• Dans les années 1890-1940, un capitalisme autochtone a pris naissance en Chine, entrainé par un esprit d’entreprise venu d’autres pays, dont la France #Chine #industrie #finance #histoire #histoire_économique

    https://sms.hypotheses.org/21739

    La Chine est redevenue un enjeu de la compétition mondiale depuis les années 1980 en adoptant une stratégie de « croissance en économie ouverte ». Ce serait peu ou prou un retour à la situation d’avant l’étatiste communiste instauré dans les années 1950. Mais les rapports de force sont inversés : « les traités inégaux » des années 1840-1860, l’octroi de concessions, la colonisation de Hong Kong qui incarnaient l’impérialisme européen, puis aussi japonais et américain, ont rejoint l’histoire des « humiliations » étudiée aujourd’hui par l’enseignement chinois. Un capitalisme purement autochtone a pris corps, entraîné par l’esprit d’entreprise et d’innovation et une volonté de pouvoir au sein de l’économie mondiale.

    Dans le cadre des études qui se multiplient sur les liens entre géopolitique et géoéconomie, la mobilisation des archives des banques ou aussi des consuls de France permet de déterminer la convergence des stratégies diplomatiques, financières, bancaires et commerciales afin d’affûter la compétitivité des intérêts économiques français face aux rivaux, notamment britanniques (...)

  • Chine. Le déploiement des projets d’infrastructures de l’ « Initiative Belt and Road » (BRI)

    https://www.diploweb.com/Chine-Le-deploiement-des-projets-d-infrastructures-de-l-Initiative-Belt-an

    Par Barthélémy COURMONT, Eric MOTTET, Frédéric LASSERRE , le 12 janvier 2020

    Grand projet géoéconomique, voire géopolitique, la BRI n’est cependant pas un grand projet conçu par la seule Chine. Celle-ci s’est inspirée de projets antérieurs, puis a intégré de nombreux projets antérieurs de manière opportuniste et habile. Dans la coordination globale de ces projets, le gouvernement central et la NDRC disposent certes d’un poids considérable, mais cela ne veut pas dire que la mise en œuvre de tous les projets labellisés BRI réponde à une stratégie savamment conçue et planifiée. Relèvent-ils d’une véritable vision régionale ou restent-ils fragmentés ? Voici des réponses très documentées, avec une carte. Les co-auteurs de l’article viennent de publier une référence : Frédéric Lasserre, Éric Mottet, Barthélémy Courmont, (sous la direction de) « Les nouvelles routes de la soie. Géopolitique d’un grand projet chinois » collection Asies contemporaines, Presses de l’Université de Québec, 2019.

    #Chine #route_de_la_soie #transport #infrastructures

  • China stealing soil from different parts of the Philippines
    https://www.manilalivewire.com/2015/10/china-stealing-soil-from-different-parts-of-the-philippines

    China is not only stealing and occupying Philippine Territories at the West Philippine Sea or Spratly islands but at the same time, they also stealing massive quantities of soil from different parts of the Philippines for both mining and island-building purposes.

    C’est dans la presse philippine et je ne trouve pas de meilleure source.
    #sol #Chine #extractivisme #Philippines

    https://www.facebook.com/buboylamigo/posts/1048506611849439
    https://www.elitereaders.com/china-steals-soil-from-philippines

  • Is Taiwan an unrecognized country? · Global Voices

    https://globalvoices.org/2020/01/09/is-taiwan-an-unrecognized-country

    The legal status of Taiwan is one of the most contested issues in international relations. In Taiwan itself, the majority of its 23 million inhabitants view their island as a sovereign state under the label of the Republic of China (ROC), while a fraction of the population calls for it to declare full independence. In China, the position of the government is that Taiwan is a province that is part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), even though it is not currently under its political or administrative control. Beijing strongly opposes any description of Taiwan as a sovereign or independent state. Citizens in mainland China hold a variety of views on Taiwan’s status, but at least publicly, tend to align with their government’s views. The issue is also strongly debated in the campaign leading to the January 2020 Presidential elections in Taiwan.

    #taïwan #chine #frontières #souveraineté

  • Interesting Poll Shows Hong Kongers Not Exactly Against China
    https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/01/02/interesting-poll-shows-hong-kongers-not-exactly-against-china

    Only 17% of Hong Kongers say they want independence from China with just 20% saying China has abused the “one country, two systems” model to favor Beijing, a Reuters poll released on December 31 shows.

    [...]

    The U.S. Senate passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act last month, backing the Hong Kong protesters whom Trump said should have been listed in Time magazine’s Person of the Year issue.

    Hong Kong protesters are often seen waving American and British flags at protest rallies.

    #Chine #états-unis #manipulations

  • Un drone filme le pillage pour la Chine des dernières forêts du Sénégal

    La #Gambie est la plaque tournante du #trafic_de bois de vène vers la Chine. L’ex-ministre de l’environnement sénégalais Haïdar El-Ali dénonce l’inaction de Dakar.


    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/26/un-drone-filme-le-pillage-pour-la-chine-des-dernieres-forets-du-senegal_4926

    #déforestation #Chinafrique #Chine #Sénégal #forêt

  • #Géopolitique: #Chine, #Russie et #Iran: exercices navals conjoints - Monde - tdg.ch
    https://www.tdg.ch/monde/chine-russie-iran-exercices-navals-conjoints/story/29151431

    Alors que les tensions avec Washington autour de l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien perdurent, les marines chinoise, russe et iranienne doivent entamer vendredi des manoeuvres militaires conjointes dans le golfe d’Oman, a annoncé jeudi Pékin.

  • The Dark Side of the Chinese Dream - The Atlantic
    https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/dark-side-chinese-dream/602113

    November 23, 2019 Story by Frank Langfitt - A Woman Missing in the Mountains

    A Chinese American woman searches for her missing sister in China, encountering the dark side of the country’s economic rise.

    A few years back, I created a free taxi service in Shanghai in the hope of meeting a variety of Chinese people to tell the story of the country’s rapid transformation through their eyes. I drove scores of passengers and stayed in touch with the most interesting ones, profiling them in radio stories for NPR, where I worked as the Shanghai correspondent.

    About a year after I started driving, I received a cryptic message from a Chinese American woman named Crystal, who had grown up outside the city of Harbin in northeastern China and now lived in central Michigan. Crystal said she was returning to China in the fall to continue a search for her little sister, Winnie, who’d vanished two years earlier near the country’s border with Laos. Winnie had married a farmer, who she said had beaten her. She had fled their home and then disappeared.

    “By reading and listening to your reports,” wrote Crystal, who had heard my free-taxi radio stories on NPR, “I know you can help me.”

    Two months later, I met Crystal in Jinghong, a city in Yunnan province, in southwest China. She was a slim 44-year-old who wore jeans, a blue polo shirt, and sneakers. We drove in my rented SUV to see an attorney for advice on the law surrounding missing persons. He explained that although the police were legally obligated to search for people who’d disappeared, they rarely made much effort. Too many people went missing in China, and the cops didn’t have the resources. Crystal, who’d been living in the United States for six years and had an especially favorable impression of American law enforcement, was appalled.

    “Don’t you understand?” the lawyer said, shaking his head and laughing. “This is China. We’re not in America.”

    This became one theme of our journey: how different the country of Crystal’s birth was from her adopted one.

    After lunch that day, we drove across the muddy Mekong river and soon came to a military checkpoint manned by armed soldiers in camouflage, helmets, and body armor. I wondered what they were looking for. Crystal guessed correctly: drugs. We were just north of the Golden Triangle, a hub for opium and human trafficking where the borders of Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar (also known as Burma) meet.

    As we drove on, climbing into the mountains, Crystal filled me in on her family’s history. She’d grown up in the 1970s and ’80s on a farm, and was eight years older than Winnie. The family lived in a one-bedroom mud-brick house with a dirt floor and a grass roof. They relied on government rations, which weren’t enough to feed them all. Crystal’s mother couldn’t produce milk for Winnie, who as an infant suffered from calcium deficiency, which Crystal thinks affected her little sister’s intelligence. “She was kind of slow,” Crystal recalled. “She studied so hard, but she never got good scores.”

    Had the sisters been born a decade or two earlier, they would have probably remained in the countryside and lived similar, circumscribed lives under Mao Zedong’s socialist system. But economic reforms by Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, created something new: the opportunity to succeed and the chance to fail. Crystal moved to Harbin, the provincial capital, where she studied and became a nurse. Winnie left school at 16 and headed to Harbin as well, where she fell into the default profession for many uneducated migrant women—sex work.

    During the Communist era, Mao had all but eradicated prostitution, but after the economy began to open up, it returned with a vengeance. Tens of millions of men moved to coastal cities on their own to work, creating tremendous demand. Undereducated women left the farm as well, providing supply.

    Winnie would call Crystal when her older sister was in the U.S. and tell her of the dangers of her work, of the beatings she suffered. Crystal urged Winnie to quit the business. Instead, Winnie climbed the next rung of the career ladder and became the mistress of a businessman. Working as an ernai—or “second wife”—is widely seen as an occupation and includes a contract. These women can expect an apartment and a monthly allowance, depending on the size of the city where they live and their perceived market value. Having a mistress is common among well-to-do businessmen and government officials in China: In 2013, a Renmin University study found that nearly all corrupt officials had adulterous affairs, and that most of those kept a mistress.

    As the late 2000s arrived, Winnie turned 30. Her skin was not yet creased, but her youth was beginning to fade and she often looked tired. She took her savings and moved from northeast China to the other end of the country, where she could enjoy anonymity and her money would go further. She bought six small apartments in Jinghong and became a landlady. In the fall of 2013, Winnie stunned her family by announcing that she’d married a rubber farmer named Luo and moved into his tiny house in a remote village. In the beginning, she said her husband treated her like a queen, washing her feet and making her meals. But Winnie kept her secrets. She didn’t tell Luo about the apartments she owned, and when she traveled to the city to check on her real estate, he became suspicious.

    “He always said I went to Jinghong to look for other men,” Winnie told Crystal at the time over WeChat, China’s most popular messaging app. “A couple of days ago, he smashed my phone.”

    Luo had beaten her twice, Winnie said, and she had threatened that if he did so again, she would leave him or commit suicide. Crystal asked whether Luo was aware of Winnie’s past, arguing that he would likely never trust her. “You’d better find a good place and go into hiding to start a new life,” she told her younger sister.

    Winnie grew more distraught. She was now 34. Her dream of finding a lasting relationship and building a new, independent life was slipping away. “I myself feel empty, always feel empty,” Winnie told Crystal as she wept over WeChat. “I simply want to find a man who dearly loves me. Why is it so difficult?”

    Winnie took Crystal’s advice, eventually boarding a bus and riding 10 hours to a nearby city, where she checked into a hotel. “You take care and let’s stay in touch,” Crystal told her. “Okay,” Winnie messaged back.

    A few days later, Winnie checked out of the hotel and vanished.

    That was nearly two years ago, and in all the time Winnie had been missing, she’d never reached out to tell family members she was okay.

    There was one cause for hope: Police had received an alert that Winnie’s government-issued ID number had been used at a bank in northeastern China, where she’d lived before marrying Luo. A lawyer had told her that if she disappeared for two years, she could dissolve her marriage without having to face her husband, Winnie had told Crystal in their conversations. If that were the case, Crystal thought, perhaps she would emerge in a couple of months.

    After several hours on the road, Crystal and I arrived at the police station where officers had supposedly investigated Winnie’s disappearance. It quickly became clear police had all but ignored the case, not even checking Winnie’s social-media accounts. I pressed them for the village of Winnie’s husband, Luo. The officer cautioned us against approaching Luo, who’d recently been released from jail for stealing a motorbike; although they didn’t tell us at the time, police also believed that he dealt drugs.

    We ignored their advice, and pressed on to the village. I guided the SUV up a one-lane road past fishponds, farmers weighed down with wicker baskets, and men on motorbikes. We eventually met Luo walking along the road in a black T-shirt, shorts, and flip-flops. He invited us back to his home. He said during their brief courtship, Winnie had been very pleasant.

    “But after our marriage, she turned into a different person,” Luo said. “She was very irritable. One night I was out harvesting rubber. She went to a bank to wire money to someone. I asked her who she was sending the money to. She refused to say.”

    Luo said they argued and admitted that he had slapped her once but insisted he didn’t beat her in the way she had described to Crystal. Glowering, Crystal confronted him.

    “Do you know what happened exactly?” she asked angrily. “Where did she go? Or did you kill her?”

    “If I’d killed her, I wouldn’t still be here,” said Luo, taken aback by Crystal’s prosecutorial tone. He seemed to know little about his wife. She didn’t tell him where she lived in Jinghong and refused to let him see her ID card. The day they picked up their marriage license, Luo learned Winnie had divorced another man a month earlier.

    We said goodbye to Luo and made our way back out of the valley. “Do you think he killed your sister?” I asked Crystal.

    “Not really,” she said. “I was just trying to get a reaction out of him.”

    The more we learned, the more questions we had.

    “My God, little sister,” Crystal said. “What did you leave behind?”

    The next morning, we returned to Jinghong to meet Cao, a friend of Winnie’s. The first thing that struck me was just how different Cao was from Luo. Winnie’s husband was a poor country boy in his 20s, whereas Cao, a businessman who worked in biofuel, was in his mid-30s, tall, confident, and gregarious, with the chiseled features of a movie star. He said he met Winnie at an outdoor market one evening and they’d struck up a friendship. He said he knew nothing of her marriages, but sensed she was looking to settle down and start a family. Cao was friendly and charming, but provided very little information.

    Running out of leads, I drove Crystal to the airport, where she flew to the northeast in hopes of finding who had used her sister’s police ID number at the bank. That trip was a disaster. Bank officials told her that Winnie didn’t have an account after all. Because of a glitch, a computer had mistakenly spit out Winnie’s ID number, triggering a false alert to police.

    Crystal returned to Jinghong and went to the apartment where Winnie had stashed her belongings nearly two years earlier as she prepared to go on the run. The apartment was a time capsule of a life interrupted, crammed with artifacts from Winnie’s past. There was a pile of instructional DVDs on stripping and exotic dancing and a book filled with the personal confessions of prostitutes, including those who had tried to leave the life but failed.

    However, the contents of her home also suggested Winnie was trying to turn a corner and become an independent businesswoman. She’d obtained a flyer for a local bar for sale and had been chatting online with a supplier of beer-making equipment. Her library was a collection of Chinese-language self-help and educational books with titles such as The Must-Have Book for Cultivating Character, From Mediocrity to Excellence, and Lessons on Managing People.

    Reinvention is now as much a part of China’s mythology as America’s, and Winnie’s collection of books reminded me of Jay Gatsby and the American gospel of self-improvement. She was trying to change and pursue success as her big sister had, part of what Chinese President Xi Jinping has called the Chinese Dream. What set Winnie apart, though, was her earlier path. She had made her money beyond China’s gleaming skyscrapers, in the shadows amid the gritty reality of city life, and she hadn’t been entirely able to leave it behind. Among her belongings were several SIM cards and health-care records indicating that she had operated under an alias for years. One document showed that several months before her disappearance, she’d become pregnant. But there was something odd: A month after the pregnancy test, she went to the hospital under her alias and had her IUD removed, which suggested she couldn’t have been pregnant in the first place.

    There was more. Hidden amid Winnie’s clothing was a handwritten note. “Cao and Winnie must be together for their whole lives,” it read, with what appeared to be a signature from Cao. “If they don’t stay together, Cao’s family must break up and his family members must die.”

    The note implied that if Cao—who had insisted he had been nothing more than a friend—left Winnie, he would curse his own family and wish for their destruction. Stored on Winnie’s laptop were videos of Cao and her cuddling together and having sex, which Cao knew could serve as ammunition if Winnie ever chose to expose their relationship.

    I headed to the hospital that performed the pregnancy test and explained the situation to the doctors. “Please take a look; can you tell us if it is real or fake?” I asked, showing a cellphone photo of the document. The doctor was skeptical. “It’s not done by us,” she said dismissively. “Our department doesn’t have a doctor by this name or an ID number like this. This report is fake.” Another physician called up Winnie’s medical records and found an earlier, legitimate pregnancy test, which had been negative. He said Winnie appeared to have created the positive test using a Word document. “Some girls want to take some leave from their jobs,” the female doctor explained. “Others lie to a man, saying, ‘I’m pregnant,’ to get a sum of money.”

    I was feeling anxious about where our search was heading, so I called Cao and told him I’d seen the note threatening his family. Cao acknowledged the relationship and said in the months before Winnie disappeared, his wife came to Jinghong and discovered the affair. He had a tearful breakup with Winnie, but said they remained friends. He said his wife forgave him. Cao said he last saw Winnie not long before she vanished and thought she’d become a victim of the region’s drug trade or human trafficking.

    I had been working on this trip with the help of my Shanghai news assistant, Yang Zhuo. We were almost out of leads, but had several phone numbers from Winnie’s papers, including one she’d put on a flyer to rent out one of her Jinghong apartments. We didn’t want to spook anyone who might answer, so Yang dialed and I listened in.

    A man picked up. “Do you have any apartments to sell or rent?” Yang asked.

    “Who are you?” the man answered. Yang said he wanted to buy an apartment and had gotten his phone number from a realtor. The man was unconvinced, demanding to know where Yang was at that moment, how Yang had obtained the number and the name of the supposed realtor who had provided it. Yang tried to finesse the answers.

    “Okay,” the man said, “where are you right now?” Yang, sensing danger, declined to say. My heart began beating faster. These were not the questions of someone trying to hang up on a misdialed call or someone who might have been randomly reassigned Winnie’s phone number. This was the longest wrong-number conversation I’d ever heard. “Can we meet up?” the man pressed.

    “If you don’t have an apartment to sell,” Yang responded, “we can forget about it.” There was a long pause and then the man hung up.

    Yang and I looked at each other wide-eyed. The story of Winnie’s disappearance was growing more chilling with each new detail. I spoke with NPR security personnel, who advised that continuing to look for Winnie was unwise. Even Crystal agreed that it was no longer safe to keep digging.

    I never did find out what happened to Winnie. The facts, though, supported a general theory: She’d moved to Yunnan to turn her life around and fallen in love with a married man. She wanted what her big sister had—a stable life with a good income and a lifelong romantic partner. But to secure that, Winnie faked a pregnancy and threatened to expose their affair, a dangerous strategy, even more so on the edge of the Golden Triangle, where few would miss someone like her, another anonymous migrant. Instead of achieving her Chinese dream, Winnie had descended into a Chinese noir.

    I returned to Shanghai and visited Wei Wujun, a private detective I knew who’d made a career of investigating adultery. Wei saw his booming business as a measure of the problems beneath what some called the China miracle. Market economics had thrust the country forward at warp speed, providing previously unimaginable temptations. But the construction of a moral framework to help people grapple with such extraordinary change had lagged far behind. China’s radical transformation was more than most people could absorb or navigate.

    “China’s huge economic success has concealed people’s falling morals and spiritual degradation,” Wei told me. “Its exterior looks shiny and splendid and the entire world is watching, but actually its inside is rotten to the core.”

    I asked Wei what he thought had happened to Winnie. Throughout his years of tracking adultery cases, he said, he’d seen many people who took the sorts of risks Winnie did end up the same way.

    “She’s dead,” he said.

    Before Crystal returned home to the U.S., she made one last attempt to find her little sister. She rode a bus nine hours through the mountains to the hotel where Winnie had last been seen. She put up flyers in the city market and asked people if they’d seen anyone fitting her description. The journey was grueling. The bus passed through military checkpoints and careened along twisting roads with no guardrails. She couldn’t understand the other passengers, who spoke local dialects. As she prepared to fly back to Michigan, I asked Crystal what she had learned in her nearly three weeks in China.

    “I miss my life in America,” she said, laughing and sniffling at the same time. “I think I was spoiled by the civility of America.”

    She also couldn’t shake the sense that she’d failed her baby sister. Crystal had made it out and built a happy life overseas with an attorney husband and a house overlooking a lake, while Winnie spiraled downward thousands of miles away. Under Communism, most people’s lives in China had been pretty similar, but under capitalism, there were winners and losers. Some rode the economic wave and won, while others, like Winnie, lost and paid for it.

    This article is an adapted excerpt from Langfitt’s new book, The Shanghai Free Taxi: Journeys with the Hustlers and Rebels of the New China.

    #Chine #fémicide

  • Journal articles ‘tacitly support China territory grab’

    The role of academic journals in adjudicating on fiercely disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea has come under scrutiny as Chinese scholars use maps endorsing China’s position.

    Papers by Chinese researchers, often co-authored with Western collaborators, have been illustrated with maps that include the “nine-dash line” – a U-shaped borderline stretching south from China and Taiwan to Borneo. It envelopes islands and reefs claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, including Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands.

    An international tribunal convened in The Hague in 2016 under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled against the line. China disputes the ruling.

    Clive Hamilton, professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, claimed that the issue echoed moves in 2017 by Springer Nature and Cambridge University Press to appease China by removing politically sensitive articles from their Chinese websites.

    “Here’s another example of Beijing asserting its claims through international scientific journals,” said Professor Hamilton, a high-profile critic of Chinese foreign policy.

    “A very big, economically powerful authoritarian power [is] engaged in a political struggle over territory, and wants the international scientific community to in effect endorse its claim by publishing maps that have no validity under international law.”

    He said Chinese researchers “would undoubtedly suffer if they were authors of an article in an international journal that included the South China Sea but did not show the nine-dash line”.

    However, one influential journal said that it was “not unusual” for scientific publishers to remain neutral on jurisdictional claims, while a China expert warned of the difficulty of requiring peer reviewers to be aware of and enforce geopolitical issues.

    Times Higher Education has found nine-dash line representations in nine journal articles by Chinese researchers. Most have been published since early last year, and none is about maritime issues. The papers’ subject matter includes bamboo, butterflies and Tibetan vegetation. Five boast co-authors from Australia, Germany, Scotland, Singapore and the US.

    An Australian geneticist based in Japan said maps depicting Chinese ownership of South China Sea islands appeared in about half the Chinese-authored papers he came across. Their frequency was increasing, the scientist continued, and they now appeared in high-ranking international journals as well as in smaller publications favoured by Chinese authors.

    The researcher, who asked not to be named, said he had objected to such a map’s inclusion in a forthcoming paper he wrote with Chinese collaborators. “I was told that they cannot do anything because it is a requirement of the Chinese Communist Party. They are provided with official maps that they have to use.

    “Most [foreign co-authors] choose to ignore it, perhaps because they think it is not worth the trouble to say anything. Journals do not give guidelines on how to deal with the issue when reviewing papers.”

    THE sought comment from the journals Cells, Diversity and Distributions, Molecular Ecology, New Phytologist and Plos One. The last was the only one to respond, saying that a policy introduced last year required territorial descriptions in submitted manuscripts to “follow international treaties and conventions”.

    “Otherwise, Plos remains neutral on any jurisdictional claims expressed,” it added. “This policy is not unusual in scientific publishing.”

    Professor Hamilton said journals that failed to enforce such policies “implicitly endorsed a claim that violated the rights of poor Filipino fishermen. My guess is editors have probably not had it drawn to their attention,” he added.

    University of Melbourne entomologist Nancy Endersby co-authored a 2019 Cells paper that contains representations of the nine-dash line. “If I had been aware of this inclusion and its significance, I would not have allowed my name to be on the paper,” she said. “I focused on the molecular aspect of the paper and trusted [the] map was accurate.”

    Co-author Ary Hoffman said: “Now that we’re aware of it, we’ll certainly look for it in any future collaborative efforts. As biologists, it is not something that was on our radar.”

    James Laurenceson, head of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney, supported Professor Hamilton in raising the issue. He said Chinese academics were likely to assume that Beijing would “look approvingly” on their reproduction of the nine-dash line.

    “But I wouldn’t necessarily take it as evidence that they’ve been directed to do so,” he said. “I’m not sure the Chinese bureaucracy is that organised.”

    Professor Laurenceson said peer review had failed to pick up the offending maps. “Finding peer reviewers of journals is tough enough already,” he said. “If we insist that they’re also aware of geopolitical issues, many academics are just not going to have the time to be abreast of it.”

    https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/journal-articles-tacitly-support-china-territory-grab

    #manipulation #cartographie #visualisation #Chine #Philippines #différend_territorial #revues_scientifiques #recherche #nine-dash_line #Mer_de_Chine_méridionale #responsabilité

    ping @simplicissimus @reka

  • Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in #Xinjiang

    After recruiting a hundred or more thousand police forces, installing massive surveillance systems, and interning vast numbers of predominantly Turkic minority population members, many have been wondering about Beijing’s next step in its so-called “war on Terror” in Xinjiang. Since the second half of 2018, limited but apparently growing numbers of detainees have been released into different forms of forced labor. In this report it is argued based on government documents that the state’s long-term stability maintenance strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse and extremely intrusive combination of forced or at least involuntary training and labor, intergenerational separation and social control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of “poverty alleviation”.

    Below, the author identifies three distinct flow schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of adult Uyghurs and other minority populations, both men and women, into different forms of coercive or at least involuntary, labor-intensive factory work. This is achieved through a combination of internment camp workshops, large industrial parks, and village-based satellite factories. While the parents are being herded into full-time work, their children are put into full-time (at least full day-time) education and training settings. This includes children below preschool age (infants and toddlers), so that ethnic minority women are being “liberated” and “freed” to engage in full-time wage labor. Notably, both factory and educational settings are essentially state-controlled environments that facilitate ongoing political indoctrination while barring religious practices. As a result, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time. The targeted use of village work teams and village-based satellite factories means that these “poverty alleviation” and social re-engineering projects amount to a grand scheme that penetrates every corner of ethnic minority society with unprecedented pervasiveness.

    Consequently, it is argued that Beijing’s grand scheme of forced education, training and labor in Xinjiang simultaneously achieves at least five main goals in this core region of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): maintain the minority population in state-controlled environments, inhibit intergenerational cultural transmission, achieve national poverty reduction goals, promote economic growth along the BRI, and bring glory to the Party by achieving all of these four aims in a way that is ideologically consistent with the core tenets of Communist thought – using labor to transform religious minority groups towards a predominantly materialist worldview, akin to the Reform Through Labor (劳改) program. Government documents outline that the transformation of rural populations from farming to wage labor should involve not just the acquisition of new skills, but also a thorough identity and worldview change in line with Party ideology. In this context, labor is hailed as a strategic means to eradicate “extremist” ideologies.

    The domestic and global implications of this grand scheme, where internment camps form only one component of a society-wide coercive social re-engineering strategy, are dramatic. Government documents blatantly boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in Xinjiang, supporting the economic growth goals of the BRI.

    Through the mutual pairing assistance program, 19 cities and provinces from the nation’s most developed regions are pouring billions of Chinese Yuan (RMB) into the establishment of factories in minority regions. Some of them directly involve the use of internment camp labor, while others use Uyghur women who must then leave their children in educational or day care facilities in order to engage in full time factory labor. Another aspect of Beijing’s labor schemes in the region involve the essentially mandatory relocation of large numbers of minority workers from Xinjiang to participating companies in eastern China.

    Soon, many or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, may contain elements of involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang.

    The findings presented below call for nothing less than a global investigation of supply chains involving Chinese products or product components, and for a greatly increased scrutiny of trade flows along China’s Belt and Road. They also warrant a strong response from not only the international community in regards to China’s intrusive coerced social re-engineering practices among its northwestern Turkic minorities, but from China’s own civil society that should not want to see such totalitarian labor and family systems extended to all of China.

    https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev
    #contrôle_social #travail_forcé #Chine #camps #minorités #pauvreté #Ouïghours #rééducation #Nouvelle_route_de_la_soie #Reform_Through_Labor (#劳改) #camps_d'internement

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

    • How the world learned of China’s mass internment camps
      A paradox characterizes China’s mass internment camps in Xinjiang.

      Advanced technology has allowed Chinese authorities to construct a total surveillance and mass detention regime, of which other architects of internment camps, such as the Nazis and the Soviets, could only dream.

      But technological advancements are a double-edged sword. Whereas it was years or even decades before the world knew the extent of the Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet gulag, it took only months to learn the scope and scale of what the Chinese Communist Party has been doing in Xinjiang. Why? Satellite images shared on the internet.

      The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ China Cables investigation gave us a unique glimpse at how the Chinese government runs this mass detention and “re-education” program and how they’ve deployed surveillance techniques to track an entire ethnic minority population. The leaked documents build substantially – and in the government’s own words – on our understanding of the situation in Xinjiang.

      But a leak from inside the Chinese government is exceedingly rare. So how have journalists used technology, advanced reporting methods, and sheer perseverance to extract information out of this remote and closely-guarded region in China’s northwest? And at what cost?

      The earliest English-language reports mentioning large internment facilities came in September 2017.

      On Sept. 10, Human Rights Watch published a report saying that the Chinese government had detained “thousands” of people in “political education facilities” since April 2017. The report cited interviews with three people whose relatives had been detained, as well as Chinese-language media reports from local Xinjiang outlets that mentioned “counter extremism training centers” and “education and transformation training centers.”

      On Sept. 11, Radio Free Asia became the first major English-language news organization to state that there were “re-education camps” in Xinjiang. The outlet’s team of Uighur-speaking reporters learned details about the camps by calling numerous local officials and police officers in Xinjiang.

      These reports raised awareness of the issue among China watchers already concerned about the situation in Xinjiang, but did not make waves among the wider public. The basic claims made in these initial reports – that many Uighurs were being put into special indoctrination facilities simply for being religious or having relatives abroad – were later corroborated. In late 2017, the number of camps and sheer scale of the detentions were still unknown; the highest estimate of the number of people detained was in the thousands.

      It was the subsequent work of two independent researchers that unveiled the true scope of China’s mass internment drive and brought the issue to the national and international spotlight. Adrian Zenz, a German researcher based at the time in Korntal, Germany, dug through obscure corners of the Chinese internet, using government procurement documents, construction bids, and public recruitment notices to calculate the first rough estimate of the number of people held in the camps. He put it somewhere between several hundred thousand and one million, in an article published in May 2018 for Jamestown Foundation. After further research, he later revised his estimate to around 1.5 million.

      Meanwhile, Shawn Zhang, a graduate student in Canada, used satellite images obtained through Google Maps to locate dozens of facilities, most newly built, that he believed were detention camps; he posted his findings in a May 2018 blog post. Zhang has now assisted many news outlets in the use of satellite imagery to locate and verify camps. The dozens upon dozens of potential sites he unearthed corroborated Zenz’s finding that the camps’ population reached the hundreds of thousands, if not more.

      In late 2017 and early 2018, several journalists from foreign media outlets were able to travel to Xinjiang and observe the expanding security state there firsthand. Megha Rajagapalan’s October 2017 dispatch for Buzzfeed painted a dark picture of the high-tech surveillance, or what she called a “21st century police state,” that had begun to blanket the city of Kashgar, in Xinjiang’s more restive southern region. The Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press both ran a series of dispatches and investigations into the camps, and Agence France-Presse revealed how local governments in Xinjiang had spent a small fortune buying surveillance technology and riot gear as the security state grew.

      There remain many unknowns. Exactly how many people are or have been detained in the camps? How many people have died while interned there? Does China plan to make detention facilities a permanent fixture of life in Xinjiang?

      These questions are not easy to answer. In addition to the sheer logistical challenge of gaining unfettered access to the region, the Chinese government has also sought to silence and punish those who have helped reveal its activities in Xinjiang. Authorities have detained the relatives of Radio Free Asia’s team of Uighur journalists. In 2018, Rajagapalan’s journalist visa was not renewed, effectively expelling her from the country. Chinese authorities have threatened Uighurs abroad who have spoken out about the camps.

      Nevertheless, reporting continues. And there remains a resolute community of journalists and activists working to bring more transparency and international scrutiny to the region.

      https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-the-world-learned-of-chinas-mass-internment-camps
      #technologie

  • GRAIN | L’Asie sous la menace de l’UPOV 91
    https://grain.org/e/6376

    L’Asie, qui compte 60 % de la population et 74 % des paysans du monde, est depuis longtemps la cible d’une campagne de plus en plus intensive qui vise à privatiser les semences à coups de nouvelles lois et réglementations.1 Aujourd’hui jusqu’à 80 % de toutes les semences utilisées en Asie proviennent des paysans qui conservent les semences des récoltes précédentes.2 Les grandes entreprises veulent rendre cette pratique illégale et faire ainsi de l’argent en obligeant les paysans à racheter des semences à chaque saison de plantation. Pour beaucoup de paysans et de groupes d’intérêt public, cette évolution est extrêmement dangereuse, car quiconque a la main sur les semences peut contrôler l’approvisionnement alimentaire.

    #semence #Asie

  • Vendredi 29 novembre 2019, 17h30 - La Cinémathèque française
    https://www.cinematheque.fr/seance/32947.html

    Portraits de personnalités de la Chine contemporaine : des artistes, un journaliste d’investigation, un environnementaliste, un entrepreneur. Âgés de moins de quarante ans, ils mènent tous la vie qu’ils souhaitaient.

    Documentaire collectif composé de 12 courts métrages, à l’initiative de Jia Zhangke, lui-même réalisateur des segments Cao Fei et Pan Shiyi.

    Drôle de portrait de la #Chine contemporaine. Sur douze portraits de mâles dans la force de l’âge, une schtroumpfette (ONG caritative pour les orphelin·es du Sida) qui est presque seule à parler de bien commun (et de conciliation avec sa vie privée, bizarrement). Même un activiste écolo ne parle, comme tous les autres, que d’accomplissement personnel, de dépasser ses limites, etc. Que des gars autocentrés - et pas tous jeunes, certains ont plutôt 50 ans. J’ai préféré les portraits de losers, car il y en a, mais il faut qu’ils refusent de se laisser abattre, bien sûr.
    #documentaire

  • « Les #Etats-Unis pourraient rentrer en récession à cause des tensions avec la #Chine » - Capital.fr
    https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/les-etats-unis-pourraient-rentrer-en-recession-a-cause-des-tensions-avec-la-

    ... les chiffres de la seconde partie de l’année risquent d’être beaucoup plus mauvais et l’économie va sûrement décélérer, car la guerre commerciale que les Etats-Unis mènent contre la Chine commence à avoir un impact important. On le voit avec certains indicateurs qui ne sont plus aussi positifs qu’auparavant : les créations de postes, par exemple, sont en train de ralentir.

    Cet affaiblissement de la croissance devrait d’abord provenir de l’incertitude politique, qui pèse de plus en plus sur l’investissement des entreprises. Mais aussi des conséquences négatives de la guerre tarifaire sur les dépenses des ménages. Depuis le 1er septembre, ce sont en effet près de 70% des biens de consommation exportés par le pays de Xi Jinping vers les Etats-Unis qui sont désormais surtaxés (contre seulement 29% auparavant)...

    La croissance va-t-elle seulement se contracter ou les Etats-Unis peuvent-ils entrer en récession ?

    Si les tensions avec la Chine s’intensifiaient et que 100% de leurs produits étaient surtaxés, comme menace de le faire Donald Trump, la probabilité de récession en 2020 dépasserait alors les 50%. Cela aurait un effet désastreux sur les consommateurs, mais aussi sur les entreprises, car elles ne pourraient pas forcément répercuter toute la hausse de prix, et cela mettrait leurs marges sous pression. C’est pour cela qu’il y a peu de chances que Donald Trump aille jusqu’au bout de sa menace : 2020 est une année électorale et il va essayer de limiter les turbulences économiques en nouant le maximum de deals, avec la Chine mais aussi avec l’Union européenne.

  • « #China_Cables » : au #Xinjiang, le #big_data au service d’une surveillance totale des #Ouïgours
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/11/25/china-cables-au-xinjiang-le-big-data-au-service-d-une-surveillance-totale-de
    #chine

    "Quatre bulletins internes émanant du chef de la sécurité de la région du Xinjiang, Zhu Hailun, obtenus par le Consortium international des journalistes d’investigation (#ICIJ), mettent en lumière l’utilisation du big data pour ratisser au plus large et envoyer une part importante de la population ouïgoure en détention. Les policiers font remonter les informations détaillées sur chaque individu, puis la plate-forme liste des milliers de noms de personnes à interner chaque semaine, sans que l’on sache si la décision relève de l’évaluation d’officiels ou de l’utilisation d’algorithmes.

    Les directives datent du mois de juin 2017, alors que la campagne « Frapper fort contre le terrorisme violent », lancée quelques mois plus tôt par un nouveau secrétaire du #Parti communiste chinois pour la région du Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, prend toute son ampleur.

    Sur une semaine seulement, du 19 au 25 juin 2017, la base de données « notifie » aux autorités locales 24 412 noms de « personnes suspectes » dans quatre préfectures du sud du Xinjiang. Conséquence directe, 15 683 sont envoyées dans des centres dits « d’éducation et de formation », tandis que 706 sont « détenues pénalement », c’est-à-dire probablement destinées à la prison. Enfin, 2 096 feront l’objet d’une « surveillance préventive ». Malgré ces chiffres accablants, le chef de la sécurité de la région, Zhu Hailun, fait le constat de défaillances qui expliquent que certaines personnes, dont le nom est sorti, n’ont pas été localisées."

  • Des documents révèlent le fonctionnement des #camps_de_détention chinois au #Xinjiang

    Des documents révélés dimanche par un consortium de journalistes montrent le contrôle absolu exercé par le régime chinois dans ses immenses camps de détention de la région à majorité musulmane du Xinjiang, où sont internées plus d’un million de personnes.

    Ces documents, obtenus par le Consortium international des journalistes d’investigation (ICIJ) et publiés par 17 organes de presse à travers le monde, détaillent les règlements draconiens, de la fréquence des coupes de cheveux aux horaires de verrouillage des portes, régissant ces camps installés dans la région du nord-ouest de la Chine.

    D’après des organisations de défense des droits humains, plus d’un million de #musulmans, principalement d’ethnie ouïghoure, sont détenus dans des camps de #rééducation politique au Xinjiang. Pékin récuse ce chiffre et évoque des « #centres_de_formation_professionnelle » destinés à lutter contre la radicalisation islamiste.

    Ces informations sont publiées une semaine après l’annonce du quotidien américain New York Times qu’il avait réussi à se procurer plus de 400 pages de documents internes au pouvoir chinois, dont des discours secrets du président Xi Jinping appelant dès 2014 à lutter « sans aucune pitié » contre le terrorisme et le séparatisme au Xinjiang.

    Les dernières révélations concernent une série de directives de gestion des camps de détention, approuvées en 2017 par le chef des forces de sécurité aux Xinjiang, ainsi que des rapports des services de renseignement montrant comment la police utilise l’intelligence artificielle et la collecte de données pour cibler les personnes à interner.

    Les directives qualifient les détenus d’"étudiants" devant « obtenir leur diplôme ».

    Elles décrivent avec une grande précision comment les gardiens doivent gérer la vie quotidienne des détenus, de l’interdiction d’entrer en contact avec le monde extérieur à la marche à suivre en cas de maladie, selon une traduction en anglais des documents publiée par l’ICIJ. Les directives instaurent notamment un système de points pour évaluer « la transformation idéologique » des détenus, leur « respect de la discipline » et leur ardeur à « l’étude ».

    « Les portes des dortoirs, des couloirs et des étages doivent être fermées à double tour immédiatement après avoir été ouvertes et refermées », détaillent les auteurs. « Une vidéosurveillance complète doit être établie dans les dortoirs et les salles de classe, sans angles morts, de façon à ce que les gardiens puissent exercer leur surveillance en temps réel, enregistrer les choses dans le détail et rapporter immédiatement tout événement suspect ».

    Les directives prévoient que les « étudiants » doivent rester en détention pendant au moins un an, même si cette règle n’est pas toujours appliquée, selon les témoignages d’anciens prisonniers recueillis par l’ICIJ.

    A Londres, l’ambassade de Chine a nié l’authenticité des documents publiés, les qualifiant de « pure falsification » et de « fausses informations ». « Il n’existe aucun document ou ordres pour de soi-disant +camps de détention+. Des centres de formation et d’entraînement professionnels ont été établis à des fins de prévention du terrorisme », a-t-elle affirmé dans un communiqué au quotidien The Guardian, qui fait partie des médias ayant publié les documents.

    https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/des-documents-revelent-le-fonctionnement-des-camps-de-detenti
    #détention #Chine #islamophobie #Ouïghours

  • Podcast : « Xinjiang : quel avenir pour la population ouïghoure ? » - Asialyst
    https://asialyst.com/fr/2019/11/23/podcast-xinjiang-quel-avenir-ouighours

    « Système orwellien », « région la plus surveillée du monde », « laboratoire du contrôle social chinois »… les qualificatifs ne manquent pas pour décrire la situation politique dans la région autonome ouïghoure du Xinjiang.
    Située dans l’Extrême-Ouest chinois, frontalière de huit pays (dont le Pakistan et l’Afghanistan), la zone a toujours a fait l’objet d’une surveillance massive des autorités chinoises. Mais la pression sur les communautés musulmanes turcophones, principalement composées de Ouïghours (environ 10 millions d’habitants), semble atteindre un niveau jamais vu. L’utilisation de technologies de pointe (fichage génétique, recours massif à l’intelligence artificielle) s’associe à la mise en place d’un immense système de camps d’internement. Jusqu’à 1 million d’habitants, majoritairement ouïghours, pourrait y être détenus selon le Comité de l’ONU pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale. Depuis les « Xinjiang Papers », ces documents confidentiels impliquant Xi Jinping et révélés par le New York Times le 16 novembre dernier, le projet concentrationnaire de la Chine contre les Ouïgours ne peut plus être nié. Officiellement, Pékin, qui ne donne pas de chiffres, les décrit comme des « centres de formation professionnelle » destinés à combattre le séparatisme et l’Islamisme.

    #vidéo #documentaire #conférence #Chine #Ouïghours

  • Hong Kong : trois scénarios pour l’avenir du mouvement
    https://usbeketrica.com/article/hong-kong-trois-scenarios-pour-l-avenir-du-mouvement

    Pour l’heure, l’Union européenne apparaît pourtant relativement discrète sur le sujet, se contentant d’appels « à la retenue » auprès de « toutes les parties » et exprimant régulièrement son « inquiétude » quant au sort réservé aux manifestants. Lors de son récent voyage en Chine, le président français Emmanuel Macron a simplement déclaré que le sujet de Hong Kong avait été « abordé » et qu’il avait exprimé ses « préoccupations » auprès du dirigeant chinois Xi Jinping, sans donner plus de précisions.

    Une retenue qui s’explique notamment par les intérêts économiques et financiers en jeu entre les pays de l’Union européenne et la Chine. Le 20 novembre, la BBC et le Wall Street Journal ont publié le témoignage d’un ancien employé du consulat britannique à Hong Kong disant avoir été frappé, privé de sommeil et enchaîné cet été par la police secrète chinoise, qui cherchait à lui soutirer des informations sur les manifestants mobilisés depuis juin. Condamnant le traitement qui lui a été réservé par la Chine, le ministre britannique des affaires étrangères s’est pourtant contenté de parler d’actes « assimilables à de la torture » et a convoqué l’ambassadeur de Chine à Londres pour lui exprimer son « indignation ».

    #Hong-Kong #luttes #Chine #Répression-policière #Hong-Kong-Protests

  • #Hong_Kong, cinq ans après : parapluies, indigènes et balles réelles
    https://lemediapresse.fr/international/hong-kong-cinq-ans-apres-parapluies-indigenes-et-balles-reelles

    Cinq ans après le mouvement des parapluies, notre journaliste Filippo Ortona retourne à Hong Kong. Le récit d’une lutte de rue, d’un mouvement sans tête et d’un bouleversement militant.

    #International #Chine #En_lutte_ ! #Violence_non-violence

  • 23. November 1923
    https://www.berliner-zeitung.de

    Cette date est importante pour le mythe fondateur de l’Allemagne capitaliste après 1945. On veut nous faire croire que les militaires et conservateurs modérés de la république de Weimar suivaient les ordres d’un président socialdémocrate qui défendait cette république contres les extrémistes de droite et de gauche.

    Von Arno Widmann - Militärdemokratie: Der Chef der Heeresleitung der Reichswehr, General Hans von Seeckt (1866–1936), verbietet nach Aufstandsversuchen von rechts und links die KPD, die NSDAP und die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei. Auf die Frage von Reichspräsident Ebert (1871–1925), wo denn die Reichswehr stehe, antwortet von Seeckt: „Die Reichswehr steht hinter mir.“ Am 8. November 1923 hatte der sozialdemokratische Reichspräsdent Ebert Seeckt die oberste Exekutivgewalt zur Sicherung des Reiches gegen innere Unruhen übertragen. Die damit verbundenen Vollmachten enden mit dem 1. März 1924. Der deutsche Bürgerkrieg ist somit beendet.

    En lisant attentivement cet article sur wikipedia Allemagne qui ne cache pas la sympathie de son auteur pour le militarisme prusse on comprend que les socialdémocrates avaient signé déjà longtemps avant leur propre arrêt de mort et celui de la république allemande. En faisant front commun avec les militaires et les industriels réactionnaires ils confiaient les rênes à des militaires prêts à suivre chacun qui leur promettait l’exercice sans contrainte de leur métier.

    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Seeckt#Reichswehr

    Der britische Historiker John Wheeler-Bennett charakterisierte Seeckts Wirken an der Spitze der Reichswehr folgendermaßen:

    „Der Name Hans v. Seeckt ist in den Annalen deutscher militärischer Größe neben denen Moltkes, Roons und Schlieffens verzeichnet. Wie Moltke gestaltete er aus sehr geringen Anfängen die Militärmaschine nach Form und Guß neu. Wie Schlieffen blickte er in die Zukunft und sann über Entwürfen für den Tag, von dem er nicht genau voraussehen konnte, wann er kommen würde. Wie Moltke und Schlieffen hinterließ er das Heer stärker und schlagkräftiger als er es vorgefunden hatte. Während jedoch Moltke und Schlieffen bei ihren Berechnungen auf der ruhigen Sicherheit fußen konnten, wie Siege und allgemeiner Wohlstand sie verliehen, war Seeckt wie Gneisenau und Scharnhorst gezwungen, aus der Asche der Niederlage aufzubauen. ... Sein Genie äußerte sich nicht in der Aufstellung großer Armeen, sondern in der Erschaffung eines militärischen Mikrokosmos, der bis in die letzte Einzelheit in sich vollkommen war, im gegebenen Augenblick aber unbegrenzt vergrößert werden konnte.“

    Hans von Seeckt disait à propos d’Adolf Hitler qu’il était d’accord avec les buts politiques nazis mais qu’il préférait un itinéraire différent pour y arriver .

    Adolf Hitler begegnete er erstmals am 11. März 1923 in München. Später sagte er hierzu: „Im Ziel waren wir uns einig; nur in den Wegen dorthin unterschieden wir uns.“

    Am 22. April [1936] konnte der Schöpfer der deutschen Reichswehr, Generaloberst von Seeckt, bei bester Gesundheit seinen 70. Geburtstag in der Reichshauptstadt begehen. Der Führer hat aus diesem Anlass Seeckt zum Chef des Infanterie-Regiments 67 ernannt. Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg überbrachte dem Generaloberst, vor dessen Haus Doppelposten als Ehrenwache aufgezogen waren, die Glückwünsche der Wehrmacht. Eine Ehrenkompanie des Infanterie-Regiments 67 erwies militärische Ehren.
    ...
    Scherl Bilderdienst Berlin

    A la fin de sa carrière Hans von Seeckt devient conseiller militaire pour le gouvernement chinois sous Chiang Kai-chek .

    A Pocket Guide To China, For use of Military Personnel only . ... Prepared by SPECIAL SERVICE DIVISION, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
    UNITED STATES ARM Y1943, page 38.
    https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/19/A_Pocket_Guide_to_China_%281943%29.pdf

    Chiang received most of his military training in Japan where German ideas prevailed, but there have been a number of other foreign influences on the organization and training of the Chinese armies. Whampoa Academy, China’s West Point, was organized with the help of Russian advisers, notably Marshal Bluecher. Incidentally, many Chinese officers received their training in our own West Point or other American military schools. In the 1930’s German influence was predominant with a per­manent German military mission in China, successively headed by Col. Max Bauer, Gen. Hans von Seeckt, father of the Reichswehr, and General von Falkenhausen. The mission was withdrawn in 1938.

    L’entrerrement du général von Seeckt fut une événement majeur pour l’élite nazie.

    Sa tombe se trouve sur un cimetière berlinois qui faisait partie du no man’s land entre l’Est et l’Ouest. Le contexte politique et géographique faisait qu’entre 1961 et 1989 on commençait à oublier la tombe et du général et le rôle qu’il avait joué pour les nazis.

    Depuis 1989 nous sommes témoins du renouveau de l’alliance des militaristes sans complexe avec le monde culturel et politique modéré. Depuis le discours du président fédéral Gauck en 2014 on sait que l’Allemagne dévéloppe activement ses interventions et agressions militaires dans le monde.


    https://seenthis.net/messages/239860

    Ces personnes renouent aussi avec le culte du militarisme et de la mort.
    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invalidenfriedhof#Grabmal_Hans_von_Seeckt

    Das Grabdenkmal wurde 1997 aufwendig rekonstruiert. Der Granitsarkophag war nur noch teilweise erhalten, die Deckplatte fehlte. Die Wiederherstellung erfolgte auf der Basis von Fragmenten des Sarkophagkörpers und von Fotografien der Deckplatte. Die Arbeiten wurden zum Teil von überlebenden Angehörigen des 67. Infanterie-Regiments finanziert, das Seeckt einst kommandiert hatte.

    #Allemagne #Chine #histoire #nazis #militarisme

  • Le jeu de go de la Chine autour des ports européens - Page 1 | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/211119/le-jeu-de-go-de-la-chine-autour-des-ports-europeens

    La #Chine n’en fait pas mystère. Les #ports européens font partie de ses cibles dans son grand projet de conquête des « #nouvelles_routes_de_la_soie ». Méthodiquement, les sociétés chinoises investissent les quais et les terminaux à conteneurs délaissés par les opérateurs privés européens et les collectivités frileuses.

    La prise de contrôle la plus symbolique est celle du port du Pirée, en Grèce, en avril 2016. Sous la pression de la Troïka (FMI, BCE, Commission européenne), le gouvernement grec a privatisé l’ensemble du port voisin d’Athènes. Le repreneur est un groupe chinois, Cosco, qui détenait déjà 49 % du port.

    Depuis cette privatisation sans précédent dans les transports en Europe, une douzaine d’autres ports de l’Union européenne ont vu récemment débarquer des opérateurs publics chinois en vue de prendre possession des terminaux portuaires. Ils détiennent désormais plus de 10 % des capacités portuaires européennes.

    Cette montée en puissance provoque autant d’enthousiasme que d’appréhension, les opérateurs chinois n’hésitant pas à jouer des rivalités entre pays, entre ports, pour imposer leurs conditions. Bruxelles commence aussi à s’inquiéter de cette percée pouvant porter ombrage à la souveraineté européenne.


    Treize ports européens en partie ou complètement sous pavillon chinois

    En rouge, les parts détenues par l’armateur chinois Cosco ; en jaune, celles détenues par China Merchants. Cliquez sur les anneaux pour plus d’informations.
    #transport #transport_maritime

  • Saudi #Aramco : itinéraire d’une entrée en #Bourse ratée - FRANCE 24
    https://www.france24.com/fr/20191119-saudi-aramco-entree-bourse-mbs-echec-annonce-explication-petrole

    Les efforts de Riyad afin de raviver la flamme des investisseurs étrangers pour l’introduction en Bourse de Saudi Aramco, notamment en promettant des retours sur investissement toujours plus conséquents, ont tous fait long feu. La semaine dernière encore, l’armada de banques internationales et des conseillers financiers engagés par l’Arabie saoudite n’a pas réussi à convaincre de potentiels investisseurs à miser gros sur Saudi Aramco, raconte le Financial Times.

    Surtout que depuis 2016, un autre sujet brûlant a pris de plus en plus d’ampleur : le réchauffement climatique. Les investissements dans les #énergies_fossiles n’ont plus la côte, ce qui ne joue pas en faveur de Saudi Aramco, le plus important exportateur de #pétrole au monde. La prise de conscience de la menace climatique a aussi donné un coup d’accélérateur au développement des voitures électriques, moins polluantes… et qui ne dépendent pas de l’or noir extrait en Arabie saoudite pour rouler.

    Les attaques contre les installations pétrolières sur le sol saoudien en septembre ont érodé encore un peu plus l’intérêt des investissements étrangers. Ces bombardements ont donné l’impression que Riyad était incapable de protéger correctement les joyaux de sa couronne pétrolière. L’envoi, en octobre, de troupes américaines supplémentaires en Arabie saoudite pour renforcer la protection du territoire a pu rassurer l’opinion internationale, mais il a aussi rappelé au régime à quel point il était dépendant de Washington pour sa sécurité. Impossible dans ces circonstances pour Mohammed ben Salmane “de proposer à la #Russie ou à la #Chine des investissements importants dans Saudi Aramco de peur de froisser son allié américain. Il y a pourtant eu des discussions en ce sens, mais elles n’ont pas abouti”, souligne Garen Markarian.

    #etats-unis

  • 5 Takeaways From the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-muslims-detention.html

    Internal Chinese government documents obtained by The New York Times have revealed new details on the origins and execution of China’s mass detention of as many as one million Uighurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region.

    The 403 pages reveal how the demands of top officials, including President Xi Jinping, led to the creation of the indoctrination camps, which have long been shrouded in secrecy. The documents also show that the government acknowledged internally that the campaign had torn families apart — even as it explained it as a modest job-training effort — and that the program faced unexpected resistance from officials who feared a backlash and economic damage.

    D’après des organisations de défense des droits de l’Homme, plus d’un million de musulmans, principalement d’ethnie ouïghoure, sont en détention dans la région du Xinjiang.
    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/la-violence-de-la-repression-chinoise-contre-les-ouighours-illustree-
    #Chine #Ouïghours #Xinjiang

  • Hong Kong : « Nous sommes tous au front » - Asialyst
    https://asialyst.com/fr/2019/11/09/hong-kong-nous-sommes-tous-au-front-frontliner

    La police de #Hong_Kong a annoncé ce samedi avoir arrêté trois parlementaires pro-démocratie et a demandé à quatre autres de se présenter au commissariat pour être placés en état d’arrestation. Tous sont accusés de violences lors d’échauffourées au Conseil législatif en mai dernier, au moment où la dirigeante tentait de faire adopter en urgence une loi autorisant les extraditions vers la #Chine populaire. Depuis, la cheffe de l’exécutif hongkongais a retiré son texte, mais les #manifestations ont continué. La confrontation avec la #police s’est installée dans une violence systématique. David Bartel s’est entretenu avec un « frontliner », parmi ceux qui montent en première ligne au contact direct des forces de l’ordre.