nel mondo, dall’altra sfruttare il sottosuolo dell’Artico. Parliamo del 20% di tutte le riserve del pianeta: fra cui petrolio, gas, uranio, oro, platino, zinco. Pechino ha già commissionato i rompighiaccio, fra cui — gara appena chiusa — uno atomico da 152 metri, costo previsto 140 milioni di euro, con 90 persone di equipaggio. Il più grande al mondo di questo tipo, e potrà spaccare uno strato di ghiaccio spesso un metro e mezzo. La Cina ha iniziato anche i test per l’«Aquila delle nevi», un aereo progettato per i voli polari, e sta studiando che cosa può combinare un sommergibile che emerga dai ghiacci. Un articoletto pubblicato dal Giornale cinese di ricerca navale, e subito monitorato dagli analisti militari occidentali, spiega: «Sebbene il ghiaccio spesso dell’Artico provveda a una protezione naturale per i sottomarini, tuttavia costituisce anche un rischio per loro durante il processo di emersione». Segue uno studio dettagliato sulle manovre da eseguire . Tutte le superpotenze compiono queste ricerche. Però la Cina non è uno Stato artico come la Russia o gli Usa, ma nel 2018 si è autodefinita uno «Stato quasi-artico». Il segretario di Stato americano Mike Pompeo ha risposto qualche settimana fa: «Ci sono solo Stati artici e non artici. Una terza categoria non esiste».

    Le attività cinesi in Groenlandia

    Pechino tira dritto, sopratutto in Groenlandia, portaerei naturale di fronte agli Usa e al Canada, dove il riscaldamento del clima sta sciogliendo 280 miliardi di tonnellate di ghiaccio all’anno. Un dramma mondiale che però agevola l’estrazione di ciò che sta sotto. Perciò ha acquistato o gestisce con le sue compagnie di Stato i quattro più importanti giacimenti minerari. All’estremo Nord, nel fiordo di Cjtronen, c’è quello di zinco, gestito al 70% dalla cinese NFC, considerato il più ricco della terra. È strategico perché si trova di fronte all’ipotetica «Via polare della Seta», quella del passaggio verso Canada e Usa; e perché potrebbe placare la domanda di zinco della Cina, salita del 122% dal 2005 al 2015. Poi c’è il giacimento di rame di Carlsberg, proprietà della Jangxi Copper, colosso di Stato considerato il massimo produttore cinese di rame nel mondo. Il suo ex-presidente è stato appena condannato a 18 anni per corruzione.

    La Cina controlla le «terre rare»

    Poi ancora la miniera di ferro di Isua (della «General Nice» di Hong Kong); e infine Kvanefjeld, nell’estremo Sud: una riserva mai sfruttata di uranio e «terre rare», i metalli usati per la costruzione di missili, smartphone, batterie, hard-disk. Kvanefjeld , che è accessibile solo via mare, è proprietà della compagnia australiana Greenland Minerals Energy e al 12,5% della compagnia di Stato cinese Shenghe Resources, considerata la maggiore fornitrice di «terre rare» sui mercati internazionali. Con un investimento da 1,3 miliardi di dollari il giacimento potrà fornire una delle più alte produzioni al mondo di «terre rare». La quota azionaria della Shenghe è limitata, ma il suo ruolo nel progetto no, perché il prodotto estratto da Kvanefjeld sarà un concentrato di «terre rare» e uranio, i cui elementi dovranno essere processati e separati, e questo accadrà soprattutto a Xinfeng, in Cina, dove gli stabilimenti sono già in costruzione. Nel progetto anche un nuovo porto, nella baia accanto al giacimento. La Cina possiede già oltre il 90% di tutte le «terre rare» del mondo, dunque ne controlla i prezzi. Con quel che arriverà da Kvanefjeld, chiuderà quasi il cerchio. Nei lavori del porto, è coinvolto anche il colosso di Stato cinese CCCC, già messo sulla lista nera della Banca Mondiale per una presunta frode nelle Filippine. I dirigenti della Shenghe nel gennaio di quest’anno hanno formato una joint-venture con compagnie sussidiarie della China National Nuclear Corporation.

    Aereoporti: la CCCC non lascia

    La sigla del colosso edilizio CCCC è riemersa nella gara d’appalto lanciata dal governo groenlandese per l’allargamento e la costruzione di tre nuovi aeroporti intercontinentali — a Nuuk, Ilulissat e Qaqortoq — che dovrebbero assicurare all’isola collegamenti diretti con gli Usa e l’Europa. Nel 2018, sei imprese sono state ammesse: l’unica non europea era la CCCC. Ma la sua offerta ha preoccupato gli Usa (nell’isola c’è la base americana di Thule, che può intercettare i missili in arrivo su Washington) e la Danimarca (che ha un diritto di veto sulle questioni che toccano la sicurezza). Così i danesi hanno lanciato all’ultimo momento un’offerta d’oro rilevando un terzo della compagnia groenlandese che appaltava la gara, e la CCCC è stata esclusa. Ma lo scorso 5 aprile è stata annunciata una nuova gara per il «completamento» delle piste e dei terminal a Nuuk e Ilulissat: altro affare milionario, e i cinesi hanno tentato di rientrare grazie a joint-venture formate con imprese olandesi, canadesi e danesi. I lavori inizieranno a settembre.

    Le operazioni di controllo in Islanda

    Pechino ha messo a segno un altro successo nordico, questa volta a Karholl in Islanda: l’osservatorio meteo-astronomico battezzato «CIAO» («China-Iceland Joint Arctic Science Observatory»), tutto finanziato dai cinesi. Tre piani, 760 metri quadrati, controlla i cambiamenti climatici, le aurore boreali, i percorsi dei satelliti. E lo spazio aereo della Nato. Il vice responsabile dell’osservatorio è Halldor Johannson, che in Islanda è anche portavoce di Huang Nubo, il miliardario imprenditore ed ex dirigente del Partito comunista cinese che nel 2012 tentò di comprare per circa sette milioni di euro 300 chilometri di foreste islandesi, dichiarando di volerne fare un parco naturale e turistico. Anche su quelle foreste passavano e passano le rotte della Nato.

    https://www.corriere.it/digital-edition/CORRIEREFC_NAZIONALE_WEB/2019/06/24/12/pvia-polare-span-classrossodella-seta-span-classsezionele-mosse-della-cinas
    #arctique #Chine #Chinarctique #Groenland #espace_aérien #OTAN #mines #extractivisme #Baltique #route_de_la_soie #route_polaire #Estonie #Finlande

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

  • A Hong Kong, les mobilisations attisent le sentiment régional
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/210619/hong-kong-les-mobilisations-attisent-le-sentiment-regional

    Les mobilisations massives qui agitent Hong Kong, pour demander l’annulation d’un projet de loi autorisant l’extradition vers la Chine, réveillent parfois un sentiment anti-chinois très vif, et risquent de renforcer les mouvements indépendantistes. Ceux-ci se font discrets pour éviter la répression. Pour l’instant, du moins.

    #Asie #Chine,_manifestation,_extradition,_Hong_Kong,_Carrie_Lam

  • China : Der größte Automobilmarkt der Welt bricht ein - WELT
    https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article195553245/China-Der-groesste-Automobilmarkt-der-Welt-bricht-ein.html

    30 ans après sa transformation capitaliste la Chine se trouve face à une récession de plus en plus ingérable.

    Seit zwölf Monaten fallen in China Autoproduktion und -absatz. Die Lager sind überfüllt, Händler versuchen verzweifelt, mit Rabattaktionen doch noch Fahrzeuge loszuwerden. Ein ausländischer Hersteller steht als großer Verlierer da.
    ...
    Vergangene Woche meldete das Statistische Amt als Hiobsbotschaft für die Industrieproduktion nur noch fünf Prozent Wachstum im Einzelmonat Mai. Es war der schwächste Zuwachs seit 2002. Schuld daran trug die im gleichen Monat um 21,5 Prozent im Vergleich zum Vorjahr eingebrochene Automobilherstellung.

    Sie war jahrelang Motor der Konjunktur und steuerte bis zu zehn Prozent zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt bei. Nach Angaben des Herstellerverbandes CAAM konnten im Mai noch 1,91 Millionen Neufahrzeuge an den Handel ausgeliefert werden. Das waren 16,4 Prozent weniger als im Mai des Vorjahres und 3,4 Prozent weniger als im Vormonat. Mit anderen Worten: Die Talfahrt beschleunigt sich immer weiter.
    ...
    Das Bild ist jedoch durchwachsen. Deutsche Hersteller und Marktführer wie VW, Mercedes oder BMW spürten den Gegenwind zwar ebenfalls, behaupteten sich aber, vor allem mit ihren Premiumfahrzeugen. Die vor einigen Jahren noch abgeschlagenen Japaner haben sogar zugelegt. Größter Verlierer ist – quasi als Kollateralschaden des Handelskrieges – der amerikanische Autobauer General Motors.

    #Chine #économie #crise #industrie_automobile

  • Plus de 715.000 crabes chinois capturés dans un seul piège en Flandre Anne François - 17 Juin 2019 - VRT
    https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/fr/2019/06/17/plus-de-715-000-crabes-chinois-captures-dans-un-piege-en-flandre

    La Société flamande pour l’environnement entame la construction d’un second piège à crabes chinois sur le cours d’eau à Wichelen, en Flandre orientale. Le premier piège, installé à Grobbendonk sur la Petite Nèthe, a en effet déjà permis de capturer 715.000 crabes poilus cette année. Il s’agit d’une espèce de crabes fouisseurs importée qui cause de gros dégâts aux plantes et animaux dans nos eaux, parce qu’elle mange tout ce qui se trouve sur le fond.

    L’entrepreneur commence ce lundi les travaux de béton au canal Kalkenvaart à Wichelen, afin de construire un second piège à crabes chinois", indique Katrien Smet de la Société flamande pour l’environnement. « Pourquoi à Wichelen ? Parce qu’on y trouve énormément de crabes poilus. En fait ces crabes sont signalés dans toute la Flandre, mais il n’est malheureusement pas possible de placer des pièges partout ».

    Ce piège a la forme d’une boite-aux-lettres, avec une fente étroite sur le dessus, et s’étend sur toute la largeur du lit du canal (photo). Les crabes peuvent ainsi entrer dans le piège par la fente, mais ne parviennent plus à en ressortir. Ils cherchent alors une sortie. Elle a la forme d’un tuyau le long duquel ils grimpent pour tomber dans un bac collecteur sur la rive.

    Détruire ou donner à manger aux poissons ?
    « Dans notre piège à Grobbendonk, en province anversoise, nous avons déjà capturé 715.000 crabes chinois depuis le début de cette année. Ce qui prouve que ce piège fonctionne bien », précise Katrien Smet de la Société flamande pour l’environnement. « Les crabes sont d’abord étourdis. Ensuite pour les broyons et nous les amenons à Rendac, parce qu’ils ne nous sont plus d’aucune utilité ici ».

    Rendac est l’entreprise qui réalise, à la demande des autorités, la collecte et transformation ou la destruction de déchets et cadavres animaux. « Entretemps, il s’agit d’une très grosse quantité de crabes et nous sommes en train de voir si nous ne pourrions trouver une autre façon de nous en débarrasser. Nous pensons à faire de ces crabes de la nourriture pour poissons », précise Katrien Smet.

    « Nous avons aussi été contactés par une firme qui voudrait les exporter à nouveau vers la Chine. En tant que gouvernement flamand, nous ne pouvons envisager cette piste pour l’instant. Mais nous allons la reconsidérer ».


    #Anvers #Flandres #Belgique #Chine #crabes #mondialisation #pollution #saloperie

  • Yulin : la viande de chien, son festival, ses opposants
    https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/06/16/yulin-la-viande-de-chien-son-festival-ses-opposants_1734079

    Bien qu’invérifiables, les chiffres qui circulent donnent une idée de l’ampleur de cet « événement » : 10 000 chiens et 4 000 chats seraient mangés durant le festival de Yulin (province de Guangxi, dans le sud de la Chine). La plupart d’entre eux seraient des animaux errants ramassés dans les rues. Les images qui témoignent de leur traitement durant leur transport, leur vente puis leur mise à mort sont difficilement soutenables : entassés dans des cages de fortune, transbahutés dans les pires conditions, exhibés au bout d’un collet, ils sont ébouillantés vivants ou tués à coups de bâtons. Autant dire qu’il faut avoir le cœur bien accroché pour assister à de pareilles scènes.
    Témoignages, vidéos et reportages

    Mais il en faudrait davantage pour décourager William Burkhardt, un militant animaliste de 30 ans qui prépare déjà ses bagages. « Le festival qui se tiendra du 21 au 29 juin à Yulin est sans doute le plus connu mais ailleurs en Chine, lors d’autres festivals ou sur des marchés locaux, des chiens sont également vendus et mangés, raconte-t-il. Je vais donc partir pour filmer ces marchés ainsi que les abattoirs de chiens et de chats… si j’y parviens. »

    William Burkhardt et sa compagne Léa ont créé en octobre 2018 la branche française de l’association américaine Direct Action Everywhere (DxE). Depuis, avec une poignée de militants, ils enquêtent dans les élevages, enchaînant témoignages, vidéos et reportages. Lors de leur séjour en Chine, ils comptent s’appuyer sur l’aide logistique de particuliers et d’associations opposés à la consommation de viande de chats et de chiens. « Certains ont même créé des sanctuaires pour les animaux qu’ils ont pu sauver », raconte William Burkhardt, qui souhaite lui-même ramener un chien. Un sauvetage symbolique qui vise selon lui à « éveiller les consciences ici, en France, afin que les gens fassent le parallèle entre cet animal, qui attire la compassion, et les millions d’animaux tués dans nos abattoirs ».
    « Pas de politique vétérinaire »

    La consommation de chats et de chiens ne s’étend toutefois pas à l’ensemble de la Chine. « On estime que 10 millions d’animaux sont consommés chaque année, notamment dans le sud. La majorité de la population n’en mange pas, affirme Michèle Jung, responsable de la branche française de l’association Animals Asia, basée à Hongkong. Parmi les nombreux festivals qui célèbrent cette tradition, celui de Yulin a été créé en 2009 par des commerçants locaux pour attirer des touristes asiatiques, poursuit-elle. Mais le vrai problème, c’est qu’il n’y a pas de politique vétérinaire en Chine, ni d’identification des animaux, ni de stérilisations. Nous travaillons donc avec des députés chinois pour que la question animale soit prise en compte dans sa globalité. »

    De nombreuses pétitions circulent sur Internet afin de mettre un terme au festival de Yulin. Le 29 mai, l’association Stéphane Lamart organisait un rassemblement devant l’ambassade de Chine, à Paris, après avoir réuni plus de 175 000 signatures.

    #viande #carnisme #nos_ennemis_les_bêtes #chine

    • Bof. C’est certainement un truc immonde et pompe à fric que ce festival là mais l’idée d’aller manifester contre les pratiques alimentaires des autres au motif qu’il y a des animaux que l’Ouest a décrétés mignons, comment dire ?

  • The U.S. Is Purging Chinese Americans From Top Cancer Research - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-06-13/the-u-s-is-purging-chinese-americans-from-top-cancer-research

    In January, Wu, an award-winning epidemiologist and naturalized American citizen , quietly stepped down as director of the Center for Public Health and Translational Genomics at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center after a three-month investigation into her professional ties in China. Her resignation, and the departures in recent months of three other top Chinese American scientists from Houston-based MD Anderson, stem from a Trump administration drive to counter Chinese influence at U.S. research institutions.

    #Chine #Etats-unis #air_du_temps #régression

  • The Epoch Times
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Epoch_Times


    Je constate que les membres de Falun Gong sont des personnes apolitiques et paisibles alors que les organisateurs du mouvement dépensent des millions pour soutenir des extrémistes de droite dans le monde entier. Ceci met en question les affirmations de l’organisation qui accuse la Chine d’emprisonner ses disciples afin de les tuer pour vendre leurs d’organes.

    The Epoch Times is a multi-language newspaper headquartered in New York City. The company was founded in 2000 by John Tang and a group of Chinese Americans associated with the Falun Gong spiritual movement. The newspaper covers general interest topics with a focus on news about China and human rights issues there. It draws from a network of sources inside China, as well as Chinese expatriates living in the West. It is also known for coverage favorable to rightist politicians in the West, including Donald Trump in the United States and far-right groups in Germany.

    The Epoch Times is widely distributed in overseas Chinese communities, and has been publishing in Chinese since May 2000. It is either sold or distributed free-of-charge in 35 countries, including various intranational regional editions. It has editions in English, Chinese and nine other languages in print, as well as 21 different languages on the internet.

    #Chine #religion #politique #extrême_droite

  • Juni 1989 : Umsturzversuch in Peking - Rolf Berthold, ehem. Botschafter der DDR in China
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IwrYmxjDDo


    Pensez-en ce que vous voulez, c’est un document qui rend très bien la position d’une partie importante du gouvernement de la RDA en 1989.

    Antikrieg TV - Zahlreiche Berichte widersprechen Behauptungen in Peking seien Tausende von Studenten Opfer von Massenerschiessungen geworden. Die oben verlinkten deutschsprachigen Berichte versuchen nun, die Ereignisse in andere Stadtteile Pekings zu verschieben. Auch dies könnte eine Verwirrungstaktik sein. Fakt scheint zu sein, dass westliche Medien über die Vorfälle auf dem Platz des himmlischen Friedens falsch berichtet haben.

    #Chine #DDR #histoire #4689

  • Pauvreté: la misère des indicateurs

    Alors que l’#ONU s’était félicitée de la diminution de l’#extrême_pauvreté de moitié, la pauvreté, elle, aurait au contraire augmenté depuis 1990. Tout dépend des critères retenus.

    Eradiquer l’extrême pauvreté et réduire de moitié la pauvreté dans le monde. Tels sont les deux premiers buts que se sont fixés les Nations Unies d’ici à 2030 dans le cadre des Objectifs du développement durable (#Agenda_2030). Est-ce réaliste ? Tout dépend de la façon dont seront calculés les résultats !

    En 2015, l’ONU avait annoncé avoir atteint sa cible fixée en l’an 2000 : l’extrême pauvreté avait été réduite de moitié. Pourtant, son mode de calcul est largement contesté aujourd’hui. Non seulement, il n’est pas aisé de mesurer la pauvreté, mais la méthode choisie peut répondre avant tout à des considérations idéologiques et politiques.

    Selon le multimilliardaire #Bill_Gates, s’appuyant sur les chiffres de l’ONU, le monde n’a jamais été meilleur qu’aujourd’hui. Selon d’autres voix critiques, la pauvreté a en réalité progressé depuis les années 1980. Où est la vérité ?

    Le Courrier a voulu en savoir davantage en interrogeant #Sabin_Bieri, chercheuse au Centre pour le développement et l’environnement de l’université de Berne. La spécialiste était invitée récemment à Genève dans le cadre d’une table ronde consacrée à la lutte contre la pauvreté, organisée par la Fédération genevoise de coopération.

    L’ONU s’était félicitée de la réduction de l’extrême pauvreté de moitié (Objectifs du millénaire). Est- ce que cela correspond à la réalité des faits ?

    Sabin Bieri : Si l’on prend le critère qu’elle a choisi pour l’évaluer (élaboré par la #Banque_mondiale), à savoir un revenu de 1,25 dollar par jour pour vivre (1,9 à partir de 2005), c’est effectivement le cas, en pourcentage de la population mondiale. Mais pour arriver à ce résultat, la Banque mondiale a dû modifier quelques critères, comme considérer la situation à partir de 1990 et pas de 2000.

    Ce critère de 1,9 dollar par jour pour évaluer l’extrême pauvreté est-il pertinent justement ?

    Ce chiffre est trop bas. Il a été choisi en fonction de quinze pays parmi les plus pauvres du monde, tout en étant pondéré dans une certaine mesure par le pouvoir d’achat dans chaque pays. Ce seuil n’est vraiment pas adapté à tous les pays.

    Et si une personne passe à trois dollars par jour, cela ne signifie pas que sa qualité de vie se soit vraiment améliorée. De surcroît, la majeure partie de cette réduction de l’extrême pauvreté a été réalisée en #Chine, surtout dans les années 1990. Si on enlève la Chine de l’équation, la réduction de l’extrême pauvreté a été beaucoup plus modeste, et très inégale selon les continents et les pays. On ne peut donc plus s’en prévaloir comme un succès de la politique internationale ! L’extrême pauvreté a beaucoup augmenté en #Afrique_sub-saharienne en particulier.

    Tout cela est-il vraiment utile alors ?

    Il est pertinent de parvenir à une comparaison globale de la pauvreté. Je vois surtout comme un progrès le discours public qui a émergé dans le cadre de ces Objectifs du millénaire. La réduction de l’extrême pauvreté est devenue une préoccupation centrale. La communauté internationale ne l’accepte plus. Un débat s’en est suivi. Accepte-t-on de calculer l’extrême pauvreté de cette manière ? Comment faire autrement ? C’est là que j’y vois un succès.

    Dans ses travaux, le chercheur britannique #Jason_Hickel considère que la Banque mondiale et l’ONU ont choisi ces chiffres à des fins idéologiques et politiques pour justifier les politiques néolibérales imposées aux pays du Sud depuis la fin des années 1980. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

    Ce n’est pas loin de la réalité. Ce sont des #choix_politiques qui ont présidé à la construction de cet #indice, et son évolution dans le temps. La Banque mondiale et le #Fonds_monétaire_international ont mené des politiques d’#austérité très dures qui ont été vertement critiquées. Si on avait montré que la pauvreté avait augmenté dans le même temps, cela aurait questionné l’efficacité de ces mesures. Au-delà, ces #chiffres sur l’extrême pauvreté sont utilisés par nombre de personnalités, comme le professeur de l’université d’Harvard #Steven_Pinker pour justifier l’#ordre_mondial actuel.

    Certains experts en #développement considèrent qu’il faudrait retenir le seuil de 7,4 dollars par jour pour mesurer la pauvreté. A cette aune, si l’on retire les performances de la Chine, non seulement la pauvreté aurait augmenté en chiffres absolus depuis 1981, mais elle serait restée stable en proportion de la population mondiale, à environ 60%, est-ce exact ?

    Oui, c’est juste. Nombre de pays ont fait en sorte que leurs citoyens puissent vivre avec un peu plus de 2 dollars par jour, mais cela ne signifie pas qu’ils aient vraiment augmenté leur #standard_de_vie. Et le plus grand souci est que les #inégalités ont augmenté depuis les années 1990.

    Une mesure plus correcte de la pauvreté existe : l’#Indice_de_la_pauvreté_multidimensionnelle (#IPM). Qui l’a développé et comment est-il utilisé aujourd’hui dans le monde ?

    Cet indice a été créé à l’université d’Oxford. Adapté par l’ONU en 2012, il est composé de trois dimensions, #santé, #éducation et #standard_de_vie, chacune représentée par plusieurs indicateurs : le niveau de #nutrition, la #mortalité_infantile, années d’#école et présence à l’école, et le #niveau_de_vie (qui prend en compte l’état du #logement, l’existence de #sanitaires, l’accès à l’#électricité, à l’#eau_potable, etc.). L’indice reste suffisamment simple pour permettre une #comparaison au niveau mondial et évaluer l’évolution dans le temps. Cela nous donne une meilleure idée de la réalité, notamment pour les pays les moins avancés. Cela permet en théorie de mieux orienter les politiques.

    https://lecourrier.ch/2019/06/13/pauvrete-la-misere-des-indicateurs
    #indicateurs #pauvreté #statistiques #chiffres #ressources_pédagogiques #dynamiques_des_suds

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

    • J’explique régulièrement que l’argument monétaire est globalement de la grosse merde pour évaluer la pauvreté. Ce qu’on évalue, en réalité, c’est la marchandisation de populations qui étaient jusqu’à présent épargnées et donc une réelle augmentation de la pauvreté inhérente au fonctionnement du capitalisme.

      Un exemple simple pour comprendre : une famille de petits paysans qui vivent plus ou moins en autosuffisance.

      Ils ont un toit sur la tête (mais pas forcément l’eau courante et l’électricité) et ils cultivent et élèvent une grande part de leur alimentation. Les excédents ou produits d’artisanat permettent éventuellement d’acquérir des merdes modernes sur le marché monétarisé, mais majoritairement, ils échangent avec des gens comme eux.
      Ils sont classés extrêmement pauvres par la BM, parce qu’ils n’ont pas 2$/jour.

      Maintenant, ils sont dépossédés de leur lopin de terre, expulsés par le proprio ou à la recherche d’une vie plus moderne en ville.
      En ville, ils n’ont plus de toit sur la tête et tous leurs besoins fondamentaux sont soumis à la nécessité d’avoir de l’argent. S’ils se prostituent ou louent leur bras pour les jobs pourris et dangereux que personne ne veut, ils pourront éventuellement gagner assez pour manger un jour de plus (pas pour se loger ou subvenir à leurs besoins vitaux), ils n’auront jamais été aussi démunis et proches de la mort, mais du point de vue de la BM, ils sont sortis de la grande pauvreté parce qu’ils se vendent pour plus de 2$/jour.

      L’IPM est mieux adapté, mais je doute qu’on l’utilise beaucoup pour se vanter du soit-disant recul de la pauvreté dans le monde !

    • En France aussi, être pauvre n’est pas qu’une question monétaire. Être pauvre (= avoir peu de pognon) n’empêche pas a priori l’accès à : école, université, soins de santé, transports, etc. Mais ça commence à être violent quand à la pauvreté monétaire s’ajoute l’impossibilité de faire valoir des droits de base.

    • En fait, si, en France, être pauvre prive de l’accès à beaucoup de choses.
      Prenons le RSA 559,74€ pour une personne seule, moins le forfait logement de 67,17 (en gros 12% du montant), soit, royalement 492,57€ → 16,42€/jour pour les mois à 30 jours.

      Ceci n’est pas de l’argent de poche. En admettant que l’on touche l’APL au taquet, ce qui n’est jamais évident, on peut ajouter 295,05€ max d’APL à Paris et 241,00 pour un bled quelconque de province. Comparez avec le montant des loyers pratiqués, le prix des factures (eau, énergie, au même prix pour tout le monde) et demandez-vous comment fait la personne pour seulement se nourrir correctement.

    • Être pauvre prive de l’accès à du pognon. Dans l’idéal, ça ne prive pas d’accès aux soins, à l’éducation (supérieure). Ajoute le logement (être pauvre prive d’accès aux logement dits sociaux pour la petite bourgeoisie, 80 % des logements pour 20 % des demandes, même s’ils sont moins chers que les logements du privé qu’habitent effectivement les pauvres) et toutes les choses dont tu considères, @monolecte, qu’elles font une vie digne : transports métropolitains ou à la métropole, culture, activité physique, etc. Avec le même revenu, tu peux être pauvre dans un pays qui socialise l’accès à plein de choses et misérable dans les pays où c’est le marché qui prévaut.

      En tournée chez les paysan·nes, je suis hébergée par un précurseur de la bio qui s’intéresse depuis longtemps à la question de l’accès à l’alimentation de qualité et parle de service public alimentaire...

      https://seenthis.net/messages/788028

    • Être pauvre monétairement est surtout du au fait que seules les banques sont autorisées a créer la monnaie (€)
      Mais rien nous empêche de créer notre propre monnaie (sans banque ni état), une monnaie créée à égalité par les citoyens pour les citoyens. Un vrai Revenu Universel n’est pas compliqué a mettre en place, ce sont seulement des chiffres dans des ordinateurs (comme pour l’€).
      Une nouvelle monnaie pour un nouveau monde ;)
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjoYIz_3JLI